

Historical Materialism 294

Historical-Critical Dictionary of Marxism

A Selection

Edited by Wolfgang Fritz Haug,
Frigga Haug, Peter Jehle,
and Wolfgang Küttler

English selection edited by
Konstantin Baehrens, Juha Koivisto,
and Victor Strazzeri

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Historical-Critical Dictionary of Marxism

Historical Materialism Book Series

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General Editors

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For(e)ward: An Invitation

A “message in the bottle” for a different future’, Fredric Jameson wrote 25 years ago, after the first four volumes of the (German-language) *Historisch-kritisches Wörterbuch des Marxismus* (HKWM) – *Historical-Critical Dictionary of Marxism* (HCDM) – had been published. Admittedly, the Preface to the first volume may have approached the matter somewhat less modestly, stating that it was the HKWM’s task, ‘as if on Noah’s Ark’, to carry ‘humankind’s treasure trove of enlightening knowledge and social imagination [...] into a new era’, so as to salvage it from ‘an enormous mountain of historical debris, one which threatens to indiscriminately bury both that system’s rational elements and seeds for the future, along with those elements which are irrational and hostile’ to life (1994, III).¹

The time in which these lines were written – and, indeed, understood as a historic mission – was shaped by the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union. In December of 1994, Heiner Müller captured the situation in the following verses: ‘From my cell before the blank page / In my head a drama for an empty auditorium / Deaf are the victors, and the vanquished mute’.

We announced the first volume under the title *Abbau des Staates bis Dummheit* (*Dismantling of the State to Stupidity*). To the news magazine *Der Spiegel* this sounded so absurd that it printed our announcement in its *Hohlspiegel* column, which features involuntarily comical quotes. Of course, this brought us attention. However, the first volume had become considerably too long and had to be divided up. The new, rather sober title was *Abbau des Staates bis Avantgarde* (*Dismantling of the State to Vanguard*). The second volume, titled *Bank bis Dummheit in der Musik* (*Bank to Stupidity in Music*), was published the following year and earned an appreciative review from the centre-left daily newspaper *Frankfurter Rundschau*, which we used for its cover blurb: ‘Considering its philologically precise form and its convincingly undogmatic approach, this dictionary won’t be one of the worst legacies of the intellectual culture of this century to be carried over into the next millennium’.

We, for our part, however, were obviously quite unaware of the magnitude of the endeavour we had embarked on. The HCDM would probably ‘not be completed before the year 2000’, concluded the Preface written that autumn in 1994 (VI). The fact that the first volume had to be limited to entries beginning with the letter ‘A’ should have made us aware of the absurdly overambitious under-

1 On this, see the Preface to HKWM 1 (1994), in this volume, pp. XXV-XXXI.

statement of ‘not [...] before the year 2000’. In the meantime, the endeavour has turned into a veritable generational task. ‘Due to an irresistible intrinsic logic’, as we learn in volume 7/1 from 2008, in which Frigga Haug and Peter Jehle acted as co-editors, ‘it has since transcended the originally intended boundaries and is exceeding the limits imposed on its founding editors’ stamina, and, indeed, lifetime’ (11). In 2012, some 30 years after its launch, the HCDM project had not even accomplished half of its task, when Oskar Negt, one of the most renowned of the German intellectuals who emerged from the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory, referred to the HCDM as ‘ein Jahrhundertwerk’, a formulation which in German ranks it as one of the great achievements of the century.

Another decade down the road, the term *Jahrhundertwerk* has acquired the ironic undertone of ‘the work of a century’, suggesting it may refer to the actual time required for its completion.

Anyway, this ‘ark’, or ‘message in a bottle’, is now being brought ashore in two world languages: first, in Chinese, in the form of a meticulous translation by Beijing University of the first three HCDM-volumes, conceived as the beginning of a complete edition; second, in Spanish, through theme-specific volumes compiled by Mariela Ferrari and Victor Strazzeri under the guidance of Miguel Vedda at the University of Buenos Aires in Argentina, and beginning with a selection of feminist articles integrated into the HCDM under the supervision of Frigga Haug.

At long last, as this present volume proves, the ark is now releasing a first sample of specimens in English. Following up on the diachronic practice maintained by the journal *Historical Materialism* over several years, in which it published one English-language HCDM entry in each of its issues, this selected volume, compiled under the aegis of and edited by Victor Strazzeri alongside Konstantin Baehrens and Juha Koivisto, has the merit of, finally, bringing a synchronic body of such selected ‘work samples’ ashore.

For the HCDM, this marks a decisive step. Why?

Well, as Friedrich Engels loved to say, ‘the proof of the pudding is in the eating’. This collection accomplishes what ‘author guidelines’ never can: namely to convey to potential authors, in our epoch’s foremost global language and *modus operandi*, the criteria of this historical-critical or *Dictionary of Concepts* (*Begriffswörterbuch*) in the epistemological sense of a concrete theoretical reconstruction of its objects that afford the HCDM the character of a practical-theoretical encyclopaedia.

The reason can be summed up very succinctly – albeit not without summoning a Roll of Honour for those we have lost along the way: most of the international founding generation of the HCDM project, many of whom – coming from varying strands of Marxism and socialism and having played influential

roles in the disputes over the ‘concrete analysis of a concrete situation’² and the best way forward for the workers’ movement – have succumbed to the ‘fury of disappearance’ (Hegel)³ that is time. It was a generation of internationally active and influential Marxist intellectuals, many of whom still spoke (or at least read) German, as had been common in the first three Internationals, in the Second and Third International at least up to the period immediately following the First World War.

The loss of this generation turned the publication of selected texts for a global English-reading public of university-educated intellectuals from all over the world into a matter of survival for the HCDM project. The project relies on these authors and courts their collaboration. And while not originally intended, the historicity or, indeed, historicity of our project has firmly inscribed English-language publications into our repertoire. What exactly this may entail in the future remains to be seen.

In reality, this historicity was inscribed into the HCDM project from quite early on, seeing as it was launched on the 100th anniversary of Marx’s death (1983) as a translation project of Georges Labica’s *Dictionnaire critique du marxisme* realised by two dozen notable academic intellectuals associated with *Das Argument*. Without this journal and the various research projects that emerged from it, the new project could not have been tackled. Then in 1984 it was confronted with a concerted attack from the DKP’s staunchly ML-aligned intellectuals under the aegis of the DKP-affiliated *Institut für marxistische Studien und Forschungen* (IMSF, Institute for Marxist Studies and Research). The journal and the HCDM both adhered to a “leftist-ecumenical” line, an approach that generally included the DKP intellectuals as well. This was denounced as a usurping of co-responsibility for the political culture among all those parts of the left that operated within “shouting distance” of Marx, as Stuart Hall liked to say, a responsibility supposedly reserved exclusively for “the party”. Things became so heated that the author of these lines of text – who was responsible for launching and developing the journal from 1959 onward as well as initiating the *Projekt Ideologie-Theorie* (‘Project Ideology Theory’) in 1978, the *Berliner Volksuniversität* (‘Berlin People’s University’) in 1980, and the HCDM in 1983 – was barred from the IMSF after a formal hearing, albeit without ever

2 This is how Lenin addressed the basic tenet also expressed in part 2 of Antonio Labriola’s *Essays on the Materialist Conception of History*, describing it as ‘the very gist, the living soul of Marxism’ (CW 31/166); priority should be given ‘not [to] logical reasoning, but [to] actual developments, the actual experience’ (CW 25/414), which, of course, subsequently require theoretical analysis.

3 See Appendix below.

having been affiliated to begin with. This author's combative response was a two-volume collection of political-theoretical analyses with the programmatic title *Pluraler Marxismus* (Haug 1985 and 1987). The starting point of its Preface is the so-called 'Yalta memorandum' dictated by the chairman of the Italian CP, Palmiro Togliatti, shortly before his death in 1964. Faced with the effects of the Sino-Soviet split, Togliatti then formulated – in reference to the communist parties and socialist countries as a whole – the postulate of '*unità nella diversità*, unity in diversity [...] in the diversity of our concrete political positions, conforming to the situation and degree of development in each country'.

In the projects mentioned here, we transferred Togliatti's approach to the conditions within the left. For the internationally oriented HCDM such a procedure was a matter of course. Yet, wherever there was mention of plurality, those summoned from their fortresses to join a context of rational and free debate would mishear and instead deduce this only to be a prescriptive pluralism directed against coherent critical theory, which Margherita von Brentano (*Das Argument* 1971), then vice-president of Free University Berlin, had criticised on our West-Side of the Iron Curtain where pluralism was obligatory, as a 'battle cry' for institutional sanctioning, or, to put it rather bluntly, repression of any 'theory that contradicts and threatens the dominant theory' (2010, 331).⁴

No, plural Marxism does not entail arbitrariness, but rather research-based unity within diversity; not proceeding from dogmas, but from real problems and crises, which, according to Antonio Labriola – the "last orthodox Marxian" (Karl Korsch) – has to be analysed as a mute self-criticism of the specific social relations and their stages of development. At least with a view to the advancement of Marxism in the different world regions, respect for diversity and difference had to be recognised as imperative. At the same time, history's open horizons, traversing all differences, made and always again make constant engagement with the question of "What is to be done?" inevitable. An inevitable form of this engagement is controversy, with the danger of division constantly looming in the background.

How to accommodate all this within a conceptual dictionary? – We decided to attempt to defuse the danger of division through well-argued critiques and philologically precise reasoning. Criticism of other authors must always be

4 Only a week after the fall of the Berlin Wall in the night of 9/10 November 1989, the IMSF 'formally "rehabilitated" me (and *Das Argument*)' (Haug 1990, 134). The names 'from the GDR' on the Roll of Honour that concludes this Invitation indicate the extent of the contribution to the HKWM's core content from critical Marxists, particularly from the erstwhile ML context among them, not least our co-editor the historian Wolfgang Küttler. It was, so to speak, a fortunate 'eastward expansion' of the 'ark', albeit not without setbacks and disappointments.

presented in a way that allows for a response and clarifies the contradictions and unresolved issues of the problematic under scrutiny. The boundaries we established in this regard include the following guidelines: no name dropping, nor concept dropping, in short, no citation cartels. In positive terms, then, we urge that lines of reasoning be documented through accurately referenced source citations, so as to enable future readers to judge the reasoning contexts for themselves and to pursue further research. In this regard, the Preface to HKWM 4 (1999) reads:

If plurality is to imply more than mere disparity, it requires work. Parallel to the expansion of the scope and the growing diversity of the political-cultural heritage and style of the authors, our editorial tasks also increased considerably. The inclusion of theme areas that had been traditionally neglected by Marxists and in which the corresponding theoretical culture was therefore poorly developed did not make our task any easier. The translation work, language and content editing, research of quotes and text information details, not least the condensing and avoiding of redundancies, and, finally, multiple rounds of corrections and proofreading, were virtually never-ending. [...] Interventions were skewed towards making an argument more historically and philologically precise, and at times towards making sprawling material more compact. The design principle of conceptual fragmentation came with the danger of overlapping, which had to be reduced as far as possible during final editing. This process demanded a great deal from all parties involved – authors, editors, the coordinator, and the editor-in-chief.

The fact that the path from French, and in particular from German to English (especially American English), encounters linguistic filters in which some of the language of dialectics may become snared, was already noted by Fredric Jameson in the Preface to his work *Marxism and Form*. Here, he mercilessly rails against the widespread ‘mixture of political liberalism, empiricism, and logical positivism’ (1971, x). We agree on his point that the dialectical method requires ‘a concrete working through of detail’ (xi). Any result is the outcome of a prior development that demands meticulous scrutiny. We refer to this as genetic reconstruction. Though it may not be the easier path, it is certainly the most rewarding one, as it extrapolates the experience and concept of the subject matter which is being investigated.

One basic contradiction that is present in our project is due to the original publication being in German, which during the first two or even three phases of Marxism had been the established language of the international Marxist work-

ers' movement. These days the German language has been reduced to a de facto 'local dialect', as the Croatian-born author Boris Buden recently asserted with both a subversive ironic tone and a sense of resignation, citing the example of a new (third) translation of Marx's *Capital* into Slovenian (2013), 'a language spoken by fewer than 2 million people', while, at the same time, the works of the world-famous 'Slovenian School' of philosophy and cultural theory, and of Marxism, 'are exclusively written in English. And, as far as they refer to Marx, they necessarily rely on English translations of his writings' (Buden 2019, 151, fn. 27; on the error sources of such an anglophone enclosure of Marx see Haug 2017).

Wolfgang Fritz Haug
 Esslingen am Neckar, 5 October 2022
Translated by Jan-Peter Herrmann

Appendix

Anyone who relates to the history of Marxism like someone who doesn't remember anything cannot be a good Marxist.

Based on Lenin⁵



The following Honour Roll unmistakably shows that the volumes published so far – to say it in the words of Marx's sixth thesis on Feuerbach – are 'in their reality' not the work of a German group, but rather the collective international work and, indeed, achievement of contributors representing many autonomous facets of a global Marxism.

At the same time, however, the Honour Roll reveals the gaping hole that death has torn into the fabric of our group of collaborating authors over the years. The first and foremost aim of these invitational remarks and of the subsequent Honour Roll is to commemorate these contributions of the past. In doing so, then, we hope these lines are also understood as an invitation to read-

5 Cf. Lenin, *The Ideological Struggle in the Working-Class-Movement* (May 4, 1914; CW 20/278–80).

ers to enter into dialogue with the HCDM and its ongoing reception and impact, while joining the efforts to pursue its actual task, namely to *progressively* compile an historical critical dictionary of Marxist concepts – i.e., to update these concepts and apply them to our challenges of today and, in the process, to continually test, renew, and refine them over and over, again and again. May these historical voices serve as an encouragement to build on and resume their work in one form or another in forthcoming volumes.

Let us remember, from Egypt, Samir Amin (*Anti-colonialism*),⁶ one of the most enduringly influential voices from the Global South, who became head of the Third World Forum in 1980; Anouar Abdel-Malek (*Non-alignment*), author of *Egypte, société militaire* (Paris 1962, Ital. and Span. 1967, Engl. and Germ. 1971); from India Ajit Roy (*Gandhism I*), who was very influential in the South Indian autonomous Marxist scene, who represented a Marx-oriented anti-Stalinist Marxism with the *Occasional Letters* of *The Marxist Review*, and also did so internationally, for example through his participation in the Lelio-Basso Permanent Peoples' Tribunal; the Marxist theologian Bastiaan Wielenga, working in Tamil Nadu, had put us in contact with Roy, and, moreover, wrote twelve essential articles for the HCDM (*Atheism, Village community, Gandhism II, Justice I, Green Revolution, Gulag, Indian question, Church of the poor I, Smallholders/small peasants II, Colonial mode of production, Leviathan, Moloch*); finally, let us think of Ramkrishna Bhattacharya (*ancient Indian materialism*), from Kolkata, famous for his extensive work on Indian materialism, especially the ancient Indian Carvaka/Lokayata system. From China, let us think of Su Shaozhi from the People's Republic of China (*Chinese cultural revolution*), former Director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the Academy of Social Sciences, and also of labour movement historian Yin Xuji of the Central Translation Institute, both of which are based in Beijing; from Latin America let us think of the philosophers Adolfo Sánchez Vázquez (unfortunately, we did not retrieve his article in time), who, born in Spain, fought as a young communist poet in the civil war and then later, during his exile in Mexico, further elaborated Marx's approaches to a philosophy of praxis and a corresponding aesthetics, as well as Bolívar Echeverría, who linked the world of *mestizaje cultural* in the midst of capitalist modernity with the 'critique of this modernity at the top of the neoliberal and postmodern *Index librorum prohibitorum: El Capital*, de Marx' (1994, 18), and who co-founded the intermittent Latin American editorial group of the HCDM under the aegis of Gabriel Vargas Lozano in Mexico City; from Japan, let us think of the internationalist Luxemburgist

6 The keywords which have been worked on by the respective authors are listed in parentheses.

Narihiko Ito (*Something*); from the USA, let us think of Lawrence Krader (*Asiatic mode of production, Ownership/property, Form and substance*), editor of *The Ethnological Notebooks of Karl Marx* (1972); let us think of the co-founder of world-systems theory Immanuel Wallerstein (*Bourgeoisie/middle classes II*); of the feminist epistemologist and standpoint theorist Nancy Hartsock (*Domination/rule II*), active on many fronts including the foundation of social institutions, teaching and writing, who was President of the Western Political Science Association (1994–95) and founding director of the Center for Women & Democracy in Seattle; of Joseph Buttigieg (*Prison Notebooks*) from the University of Notre-Dame (Indiana), the translator and editor of the initial published volumes of the planned comprehensive multi-volume English edition of Gramsci's *Prison Notebooks*, with whom we had been in close contact; of Norman Birnbaum (*Struggle/fight*), a professor at Georgetown University Law School who was also a classical intellectual in terms of his critical and political work, who contributed to many left-wing journals and whose activities included working as a consultant for Robert and Edward Kennedy, for United Auto Workers, and for the German Green Party; of William H. Shaw (*Functional explanation*) from San José State University; of the labour movement intellectual Stanley Aronowitz (*Power elite of the USA*) from the City University of New York; from Canada, of Frank Cunningham from the University of Toronto, former President of the Canadian Sociological Association, who welcomed the launch of the HCDM as 'world historic'; of North American historian Ellen Meiksins Wood (*Origin of capitalism*), editorial board member of *New Left Review*, co-editor of *Monthly Review*, later inducted into the Royal Society of Canada; of Roger Simon (*Collective memory II*); from Australia, let us think of the epistemologist and science theorist Wal A. Suchting (*Empiricism, Epistemology, Experiment, Falsificationism*); from then-Yugoslavia, of Miloš Nikolić, the *spiritus rector* of the annual 'Socialism in the World' conferences in Cavtat, where the HCDM forged many of its initial contacts with contributors; from England, Monty Johnstone, one of the most striking voices from the CPGB leadership and former co-editor of the English edition of the *Collected Works of Marx and Engels*, who concerned himself with the controversial topic of *Democratic centralism*; let us think of the Jamaican-born pioneer of British cultural studies, who moved 'within shouting distance of Marx', Stuart Hall (*Identification I*); of the historian Gerald Aylmer (*English Revolution*), from St. Peter's College, Oxford; and of the British historian Eric Hobsbawm, who grew up in Vienna and Berlin; from France, of Paul Boccara (*Informational revolution*), Henri Lefebvre (*Everydayness/dailyness, Surplus product, Metaphilosophy I*), of Claude Meillassoux (*Anthropology*), of Georges Labica, the grandfather, as it were, of the HCDM project, whose article *Dismantling of the state* opens the first volume,

later followed by that on *Illegality*; of Lucien Sève (*Historical forms of individuality*), who passed away after contracting Covid before he was able to complete his article on *Nonlinearity*; of Michel Vadée (*Ensemble of the social relations 1*), of André Tosel (*Communism*), and Arnaud Spire (*Ideal II, Collective action 1*), who participated in the management of *Espaces Marx* and maintained the link with the HCDM, all of whom were active in the PCF; of Larry Portis (*Society*), whose path led him from Bremerton (Washington) in the United States to the University of Montpellier in the 1970s and brought him into contact with the anarcho-syndicalist movement; from Sweden, let us think of Carl-Henrik Hermansson (*Finance capital 1*), the leader of the Left Party there, who spurred the party's emancipation from CPSU hegemony; from Finland, of Veikko Pietilä (*Abstract/concrete, Analysis/synthesis, Apologetics, Concept, Formal abstraction/real abstraction, Research/presentation, Social law*), who helped shape the HCDM project from the outset and enriched it with his scientific-theoretical articles; from Belgium, of Ernest Mandel (*Classless society 1*), the leading intellect and theoretician of the Fourth International, from whom we still have a posthumous text waiting to be published; from Italy, of the Spinoza scholar Emilia Giancotti Boscherini (*Determinism 1*), editor of the *Lexicon Spinozanum*; of Antonio A. Santucci (*Gramscianism*), whose works 'include the complete Italian critical editions of Gramsci's pre-prison and prison letters'; of Giorgio Baratta, the founding chair of the International Gramsci Society, and of his brother Alessandro Baratta (*Critical criminology 1*); let us think of the unbending communist Marxist Domenico Losurdo (*Fundamentalism*), whose two-volume *Intellectual Biography and Critical Balance-Sheet* on Nietzsche was published by InkriT in German translation; from Spain, let us think of Francisco 'Paco' Fernández Buey; from Greece, of Kosmas Psychopedis (*Hegelianism, Idea*) from the University of Athens; from the former GDR ('East Germany'), let us think of Jürgen Kuczynski, the resistance fighter against Nazism and later doyen of social and workers' history in the GDR (*Misery/poverty*); of Lothar Bisky (*Informational society*), the long-time chairman of the PDS, under whose leadership it merged with the West German WASG to form the party Die Linke (The Left); of Michael Schumann (*Renewal, Mistake/error*), one of the leading reformers as the SED evolved into the PDS, to whom the HCDM owes much of its early funding; of Hanna Behrend (*Denazification*), who emigrated from Nazi Germany to France, then to England, before returning to Germany, or rather the GDR, after the victory of the Allies, and under these changing conditions ceaselessly pursued the goal of a just society, including as a member of the *Argument* women's editorial team; of the sociologist and class analyst Helmut Steiner (*Class analysis, Expropriation of Marxism*), who was the editor-in-chief of the journal *Utopie kreativ*, which appeared from 1990–2008 and was

important for the discussion between Eastern and Western Marxist intellectuals, and who was a corresponding member of the *Argument* editorial board from 1998 to 2005 and then a member of the journal's Scientific Advisory Board; of Dieter Wittich (*Experience, Immaterial, Materialism and Empirio-criticism*); of Helmut Seidel, whose death occurred before he could submit the article we had agreed that he would write, and of the long-time HCDM editorial board member and author Thomas Marxhausen, who had been engaged in the MEGA and who, from the end of the 1990s onwards, served as a mainstay of our editorial board for a decade and contributed a substantial body of articles within our collective work of a dictionary (*Ivory tower, Development, Extra profit, Factory legislation, Commodity fetishism, Functionary, Secret diplomacy, Secret, Just wages, Glasnost, Historic mission of the working class, Historical School of Economics, Jacobinism, Capital-editions, Kautskyism I, Classical political economy, Collectivisation II, Communist Manifesto, Consumption*); of the musicologist Günter Mayer, to whom we are grateful not only for a complex of foundational politico-aesthetic entries (*Aesthetics, Basis aesthetics, Campaign against formalism, Formalism* [Russian], *Kitsch, Internet II* [its utopian aesthetic-political beginnings], *Barracks communism* [together with Alexander Buzgalin]), but also for the unforgettable musical programmes at InkriT's annual international HCDM conferences; let us also remember Heinrich Taut, who remained youthfully impetuous in his old age, and contributed not only as an author (*Need, Awareness*), but also as an editorial board member; from the Federal Republic of Germany ('West Germany'), let us think of Margherita von Brentano, who, like Helmut Fleischer, Heiner Ganßmann, and Hella Tiedemann-Bartels, contributed to the German translation of Labica's *Dictionnaire critique du marxisme*; of the theologian Helmut Gollwitzer (*Christianity and Marxism*), a leftist-ecumenical spirit with the confidence inherent in world-changing praxis from whom we have learned how to resist; of the philosopher and social historian Leo Kofler (*Elite*), who was influenced by Austro-Marxism, especially Max Adler; of Klaus Holzkamp, the founder of Marxist Critical Psychology, who is quoted in many HCDM entries but died before he could write his planned article; of the democratic communist Theodor Bergmann, tireless co-creator and author from the very beginning (*Agrarian question, Agrarian reform/land reform, Workers control, Workers' self-management, Insurrection/uprising, Peasant war*, and a further 15 entries, including on Chinese reform policy); of Christian Sigrist, a researcher of acephalous societies (*Commune*); of the art historian Jutta Held (*Architecture*), founder of the Guernica-Gesellschaft, and of her colleague and husband Norbert Schneider (*Fine arts, Art market, Melancholy I*), with her teaching at the University of Oldenburg, and him at Münster University; of Hansgeorg Conert (*Command economy, Decentralisation*) from

the University of Bremen; of the theologian Dorothee Sölle (*Feminist theology*), who was involved in bringing the ecumenical Political Night Prayer into being; of Erich Wulff (*Anti-psychiatry, Satisfaction, Democratic Psychiatry, Mental illness, Instance II*), who – while participating in the foundation of a modern Psychiatry department at the university of Hué in Vietnam – not only opened a new chapter in the field of Transcultural Psychiatry but also witnessed atrocities committed by the US army in Vietnam and made them public internationally under the pseudonym Georg W. Alsheimer (back in West Germany he taught Social Psychiatry at the Hanover Medical School and acted as the long-time Chairman of the West German Solidarity Committee with the Peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America); let us also think of the Marxist-Keynesian economist Herbert Schui (*Keynesianism II*) from the Hamburg University of Economics and Politics; of the political scientists Elmar Altvater (*Disembedding*), Werner Goldschmidt (*Separation of powers, Domination/rule I, Class domination II, Class struggle II, Power I*), and the powerfully eloquent radical democrat Wolf-Dieter Narr (*Inner-party democracy, Clientelism, Control*); of Volker Schurig, a biologist who was also involved in the development of Critical Psychology (*Ape, Anatomy I, Darwinism, Evolution, Struggle for existence, Lamarckism, Lysenkoism II*); from Switzerland, let us think of Claudie Weill, who taught at EHESS Paris (*Emigration, Factory councils/workers' councils*); from Austria, of the Austro-Marxist Eduard März (*Keynesianism I*), of the opera enthusiast Derek Weber (*Commanding heights II, Luxury II*) who, like März, was based at the Vienna University of Economics and Business; from the Netherlands, let us think of the revolutionary theologian Ton Veerkamp (*God, Heaven/hell, Messianism I, Moloch*), whose HCDM articles, together with his *Political History of the Grand Narrative*, have linked the inquiry of the HCDM to the history and content of the monotheistic religions and the social movements that have emerged from them. And so many others.

WFH

Abbreviations

<i>DKP</i>	Deutsche Kommunistische Partei
<i>IMSF</i>	Institut für marxistische Studien und Forschungen, linked to the DKP
<i>InkriT</i>	Berliner Institut für kritische Theorie, institutional editor of the HCDM
<i>ML</i>	Marxism-Leninism
<i>PDS</i>	Partei des demokratischen Sozialismus, resulting from the antistalinist reform of the SED in the wake of 1989
<i>SED</i>	Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, ruling party of the GDR up until 1989

WASG Arbeit & soziale Gerechtigkeit – Die Wahlalternative, German political party founded 2004 by leftist members of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) and trade union actors, merged with the PDS in 2007 to form the democratic-socialist party DIE LINKE.

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Foreword

The sudden downfall of the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc after 1989, an upheaval of cataclysmic proportions, left many of us in a state of shock, disbelief, grief, relief, doubt, and hope. It forced us to take stock of what was irretrievably lost, and what could and should be saved. The *Historical-Critical Dictionary of Marxism* (HCDM) is imbued with this traumatic moment. The project, begun in 1983, one hundred years after Karl Marx's death, underwent a complete reset before the first volume of the *Historisch-kritisches Wörterbuch des Marxismus* (title of the original German edition) appeared in 1994. Edited by Wolfgang Fritz Haug and later by an editorial team, it is an undertaking of epochal scope, ambition, and importance. Its entries adhere to the highest standards of philological accuracy, scholarly erudition, and painstaking historical reconstruction. Transcending its European origins, it is the work of more than eight hundred Marxists from every corner of the English-speaking world, as well as from Latin America, India, and China – where a translation of the first volume appeared in 2019 –, from Western and Eastern strands of Marxist thought. Beginning with volume 6, each new volume was subdivided into two volumes. With more than 1,500 entries, its projected fifteen large-format volumes may well end up as twenty. The halfway point of the project was reached in 2012 with volume 8/1; the latest volume to appear is 9/1 (2018). At that pace it may well take another twenty years until the publication of the final volume.

A drawback, you say. It is a drawback only if you expect the HCDM to be a museum where Marx's concepts and terminology, if not Marxism itself, are preserved in the form of fixed entities, explained once and for all. The fact that nearly thirty years have elapsed since the publication of volume 1 is a metaphor for the project itself: it is a work in progress, profoundly dialectical in nature. Each lemma describes a term or concept in motion, evolving, changing, shedding older shadings under the impact of history, and acquiring new ones. Marx's concepts are shown in a state of evolution; the HCDM both captures and embodies that state. Earlier positions have shifted, our understanding of 1989 and its consequences have evolved. New concepts and sites of struggle emerge, from post-colonial to feminist, from gender to ecology. They are presented in *statu nascendi* as critical theories about them take shape.

Each entry is written from a present moment, and each new volume is an account of the status of Marxist theory at that moment, as well as an intervention in ongoing debates. The volumes of the HCDM have themselves become part of the history of Marxist theory – an unfinished record of an unfinished story.

The German origin of the HCDM offers a unique historical opportunity to combine Western and Eastern strands of Marxist thought. The HCDM reconstructs the internal divisions within Marxism, and provides analytical tools for interrogating its history. It preserves intellectual resources of Eastern Marxism from falling into oblivion. It does not neatly separate Marxist theory from the crimes committed in its name and associated with figures from Stalin to Pol Pot. As an essential part of the history of Marxism, the communist political systems remain an object of historical-critical investigation for the left. The HCDM opens up a safe space for mourning and critical renewal. The end of the system of “administrative socialism” (Fredric Jameson) was experienced by many Marxists as a liberation not from Marx, as some would have us believe, but from what in the Eastern bloc had become “Marxism-Leninism”, a static, self-contained theory construct from which all dialectics had been drained. Against this the HCDM posits and encourages direct access to Marx and the history of Marxist theory. When misinformation, distortions, and anti-enlightenment positions spread instantly to the farthest reaches of the globe, we need to revisit and verify our sources and ascertain the facticity of our arguments.

The HCDM insists on the plurality of Marxist thinking. Plurality, and pluralism are key concepts in Wolfgang Fritz Haug’s thinking about Marxism. Professor emeritus of philosophy at Freie Universität Berlin, Haug has published more than thirty books on Marxist theory, ranging from theories of fascism and high-tech capitalism to *Commodity Aesthetics* (original edn. 1971, new edn. 2009), and on the transition from the Soviet Union to post-communist Russia; he is a co-founder of the Marxist theory journal *Das Argument* (now in its 63rd year), co-editor of a ten-volume annotated German edition of Gramsci’s prison notebooks, and founder of the Berlin Institute of Critical Theory. A key component of the HCDM’s pluralism is its feminism, more precisely its Marxist feminism or feminist Marxism. It contains numerous entries on gender relations, on gender-related exploitation, on domestic labour, and the feminisation of poverty. Spiritus rector behind this component is Haug’s wife Frigga Haug, professor emerita of sociology and a leading figure of leftist German feminism who has written, edited, or co-edited numerous books on Marxism and feminism. Also on the editorial board are historian Wolfgang Küttler, former department head of the Central Institute of History at the Academy of Sciences of the GDR, with numerous publications on the theory and methodology of historiography and on Marx’s theory of history; and Peter Jehle, associate professor of Romance Studies at Potsdam University, chairman of the Berlin Institute of Critical Theory, and co-editor of *Das Argument*, whose publications have a focus on Gramsci.

From its inception, and commensurate with Marxism's global presence both as a theory and as a political practice, the HCDM was intended for an international audience. German was the language of Marx and Engels, of Marxist theorists such as Rosa Luxemburg, Georg Lukács, Ernst Bloch, and Bertolt Brecht. The defeat of Nazi Germany also put an end to the international importance of the German language. English became the global *lingua franca*. The ascendance, after 1968, of Marxist theorists writing in many different languages, from Antonio Gramsci to Mao Zedong, José Carlos Mariátegui, and Louis Althusser, made the need for an English language edition of the HCDM ever more pressing. While specialists will still need to go back to the texts in their original languages, the English edition of the HCDM is meant for the many for whom this is not an option.

Is the HCDM only for Marxists? Are you a Marxist? You're not sure you know enough to call yourself a Marxist? You don't want to be pinned down? You want to know if being a Marxist includes – or excludes – being a Leninist, a Luxemburgist, a Trotskyist, a Lukácsian, a Blochian, a Gramscian, a Brechtian, an Althusserian (or a Stalinist)? Does being a Marxist define you as an intellectual disconnected from the real suffering of the vast majority of mankind? And what could it mean to be a Marxist in one's everyday activities? How can you participate in working toward changing the world, toward organising society in such a way that it works for the many, rather than the few? If these questions haunt and trouble you, the HCDM is for you.

How to use the HCDM? You can start by looking up any lemma. This will likely lead you to another lemma, and another, and another. It will lead you through erudite reconstructions and heated debates, through contradictions, pitfalls, failures, and triumphs, through dead ends and new beginnings. Your curiosity, your desire for knowledge, and your empathy with those these volumes are about, can get you hooked. You can both lose and find yourself in these pages. The HCDM is a site for open-ended learning, and in this way it is a joyful experience.

As for the above reference to Marxism's global presence, it would seem more appropriate to talk about the global presence of neoliberal capitalism: a system fuelled by a financial industry severed from the "real" economy, pushing through reactionary social policies that foster xenophobia and racism. Marxism, with its immense scope and splendour of human thinking in the service of mankind, while fully conscious of the horrors perpetrated in its own name, remains the utopian other of this system. As long as the vast majority of people on the planet and the planet itself are exploited while the few acquire unimaginable wealth, it cannot disappear. Walter Benjamin, in his *Commentaries on Brecht's Poems*, wrote of the poem 'Von der Freundlich-

keit der Welt' (On The World's Kindness) that it contains a 'minimum program of humanity'. That is as good a summary as any of the usefulness of the HCDM.

Robert Cohen

From the Preface to the First Volume of the HKWM

1

This is not the first time that a new dictionary has emerged from the intention to translate, revise, or supplement a previous one.¹ The most renowned reference book of the Enlightenment, Denis Diderot's *Encyclopédie*, grew out of a translation project; Joachim Ritter's *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie* began as the revision of another. The *Historical-Critical Dictionary of Marxism* resulted from the planning of supplementary volumes to a translation. These volumes were announced in the preface to the German edition of Georges Labica's *Dictionnaire critique du marxisme* in 1983.² They were intended to lend additional – especially German – emphases to the existing French focus of the work. Every critical school of thought related to Marx was invited to contribute. When, in what was then two-state Germany, the project found itself deadlocked between dogmatic anathema on the one side and social-liberal reserve on the other, it took on a more international approach – not least through seeking out collaboration, wherever possible, with intellectuals from the “tricontinent” of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The limits of the supplement form were soon exceeded, if only for the obvious fact that the scope had grown to a size which was many times that of the original.

At the same time, there were also internal reasons for this new start. A new type of problematic surfaced, in the broad sense of a configuration of fields of crisis and critique. The ‘Limits to Growth’ and other existential problems with which the new social movements concerned themselves, as well as the implementation of the high-tech mode of production, all led to a progressive shift in the questions at hand. Soviet perestroika – and ultimately the fall of the Soviet Union and end of the international order which had emerged out of the October Revolution of 1917 and the victory of the antifascist East-West alliance in the Second World War – promoted an “epistemological break” and a drive toward historicisation, pushing the dictionary project into completely new territory.

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- 1 *Historisch-kritisches Wörterbuch des Marxismus*, edited by Wolfgang Fritz Haug in collaboration with nearly 1,000 scholars. Volume One of 15 came out in 1994 (Hamburg: Argument-Verlag); by 2022 eight more volumes have been published, some of them double volumes. Entries are in German. Foreign-language equivalents to the lemmas are provided in Arabic, English, French, Russian, Spanish, and Chinese. For details see www.inkrit.de.
 - 2 Georges Labica and Gérard Bensussan, *Kritisches Wörterbuch des Marxismus*, German edition, edited by Wolfgang Fritz Haug in eight volumes (Hamburg: Argument-Verlag, 1983–89).

Although Joachim Ritter's *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie* set a virtually unattainable standard in terms of its erudition, it is a remarkable experience to place the accumulated knowledge of the two works next to one another: not only are there hardly any points of overlap, but it is also as if the *Historisch-kritisches Wörterbuch des Marxismus* spoke into a gaping silence, a silence which marks the discourse of the other work as bourgeois – just as the breaking of this bourgeois silence is what necessitates the existence of a Marxist dictionary.

After the breakdown of the communist experiment, historical and critical attention to the now-defunct form appears to the zeitgeist to be of merely archaeological interest, as if there were neither 'Western Marxism' nor the manifold academic and cultural Marxisms of the intellectuals. Even if this were so, and Marxism had really ceased to exist, it would nevertheless remain a part of our history. The science, culture, and politics of the 20th century are impossible to understand if one does not take into account the Marxian challenge and the varied and antagonistic reactions to it.

In any case, any declaration of its demise is premature. An unfinished project cannot die, as long as the existential problems which it had begun to address have neither been solved nor rendered irrelevant. Marxist thought is not an insular or sectarian phenomenon. It emerged and continues to develop out of practical and theoretical attention to the questions of human socialisation and natural relations, as well as of antagonisms and crises. These questions concern everyone. They remain unresolved, and this lack of resolution is increasingly perceived as a question of the survival of humankind on 'Spaceship Earth', even if the scope of these questions is barely understood.

Just as the history of Christianity was not ended by the fall of early Christian rule, neither has the theoretical and practical search for a model of socialisation based on the principles of solidarity and environmental sustainability been ended by the fall of communist rule. The crimes committed in the name of socialism can no more erase the ethical and political substance of the socialist idea than the immeasurable crimes committed in the name of Christianity could erase the Christian ethical impulse.

Joachim Ritter wrote in the preface to the first volume of his *Wörterbuch* that 'it cannot be predicted how a new synthesis will one day look, nor whether it is, or is not, already in play'. This sentence could also be applied to Marxist knowledge on the threshold of the 21st century. From this body of knowledge, it is just as impossible to predict which individual elements will one day be taken up again, and in which combination they will appear.

This fissured knowledge shot through with manifold antagonisms, this knowledge with its insights and blind spots, presumptions and experiences,

its refuted hypotheses and points of unrealised potential, is the unwieldy and boundless material of the historical-critical dictionary. It goes without saying that this material can never be exhaustively represented, and that any representation is only possible in the form of digression and from a restricted standpoint. Additionally, a clear demarcation of the material would have made little sense, since it is in communication primarily with European traditions and since the bridges between Marxist and “bourgeois” knowledge have always been open, even if often traversed incognito from both sides. The presentation of models of thought, conceptual tools, and delineation of thought processes opens up connections in every direction and reveals possible sites of interaction.

2

The current historical configuration is both favourable and unfavourable for the project of a historical-critical dictionary of Marxism. The collapse of Marxist state censorship is advantageous when it comes to reflecting on the past; the archives are open and the theories ownerless. The antihistorical grip which the “victors” hold on history is unfavourable; in many ways it equates to an erasure of social memory. The post-communist situation thus imprints the title terms ‘historical’ and ‘critical’ with an emphatic relevance to the present-day; these terms address the critical (and self-critical) evaluation of historical experience on the one hand, and the scientific review, analysis, and critical examination of an enormous theoretical corpus on the other. A historical-critical glimpse into the labyrinthine “library” of Marxist knowledge can help effect a curative return to one’s senses. Working through memory in this way may even contribute to the dissolution of blind ‘repetition compulsion’.

