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Migration disequilibrium and specific division rules

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Abstract.

We examine the extent to which migration equilibria fail to exist in a global economy in which a specific division rule determines the allocation of a perfectly divisible, nondisposable resource among individuals with single-peaked preferences who reside in local economies. In particular, almost without exception, under the egalitarian, proportional, queuing, and uniform division rules, migration equilibria fail to exist for some sets of preferences.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY 13244-1090, USA, , , , , , US

    Susan H. Gensemer, Lu Hong & Jerry S. Kelly

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  1. Susan H. Gensemer
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  2. Lu Hong
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  3. Jerry S. Kelly
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Received: 23 May 1995 / Accepted: 1 October 1996

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Gensemer, S., Hong, L. & Kelly, J. Migration disequilibrium and specific division rules. Soc Choice Welfare 15, 201–209 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050100

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050100

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