Abstract
The outcome of political opposition or revolution is a public good, which suggests that free riding will diminish the effectiveness of these forms of collective action. The private gains from contributing to collective goals are increased, however, if individuals place some value on ideological conformity or group identity. Nevertheless, some external stimulus is often needed to set in motion a tendency toward social motivation that is strong enough to outweigh the free rider incentive. This paper investigates the extent to which international pressure and demonstration effects can serve to signal support for the objectives of domestic groups in a target country and thereby mobilize collective action in pursuit of their goals. It is of interest to know not only the extent to which inherent barriers to effective collective action are overcome by outside support, but also to show how foreign economic policy can have an impact on political processes in the target country even when that policy itself has minimal economic effects.
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This paper benefited from discussion with John Chilton, Ronald Wintrobe, Robert Young, and other participants in a session of the 1990 Public Choice Society Meetings. We are also grateful to Lynne Bennett and Thomas Willett for insightful comments.
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Kaempfer, W.H., Lowenberg, A.D. Using threshold models to explain international relations. Public Choice 73, 419–443 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01789560
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01789560