The demise of Marxism-Leninism initially has left behind an accumulated historical guilt in the collective memories of humanity’s peoples. This is reflected in an enormous mountain of historical debris, one which threatens to indiscriminately bury both that system’s rational elements and seeds for the future, along with those elements which are irrational and hostile. This situation makes dealing with the stress and pain of the negative in the form of ‘ruthless criticism’ a condition of survival for Marxist thought. Only in this way can humankind’s treasure trove of enlightening wisdom and social imagination be successfully saved from the wreckage. It is only the ‘saving critique’, as spoken of by Walter Benjamin, which is able to carry these treasures, as if on Noah’s Ark, into a new era.

This kind of critique is also negative, it can hurt, but it never tacitly purports to be beyond that which it criticises. Instead it ventures into historical

experience, and by accepting this experience, it is also able to accept its own. This criticism does not lay claim to being the last word on the matter, but rather breaks through the combination of gloomy silence and short-sighted triumphalism.

Such much-needed attempts to do historical justice to the object of criticism will not always succeed. Nevertheless, they must be made. Following a setback, if hindsight creates an inflated sense of “knowing better”, this does not necessarily indicate superior knowledge. Often enough, it is just another form of incorrigibility. To simply switch sides after the state socialist catastrophe is to shy away from responsible examination in favour of wilful amnesia.

One need not only recall the examples of opportunistic *volte-faces* after the failure of the Soviet attempts at reform. De-Stalinisation had already produced similar cases. In 1956, when Nikita Khrushchev denounced the crimes of Stalin – which for the communist experiment was equivalent to being ‘released on probation’, a probation which was forfeited no later than 1968 with the suppression of Czechoslovakian reform communism – Henri Lefebvre remarked that it had become ‘fashionable among Marxists to make fun of quotations: “the shortest way from one idea to another”’. He continues, explaining that this fashion was started precisely by ‘the ones who before were unable to write a *single line* or say a single sentence without quoting Stalin. Nowadays they have found other ways of disguising their ignorance and the emptiness of their minds.’³

Without social memory, experience cannot exist. The purpose of a historical-critical dictionary in these times of ‘historical rupture’ (*Geschichtsbruch*, as Peter Glotz termed it) is to convey intellectual experiences through the process of remembering. These intellectual experiences are made up of historical-critical “quotation”, not only of the sort which displays brilliant achievements, but also those which expose the theoretical emptiness of thought enamoured of power.

3

The *Historical-Critical Dictionary of Marxism* has a strong philological emphasis, in addition to its practical-critical and experiential focus. All quotes from and references to sources have been carefully recorded in the articles, in order to facilitate further independent work and offer a kind of Ariadne’s

3 Henri Lefebvre, *Critique of Everyday Life*, vol. 1, transl. John Moore (London: Verso, 1991), 257 et sq.; transl. corr.

thread as a guide through the labyrinths of literature. This also yields valuable information as to which works merit being re-read in order to de-fetishise history. The history – or histories – these terms can recount, in their various usages and connotations, have the power to subvert false certainties and seemingly immovable edifices of thought.

The organisational structure of a conceptual dictionary seemed the most suitable for this project, which is intended to lead to an open workshop atmosphere rather than a closed-minded *Weltanschauung*. While the popular notion of an encyclopaedia generally assumes that it has control over discrete spheres of knowledge, interconnecting like the links of a chain, this dictionary rather philosophises by taking a hammer to those conceptual spheres, breaking them up into individual terms. The overarching meaning is not something already given. The imagined sense of being able to command such knowledge at will should instead make space for the deconstruction of hermeneutic totalities. This theoretical reworking of “philosophical grammar” may aid in the introduction of Marxist knowledge into a new “reflexive modernity” enlightened by historical materialism, a modernity in which the common myths of subject and meaning have dissolved, and which is consequently able to take up the project of critical social theory anew, and to do this from a practical perspective.

4

Over 1,200 conceptual terms are addressed within: terms which have become relevant to Marxism, with its various theoretical and practical strands, and to social liberation movements. The theoretical and politically strategic terms which had become particularly meaningful to Marx and Engels, and to the lines of thought connected to them, were the first to be included. However, terms have also been included which were unknown to the Marxist classics or even to Marxist schools of thought, or at least were yet to find a home in those traditions. This seemed to be the right choice when it came to articulating historically-novel problematiques and epistemological claims, or terms which illuminate previously-neglected facets of Marxism.

Many of these keywords derive from the current lexis of political theory and have never before been included in comparable dictionaries. In these keywords, many of which are newly coined, the problems of this era are articulated. They are the unresolved issues of an epoch of global crises: the transition to the high-tech mode of production of transnational capitalism; the failure of Soviet society, caused by the structural inability to keep up with this transition;

and the eruption of the North-South conflict in world capitalism once it was no longer held in check by the East-West divide. Last but not least, the new social movements, most importantly feminism and environmentalism, helped shape this new lexis.

Even in places where the vocabulary is not new, the readings certainly are, since they have let their questions be dictated by the times.

Historical events, geographical designations, and the names of organisations have not been included, except in cases where they have become terms in which strategic problems and reflections thereof are encapsulated. Names of individuals appear within keywords only in the designation of doctrines, ideologies, or schools which originated with them.

Metaphors, images, topoi, idioms, buzzwords, etc. are accepted whenever they have become important to the articulation of theoretical-political concepts. Ritter, however, did not accept such terms, even though he, along with Hans Blumenberg, knew that they 'lead to the substructure of thought'.

Terms which have a 'split' history appear in a few cases as double entries under the possible variant designations. The resulting polyphony and plurality of perspectives is desirable. It brings us right to the centre of the still-developing field of Marxism.

5

The formulation of the concept, the compiling of the keywords which were to be included, and the seeking out of suitable authors occurred partly via public and published discussion, and partly through consulting a large number of scholars across every continent. Not everything that was initiated could be seen to completion.

The publication of this first volume was ten years in the making, with all texts worked on meticulously by the publishers and editorial team. In 'dictionary workshops', the submitted drafts were reviewed and then discussed with the authors.

'What we agree with leaves us inactive', Goethe once said, 'but contradiction makes us productive'. And productivity, one might add, propels us towards contradiction. Therefore, let it be acknowledged as a strength that the authors could disagree on topics even while working on them, just as in each living academic or also political culture there must be a perpetual flow of dissenting opinions. Needless to say, there has been no censorship of any kind. The initial fixed scope of the articles soon gave way to greater permeability, so as not to become a Procrustean bed.

If there has been any editorial intervention, then this has been for the purposes of historical-philological precision, and occasionally also to make an overly-digressive text more compact. 'Conceptual fragmentation' as a design principle brought with it the danger of overlap, which then had to be reduced as much as possible in the final edit. Avoiding this entirely was not feasible. This technique of 'moulding' the texts has not affected the diversity of perspectives within.

6

I would like to express my gratitude to the authors of the texts for their (sometimes severely strained) patience, and their understanding – particularly those who were already working on the project from 1983 onwards, and who had to repeatedly face the realisation that the projected timeframes were somewhat illusory. Some did not live to see the publication of this volume [...].

The Free University of Berlin's Institute of Philosophy deserves thanks for having provided opportunities to work on the dictionary project as well as facilitating workshops. [...]

The editors and publishers hope not only for a good reception, but also for the input and involvement of the readers.

In the words of Francis Bacon, 'truth is the daughter of time'. Above all, what sets the *Historical-Critical Dictionary of Marxism* apart from earlier works is the influence of the precise historical moment of secular upheaval, and while admittedly for many this is one of hopelessness or resignation, it can equally be taken as impartial critique, offering fresh impetus for the future.

Wolfgang Fritz Haug

Berlin, autumn 1994

Translated by Elizabeth C. Penland and Rowan K.A. Coupland

About This Edition

The articles included in this publication are a selection of entries from the German-language *Historisch-kritisches Wörterbuch des Marxismus* (HKWM), published by the Berlin Institute for Critical Theory (InkriT). It is a first selection in a series of planned volumes in English translation, aiming to compile relevant articles for an English-language, international readership.

The selection of these articles was intended to bring forth some of the basic orientations of the HKWM. As this is a dictionary based on concepts, names of persons appear in the lemmas only in schools of thought or when “-isms” built around them are discussed. Neither articles discussing various countries nor academic disciplines are to be found. The dictionary is concentrated on philologically following the development of concepts and various disputes encountered along the way. Instead of steadfast definitions, the result consists in critical knowledge on the development of Marxist thought and the problems it is aimed at tackling. The historical-critical approach means sifting through the concepts, their contested history, and their current relevance from the perspective of the pressing need for a solidary and ecologically sustainable economy and societal form. Besides traditional concepts, more recent ones such as ‘hacker’ or ‘cybertariat’ are also included. The aim is – instead of some hierarchical official doctrine – an open, self-developing, self-criticising Marxism.

This project is about a third of a century old. Like the great *Encyclopédie* of Diderot and d’Alembert (work on which began in 1745) that started as a translation and enlargement of Ephraim Chambers’s *Cyclopaedia or an Universal Dictionary of Arts and Sciences* of 1728, the HKWM started from the initiative to publish supplementary volumes to the German translation of Georges Labica’s and Gérard Bensussan’s *Dictionnaire critique du marxisme* (1st edition 1982). The planned supplementary articles grew in number and in 1989, as the last volume of the translation came out, the publication plan of the new dictionary under the editorship of Wolfgang Fritz Haug was announced. It seems the time could hardly have been more unfavourable; after ‘Perestroika’ followed the downfall of state-administrative socialism. Nevertheless, absent its erstwhile bureaucratic patrons, new possibilities for cooperation and critique were opened up for Marxist thought.

The latest volume (9/11) of the HKWM, currently (2022) in its final editing phase, approaches concepts from ‘Mitleid’ (Compassion) to ‘Nazismus’ (Nazism). In addition, three volumes of the *Historisch-kritisches Wörterbuch des Feminismus* (2003–), based on the articles in the HKWM, have been pub-

lished. In order to understand the present selection, a few peculiar circumstances must be taken into account. First, the original edition is still in progress, just about halfway through, and the final volume is not expected to appear until the 2030s or even 40s. As a result, already written entries that are undoubtedly relevant but have not yet been published could not be included.

Second, because of the different alphabetical assignments of lemmas in German and English (for example, the German 'Feuerbach-Thesen' is 'Theses on Feuerbach' in English), the articles have been reordered. The original context of each entry's publication can be learned from an index included in the appendix to the present edition, indicating the original volume and the year of first publication.

In addition, as in the original edition, further НКWM lemmas are listed (in German and English translation) at the end of each entry as cross-references that are related to the content of the entry in question, so that interested readers can delve further into the subject.

The formal guidelines of this edition are based on those of the original НКWM, although some adaptations were necessary. The most basic formal criteria are the following:

Titles of entries: Lemmas of two or more words are separated by a slash if they represent complementary pairs of terms (e.g.: 'Class in Itself/for Itself'), and by a comma if they represent alternative forms of expression (e.g.: 'Action Potence, Agency').

Equivalents in other languages: For the lemma in the title of each entry, equivalents in five other languages are given: Arabic (Ar., in transcription), French (F.), German (G.), Russian (R., in transcription), Spanish (S.), and Chinese (C., in transcription and in ideograms).

Abbreviations: Instead of the full lemma in the title, an initialism in capital letters appears throughout the body of the article. This initialism is also used within citations to emphasise the thematic focus of each article. (Apart from the abbreviation 'cent.' for 'century', no other changes have been made within quotations unless otherwise stated). All other abbreviations are in common use or are listed in the lists of abbreviations and scribal abbreviations.

Emphasis: Names of persons are rendered in boldface script when they are mentioned for the first time within a paragraph or when another name has been mentioned directly before. All other emphasis is italicised.

Quotation marks and brackets: Regular quotation marks '...' indicate quotations (with the exception of those in Ancient Greek); double quotation marks "... " indicate meta-linguistic usages or terms used with a certain distance. Interpolations within quotations are marked with square brackets []; omissions with ellipses in square brackets [...].

Citation method: References to works and editions that are frequently cited in the HKWM are indicated by scribal abbreviations (see list of scribal abbreviations). Otherwise, citations are made as follows: The author's name, the year of publication and the page reference appear in brackets after the citation; if the immediately following references refer to the same author and/or the same work, the author's name and/or the corresponding year of publication are not repeated. Literature not marked with a scribal abbreviation is listed at the end of each entry in the bibliography.

Classical philosophical works are cited, if possible, with indication of articles, paragraphs, etc., so that the cited passage can be found in different editions.

Bibliography: The works cited are listed in alphabetical order by author's name. In the case of several titles by the same author, in chronological order. Only directly or indirectly cited or used literature is included (as far as it is not already mentioned in the general list of scribal abbreviations).

The years of the original edition are given in brackets where appropriate.

Editions used: Wherever possible, quotations from existing translations into English have been used. Only when no translations were available or the available English-language editions are deemed problematic have quotations been translated for this publication. References to the German editions of Marx and Engels (MEW and MEGA), to *Gesammelte Schriften* or *Collected Works* by different authors (GS, or CW) have been retained, as these editions in particular are also consulted by English-speaking scholars, students, teachers, and researchers.

Konstantin Baehrens, Juha Koivisto, and Victor Strazzeri

Abbreviations and Scribal Abbreviations

Abbreviations

a.o.	and others
Aph.	Aphorism
App.	Apparatus
approx.	approximately
b.	born in
B.C.	before Christian era
Berlin/W	West Berlin
CC	Central Committee
cent.	century
cf.	compare
ch.	chapter
cit.	cited
col.	column
Comintern	Communist International
CP	Communist Party
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CPUSA	Communist Party of the United States of America
CW	Collected Works
diamat	dialectical materialism
DKP	Deutsche Kommunistische Partei (German Communist Party)
ead.	eadem
eaed.	eaedem
ECCI	Executive Committee of the Communist International
ed.	edited by
ed., eds.	editor, editors
edn.	edition
eid.	eidem
Eng.	English
enl.	enlarged
esp.	especially
et al.	et alii
et sq.	et sequens
et sqq.	et sequentes
FDJ	Freie Deutsche Jugend (the official youth organisation in the GDR)
fn.	footnote

FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GDR	German Democratic Republic
Ger.	German
GS	Gesammelte Schriften (Collected Writings)
GULag	Glawnoje Uprawleenije Lagerej (chief administration of the penal camp system of the USSR)
i.a.	inter alia
ibid.	ibidem
id.	idem
IISG	Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis (Amsterdam)
IMES	Internationale Marx-Engels-Stiftung, Amsterdam
IML	Institute of Marxism-Leninism
introd.	Introduction by
It.	Italian
IWA	International Workingmen's Association
KPD	Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (Communist Party of Germany)
Let.	Letters
ML	Marxism-Leninism
Ms.	manuscript
n.p., n.d.	no place, no date
NEP	New Economic Policy
NS	Nationalsozialismus (Nazism)
no.	number
NT	New Testament
PCF	Parti communiste français (French Communist Party)
PCI	Partito Comunista Italiano (Italian Communist Party)
pub.	published
qtd.	quoted
RCP(b)	Russian Communist Party (bolsheviks)
repr.	reprint
rev.	revised by
Russ.	Russian
SAPMO	Foundation Archive of Parties and Mass Organisations of the GDR
SDS	Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund (Socialist German Student League)
SED	Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (Socialist Unity Party of Germany)
SelWks	Selected Works
SelWr	Selected Writings

ser.	series
SI	Socialist International
SPD	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany)
SU	Soviet Union
suppl.	supplement
transl.	translated by
transl. corr.	translation corrected
UN	United Nations
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
vol.	volume

Scribal Abbreviations

1 *Lexica, Dictionaries, and Collections of Texts*

BdK	<i>Der Bund der Kommunisten: Dokumente und Materialien</i> , ed. IML, CC of the SED and IML, CC of the CPSU, vol. 1 (1836–1849), vol. 2 (1849–1851), vol. 3 (1851–1852), Berlin/GDR 1970, 1982, 1984.
Benseler	<i>G.E. Benselers Griechisch-Deutsches Wörterbuch</i> , rev. by A. Kaegi, Leipzig 191990.
Georges	K.E. Georges, <i>Ausführliches Lateinisch-Deutsches Handwörterbuch</i> , 2 vols., Hanover-Leipzig 81913.
Grimm	J. and W. Grimm, <i>Deutsches Wörterbuch</i> , ed. by the German Akademie der Wissenschaften (AdW) at Berlin, 16 vols., Leipzig 1854–1960, continued from vol. 4.1.4 onwards by H. Wunderlich et al.; new rev. edn. by the AdW of the GDR in cooperation with the AdW at Göttingen, Leipzig 1965 et sqq.
HKWM	<i>Historisch-kritisches Wörterbuch des Marxismus</i> , ed. W.F. Haug and (since vol. 7/1) F. Haug and P. Jehle and (since vol. 8/1) W. Küttler, Berlin-Hamburg 1994 et sqq.
HWPh	<i>Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie</i> , ed. J. Ritter (†), K. Gründer, and G. Gabriel, 12 vols., Basel 1971–2004, vol. 13 (index) ed. M. Kranz, Basel 2007.
KWM	<i>Kritisches Wörterbuch des Marxismus</i> , ed. G. Labica and G. Bensussan, Ger. version ed. W.F. Haug, 8 vols., Berlin/W-Hamburg 1983–89 (<i>Dictionnaire critique du marxisme</i> , Paris 1982, 21985).

2 *Periodicals and Series of Books*

- Argument* *Das Argument: Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Sozialwissenschaften*, Berlin/W 1959 et sqq.
- Leviathan* *Leviathan – Zeitschrift für Sozialwissenschaft*, Düsseldorf 1973 et sqq., Opladen 1975 et sqq.
- MEF* *Beiträge zur Marx-Engels-Forschung*, ed. IML, CC of the SED, Marx/Engels-Department, Berlin/GDR 1977–90; *Neue Folge*, ed. C.-E. Vollgraf, R. Sperl, R. Hecker, Berlin-Hamburg 1991 et sqq.
- MEJb* *Marx-Engels-Jahrbuch*, vols. 1–11 ed. IML, CC of the CPSU and IML, CC of the SED, vol. 12 ed. IML, CC of the CPSU and of the Institut für Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung Berlin, Berlin/GDR 1977–90; *MEJb* 2003 et sqq., ed. IMES, Berlin 2004 et sqq.
- NLR* *New Left Review*, London 1960 et sqq., since 2000 new series.
- NZ* *Die Neue Zeit*, Stuttgart 1883–1923.
- Prokla* *Probleme des Klassenkampfes: Zeitschrift für politische Ökonomie und sozialistische Politik*, Berlin/W 1971 et sqq., since 1992 with the subtitle *Zeitschrift für kritische Sozialwissenschaften*, Münster.
- spw* *spw – Zeitschrift für sozialistische Politik und Wirtschaft*, Berlin/W 1978 et sqq., Cologne 1990 et sqq.

3 *Editions and Titles of Works*

Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels

- 18.B* Marx, 'Der 18. Brumaire des Louis Bonaparte' (1852), MEW 8/111–207, MEGA 1.11/96–189; Eng. 'The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte', MECW 11/99–197.
- AD* Engels, *Herrn Eugen Dührings Umwälzung der Wissenschaft* (1878), MEW 20/5–303, MEGA 1.27/217–538; Eng. *Anti-Dühring: Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science*, MECW 25/1–309.
- AMI* *Karl Marx: Exzerpte über Arbeitsteilung, Maschinerie und Industrie*, historical-critical edn., transcr. and ed. R. Winkelmann, Frankfurt/M-Berlin/W-Vienna 1982.
- C I* Marx, *Das Kapital: Kritik der politischen Ökonomie. Erster Band. Buch 1: Der Produktionsprozess des Kapitals* (1867, 21872); Eng. *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. Volume 1*, transl. B. Fowkes, London 1976.
- C II* Marx, *Das Kapital: Kritik der politischen Ökonomie. Zweiter Band. Buch II: Der Zirkulationsprozess des Kapitals*, ed. F. Engels (1885, 21893); Eng. *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. Volume II*, transl. D. Fernbach, London 1978.
- C III* Marx, *Das Kapital: Kritik der politischen Ökonomie: Dritter Band. Buch III: Der Gesamtprozess der kapitalistischen Produktion Capital*, ed. F. Engels

- (1894); Eng. *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. Volume III*, transl. D. Fernbach, London 1981.
- CCPE* Marx, *Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie* (1859), MEW 13/3–160, MEGA 11.2/95–245; Eng. *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. Part One*, MECW 29/257–417.
- CHPL* Marx, ‘Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie: Einleitung’ (1844), MEW 1/378–91, MEGA 1.2/170–83; Eng. ‘Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law: Introduction’, MECW 3/175–87.
- CHPS* Marx, *Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrechts* (1843, first pub. 1927), MEW 1/203–333, MEGA 1.2/3–137 (Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie); Eng. *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of the State*, MECW 3/3–129.
- Civil War* Marx, *Der Bürgerkrieg in Frankreich* (1871), MEW 17/313–65, MEGA 1.22/179–226; Eng. *The Civil War in France*, MECW 22/307–59.
- Class Struggles* Marx, ‘Die Klassenkämpfe in Frankreich 1848–1850’ (1850), MEW 7/9–107, MEGA 1.10/119–96 (parts I–III); Eng. ‘The Class Struggles in France, 1848 to 1850’, MECW 10/45–145.
- Condition* Engels, *Die Lage der arbeitenden Klasse in England* (1845), MEW 2/225–506; Eng. *The Condition of the Working-Class in England*, MECW 4/295–596.
- CPE* Critique of Political Economy
- DFJB* *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*, ed. A. Ruge and K. Marx, 1st and 2nd instalment, Paris 1844.
- DI, Hiromatsu* Marx, Engels, *Die deutsche Ideologie: Neuveröffentlichung des Abschnittes 1 des Bandes 1 mit textkritischen Anmerkungen*, ed. W. Hiromatsu, Tokio 1974.
- Difference* Marx, *Differenz der demokritischen und epikureischen Naturphilosophie* (doctoral dissertation, 1840–41), MEW 40/257–373, MEGA 1.1/5–92; Eng. *Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature*, MECW 1/25–107.
- DN* Engels, *Dialektik der Natur* (1873–83, first pub. 1925 titled *Dialektik und Natur*), MEW 20/305–570, MEGA 1.26; Eng. *Dialectics of Nature*, MECW 25/311–699.
- Erfurt* Engels, ‘Zur Kritik des sozialdemokratischen Programmentwurfs 1891’ (1891), MEW 22/225–40; Eng. ‘A Critique of the Draft Social-Democratic Programme of 1891’, MECW 27/217–32.
- Ethnol* *Karl Marx: Die ethnologischen Exzerptheftes*, ed. L. Krader, Frankfurt/M 1976 (modernised and Germanised edn.).
- Ethnol Nbks* *Karl Marx: The Ethnological Notebooks*, ed., transcr., and with an introd. by L. Krader, Assen 1972.

- Formen* Karl Marx über *Formen vorkapitalistischer Produktion*, ed. H.-P. Harstick, Frankfurt/M 1977.
- GI* Marx, Engels, *Die deutsche Ideologie* (1845/46), first pub.: Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, *Historisch-kritische Gesamtausgabe: Werke, Schriften, Briefe* (MEGA¹), comm. by the Marx-Engels-Lenin-Institute Moscow, ed. V.V. Adoratskij, vol. 5, Berlin 1932; MEW 3/9–530, *MEJb* 2003; Eng. *The German Ideology*, MECW 5/19–539.
- Gotha* Marx, 'Kritik des Gothaer Programms' (1875, first pub. 1890/91), MEW 19/11–32, MEGA 1.25/3–25; Eng. 'Critique of the Gotha Programme', MECW 24/75–99.
- Gr* Marx, *Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie* (Rohentwurf) (first pub. 1939/41), Berlin/GDR 1953; new edn. MEW 42/47–768 (1983) and MEGA 11.1.1–2, 49–747; Eng. *Outlines of the Critique of Political Economy* (Rough Draft of 1857–58), First Instalment, transl. E. Wangermann, MECW 28/49–537; Second Instalment, transl. V. Schmittke, MECW 29/5–253.
- HF* Engels, Marx, *Die Heilige Familie* (1845), MEW 2/3–223; Eng. *The Holy Family*, MECW 4/5–211.
- Inaugural Address* Marx, *Inauguraladresse der Internationalen Arbeiter-Assoziation* (1864), MEW 16/3–13, MEGA 1.20/3–12 (Eng.), 16–25 (Ger.); Eng. *Inaugural Address of the Working Men's International Association*, MECW 20/5–13.
- Intro 57* Marx, 'Einleitung [zu den "Grundrissen der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie"]' (1857), *Gr*, 3–31, MEW 42/15–45 (also 13/615–42), MEGA 11.1.1/17–45; Eng. 'Introduction' [Economic Manuscripts of 1857–58], MECW 28/17–48.
- Jewish Question* Marx, 'Zur Judenfrage' (1844), MEW 1/347–77, MEGA 1.2/141–69; Eng. 'On the Jewish Question', MECW 3/146–74.
- LF* Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der klassischen deutschen Philosophie* (1886), MEW 21/259–307; Eng. *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*, MECW 26/353–98.
- Manifesto* Marx, Engels, *Manifest der kommunistischen Partei* (1848), MEW 4/459–93; Eng. *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, MECW 6/477–519.
- MECW* *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, 50 vols., Moscow-London-New York, 1975–2005.
- MEGA* *Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe*, ed. IML, CC of the CPSU and IML, CC of the SED, Berlin/GDR-Moscow 1975–89, since 1992 ed. IMES, Berlin-Amsterdam.
- MEW* *Marx-Engels Werke*, vols. 1–42, ed. IML, CC of the SED, Berlin/GDR 1957 et seq., new edn. since 1990 and vol. 43 ed. by Institut für Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung, Berlin

- Ms 44* Marx, Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte aus dem Jahre 1844 (first pub. 1932, MEGA¹ 1.3), MEW 40/465–588, MEGA 1.2/187–438; Eng. Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, MECW 3/229–346.
- Ms 61–63* Marx, Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie (Manuskripte 1861–1863), MEGA 11.3.1–6; part 1 also in MEW 43; Eng. A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (Economic Manuscript of 1861–1863), MECW, vols. 30–34.
- Ms 63–67* Marx, Ökonomische Manuskripte 1863–1867, MEGA 11.4.1 and 11.4.2.
- NRhZ* Marx, Engels, Artikel aus der *Neuen Rheinischen Zeitung* (1848/49), MEW 5/11–457, 6/5–519; Eng. Articles from the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, MECW 7/15–506, 8/3–480, 9/3–467.
- Origin* Engels, *Der Ursprung der Familie, des Privateigentums und des Staates* (1884), MEW 21/25–173, MEGA 1.29; Eng. *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*, MECW 26/129–276.
- Original Text* Marx, Fragment des Urtextes von *Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie* (1858), Gr, 869–947, MEGA 11.2/17–94; Eng. The Original Text of the Second and the Beginning of the Third Chapter of *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, MECW 29/430–510.
- Outlines* Engels, 'Umrisse zu einer Kritik der Nationalökonomie' (1844), MEW 1/499–524, MEGA 1.3/467–94; Eng. 'Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy', MECW 3/418–43.
- Peasant Question* Engels, 'Die Bauernfrage in Frankreich und Deutschland' (1894), MEW 22/483–505; Eng. 'The Peasant Question in France and Germany', MECW 27/481–502.
- Peasant War* Engels, 'Der deutsche Bauernkrieg' (1850), MEW 7/327–413, MEGA 1.10/367–443; Eng. 'The Peasant War in Germany', MECW 10/397–482.
- Poverty* Marx, *Das Elend der Philosophie* (1847), MEW 4/63–182; Eng. *The Poverty of Philosophy*, MECW 6/105–212.
- Pref 59* Marx, 'Vorwort' to *Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie* (1859), MEW 13/7–11, MEGA 11.2/99–103; Eng. 'Preface' to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. Part One, MECW 29/ 261–65.
- Rules* Marx, 'Provisorische Statuten der Internationalen Arbeiter-Assoziation' (1864), MEW 16/14–16, MEGA 1.20/13–15 (Eng.), 54–56 (Ger.); Eng. 'Provisional Rules of the International Working Men's Association', MECW 20/14–16.
- TechExz* *Karl Marx: Die technologisch-historischen Exzerpte*, historical-critical edn., transcr. and ed. H.-P. Müller, Frankfurt/M-Berlin/W-Vienna 1982.
- ThF* Marx, Thesen über Feuerbach (1845, first pub. 1888), MEW 3/5–7, MEGA IV.3/19–21 (ed. Engels 1888, MEW 3/533–35, MECW 5/6–8); Eng. Theses on Feuerbach, MECW 5/3–5.

- TSV* Marx, *Theorien über den Mehrwert* (1862/63, first pub. 1905–10 by K. Kautsky), MEW 26.1–3, MEGA II.3; Eng. *Theories of Surplus Value*, 3 vols., ed. S. Rayazanskaya, transl. from the German by E. Burns, R. Simpson, J. Cohen, S. Rayazanskaya, MECW, vols. 30–32.
- Utopian* Engels, *Die Entwicklung des Sozialismus von der Utopie zur Wissenschaft* (1880), MEW 19/177–228, MEGA I.27/583–627; Eng. *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*, MECW 24/281–325.
- Value* Marx, *Lohn, Preis und Profit* (1865, first pub. 1898), MEW 16/101–52, MEGA I.20/141–86 (Eng.), II.4.1/383–432 (Eng.); Eng. *Value, Price and Profit*, MECW 20/101–49.
- Wage Labour* Marx, 'Lohnarbeit und Kapital' (1849), 6/397–423; Eng. 'Wage Labour and Capital', MECW 9/197–228.

Vladimir Ilyich Lenin

- CapR* *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* (1899), CW 3, 21–607.
- ECont* *The Economic Content of Narodism and the Criticism of it in Mr. Struve's Book* (1895), CW 1, 333–507.
- FP* *What the 'Friends of the People' Are and How They Fight the Social-Democrats* (1894), CW 1, 129–332.
- Imp* *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* (1917), CW 22, 185–304.
- ImpNbks* *Notebooks on Imperialism* (1915–16), CW 29
- cw* *Collected Works*, transl. of the 4th suppl. Russ. edn., prepared by IML, CC of the CPSU, 4th Eng. edn., Moscow 1960–1970.
- Lett.* *Letters*, CW, vols. 34–37 and 43–45.
- LWC* 'Left-Wing' Communism: an Infantile Disorder (1920), CW 31, 17–118.
- ME* *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* (1909), CW 14, 17–361.
- Ph* *Philosophical Notebooks*, CW 38.
- SR* *State and Revolution* (1918), CW 25, 385–497.
- Tactics* *Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution* (1905), CW 9, 15–140.

Rosa Luxemburg

- Anti-Critique* *Die Akkumulation des Kapitals oder Was die Epigonen aus der marx'schen Theorie gemacht haben: Eine Antikritik* (posthum. 1921), GW 5, 413–523; Eng. *The Accumulation of Capital, Or, What the Epigones Have Made Out of Marx's Theory – An Anti-Critique*, CW 2.
- Accu* *Die Akkumulation des Kapitals: Ein Beitrag zur ökonomischen Erklärung des Imperialismus* (1913), GW 5, 5–411; Eng. *The Accumulation of Capital: A Contribution to the Economic Theory of Imperialism*, transl. N. Gray, CW 2; *The Accumulation of Capital*.

- Briefe *Gesammelte Briefe*, vols. 1–5 ed. IML, CC of the SED, Berlin/GDR 1982–84, vol. 6 ed. A. Laschitza, Berlin 1993.
- Crisis *Die Krise der Sozialdemokratie* (1916), GW 4, 49–164; Eng. *The Crisis in German Social-Democracy*, transl. Socialist Publication Society, New York 1919, repr. in *RLR*, 312–78.
- cw *The Complete Works of Rosa Luxemburg*, ed. P. Hudis and P. Le Blanc, London-New York 2013 et sqq. (14 vols. forthcoming).
- GW *Gesammelte Werke*, vols. 1–5 ed. IML, CC of the SED, first edn., Berlin/GDR 1970–75, since 1990 ed. Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung, Berlin, vol. 6 ed. A. Laschitza and E. Müller, Berlin 2014.
- Lett. *The Letters of Rosa Luxemburg*, ed. by G. Adler, P. Hudis, and A. Laschitza, 2nd rev. edn., London 2013.
- Mass *Massenstreik, Partei und Gewerkschaften* (1906), GW 2, 91–170; Eng. *The Mass Strike, the Political Party, and the Trade Unions*, transl. P. Lavan, Detroit 1925, repr. in *RLR*, 168–99.
- RLR *The Rosa Luxemburg Reader*, ed. P. Hudis and K. Anderson, New York 2004.
- SoR *Sozialreform oder Revolution?* (1899), GW 1/1, 365–466; Eng. *Social Reform or Revolution*, transl. D. Howard, *RLR*, 128–67.

Antonio Gramsci

- Briefe *Gefängnisbriefe*. Ger. critical edn. of the Lett. in 4 vols., ed. U. Apitzsch, P. Kammerer, A. Natoli, and M.P. Quercioli, Berlin-Hamburg 1994 et sqq.
- AGR *The Antonio Gramsci Reader*, ed. D. Forgacs, New York 2000.
- CPC *Costruzione del Partito comunista* (1923–26), Turin 1971.
- FS *Further Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, ed. and transl. D. Boothman, Minneapolis 1995.
- Gef *Gefängnishefte*. Ger. critical complete edn. based on the It. edn. by V. Geratana comm. by the Gramsci Institute (1975), ed. Ger. Gramsci Project under the scientific guidance of K. Bochmann and W.F. Haug, and P. Jehle since vol. 7, 10 vols., Berlin-Hamburg 1991–2002.
- HPC *History, Philosophy and Culture in the Young Gramsci*, ed. and transl. P. Cavalcanti and P. Piccone, St. Louis 1975.
- INT *Gli intellettuali e l'organizzazione della cultura*, Turin 1949.
- LC *Lettere dal carcere*, Turin 1965.
- Lett. *Letters from Prison*, ed. F. Rosengarten, transl. R. Rosenthal, 2 vols., New York 1994.
- LVN *Letteratura e vita nazionale*, Turin 1949
- Mach *Note sul Machiavelli, sulla politica e sullo Stato moderno*, Turin 1949.
- MS *Il materialismo storico e la filosofia di Benedetto Croce*, Turin 1949.

- ON *Ordine nuovo* (1919/20), Turin 1954.
- ON2 *L'Ordine Nuovo: 1919–1920*, ed. V. Gerratana and A. Santucci, Turin 1987.
- O *Opere di Antonio Gramsci*, Turin 1947 et sqq.
- PN *Prison Notebooks*, ed. and transl. J.A. Buttigieg, 3 vols., New York 1992, 1996, 2007.
- PP Lett. *The Pre-Prison Letters, 1908–1926*, ed. and transl. D. Boothman, London 2014.
- PPW *Pre-Prison Writings*, ed. R. Bellamy, transl. V. Cox, New York 1994.
- Q *Quaderni del carcere*, It. critical edn. of the Gramsci-Institute, ed. V. Gerratana, 4 vols., Turin 1975.
- SCW *Selections from Cultural Writings*, ed. D. Forgacs and G. Nowell-Smith, transl. W. Boelhower, Cambridge, MA 1985/1991.
- SG *Scritti giovanili* (1914–18), Turin 1958.
- Southern Question* 'Alcuni temi della questione meridionale' (1926, first pub. 1930), *CPC*, 137–58; Eng. 'Some Aspects of the Southern Question', *SPW II*, 441–62.
- SP *Scritti politici*, ed. P. Spriano, 3 vols., Rome 1973.
- SPN *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, ed. and transl. Q. Hoare and G. Nowell-Smith, New York 1971.
- SPWI *Selections from Political Writings, 1910–1920*, ed. Q. Hoare, transl. J. Mathews, London 1977.
- SPWII *Selections from Political Writings, 1921–1926*, ed. and transl. Q. Hoare, London 1978.

4 *Further Editions and Titles of Works*

Th.W. Adorno

- CultInd* *The Culture Industry: Selected Essays on Mass Culture*, ed. J.M. Bernstein, London-New York 1991.
- GS *Gesammelte Schriften*, ed. R. Tiedemann, 20 vols., Frankfurt/M 1973–86.
- Hegel* *Drei Studien zu Hegel* (1963); Eng. *Hegel: Three Studies*, transl. S. Weber Nichol森, Cambridge (MA) 1993 [GS 5].
- JargonAuth* *Jargon der Eigentlichkeit: Zur deutschen Ideologie* (1964); Eng. *The Jargon of Authenticity*, transl. K. Tarnowski and F. Will London 1973 [GS 6].
- NegDia* *Negative Dialektik* (1966); Eng. *Negative Dialectics*, transl. E.B. Ashton, New York 1973 [GS 6].
- Prisms* *Prismen: Kulturkritik und Gesellschaft* (1955); Eng. *Prisms*, transl. S. Weber and S. Weber, London 1967, Cambridge (MA) 1981 [GS 10.1].

L. Althusser

- Ephp* *Écrits philosophiques et politiques*, ed. F. Matheron, 2 vols., Paris 1994, 1995.
- ESC* *Éléments d'autocritique*, Paris 1974; Eng. *Essays in Self-Criticism*, transl. G. Lock, London 1976.
- ISA* *On The Reproduction Of Capitalism: Ideology And Ideological State Apparatuses*, transl. G.M. Goshgarian, London-New York 2014.
- LeninPh* *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*, transl. B. Brewster, New York 2002.
- LLC, RC* L. Althusser, É. Balibar, R. Establet, P. Macherey, and J. Rancière, *Lire le Capital*, Paris 1965, rev. new edn., Paris 1996; Eng. *Reading Capital: The Complete Edition*, transl. B. Brewster and D. Fernbach, London 2015.
- PM, FM* *Pour Marx*, Paris 1965, new edn. with a preface by É. Balibar, Paris 1996; Eng. *For Marx*, transl. B. Brewster, London 2005.
- PSPS* *Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists*, ed. G. Elliott, London 1990.
- TFLF* *The Future Lasts Forever: A Memoir*, ed. O. Corpet and Y.M. Boutang, transl. R. Veasey, New York 1993.

Aristotle

- Met* *Metaphysica*
- Politics* *Politica*

O. Bauer

- WA* *Werkausgabe*, ed. Arbeitsgemeinschaft für die Geschichte der österreichischen Arbeiterbewegung, 9 vols., Wien 1975–80.

W. Benjamin

- AracadesPrj* *Das Passagen-Werk; Eng. The Arcades Project*, transl. H. Eiland and K. McLaughlin, Cambridge (MA)-London 1999.
- GS* *Gesammelte Schriften*, ed. R. Tiedemann and H. Schweppenhäuser, 7 vols., Frankfurt/M 1972–89.
- SelWr* *Selected Writings*, ed. H. Eiland and M.W. Jennings, 4 vols., Cambridge (MA)-London 1991–99.

E. Bernstein

- Preconditions* *Die Voraussetzungen des Sozialismus und die Aufgaben der Sozialdemokratie* (1899); Eng. *The Preconditions of Socialism*, ed. and transl. H. Tudor, Cambridge 1993.

E. Bloch

- GA *Gesamtausgabe*, 16 vols., Frankfurt/M 1969–76, suppl. vol. 1978.
 HOT *Erbschaft dieser Zeit* (1935); Eng. *Heritage of Our Times*, transl. N. Plaice and S. Plaice, Berkeley 1962 [GA 4].
Natural Law *Naturrecht und menschliche Würde* (1961); Eng. *Natural Law and Human Dignity*, transl. D.J. Schmidt, Cambridge (MA) 1996 [GA 6].
 PH *Das Prinzip Hoffnung* (written 1938–47, rev. 1953 and 1959); Eng. *The Principle of Hope*, 3 vols., transl. N. Plaice, S. Plaice, and P. Knight, Cambridge (MA) 1986 [GA 5].

