References
Alesina, A. (1987). Macroeconomic policy in a two-party system as a repeated game.Quarterly Journal of Economics 102: 651–678.
Austen-Smith, D. and Wright, J.R. (1992a). Competitive lobbying for a legislator's vote.Social Choice and Welfare, forthcoming.
Austen-Smith, D. and Wright, J.R. (1992b). Counteractive lobbying. University of Rochester working paper.
Dow, J. and Munger, M.C. (1990). Public choice in political science: We don't teach it, but we publish it.PS: Political Science and Politics 23: 604–609.
Fischer, S. (1977). Long-term contracts, rational expectations, and the optimal money supply rule.Journal of Political Economy 85: 191–206.
Gerber, E. and Lupia, A. (1992) Competitive campaigns and the responsiveness of direct legislation. California Institute of Technology working paper.
Lohmann, S. and O'Halloran, S. (1992). Divided government and U.S. trade policy. Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 1201, Stanford University.
Lupia, A. (1991a) Agenda control and the power of information. University of California at San Diego working paper.
Lupia, A. (1991b). Direct democracy, political information and “The Will of the Majority”: A spatial model. University of California at San Diego working paper.
Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (1990)Macroeconomic policy, credibility and politics. Chur: Harwood Academic Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Enelow, J.M., Morton, R.B. Promising directions in public choice. Public Choice 77, 85–93 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01049222
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01049222