Abstract
Viewing budgets as contracts, transaction cost theory focuses on the costs of negotiating and enforcing the myriad political agreements by which policymakers allocate the government's resources. This essay provides an overview of transaction cost theory and its implications for the design of budgeting institutions. It contrasts the behavioral premises (bounded rationality and opportunism) of the transaction cost approach with those of more traditional budgetary theories, and examines whether commitment and agency costs have structured budget actors' institutional choices. Investigation of the usage of key budget instruments- entitlements, multi-year appropriations, and tax expenditures - suggests that Congress has been more discriminating in its institutional choices than is commonly supposed. Sensitivity to the importance of transaction costs would increase the effectiveness of budget reforms.
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Patashnik, E.M. The contractual nature of budgeting: A transaction cost perspective on the design of budgeting institutions. Policy Sci 29, 189–212 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00136103
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00136103