B. Brecht

- BTheat* *Brecht on Theatre*, 3rd edn., ed. M. Silberman, S. Giles, and T. Kuhn, transl. J. Davis, R. Fursland, S. Giles, V. Hill, K. Imbrigotta, M. Silberman, and J. Willett, London 2015.
 CP *Collected Plays*, ed. J. Willett and R. Manheim, 8 vols., London 1994–2004.
 GA *Werke: Große kommentierte Berliner und Frankfurter Ausgabe*, 30 vols. with index vol., 1988–2000.
 GW *Gesammelte Werke*, 20 vols., Frankfurt/M 1977.
 AJ *Arbeitsjournal* (1938–55); Eng. *Journals, 1934–1955*, ed. J. Willett, transl. H. Rorrison, London 1993.
Me-ti *Me-ti: Buch der Wendungen*; Eng. *Book of Interventions in the Flow of Things*, ed. and transl. A. Tatlow, London 2016 [GW 12; GA 18].

H. Eisler

- Conversation* *Gespräche mit Hans Bunge: Fragen Sie mehr über Brecht*, GW 7, Leipzig 1975; Eng. *Brecht, Music and Culture: Hanns Eisler in Conversation with Hans Bunge*, ed. and transl. S. Berendse and P. Clements, London 2014.

L. Feuerbach

- Essence* *Das Wesen des Christentums* (1841); Eng. *The Essence of Christianity*, transl. G. Eliot, Cambridge 2011 [GW 5].
 GW *Gesammelte Werke*, ed. W. Schuffenhauer, vols. 1–18, Berlin/GDR 1967 et sqq., vol. 19, Berlin 1993.
 W *Werke in sechs Bänden*, ed. E. Thies, Frankfurt/M 1975.

S. Freud

- vol.* *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, transl. from the German under the General Editorship of J. Strachey, in collaboration with A. Freud, with the assistance of A. Strachey and A. Tyson, 24 vols., London 1953–74.

S. Hall

CritDlgs *Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies*, ed. D. Morley and K.-H. Chen, London-New York 1996.

G.W.F. Hegel

Aes *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik* (1835, ²1842); Eng. *Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art*, 2 vols., transl. T.M. Knox, Oxford 1998.

Bassenge *Ästhetik*, according to the 2nd edn. of 1842, ed. F. Bassenge, 2 vols., Berlin/GDR-Weimar 1955 *et passim*.

Enc – Enc I, Enc II, Enc III *Zyklus der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse* (1817, ³1830); Eng. *The Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline: Part 1: Logic*, ed. and transl. K. Brinkmann and D.O. Dahlstrom, Cambridge 2010 [Enc I]; *Hegel's Philosophy of Nature*, transl. A.V. Miller, Oxford 1970 [Enc II]; *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind*, transl. W. Wallace and A.V. Miller, revised by M. Inwood, Oxford 2007 [Enc III].

GW *Gesammelte Werke*, ed. Rheinisch-Westfälische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Hamburg 1968 *et sqq.*

HistPhil – LHP, LHP 1825–6; LHP Intro *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie* (1819–28, pub. 1833–36); Eng. *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, 3 vols., transl. E.S. Haldane and F.H. Simson, with introd. by F.C. Beiser, Lincoln 1995 (first pub. 1892–6) [LHP]; *Lectures on the History of Philosophy, 1825–6*, 3 vols., ed. R.F. Brown, transl. R.F. Brown and J.M. Stewart, with the assistance of H.S. Harris, Oxford 2006–09 [LHP 1825–6]; *Hegel's Introduction to the Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, transl. T.M. Knox and A.V. Miller, Oxford 1985 [LHP Intro].

SciLogic *Wissenschaft der Logik* (1812–16); Eng. *The Science of Logic*, transl. G.di Giovanni, New York 2010.

Phen *Phänomenologie des Geistes* (1807, ²1831); Eng. *Phenomenology of Spirit*, transl. M. Inwood, Oxford 2018.

PhilHist – PH, LPWH 1822–3, LPWH Intro *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte* (1837, ²1840); Eng. *The Philosophy of History*, transl. J. Sibree, New York 1956 [PH]; *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History: Volume 1: Manuscripts of the Introduction and the Lectures of 1822–3*, ed. and transl. R.F. Brown and P.C. Hodgson, with the assistance of W.G. Geuss, Oxford 2011 [LPWH 1822–3]; *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History: Introduction: Reason in History*, transl. H.B. Nisbet with an introduction by D. Forbes, Cambridge 1975 [LPWH Intro].

PhRight *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts* (1821, ²1833); Eng. *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, ed. A.W. Wood, transl. H.B. Nisbet, Cambridge 1991.

PolWr *Political Writings*, ed. L. Dickey and H.B. Nisbet, transl. H.B. Nisbet, Cambridge 1999.

- SW *Sämtliche Werke*, ed. G. Lasson, Hamburg 1917 et sqq., new critical edn. by J. Hoffmeister, Hamburg 1955.
- W *Werke in zwanzig Bänden*, based on the *Werke* 1832–45, re-ed. E. Moldenhauer and K.M. Michel, Frankfurt/M 1971.

K. Holzkamp

- GdP *Grundlegung der Psychologie*, Frankfurt/M-New York 1983.
- LSG *Lernen: Subjektwissenschaftliche Grundlegung*, Frankfurt/M-New York 1993.
- Schr *Schriften*, comm. by the Berlin Institute of Critical Theory, ed. F. Haug, W. Maiers, and U. Osterkamp, Hamburg-Berlin 1997 et sqq.
- SE *Sinnliche Erkenntnis: Historischer Ursprung und gesellschaftliche Funktion der Wahrnehmung*, Frankfurt/M 1973.

M. Horkheimer

- DE M. Horkheimer and Th.W. Adorno, *Dialektik der Aufklärung: Philosophische Fragmente* (1947, already 1944 as mimeography titled *Philosophische Fragmente*); Eng. *Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments*, ed. G. Schmid Noerr, transl. E. Jephcott, Stanford (CA) 2002.

I. Kant

- CPJ *Kritik der Urteilskraft* (1790 = A, ²1793 = B); Eng. *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, ed. P. Guyer, Cambridge 2000.
- CPR *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (1781 = A, ²1787 = B); Eng. *Critique of Pure Reason*, ed. P. Guyer and A. Wood, Cambridge 1998.
- CPrR *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* (1788); Eng. *Critique of Practical Reason*, ed. and transl. M.J. Gregor, in *Practical Philosophy*, Cambridge 1996, 133–271.
- WA *Werkausgabe*, ed. W. Weischedel, 12 vols., Frankfurt/M 1968.

K. Korsch

- GA *Gesamtausgabe*, ed. M. Buckmiller, vol. 1 and 2, Frankfurt/M 1980, since vol. 3, Amsterdam 1993 et sqq.
- ThreeEss *Three Essays on Marxism*, introd. P. Breines, New York 1971.

A. Labriola

- EssMCH *Essays on the Materialist Conception of History*, transl. C.H. Kerr, Chicago 1903, repr. New York 1966.
- MCM *In memoria del Manifesto dei comunisti* (1895); Eng. *In Memory of the Communist Manifesto*, in *EssMCH*, 9–91.

SocPh *Discorrendo di Socialismo e filosofia* (1898–99); Eng. *Socialism and Philosophy*, transl. E. Untermann from the 3rd It. edn., first publ. Chicago 1906.

G. Lukács

HistClassCon *Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein* (Berlin 1923), enl. edn. 1967; Eng. *History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics*, transl. R. Livingstone, London 1971 [W 2].

W *Werke*, ed. F. Benseler et al., vols. 2, 4–17, Neuwied-Berlin/West 1962 et sqq., vols. 18, 1, 3, Bielefeld 2005 et sqq.

M. Luther

W *Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe in 4 Abteilungen*, Weimar 1883 et sqq.

Mao Zedong

SelWks Selected Works, 5 vols., Peking 1965 et sqq.

J.C. Mariátegui

oc *Obras completas* (ediciones populares), 20 vols., Lima 1959 et sqq.

Seven Essays *Siete ensayos de interpretación de la realidad peruana* (1928); Eng. *Seven Interpretive Essays on Peruvian Reality*, transl. M. Urquidi, Austin 1971; Ger. *Sieben Versuche, die peruanische Wirklichkeit zu verstehen*, with a preface by K. Füssel and a postscript by W.F. Haug, transl. K. Füssel, B. Kinter, and U. Varchmin, Berlin/West-Freiburg/Switzerland 1986.

F. Mehring

GS *Gesammelte Schriften*, ed. Th. Höhle et al., 15 vols., Berlin/GDR 1960–66, Berlin/GDR 21971.

F. Nietzsche

A *The Antichrist* (1888).

HH *Human, All Too Human* (vol. I, 1878; vol. II, 1879–80).

KSA *Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe*, ed. G. Colli and M. Montinari, 15 vols., Munich-Berlin/West 1980.

Plato

Leg *Leges*

Men *Meno*

Tim *Timaeus*

D. Ricardo

Principles *Principles of Political Economy and Taxation* (1817), ³1821.

A. Smith

Wealth *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (London 1776; 3rd enlarged edn., London 1784; 5th definitive edn., London 1789).

J. Stalin

DHMat 'Dialectical and Historical Materialism' (first pub. in *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks): Short Course*, ed. by a comm. of the CC of the CPSU(b), New York 1939).

Wks

Works, 13 vols., ed. *Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute of the CP, CPSU (b)*, Moscow 1954, vol. 14 ed. Red Star Press, London 1978.

M. Weber

RS *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie* (1920/21), ed. Marianne Weber, vols. 1–3, Tübingen ⁹1988, ⁷1988, ⁸1988.

WL

Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre (1922), ed. J. Winckelmann, 6th, rev. edn., Tübingen 1985.

E&S

Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Grundriss der verstehenden Soziologie (1921), ed. J. Winckelmann, 5th, rev. edn., Tübingen 1972; Eng. *Economy and Society*, 2 vols., ed. G. Roth and C. Wittich, Berkeley 1978.

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Contributors

Samir Amin

b. 1931, died in 2018; Dr. rer. oec., was prof. of economics at the University of Vincennes – Paris VIII (France), director of the Institut Africain de Développement Économique et de Planification, and director of the Third World Forum, Dakar. Selected publications: *Modern Imperialism, Monopoly Finance Capital, and Marx’s Law of Value* (New York 2018); *Global History – a View from the South* (Oxford 2010); *Transforming the Revolution: Social Movements and the World System* (co-author, New York 1990).

Jan Otto Andersson

b. 1943; professor in International Economics (retired) at the Institute for Statistics and Economic Research at Åbo Akademi University, Turku (Finland). Selected publications: ‘International Trade in a Full and Unequal World’. *International Trade and Environmental Justice* (New York 2010); ‘Universalism in the Age of Workfare: Attitudes to Basic Income in Sweden and Finland’. *Normative Foundations of the Welfare State* (co-author, London-New York 2005); *Nordic Studies on Intra-Industry Trade* (Åbo 1987); *Studies in the Theory of Unequal Exchange between Nations* (Åbo 1976).

Konstantin Baehrens

b. 1984; editorial coordinator in the HKWM International project, fellow in the Ludwig Rosenberg Kolleg ‘Historical Relations of Judaism and the Labour Movement’ at the Moses Mendelssohn Centre, an affiliated institute of Potsdam university. Selected publications: *Material und Begriff: Arbeitsverfahren und theoretische Beziehungen Walter Benjamins* (co-editor, Hamburg 2019); *Nachkriegsliteratur als öffentliche Erinnerung: Deutsche Vergangenheit im europäischen Kontext* (co-editor, Berlin-Boston 2018).

Lutz-Dieter Behrendt

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Action Potence, Agency

A: al-qudra ‘alā at-taṣarruf. – F: potence d’agir. – G: Handlungsfähigkeit. – R: sposobnost’ dejstvovat’, deesposobnost’. – S: potencia de actuar. – C: xíngwéi nénglì 行为能力

1. Translating **Spinoza**’s concept of *potentia agendi* as ‘capacity to act’ or ‘agency’ [Ger. *Handlungsfähigkeit*] reminds Marxism of the prehistory of an emancipatory understanding of action that does not posit itself as absolute, but enables one to think about one’s own growth of power within a complex multiplicity of relations of forces. At the same time, it offers the opportunity to reflect, via Spinozism, which serves as a kind of mirror, on possible weaknesses of one’s own concept of action.

Marx writes in the *Holy Family* that **Spinoza**’s substance, as antipode to the **Fichte**an self-consciousness, is ‘metaphysically disguised *nature separated from man*’ (MECW 4/139 [2/147]). This dictum (from the end of the 1850s, **Marx** will express himself very differently) applies only to the extent that for **Spinoza** all things exist in a single substance, according to their own logic and dynamics – so to speak in interconnectedness within a field of force – and (de)potentiate themselves, without a ‘self consciousness’ being able to raise itself above them. Even God does not have a *potentia absoluta* or *extraordinaria* which could undermine the realisation of laws already or not yet known; his *potentia* is bound to his *essentia* (*Ethics* I, prop. 34; 1996, 25); he does not have free will, but acts only according to the laws of his nature (i.e. nature itself) (I, prop. 17; 1996, 13). Equally, ‘the *potentia* by which singular things (and consequently [any] man) preserve their being’ (IV, prop. 4 dem.; 1996, 119) – because the *potentia* of the things is their “striving” [conatus], (see III, prop. 7 dem.; 1996, 75) – is the *potentia* itself of God, or Nature, insofar as it can be explained through the man’s actual essence [*essentia actualis*]; thus ‘man’s *potentia*, insofar as it is explained through his actual essence, is part of God or Nature’s infinite *potentia*, i.e. *essentia*’ (IV, prop. 4 dem.; 1996, 119). ‘When man’, **Marx** will say, ‘engages in production, he can only proceed as nature does herself’ (C I, 133 [MEW 23/57]). According to **Spinoza**, he does not possess his own substantiality (II, prop. 10; 1996, 37); nor does his reason possess absolute freedom as in **Descartes**, or absolute self-mastery as in the Stoa; man does not have *potestatem absolutam in suas Passiones* (III, praef.; v, praef.; 1996, 69, 160 et sq.), because he is determined by an unending series of causalities.

This realisation in no way implies an abstract ‘nature separated from man’ or conceive of reality, with ‘all previous materialism,’ ‘only in the form of the object, or of contemplation,’ instead of ‘as *sensuous human activity*’ (*ThF* 1, MECW 5/3 [3/5]). Indeed Spinoza’s ethics seek – for the individual in any case – to sketch a perspective for action, and his political writings investigate the conditions for an optimal constellation for this. In addition to a theory of the *field* of force, Spinoza also offers a theory of the *unfolding* of force and the relations of forces (see v, ax. 1; 1996, 162). Therefore, immediately after the first fundamental parts of the *Ethics* – Antonio Negri calls them the ‘destructuring’ parts, that is, those that undermine the traditional metaphysics (including progressive metaphysics), the concept of action is introduced: ‘I say that we act [*agere*, translated by the Jewish Social Democrat Jakob Stern as ‘tätig sein’ – ‘are active’] when something happens, in us or outside us, of which we are the adequate cause, i.e. when something in us or outside us follows from our nature, which can be clearly and distinctly understood through it alone’ (III, def. 2; 1996, 70). It is striking how qualified this definition is: the ‘adequate cause’ for the I is distinguished from the only partially comprehensible cause, i.e. the *actio* is distinguished from the *passio* (III, prop. 1; 1996, 70) and the adequate from the inadequate conception. Therefore it cannot be said of everything that has an effect that it acts. That is also why the *potentia agendi* (mentioned for the first time in III post. 1) exists in a relationship of tension to the earlier introduced *potentia imaginandi* [power of imagination] (II, prop. 17 schol.; 1996, 45 et sq.). Of course this also has a function for human self-preservation, yet at the same time it is a cause of inadequate conceptions (such as the already mentioned conceptions of the *potentia absoluta* of God or the absolute freedom of the human soul).

It seems initially that the *potentia agendi* is associated with the power of the body (III, def. 3), whereas the *potentia cogitandi* (‘intellectual capacity’, II, prop. 21 schol.) is associated with the power of the *mens* (for the most part not unproblematically translated as ‘Geist’ [mind, spirit]) (II, prop. 7 cor.; 1996, 35): ‘The idea of anything that increases or diminishes, aids or restrains, our body’s power of acting [*agendi potentia*], increases or diminishes, aids or restrains, our mind’s power of thinking [*cogitandi potentia mens*]’ (III, prop. 11; 1996, 76). The *mens* acts by thinking (‘Man thinks’, II, ax. 2; 1996, 32); ‘But man’s true *agendi potentia*, or *virtue*, is reason itself’ (IV, def. 8; prop. 52 dem.; 1996, 117, 143). Part IV is concerned with optimizing the potencies of this thinking-acting. The circumstances under which this is to happen are regarded as daunting from the outset: ‘The *potentia humana* is very much limited, and infinitely surpassed by the *potentia* of external causes’ (IV, prop. 3; 1996, 118; also IV, ap. cap. 32;

1996, 160). For this very reason, **Spinoza** investigates the prospects for a self-realisation that is superior to the one produced spontaneously by the *potentia imaginandi*.

Here a figure related to the homo oeconomicus emerges: the optimising rational being that is fully aware of his interests. ‘When each man most seeks his own advantage for himself, then men are most useful to one another’ (IV, prop. 35 cor. 2; 1996, 132). However, **Spinoza** does not stop there but rather develops this point further than **Hobbes** (something **Adorno** and **Horkheimer** [*DE*, 2002, 22 et sqq.] fail to recognise). For **Spinoza**, the highest self-realisation is not the maximisation of utility in the sense of utilitarianism, but the recognition of the true, i.e. of nature or [=] God (IV, prop. 28; 1996, 129), as well as the actions implied thereby (II, prop. 49 schol.; 1996, 63 et sqq.). In addition, this act of knowledge creates sociality among humans (IV, prop. 32; ap. cap. 7; 1996, 130, 156): ‘But if man lives among such individuals as agree with his nature, his *agendi potentia* will thereby be aided and encouraged’ (also cap. 12). He who emancipates himself thereby finds his peers.

Contrary to **Alexandre Matheron**, who in spite of a narrow textual basis in the *Ethics* (only v, prop. 40 schol.; 1996, 179), wishes to maintain that the *Ethics* contains guidance not only for the individual, but for all of humanity, right back to Adam (1969, 591–601, 608–12), it must be said that the path to freedom pointed out in the book’s final part is a solitary one. Consummate self-realisation is an exception. Nevertheless, the entire unfolding of force sketched out here is aimed at it. At the beginning of part v there is a reversal of perspective: After the priority of the body, there is now apparently something like a priority of the *mens* as the instance of reason (cf. the Marxist debate about the relationship between determination through the economic and the primacy of the political). Now the previously developed category of the *potentia mentis*, the conscious power over the affects, is unfolded (v, prop. 6; prop. 20 schol.; prop. 42 schol.; 1996, 165, 170 et sq., 180 et sq.). In true knowledge the whole field of the human passions and conflicts is apprehended in its natural necessity (for **Spinoza**, this is identical with the contemplation of God), and thereby, true action is given (v, prop. 18, dem.; 1996, 169). Contemplation (though in the strict sense of a theory of natural necessity) and action are not (yet) seen here as opposites. If in God/Nature the whole causal nexus in all its details is comprehended, apparently not only are the ‘conditions’ for right action given, but this is right action itself. It is the case that ‘the more perfection each thing has the more it acts, and the less it is acted on’ (v, prop. 40; 1996, 179). However, ‘perfection [perfectio] is (according to II, def. 6; 1996, 32) only another word for reality [realitas]’. Acting and reality [Wirken und Wirklichkeit] are intertwined in this dynamic ontology.

The affect of the increase in A is *laetitia* (joy); *tristitia* (sadness) is the affect of its decrease. *Acquiescentia in se ipso* (self-satisfaction) is the joy arising from man regarding himself and his capacity to act (*agendi potentia*), just as dejection is the affect of *impotentia* (III, aff. def. 25 and 26; 1996, 108; cf. also III, prop. 55 schol.; 1996, 98 et sq.; IV, prop. 52 and 53; 1996, 143). Therefore, in his self-realisation man is with himself instead of being in the service of a stranger, active instead of passive. Thus the Spinozist programme points consistently to an emancipatory feature of the unfolding of force (and to that extent the not unproblematic juxtaposition of *potentia agendi* with the critical-psychological concept of 'A' [Handlungsfähigkeit] is justified).

In light of the experiences of Marxisms, two problems associated with this program are to be considered. The first concerns the claim that *potentia agendi* is *potentia cogitandi*. To the extent that the *deus-substantia* is thought of as a 'field of force', the conventional teaching of a *potentia absoluta* could be denied and combated. However, it is questionable whether this still holds for the God of the last part of the *Ethics*: 'insofar as he can be explained by the human *mens*, considered under the aspect of eternity' (v, prop. 36; 1996, 176). The Spinozean sage, who comprehends himself and the conditions of the constitution of his life in God/nature, is in possession of the high claim to act with adequate knowledge. Only his peers share this knowledge. He who is dependent on the *potentia imaginandi* cannot do otherwise than regard the sage's claim (or, a Spinozism translated into political Leninism: the avant-garde?) to better knowledge as a claim to social power. According to the offensive and subversive characteristic style of **Negri**, the critical *potentia* (self-unfolding) of the masses is to attack every kind of *potestas* (unfounded authority). But according to **Terpstra** this dream goes awry: In Spinozism too, a secret, equally unfounded *potestas* – a knowledge as *potentia absoluta* in a new shape – announces itself. If a critical theory is to find in **Spinoza** a pioneering thinker and supporter, whom it can disregard only to its own detriment, then its Spinozism can only be heretical. It can then adopt the concept of the *potentia agendi* as A [or as capacity to act] only as a less absolutist concept. 'But', says **Althusser**, 'to be a heretical Spinozist is almost part of Spinozism' (1976, 132, transl. corr., ks).

The second problem requires taking into account 'the back side of the mirror'. Undoubtedly the insistence on cognition has a great significance where opaque powers are legitimised, or at least accepted, precisely by reference to their opacity. It is equally certain the emphasis on joy as a moment of increasing A has great value for the formation of militant subjects. But what does one make of the non-cognitive or irrational aspects of life in other people and in oneself? For example, does emancipation have nothing to do with children, who live almost exclusively in the *potentia imaginandi*? Does it have nothing to

do with the disabled, whose *potentia agendi corporis et mentis* might after all be constituted completely differently from that of the sage? And are the moments of passivity and dejection, in which one is simply 'down' and cannot hear or believe the language of revolution, simply moments one should forget because they only produce 'inadequate' realisations? Is this last assumption even correct? Is the most important affect produced by joy really *acquiescentia in se ipso*, 'self-satisfaction' (even when the concept is freed from its petty-bourgeois meaning)? Are external factors to be regarded only as inhibitors of self-realisation, or is there perhaps an inherent value in alterity that needs to be taken into consideration? A relevant theory of A has to bypass such pitfalls, which have not always been avoided in the history of certain Spinozisms and socialisms. A contemporary reading of Spinoza needs to interpret the *Ethics* anew starting from here, i.e. from the question of alterity, about which the opening passage of the *Ethics* states: *omnia, quae sunt, vel in se, vel in alio sunt* ('Whatever is, is either in itself or in another'; I, ax. 1).

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II. *Critical Psychology*. – The word *Handlungsfähigkeit* [agency], which is commonly used in everyday life and politics, has not undergone any systematic elaboration in academic psychology; nor has it received conceptual status, although the *Lexikon der Psychologie* (2000) contains over 30 other word combinations which begin with 'action' (from 'incentives to action' [Handlungsan-

reize] to 'goals of action' [Handlungsziele]). This can be regarded as a symptom of the professional science of psychology's renunciation of an elementary category of the subjectively experienced and practically (re)produced human-world-connection, in favour of an emphasis on disparate, single concepts that tend to be detached from everyday problems. On the other hand, in *Critical Psychology*, which pursues the objective of a paradigmatic foundation of emancipatory psychology (**Holzkamp** 1970 and 1983 in *GdP*), A is the concept through which the (everyday practical) mediation of the individual with social reproduction is conceptualised: 'personal A' is seen as 'the control [Verfügung] of one's own living conditions, which is mediated by society as a whole' (*GdP*, 239). Psychological concepts must accordingly be specified as 'instances, dimensions, aspects, levels of existential orientation [Befindlichkeit]/A' (539). Terminologically, Klaus **Holzkamp** (*SE*, 71; *GdP*, 70 et sqq.) sets the concept of A apart from the concept of activity in **Leontiev's** sense, because the latter also includes pre-human activities.

1. To regard A as a basic category of Marxist subject science requires the determination of its relationship to work. 'Men can be distinguished from animals by [...] anything else you like. They themselves begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to *produce* their means of life [transl. corr.]' (*MECW* 5/31 [3/21]). Since human existence is societal, personal A entails the transcending of merely immediate-cooperative contexts of life; transcending directed at participating in control of the overall societal process produced by work. The psychologically explosive nature of the societal mode of existence lies in the fact that, in the course of and as a result of its development, the immediacy of the connection between the creation and the use of the means and conditions of life by one and the same individual is disrupted. Accordingly, the psychic has to be specified with regard to this 'objective fundamental relationship of the overall societal mediatedness of individual existence' (**Holzkamp**, *GdP*, 193). This leads to a rejection of the psychological illusion that small and intimate everyday practices and struggles can be theoretically and methodically separated from their societal dimensions. The 'subjective experience of the limitation of A' requires 'overcoming this limitation' in order to avoid anxiety accompanying the loss of individual A (241). Under these premises **Holzkamp** wants to relieve **Marx's** statement that labour is life's prime need [Lebensbedürfnis] (*MECW* 24/87 [19/21]) 'of all misinterpretations': "labour" can only be meant to the extent that it allows the individual to have joint control of the social process, i.e. makes it "capable of action". Then, however, 'A' is the primary need of human life – 'as the most general quality of the framework of a human and humane existence' (*GdP*, 243). – As

much as it seems suitable for criticising the subjection to wage labour, Frigga Haug (1987) contends that this formulation fails to consider the sensuously-pleasurable dimension of ‘self-actuation in the creation of material life’, freed from the form of wage labour (81). Labour as life’s prime need means: ‘If people succeed in liberating themselves from material misery and domination, then the creation of material life is productive enjoyment and development of their capacities’ (80).

2. In the history of psychology as a history of unresolved controversies, A stands for a way of thinking that seeks to overcome the abstract opposition between the environmental determinacy of “behaviour” (in psychological nomothetics and sociological “economism”) and the world detachment of subjective creation of meaning [Sinnstiftung] (idiography). Psychological subject science includes ‘the consideration of objective conditions [...]: What is excluded is thus only the reduction of my relation to reality to my “conditionality”, disregarding my possibility of control’ (Holzkamp, *GdP*, 539). The material correlates of this control are also disregarded when, with the intention of asserting the intentionality of the subject, action is ultimately sublimated to mean only creation of meaning [Sinnstiftung], ‘disengaged’ from the relations forming meaningful events in ways that need to be deciphered from case to case. The relation between ‘objective determinacy’ and ‘subjective determination’ is thereby misconstrued again. Against the background of the category of A, which wants to render this connection comprehensible, the world side, i.e. natural and social conditions, is conceived of as economic, cultural, symbolic *‘Bedeutungen’* (*‘meanings’* that are *objective* [sachlich] and cannot be reduced to one another), to which the individual can and must relate – just as it can and must relate to itself and others (through “our” respective *personal* meanings for one another). The determination of human action through meanings, specified in this manner, is not immediate. Instead, meanings are grasped as possibilities for action, which the individual draws upon reasonably: on the basis of its experience of the surrounding conditions as well as its needs and interests, the individual chooses its premises from the possibilities for action. So it substantiates its necessary intentions for action, if the difficulties at hand and the subjective need for their solution compel it to do so. Thus, premises for action constitute a subjectively grounded relationship to the world. The ambiguity entailed by this does not imply arbitrariness: the understandability of action is based on the fact that the respective relation of premises and reasons can be comprehended (for a methodological reflection, cf. Markard 1991). It requires the interdisciplinary ‘ascertainment of the historically determined objective living conditions’ on the ‘societal-theoretical level of relation’ (Holzkamp, *GdP*,

356), as well as the exploration of the ‘subjective space of possibility’ (368) of the individual through the inclusion of biographical aspects. With the differentiation between the ‘real and the phenomenal aspect of A’, **Holzkamp** intends to address, in this context, the problem of self-deception and rationalisation, and thereby the ‘conditions of the *subjective “withdrawal of control”*’ (369) and their overcoming.

3. Just as Marxism, in its way of working out ‘the relation between objective determinacy and subjective determination of the historical process’, is ‘historical subject science par excellence’, so Critical Psychology as ‘special subject science’ aims at the ‘development of the subjectivity-active component, i.e. self-determination, in individual life activity’ (**Holzkamp** 1978, 64; emphasis removed). If in societal perspective the social life-situation of the individual appears to be a mere dependent factor, then from the individual standpoint this relation is ‘virtually reversed’: The attainment of individual A becomes fundamentally precarious insofar as the ‘overall societal mediatedness of individual existence’ means the life of the individuals takes place in a ‘contrariwise structuring of the overall societal process through the mode of production on the one hand, and the structuring of the personal life process through the reproduction of individual existence on the other’ (*GdP*, 358). This situation is escalated in a specific way under capitalism. Since society is never given to the individual in its totality, but only in those sections the individual is confronted with, the ‘meaning’ of specific circumstances can only be understood from their function in overall reproduction with its division of labour.

The societal level of reference with which capitalist power relations are grasped entails that *possibilities* to act always exist in a relationship to power-mediated *hindrances* to action; a relationship that needs to be clarified accordingly. For the individual there is the ‘double possibility’ of either “using” only *conceded* possibilities and accordingly to reproduce suggested forms of thinking in a ‘restrictive’ mode of coping, or of extending these possibilities themselves – if necessary in association with others. The first possibility may strengthen the problems it is confronted with; the second involves the risk of failure and of encountering additional, greater problems. This conflict-laden alternative of individual A constitutes the core of subject-scientific research, as an analysis of functionalities of action and extension of possibilities to act (376). It is categorially conceptualised by the differentiation of ‘restrictive’ vs. ‘generalised’ A (367 et sqq.). With the term ‘generalised A’, which he understands as determining the direction of inquiry, **Holzkamp** reflects on the *perspective* (of the creation) of living conditions, under which ‘there is no need

for conducting one's life at the expense of others', but beyond the dominance of competition and particular interests "where the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all" (MECW 6/506 [4/482]) (SWr, 2013a, 86 et sq.).

Against this background, the central task of critical-psychological research on A is to work out the relationship between the immediate-situational context, or rather its concrete experience (of intuition), and the social structures that shape them both. These structures cannot themselves be reconstructed intuitively, but only theoretically; they must be "conceptualised" (Holzkamp 1984b, 14). Without their reconstruction the relation to the world of psychological research would be "flat". It 'can only adequately be comprehended when we move from the mere actuality of the world to its *structure*' (SWr, 2013b, 277). – In his examination of phenomenological psychology Holzkamp emphasised that this does not imply reductionistically overlooking phenomenal determinations such as the temporal and spatial arrangements of everyday life or their associated ways of experiencing and coping. Instead, their peculiarity of content needs to be clarified in relation to the 'overarching objective context in which they stand': as a scientific realisation of the path 'from the imagined concrete to the abstraction, and then to the mental concrete' (1984b, 50 et sq., cf. Marx, MECW 28/37 [42/35]). In this respect, 'a main task of our analysis is to adequately elaborate [...] the *mediation* between the societal structure and the individual' (SWr, 2013b, 277). The conceptual pair 'restrictive' and 'generalised A' does not serve to typify or guide people, but to analyse situations in which 'due to a current restriction/threat of A, there arises a subjective necessity to act in order to overcome the threat' (GdP, 370). This occurs in situations in which 'short-sighted, "restrictive" figures of reason [...] can be detrimental to one's own, generalised life interests. This means [...] an attempt is made to come to terms with dominant instances while psychologically repressing the self-damaging consequences inherent therein. The alternative is the conscious reflection of these consequences'. (1990, 38)

Holzkamp emphasises that relations of contradiction do not exist between the poles of the conceptual pair 'restrictive'-'generalised', which would run counter to the analytical function of the concepts; rather, the structure of grounds [Begründungsstruktur] of the category 'restrictive A' is 'contradictory in itself': "Generalised A" is the alternative if the restrictive, self-damaging character of a reason pattern becomes clear to me' (39). This is an alternative which, in view of the persistence of the above-mentioned relations of contradiction, is not something simply factual or granted but rather something that is assigned to [aufgegeben], given as an open task; psychological research therefore needs to analyse it in terms of problems and practice (Markard/ASB 2000).

In light of the fundamental significance of the category of A, the psychological ‘functional aspects of A, the individual cognition/valuation/motivation processes’ (**Holzkamp**, *GdP*, 383) and the interpersonal relationships or specific psychological concepts (for example ‘learning’, **Holzkamp**, *LSG*, 1993) can only be differentiated within the framework of the problem of restrictive vs. generalised A. – The fact that, in principle, the premises-reasons relation can be clarified makes actions understandable both in their subjective functionality for the respective individual and intersubjectively, thus providing a scientific psychology from the generalised standpoint of the subject. Against this background, psychological theories serve the (social) self-understanding of people. Such thinking excludes the verdict of the ‘irrationality’ of humans or their actions (*GdP*, 370 et sq.), as such a verdict merely signals abandonment of the attempt to understand the subjective functionality and reasonableness of action. The background is the a priori assumption that ‘the human being cannot harm itself consciously’ (350).

4. With A, Critical Psychology formulates a counter-concept to Freudo-Marxism insofar as in the latter psychoanalysis is to take over the subjective and ‘Marxism’ the societal part (**Lichtman** 1999; **Holzkamp-Osterkamp** 1976, 196 et sqq.; **Holzkamp** 1984a, 39; 1978, 53 et sqq.). The problem is that the Freudian anti-societal model of instincts [Triebmodell] is incompatible with the Marxist concept of the relationship between individual and society. In the psychoanalytic model of instincts, the suppression of individual demands for life and happiness can be thought of, but not the sublation of this suppression on a social scale. However, this does not mean that Freudian psychoanalysis did not play an essential role in the development of the critical-psychological category of A. In her reinterpretation of psychoanalysis, Ute **Osterkamp** (1976, 184 et sqq.) had to distinguish between the categorical – ‘subject-scientific’ – level of psychoanalysis and its contentual problematic: The difference ‘explicated by **Freud** between the mode of appearance and the essence of subjective self- and world-experience’ should not be lost (**Holzkamp** 1984a, 37). In accordance with the conception of the unconscious developed through examination of **Freud**, ‘the principal prerequisite for the development of the “unconscious” is understood to be ‘the ‘contradiction between the attempt to secure A without risk within the existing framework of control on the one hand, and the reduction of my “human” quality of life, for which I am co-responsible by waiving the possibility of participation in the joint extension of control on the other hand. The reason for this is the ‘complicity’ with the rulers in the attempt to gain restrictive A and the associated harm to oneself and to others: “The “unconscious” is neither an anthropological finality nor is it irrational. Rather, it is the

implicature of the subjective *groundedness and functionality of a framework of action which subordinates itself to the “rationality” of the rulers, ultimately of capital*’ (Holzkamp, *GdP*, 381 et sqq.).

5. The psychological insight into *class- and gender-specific* formations/openings of possibilities to act, an insight grounded in social theory, is intended to make a psychological contribution to emancipation. In the face of (the persistence of) restrictively functional self-effacement [Selbst-Bescheidung], as well as self-assertion in competition – which must always be questioned as to the extent to which it violates the life aspirations of others –, the alternative of the extension of control can only become subjectively functional to the extent that the individual can anticipate its realisation. This ultimately amounts to ‘winning a supraindividual countervailing power – through association in immediate cooperation – of an order of magnitude capable of sublating the threat to each individual’s existence’ (Holzkamp, *GdP*, 373).

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Both parts of the article translated by Kolja Swingle and Larry Swingle

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→ action, activity, anxiety, fear, collective action, competence/incompetence, conduct of life, contemplative materialism, counterpower, critical psychology, determination/destination, determinism, dialectics, emancipation, ethics, feelings, emotions, Freudo-Marxism, functional-historical analysis, imaginary, individual, individual reproduction, irrationalism, joy, meaning, mediation, metaphysics, mode of production, monism, nature, need, object, ontology, opportunism, pantheism, personality theory, power, practice, praxis, rationalism, rationality, reason, relation of forces, science of the subject, self-organised activity, self-realisation, Spinozism, spirit, mind, strange, alien, strangeness, subjectivism, substance, Theses on Feuerbach, thought, thought form, unconscious, wisdom, work/labour

→ Angst/Furcht, anschauernder Materialismus, Arbeit, Bedeutung, Bedürfnis, Bestimmung/Determination, Denken, Denkform, Determinismus, Dialektik, Emanzipation, Ethik, Feuerbach-Thesen, fremd/Fremdheit, Freude, Freudo-marxismus, funktional-historische Analyse, Gefühle/Emotionen, Gegenmacht, Gegenstand, Geist, Gesellschaft, Gott, Handlung, Imaginäres, individuelle Reproduktion, Individuum, Irrationalismus, kollektives Handeln, Kompetenz/Inkompetenz, Kräfteverhältnis, Kritische Psychologie, Lebensführung, Macht, Metaphysik, Monismus, Natur, Ontologie, Opportunismus, Pantheismus, Persönlichkeitstheorie, Praxis, Produktionsweise, Rationalismus, Rationalität, Selbsttätigkeit, Selbstverwirklichung, Spinozismus, Subjektivismus, Subjektwissenschaft, Substanz, Tätigkeit, Unbewusstes, Vermittlung, Vernunft, Weisheit

Anticolonialism

A: al-‘adā’līl-ist‘amār. – F: anticolonialisme. – G: Antikolonialismus. – R: anticolonializm. – S: anticolonialismo. – C: fǎn zhímínzhǔyì 反殖民主义

The ideology and political stance of A is based on recognition of the right of all peoples to dispose of an independent state that participates in the state system with other states on the basis of legal equality. This right is new: as a universal right, it was not declared until 1945, on the occasion of the founding of the United Nations. Its recognition implies that various types of units – designated as nations, ethnic groups, peoples etc. – are recognised as numbering among those historical actors who are capable of expressing a common will. Thus the debate requires stipulating the criteria according to which collective units are accorded the right to self-determination; it also requires specifying the conditions a people needs to meet in order to be able to respect the rules of the international state system.

Oppression of ethnic, linguistic or religious groups goes back to the earliest times of antiquity, regardless of whether the group in question constitutes the totality of a people or a minority within a people. Rome provides a familiar example. While oppression is often closely linked to one or another form of labour exploitation, it nevertheless represents a phenomenon in its own right, which at times can even exist independently of exploitation. Yet by comparison to economic theory and the theory of labour exploitation, the theory of oppression is still in its early stages of development – as is the theory of politics, and of power in general.

The development of the capitalist world system has been based, since its mercantilist origins in the 17th cent., on a massive expansion of the fact of colonialism, which assumes five different forms, each with its own specific functions: 1. The colonies based on European resettlement – be it in unpopulated or scarcely populated areas, be it by means of the extermination of the local population (New England and Canada, and later South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand) – are the product of an immense migratory movement, caused by capitalist development in Europe, which drives poor peasants off the land. The emigrants recreate a system of simple commodity production that is free of all feudal fetters. Animated by an anticolonialist ideology, of which the American Revolution represents the finest example, the colonists quickly take up the struggle for independence and against the metropolises.

