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Price-distorting compensation serving the consumer and taxpayer interest

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Reprinted fromPublic Choice 77: 275–291, 1993.

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Foster, W.E., Rausser, G.C. Price-distorting compensation serving the consumer and taxpayer interest. Public Choice 80, 173–189 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01047954

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