Abstract
This paper explores the theory of legislative inefficiency and the role of ideological preferences of legislators. It is shown that inefficiency can be caused by many factors other than legislative ideological behavior. Three major sources are emphasized: cost of voting and policy position information asymmetries across groups of voters and barriers to entry in political competition. Ideological preferences of legislators is not a cause of inefficiency independently. Legislators who care about both policy and winning will give inefficient representation to their constituents only when groups of voters are prevented from participating equally in the legislative process.
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Morton, R.B. An analysis of legislative inefficiency and ideological behavior. Public Choice 69, 211–222 (1991). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00123848
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00123848