2. In certain areas of Latin America, the decimated, but not fully exterminated populations are subjected, by Atlantic mercantilism, to a form of exploitation that targets first natural resources, and then agriculture. In such cases (e.g. Brazil), the anticolonialist independence movement emerging at the beginning of the 19th cent. is associated with the local ruling classes, which are of Iberian origin (Creoles). The movement, which opposes the monopolies of the declining metropolises, is supported by Great Britain, the ascending power within the capitalist system. 3. A third form of colonisation is represented by the actual colonies of this period, whose significance derives from the extraction of surplus value via the exploitation of slaves (the Antilles, the US South, northeastern Brazil). Here, A assumes the form of a violent slave uprising, Haiti during the French Revolution being the most prominent example. 4. The colonisation of Asia's large populated territories (India, Indonesia, and the Philippines) only integrates with the new capitalist system following the industrial revolution, becoming, in the 19th cent., both a source of agricultural resources and a sales market for the manufacturing industries of the metropolises. 5. Finally, control of the seas allows England (and, in a subordinate position, France) to establish a global web of maritime commercial centres. The General Act of the Berlin Conference (1884/85) is the prelude to a new wave of colonial conquest, leading, after a number of years, to the division of Africa. At the same time, the Asian states (China, Persia, the Ottoman Empire) are reduced, *de facto*, to the status of 'semi-colonies'. This is when the modern colonialist ideology emerges, attempting to justify itself by reference to the West's 'civilising mission'.

The counterattack by the victims of the imperial system is not long in coming. As early as the end of the 19th cent., we see the development of national liberation movements that act as the anti-imperialist and domestic agents of social and political reform. This movement provides the link to modern A, which leads, after the Second World War, first to recognition of the law of nations and then, following the Bandung Conference (1955), to an acceleration of general decolonisation, particularly in Africa.

It has been observed that the colonial phenomenon was specific to the phases of intensified competition between various metropolises vying for world hegemony: specific, that is, to the period of the 17th and 18th cent.s, characterised by the confrontation between England and France, and to the period of 1880–1945, characterised by the conflict between the imperialisms analysed by **Lenin**. By contrast, the brief periods during which the hegemonic power genuinely exercises its power (England between 1815 and 1870, the USA after the Second World War) see this power defending the principle of opening the world to all competitors (the free trade of the 19th cent., the corporate freedom

of today) – a principle that is very much compatible with the formal recognition of independent statehood.

Thus colonialism is distinct from the more essential phenomenon of inequality within capitalism's worldwide expansion, a phenomenon characterised by the polarisation of centre and periphery. This polarisation can by no means be reduced to the imperialist-colonialist form it assumed between 1880 and 1945. It is an immanent feature of the capitalist system and accompanies each of that system's developmental stages, from the system's origins until today.

While the colonial form may appear archaic, it persisted into the 1990s in two cases: that of Palestine, a territory claimed for colonisation by Zionist settlers, and that of South Africa, where the apartheid regime denied the African majority the rights of a people. These forms were only able to survive thanks to their integration into imperialism's global strategies.

Enlightenment philosophy gave rise to a first anticolonialist ideology, which even extended, at the moment of the French Revolution's radicalisation, to solidarity with the insurrectionaries of Haiti. Later, the European liberal left and even the dominant currents of the European labour movement (Second International) renounced A. The latter even went as far as justifying the 'objectively progressive' effects of colonisation. In this respect as in others, the break enacted by **Lenin** laid the foundations for a new internationalism, capable of linking workers in the developed capitalist world to the oppressed and exploited peoples of the periphery. To this day, this goal remains an unfinished task.

Confronted with the problem of the unequal development of capitalism, Marxism consistently assumed positions that were in principle anti-imperialist, anticolonialist and anti-neocolonialist. **Marx** and **Engels** criticised the corrupting effect of England's colonisation of Ireland and Russia's colonisation of Poland: 'A people that oppresses others cannot emancipate itself' (MECW 24/11 [18/527]). While the Second International later shifted towards a pro-colonialist position, **Lenin** presented in 1917 a theory of imperialism as the 'highest stage of capitalism' (CW 22, 185 et sqq.) that linked the formation of monopolies in the capitalist centres at the end of the 19th cent. to the division of colonial territories, inter-imperialist conflict and the corruption of the 'worker aristocracy'. Following the first Congress of the Peoples of the East (Baku, September 1920), the Third International called upon the working classes of the West to engage in practical solidarity with the peoples struggling for national liberation. It was in this spirit that **Stalin** claimed the Afghan emir resisting British aggression is objectively more progressive than those British workers, organised in the Labour Party, who support their imperialist masters. Following the Bandung Conference (1955), the USSR finally broke out of the isolation the

Western powers had confined it to since 1917, and did so precisely by supporting the liberation movements in Asia and Africa, as well as the radically anti-imperialist and anti-neocolonialist states that national liberation had produced. The tide has now turned, due to the dissolution of the Soviet system: on the occasion of the 1991 Gulf War, the new Russia has sided with the unified camp of capitalist countries.

While colonisation in the narrow sense is a phenomenon specific to particular epochs, the opposition of centre and periphery is immanent to capitalism's global expansion from the outset. Yet analysis of the causes and mechanisms of this global polarisation, which is associated with capitalism, and of its consequences for political action, remains incomplete. Historical Marxism may even have underestimated this polarisation, like socialist thought in its entirety. Within its optimistic vision, historical Marxism hoped the bourgeoisies would play their historical role by ensuring a development of the forces of production that homogenises the conditions of class struggle across the globe. In a departure from this view, Rosa **Luxemburg** formulated the hypothesis, in *Accumulation*, that the reproduction of capital requires its extension to pre- and non-capitalist milieus. While **Lenin** rejected **Luxemburg's** theoretical argument, he did take note of unequal development and suggested, in his theory of the 'weakest link' (**Stalin**, Wks 6, 100; cf. **Lenin**, CW 33, 112 et sq. and CW 5, 502), that the socialist world revolution could be initiated from the peripheries of the system.

The theory and practice of 'socialist transition' must be reexamined and criticised in light of the proposed analyses of actually existing world capitalism's polarisation. Confronted with the intolerable social consequences of this polarisation, it is up to the peoples of the periphery to revolt and resist subordination to the polarising logic of capitalism's global expansion. Following the Russian revolution, the revolutions in China, Vietnam, and Cuba have developed a strategy of building socialism in the peripheries of the world system that was systematised by **Mao Zedong's** theory of the 'uninterrupted' revolution of the 'New Democracy' (1940, SelWks 2, 339–84). At the opposite pole of Marxist-inspired thought, post-1955 Soviet theory oriented itself toward supporting the national bourgeois development attempts of the Bandung period (1955–1975). This practice was considered opportunist and ineffective by those who, like **Che Guevara**, started from the premise that the historical role of the bourgeoisies in the periphery was unable to transcend the limit of the subalternisations imposed by global capitalism ('compradorisation').

Historical experience shows that the entire theory of the transition from global capitalism to communism (a transition that must also be global) needs to be thought through anew. A better understanding of the nature of capitalist

polarisation is a necessary prerequisite to a renewed forward movement of socialist thought and action, as well as of creative Marxism.

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→ Chinese revolution, colonial mode of production, Cuban revolution, decolonisation, delinking, dependency theory, Enlightenment, exploitation, French revolution, guerilla, imperialism, labour aristocracy, liberation, national liberation, neocolonialism, nonalignment, October revolution, oppression, peasant movement, people, peripheral capitalism, periphery/centre, power, solidarity, Third World, three worlds theory, unequal exchange, Vietnam war

→ Abkopplung, Arbeiteraristokratie, Aufklärung, Ausbeutung, Bauernbewegung, Befreiung, Blockfreiheit, chinesische Revolution, Dependenztheorie, Drei-Welten-Theorie, Dritte Welt, Entkolonisierung, Französische Revolution,

Guerilla, Imperialismus, koloniale Produktionsweise, Kolonialismus, Kubanische Revolution, Macht, nationale Befreiung, Neokolonialismus, Oktoberrevolution, peripherer Kapitalismus, Peripherie/Zentrum, Solidarität, ungleicher Tausch, Unterdrückung, Vietnam-Krieg, Volk

Being a Marxist

A: mārksī, mārksīya. – F: être Marxiste. – G: Marxistsein / Marxistinsein. – R: byt' marksistom, byt' marksistkoj. – S: ser Marxista. – C: shì Mǎkèsīzhǔyì zhě 是马克思主义者

Active subjects move into focus with 'BM', the object of this article. The political thus appears in the personal. It is not bare conditions that are Marxist, but people. The ethical dimension of their action and their forbearance comes into the field of vision. Objectivism finds itself restricted to their conditions. To give an idea of the historical situation and generational affinities, the Marxists cited in this article who came of age in the 130 years after Marx's death will be introduced with their birth years. The way they expressed the characteristics of their specific forms of existence is the material. The same thing can be said of this which has been said of how Wolfgang Heise (b. 1925) approached the ideas collected in his library: that through them he 'could fully make present, at the very least as foreign thinking, even those ideas which are not overtly conveyable, which perhaps cannot even be conceived of in one's own words' (Reschke 1999, 16). Precisely for this reason, and in the expectation of uncomfortable truths, 'renegades' too are carefully listened to.

Innumerable people have considered themselves Marxists. At the high point of the revolutionary struggles of the 20th cent., they counted in the millions. There are fresh influxes, depending on the historical constellations, from ever new generations and regions of the world. There are good reasons for this, 'but the reasons are guiding rather than forcing ones', in Norman Geras's (b. 1943) words, and at play here 'is a sort of existential choice one makes' (2011, 5). Nevertheless, and unlike in the question of being a socialist or communist, it is seldom and usually only incidentally that there is a theoretical reflection on BM, its driving forces and practices, its contradictions and crises, its productivity, and its manifold forms.

As long as 'state socialism' asserted its claim to the sole representation of Marxism, whose name was overwritten with Marxism-Leninism, it reproduced its own growing gap between claim and reality as the external antagonism between the 'ideal-socialist' counter-world of unorganised BM and 'actually existing socialism', or rather, as Johannes Agnoli (b. 1925) was fond of gibing, the 'nominal-socialist countries' (in Mandel/Agnoli 1980, 17). The collapse of these countries in Europe and the integration of the non-European people's republics

dominated by party communism into the capitalist world market have excised the basis for this antagonism. Out from the shadow of the CP and its claim – still affirmed in 2010 by Hans Heinz Holz (b. 1927) – to be ‘the sole [...] locus of historical truth’ BM has come forward again as a *historical form of identity* in its own right. Whether organised or unorganised, it contributes its intellectual practices of analysis, discussion, and communication in a multi-faceted social engagement.

The ‘post-communist situation’ (Haug 1993), in which BM has to shape itself from now on, is determined by the neoliberal emancipation of capital from the fetters of the social compromises won in conditions of inter-system competition and by the demolition of the nation-states’ protective shields against the world market within the accelerated transition to transnational high-tech capitalism. Its crises, accompanied by new war scenarios, are keeping the world in suspense. This situation is overdetermined by the fact that capital, as Georg Fülberth (b. 1939) has noted, ‘is constantly revolutionising society: through technological innovation and the mobilisation of consensus, in which the masses, through their desires, contribute to the further development of capitalism’, a process that can be characterised as a ‘passive revolution’: ‘the lower classes accept the hegemony of capital and themselves consolidate it through their own mobilisation’ (2013).

In this situation, Fülberth sees Marxism, with its core content historical materialism and the critique of political economy, in danger of becoming ‘academic, if it does not indeed completely disappear’ (ibid.). Yet the theoretical and scientific aspect of BM is not limited to academics or academic apparatuses. Together with the claim affirmed by Louis Althusser (b. 1918) ‘that a Marxist cannot fight, in what he writes or in what he does, *without thinking out the struggle*’ (PSPS, *Is it Simple* 1975, 208), BM implied, from its very first appearance, a historical materialist shift of perspective in the direction of social relations. Antonio Gramsci’s (b. 1891) concept of the ‘organic intellectual’ – which he rescued from academic confinement as well as from its confiscation in the form of the “free-floating” literati and instead derived from socialising practice [Vergesellschaftungshandeln] – is well-suited to express this aspect of BM.

At the same time, BM appears as a political-ethical form, since it confronts individuals with the responsibility for the social world and its relations with nature. The activity-orientation towards the ‘*categorical imperative to overthrow all relations* in which man is a debased, enslaved, contemptible being’ (CHPL, MECW 3/182 [1/385]) and towards the challenge to ‘hand it [the globe] down to succeeding generations in an improved condition’ (CIII, MECW 37/763 [25/784]) has its price. Franz Mehring (b. 1846) was one of the first to go on

record as realising that ‘the profession of historical materialism demands a high moral idealism, since it invariably brings with it poverty, persecution and slander, whereas every careerist makes historical idealism his cause, since it offers the richest expectations of all earthly goods, of happiness, of fat sinecures’ (1893, 442). Bertolt **Brecht** (b. 1898) has raised awareness that individuals do adhere to BM for ethical reasons, but not to be selfless, for BM brings something decisive to their own lives. ‘Whoever is incapable of being angered by a private injustice done to him will be little able to fight. Whoever isn’t capable of getting angry over injustice done to others won’t be able to fight for the Great Order’ (*Me-Ti*, 165 [GW 12, 576]).

Lucio **Lombardo Radice** (b. 1916) advises it is not enough to answer the why-question of BM. One would ‘also have to try to explain *how* one is a Marxist’; in so doing, he continues, it becomes ‘clear that there can no longer be a question of “Marxism” as such without making distinctions’ (1978, 219 et sq.). However, it is not differences in the direction that are at stake but the opposition between two modes of BM, specifically the ‘decisive, methodological boundary between conservative and progressive revolutionary Marxism’, freely adapted from **Goethe**’s invocations of the ‘eternal living action’, ‘to take what’s made and then re-make it, to find rigidity and break it, with effect to make creation new, its weaponed rigour soon enough undo’ (‘One and All’, CW 1, 243, transl. corr.). However, this challenge to create anew, to open up sedimented Marxism, to help bring it into a changed reality, unavoidably leads to conflicts not only with conservatives who seek protection in ossification but also with those who are openly looking for new paths. Consequently, it is necessary to think ‘the living and lived contradictions, that is, the dialectic’ of BM (**Lefebvre** 1959, 683), but also inner-Marxist conflicts, not only those of BM in the bourgeois-capitalist environment.

1. The genealogy of BM leads back to anti-Marxism. It was the opponents of **Marx** within the left who dubbed his adherents ‘Marxistes’ to isolate them. Jules **Guesde** (b. 1845), according to **Engels**, ‘in matters of theory [...] by far the most lucid thinker amongst the Parisians, and one of the few who takes no exception at all to the German origins of present-day socialism’, was defamed as ‘**Marx**’s mouthpiece’ (to **Bernstein**, 15 October 1881, 46/147 [35/231]). After the publication of the French translation of *C I* (1872–75), those thus stigmatised in France began to repurpose this epithet. That **Marx** distanced himself from it is attested by **Engels**. To Eduard **Bernstein**’s (b. 1850) ‘reiterated assertion that in France “Marxism” suffers from a marked lack of esteem’ **Engels** replied on 2 and 3 November 1882: ‘Now what is known as “Marxism” in France is, indeed, an altogether peculiar product – so much so that **Marx** once said

to **Lafargue**: “Ce qu’il y a de certain c’est que moi, je ne suis pas Marxiste” (46/356 [35/388]). In the same year – he was to live another six months, and was taking the cure in French-ruled Algeria fearing deportation by the political police if his presence were to come to the government’s attention – **Marx** spoke of the “Marxistes” and “Anti-Marxistes” having, at their respective socialist congresses at Roanne and St-Étienne, both done their damndest to ruin my stay in France’ (to **Engels**, 30 September 1882, 46/339 [35/100]). But at the same time, he seems to have gradually warmed to his comrades’ use of the term “Marxists” since the hostile ‘innuendo, “Marx is a ‘German’, alias ‘Prussian’, hence French ‘Marxistes’ too are traitors”, could no longer cut any ice with anyone, nor yet dare make itself “heard”, even for a moment. C’est un progrès’ (ibid.).

That there were also ‘anti-Marxist’ tendencies among the German socialists is attested a year after **Marx**’s death by **Karl Kautsky**’s (b. 1854) 16 July 1884 letter to **Engels** to whom he wrote that by writing articles for *NZ* he had ‘incurred the accusation of “Marxist one-sidedness and intolerance”’ (*Engels’ Briefwechsel*, 134).

The founding of the Second International (1889) brought with it the institutional breakthrough of BM, whatever the individual level of theoretical and political depth may have been. Looking back at the struggle with the ‘anarchists’ for hegemony in the labour movement, **Engels** wrote to **Marx**’s daughter **Laura Lafargue** (b. 1845): ‘we have proved to the world that almost all Socialists in Europe are “Marxists” (they will be mad they gave us that name!)’ (11 June 1889, 48/338 [37/235]). We seem still to be hearing hesitation when in 1896 in the case of **Antonio Labriola** (b. 1843), often called ‘Italy’s first Marxist’, ‘the critical communist, that is, the sociologist of economic materialism, or, as he is commonly called, the Marxist’ emerges (*EssMCH*, 222). Still in 1928, after the great split in the labour movement, **Otto Bauer** (b. 1881) said: ‘Socialist ideology: In practice, there is practically no other than Marxism, nor can there be’ (*Klassenkampf und Ideologie*, WA 9, 199).

‘BM’ soon opened up career opportunities in the rapidly growing organisations and press of Marxist social democracy. In the process **Engels** noted ‘the relative weakness – and this also applies in the field of theory – of the younger generation’ (to **Bebel**, 15 November 1889, 48/404 [111.30/58]). He was disquieted at the young academic intellectuals’ arrival ‘just in time to take most of the editorial posts in the new papers that were then proliferating’ (28 August 1890, 49/21 [37/450]). He wrote to **Paul Lafargue**: “These gentry all dabble in Marxism, albeit of the kind you were acquainted with in France ten years ago and of which **Marx** said: “All I know is that I’m not a Marxist.” And he would doubtless say of these gentry what **Heine** said of his imitators: “I sowed dragons and

I reaped fleas” (22). This disquiet is still echoed a generation later when Rudolf Hilferding (b. 1877) wrote to Kautsky that soon “Marxists” and “anti-Marxists” would equal each other in their total ignorance of Marx’s ideas and method. A pity that we did not register a trademark for “Marxism” early on’ (IISG Amsterdam, Bequest Kautsky; cited from Krätke 1996, 73, fn. 5).

From the opposed viewpoint, Rosa Luxemburg (b. 1871) reflected on the crippling shadow that Marx was in danger of exerting as ‘a somewhat restrictive influence [...] upon the free development of theory in the case of many of his pupils’ (‘Stagnation and Progress of Marxism’, 2010, 74 [GW 1/2, 364]). This danger and this concern point to a problem that was to accompany BM in its historical development. Just as being a Christian is conceived in early modern theology as *imitatio Christi* (Thomas à Kempis), so in ascendant social democracy, but at first negatively, the growing intellectual BM was thought of as an imitation of Marx, who had by then died. In what followed, BM, from the positive point of view, meant on the one side individual Marx discipleship, on the other side the collective commitment to the social movement that saw itself as ‘Marxist’, believing that ‘an historical act can only be performed by “collective man”, and this presupposes the attainment of a “cultural-social” unity’ (Gramsci, *SPN*, N. 10.11, §44, 349). On the whole, a twofold requirement of theoretical competence and practical engagement is posited. It is in this that Marx’s ambivalence reproduced itself undetected: inwardly because the claim can only be partially fulfilled; in another way outwardly, because for its part the social and political antagonisms continue to characterise the Marxist way of being in the tension between external perception and self-conception in a hostile or rivalrous environment. And just as Marxism, as a concrete-historical movement, arose from the connection between the labour movement and the critical theory of capitalism shaped by Marx and Engels, and fortified by Marx with the backbone of *Capital*, so BM was and still is conditioned by a tension-filled double affiliation, which is not necessarily organisational even if it is grounded in the insight that it is insufficient to analyse the world critically but that ‘the point is to *change* it’ (*ThF* 11, 5/5 [3/7])

Comment. – It should be noted that in German the adjective ‘Marxist’ (‘marxistisch’) and the noun denoting the actor ‘Marxist’ (‘Marxist’) are, in contrast to neighbouring languages, different words and that particularly in Anglo-Saxon there is often no distinction made between ‘Marxsche’ (Marxian, referring to words and ideas written or expressed by Marx) and ‘Marxistischen’ (referring to the Marxist characteristic of ideas and people other than Marx). – On the spread of the terms ‘Marxista, los Marxistas, Marxismo’ in Spanish-speaking areas, see the article of the same name at *Proyecto Filosofía en español* (www).

2. *Motivations and paths of becoming a Marxist.* – Henri Lefebvre insists that it is first necessary to come to an understanding regarding the phrases ‘being a Marxist, being a communist’. ‘One has imagined Marxism and communism in an ontological sense (Being) instead of the way in which Marx understood it as Becoming and Movement’ (1959, 683 et sq.). ‘It is not that you *are* a Marxist’, in Lucien Sève’s (b. 1926) words, ‘you *become* one. And in reality, one never reaches an endpoint with this becoming. For BM means not completing a prescribed programme but continuously inventing a position and a practice’ (2014). Here a permanent mode of being is set forth. But what about the initial Becoming?

2.1 *Resistant paths.* – One of the models is the transformation of a Saul into a Paul, of a persecutor into an ardent adherent. For example, **Mehring**’s transformation from vitriolic critic to one of the most important theoreticians of Marxism at the turn of the 19th cent. Still, in 1879 he pulled to pieces the ‘international fraud’ (cited in **Höhle** 1956) of social democracy and painted a nightmare scenario of the ‘victory of the international communist **Marx** [...] over the traditions of the national-oriented socialist **Lassalle**’ (74 et sq.). In 1893 he published, as an appendix to *The Lessing Legend*, the first concise presentation of historical materialism and in 1902 the first collected works *Aus dem literarischen Nachlass von Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels und Ferdinand Lassalle*. This four-volume edition ‘had the greatest significance. In a time of heated ideological and political conflicts between Marxists and Revisionists, **Mehring** made valuable, long-forgotten writings of the classics available again to the German workers and in so doing decisively contributed to the deepening and consolidation within the party of the revolutionary body of thought of undistorted and undiluted Marxism’ (**Höhle** 1956, 297).

A letter of Vera **Zasulich**’s (b. 1849) speaks to the same experience through which an initial critic can become an especially resilient and independent-minded Marxist. ‘Most of our young friends, our comrades, and indeed the best’, have taken up the study of the Marxian-socialist literature ‘intending to refute our arguments and have ended by accepting our ideas’ (to **Engels**, 3 April 1890, III.30/226). This model is repeated in the case of **Trotsky** (b. 1879). In *My Life* he recounts how as a young man he felt ‘repelled’ by Marxism (1929/1970, 99) and had written ‘a polemical article for a populist periodical in Odessa, taking issue with the first Marxist journal. The article had more epigraphs, quotations and venom than it had content’ (101). In his prison cell in Odessa he ‘read with delight two famous essays by the old Italian Hegelian-Marxist, Antonio **Labriola**, which reached the prison in a French translation’ (119; transl. corr.). However, it was only in exile (1900) that **Trotsky** became a Marxist. ‘Since 1896, when I had tried to ward off revolutionary ideas, and the following year, when I had done the same to Marxist doctrines even though I was already carrying

on revolutionary work, I had travelled far. At the time of my exile, Marxism had definitely become the basis of my worldview and the method of my thought' (127).

This path from critic to champion has been repeatedly taken. Two generations after **Trotsky** it was trodden by the theologian Helmut **Gollwitzer** (b. 1908) who saw himself 'as an anti-Marxist [...] after his experiences in Soviet imprisonment [...] until the 1960s' (**Rehmann** 1994, 9). For him, a key moment in his transformation 'from an exceptionally well-informed critic of "the" Marxist worldview into a pioneer of an operational Marxism within Christianity, who at the same time was active as a Christian pioneer within Marxism' (17), was an encounter at the World Conference for Church and Society within the Ecumenical Council of Churches in Geneva in 1966, where a cleric from Mozambique said in essence: 'You are not my brother as long as you cannot extricate yourself from your involvement in the First World's exploitative system' (see **Keller** 1988, 20). This transformation was fortified by the experience with a 'non-state/nonofficial Marxism that was critical of domination' in the extra-parliamentary opposition in the then Federal Republic of Germany (**Rehmann** 1994, 14).

2.2 *Intellectual paths.* – **Labriola** describes himself as someone who 'for many years had struggled with abstract philosophy and precisely through philosophy slowly arrived at socialism' and then even participated in 'practical propaganda' (to **Engels**, 3 April 1890, III.30/231). Here, to the astonishment of his bourgeois contemporaries, was a 'scholar' who 'from the heights of Kantian moral philosophy, by way of **Hegel's** philosophy of history and **Herbart's** *Völkerpsychologie*, arrived at the conviction that he should publicly advocate socialism as his specific profession' (ibid.). Certainly, it was not philosophy alone that brought this about: 'A long and continuous journey towards the real problems of life, a disgust at political corruption, and contact with workers, have gradually made the scientific socialist in the abstract into a real social democrat' (ibid.).

Like **Brecht**, who forty years later 'did not arrive at Marxism through pity for the proletarians but as a reader of Karl **Marx's** writings' (**Mayer** 1996, 39), his contemporary **Herbert Marcuse** (b. 1898), one of the defining figures of Critical Theory, became a Marxist on a path that led through theory. As a student he had turned to **Heidegger** in his search for a 'concrete' philosophy of time but then realised 'that this concretization was quite false' (1978, 125). During all of this time he 'had already read **Marx** [...]. Then the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844* appeared. This was probably the turning point. Here was, in a certain sense, a new **Marx**, who was really concrete and at the same time went beyond the parties' petrified practical and theoretical Marxism' (ibid.). **Mar-**

cuse's understanding of Critical Theory articulates the idea that 'up until the end Marxist theory itself was the integrating force that prevented, for example, economic problems from being treated solely as discipline-specific problems' (129). His work on Soviet ML that he published in the US in the 1950s (published in 1964 in German) became 'very valuable' for the autonomous-intellectual Marxists of the student movement 'for the critical assessment of the Soviet Union, indeed from a wholly new standpoint, neither that of Trotskyism nor of the Comintern' (**Dutschke** in **Marcuse** 1978, 136).

Iring **Fetscher** (b. 1922) describes as 'the deepest impression' of his period in Paris his encounter with Alexandre **Kojève** (b. 1902) whom he counts as 'one of the rare convinced Hegelians of our century [...] who was at the same time a convinced Marxist' (1983, 11), and whose commentary on the *Phenomenology of Spirit* he translated into German (1958). Through the reading of '**Lukács's** **Hegel** book that had to be published in Switzerland in 1948 because it appeared insufficiently orthodox to his comrades' (*ibid.*), but also the works of **Marx** and **Engels**, **Fetscher** was prepared for **Kojève's** **Hegel** interpretation, all the more so that 'through contact with Dresden, from where my mother settled in the West in 1948' he 'had come to numerous Marxist publications and had already read with great interest works by **Marx**, **Engels**, **Plekhanov**, Georg **Lukács**, and Ernst **Bloch**, which had been published there' (*ibid.*). He describes his relationship to Marxism as 'both critical and engaged. [...] In view of widespread ignorance and one-sided defamatory polemics I regarded as an important task to work out the far-reaching differences, indeed antagonisms, between the humanist critique of the early **Marx** and Stalinist Marxism's dogmatic doctrine of justification' (11 et sq.).

Rudi **Dutschke** (b. 1940), who had grown up in the GDR, was at first shaped by Christian socialism, and was part of the democratic socialist opposition to repressive state socialism, which barred him from university; he repeated his university-entrance diploma in West Berlin, settling there in 1961 to study philosophy and social sciences. Here he transformed himself into a Marxist – through thorough readings of the Marxist classics, starting with the young **Marx**. Drawn into the growing student movement via Situationist influences, he accomplished a second transformation to become its best-known leader, which is how he is remembered. – At approximately the same time and through partially identical readings the theologian Ton (Antonius) **Veerkamp** (b. 1933) came to BM in the Netherlands, and this in a practical perspective and in a situation which heralded the '68 movement: 'November 1965, Reading Room of the Library of the Theological Faculty in Maastricht. I read through a collection of writings of the "young **Marx**" specifically "The German Ideology. Feuerbach". At the time the political climate in the Netherlands was shifting, towards the left.

The “young Marx” was an insider tip among us. [...] I [...] saw myself confronted with an approach to history that [...] began to clear away the whole phantom of the history of ideas and of salvation. Ever since I have been a student of **Marx**, without becoming a doctrinaire Marxist’ (Letter to W.F. **Haug**, Dec. 2013).

‘The inadequacy of traditional science, the impossibility of anchoring it in personal life’, ‘produced’ in the art historian Jutta **Held** (b. 1933) ‘a diffuse tendency to opposition’, which in the 1960s ‘drove’ her ‘not only into the ranks of the protesting demonstrators but also led me to take up Marxist theory, which soon proved to me to be the only alternative’ (1988, 48). As with many others, this meant the beginning of ‘a self-organised “second doctorate”, in which – though with difficulty, heated conflicts and painful farewells, yet accompanied, as a whole, by euphoria – everything was reordered and re-dimensioned. Our science began to become more human and concrete. We no longer perceived artistic phenomena in isolation but learned to see them integrated within the dialectic of forces and relations of production’ (ibid.).

Helmut **Peitsch** (b. 1948) calls into question ‘the widespread periodisation’ that derives becoming Marxist from the ’68 movement, using the example of three of the younger generation of West German literary historians – Thomas **Metscher** (b. 1934), Helmut **Lethen** (b. 1939), and Gert **Mattenklott** (b. 1942) – since these scholars had already ‘declared themselves to be Marxists’ (2000, 127) in 1964 (**Metscher** in *Das Argument*), or 1966 (**Lethen** in *Alternative*, followed by **Mattenklott** in 1971), and already from 1961 ‘a specific shift in the direction of Marxism [had] taken place, which was evidenced in the editorials of *Das Argument* in an evolving theory of the intellectual’ (133). Marxism provided space for a self-conception of critical-scientific praxis, and through historical materialism, it consolidated the delegitimation of the intellectual post-fascism which continued to exist in universities and especially in German language and literature studies.

2.3 *The party trajectory.* – Ilya **Ehrenburg** (b. 1891), who came from a comfortable Jewish family, heard ‘from older Gymnasium students, for the first time’ at the age of 14 during the First Russian Revolution (1905) ‘about historical materialism, surplus value and many other things that appeared extraordinarily important to me and changed my life radically’ (1962, 91). In the following turbulent year, ‘I was pulled towards the Bolsheviks, to the romance of the unromantic. I had already read essays by **Lenin**’ (93). He became a militant Bolshevik and went into the underground and regarded the six-month jail time he served at the age of 17 for this engagement as ‘a kind of graduation’ (107).

After the experiences of the First World War, the thunderbolt of Russia’s October Revolution pulled millions of people worldwide into the gravitational field of the parties of the newly founded Communist International and thus

towards a **Marx** represented by the new **CPs** and interpreted by **Lenin**. Ernst **Bloch's** (b. 1885) pronouncement is emblematic here: 'ubi Lenin, ibi Jerusalem' (*PH*, 610 [GA 5, 711]) – 'where Lenin is there is Jerusalem'. This dictum was a response to Moses **Hess's** communist utopia of the New Jerusalem alluding to John, *Book of Revelation* 21, though not as a new vision descending from heaven but as an earthly one, a vision of which **Bloch** said that **Hess** 'would now no longer locate his imagined Jerusalem in Jerusalem, in the age of the Soviet Union and the movement towards Soviet Unions' (609 et sq.). Looking back in 1970, Georg **Lukács** (b. 1885) was no longer certain 'whether the First World War and the completely negative effect of my personal war experiences would suffice to change my attitude [...]. In any case, it was the Russian Revolution and the ensuing revolutionary developments in Hungary which made me into a socialist. And I have remained one ever since' (W 18, 431).

In the following epoch **BM** largely became a matter of being a communist, the relationship to **BM** itself often being secondary. To be sure, not immediately and not everywhere to the same extent. A significant phenomenon between the two world wars was Austro-Marxism, which claimed to be continuing Marxist social democracy as shaped by **Engels**. Furthermore, there were individual differences within the "organic composition" of the motif of organised action whose principal theoretical motif was **BM**. Wolfgang **Abendroth** (b. 1906), for example, appropriated Marxist theory in order to transmit it in left milieus; he learned in order to teach (and learned through teaching). The Communist Youth to which he belonged and which saw itself as a 'non-party-oriented educational community' (**Heigl** 2008, 37) wanted 'systematically to carry out Marxist schooling, to work through and disseminate Marxian literature [...]. We wanted to promote Marxist thinking on a broad level among the youth – and in so doing we became systematically schooled' (**Abendroth** 1976, 28). The organisations and groups that arose within the tide of a Marxist-oriented labour movement functioned literally as 'schools [...] in which people learned to become Marxists' (**Hobsbawm**, *Storia*, XVIII). To teach meant to learn in this context. This experience, though at a certain distance from the labour movement, was massively repeated in the late 1960s among university and gymnasium students and trainees in the course of what is too narrowly known as the student movement, an experience to which the origins of the **HCDM** ultimately go back.

For the generation of the Second World War resistance to fascism became an important driving force. Wherever a communist-led resistance movement fought against Nazi occupation being-a-Communist 'appeared earlier – and more often – than **BM**' (**Sève** 2014). Gajo **Petrović** (b. 1927) 'became a Marx-

ist and Communist as a gymnasium student [...] during [...] the Nazi-fascist occupation of Yugoslavia', which in practice meant that he participated 'in the liberation struggle through illegal activity in the occupied territory'. He came to the conviction 'that Marxism is the [...] theory that best sees the problems of human life and of contemporary society and is therefore also the best basis for the struggle not only against Nazi-fascism but against all forms of inhumanity and for a truly human, free society' (1978, 195 et sq.). In Italy, Lucio **Lombardo Radice** found his way to **Marx** as an 'anti-fascist-oriented twenty-year-old' (1978, 214 et sqq.). He wanted to fight against dictatorship. In his search for organised resistance he came upon the PCI, which was seeking to unify all anti-fascist forces in accordance with Popular Front policy established by the Seventh Congress of the CI in 1935. Coming from a Liberal family he sought to understand why the Liberals opposed this. He found the answer in the *Communist Manifesto*, which for him was reinforced by **Labriola's** *Essays on the Materialist Conception of History*: Behind ideas there were class interests. The group with which **Lombardo Radice** discussed **Marxian** texts was carrying out a prolonged philosophical and philological debate: 'Does the base determine the superstructure or just condition it?' Aldo **Natoli** (b. 1913) and **Lombardo Radice** were 'inclined to be anti-dogmatic and anti-mechanistic' and got hold of 'the writings of the Marxist classics in German in order to find out whether "bestimmen" [determine] or "bedingen" [condition] was the key word'. In this path 'from a critical idealism to a critical Marxism [...] **Lenin** did not play as great a role [...] as **Marx** and **Engels**, on the one side, and **Labriola**, and later **Gramsci** and **Togliatti**, on the other'. Even more, in view of the 'enormous difference between the basic conditions of Russia in 1905–1917 and Italy in 1935–1945' **Lombardo Radice** and **Natoli** were clear that 'just as **Lenin** had accomplished a revolution against [**Marx's**] *Capital*' (in **Gramsci's** words) they had to 'bring about a revolution against [**Lenin's**] *State and Revolution*'. As far as **Stalin** is concerned, **Lombardo Radice** describes his own attitude and that of his comrades as a divided one: To stand behind the Soviet Union – and with it also **Stalin** – was 'an absolute necessity of life in these tough years', while at the same time 'the continually more dogmatic and conservative Soviet Marxism, which was platitudinised in quotations, repetitions and "eternal truths"', was impossible for them. Besides, **Stalin** 'followed the same principle of a double truth' that they did, in that he 'supported [their] struggle for freedom and democracy' (218). Perhaps this is the reason why **Lombardo Radice** counts him, despite everything, 'among the great Marxist thinkers'.

Rossana **Rossanda**, eight years younger (b. 1924) also came first into the ranks of the CP through her engagement in the communist-led Resistance and

then secondarily arrived at Marxism. What she read of **Marx** was his concrete political-historical writings, while she still ‘dropped’ *Capital* at that time ‘as if it were not so urgent’ (2007, 92).

The intellectual and anti-fascist paths were contingent on each other in the case of Robert **Havemann** (b. 1910). In 1931 – while he was still an apolitical student of the natural sciences who was revolted by the Nazis’ anti-Semitism – a girlfriend had given him **Engels** to read. He could ‘at first not understand it at all, but every evening I had to study “Anti-Dühring” because it contained so much on the natural sciences [...]. I thus suddenly began to be interested in a movement with an extraordinary intellectual depth’ (1978a, 36). He became involved in the CP and transformed himself ‘within a year [...] into a passionate politically engaged person’ (37 et sq.).

Darko **Suvin** (b. 1930) relates how, later, during the height of Nazism: ‘**Marx** hit me like lightning and stayed with me’. That he had already read the *Manifesto* as a schoolboy and had entered the Communist Youth League he ascribes to ‘the existential experiences’ of youth of bourgeois Jewish origins whose family fled from German-occupied Zagreb to Italy where his father joined the Resistance in 1943 and he himself and his mother were brought by Communist partisans by boat to safety in liberated Bari. ‘Anti-fascism was the decisive experience that caused me to become and remain a Communist and then a Marxist’ (2014).

In the countries in which the communist-led resistance movement played a part in the liberation from fascism, many paths led to **BM** via the **CP** also in the immediate post-war years. Thus with **Althusser** communist engagement came first and **BM** at first took second place. ‘I was already a Communist [1949–50], and I was therefore trying to be a Marxist as well – that is, I was trying, to the best of my ability, to understand what Marxism *means*’ (*PSPS, Is it Simple*, 205). For him, theory was a dimension of membership. – The eight-years-younger **Sève** ‘wanted passionately to change life; the Communists taught me that to do this one had to change the world’ (2014).

In the Soviet-occupied part of Germany, in view of the ‘unparalleled radical dimensions of the collapse and of the enormity of the criminal evil that the Germans visited upon the world and upon themselves’, it was not hard for the historian Fritz **Klein** (b. 1924) to opt for the **SED** and the construction of socialism in the **GDR**; ‘in both respects the immense size of the tasks that lay before those who now wanted to do something different and finally better – all of this favoured simple thinking in terms of a few, absolutely understandable categories. The big No, which was so irrefutably necessary, was inseparable from the big Yes to the alternative that promised a radical new construction’ (2000, 8 et sq.).

2.4 *Paths of movement.* – The path to BM often leads through a rising and vibrant social movement. Where this occurs self-elaborated theoretical bases and political-ethical principles often have decisive weight. That Clara **Zetkin** (b. 1857) ‘came to **Marx** through **La[s]salle**’ (letter to Kurt **Eisner** 27 June 1918) had to do with the latter’s having embodied the element of movement within historical materialism. It was the same for **Mehring** and **Luxemburg** who defended **Lassalle** against **Marx**’s criticism. In **Luxemburg**’s eyes, **Lassalle** had ‘led the working class in a double-quick step, through an abbreviated and boldly taken byway [...], onto the same great historical path on which it is henceforth being led under **Marx**’s flag’ (GW 1/2, 156). August **Bebel** (b. 1840) emphasised that it was not Wilhelm **Liebkecht** who ‘made him into a Marxist’, as had been claimed, but that he ‘had [...] to read **Lassalle**’s writings in order to know what they [**Marx** and **Liebkecht**] meant’ (1910/1946, 116), and it was thus that in the 1860s, ‘like most of us who then became Socialists, I went from **Lassalle** to **Marx**. **Lassalle**’s writings were in our hands before we knew anything of **Marx** and **Engels**’ (1912, 79). In 1864 **Bebel** had a try at **Marx**’s *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* but could not understand it. ‘The first work of **Marx** which I really understood and enjoyed was his “Inaugural Address” advocating the formation of the “International Working Men’s Association”’ (ibid.); in 1866 **Bebel** joined the IWA. It was only at the end of 1869 that he ‘found leisure to study **Marx**’s first volume – “Capital” – in prison’ (ibid.).

It is often an inclination to contradict, combined with a keen desire for freedom and justice, which leads individuals towards BM. Leo **Löwenthal** (b. 1900), for example, depicts himself as a ‘rebel’ from his early youth, ‘and everything that was then oppositional, that is, to quote **Benjamin**, on the side of the losers in world history, attracted me as if by magic’ (1987, 25). The early years of the GDR philosopher Heinrich **Taut** (b. 1907) followed a similar trajectory. Already rebellious as a boy, he felt a ‘tempestuous’ attraction to Marxism as a student in Heidelberg in 1928 – to the horror of his famous father, the architect Bruno **Taut**, who prescribed a cure for him in the form of a semester in England, which however resulted in Heinrich getting to know the theory of imperialism in 1929 at London’s Indian House; in 1931, after a thorough reading of **Lenin** – above all *What Is To Be Done?* – and **Trotsky**, on his own initiative, and supplied only with a recommendation from the architect Ernst **May**, he set out on a dangerous journey to Russia in order to ‘prove or disprove the theory I had read’ (**Taut** 1995, 183 et sq.). He later recognised the state of mind he had been in when he read the Russian writer Lev **Kopelev**’s (b. 1912) autobiographical depiction of the state of mind ‘of those selfless, earnest, authentic – often murderous and not seldom suicidal – emotions that agitated and inspired our youth’ (ibid.)

The road towards BM became a mass phenomenon in the course of the '68 movement, as 'the most active parts of university youth in Western Europe and the USA [became] Marxist or quasi-Marxist almost overnight' (Nolte 1994, 54). Fritz Tomberg (b. 1932) experienced these students as 'having been almost naturally drawn into the maelstrom of the rebellion that reached its height in 1968. And it was almost equally natural for these rebellious students, after an initial anti-authoritarianism, to turn towards Marxism' (1988, 71). Hans-Jürgen Krahl (b. 1943), one of SDS's charismatic leaders, describes his journey – characteristic of many of his contemporaries – from the most reactionary circles through several stages until he 'finally arrived at Marxist dialectics, which also marks the educational trajectory of many whose class position did not require them to ascribe to the praxis of the proletariat [...]. I experienced for the first time in SDS what solidarity meant: namely to create forms of association that free themselves from oppression and subjugation by the ruling class' (1969/1971, 21 et sq.).

Similar experiences in this period provided the stimulus also for established scholars. Examples are Ute Osterkamp (b. 1935) and Klaus Holzkamp (b. 1927). 'The first encounter was rather defensive, in reaction to challenges from students, which one could face or from which one could withdraw. This involved an inversion of the relationship between teachers and learners. We sat in the student reading groups and were delighted if we could avoid writing the minutes because at first we could not understand a word' (Osterkamp 2013). With the students they plunged into the project of the *Schülerladen Rote Freiheit* (an anti-authoritarian cultural development project for working-class children). In the following semester breaks 'everyone systematically re-read *Capital* on his or her own and in so doing caught fire or were "gripped", in the fullest sense of the word, by a thinking that had at first been largely impenetrable for us' (ibid.).

In particular, the protest against the US' Vietnam War, which shaped the '68 generation, brought many to Marxism. One such was the psychiatrist Erich Wulff (b. 1926) who came from the phenomenological school. He was collaborating in the framework of a partnership between the University of Freiburg and the Medical Faculty in Hue (South Vietnam) on the construction of a psychiatric department there. When he accidentally came into contact with Marxist ideas during a stopover in Cologne the pieces of the puzzle of his trans-cultural experience fell together. At a carnival party, he came into contact with 'an SDS activist'. He told her about Vietnam under the US-financed Catholic dictator Ngô Đình Diệm, 'of the poverty of the peasants, of the arbitrariness of the Diemist militia, of the resistance organised by the Communists, of the arrogance and egoism of the rich and the powerful. His discussion partner [she was

Frigga Haug (b. 1937)] easily put all of this into relation with the Marxist logic of class' (Wulff 2001, 359 et sq.). She impressed on him that he must read Marcuse and 'already gave him on the day after a stack of old issues of *Das Argument* with several articles of Marcuse to read which did not fail to have an effect on him' (ibid.).

For the Protestant theologian Dorothee Sölle (b. 1927) everything began with a discussion in which Wulff 'told her how the Americans [in Vietnam] though they did not practice torture themselves nevertheless stood with a tape recorder next to the torturers from other Asian countries and recorded the forced confessions of the Vietcong' (Sölle 1995, 88). In the following years, her involvement 'with the liberation movements, with imperialism theory, with knowledge of what was actually occurring in the Third World [...], helped me to also reinterpret my own history: With Auschwitz, Auschwitz was not over, it continued to exist – that was the lesson. It never left me' (ibid.). In 1968 she had her first close acquaintance with a communist, Fredi Hülser. When he recounted how, in prison, the Nazis had broken his ribs it became 'suddenly clear' to her that she was a socialist. 'There had already long since been a preparation for this, and naturally big Karl from Trier had a part in it' (84). From all of this there 'grew the "political evening prayer" that we have been doing in Cologne since 1968; out of this there arose the European section of "Christians for Socialism"' (88 et sq.). Sölle later recounted how she 'often became impatient when believers asked me "Are you a Marxist?" The best reply that occurred to me was to ask "Do you brush your teeth? I mean after the toothbrush was invented?" – How can we read [the prophets] Amos and Isaiah and not Marx and Engels? [...] Should we not use every analytical tool that makes the causes of injustice understandable and at the same time identifies the victims of injustice as the possible forces for change, and that breaks the spell for both, perpetrators as well as victims?' (95)

3. *Motives for remaining a Marxist.* – Labriola recorded the experience of people turning away from BM during the 'crisis of Marxism', which appeared for the first time after Engels's death: 'Some people are leaving us, others are weakening along the path. We want to wish the former a good journey and give the latter a shot in the arm' (quoted from Luxemburg, GW 6, 265). He himself promised the boost for the wavering by making conscious what lies 'behind all this hubbub': 'fervid, mercurial, hasty hopes that one harboured some years ago, these expectations with all too sharp details and contours' remain, in view of the difficulties, 'stalled and derailed in mid-path' (264 et sq.). He was convinced that in the then given situation the 'assertion of the fundamentals' above all by Luxemburg against Bernstein 'is not a matter of doctrinaire obstinacy but the

very life of the organism; that this organism is kept alive through these fundamentals that have become its flesh and blood; and that it defends through them its criteria, its basic principles, its mode of action, in one word its very existence' (263). However, if it is left here it remains an empty principle. 'To bring *intellectual* time (that is, patience and the sense of observation) into harmony [...] with the *time of things*' requires the capacity to draw the 'individual ability to think and act' even from 'the most complicated barriers of economic relations' and 'the most convoluted difficulties of the political world' (265).

Seeking the reasons for remaining a Marxist, one happens upon its 'productivity'. It easily hides itself under the cloak of supposed 'selflessness', as indeed the fate of the weak and oppressed is also a powerful motive for those not directly affected. The core of the commitment to others is formed in its fusion with self-realisation within the social materiality of time. Neither career nor an increase in ruling power can achieve this; where these two predominate as the driving motive BM is diluted and becomes a façade. What is decisive is the growth of one's own possibilities for development and 'cultural' productivity in the mode of solidarisation. On this depends the question of what relations of force are formed between the various and partly antagonistic driving forces within individuals. Because the 'individual' is a 'dividual', as **Brecht** says 'echoing **Nietzsche** and the ideas of quantum mechanics, and absorbing the psychology of **Kurt Lewin** inspired by the latter' (**Haug** 1996/2006, 19), 'a multiplicity more or less rocked by struggle' (**Brecht**, GA 22.2, 691), his/her Self-Being is determined in a manifold and contradictory way. The productivity released by BM and experienced as growth of capacity to act and think (**Spinoza's** *potentia agendi & cogitandi*) conditions which determinations prevail and perhaps also why in a concrete case neither the private-economic nor the restricted corporate 'class interest' gains the upper hand – instead there is a kind of 'working itself upwards' (*l'elaborazione superiore della struttura in superstruttura nella coscienza degli uomini*), viz. into the form of the general interest that is capable of hegemony (**Gramsci**, Q., 10.11, § 6, 1244 [*SPN*, 366]). The latter's political-ethical mooring is found in **Marx's** chief work at the centre of the critique, for 'Marx's critique of political economy is consistently worked out from the viewpoint of what is general or at least bears generalisation. It is in particular labour that presses towards this generalisation because individual labour time would be shortened through its real generalisation and liberated from its antagonistic form. [...] In the *VOS, NON VOBIS*, which Marx quotes (31/119) from **Virgil's** *Epigrams* and which can be translated as "you labour, but not for yourselves", the *NON* indicates the rule of special interest. The negation of this negation is the positing of the general as the determinate negation' (**Haug** 1972/2006, 257).

Everything of general benefit is in this perspective experienced, to the extent possible, as released from the restraints of particular interests.

Thus for Wolf-Dieter **Narr** (b. 1937), what is ‘fascinating about wanting to behave as a Marxist [...], without hopeful rewards and positions’, consists ‘in its human authenticity, indeed truth. That which one wants on the level of society, which one intensely and joyfully advocates, can be grounded downright categorically in humanity’s history of suffering, in currently suffering people, and be practicable, in the most convincing way conceivable, in the sense of a practical epistemology. In this sense, BM requires a materialist theory-practice commensurate with human beings, which demands the whole person, at the same time self-creating this person with a view to the transformative goal’ (2014). Wolfgang Fritz **Haug** (b. 1936) analogously experiences ‘the productive capacity’ of BM: it ‘unleashes intellectual productivity and connects it at the same time to a diagnosis of dangers and to a project that gives it meaning. This is a this-worldly connection that yet transcends the condition of the world’ (2013a, 679).

3.1 What BM brought wage dependents at the end of the 19th cent. and in the 20th is expressed by Eugène **Pottier** in the line of the *Internationale* (1871): ‘Nous ne sommes rien, soyons tout’ (‘We have been nought, we shall be all!’).

Fidel **Castro**’s (b. 1926) revolutionary strategy was built on this potential: ‘Many people who were part of the masses might be anti-communist; beggars, hungry people, and the unemployed might be anticommunist. They did not know what communism or socialism was all about. However, I could see that the masses were suffering from poverty, injustice, humiliation and inequality. The people’s suffering wasn’t just material; it was moral, as well. [...] you feel constantly debased and humiliated as a human being, because you’re treated like dirt, as if you don’t exist, as if you are nothing’ (**Castro/Betto** 2006, 125).

What **Castro** says of the masses of people and his own role as one of the academically educated intellectuals in the run-up to the Cuban Revolution also applies mutatis mutandis to the class of wage workers. ‘Without the cooperation of the intelligentsia it is only with difficulty that [it] can free itself from the cultural influence of the petite bourgeoisie’, Leszek **Kořakowski** (b. 1927) wrote, and he does not fail to add that, on its side, ‘the intelligentsia [...] cannot free itself of its intellectual dependency on capitalism without tying its life to the fate of the working class’ (1967, 41).

For wage workers, BM, where it is collectively absorbed, means the transformation of competitors into comrades and of individual powerlessness into class power. They experience themselves at the same time as being called to cooperate in self-socialisation and, through historical-materialist answers, catapulted towards the fundamental questions of philosophy, as articulated

by **Kant**, into the advanced consciousness of the epoch. The emphatic self-commitment to solidarity is expressed in the fact ‘that henceforth no one can be a socialist, unless he asks himself every minute: What is the proper thing to think, to say, to do, under the present circumstances, for the best interests of the proletariat?’ (**Labriola** 1897, *SocPh*, 1912, III, 41). – Reading **Marx**, could, it is true, ‘only be dealt with collectively [...] by the working class in their educational associations since 1860. [...] So, even politically interested people have to take laboriously small steps in order to understand something’ (**Eisler**, *Conversation*, 106).

3.2 That the appropriation of **Marx**’s work can impart something decisive to bourgeois intellectuals, according to their class position, is attested to by no less than the British dramatist George Bernard **Shaw** (b. 1856). He described himself as ‘a nobody full of resentment and feelings of shame until he read *Das Kapital*. “Karl **Marx** made a man out of me”, he said’ (quoted in Constenla 2013). – Two generations later, **Rossanda**, the Chief Editor of *Il Manifesto* who won international fame through her lead articles and commentaries there, described herself as an initially ‘lacklustre girl’ (2007, 54) before she read some writings of **Marx** (*18.B, Class Struggles*) and **Lenin** (*SR*) in an Italy suffering under fascism and a world war and was pulled out of her retreat ‘into the religion of culture [and] the personal’ (1985/1994, 145 et sqq.). These readings gave her ‘a consciousness that could tolerate no further deferment. I continuously established connections between words, silence, events that I had wilfully blindly bypassed. I read everything, some things several times. [...] My former unaffectedness was over, farewell to a sober, lukewarm future, commendable ambitions, farewell to innocence’ (2007, 92). She describes her ‘being Communist’ as ‘complex, rich, living; in some moments of encounter with my comrades it even made me happier than I had melodramatically depicted myself’ (1985/1994, 148).

An analogous experience can be seen in the development of the Spaniard Alfonso **Comín** (b. 1933) who came to Marxist activism as ‘a child of the victorious Francoist bourgeoisie in the heyday of national Catholicism, though without losing my Christian belief’ (1978, 244). Since ‘communism was the only really effective force in the underground struggle and in the resistance’ (227) and the Liberals of Comín’s own background rejected anti-fascist resistance, he changed, as did many other ‘children of the victors of the Civil War [...] with their whole burden and with a new conception of Christian belief, to the side of the vanquished. They sought their connection to Marxism [...]. There they found the *organised people*. And this people operated on a Marxist basis’ (229).

Alongside its practical importance, **Luxemburg** emphasised the theoretical fecundity of **Marx**’s ‘materialist-dialectical conception of history’. Far from

being the basis of a closed orthodoxy it ‘only represented a *research method*, a couple of genial guiding ideas that permit a vista into a whole new world’ (1903, GW 1/2, 364). To the high school student Carl Henrik (‘Ce Ho’) **Hermansson** (b. 1917), later chair of Sweden’s Left Party (Communists), these basic ideas – with which he had become familiar through the work *Materialistisk historieuppfattning och klasskamp* (1908) of the linguist and left social democratic politician Ernst **Wigforss** (b. 1881) – gave him a feeling of happiness ‘at having found in Marxism a compass that would help me to find my way in the unjust and dangerous world of the 1930s’ and ‘could explain’ to him ‘how everything is connected and everything can be changed’ (W. **Schmidt** 2005, 33). Developing his own thinking in order to help others to find their own way was a matter of meaning for his life.

Bloch puts his experience with the use of these guiding ideas of Marxism in a nutshell: ‘If one is a philosopher, then in order to be a philosopher one has either to be Marxist or an ideologue of the ruling class, whether one wants to or not’ (1975, 139). That this also holds for other disciplines has determined the road taken by the psychologist Klaus **Holzkamp**. The *Capital* readings initiated by the ‘68 movement led him to found Critical Psychology. ‘Then and there we were introduced to cognitive processes through an encounter with *Capital* that was so transformative that they led to a restructuring not only of our psychological concepts but of our entire life practice. [...] A person who works the way through *Capital* changes in appropriating it or has not understood’ (1976/2014, 204). **Marx**’s concept of ‘forms of thought which are socially valid, and therefore objective, for the relations of production belonging to this historically determined mode of social production, i.e., commodity production’ (*CI*, 1976, 169 [23/90]), provided **Holzkamp** with the insight that the inquiring subject, which ‘relates cognitively to social reality is already always a part of what is to be cognised’ (1976/2014, 204). This grounds the critique of bourgeois psychology, which is ‘caught up in the objectivist illusion as if social reality is simply an external object confronting the scientist that he can apprehend from a “standpoint outside of it” as if uninvolved’ (205).

At the end of the 1930s, the historian Eric **Hobsbawm** (b. 1917) read ‘enthusiastically due to its pedagogical simplification’ the philosophical part of **Stalin**’s *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union / Bolsheviks – Short Course (DHMat)*. ‘It corresponded pretty much to what I, and perhaps most of the British intellectual reds of the 1930s, understood to be Marxism. We considered it “scientific” in a sense rather more typical for the nineteenth century’ (2002, 96). What made Marxism so ‘irresistible’ for him was its all-encompassing horizon. ‘Dialectical materialism, it is true, did not offer a “theory of everything” but at least a “framework of everything” in that it connected inorganic and organic

nature to human affairs, collective and individual, and a guide to the nature of all interactions in a world in constant flux' (97).

Under the different circumstances of the post-war period, there were different criteria. Leo Kofler (b. 1907), who 'after heated exchanges with the SED when he was a professor in Halle (actually as the first "dissident"), left the GDR' (1988, 54) and went to the West, nonetheless remained a lifelong Marxist. Coming as he did from Austro-Marxism, he ascribes his attitude to 'the excellent [...] theoretical and political education we young people got in "Red Vienna"', and, as an objective reason, to the productivity of historical materialism 'in thinking about the process of the dialectical transformation of manifold individual actions [...] into the objective social process' (ibid.) – What enabled the philosopher Heise to carry out his work and be effective for others within the contradictions of BM in the GDR 'in a convinced way, without intellectual self-betrayal' (Thierse 1999, 12), was the way in which he used Marx – 'incontestably the focus of Heise's thinking' – as an intersection 'in which Enlightenment thought, western cultural and intellectual history and European social thought came together and united in a philosophical approach that as such made the dynamic of permanent self-criticism and its test by means of praxis into the criterion of its legitimacy. From this perspective, the only kind of philosophy possible for him was a critical one' (Reschke 1999, 13). Thus, Heise at the same time offers 'an example of the richness, diversity, contradictoriness, and development of Marxist thinking in the GDR' (Thierse 1999, 6).

The theologian Veerkamp was helped 'by Marx and the new Marxism based on him [...] not only in better understanding history but also in reading ancient texts (the Bible, Greek texts) so that they became comprehensible to me and to others. And it still helps me today to see through capitalism, which determines our life' (2013). And, not least, it helped him as the pastor of the Protestant Student Community of Berlin's Technical University in being an indefatigable aid and source of inspiration regardless of the students' religious denomination. – If Adam Schaff (b. 1913) still remained a Marxist after the erosion and then collapse of communist-dominated European state socialism, this was because he felt Marxist theory to be 'the best theoretical basis for the thinking of the new left' (1997, 117).

3.3 For many creative artists, among them some of the most important of their generation, BM opened up a relationship to reality in their works that helped their productivity on to historical effectivity. Amidst the horrors of his century the statement by the poet-philosopher Bertolt Brecht – 'when I read *Capital* I understood my plays' (GW 15, 129; GA 21, 256) – registers this experience with his own political and aesthetic capacity to act and think. Brecht came to Marxism 'via a different route from that of his friends of the same age',

as the composer Hanns Eisler, born in the same year (1898) recounts (1986, 211), who himself became a Marxist as a result of his own ‘involvement with the organization of the “Socialist High School Pupils” [...], where we read the easier texts by Marx and Engels’, and finally as a result of ‘the First World War’ (Eisler, *Conversation*, 183). Eisler remembers Lenin’s critique of empirio-criticism (published in 1922 in German) as ‘the first nourishment after which we started to read Marx anew’: ‘There we began to think differently. After the Great War, we had Social Democracy in our heads, or rather some sort of foggy utopianism’ (127 et sq.). Brecht, by contrast, had ‘first taken the definitive step towards Marxism during the Great Economic Crisis of 1929’ (Eisler, *ibid.*). Although Brecht’s path led through Marx’s critique of capitalism, Eisler did not want to see Brecht nailed down ‘to a man like Marx, who is mainly in people’s consciousness today because of economics [...]. Many people call themselves Marxists. To do so is meaningless today’ in comparison to ‘the kind of correction of Marxism that Lenin made’ (1986, 130). He overlooks that Brecht, despite his closeness to Lenin the practical dialectician and revolutionary, had implicitly turned against his ‘neutral’ conception of ideology and pursued Marx’s anti-ideological dialectics congenially as few others did and pulled back in horror from the ‘silting up and metaphysicisation’ of ‘generally accepted Marxism’ (to Korsch, 23 January 1937, GA 29, 7).

‘Having grown up in a state that seemed to him – in contrast to the western Federal Republic – to be the “other, better Germany”’, for the playwright Heiner Müller (b. 1929), a generation after Brecht, ‘the utopia of Marxism was the decisive motive of his life to which he tried to hold as long as possible, actually until he died in 1995. The fact that there were also disillusioning setbacks, that indeed this utopia receded to an ever greater distance in the course of the demise of the GDR and finally the so-called Wende of 1989/90, although it altered his subject matter, his style, and his directorial work, never led him – despite all bitterness – to become a repentant renegade and go over to the camp of the triumphant Wessis’ (Hermand 2015, 216).

For the sculptor Alfred Hrdlicka ‘Engels and Lenin [were ...] very important, I also avidly read Lukács and feel drawn to Marx’s polemical anger; nevertheless, it is still an open question as to whether I am a Marxist and what moves me to declare myself a Marxist’ (1978, 175). Like Heiner Müller, he describes his relationship to BM as a relationship to the material of his artistic existence – ‘questionable metamorphoses – into the CP, out of the CP, sympathising with the revisionists, sympathising with the Stalinists’ (*ibid.*).

For the composer Hans Werner Henze (b. 1926) there initially were ‘impulses to break out of the artistic isolation that is expected of artistic activity in our civilisation’ (1978, 169). To understand why art ‘has to be degraded to become

entertainment and a hobby and, after this assessment, to be able at least to contemplate the possibility of alternatives' he felt was 'only possible in the context of Marxist practice and theory' (170), without however expecting the prescription of rules indicating 'how one should paint, compose, or write poetry' (171). He describes his becoming a Marxist as a 'road paved with learning difficulties, with hesitation, misgivings, spontaneous decisions, and moments of regression and reversal' spurred on by the desire for clarity 'about the connections between the social misery of the masses in the Third World and the moral immiseration of individuals in the system of the technologically highly developed centres of capital' (169). BM gives artists the task 'of understanding themselves in the contradictoriness of their difficulties, of embedding these difficulties in their work and in daily work, [...] to project their work onto the new reality and a new combative realism and to prepare it, in its content, for this future. Marxism is struggle, future, a new idea of life' (172). – The Italian painter Renato **Guttuso** (b. 1911) experienced his first political socialisation in his native Bagheria, a village near Palermo, where anti-fascism and opposition to the Mafia had led to the formation of a Communist group. This was followed by the experiences of resistance and persecution. Italy's post-war reality compelled him and his comrades 'to clarify the direction of our work' (1978, 166). After an initial idealist formation under **Croce's** influence, 'readings of the works of **Gramsci**, [Arnold] **Hauser**, and **Lukács** [...] opened up new levels of reflection. For us, for me, the artist who only followed his own intuition made no more sense' (**Guttuso**, *ibid.*)

BM had special significance among architects and the connected design professions. Here it was a question of attempts to make Marxism or BM become practical in the form of the objectual-spatial environment. A paradigmatic figure here is the Swiss architect Hannes **Meyer** (b. 1889) in whose constructions (among them the 1928–30 Trade Union School in Bernau near Berlin and the famous, though not built, design of the League of Nations Building in Geneva) Karel **Teige** saw 'the high point of the development of modern architecture' (**Winko** 2005, 22). In 1928 Walter **Gropius** pushed through his appointment to become his successor as Director of the Bauhaus, where **Meyer** came upon the contradiction 'of a "cathedral of socialism" in which a medieval cult was practised' (1930/1980, 68), and by contrast pursued a 'functional-collectivist-constructivist' orientation (to Gropius, 28 January 1927). Confronting the hostility of the right as a declared 'scientific Marxist' (**Schnaidt** 1982, 258), and at the moment of the Great Economic Crisis and rise of the Nazi movement, he was dismissed in 1930. Together with seven students, he accepted an offer from the SU, where he taught at the Moscow School of Architecture and Civil Engineering (WASI) but faced difficulties for his divergence during the intensi-

fying Stalinist witch hunt and returned to Switzerland where he had no work opportunities until he was called to Mexico in 1939 to direct the newly founded Instituto de Urbanismo y Planificación.

4. *Theory and practice.* – The theories of **Marx**, **Engels**, and their followers could and can still ‘only become a “historically potent” (or more modestly: practically relevant) intellectual and political force’ to the extent that they are ‘received, translated, and recognised as, so to speak, “emancipation theory” by large social and political movements’ (**Deppe** 1991, 27). This connection lifts Marxism above the level of a mere current of thought and requires of the Marxist individual to act in both areas – scientific theory and class struggle. The ‘unity of theory and practice’ is thus among the fundamental requirements of BM through which it becomes filled with a series of contradictions. The experience that scientific theory and political (organised) practice do not fit seamlessly but in part follow contrasting rules has accompanied Marxism from its very beginnings.

Even for **Marx** and **Engels**, where theory and practice, as the two poles of BM, seem embodied in personal union, the difference asserts itself. It flares up in a letter of **Victor Adler’s** (b. 1852), the founder of Austrian social democracy, in which he writes to **Engels** ‘how we in Austria all are connected to you and [...] steeped in that for which we have you to thank. In a sense more, or we could say, differently from **Marx**: politics and tactics. Application of the theory in corpore vivo’ (21 January 180, III.30/169). **Marx** stands primarily for theory, **Engels** for practice.

In this approach the relation of theory and practice is disassembled into the relation between ‘theoretician and politician’, whose identity, as **Lukács** recorded it, ‘represents a quite extraordinary phenomenon’. ‘The first labour movement certainly was lucky that **Marx** and after him **Engels**, and after him **Lenin**, were men who united in themselves the capacities of great theoreticians and outstanding politicians. [...] Today nobody can say whether there will ever be another time in our movement in which the political leaders are at the same time also the personalities who lead the teaching of the movement. [...] Therefore we must [...] consciously concentrate our attention on the “dualism” [of theory and practice] [in order] to call forth in the interest of the movement optional cooperation between the politicians and the theoreticians present in each party’ (**Lukács**, W 18, 378). What can be learned from **Gramsci** is that a problem shift has thus taken place surreptitiously. Now it is the tactical relationship between two leading departments of intellectuals which comes into focus and takes priority over the strategic problem of the relation between “the mass of the simple” and the intellectuals, or between “rank-and-file” and lead-

ership, as well as the managing of the theory/practice contradiction in the BM of each individual.

4.1. In 1847 the *Manifesto* heralds BM – which would come into play a generation later – in the clothing of bourgeois ‘class betrayal’, something that has misled people into overlooking a fundamental contradiction: ‘In times when the class struggle nears the decisive hour the process of dissolution going on [...] within the whole range of old society, assumes such a violent, glaring character, that a small section of the ruling class cuts itself adrift, and joins the revolutionary class, the class that holds the future in its hands. Just as, therefore, at an earlier period, a section of the nobility went over to the bourgeoisie, so now a portion of the bourgeoisie goes over to the proletariat, and in particular, a portion of the bourgeois ideologists who have raised themselves to the level of comprehending theoretically the historical movement as a whole’ (6/493 et sq. [4/471 et sq.]).

Precisely that which functions here as the theoretical understanding ‘of the historical movement as a whole’ contains the seed of a phenomenon that in the future was largely identified with ‘Marxism’: Marxist theory abstracted from praxis anchored in a movement and its organisation. That Marxist theory taken as a theory *for itself* contradicts itself, becomes scattered in this mistakenly self-evident fact.

This goes hand in hand with a second contradiction. Theoretical education as a condition brings into the BM of non-theoreticians a factor of alienness – incompetence mixed with subordination. According to **Engels** it is ‘the duty of the leaders to gain an ever clearer insight into all theoretical questions, [...] and constantly to keep in mind that socialism, since it has become a science, demands that it be pursued as a science, that is, that it be studied’ and ‘spread with increased zeal among the masses of workers’ (1874, 23/631 [18/517]). Thus the labour movement feels “insecure” in the face of theory, which is repeatedly visible as ambivalence and can grow into hostility to intellectuals accompanied by the opposite extreme of a cult of leaders. Respect and contempt for intellectuals, especially among the militant industrial workers, frequently go hand in hand.

In ambivalence from the opposite angle, the late **Engels** looked at ‘some younger writers’ who ‘unfortunately [...] all too frequently believe they have mastered a new theory and can do just what they like with it as soon as they have grasped – not always correctly – its main propositions’ (to **J. Bloch**, 21–22 September 1890, 49/36 [37/465]). The occasion for this observation was what **Lenin** a good decade later, and then again two decades later **Gramsci**, were to criticise as the false road of economism, in which ‘more weight’ is attributed ‘to the economic aspect than is its due’ (ibid).

In so far as BM demands of individuals the utmost scientificity they are capable of, regardless of the fact that science is a foreign world for most of them, it contributes to the monopolistic concentration of theoretical-scientific competence in the top leadership of organisations and/or in the accredited authorities of the past. Reacting to this in 1934, Karl Korsch (b. 1886) proclaimed the opposite extreme of ‘ruthlessly’ putting to the test ‘of present-day practical utility’ all ‘the elements contributed by Marx and the Marxists in more than 80 years making up the whole of a revolutionary theory and movement’ (*ThreeEss*, 1972, 61 et sq.). What distinguishes Marxist from Hegelian dialectics, he wrote, is that it ‘subordinates all theoretical knowledge to the end of revolutionary action’ (70). But how then does this differ from what Lukács criticised as the advent of ‘a manipulated direction’ in the ML of Stalin’s period? (W 18, 349). Against Hans Heinz Holz, who wanted to recognise Stalin, ‘despite all of the alienating features’ (ibid.) as a great theoretician, Lukács insists ‘that the great leap that occurred between Lenin and Stalin consists precisely in [...] the general theory being downgraded to become a garnish, a superstructure, an adornment’, a ‘supremacy of the tactical over the theoretical and the principled’, which sealed the downfall of both (349 et sq.). How then is the right balance to be found in this contradiction?

4.2 There are, first of all, inherent, indeed constitutive reasons why BM requires the unity of theory and practice. ‘What matters in analysis’, Althusser wrote in 1985 in a reversal of what he had rescinded earlier as his ‘theoristic deviation’ (*ESC*, 1970/1978), ‘is not theory – but (a materialist and Marxist basic principle) *praxis*’ (*TFLF*, 1993, 168; transl. corr.). Sève was to agree with him in accentuating praxis but without the exclusive antagonism to theory: ‘This is the main difference between the Marxist and the Marxologist for whom Marx’s work, however learned he may be in relation to it, nevertheless remains a *dead letter*. The chief characteristic of BM: it is not mere knowledge; it is what I call a historical form of individuality, a practical mode of life, as it is defined in the eleventh Feuerbach Thesis: “to change the world” and in the same movement to change life’ (2014).

Maurice Merleau-Ponty (b. 1908) sees the ‘profound philosophical meaning of the notion of praxis is to place us in an order which is not that of knowledge but rather that of communication, exchange, and association’ (1955/1973, 50). ‘In the communist sense, the Party is this communication; and such a conception of the Party is not a corollary of Marxism – It is its very centre’ (51). For Gramsci this occurs ‘through the collective organism through “active and conscious co-participation”, through “compassionality”, through a system which one could call “living philology”’ (*SPN*, N. 11, § 25, 429). By contrast, Schaff considers it ‘more correct to use the expression “Marxist” to designate certain

theoretical convictions and positions and to use other words to designate practical engagements, that, for instance, of a “communist” (1978, 237). **Lukács** said, with somewhat of a shift of emphasis, that he was ‘completely aware that by distinguishing theory and practice in Marxism, I am no orthodox Marxist’ (1965, W 18, 367). **Merleau-Ponty’s** argument is, on the other hand, that in making such a distinction ‘one makes another dogmatism’ of something whose untruth is to be seen in the fact that in the end it always denies constitutive partisanship and thus the subjective and practical moment in BM. The Marxist conception of history is, in his view, due to the ‘development of partial views that a man situated in history, who tries to understand himself, has of his past and of his present. This conception remains hypothetical until it finds a unique guarantee in the existing proletariat and in its assent, which allows it to be valid as the law of being’ (1955/1973, 51). **Lukács**, on the other hand, says of himself that he ‘first seeks answers to questions of objective historical research even if I also know that each answer is that of a historical subject’, and ‘in any case no doctrine could give a more creative and satisfactory answer to my questions than historical materialism’ (W 18, 367).

The divergence of these two dimensions of BM, which can grow to be an antagonism, is understood by **Schaff** as the basis for ‘a truly dialectical relation as in a textbook example’, a dialectic that ‘unfortunately is mostly ignored’ (1978, 231). This escalates because ‘both functions of Marxism, due to their relative autonomy, [...] are represented by two equally different groups [...]: by the theoreticians (the scientists) and the practical ideologues (the politicians)’ – in (continually rarer) ideal cases both functions can coincide in the same person, but normally a division of labour prevails (ibid.).

Lenin embodied the unification of both functions in his person, but the manner of this personal union ominously tore them apart. This was registered by Angelica **Balabanoff** (b. 1869). Coming from a well-to-do Ukrainian Jewish family, she was ‘one of the great revolutionaries and polyglot orators of the early twentieth century’ and with Alexandra **Kollontai** and Nadezhda **Krupskaya** one of the three ‘female faces of the Revolution and of the young Soviet power’ (**Schütrumpf** 2013, 7). As an organiser of the Zimmerwald movement of internationalist socialists against the First World War, which was inspired by **Zetkin**, and later Secretary of the new Communist International, and active in many other functions, **Balabanoff** was increasingly at odds with the ‘cynical dichotomy’ (1959/1964, 143) between words and deeds of the Bolsheviks (1959/2013, 156). In 1921, after the crushing of the Kronstadt Rebellion and the change of course to the ‘state capitalism’ of the New Economic Policy, she left the SU. In working closely with **Lenin**, she experienced how the caution he had exercised in applying his ill-considered ‘principle [...] “the end justifies the means”’

(1959/1964, 102), which he endorsed 'in both theory and practice', gradually disappeared: 'the means became the end' (1959/2013, 166 et sq.). From her last conversation with **Lenin** (end of 1921/beginning of 1922), **Balabanoff** had the impression that he 'had to admit that he had contributed to the destruction of his work, of his hopes' (177). For her 'the greatest and most dangerous misunderstanding' was the 'identification with Marxism' of the 'monstrous caricature of what **Marx** and **Engels** understood by communism' as a result of this 'principled unprincipledness' (173).

4.3 *The intellectual factor of BM and the question of intellectuals in Marxism.*

– One of history's lessons is 'that the nexus of science and politics can only exist as a relationship of tension and not as the direct translation of one into the other' (**Leisewitz/Reusch** 1991, 23). Each area obeys different logics, and their communication is in each instance conditioned by the social division of labour. This is in turn overdetermined by diverse class positions. Consequently, this relation is very complex. In addition, the discussion is in the hands of intellectuals who normally do not have a Marxist conception of themselves that comprehends their tasks and limits and confers Marxist legitimacy on them. In the first three internationals as well as the Trotskyist one, the absence of a positive Marxist understanding of the status of their intellectuals is connected with the lack of a theory of leadership. The monster of the absolute leadership, flanked by anti-intellectualism, bureaucratism, and violence arises out of reason's slumber that fails to reflect this double absence and to sublimate it in theoretical self-conception. **Gramsci** was the first to fill this disastrous gap, and only years after his death has his work been received in successive waves. He points to the intellectual factor in all BM with the statement that destroys common-sense assumptions: 'all men are intellectuals', followed by the conceptual bridge: 'but not all men have in society the function of intellectuals' (*SPN*, N. 12, § 1, 9). It follows from this 'that, although one can speak of intellectuals, one cannot speak of non-intellectuals, because non-intellectuals do not exist' (*ibid.*). 'But the relationship between efforts of intellectual-cerebral elaboration and muscular-nervous effort is not always the same, so that there are varying degrees of specific intellectual activity'. (§ 3, *ibid.*)

According to the degree to which they become conscious, all social classes form their own intellectuals. **Kołakowski** highlighted the specific function of *communist* intellectuals in the 1960s, above all with a view to the state socialist countries. They create the theoretical basis for the political movement and have constantly to accommodate to the most recent state of science so that theory 'always [...] corresponds to the current situation. The intellectuals who create the theoretical bases for political action are therefore not merely "helpers" of the labour movement but an indispensable condition of their existence' (1967,

40). Their ‘theoretical work, which is to scientifically ground the political action of the communist movement corresponding to the present moment, can only be a collective work of communist intellectuals’ (45). In order to be able to fulfil this indispensable task ‘for the rebirth of the party’ (46) they are required first of all to ‘take up the struggle for the secularisation of thinking, the struggle against a pseudo-Marxist mythology and bigotry’ (45). In contrast to **Gramsci**, whom he neither names nor probably yet knew in 1967, the concept of intellectual in **Kołakowski** retains the narrower meaning of a social stratum. Ten years later, after he rejected **BM**, he maintained that for **Gramsci** “‘intellectuals’ [meant] approximately the same as “‘intelligentsia’” (1979, 264) and in so doing used the code customary in **ML**. In the process, the intellectual factor understood by Gramsci as a point of departure in all **BM** dropped from sight. After his “conversion” in the 1970s **Kołakowski** claimed ‘that the unity of theory and practice, the unity of deeds and values is nothing other than the primacy of political engagement over intellectual values’ (328), but this only describes the form rightly castigated by **Lukács**.

In fact, the affiliation to **Marx** requires of all those who claim it to develop their “intellectual” capacities and their political-ethical judgment. What is decisive for **BM** is the emphasis on a theory-permeated analysis of reality in a practical-emancipatory perspective. By contrast, being-a-communist in its party sense, where it is not understood merely as a fundamental ethical stance, lays more stress on the organisational affiliation of the “comrade”. And the theory-practice question accordingly varies for these two forms. **BM** places the greatest emphasis on theoretical and emancipatory integrity, being-a-communist on effective means of organised praxis. For the historical self-estrangement of Marxism in the theory and practice of the party-state and its **ML**, **Marx** was a disturbing factor and Marxism an occupied territory.

Leo **Löwenthal** could therefore object to those who reproached him and his co-thinkers of Critical Theory for having ‘completely cut themselves off from Marxism and lost sight of reality’ by replying: ‘We had not abandoned praxis; rather, praxis had abandoned us’ (1987, 61). In so doing he was alluding to the ‘great trauma represented by the developments in the Soviet Union and the Communist Party’ (61) and that compelled them to keep their distance precisely because ‘the most crucial feature [of our thinking] was a reflection on the relation of theory and praxis’ (62).

5. *The antinomy of BM.* – For **Luxemburg** the twentieth anniversary of **Marx’s** death was not only the occasion for praise but for reflection upon the fate of his theories in Marxism. In the same year, her two articles appearing in Berlin’s *Vorwärts* in 1903 constitute what is probably the earliest reflection on contra-

dictions of BM. **Luxemburg** perceives these, on the one hand, in the ‘scrupulous endeavour’ of many of **Marx**’s pupils ‘to keep their thinking “within the bounds of Marxism”’ (GW 1/2, 364). On the other hand, she notes as a *premise* of ‘the historical transformation formulated by the Marxian theory’ that it ‘becomes the form of consciousness of the working class and as such itself *an element of history*’ (377). At the same time, however, the ‘needs’ of the labour movement ‘do not suffice to evaluate **Marx**’s thinking’, which ‘as a scientific achievement represents a gigantic whole in itself’ (368). **Luxemburg** calls this discrepancy the revenge ‘of the proletariat’s social conditions of existence that **Marx** revealed [...] on the destinies of **Marx**’s theory itself’ (ibid.). The movement’s trailing behind in relation to **Marx** had at that time its basis in ‘revolutionary’ ‘proletarian realpolitik’ (374). In the latter, the movement goes beyond **Marx** in terms of practice. Here **Luxemburg** touches on an unavoidable contradiction of all Marxism, though without yet getting to the theoretical heart of the matter. At this point **Marx** has been dead for twenty years, **Engels** for eight; not only have the ‘born’ leaders of the movement disappeared but increasingly the concrete conditions that they had observed are disappearing. The movement has thus been thrown into the water of history and has to learn to swim. Authentic BM is characterised by ‘not being only inscribed in the struggles that are occurring but by being able to think them through critically and change them’ (Sève). This state of affairs brought an antinomy into BM. *To be* here means *to become*, and it only remains if it changes itself. To remain faithful to **Marx**’s fundamental impulse means to go beyond **Marx**. Even the most faithful translation of this impulse in changed circumstances abandons – or betrays? – the original.

5.1 How to avoid betrayal? The question this poses as to an authentic connection to the founders habitually appears on the scene in the character mask of “orthodoxy”. What lies behind this is fundamentally ambivalent – it can cripple just as well as stimulate. Gabriel **Deville** (b. 1854), to whom we owe the first French summary of *Capital*, had a low opinion of orthodoxy, ‘since to be a Marxist, that is to think that **Marx** gave modern socialism its scientific basis, does not mean a bias towards inalterable formulas: the only concern has to be to adjust as accurately as possible to the changing realities after one has penetrated the meaning of these changes’ (1897). In his case adjustment meant that seven years later he left the Socialist Party in favour of a career in the bourgeois state. Still, he was the first to have formulated a basic problem.

Actually, it is not enough ‘*to want* to be a Marxist, one has also *to be able* to do so’, that is, have competence that ‘correlates genetically with the conceptions of **Marx** and his successors’ (**Schaff** 1978, 221). But how to do this if ‘the classics did not foresee the situations and the new problems’ (220)? Then the

aforementioned question is always posed anew. There is nothing that one must believe; rather one ‘has the right to verify this heritage and if needed modify it or even reject it as obsolete’ (222). Here the question of a core collection of theses arises, with the abandonment of which one would lose the right to call oneself a Marxist (223). Does orthodoxy thus become a criterion of BM? The question as to the timeless principle that guarantees identity, however, knows ‘no unequivocal answer’ (225) and may, under the mask of loyalty, in itself be a betrayal.

The unavoidable tightrope walk on the narrow ridge of the dialectic of loyalty and betrayal – the need to go away from **Marx** in translating Marx’s project into each present circumstance – makes being a “Marxist” a precarious identity. Self-image and being seen by others come apart especially here. If the African philosopher Paulin Hountondji (b. 1942) could say that one is ‘always the “Marxist” for someone’, then the ‘converse occurs in Marxism: There one is always the “non-Marxist” for someone. The “in” in critical theorising “in” Marxism is a precarious “in”, continuously on the edge of expulsion’ (Haug 2013a, 682 et sq.).

If it can be said of **Brecht** and **Bloch** ‘that “Marxism”, when someone of this kind appropriates it, already begins not to be the same Marxism’ (Haug 2012, 254), this does not only apply to the historically empowered among Marxists, such as **Lenin** and **Mao** or **Gramsci** and **Mariátegui**, but generally. Every change breaks a taboo that lies over BM. It occurs in the dark, literally fishes in troubled waters with its demand for clarity and coherence. It threatens to turn its subject momentarily into an ‘outlaw’. Dutiful critique and change, as even the programme of the SED still required of its members, are grounds for exclusion particularly in phases of general insecurity. Thus the US sociologist Alvin W. **Gouldner** (b. 1920) as a person reflecting on Marxism in a Marxist way experienced himself as an ‘Outlaw Marxist’ (Chriss 1999). **Petrović** considered **Marx** ‘the main starting point (not the exclusive one) of my thought and life’ because he appeared to him to be ‘the most significant one [...] for the whole contemporary world’ (1978, 210). “Starting point” indicated something that could not be held on to unchanged; instead one had ‘to think in the spirit of **Marx** about the fundamental problems of the world’ and at the same time inquire ‘into the not yet realised possibilities of Marxian thought’ (1971, 9 et sq.). In this sense, the **Marx** from which **Petrović** started could not remain ‘identical with the factual **Marx**’ (1978, 207), just as **Petrović** himself ‘was not always a Marxist in the same sense’ (195). Aside from the struggles for power, markets, or influence that lurk everywhere, the ultimate explanation is found in the structural dialectic of the twofold transgression that underlies BM: To be able to struggle against capitalism, which permanently revolutionises all relations, every established

Marxism must be periodically transgressed in favour of a theory-practice conception that keeps its eyes trained on the conditions. All BM must prove itself in this dialectic. Always in danger of transforming its subject into the ludicrous form of the “one-man party” or into the plague of a “sect”, the success of such creative translations into the present, in the form of the massive appropriation of what it has brought forth, ‘is a “philosophical” event far more important and “original” than the discovery by some philosophical “genius” of a truth which remains the property of small groups of intellectuals’ (**Gramsci**, *SPN*, N. 11, § 12, Note IV; 325).

If one does not succeed in remaining faithful to the founding impulses while changing their implementation and translating them into ever new conditions the inevitable effort will be tabooed. ‘It is therefore harmful to determine the boundaries a priori within which a discussion is permissible, for this carries with it the danger of making the words “Marxism” and “Marxist” into tools of blackmail and of substituting scientific polemic with administrative pressure’ (**Kořakowski** 1967, 47). This pressure exploits the suspicion of revisionism. Thus **Schaff** found the meaning of the question of what BM means defined by the ‘complementary question’ of ‘what it means to be a revisionist’ (1978, 219). In contrast to what was still the case with **Luxemburg**, this category in the epoch of Stalinist-shaped ML in power no longer designated the abandonment of the emancipatory basic impulses and with them the goal criteria but could mean everything that contradicted a leadership or its ideological guardians. Serious BM became grounds for exclusion.

Havemann countered this by turning the condemning word around and presented **Marx** as a ‘revisionist par excellence’. ‘To be a scientist in Marx’s sense one has to always be prepared for revisionism. “De omnibus dubitandum est” (everything must be doubted) was Marx’s scientific credo. It goes without saying that even all theories and ideas that come from Marx are among the things that not only may be subject to doubt but must be continually doubted if Marxism is to remain alive and to become the generally recognised basis of the science of human society. And that it will become this, indeed thanks precisely to the work of its revisionists, of this I am firmly convinced. I am ready to be seen as a Marxist in this sense’ (**Havemann** 1978b, 33). The Stalinist turn away from the emancipatory core of the founding impulses put the ‘necessity of a “reformation” of Marxism’ (**Albers** 1983/1987, 47/34) on the historical agenda. The too belated attempt at a reformation of actually existing socialism under **Gorbachev** proved its incapacity for reform and led to its downfall.

5.2 That **Marx**’s theory and concrete-political Marxism do not form a seamless unity is already attested in the last years of Marx’s life and then the ‘early years of Marxism’ documented in **Kautsky**’s correspondence with **Engels**.

After Engels's death, **Luxemburg** was the first, in 1903, to attempt a historical materialist explanation of the substantial non-identity of **Marx** and Marxism: What is 'most valuable' in Marx's teachings lies largely 'unused' because not meeting momentary needs of the labour movement and its socialist parties (GW 1/2, 364). What she still did not see at that time she experienced ten years later: The contributions of Marxists that would be most useful for the possible actualisation of Marxism run the risk of being attacked for their distance from the original wording of this doctrine due to their actualising its meaning. The reception of **Luxemburg's** chief work, *The Accumulation of Capital* (1913), the most significant continuation of **Marx's** critique of political economy, offers a prominent example. She had dared to think for herself and, with all due respect, to criticise Marx and supplement his drafts on reproduction by taking into account non-capitalist demand with the thesis that the 'so-called primitive accumulation', which Marx appears to treat in *C I* as completed prehistory of capitalism (35/704–751 [23/741–91]) in reality accompanies capitalism along with its entire lifespan. In her 1915 *Anti-Critique* **Luxemburg** says that in writing her book 'a thought depressed me from time to time: all followers of Marxist doctrine would declare that the things I was trying to show and carefully substantiate were self-evident' (Luxemburg/Bukharin 1972, 47). To her surprise what happened was quite different. Her book, 'purely theoretical and strictly objective, and directed against no living Marxist', became the object 'of a high-handed action by the authorities'; a fate that 'until now had never happened to any other party publication in all of its history' (48).

Fritz **Sternberg** (b. 1895) considered **Luxemburg's** **Marx** criticism excessive since 'every stone of Marx's structure is determined by the realities of non-capitalist space'; 'however, as much as the findings of this book contradict certain formulations of the *historical* Marx, it believes itself to be authentic Marxism, since it intends to give no less than the systematic inclusion of facts, neglected by Marx in the analysis of the capitalist process, their systematic inclusion through Marxist method' (1926, 8). Meanwhile, for **Sternberg** **Luxemburg's** approach was also a model: 'you will find not a word of literal philology here. For my part, I wish for the living **Marx**, the Marx in which the creative fire was so great, that he would have no hesitation in confessing mistakes' (ibid.).

What **Luxemburg** could not know was the beginning of **Bernstein's** 'Afterword' to the new 1921 edition of his *Voraussetzungen*: 'Seldom has the reception of the writings of an author surprised him in the way [...] as that of the current work has done' (1899/1921, 259). He had, he wrote, anticipated contradiction but not that his book would 'call forth a storm of indignation against me and [...]

would be showered with all kind of adulation [...] in the bourgeois press'. He had 'early on been accustomed [...] to view debate with party comrades as the internal affairs of social democracy', which interested 'enemy organs' at most marginally (*ibid.*).

Bernstein stresses the 'great influence tradition has on the evaluation of facts and ideas' (*Preconditions*, 189). 'There is always a lapse of time before people recognise that tradition is so far distant from the actual facts that they are prepared to discard it. Until this happens [...] tradition is normally the most powerful means of uniting those not otherwise bound together by any strong and continuous interest or external pressure. Hence the intuitive preference which all men of action have for tradition, however revolutionary their objectives may be' (*ibid.*). Critique is 'almost always destructive. When, therefore, the time comes to take important action, even criticism fully justified by the facts can be wrong and therefore reprehensible' (*ibid.*). That which is expressed here as the distance between the 'living' and the 'historical **Marx**' touches the contradictory core of **BM**.

In the fact that the advancement of history requires transgression of **Marx** and, even more, the revision of previous Marxism, **Otto Bauer** saw the origins of Austro-Marxism: 'In the old Austria, shattered as it was by the struggles of nationalities', Marxists had to learn 'to apply the Marxist conception of history to complicated phenomena that mocked any superficial, schematic application of **Marx's** method' (*Austromarxismus*, 1927, WA 8, 11 et sq.; see *Hindels* 1979, 13). For **Trotsky** this gave rise to a 'type of person which contrasted with the type of the revolutionary' (cited according to *Leser* 1968, 180, fn. 3). But this type too changes itself in the historical process. When **Bauer** returned from Russian war captivity to Vienna, **Victor Adler** wrote to **Kautsky** that **Bauer** is 'still a bit too Bolshevik' and needs to 'first accommodate again to the old milieu' (14 November 1917, *Briefwechsel*, 646).

5.3 *Bourgeois persecution of Marxists.* – That **BM** is met with hostility from the capitalist side cannot be surprising as at its core it seeks to end 'private ownership of the means of production' (**Lefebvre** 1959, 685), that is, to transcend the basis of bourgeois class rule. **Labriola**, a distinguished professor of philosophy in Italy in the 1880s and 90s, was one of the first to report what he got himself into: When in 1886 he 'for the first time' dealt with 'the teachings of socialism from his Chair at the *Royal University*' it went 'almost unnoticed'. In 1889, however, after he appeared before the public with 'speeches against **Crispi**, against **Bismarck**, and against the beloved German emperor, [...] and lectured on the French Revolution in oratorical style before a large audience [...] the students [...] came in droves to the University to boo me. My lectures were suspended for two months; and now I have returned to using a dry aca-

demic tone. My large audience has disappeared as well as my sweet dream of winning over the academic youth to the interests of the proletariat' (to Engels, III.30/232).

Countless stories of this sort, many of them worse, followed this pilot experience in almost all countries. In Switzerland, the communist art historian Konrad **Farner** (b. 1903) was ostracised, and he and his family received threats, for his criticism of Cold War policies; he was barred from an academic career until a sociology of art lectureship was conferred on him shortly before his death thanks to student pressure. Still, in 1968, theologians who had inaugurated the ecumenical 'Political Evening Prayer' in Cologne had similar experiences. 'The emerging proximity to socialism [...] naturally had consequences. [...] Neighbours stopped greeting us, conversations were broken off, friendships dissolved, business relationships receded. [...] There was repression. In our case, the institutions were the two major churches, which were remarkably unanimous in their reaction: space was refused, there were false newspaper reports, verbal smear campaigns, the pressure exerted on the mass media, transfers or non-appointments of young pastors' (Sölle 1995, 85). Even if only a small minority of Marxists, it is true, historically endured the same fate as the communists Hans **Coppi** (b. 1916), Hilde **Coppi** (b. 1909), and Arvid **Harnack** (b. 1901) and the other members of the resistance group called "Red Orchestra" suffered under German fascism 'as the nakedest, most shameless, most oppressive, and most treacherous form of capitalism' (Brecht, *Five Difficulties*, 1934/1966, 137) – figures who 'from their lofty goals were thrown into the deepest humiliation', as Peter **Weiss** has it in *Ästhetik des Widerstands* (1983, vol. 3, 218), and bestially executed – nonetheless, Marxists of all generations have had to pay in one or another form for their resistance to the dominion of capital. When the Belgian Marxist Ernest **Mandel**, born 1923 in Frankfurt am Main and later deported and interned by the Nazi state, was called to take a professorship in 1972 at the Free University of Berlin the West Berlin Senate refused the appointment, and the federal government imposed an entry ban. This and much worse fates have been met by critical-creative minds in all periods. 'To think on one's own feet always meant a cross to bear both inside and outside the communist parties' (Fernández Buey 2010, XXXIV).

5.4 This potential for conflict became particularly aggravated when the post-'68 wave of the Second Women's Movement reached the trade unions, churches, and organisations and institutions considering themselves to be Marxist. Wherever the women claimed their 'half of heaven' or even altogether different gender relations in theory and organised practice there were either expulsions or splits, as in a series of European CPs, trade unions, and some periodicals (for example, in *New Left Review*).

That there was a cross to bear even within the undogmatic Marxism of SDS at the time of the student movement was discovered by the Marxist-feminist women's movement that arose in its midst. In an SDS delegates conference, the drama was played out in a spectacular way. The trigger was the reaction to a talk given by Helke Sander (b. 1937) there on 13 September 1968 on behalf of the Action Committee for Women's Liberation. Her assertion that women are a class was drowned out by laughter from the delegates who had no idea that this idea came from Marx and Engels (see *GI*, 5/46 [3/32]). When things continued after this as if nothing had happened, a then very pregnant Sigrid Rieger threw tomatoes, which due to her circumstances she had with her along with other fresh vitamin-rich fruit, at leading SDSers. Sander remonstrated with the SDS that its protest did not go deep enough as long as it omitted everyday life and the personal. Women therefore had to take action 'because we are historically in the right [...]. We want to try to develop models of a utopian society already within the existing society' (quoted from Lenz 2008, 62 et sq.).

The feminist further development of Marxism is a protracted process. After a visit to Karl Marx's grave Dorothee Sölle (1983, 122) versified: 'and lest I have for a time forgotten my being-a-woman / in order to be a good socialist / I bring it out again / and bring it in / [...] / if we learn to think what is womanly / your concepts will we all / have to expand like skirts / because we ceaselessly / are in other circumstances'.

5.5 *Socialist persecution of Marxists.* – From their own quarter, too, Marxists have not been safe from condemnation and persecution. Under "liberal" bourgeois conditions, alongside the gatekeepers who block all paths there are also the closed ears of the addressees, if one acts with Heinz Jung (b. 1935) according to the motto that one 'can only be a communist or Marxist if one goes against the crowd and struggles to change their opinion' (1990/2006, 14). If it is a collective motto it can be that of an organisation in danger of becoming a sect; when adopted individually it can for "independently thinking" Marxists mean a two-fold alienation: As Marxists they are alien in capitalist society, as autonomous intellectuals they are alien among Marxists. In the bourgeois environment they are suspect because of their engagement, and to their own comrades because of their autonomy. So it was with Gramsci in fascist imprisonment when he requested to no longer participate in collective fresh-air walks in the prison yard because he, the leader of the PCI, feared the aggression of his comrades due to his criticism of Comintern policy.

The persecution of Marxists is analogous to that of communists, in which communists can be persecuted and persecutors. Fritz J. Raddatz (b. 1931) says of the authors of his collective volume on the question *Why I am a Marxist*: 'most of them [...] have at some point in their lives been threatened, jailed,

deported, or exiled'; they share 'a life against the times, against the acceptance of what exists, even if what exists is called socialism' (1978, 8). Particularly in the course of the Stalinisation of the SU and the Comintern parties 'Marxism was (as were the more lively Marxists) the first victims of this process', as **Mandel** put on the record (in Mandel/Agnoli 1980, 41).

As so many others who were entranced by the October Revolution, **Gramsci** in November 1917 praised the free way in which **Lenin** dealt with the difference between the historical **Marx** and the **Marx** who has a continuing effect in the present: 'if the Bolsheviks reject some of the statements in Capital, they do not reject its invigorating, immanent thought. These people are not "Marxists", that is all; they have not used the works of the Master to compile a rigid doctrine of dogmatic utterances never to be questioned. They live according to Marxist thought that never dies' (*AGR*, 33; transl. corr.). Here 'not being "Marxists"' exactly characterises the actualised Marxism applying to Russia's concrete situation.

But on the other hand, what **Gramsci** praises contains the germ that brought death to Marxist thinking (and the majority of **Lenin's** comrades) under **Stalin**. The contradiction between Marxism in the process of becoming and Marxism already historically objectified grows into an antagonism where, as in *ML*, a historically specific form is institutionalised with a state party. In its organised form **BM** becomes an ordeal for individuals to the degree to which the organisation and its leadership set out to tactically misuse theory. The appropriation and subjugation of Marxism by a power apparatus, 'its reduction to the role of a conventional apologetic adornment that only has its place in the façade of society, ensures that instead of becoming the blood of intellectual life it turns into a poison for it', as **Kołakowski** (1967, 52) says, echoing **Lukács**. 'The attitude toward **Lenin** as a revolutionary leader gave way to an attitude like that toward the head of an ecclesiastical hierarchy', wrote **Trotsky** (1929/1930, 404). This happened in the SU, from where it more or less spread to all state socialist countries.

Once caught in the state-party-ideology trap, it is precisely the individuals who are politically-theoretically productive who pay for this with solitude in the collective identification that animates them. For one is and is not a Marxist alone. This effect cost the communist organisations their collective intellect. **Brecht** tells it in this way: 'But the associations [the *CPS*s] outside Su declined. The members did not choose their secretaries, the secretaries chose the members. The slogans were decreed by Su and Su paid for the secretaries. [...] Soon they were no longer the best, merely the most compliant. Some good ones stayed the whole time because, if they had left, they would not have been able to speak with the members but, staying, they could only tell them what they

thought was wrong. As a result they also lost the trust of the members and their own as well' (*Me-ti*, 145). The moral of this story is 'merciless: whoever is no longer listened to at the end has no more to say' (Haug 1968, 4).

Thus the poison had effect also outside the state socialist camp. Even in the Italian CP that invoked Gramsci there was a 'hubristic know-it-all attitude in the face of everyone who did not share our concepts or did not follow the "party line". Zhdanov called it *partinost*: canonical. And *partinost* did not mean mere loyalty; it meant the "historical necessity" of thinking like the leadership, which in turn was required to think like the leadership of the USSR' (Rossanda 1982, 14).

The precondition for the Stalinist hyper-ideologisation of ML was its canonisation. If Lenin were to have been able to pursue the project of publishing his critique of empirio-criticism 'under the title "Observations of a Simple Marxist on Philosophy"' (to Gorki, 25 February 1908, Briefe II, 141), this self-description would have become mortally dangerous seven years after his death. Mark Borisovich Mitin (b. 1901), Stalin's philosophical assistant who remained in an influential position until his death (1987), initiated the expulsion of the MEGA editor David B. Riazanov thus: 'Since the "famous" words "I am not a Bolshevik, I am not a Menshevik, I am not a Leninist. I am only a Marxist, and as a Marxist, I am a communist", come from him. The sole question is whether Riazanov still considers himself today to be an "only-Marxist", a communist – but not a Bolshevik, a communist – but not a Leninist?' (Mitin 1931/1969, 338). With that said, the verdict was already pronounced: 'As we now see, Riazanov has translated this formula into practice. The most recent events have proven that he has sunk to the point of direct aid given to the counter-revolutionary Menshevik organisation, for which reason he has been expelled from the party' (ibid.).

Karl Schmückle (b. 1898) involuntarily participated in the forging of this weapon: 'What these social democratic gentlemen, the "interpreters" of the young Karl Marx strikingly but unintentionally demonstrate with this wild "theoretical" struggle against Marxism, against Communism, against Leninism, is, among other things, the fact that in our time one can no longer be a Marxist without being a Leninist' (1933/2014, 151). However, the power to define who was a Leninist had been transferred to the power apparatus, which culminated in Stalin, and Schmückle's statement immediately turned its lethal double meaning against its author who was murdered in 1938 – three months after Riazanov.

The communist poet Peter Weiss (b. 1916) lent literary expression to the reflection on the hellish low point of 20th cent. "state-owned" communism in his *Ästhetik des Widerstands* through the example of the predicament of

communist resistance fighters: He has them ponder whether their enemies sat not only in Berlin, in the Gestapo, but also in Moscow, among their comrades. 'In the form of this power struggle, this scheming infighting, **Weiss** shows the enemy in one's own communist ranks. He shows the framers of heretics at work, the extinguishing of the historical contribution of the defeated rivals. He shows the eliminators and shows how they were soon eliminated themselves' (**Haug** 1981, 37). **Ossip Piatnitsky** (b. 1882), for example, declared in 1931, in the name of the ECCI, that **Lukács** was 'in his philosophical conceptions not a Marxist' (quoted according to Rokitjanskij 2001, 16). **Lukács**, who was excommunicated from Marxism, narrowly managed to outlive the "Great Purge". **Piatnitsky** himself was executed in 1938.

5.6 *After de-Stalinisation within state socialism.* – In the GDR – and here particularly after **Stalin's** death and the cautious new beginning under **Nikita Khrushchev** (1956) – the state-ideological basic structure remained, even if sanctions were no longer immediately life-threatening. **Bloch**, the most significant Marxist philosopher of the GDR, and altogether one of the most important philosophers of the 20th cent. worldwide, was forced to emigrate to the West in 1961. He found himself 'driven into isolation, had no possibilities to teach, contact with his students was interrupted, [...] activities in publication and journalism were forbidden', as an attempt 'to bury [him] in silence'; the closing of the borders through the construction of the Wall made it completely 'clear [to him] that there was no more room for independent thinkers to exert any influence', he wrote to the President of the Academy of Sciences of the GDR (August 1961). His great impact in questions of the ethical-philosophical substance of BM became fatal for him.

The case of the chemist **Robert Havemann** is similarly significant. In post-war East Berlin he was 'from the start involved in creating a new, better, socialist university'; later, too, when his criticism of the policies of his party 'became sharper', 'all my efforts went towards positively influencing and carrying on the politics of the GDR, in order to pull them out of their dead end' (1978a, 11). With **Kurt Hager** (b. 1912), the leader of the Scientific Department of the CC and subsequent head of the Ideological Commission of the SED Politburo, **Havemann** spoke of 'the corrupted and superficial form of dialectical materialism that was represented in the university' (ibid.). The 'cadre philosophers' which he held responsible for this became his enemies. The success of his course on philosophy and natural sciences led to disastrous consequences for him. In time his course developed from a marginal event with few students to a mass event in which he as a committed Communist and former resistance fighter uninhibitedly spoke out not only on questions of the natural sciences and the principles of ML but also on the problems of the GDR.

Here Marxism could be experienced as something living and concrete. To say it with **Gramsci**, here an autonomous space of civil society arose for a discussion fundamentally affirming the GDR but which critically examined its condition and the policy of its leadership. As a result **Havemann** was finally expelled from the SED under all sorts of pretexts with the votes 'of all members of the party leadership with one exception, namely Professor Wolfgang **Heise**' and was soon also condemned to house arrest and subjected to a communication ban (18).

Nevertheless, in the GDR, alongside the official party Marxism with the mere façade of lip-service Marxism, decreed and cultivated as it was via schools, the FDJ, trade unions, and above all the party, as a precondition for career opportunities, and alongside the more or less dissident critical Marxists in the GDR, there was also some room for a primarily scholarly BM, as long as collisions with the state and party were avoided but also because its practitioners did share the broader consensus in the society. This could be the result of an obligatory retreat after a failed attempt at engagement as in the case of the historian Walter **Markov** (b. 1909) or of the jurist Hermann **Klenner** (b. 1926); or it could simply be due to the professional work of scholars and artists who after initial resistance nevertheless caught fire through their intellectual involvement with the works of the "classics" forced on them by schools and the state environment, and in whom hopes of democratisation of socialism had been raised by the 20th Party Congress (1956) of the CPSU. Examples are the theatre director Adolf **Dresen** (b. 1935) or the historian Wolfgang **Küttler** (b. 1936). **Dresen**, who joined the SED in 1956, and accused **Marx** 'of failing to recognise the role of competition' in an (only posthumously published) fundamental criticism of his economic theory (1976/2012, 89). Under conditions of a living Marxism, **Dresen's** critique, which was sparked by the state planned economy, would have flowed into the further development of Marxism. In 1976 he was expelled from the party group of the Deutsches Theater – in accord with his own vote. 'Since what he knew as Marxism excluded criticism, his criticism closed itself off to [...] any other Marxist form or even refoundation' (**Haug** 2013b, 79). **Küttler**, by contrast, already in his study years came upon fruitful historiographical and methodological stimuli in the works of **Marx**, **Engels**, and **Lenin**. In the milieu of the historian Ernst **Engelberg** (b. 1909), who authored a standard work on **Bismarck**, he could develop his studies on historical method, the history of science, formation theory, and Max **Weber** according to scholarly procedure, largely unperturbed. For people like him, the second part of the eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach, that the point is 'to change the world' referred 'in the first place to "state-party socialism" itself and only after 1989 to the directly experienced capitalism' (**Küttler** 2014).

In their approach to the antinomy of BM in state socialism, the roads that were taken by Wolf **Biermann** and his teacher **Heise** differed. Neither of them shrank back from necessary criticism of the GDR's leadership. But while **Biermann** did this 'aggressively and *sought* conflict', what was important for **Heise**, as also for Helmut **Seidel** and Lothar **Kühne**, was 'to have the stamina to make changes in the country and the party and to be effective in bringing these about (through their thinking, writings, and above all teaching)' (**Trebess** 2014). For instance in the GDR's institutionalised ML, **Heise** lived the 'simultaneous-non-simultaneous existence of criticism and orthodoxy' (**Reschke** 1999, 17), 'orthodox', however, not in the sense of ML but of **Luxemburg**, that is, of the forward-thinking affiliation to **Marx**. **Seidel** acted in exactly the same way in his 1966 habilitation dissertation, which, significantly, could only be published after the collapse of the GDR but then no longer in a historically effective way (2011).

Long after the demise of the GDR Hans Heinz **Holz** left the BM of his dissertation supervisor **Bloch**, who had been forced into silence there, in limbo: 'Of course it is [...] not a matter of simply pigeon-holing Bloch as a Marxist; but it is equally impossible to classify him simply as a non-Marxist philosopher' (2010). On the other hand, **Schaff's** experience was 'curious: In Marxist circles I was frequently seen as "heterodox" (revisionist); on the other hand, in non-Marxist circles I was taken for an orthodox Marxist' (1997, 96).

Not a few creative Marxists who had to suffer what Helmut **Steiner** analysed as the kind of 'Marxism expropriation' – anchored in the state-socialist power structure – finally turned away from Marxism. In Poland it was **Kołakowski** who had long worked for a 'reconstruction of a Marxism adequate to our epoch, the epoch of the atom bomb, of imperialism in its current phase, of today's bourgeois culture and the existence of a camp of non-capitalist states'; in this he saw a task 'whose solution' could 'decisively influence the future of communism' (1967, 71). In the 1960s he had analysed the conversion mechanism to which he now gave in: 'The dissidents of Stalinist communism easily became renegades since there was no significant force that could have kept their critique within the framework of socialist thought' (ibid.). The consequence was 'that every criticism was forced into the standpoint of the real counter-revolution and taken over by the forces of obscurantism and clericalism, which wanted to restore capitalism' (73).

This was the case with **Biermann**, who was not locked in, that is, jailed, but locked out of the country by the GDR leadership, which contrasted with the approach of his friends **Havemann** and especially **Heise**, whose criticism of his attitude leading to a total break, indeed to a sheer hatred of all Marxism, **Biermann** retained as an inner voice; at his acceptance of an honorary doctor-

ate, which he turned into a tribute to his teacher **Heise**, who had died in 1987, he openly expressed this inner voice and so for a moment granted it authority (2008, 36 et sqq.).

6. *Living in concrete utopia.* – On 16 September 1947, in a Russian prisoner-of-war camp, the then still anti-Marxist **Gollwitzer** for the first time heard the phrase: ‘You have to see it dialectically!’ He heard it from a young Russian – whom he described as an ‘honourable’ Communist-Marxist – when he confronted him with the dark side of Stalinism. **Gollwitzer** comments in his diary: ‘This “seeing things dialectically” helps them over any challenge that reality presents them with; it is the cushion that pads them from disillusioning blows’ through a ‘marvellous capacity to live in the future and jump over the present’ (1951/1974, 111 et sq.). This living beyond time has little to do with dialectics in the theoretical sense but it does have to do – mostly unconsciously – with that passive dialectic of the ‘living and lived contradictions’ of **BM** whose making conscious **Lefebvre** assigned to Marxists (1959, 683). Not thinking this dialectic but instead depicting ‘the actual reality of communists in the mode of being and of ontological participation in the future’ (684), time and again let ‘the claimed exceptional quality become its opposite: discipline became weakness of will, freedom became dogmatism, and devotion careerism’ (685). Against this fatal mechanism working ‘with the time that one eliminated’ behind the backs of those involved, **Lefebvre** reminds us ‘that the dialectic shatters everything that is absolute, everything that is unconditional, and that this is its *principle*. Only truth – which itself is always relative – has an “unconditional” and absolute right’ (685). Everything having to do with politics, state, and party must ‘be freshly relativised and “de-absolutised”; communism was defined [by **Marx**] as in movement – not in “being” – and as a movement towards a distinct goal [...]: the end of the private ownership of the means of production’ (ibid.). What does this Being towards a not-yet-being mean for **BM**?

6.1 **BM**, when referring to **Marx**, has its negative point of departure – or, in **Lukács**’s language: its *terminus a quo* (1958, 28 et passim) – in the struggle against oppression and exploitation. However, if the negation of such relations, indeed if all Marxist critique, is not to turn into pseudo-revolutionary nihilism but rather become “determinate negation” in the sense of a higher synthesis, then it has to be anchored in a *terminus ad quem*. In the succession to **Marx** this cannot be other than social relations in accordance with self-determination, solidarity, human dignity, and ‘the social guarantees of life’ (**Luxemburg**, *GW* 4, 361, fn. 1) on the basis of a mode of production committed to these goals for all people. **Bloch** brings the poles of repulsion and attraction into the image of a ‘cold stream’ vs. a ‘warm stream’ (*PH*, 205 et sq. [*GA* 5, 235 et sqq.]). The facing-

towards-a-goal [Zielzugewandtheit] of Bloch's warm stream means that BM is anchored in a 'Not-Yet Being' (ibid. [235]).

Striving beyond the factual given towards a not yet given is a general factor of being human. In BM it relates to social relations as a whole. It shifts individuals into an 'emancipatory target horizon', which Alfred Schmidt (b. 1931) characterises as 'de-domination', 'de-reification', transcendence of alienation, 'reharmonisation of the people-nature relation', 'implementation and cultivation of a culture of values and education that is in itself pluralist and humanist' (1971, 180 et sq.). For critical theory this means analysing 'the existing condition from the perspective of its future mastery through solidary, acting individuals' (132, fn. 321).

If BM thus derives its meaning from a goal whose achievability is uncertain then the transition 'from utopia to science' (Engels) would seem to have been proclaimed prematurely. Alternatively, one might understand that blueprints from the 19th cent. 'have overtaken the 20th cent. from the very start so that now they are, as the future in the past, waiting for the people of the 21st cent'. (Haug 1999/2005, 123). Since, however, 'no one has contributed so much and so far-reachingly to this kind of utopian transcendence of the given as Karl Marx [has] [...], the case of science and utopia in Marx has to be reopened' (ibid.).

6.2 Bernstein was the first Marxist to have – in a Marxist sense – reopened this case and to have diagnosed 'an actual survival of utopianism in Marx's system' (*Preconditions*, 199; cf. 1921, 244). He saw Marx's work streaked with a 'dualism' of, on the one hand 'being a scientific investigation and yet' wanting to 'prove a finished thesis long before its conceptualization'. He believed he could read this from Marx's having, in *Capital*, come back to the *Manifesto* (ibid.) – 'that is, to the ultimate socialist goal!', Luxemburg interjects here, and connects this to her observation that for Bernstein 'socialism has become only a "relict of utopianism"' (GW 1/1, 416).

Luxemburg's answer to the direct separation of reform and revolution is an orientation to 'revolutionary realpolitik' (GW 1/2, 373), which Frigga Haug understands as the task of striving for a realpolitik that maintains the 'tension-filled mediations between short- and long-term objectives' (2007, 62). This 'tension between path and goal' (63), the particular day and an uncertain future, runs through all BM.

Marcuse, who as the only one from the founders' generation of Critical Theory to be captivated by the '68 movement, then in turn to captivate it, saw in view of 20th cent.-experiences no more possibility of connecting Luxemburg's short-term and long-term goals. Instead of this, he directed critical concepts 'away from the existing whole and towards completely different possibilities'

(Haug 1968/1973, 97). His intuition of the goal of the ‘completely different’ was to pilot individuals from the existing into the new mode of existence. This way of totally leaping over what exists towards the desired goal cuts the relation to that which Marx calls ‘the elements for the formation of a new society, [and] the forces for exploding the old one’ (35/505 [23/526]) and becomes utopian in the sense of beyond reality.

Bloch tries to bridge this dualism through the concept of ‘concrete utopia’ (1975, 234). Since the utopian moment in BM was repressed in the name of an ideologically absolutised ‘scientificity’ he had ‘great difficulties in the GDR’ when he introduced this concept into Marxism (ibid.). Against class society’s ideological expropriation of the people from their world – which Marx analysed under the heading of alienation – he calls for a ‘transcending into this-worldishness’ (ibid.). In so doing he frames the ‘enchanted, perverted, topsyturvy world, in which Monsieur le Capital and Madame la Terre do their ghost-walking as social characters and at the same time directly as mere things’ (C III, 37/817) as a ‘remarkable kind of pseudo-this-worldish otherworld’ (Haug 2014, 144). In fact, the Marxist critique is directed against the de-realisation of objectively given social possibilities by the relations of domination, and the fulcrum of the goal it sets is the unrealised *possibilities*. These can be understood as objective to the extent that their becoming effective is supported by the state of the forces of production but blocked by the relations of domination and property.

Does a Being in the tension of the Not-Yet and on the soil of the objective possibility along with the prevailing non-possibility then find its point of arrival shifted to utopia? ‘One cannot be a Marxist without being a utopian’, the dissident GDR economist Fritz **Behrens** (b. 1909) would say, ‘for utopia is [...] the anticipation of what is to come, not the necessary but the possible!’ (1992/2010, 234). He fails to differentiate between mechanical necessitation and the practical-dialectical matter of necessity (Not-Wendigkeit) that one has in mind when one says it is necessary to build dams against floods. Behrens vacillates in his judgement. At times he calls the ‘belief in a domination-free society an illusion’ (225), then at another time he conceives of Marxism in the style of **Bloch** as ‘the novum of a certain “concrete utopia”’ (235) in the sense of a ‘possibility, because the conditions are present, of realising it’ (234). In another sense, that of the lost state-supported historical agency, the theologian **Dick Boer** (b. 1939) speaks of the utopian character of socialism and hence also of BM. ‘Socialism has become u-topian again, because there is no specific place for it any more. The “fusion” of Marxist theory and revolutionary praxis in the modern labour movement was apparently unique – and perhaps not even that’ (2012, 670).

6.3 But how was it in state socialism, where the conditions appeared to be present of realising the objectively possible? It was seen to be not that simple. Only the *political* conditions were present and even these only abstractly because they were separated from society in the form of the state power armoured by force. In the SU the system of the mode of production based on command and administration imposed on society the curse of 'bureaucratism and mismanagement, social apathy and lack of responsibility', Mikhail **Gorbachev** (b. 1931) said (1988; cited in **Haug** 1989, 156). What the self-blockage of the authoritarian state did not accomplish through what Anatoli **Butenko** (b. 1925) decried as the 'colossal corrosion of the human factor' (1988) was completed by the economic relations of force in a world that was increasingly integrated due to forces of production – not least the forces of communication – that ran straight through all separations.

What was blocked was collective self-socialisation, which is, however, the actual communist factor. 'In this sense the idea of socialism is also a utopia, which in no way means that socialism is impossible', **Kořakowski** declared (1967, 23). Confronted with the chasm between facts and the long-term goal 'utopia' organises 'hope for a realisation of values in the social institutions' (*ibid.*). By contrast, everything in Lothar **Kühne**, a communist faithful to **Marx**, rebelled against the secular postponement of communism. He repudiated the idea of future communism as 'a present that has become ideal and relieved of its resistances' (1985, 16). Something of that future had to begin immediately in the here and now. Since the distance to the long-term goal could not be eliminated **Kühne** banks on the 'capacity of individuals and their drive to ceaselessly reset the contradiction of ideal and reality' (1981, 267). What he thus specifies as 'the subjective condition of reproduction of communist relations' (*ibid.*) characterises a basic feature of **BM**.

ML in power legitimised itself through the goal and at the same time blocked its pursuit when this required a shifting of the initiative back into society. The consequences for **BM** were fatal. Under the reign that operated as "Marxist-Leninist" the old division between *fides* and *confessio*, of conviction and lip-service, reappeared. This led in the **GDR** to the paradox that "actually existing Marxism" had to emigrate from "actually existing socialism". Such forced emigration could take on the form of a change of research focus from the present to antiquity as in the case of **Seidel**, who was accused of pursuing the "philosophy of praxis". Or it could mean emigration to the **FRG**, as with **Abendroth**, **Bloch**, and **Kofler**. A point was reached at which Marxist research and even praxis were more possible in capitalism – only of course where its state was restrained by liberal constitutionality.

The attitude of the comrades in power who were responsible for 'governmentally prescribed Marxism' (**Havemann** 1978b, 31), was etched in by the 20th

cent.'s history of horrors. Because battle wounds and the martyrdom of persecution can also lead to the ossification of BM. Heinz **Jung** describes this reversal towards a kind of conservatism that is suffocating but whose 'moral-political strength and legitimacy' is not easy to dispute. Here it is not participation in power or the securing of status that is at work; 'this attitude here rests, rather, [...] on a [...] life spent in struggle, which is called into question through events and also the pressure of criticism' (1990/2006, 10). Alluding to **Marx's** remark that scientific investigation into the *modus operandi* of capitalist property 'summons as foes into the field of battle the most violent, mean and malignant passions of the human breast, the Furies of private interest' (35/10 [23/16]), **Jung** adds: 'Calling a life into question unleashes yet worse Furies' (1990/2006, 10).

6.4 As under capitalism *bourgeoisie* and *citoyenneté* separate from each other and clash, so, in BM, do private person and comrade. Actual everyday existence conflicts with identificational conviction, thus also with the political-ethical-intellectual life of solidarity. Under liberal-constitutional conditions BM, first of all, means a formal bourgeois existence with anti-bourgeois ideas and elements of corresponding practice.

Alexandra **Kollontai** (b. 1872) experienced how the relation of forces of these opposing determinants can push back the ideal side under the conditions of the turn from war communism to the New Economic Policy in 1921. The mute force of the conditions working behind people's back became strikingly clear to her. Answering the question of a young Communist as to whether after fulfilling all party instructions 'one is free in one's private life and can live as one likes' (1922/1979, 67) she angrily named the reason for the current aggravation of this question: 'We were all merged into one entity. [...] Now everyone is for themselves, and precisely the comrades who appeared to be "heroes" at the moment of action are now, in the daily work of tedious construction, seen to be petty, self-seeking, vindictive creatures. They are ready not only not to help the others but also to act vulgarly towards comrades' (68 et sq.). In order to keep together the private and the political against their division due to conditions, she urged 'a new communist morality that keeps the collective together as a psychic, inner cement' (69). She designated as 'bad Marxists' those who think 'that evaluating actions from a moral point of view is a vestige of the bourgeois view of life' (71).

But how is it when **Fetscher**, in his West German post-fascist bourgeois existence, sets about the task of 'working out the far-reaching differences, indeed contrasts, between the humanist critique of the early **Marx** and the doctrinaire justification of Stalinist Marxism' (1983, 12)? At the centre of his study on the relation of Marxism to **Hegel** is, among other things, the attempt 'to

demonstrate that **Stalin's** anti-Hegelianism only veils the actual conservative Hegelianism of his state doctrine and that in essence it is not **Hegel** but the critical early **Marx** who is seen by **Stalin** as an “enemy” and tabooed’ (ibid.). For the writer Franz Xaver **Kroetz** (b. 1946), a member of the DKP, ‘my great Communist Party’ (2009), there was no question in 1978: The Marxist intellectuals not organised in the CP were ‘thoroughly elitist Robinsonades, know-it-alls, not giving a damn about the working class’s experience, fundamentally petty bourgeois characters’, for ‘Marxism has an enormous amount to do with learning, with subordination, with integration, with collective thinking, feeling, and behaviour’ (*Warum*, 1978, 34 et sq.). Still, more as a living BM, Kroetz is here describing ML in power, or the CPs oriented to it outside the SU. By virtue of his party membership, Kroetz saw himself as immune to the determining power of his bourgeois-economic form of existence.

Michael **Brie** (b. 1954) analyses this split through the example of the standard **Kühne** set for himself, under conditions of the GDR, to start concretely from elements of communist practice. Using a formulation from Günther **Anders**, **Brie** understands this as the impossibility ‘of his [**Kühne's**] being able to simultaneously incorporate two absolutely different types of Being: behaving as a “conformist” while working, whereas “acting” as a non-conformist – that he could therefore lead and withstand a *schizophrenic* life’ (1956/1987, 292; cited in 1993, 53). **Heise**, who shared **Kühne's** antinomic situation but was able to find a productive balance within it describes **Kühne's** tragedy: ‘He who was so able to analyse the path from the general to the particular, so precisely the relation of ideal and reality, could so sharply approach the mediation problem, wounded himself on the contradictions of socialism [...]. He who pressed forward so impatiently, exploded inwardly when he saw the current state idolised, the achieved absolutised, and the political diehards confronting him in a new form – and he had to live with it. He who wanted to move in a practical way had to experience practice as a given fact and was limited to the theoretical. As much as he accepted the conditions for his efficacy, and became involved in them, his relationship to reality was made very tense through the complications of affirming and negating, which made him as productive as it ground him down’ (1985/1988, 117). In November 1985 he put an end to his life.

7. If, in the words of Heiner **Müller**, the post-communist situation made BM a matter for a ‘monastic order [...] that has a doctrine that now has to be buried’ (1989/2008, 487), then, at the latest, the Great Crisis of High-tech Capitalism (2008 et sqq.) put it back on the agenda. The transformed conditions have imprinted their stamp on it. Gone are the times when intellectuals wrestled with the ‘temptation’ to ‘eliminate by the stroke of a pen one of the most diffi-

cult questions of recognition for everyone' i.e. 'the problem of material unity – the unity of matter containing *my Being* and *my Consciousness*' which 'weighs so heavily on our individual consciousness' (Hans-Jörg Sandkühler [b. 1940] 1975, 615), or when **Althusser** could reflect the drama of BM with his assertion (not supported by any source) that 'the whole intellectual evolution of **Marx**' must 'be understood: as a long, difficult, and painful break in order to arrive from his petit-bourgeois class instinct at the proletarian class standpoint, which he helped in a decisive way to define in *Capital*', an 'extraordinarily difficult but not completely impossible' struggle to win (1969/1973, 109). As far as we know, Marx struggled with censorship, the secret police, ideologues of every colour, financial difficulties, stupidity ...

Anything other than the 'Marxism without guarantees' outlined in 1983 by Stuart Hall (b. 1932) is by now a matter for sectarians only. If it offers no guarantee, it is indeed an intellectual resource of knowledge that is at the same time a resource of resistance. It corresponds to the practical attitude of people who withstand contradictions and defeats, 'who do not despair in the face of the worst horrors and who do not become exuberant with every silliness' (**Gramsci**, *PN*, N. 1. § 63, 172), whether this is upheld by way of defiant matter-of-course, or by way of the *docta spes*, the '*comprehended hope*', which – in the interpretation (*PH*, 7 [GA 5, 5]) of **Bloch**, who coined the term – is disillusion-proof. The historical fusion of the labour movement with **Marx's** theory and instructions for action has largely come apart. The call for the unity of proletarians of all countries falls on deaf ears. The working class has been newly fragmented and disassembled through the transnational *dispositif*, the outsourcing on the part of corporations active in the world market, and IT-shaped skills and forms of employment. Conversely, the 'intellectualisation of production' (PAQ 1987, 43) accompanying the transition to a high-tech mode of production has changed the relation of the "automation worker" to theory and thus also to the "intellectuals" in the functional sense. Ever since industrial workers began viewing the computerised processes of production 'through a raster of physical dimensions' it can be said: 'The automation worker has to do with a *scientific information structure*' (43 et sq.). The wage dependants, among them those who were already born – from 1970 on – into a world shaped by PCs and soon also the internet, are incomparably more information-skilled and in a certain sense "more intellectual" than any earlier generation. At the same time, however, they are more individualistic, further from class consciousness and class solidarity, and so more mobile in net-based "bargain hunting".

In the broad population crises and precarisation of the conditions of work and life are fuelling a spontaneous anti-capitalism that can spread worldwide into mass protests such as the Occupy Movement in the shortest time but then

soon disappears. – What kind of conclusions can be drawn from such epoch-making determinants in terms of the consistency and coherence of the theories and options that make up BM?

7.1 The collapse of European state socialism made clear to the West German communist Heinz **Jung** that his imaginary living-in-the-other-Germany as a specific mode of living-in-the-future was over: ‘those implicit tracks toward socialism [...] can no longer be deployed to the “beyond”’ (1990/2006, 17). That orientation was ‘moreover a state of affairs that did not need to be demonstrated because it was taken for granted by everyone. We were the party of socialism that saw its point of orientation in actually existing socialism’ (ibid.). For Fritz **Behrens** in this situation, it was ‘not a matter of whether a Marxist can still be a Marxist today but whether, if he wants to be a Marxist, he can still be a Leninist’ (1992/2010, 231), which he answers in the negative. For the French Communist deputy André **Gerin** (b. 1946) ‘BM today’ means ‘having the courage to think against the current and to say that conscience and class struggle exist. I am furthermore convinced of the relevance of the theoretical work of **Marx** and **Engels**. For me, the working class in the extended sense still forms the main force of the resistance and of protest against the capitalist mode of production. And with it, together with the majority of the population [*l’ensemble du peuple*] we can maintain the perspective of a higher society, socialism, communism’ (2007).

What makes the nearly insurmountable distance between high-tech capitalist society and that ‘higher’ society difficult to bear for many is the disturbingly imaginary character of the solidarity and militant identification with the exploited and oppressed or with those held down while being fed and entertained by bread and television circuses, who in their great majority want to know nothing about those who champion them. It is hard for BM, with its commitment to historical materialist analysis, to deceive itself about this gap.

7.2 In his 1993 Riverside/CA lecture *Specters of Marx*, Jacques **Derrida** (b. 1942) encapsulates the reasons why precisely after the collapse of the SU it is objectively possible and moreover necessary to be a Marxist: First, capitalism, he points out, is reigning supreme for the first time as the global condition. Second, ‘never [before] have violence, inequality, exclusion, famine, and thus economic oppression affected as many human beings in the history of the earth and of humanity’ (1994, 106). Finally, he writes, the prospects of the alleged victors of the Cold War, all the old models of the capitalist and liberal world, have never before been as dismal, threatening, and threatened. Now after the dogma machine and the “Marxist” ideological apparatuses have disappeared there are, he points out, no more excuse, no more alibis, for shirking this responsibility. Without it there will be no future. In this sense Derrida spoke of the existence

of a 'new international' of those feeling responsible for this earth as 'a still discrete, almost secret link, as it was around 1848 [...] without status, without title, and without name, barely public even if it is not clandestine, [...] without co-citizenship, without common belonging to a class', something like 'the friendship of an alliance without institution among those' who despite all 'continue to be inspired by at least one of the spirits of **Marx** or Marxism – such as the "specter of communism" (6/481) conjured up in the *Manifesto* (they now know that there is more than one)' (Derrida 1994, 106 et sq.).

7.3 The disappearance of the ruling state party that under **Stalin** emerged from **Lenin's** vanguard party has reduced many surrogate problems to their prosaic size: reducing the unity of matter to a question of intellectual curiosity, of the appetite for thinking and philosophical-scientific education; and reducing the problem of petit bourgeois class instinct to that of political ethics and the limits that it imposes on market behaviour. But, despite everything, the army of directly or indirectly dependent workers is still the addressee of Marxist theory and, conversely, as Roger **Behrens** (b. 1967) says, 'a critical theory that does not start from **Marx** and **Engels** is void and is just as much a conceptual fraud as is Marxism without a critical-theoretical basic impulse' (2008).

The metaphysical transfiguration of the working class has not held up under historical materialist examination. Altogether, the post-communist situation of Marxists has 'at last compelled' them, in a gruesome replication of the *Manifesto*, 'to face with sober senses, [their] real conditions of life, and [their] relations with [their] kind' (6/487 [4/465]). A [religious] faith in progress and historical certainty of goal are gone. Yet the present has become what **Marx**, reaching far beyond his own time, diagnosed as 'the entanglement of all peoples in the net of the world market, and with this, the international character of the capitalistic régime' (35/750 [23/790]), completed by that other net which brings individuals from all peoples, to the extent possible, in universal contact and has generated an immense knowledge commons – however ideologically penetrated and fragmented – and with it has given a material basis to the Marxian concept of a 'general intellect' of humanity (*Gr*, 29/91 [42/602]).

The forms of Marxist engagement amongst those born in post-communism have profoundly changed with the waning of the labour movement and the **CPS'** loss of significance. For example, in the wake of the crisis **Marx** has experienced increased prestige among US liberals. Perhaps still more important, a new generation of intellectuals and internet journals understanding themselves as 'Marxish', similarly to the way in which **Bernstein** once spoke of the 'Marxischen System' – have made their voices heard. And as **Bernstein** distanced himself from the "orthodox" Marxism personified by **Kautsky** after **Engels's** death, so these intellectuals newly building on **Marx** mark a self-ironic

distance to that which is commonly considered Marxism. Their ‘Marxish’ signals a ‘more open positioning in the sense of “inspired by Marx” or “in the tradition of Marx’s thinking”’ (Misik 2014). An example is Benjamin Kunkel (b. 1972). After his novel *Indecision* (2005), in which he gives expression, among other things, to the change of mentality after 11 September 2001, made him famous overnight, and in view of the Great Crisis of 2008 et seq., he prescribed for himself several years of an ‘autodidact’s crash course on the unsustainability of global capitalism’ (Wallace-Wells 2014), to acquire an orientating framework. In contrast to Bernstein, however, he does not want to eliminate the utopian element in Marx. The title of his 2014 collection of programmatic-political essays, *Utopia or Bust*, sets the tone. The concrete-utopian perspective calls for theoretical grounding. ‘If it would take a practical movement to lend plausibility to a theoretical program, so would left politics draw strength from visions of a post-capitalist world’ (Kunkel 2014). Otherwise, political engagement to overcome capitalism would resemble a ‘leap into the dark’. The called-for historical work requires ‘a consideration that is probably especially important for would-be activists among the middle classes’ (ibid.). Not the name but the goal is decisive for him, for which he makes use, as before him Nick Dyer-Witheford as well as Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt (2009), of the name ‘commonism’, by which he understands social relations ‘that establish just and efficient economies and substantive democracy on a durable ecological basis’ (Kunkel 2014). Even though he considers capitalism irreparable as a whole he advocates reforms if only because the left is never so strong as it is in social reformist phases. Thus Luxemburg’s concept of ‘revolutionary realpolitik’ unexpectedly turns up here under another name, and BM takes on the new incipient, tentative form of Being Marxish. The coincidence with the *Communist Manifesto* of Marx is no longer in the certainty that the ‘victory of the proletariat’ is ‘inevitable’ (6/496 [4/474]) but certainly in the idea that the alternative means the ‘common ruin of the contending classes’ (6/482 [462])

7.4 The crisis-driven permanent development of the forces of production in high-tech capitalism, which overturns modes of life as much as it does social relations and global constellations of political, economic, and cultural power and which requires of all members of society, lest they “drop out”, to be life-long learners, requires Marxists to remain in a process of becoming. It is possible that in the crisis-ridden world of global capitalism corroded by extreme inequality and corruption BM might, in the “empire” of the 21st cent., be compared with Being Christians, Epicureans, or Stoics during the Roman Empire, as a form of individuality with a staunch readiness to serve the “commonalty” in the midst of a disintegrating society as locally active ‘patriots of humanity’, in the words of the Russian poet Yevgeny Yevtushenko (b. 1932) (2014). Their

stance would be distinguished by an ethos that encompasses the social relations of people together with their relations to nature. Their lives and actions would develop within that which is unfinished and uncertain, side by side with other political-ethical forces with their back against the wall, while, on the edge of the climate catastrophe, the old imperialist game would begin again, but now with the weapons of high technology. But ... the old mole of dialectic is good for surprises.

Wolfgang Fritz Haug

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→ anticipation, administrative command system, anti-intellectualism, apathy in the authoritarian administrative socialism, Austro-Marxism, bureaucracy, dialectics, coherence, command economy, contradiction, cosmopolitanism, critical psychology, critique of political economy, disillusionment, dissidents, doubt, economism, elements of the new society, expropriation of Marxism, faith, formation theory, ghost/spectre, Great Refusal, historical forms of individuality, historical materialism, hope, intellectuals, Kronstadt rebellion, labour movement, leadership, comrade, learning, left/right, Lessing legend, lie, Marxism, Marxism-Feminism, Marxism-Leninism, modern, critique, New Economic Policy, new social movements, Occupy Movement, organic intellectuals, persecution of communists, philosophy of practice, resistance, revisionism, revolutionary realpolitik, Stalinism, struggle/fight, theory and praxis, truth, utopia, Zimmerwaldists

→ Antizipation, Apathie im befehlsadministrativen Sozialismus, Arbeiterbewegung, Austromarxismus, befehlsadministratives System, Befehlswirtschaft, Bürokratie, Dialektik, Dissident(inn)en, Elemente der neuen Gesellschaft, Enttäuschung, Formationstheorie, Führung, Genosse, Gespenst, Glauben, Große Weigerung, historische Individualitätsformen, historischer Materialismus, Hoffnung, Intellektuelle, Intellektuellenfeindschaft, Kampf, Kohärenz, Kommunistenverfolgung, Kosmopolitismus, Kritik, Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, Kritische Psychologie, Kronstädter Aufstand, Lernen, Lessing-Legende, links/rechts, Lüge, Marxismus, Marxismus-Enteignung, Marxismus-Feminismus, Marxismus-Leninismus, Neue Ökonomische Politik, Neue Soziale Bewegungen, Occupy-Bewegung, Ökonomismus, organische Intellektuelle, Philosophie der Praxis, Revisionismus, revolutionäre Realpolitik, Stalinismus, Theorie und Praxis, Utopie, Wahrheit, Widerspruch, Widerstand, Zimmerwalder, Zweifel

Capitalist Mode of Production

A: tariqat intag ra'smaliyah. – F: mode de production capitaliste. – G: kapitalistische Produktionsweise. – R: kapitalističeskij sposob proizvodstva. – S: modo de producción capitalista. – C: ziběnzhǔyì shēngchǎn fāngshì 资本主义生产方式

Marx specifies, in the very first sentence of *C I*, his object of investigation as ‘societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails’ (MECW 35/45 [MEW 23/49]). Everyday political language would have it as ‘societies in which capitalism prevails’, and historiography also ‘prefers to use the expression capitalism rather than the formulation: CMP’ (Gallissot in CERM 1971, 261). The concept MP is nonetheless indispensable for social and historical *theory*. **Marx** introduced it to refer to the connection between forces of production and production relations. Because of this a contradictory dynamic has beset the concept of the CMP, which has led to certain difficulties of reception.

As for those elements constituting the specifics of the CMP as opposed to other MPs – free wage-labour and class antagonisms, the valorisation and accumulation processes, crises, the corresponding political, legal, ideological, and cultural modes of reproduction of the CMP – see the appropriate articles of this dictionary. In the following, by contrast, an ambiguity of the concept CMP stands as the focal point in which its own contradictoriness is expressed.

The ‘CMP’ of the *C I*’s first sentence appears to underscore the constant difference with respect to non-capitalist MPs, while a shifting meaning of CMP contrasts within the same work. ‘In manufacture, the revolution in the mode of production begins with the labour power, in modern industry it begins with the instruments of labour’ (MECW 35/374 [MEW 23/391]). This second approach requires identifying the distinctive forms of the MP *within capitalism* resulting from such changes. It is no longer a problem of demarcations to the exterior, but of the interior, for instance, the periodisation of determinate phases of the CMP’s development.

“CMP” stood, during the Marxist phase of social democracy’s rise, for that which was soon to be sublated, to which no inner perspective of development was attributed. In the self-conception of 20th cent. state socialism, the demarcation to the exterior dominated. Both of these lines of sight reduced the concept to an abstract and formulaic general meaning, in which the quasi legal relation of wage labour and capital – as a formal property and exchange

relation – as well as the principle of profit, are fixed as invariant essential characteristics. This meaning is maintained even in **Althusser's** critical rescue of ML and becomes radicalised through the structural-logical interpretation of *Capital* in *Lire le Capital* (1965). The general definition of CMP – as demarcated from other MPs – accompanies the spread of the range of meaning of 'CMP' to the whole of the structure and the superstructure. The echo of this reading of *Capital* went beyond **Poulantzas**, right up to the ramifications of the Regulation School and had encouraged, in many of its representatives, the systematic disregard for the development of the forces of production and consequently blocked an appropriate understanding of the transformations of the CMP brought about by High-Technology based on computers.

1. **Marx** introduces the concept 'mode of production of material life' in the *Pref 59*, so as to capture the 'totality of [the] relations of production', which are in turn 'appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production' (MECW 29/263 [MEW 13/8]). A relation of conditioning is added to this internal relation of production relations and forces of production that goes beyond the limits of the MP in the strict sense: 'The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life' (ibid. [8 et sq.]). **Marx** later solidified this foundational conception in the drafts of *C III*, where he speaks of the 'relationship of the owners of the conditions of production to the immediate producers', whose particular form corresponds 'to a certain level of development of the type and manner of labour, and hence to its social productive power' and forms 'the hidden basis of the entire social edifice', where 'the same economic basis – the same in its major conditions – [displays] endless variations and gradations in its appearance, as the result of innumerable different empirical circumstances, natural conditions, racial relations, historical influences acting from outside, etc. [...]'. (*C III*, 1981, 927 [MEW 25/799 et sq.]).

1.1 The *GI* had prepared the way for this conception: 'All collisions in history have their origin [...] in the contradiction between the productive forces and the form of intercourse' (MECW 5/74 [MEW 3/73]). In the *Pref 59* **Marx** referred to this connection between the relations of production and the forces of production also as an 'economic structure' [13/8] so as to differentiate it from the 'superstructure' – or rather, as he later wrote, from the 'superstructure of ideological strata' (*TSV*, 31/184 [MEW 26.1/259]) – and from the 'definite forms of social consciousness' that 'correspond' to that structure (MECW 29/263 [MEW 13/8]). While these determinations still seem feasible for thinking the change of a MP within an existing social formation, **Marx** explains further: 'In broad outline,

the Asiatic, ancient, feudal and modern bourgeois modes of production may be designated as epochs marking progress in the economic development of society' (ibid. [9]).

The concept social formation here appears to function only as an empty generic term for the fact that in general, societies require a formation and that this is given to them by every typical MP, which – according to their “major conditions” – can remain identical over centuries, if not for millennia.

1.2 ‘Social relations’, Marx had already penned in the *Poverty of Philosophy* (1847), ‘are closely bound up with productive forces. In acquiring new productive forces men change their mode of production; and in changing their mode of production, in changing the way of earning their living, they change all their social relations’ (MECW 6/166 [MEW 4/130]). They are shaped in ‘conformity with their material productivity’ (Kautsky and Bernstein, under Engels’s careful watch, still translated ‘productivité matérielle’ as ‘MP’ for the German edition of 1885, cf. MEW 4/130, fn. 1). Further on Marx defines ‘MP’ as ‘the relations in which productive forces are developed’ (MECW 6/175 [MEW 4/140]). Thereby he combines these relations, which correspond to ‘a definite development of men and of their productive forces, and that a change in men’s productive forces necessarily brings about a change in their relations of production’ (ibid.).

This can be understood in two ways, either as a transformation *within* a social formation, or as a *transition* to another. The second definition is captured by the oft-quoted consecutive clause: ‘The hand-mill gives you society with the feudal lord; the steam-mill, society with the industrial capitalist’ (MECW 6/166 [MEW 4/130]). Here the developmental impulse seems to originate one-sidedly from the forces of production and whose transformation seems necessarily bound to the transition to another social formation.

But since the forces of production within capitalism undergo a permanent revolution, were and still are capable of extraordinary development, a definition of the CMP as a contradictory connexion between forces of production and production relations must be able to think the inner-capitalist transformation and the respective ‘fixed form characteristic of a particular epoch in the development of the CMP’ simultaneously (MECW 35/340 [MEW 23/354 et sq.]). The ‘mode of production, and of living, and their products’ are always to be investigated in context (357 [372]). The concrete analysis of the contradiction growing out of the social scale of production and the productivity of labour within the framework of the CMP supplies the criteria for the possibility and conditions of its sublation.

1.3 Even if already, in the *Grundrisse*, these ideas are developed to a great extent, the terminological relation ‘CMP’ is still missing. Instead of this concept, the phrase ‘mode of production based on capital’ is often used (MECW 28/183

[MEW 42/177] *et passim*), sometimes even ‘the mode of production and form of society based upon exchange value’ (195 [188]) or ‘the classical, adequate modes of capitalist production’ (436 [419]). Elsewhere yet, **Marx** says ‘production based on capital or the mode of production corresponding to it’ (335 [321]), ‘the mode of production for which capital serves as the presupposition’ (388 [373]), or bluntly ‘the mode of production of capital’ (507 [490]). At one time it is also labelled ‘bourgeois mode of production’ (MECW 29/210 [723]), and another the ‘modern mode of production’ (229 [742]). Here, Marx apprehends the CMP as *one* ‘given historical stage of the social mode of production’ (28/183 [177]) and in fact as one which ‘is not only formally different from other modes of production, but also presupposes a total revolution and development of material production’ (207 [203]). The result is that the question as to the inner-capitalist consequences of the further ‘revolution and development’ of the forces of production appears subordinate to the question of the historical limit between different historical modes of production.

2. **Marx** used ‘MP’ (at times ‘form of production’, cf. MECW 35/85 [MEW 23/88]) in *Capital* and its varied drafts, partly as a concept referring to the concrete contradictory unity of the forces of production at a definite stage and the production relations disposing their use (the ‘technical and social conditions of the [labour] process, and consequently the very MP’) (320 [334]), partly in a more abstract-general sense, as in the above cited opening sentence of *C I*, but emphasis is placed upon the capital relation in its most general determinations, as present throughout during the development of capitalism as a whole. Marx also uses the expression ‘MP’ in the naïve way, as describing the methods of production. He even occasionally seems to skip over the production relations, and to identify the MP with ‘*the productivity of labour increases, i.e. the mode of production is changed*’ (TSV, MECW 32/443 [MEW 26.3/304]). The CMP is tied to the abstract-general sense of formation; only some pages later in the same manuscript, the ‘CMP disappears with the form of alienation which the various aspects of social labour bear to one another and which is represented in *capital*’ (446 [308]). Most of the time in *Capital*, however, the revolution of the MP is thought of from within the parameters of a capitalism that continues to exist.

2.1 *CMP in general and in its specific differences with other MPs.* – the definitions at hand in this sense threaten to lapse into a classifying way of thinking, which **Marx**’s dialectical manner explicitly opposed. As Georges **Labica** asked: ‘Was a theory, so explicitly dialectical and historical, which was therefore anti-dogmatic in principle, compatible with the equally explicit dogmatic art of definition?’ (1983, 12) **Engels** takes this up in the preface to *C III*, writing ‘where things and their interrelations are conceived, not as fixed, but as changing, their

mental images, the ideas, are likewise subject to change and transformation; and they are not encapsulated in rigid definitions, but are developed in their [...] process of formation' (MECW 37/16 [MEW 25/20]).

Marx had still wanted to begin his representation [*Darstellung*] in the *Grundrisse* with 'capital in general', i.e. 'the quintessence of the characteristics which distinguish value as capital from value as simple value or money' (cf. MECW 28/236 [MEW 42/231]). In its generality the CMP is an abstraction, just as these other general determinations, an 'abstraction [...] which grasps the *differentia specifica* which distinguishes capital from all other forms of wealth' (378 [362]). Marx did, after all, realise that this level of abstraction could not meet the requirements of the object of knowledge and that certain determinations designated for later treatment – for instance, competition – could not be fully excluded from the outset.

The formulation of the problem, expressed by the question regarding the CMP in general, is not to be dismissed; but in answering it in a 'classifying' manner the epistemological value, however, is threatened. What can be said of the CMP, in contrast to non-capitalist MPs, is in the end nothing more than the most general determinations of the capitalist production relations. On the one hand, it is a private division of labour, and on the other hand, it is class domination mediated through the forms of the commodity and money, which in the capacity of the free contract, exploits dependent labour, shaping the objectified means of production into the form of capital and surplus-product into that of surplus-value. Overall, in this manner, it is valid that 'in the CMP the labour process appears only as a means towards the process of valorization' (C I, 1976, 711 [23/591]), or 'the production of surplus value, or the extraction of surplus labour, forms the specific content and purpose of capitalist production, quite apart from any reconstruction of the mode of production itself which may arise from the subordination of labour to capital' (411 [315]) and so on.

Most of the time a comparable general concept for CMP is functional in *Capital* when it is a matter of demarcating it from other MPs. So for instance, historically-retrospectively: 'the CMP and accumulation, and therefore capitalist private property, have for their fundamental condition the annihilation of self-earned private property; in other words, the expropriation of the labourer' (MECW 35/761 [MEW 23/802]). A general concept as such becomes necessary so as to demarcate different MPs from one another, which coexist simultaneously within one and the same society. Marx touches on this problem when he compares the development of west European capitalism with the colonial societies. In fact in Western Europe 'the capitalist régime has either directly conquered the whole domain of national production, or, where economic conditions are less developed, it, at least indirectly, controls those strata of society

[...], though belonging to the antiquated mode of production' (752 [792]). In the colonies, however, the capitalist regime encounters 'the modes of production and appropriation, based on the independent labour of the producer'. 'The contradiction of these two diametrically opposed economic systems, manifests itself here practically in a struggle between them'. (Ibid.)

2.2 The comparison with *non*-capitalist MPs shifts observation away from inner transformation towards external difference and transition. Yet Marx draws out permanent inner-transformation as the specific dynamic of the CMP. In *C I* (MECW 35/489 [MEW 23/511, fn. 306]) he cites the *Manifesto* to show this: 'The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionising the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society. Conservation of the old modes of production in unaltered form, was, on the contrary, the first condition of existence for all earlier industrial classes' (MECW 6/487 [MEW 4/465]). The CMP's 'invariant' would be its variability. Such an introduction of dynamism into the definition bursts asunder its static-classificatory logic. No longer does the CMP, as long as it exists, turn out to be one invariant form *in history*; history breaks *into this form*. The CMP's law of being is the permanent revolutionisation of its technological foundation and its totality. Its development must be written even into its abstract general determination. Concretely, it materialises within a form of transformation that preserves the abstract and most general specifics, but whose social embedding, and consequently, concrete meaning, undergoes change.

First of all, the CMP does not arise at once: 'It takes centuries ere the "free" labourer, thanks to the development of capitalistic production, agrees, i.e., is compelled by social conditions, to sell the whole of his active life, his very capacity for work, for the price of the necessaries of life' (MECW 35/276 et sq. [MEW 23/287]).

The dynamic conception leads to a differentiation within the CMP, to its pluralisation. At first sight in *C I*, three epochal ruptures within the continuity of the CMP spring to the eye: *first*, the subjection of pre-existing handicraft production under the auspices of capital in the form of capitalist publishing, which pretty much maintains the small-scale domestic industry and the dispersed nature of production sites; *second*, the spatial concentration of labourers and the centralising reorganisation of the work place's division of labour and cooperation, still upon the handicraft basis, into manufacture as 'a specific form of the CMP' (367, fn. 3 [384, fn. 70]); *third*, large industry based on machinery with 'the revolution it effects in the mode of production and in the social conditions of production' (486, fn. 2 [507 et sq, fn. 300]). Articulated within different MPs are 'hybrid forms' which move within a specific MP,

although they may stem from an earlier MP, or conversely, anticipate forms of a later one. Merchant and usury capital are forms of such anticipation. 'In such forms capital has not yet acquired the direct control of the labour process'. It stands alongside the still present 'independent producers who carry on their handicrafts and agriculture in the traditional old-fashioned way', 'feeding on them like a parasite' (511 [533]). 'The predominance, in a society, of this form of exploitation excludes the CMP; to which mode, however, this form may serve as a transition, as it did towards the close of the Middle Ages. Finally, as is shown by modern "domestic industry" [in the contemporary sense of domestic labour, WFH], some intermediate forms are here and there reproduced in the background of modern industry, though their physiognomy is totally changed' (ibid.).

The different forms of the CMP arise not only in succession, but also in coexistence. So, for instance, 'on the basis of the same mode of social production, the division of capital into constant and variable differs in different branches of production' (310 [324]).

At the crucial points *Capital* sublates – in an interaction [*Wechselwirkung*] where the production relations have decisive sway – the technological determinism that still echoes in 1847 ('The hand-mill gives you society with the feudal lord; the steam-mill, society with the industrial capitalist'), which resolves the relation of the production relations and forces of production in a one-sided way. So it is, for instance, when looking at those manual implements that the human 'has always acted as a simple motive power' which calls for 'the application of animals, water, and wind as motive powers': 'Here and there, long before the period of manufacture, and also, to some extent, during that period, these implements pass over into machines, but without creating any revolution in the mode of production' (377 et sq. [395]). **Marx** traces the impulse to revolutionise the forces of production within the CMP back to both the capitalist's quest for 'extra surplus value' (322 [336]) and the attempt to break working class resistance with the aid of 'weapons' – ever-more powerful machinery (439 [459]).

2.3 One bears witness to a semantic ambiguity inscribed in the expression 'MP', when **Marx** sees, in the *Ms* 61–63, in the simple cooperation of wage labourers 'the first stage' in which capital changes 'the MP itself, so that the CMP is a specific MP' (MECW 30/262 [MEGA II.3.1/235]), resulting in 'a real alteration of the MP itself' (263 [237]). On the one hand, there is the abstract-concrete (a labour process that is sensually observable), on the other hand, concrete abstraction (through the social domination of definite relations of production). Now and then **Marx** seems to understand 'MP' as conditioned by the technical level of the instruments of labour, a method of production in which the production relations are ignored. So when in *C I* it is written, 'At first, capital

subordinates labour on the basis of the technical conditions in which it historically finds it. It does not, therefore, change immediately the MP' (MECW 35/314 [MEW 23/328]). In this passage, technical conditions and the MP blur into one, because the spatial ordering of the workers and their instruments of labour remain identical. 'The production of surplus value – in the form hitherto considered by us – by means of simple extension of the working day, proved, therefore, to be independent of any change in the MP itself' (ibid.). In this context, Marx continues: 'Hence, the conditions of production, i.e., his MP, and the labour process itself, must be revolutionised' (319 [333]). The development of the forces of production is here at issue. The relations of domination in the direct process of production seem to be insinuated by the 'social conditions': 'The technical and social conditions of the [labour] process, and consequently the very MP must be revolutionised, before the productive force of labour can be increased' (320 [334]). Then again, however, there is just talk of the resultant 'altered MP' (322 [336]), the 'improved MP' (223) and 'the new MP' (324 [337]). In another place Marx understands the 'revolution in the industrial methods' as the 'necessary result of the revolution in the instruments of production' (475 [496]). It may be that Marx only alters the focus on the connections, in order particularly to highlight the side of the forces of production. The 'social conditions of the labour process' could be so self-evident for him that he does not deem it necessary to qualify this constantly.

It comes to a head when Marx uses the example of the paper industry, 'the distinctions between modes of production based on different means of production' upon which 'the connexion of the social conditions of production with those modes' is to be studied. For 'the old German paper-making furnishes us with a sample of handicraft production; that of Holland in the 17th and of France in the 18th century with a sample of manufacturing in the strict sense; and that of modern England with a sample of automatic fabrication of this article. Besides these, there still exist, in India and China, two distinct antique Asiatic forms of the same industry' (384 [402]). In this passage, Marx seems to understand 'MP' as the concrete labour process 'on the basis' of definite means of production, which concur in a definite way with the particular 'social production relations'. That would obviously be an untenable abstraction; the methods of production cannot be separated from the social relations of production. In contrast, the forces of production require, embodied as they are in the workers as well as the instruments of production, that they be grasped as an abstract field of possibility for itself so as to be able to analyse the tension between the production of use value and their dominant 'production methods'.

2.4 Marx makes use of the concept MP, on the whole, "fluently" and ambiguously. Without a doubt, the instruments of production and the concrete mode

of their use apply to the concept, especially in the meaningful interpretation of the pivotal role of the relations of domination – to Marx they are the key content of the ‘MP’: ‘It is not the articles made, but how they are made, and by what instruments, that enables us to distinguish different economic epochs. Instruments of labour not only supply a standard of the degree of development to which human labour has attained, but they are also indicators of the social conditions under which that labour is carried on’ (MECW 35/190 [MEW 23/194 et sq.]). Precisely the form of these relations is impressed upon the content. They condition the choice and application of the instruments of labour. In Marx, this connexion of conditioned conditions – which does not know of an absolute origin – are consistently included within the form the concept of MP takes. In the CMP each aspect, the dominated content as well as the dominant form, experiences perpetual change, a transformation in which each aspect retains its own abstract-identity. In its strong sense, the concept of the CMP – or as Marx said simply in a letter to Vera **Zasulich** (and in the drafts), ‘capitalist production’ (19/242, cf. 384, 396, 401) – comprises the field of possibility in the form of the subjective and objective forces of production, guided as they are by the profit principle that selectively makes certain of these possibilities a reality, while all the while this field is fastened within the grip of capital’s exploitative process of valorisation. This dominating grip forms the abstract-generality of the CMP. But the development of the CMP unfolds through the development of the forces of production (as well as counting the organisation of labour, level of qualification, and potential motivation of the wage workers – for **Marx** conceives of ‘*man himself*’ as ‘*main force of production*’) (MECW 28/351 [MEW 42/337]) and it is decisive to be able to conceptualise the ‘fixed character’ – in the concrete – of the forms each particular period of the CMP’s development take.

That a contradiction envelops the CMP is expressed not least in that it ‘meets in the development of its productive forces a barrier which has nothing to do with the production of wealth as such; and this peculiar barrier testifies to the limitations and to the merely historical, transitory character of the CMP’ (MECW 37/240 [MEW 25/252]). **Marx** sees the contradiction in the fact that this MP can only function by abstracting from itself, that it has ‘a tendency towards absolute development of the productive forces, regardless of the value and surplus value it contains, and regardless of the social conditions’ (248 [259]). But this brings the forces of production more and more ‘at variance with the narrow basis on which the conditions of consumption rest’ (243 [255]). This contradiction is reflected, on the one hand, in the problem of accumulation (analysed by Rosa **Luxemburg**), in which profit converts into additional capital and as such is able to valorise, and on the other hand in the tendency for the average rate of profit to fall resulting from the minimisation of variable capital’s share

in relation to the constant. **Marx** reads the age of ‘capitalist production’ off this contradiction (MECW 36/472 [MEW 24/469]). This ‘age is measured precisely [...] by the *internal organic composition* of capital’ (Balibar 1965/2016, 344). The historical limit of capitalism comes into view here, if not in the sense of an end to which a precise date can be assigned, then at least as a phase characterised by chronic crises, capital destruction and growing irrationality.

3. While **Marx**, in his robust version of the concept MP, understood the contradiction as an immanent one, **Engels**, in *Utopian*, speaks of a ‘conflict between productive forces and modes of production’ (MECW 24/307 [MEW 19/211]) – typical of the ‘MP peculiar to the bourgeoisie, known, since Marx, as the CMP’ (ibid. [210 et sq.]). ‘But Modern Industry develops, on the one hand, the conflicts which make absolutely necessary a revolution in the MP, and the doing away with its capitalistic character – conflicts not only between the classes begotten of it, but also between the very productive forces and the forms of exchange created by it. And, on the other hand, it develops, in these very gigantic productive forces, the means of ending these conflicts’ (289 [193]). Further on Engels speaks of these terms being ‘the antagonism immanent to it [the CMP] from its very origin’ (313 [216]). In *Anti-Dühring* – out of which *Utopian* has been published as an abridged version for the French public in 1880 – Engels took the already formed perspective of *C I* further in this sense, where it reads: ‘The monopoly of capital becomes a fetter upon the MP, which has sprung up and flourished along with, and under it’ (35/750 [23/791; cf. 20/124]). Engels traces the self-fettering of the capitalist process to the ‘contradiction between socialised production and capitalistic appropriation’; this reproduces itself ‘as an antagonism between the organisation of production in the individual workshop and the anarchy of production in society generally’ (24/313 [20/255; 19/216]; original in italics). Engels hoped to convey, in both written pieces of propaganda destined for the rising workers’ movement, the certainty ‘that the approaching collapse of this MP’, of the CMP is, ‘so to speak, palpable’ (25/254 [20/248]). That defines their conception and the reception of *Capital* narrows as a result: by having analysed the production and appropriation of surplus-value, Marx ‘exposed the mechanism of the existing CMP and of the mode of appropriation based on it; he revealed the core around which the whole existing social order has crystallised’ (191 [190]). Both aspects, the very near sublation and abolition [*Aufhebung*] of the CMP and its invariant “essence” – “crystallised core” – have, to a great extent, defined the reception of Marxism in the Second International as well as the Third.

3.1 Wilhelm **Bracke** was important for the Marx reception within early social democracy, and for him it is the ‘existing MP’ in which the ‘proletariat’s struggle’

is situated, and as a 'historical task' the 'revolution of the capitalist into the socialist MP' is immediately valid (1873, quoted in **Dlubek/Skambraks** 1967, 261 and 267). Even in Johann **Most's** popular summary of *Capital* (1873) that was edited by **Marx**, the perspective of the 'transformation of the existing MP, of existing society' (quoted in *ibid.*, 268) plays a predominant role from the very start, and the small but influential written piece concludes with the barely modified last lines of *C I*: 'Capital's privileged right [Kapitalvorrecht] becomes a fetter upon the MP, which has sprung up and flourished along with, and under it. Concentration [centralisation in Marx's C] of the means of production and socialisation of labour at last reach a point where they become incompatible with their capitalist integument. Thus integument is burst asunder' (MECW 35/322; cf. 750 [MEW 23/791]). The concept of the CMP is equally eschatological; development does not take place from within the object as much as it pushes beyond it.

3.2 Even if Rosa **Luxemburg** pays detailed attention to the development of the forces of production, the questions of the variability and the periodisation of the CMP are tucked behind the view of the approaching 'period of the final crisis [Schlusskrisen] of capitalist society' (1899, GW 1/1, 386). In her *Introduction to Political Economy* (1909), the task of which she defined as being the disclosure of 'the laws of the anarchic CMP' (CW 1, 132), she goes on to argue that 'they must reveal, as a further consequence, the laws of capitalism's decline', whereby science shall transform, shifting from 'the MP of capital' into 'the scientific grounds for socialism' (GW 5, 587).

Luxemburg continues with the line that dominated within the social democracy of her time, though she does so with an acute grasp of the contradictions involved. **Bernstein**, by contrast, expected the neutralisation of capitalist crisis to result from the capitalist system as organised into cartels, which, according to **Luxemburg**, would have to 'become, even approximately, the dominant form of production', which she grasps as downright impossible because an 'organization of the field can increase the rate of profit in one branch of industry at the expense of another' (1899/2008, 50). Cartels are only a 'transitional stage [Übergangsstadium]', 'a means resorted to by the CMP for the purpose of holding back the fatal fall of the rate of profit in certain branches of production' (*ibid.*). They are not even permanent features operating within a branch, because their strategy consists 'of keeping inactive a part of the accumulated capital' (*ibid.*), a strategy that runs parallel to the fact that 'the supplementary portions of capital [...] they cannot utilize for domestic needs. That is to say, they sell abroad cheaper than at home. The result is the sharpening of competition abroad' (*ibid.*). With the shrinking of the market outlets for the disposal of this portion of capital the 'remedy will become transformed into a malady', and the

organised cartel form, already ‘pretty much “socialised”, will tend to revert back to the private, individual form’, where ‘each individual portion of capital’ will strive to recuperate their own profit and in that way themselves, to the detriment of the others (51). With this particular example, Luxemburg shows that such contradictory solutions ‘aggravate the antagonism existing between the MP and exchange by sharpening the struggle between the producer and consumer [...]. They aggravate, furthermore, the antagonism existing between the MP and the mode of appropriation by opposing, in the most brutal fashion, to the working class the superior force of organized capital’ (ibid.); likewise ‘the contradiction existing between the international character of capitalist world economy and the national character of the capitalist state’ (52, transl. corr.).

Specific to the CMP is the ‘effect of the productive forces upon the bounds of the market’ (GW 1, 385) in which the production relations express themselves. Luxemburg demonstrates this with the ‘development of the middle-size capitalist establishments’: just as the working class does, it finds itself ‘under the influence of two antagonistic tendencies, one ascendant, the other descendant’; it is continually born anew, again and again, of the corporations that are themselves repeatedly suffocated or taken over (1899/2008, 54).

In the end Luxemburg accords the combination of different MPs dominated by the CMP a far greater importance than Marx had. In *Capital*, Marx works with the theoretical assumption of the methodological fiction of a bloodlessly pure capitalist relation – a single MP (GW 5, 428). For Luxemburg, on the contrary, ‘the accumulation of capital becomes impossible in all points without non-capitalist surroundings, we cannot gain a true picture of it by assuming the exclusive and absolute domination of the CMP’ (1913/2003, 345). Therefore, step by step the CMP ‘gnaws away at and represses’ the other MPs ‘to take their place’, locked into a more ferocious ‘competitive struggle in every realm of accumulation’ and the imperialist dynamic of war is consequently unleashed (GW 5, 430). ‘In this way, imperialism brings catastrophe as a mode of existence back from the periphery of capitalist development to its point of departure. The expansion of capital, which for four centuries had given the existence and civilization of all non-capitalist peoples in Asia, Africa, America and Australia over to ceaseless convulsions and general and complete decline, is now plunging the civilized peoples of Europe itself into a series of catastrophes’ (1921/1972, 147). With this Luxemburg is counting on the impending ‘general confrontation with the rule of capital’ (147 et sq.). Her *Introduction to Political Economy* concludes with the following prognosis: ‘The CMP is still able to achieve powerful expansion by everywhere suppressing all more backward forms of production’ (CW 1, 265). But the further this development progresses, ‘the more tightly the limits placed on the market [...] constrict the need of already existing capital-

ist firms to expand' (ibid.). Were it the case that 'on the whole earth everything that people produce is produced capitalistically', then 'the impossibility of capitalism clearly appears' (ibid.).

3.3 **Lenin** frequently uses synonymous terms – using the expressions 'capitalist society', 'capitalist system' and 'capitalist order' interchangeably – to refer to the "MP" and "production relations". The concept of the CMP first occurs in retrospective delimitation, from the standpoint of the 'the transition from the feudal to the CMP' (CW 1, 242). Then it occurs from the perspective of the crossing beyond of the frontier, 'the abolition of the CMP' (CW 18, 367). In a similar vein as **Luxemburg**, **Lenin** stressed – with respect to 'the quintessence of the bourgeois MP' (CW 2, 155) – that 'accumulation is the excess of production over revenue' (ibid.) and that, 'unlike all the old MPs' (164) a 'foreign market is needed because it is *inherent* in capitalist production to strive for *unlimited* expansion' (ibid.).

For **Lenin** it is important that in the Russian context in question, the suspension of private ownership on the land can have a completely different meaning within different MPs. For a moment he assumes, like **Plekhanov**, that under **Peter the Great** the suspension of private property as a version of the nationalisation of the land would have been allowed. Yet if this were so 'the economic basis of this nationalisation was the *Asiatic MP*. But it is the *CMP* that became established in Russia in the second half of the nineteenth century, and is absolutely predominant in the twentieth century' (CW 10, 332). Because 'the words are identical', **Plekhanov** had 'failed to see the fundamental difference in economic, that is, production relations' (ibid.). In the context of the debates over the agrarian program, **Lenin** once referred to a passage from the *Theories of Surplus Value*, where **Marx** 'shows that the landowner is an absolutely superfluous figure in capitalist production; that the purpose of the latter is "fully answered" if the land belongs to the state' (CW 13, 320), then to a passage in *C III*, where **Marx** speaks about the *CMP* that '*finds* landed property in historical forms incompatible with capitalism [...] and re-creates them in keeping with the new economic demands' (CW 15, 164). Of the *CMP*, **Lenin** emphasises 'its high technique, complexity, flexibility, mobility, rapid development of world competition, and so forth' (CW 16, 350). With these characteristics of the *CMP*, **Lenin** directs attention towards its extra-economic conditions of reproduction in the form of a 'firmly established representative system' and 'certain political rights for the population [...]. These demands for a certain minimum of culture are created by the conditions of the *CMP* itself' (ibid.). If on the one hand the bourgeoisie is oriented to consensus, granting concessions and reforms, while on the other hand it makes use of coercion, the passage from the former method to the latter arises 'not because of the malicious intent of individuals'

(ibid.), wherein ‘the various countries developing primarily the application of the one method or the other at definite periods’ (351). These distinctions served Lenin as grounds for the nationally specific paths for the Bolsheviks to take. Though all the social democratic parties of the world had an *‘ultimate common goal, which is conditioned by preponderance of the CMP’*, the ‘immediate tasks’ are ‘dissimilar [...] because the capitalist system is not developed everywhere to the same degree, and because in different countries it develops in a different social and political setting’ (1917, CW 24, 470, original in italics).

Lenin’s theory of imperialism ‘as the highest stage of capitalism’ is his form of a periodisation of the CMP, but it is only indirectly and vaguely based upon a concrete analysis of the MP. Without this coming to expression in the formation of theoretical concepts, he proves to have – after the October Revolution, confronted with the task of organising a state-socialist industrialisation of the country – a sharp sense for the productive side of Fordism then being developed in the USA.

3.4 The definitions in the *Pref 59* were canonised with ML without concern for their lack of clarity and contradiction (see Stalin 1972, 3 et sq.); Marxism transformed into a ‘general theory of MPS, in which this is equated with the stages of historical development (the famous five basic stages)’ (Abélès 1987, 1063). After the 20th congress of the CPSU in 1956, this fixed state would be partially loosened up, so that one focuses upon the ‘contradictory interrelationship of MPS within a social formation, in which *one* MP is dominant’ (1064). In practice this went hand in hand with permission for more small private businesses. In theory it went hand in hand with the tendency to interpret the “social formation” as a concept for the historically concrete. “MPs”, in contrast, were interpreted as a typology of general definitions, whose specific order in relation to one another in each concrete formation was to be investigated. In the GDR’s *Philosophisches Wörterbuch*, ‘MP’ describes ‘the unity of social productive forces and production relations’; the first, effective as ‘the most mobile and revolutionary element within the MP’. The forces of production of society develop impetuously in their transformation, but appear only to be a transition to a more advanced social formation rather than as a development of the social formation itself (Heyden 1974, 977 et sq.).

4. Étienne Balibar developed the most significant “structural” reinterpretation of the Marxist concept of MP within the framework of a theoretically rigorous reading of *Capital*. He subjected this concept to a ‘réflexion spéciale’ from within the rubric of Louis Althusser’s inaugural project of reading *Capital* (LLC II, 1965). Means of labour ‘determine the MP’, according to Althusser’s determinate object of *Capital*, and its concept is ‘established [...] in their productiv-

ities' (RC, Althusser et al. 1965/2016, 244). 'The concept of the MP therefore contains the concept of the unity of this double unity' (245) – which mediates the unity of humanity and nature through the means of labour and the '*social relations* in which production takes place' (ibid.). **Balibar** moved the determination, in contrast, to the 'structure'. Like **Althusser**, **Balibar** assumes 'that a general theory of history is contained in **Marx's** work'; especially since the concepts "MP" and "reproduction", in particular, form the conditions for the 'concrete knowledge of every social formation' (1972, 268). Hence the MP interests **Balibar** as a concept of periodisation for the solution to one of the great problems of historical theory, 'the problem of the "right break"' (RC, 1965/2016, 270). His analysis of the CMP is subjected to this epistemological interest in historical "limits".

At first **Balibar** addresses the meaning of the German expression – "Weise der Produktion" – to which he ascribes a 'descriptive and comparative character' (274) and translates as 'manière de produire' [*Manner of Producing*] (273 [1972, 91]). In **Marx's** *Capital*, **Balibar** looks for other connectors with *Weise*: 'modes of exchange' (MECW 36/120 et sq. [MEW 24/119]), 'modes of circulation' (36/164 [24/161]), 'modes of consumption' (the reference to 'modes of consumption' as present in *Capital* (35/181 [23/185]), is indeed implied but the expression itself is not used), and so forth, and defines 'a "mode" as a system of forms which represents *one state of the variation* of the set of elements which necessarily enter into the *process considered*' (RC, 1965/2016, 274). The concept of the MP in general – in this framework – has its starting point in *C II*: 'Whatever the social form of production, labourers and means of production always remain factors of it. [...] For production to go on at all they must unite. The specific manner in which this union is accomplished distinguishes the different economic epochs of the structure of society from one another' (MECW 36/42 [MEW 24/42]). The CMP would accordingly be, on the whole, only one of the 'economic epochs of the structure of society'. It would not, however, itself be structurally divided into epochs – on the basis of the interdependent development of the forces of production and production relations.

According to **Balibar** 'the elements combined [...] have different and independent origins' (RC, 1965/2016, 329), and by 'varying the combination of these elements according to the two connections which are part of the structure of every MP, we can therefore reconstitute the various MPs, i.e., we can set out the "presuppositions" for the theoretical knowledge of them, which are quite simply the concepts of the conditions of their historical existence' (278).

Balibar approaches the determination of the CMP through the continuation of the cited passage from *C II*: 'In the present case, the separation of the free worker from his means of production is the starting-point given, and we have

seen how and under what conditions these two elements are united in the hands of the capitalist, namely, as the productive mode of existence of his capital' (MECW 36/42 [MEW 24/42]). To this third element – after labour power and means of production – the capitalist as '*non-worker, appropriating surplus labour*' (Balibar, *RC*, 1965/2016, 275), Balibar adds the relation between the elements (either separation or combination by virtue of property) as a fourth element. As a fifth element he adds a second kind of relation: the "factors of the combination'. This redoubles the meaning of "appropriation", on the one hand as being a productive appropriation of nature by direct producers, and on the other hand, appropriation of the products through the capitalists because of the power of the first kind of relation (ibid.). Like "appropriation", the "separation of workers from the means of production" also has a double meaning – so that the latter in their corresponding form as socialised capital have dispossessed the individual worker in another manner and his or her labour 'without the capitalist's "control", which is a technically indispensable moment of the labour process, labour does not possess the *fitness (Zweckmässigkeit)* it requires if it is to be social labour, i.e., labour used by society and recognized by it' (277). The capitalist is also subject to the double determination, first through private property, then second as an organiser of the combination of workers and the means of production. Balibar refers to these relations with the concept 'structural complexity', as shaped by **Althusser**, with the intersection of relatively autonomous instances within the social structure as a whole. He has this to say about it, 'the complexity which characterizes the Marxist totality as opposed to the Hegelian totality' (ibid.). According to **Balibar** 'structural complexity' and its difference to the Hegelian totality was constituted by 'the fact that the elements of the totality are not linked together once, but twice, by two distinct connections', what **Marx** thought of as the forces of production and production relations (ibid.).

Two operations are problematic. The first defines 'the CMP, in the narrow sense of the industrial MP, the utilization of machinery' (274). This operation retrospectively excludes manufacturing and prospectively rules out computer-based production. The second is laden with further consequences in its strategic conceptualisation. **Balibar** drags the conditioned into the condition and the whole of the social construction into its 'foundation' – where **Marx** defines, in the *Pref 59*, the MP as the 'economic structure', which 'conditions' the determinate superstructure, which ought to correspond to it, and where, in *C III*, he grasps 'the direct relationship of the owners of the conditions of production to the direct producers [...] [as] the innermost secret, the hidden basis of the entire social structure' (MECW 37/778 [MEW 25/799 et sq.]). Because the social intervention of 'corresponding' instances is a means towards economic

stability, he now explains ideologies, familial relations, forms of political organisation and so on, as ‘implied [impliqués] by the structure of a particular MP’ (Balibar, *RC*, 1965/2016, 280) retracting superstructures into the structure.

But if a social formation can combine distinct MPs within it, that combination cannot be included in the dominant MP. That is why the intentional meaning that Marx assumed with the concept of social formation now appears in a twofold manner: ‘MP’ now refers to a definite dominant MP conditioning a social structure in general; as ‘social formation’, the various particulars of this structure. The Marxian ‘society in which the CMP prevails’ (MECW 35/45 [MEW 23/49]) means henceforth, in the terms of an abstract-general category, the CMP; as a particularised historical-concrete, the “capitalist social formation”.

The structural concept of the MP, totalised and centralised by Balibar, tolerates no concept of forces of production (in Marx, one of the two component parts of the MP) alongside it. Balibar turns against the notion of the development of the forces of production (because they stand in ‘the *rhythm* [...] of their development [...] directly linked to the nature of the relations of production, and the structure of the MP’; *RC*, 1965/2016, 293). In order to ward off “the verbal illusion” in the concept of the “forces of production”, Balibar grasps it on the basis of the relation of both appropriators (capital and labour), as a ‘production relation’: a type of relationship “within the MP” (ibid.). At the same time he sees ‘that the *productivity* of any labour, i.e., the “measure” of this development, increased more in a few decades of industrial capitalism than in centuries of previous MPs, whereas the “relations” of production and the legal and political forms maintained a comparable rate of change’ (ibid.). In this way Balibar ignores the feedback effect that the development of the forces of production can have upon these dominant production relations and paves the way for the tendency to reduce the MP to one of these elements, insofar as they may determine the structural form. Structure, in this sense, is akin to the unmoved mover of medieval theological ontology. And just like Hegel, Balibar speaks metaphorically of the ‘circle in which the whole MP moves with an immobile movement’ (337). Dynamism is fit only for *accumulation*, in which the concept of the development of forces of production is incorporated. Balibar conceives of its direction as ‘necessarily irreversible’. Yet it does not escape the circle: ‘indefinitely retaining (*reproducing*) the properties of the structure on a different scale’ (344).

The ‘immobile movement’ as claimed of the CMP meets with the radical de-temporalisation of the concept. It is distinguished as contemporaneity (*synchronie*), although Balibar sees that ‘the synchrony is not a *real self-contemporaneous present*’, but ‘all theory is synchronic in so far as it expounds a sys-

tematic set of conceptual determinations' (343). No connection between synchronic and diachronic concepts is to be admitted: 'one of which designates the structure of the thought process, while the other designates a particular relatively autonomous object of analysis' (ibid.). This abysmal separation of thought and being – without any mediating practice – is one way of answering the basic old question of (pre-Marxist) philosophy. Instead of contemporaneity, it would be more correct to speak of extra-temporality. As in **Althusser's** epistemology, the concepts and that which is conceptualised reside in the sphere of logic based on the example of mathematics. The Logosphere is not touched by time because it is not touched by any reality. But just as they are in **Plato**, these concepts are supposed to understand reality in its innermost essentiality.

In the revised German edition of *Reading Capital*, **Balibar** sees 'a constant confusion in Marxist literature between the *social formation* and its economic infra-structure (which is itself often related to *one MP*)' (1972, 277). In such a way he overlooks the fact that different MPs do not tolerate simple co-existence alongside one another, but that – exempted from the time of transition – 'in every form of society there is a particular [branch of] production which determines the position and importance of all the others' (MECW 28/43 [MEW 42/19]) and fashions them according to its particularity. This makes it all the more important to establish how this determinate form of production or MP is theoretically grasped.

In retrospect **Balibar** modified his thesis to the effect 'that it is not the MP (and its development) that "reproduces" the social formation and "generates" its own history, as it were, but quite the opposite it is the history of the social formation, which reproduces (or not) the MP, upon which it is based, and which explains its development and transformations' (1977, 336). Yet with this, once again and especially, the forces of production and their development were ignored in the asymmetrical interaction with the further development of the production relations. Much later he recognised that it is practice that bursts asunder the "inner-outer" paradigm with its logicism. Praxis 'actually frees itself from philosophy's traditional oppositions, in particular the binary opposition to theory, because it circumvents the opposition between reproduction and transformation' (1994, 38).

5. Of all things, however, the central operation of de-differentiation of **Balibar's** extraordinarily differentiated reading of *Capital* became the rule later on. Subsequently, Marxist historians above all in France were preoccupied with the problem of the demarcation between, '*MP in the general sense*, as all-encompassing structures of each economic social formation, which draws together the elements stemming from the diverse MPs', and the '*partial MPs*, those very

elements' (CERM 1971, 258). In the Althusserian School, and in the Regulation School, as originally influenced by Althusser (cf. Lipietz 1992), the abstract-general meaning of the "CMP" and its totalisation was firmly ingrained so as to take, in the end, the tracks that have already been super-imposed by Marx in the *Pref* 59, which assume the name 'capitalist social formation'. This continuously causes confusions. In this view, social formations are valid as 'concrete combinations of many MPs, of which one dominates' (Andreani 1989, 8). Reinforced by the critique of economism and technological determinism, this definition encourages the neglect of the concrete and contradictory double determination of the mode of productive metabolism with nature.

For Marta Harnecker, the MP refers to 'an abstract social totality (capitalist, feudal or slavery)', while the concept social formation refers to 'a concrete social totality' (1971/1980, 23). But both totalities become blurred within one another, precisely when Harnecker defines the object of *Capital* as 'the CMP (abstract object)', yet then thinks that Marx was inconclusive with respect to this object on account that he had only handled the economic level. The concrete totality, which was just reserved for the 'social formation', is hereby already included in the concept of the CMP. Bob Jessop grasps the 'MP' as 'the unity of capitalism', while Fordism is seen merely as an 'accumulation regime' rather than as a MP (2001, 11 et sq.). For Jacques Bidet, the MP is 'the articulation of some-such economic base – also known as a *founding structure* – and a political, economic and legal "superstructure"' (2004, 153). He claims, from this, that the conception runs through *Capital*: 'a MP is a social structure understood with the concepts of its reproduction' (154). Sabah Alnasseri et al. set out with the definition, which has been stressed by Althusser, Poulantzas, and the French Regulation theorists, 'in Marx's footsteps', according to which 'MPs discover the concrete space-time of social formations and determine their essential historical development. Historical social formations are, however, structured in complex ways and can only be composed of different MPs, forms of production and social relations (gender relations, relations of the generations, "ethnicities", and so forth). None of these are reducible one to the other [...] For the transition from [...] the abstract to the concrete, *intermediary* concepts are helpful – regime of accumulation, mode of regulation, production norm, norms of consumption, etc – which were developed within the regulation approach and operate within the middle planes of abstraction and complexity between the concept of MP and the social formation' (Alnasseri et al. 2001, 24). These intermediary concepts are doubtlessly helpful. Yet basing the designation of the CMP upon capitalism's abstract identity tempts "forgetfulness" when it comes to the invigorating, processual contradiction between the relations of production and the forces of production – a unity which is incessantly overturned by capital.

6. While affirmative bourgeois theories tend to replace ‘the CMP with an imaginarily reasonable system’ (Baran/Sweezy 1968, 305), the analysis of the CMP as such is, for critical theory, the first prerequisite. But Marx had not considered the contradiction between invariance and change in the concept of the CMP, but had, at times, used the term in the one way, or the other. And in the *Pref* 59 Marx approximated it to the concept of ‘social formation’ [*Gesellschaftsformation*] (MECW 29/263 [MEW 13/9]). This had contributed to the ‘complete absence of a *theory* (and not only historiography) of capitalist development’ (Hirsch 1983, 158). What Hirsch expected of such a theory had two sides. On the one hand, a ‘categorially “derivable” structural determination’, and on the other hand, ‘their actual historical and specific form in the concept of class relations and conflicts, the historical phases of an MP’s implementation, the overlapping of formations, etc.’ (159). Yet Hirsch errs when he sees the phases of ‘the technologically aided rise of the general “relative” production of surplus-value’ as being determined by a ‘relatively strong position of the working class in political and economic terms’ – the development of the forces of production sets labour power free and sharpens the competition among the sellers of labour power. Furthermore, when Hirsch sees ‘definite laws of the “capital logic”’ as effective in the ‘historical development of the capitalist formation’, and yet allows their ‘mode and manner of effectivity’ to depend upon the ‘development of class relations and class struggles’ alone, the dimension of the development of the forces of production is ignored, as well as what Karl Hermann Tjaden calls the ‘progress of the CMP’, the ‘laws of development of this MP itself’ (1983, 66 et sq.).

7. The collapse of the Marxist eschatology that reigned throughout the 20th cent. has pushed the “dividing lines oriented to a future beyond” into the background. For the task of theoretically comprehending social reality, as for the political capacity to act, it has become a condition for survival to investigate the interactively changing and contradicting connections between the forces of production and production relations, to be able to think through the differences between the transformations *within* capitalist society and the revolutionary ruptures, both of which condition the upheaval of the whole of the social and institutional structures. Labour research and policy are particularly reliant on the concept of the CMP as a contradictory unity of forces of production and production relations, and their further interdependent development (see the pioneering work in PAQ 1983 and 1987). The transnational capitalistic use of computers in the 21st cent., and the “higher technologies” that have been facilitated by this – with ramifications reaching into every pore of social life – pose analysis with the task of probing the concrete conditions under

which these changed conditions, in Marx's terms 'revolution in the industrial methods which is the necessary result of the revolution in the instruments of production', the changes of the CMP together with its 'medley of transition forms' (MECW 35/475 [MEW 23/496]). In this way it shall be demonstrated anew just how all other co-existing MPs are subordinated as 'conditions of its [the CMP's] own reproduction' within the CMP grasped in this concrete way (Godelier 1987, 643). This thought ought to be extended to the relation between the more promoted to less developed forms of capital. As in Luxemburg's conception of total capital living off of pre-capitalist MPs by invading pre-capitalist spheres, the advanced forms of capital feed off the less developed by enveloping them.

The CMP is to be grasped in its complementary relation to its extra-economic modes of reproduction instead of, as Maurice Godelier presupposes (641), taking the superstructures – which according to Marx are “corresponding” to the MP – into the definition of the MP itself. The CMP and the complementary modes of reproduction cannot exist without each other, even if they are not reducible to one another; the respectively separate analysis of them has therefore its own relatively autonomous right. The CMP would henceforth be understood as the economically dominant structure of capitalist society, which as the concrete and contradictory unity of forces of production and production relations determines the extra-economic social sphere's own field of possibility. The “structure” would, as Marx specified the concept in his terminological introduction, condition the “superstructures”; without which they would not hold and continually reproduce themselves (and change) anew. The structure, however, cannot absorb the superstructures without losing influence on their necessary reproduction. Without a doubt, changes in the CMP, in this strict sense of the economic structure, induce corresponding changes in all the extra-economic spheres of social life. The most recent is the transition of the MP to transnational high technology capitalism (see Haug 2003). Godelier's dictum continues thence to apply: 'in our time, the expansion of the CMP is yet far from coming to an end' (1987, 644).

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→ accumulation, african mode of production, Althusser School, ancient mode of production, asiatic mode of production, automation, base, structure, basic contradiction, chief/secondary contradiction, capital in general, capitalism, colonial mode of production, competition, complementarity, contradiction, crisis theories, definition, depreciation, destruction of capital, determination, destination, dialectics, domestic mode of production, domination, rule, extra profit, family work/domestic labour/housework, finance capital, force of production, fordism, fundamental question of philosophy, high-technological mode of production, homeworking/telework/outwork/putting-out, ideologue, imperialism, interior/exterior, irrationality of capitalism, labour politics, mercantile capital, mode of production, organic composition, organised capitalism, pre-capitalist modes of production, Pre-Columbian mode of production, profit, reading of *Capital*, relations of production, scientific-technological revolution, social formation, state mode of production, structure, superstructure, tendential fall of the profitrate, totality, tributary mode of production, usury, whole, work/labour, world market

→ afrikanische Produktionsweise, Akkumulation, altamerikanische Produktionsweise, Althusser-Schule, Arbeit, Arbeitspolitik, asiatische Produktionsweise, Automation, Basis, Bestimmung/Determination, Definition, Dialektik, Extraprofit, Familienarbeit/Hausarbeit, Finanzkapital, Fordismus, Ganzes, Gesellschaftsformation, Grundfrage der Philosophie, Grundwiderspruch, Handelskapital, husliche Produktionsweise, Heimarbeit/Telearbeit, Herrschaft, hochtechnologische Produktionsweise, Ideologe, Imperialismus, innen/auen, Irrationalitt des Kapitalismus, Kapitalentwertung/-vernichtung, Kapital im Allgemeinen, Kapitalismus, *Kapital*-Lektre, koloniale Produktionsweise, Komplementaritt (ideologische), Konkurrenz, Krisentheorien, Manufaktur, organische Zusammensetzung, organisierter Kapitalismus, Produkti-

onsverhältnisse, Produktionsweise, Produktionsweise (antike), Produktivkräfte, Profit, Regulationstheorie, staatliche Produktionsweise, Struktur, Superstruktur, tendenzieller Fall der Profitrate, Totalität, tributäre Produktionsweise, vorkapitalistische Produktionsweisen, Weltmarkt, Widerspruch, wissenschaftlich-technische Revolution, Wucher

Class in Itself/for Itself

A: tabaquah biḍātihā/liḍatihā. – F: classe en soi/pour soi. – G: Klasse an sich/für sich. – R: klass v sebje/dlja sebja. – S: clase en sí/para sí. – C: zìzài jiējí/zìwèi jiējí
自在阶级/自为阶级

The expressions ‘class in itself’, ‘class for itself’, and ‘class in and for itself’ are usually attributed to **Marx**, but they are not in fact found in his works. **Bukharin**, for instance, claims in *Historical Materialism* (1925, 292 et sq.) that **Marx** uses the expressions ‘class in itself’ and ‘class for itself’ in *The Poverty of Philosophy*. But there, especially in the passage **Bukharin** cites as reference, **Marx** distinguishes ‘a class as against capital’ (‘eine Klasse gegenüber dem Kapital’), in which a ‘mass’ of propertyless people are thrown together, from a ‘class for itself’ (‘Klasse für sich selbst’), into which this mass is transformed through conflicts, experiences and organisation (MECW 6/211 [MEW 4/181]). The objective condition of that mass precedes its intersubjective realisation. Hence E.P. **Thompson** and his opponent **Althusser** both share the seemingly paradoxical insight that class struggle precedes class (in the fullest sense). (Editors)

Social classes are large groups into which societies divide and which are distinguished according to their economic positions and life situations, their internal dispositions to act and external chances of action, and, as the case may be, their opposition to one another. **Marx** and **Engels** distinguish social classes according to their *position* within a historical mode of production and specific relations of domination as well as their *praxis* in the field of social and political conflicts. “Class” for them first of all is a heuristic concept: how a class as against capital becomes a ‘class for itself’ (MECW 6/211), or changes from object to subject of history, cannot be ‘derived’ solely from a class position described in social economic terms but must ‘be studied’ (**Engels** to C. **Schmidt**, MECW 49/8) with reference to the real historical dynamics. Nevertheless, two different doctrines on the development of classes are attributed to **Marx** and **Engels**, the first of which emphasises rather the political transformation of society, and the second of which focuses on social transformation of society. These doctrines solidify historical diagnoses that were originally based on different constellations and phases of capitalism in the 19th cent., and which were not necessarily mutually exclusive. The first diagnosis

traces back to the specific intensification of class antagonisms in England of the 1840s: a continuous deterioration of working and living conditions, plummeting qualification standards, failing strike and suffrage movements, and the expectation of a violent revolution to end this powerlessness. This view has dominated the ideas of “revolutionary” Marxist class theory in the 20th cent. – The second diagnosis arose at the same time, but was only worked out more closely after the failed revolution of 1848 under the impression of a sustained international growth of the forces of production and of the organised labour movement. It is summed up in the following theorem: already within the capitalist dominated order, a contradiction develops between the institutional relations of production and the economic forces of production pointing beyond capitalism. The working class is understood as the greatest of these productive forces and the initial basis of the formation of institutional counter-powers.

After 1848, **Marx** and **Engels** closely observed the emergence of new potentials of counter-powers in the advanced countries. They criticised the autocracy of the state apparatus in France as well as the worship of the state within the workers movement. On the other hand, they supported the emergence of forces which, being independent from the state and from the bourgeoisie, organised in the form of co-operativistic, communal, and federal self-management. At the same time, they observed the improvements won by the struggles of the skilled workers’ trade unions in labour and suffrage legislation, in living and working conditions, and demanded a labour, social, health and education policy of the state to improve the social situation. These improvements, however, would only check the increase of misery but not end the fundamental ‘insecurity of existence’ (MECW 27/223) – as long as political power was not taken. Both perspectives aim at overcoming capitalism, but point to different possible historical constellations and national paths. The hardening of mutually exclusive doctrines was a consequence of the dehistoricisation of their class concept.

1. The class concept outlined by **Marx** and **Engels** is, in a threefold sense, a *historical* one: in the posing of the question, in the formation of the theory, and its linking to a specific historical situation. This conditionality was often eclipsed in the reception history of the concept. The initial question was not whether there were any social classes at all. In the 19th cent., it was self-evident that the historic victory of the bourgeoisie over the old ruling classes in England and France had brought no end to class distinctions, but rather added a further antagonism towards the newly emerging class of industrial wage-labourers. Equally obvious from **David Ricardo** (1817) to **Max Weber** (1895) was

the idea of classifying advanced societies according to the economic positions of their principal members into three classes: large landed property, industrial capital and wage-labour, especially since they dominated the social and political conflicts of the 19th cent. However, the decisive, controversial question up to Weber was which of these classes would be capable of independently shaping the political and the social order (Weber 1895/1994, 20). Could the working class, like the bourgeoisie before it, create a new social order? And would this new order fulfil the demand of classlessness and emancipation better than the bourgeoisie?

A question aimed at the transformation of a whole social order cannot be answered without a comprehensive theory of societal development. With critical recourse to the political economy of **Smith** and **Ricardo**, **Marx** and **Engels** were able to analyse social classes as economic forces as well. Instead of tracing social struggles solely back to ideas or to power struggles, they studied them 'according to the existing empirical data' (MECW 5/43) and the 'real movement' (MECW 5/49) of historical structures and actors. Their studies resulted in the theorem of the contradiction between the dynamics of the economic forces of production and the perseverance of the relations of production operative in forms of intercourse and institutions. **Smith** and **Ricardo** had also brought this contradiction to the centre and emphasised that the development of the forces of production required new institutional forms. But they had assumed that this contradiction would be resolved by the autonomous working of the capitalist laws of the market, through which general prosperity would spread over all social strata of society (**Smith** 1776/1937, 11). In contrast, **Marx** and **Engels** assumed that no end of history as a history of modes of production and class struggles would be achieved with the victory of the bourgeoisie. Rather, the contradiction between socialised labour and private capitalist appropriation would propel history beyond capitalism. In this process the working class, like the bourgeoisie before it, would appear in two forms: first as 'the greatest productive power' of the economy, and then as a potentially struggling agent in the socio-political field (MECW 6/211).

As long as the elements of a new historical mode of production and social order are preparing in the womb of the old society, they still coexist with the elements of the old society. Theodor **Geiger** in particular has inferred from this and shown in more recent developments that historical social formations are not found in "pure" forms sharply separable from one another, such as feudal, estate, capitalist orders, etc. Rather within social formations and over long periods of time, historically "non-simultaneous" 'dominant' capitalist and 'subordinated' non-capitalist elements co-exist with one another in conflict (1932, 84 et sq., 92, 103 et sqq.; 1949, 44 et sq., 47, 152–56).

1.1 The development of **Marx** and **Engels's** concept of class was bound to certain historical conditions that limited the possibilities for theory formation. The initial problematic was strongly linked to the specifically exacerbated (or "antagonistic") class confrontations of the 1840s (cf. 2); it could neither fully anticipate the new and differentiated developments after 1848 (cf. 3) nor do justice to the class developments before 1840 (cf. 4) without perspectival distortions.

Engels presented an exceptionally comprehensive account of English economic and social relations in 1845 in *The Condition of the Working Class in England*. However, it still contains, to some extent, linear predictions and an underestimation of the class-consciousness of workers, which stems from an elite-mass schema. In 1847, **Marx** advanced a methodically stringent concept of class development which grasped the empirical evolution of the English trade union movement according to a praxeological theoretical frame, and which cuts across the alternative between idealist and materialist interpretations. The theorem of the development from the 'class as against capital' to the 'class for itself' (MECW 6/211) already contains almost all the essential elements of an analytical concept of social practice (in the sense of the *Theses on Feuerbach*), according to which the working class is both created through certain external conditions as well as self-created by its own struggles and alliances.

The praxeological theorem reaches far beyond its time. It provides a viable framework for a theory of class formation, even though **Marx** and **Engels** were only able to sufficiently and concretely anticipate and scientifically grasp the future steps of development after 1848. As their ethnological and historical studies prove, in their day they could only rely on a rudimentary development of science that anticipated the elements of a sociology and psychology of collective behaviour, cultures and mentalities. These social sciences emerged only after 1890 as a reaction to the new mass movements of the working class; they were, at first, hardly linked to a class analysis. **Marx's** praxeological analysis of class was first picked up and developed further in the works of Theodor **Geiger** (1949), Edward Palmer **Thompson** (1963), Michael **Vester** (1970) and Pierre **Bourdieu** (1979).

1.2 While **Marx** and **Engels** largely present economic and political processes together in their historically specific interrelations, these two aspects have become mutually independent in the history of Marxism's influence. The 'subjective formula' (**Korsch** 1938/2016, 136) received its short form in the 1848 *Manifesto*: 'The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle' (MECW 6/482). This formula summarises the historical parts of the *Manifesto* which date back to the social-historical writings of the 1840s (cf. *Con-*

dition, MECW 4/501–30, 580 et sqq.; *German Ideology*, MECW 5/27–81; *Poverty*, MECW 6/206–12). The ‘objective formula’ (Korsch 1938/2016, 136) appears in 1846 as the quintessence of the *German Ideology*: ‘Thus all collisions in history have their origin, according to our view, in the contradiction between the productive forces and the form of intercourse’ (MECW 5/74), or – in the words of the Preface to the *Critique of Political Economy* from 1859 – the ‘relations of production’ (MECW 29/263).

Karl Korsch in particular has emphasised that although the two formulae complement each other, they are inadequately interrelated on the theoretical level (1938/2016, 80 et sqq., 135 et sqq., 154 et sqq.). For this reason too, they have become the basis for opposing concepts of the historical perspective of action concerning workers’ movements: a substantialist or mechanistic-evolutionist concept and a ‘relational’ or ‘praxeological’ one. The latter term comes from Bourdieu (1977, 72–159) who, inspired by Marx’s *Theses on Feuerbach* (10, 96), developed his ‘Outline of a Theory of Practice’, distinguishing himself from phenomenological and structuralist approaches. The “mechanical model”, initially laid out by Engels in *Condition*, runs through the more polemical writings (especially the *Manifesto* and *Anti-Dühring*). In that approach, the working class appears primarily as an automatic carrier (“Träger”) of structural determinations, that is, as a passive, fragmented object needing guidance, which can only defend itself through violent insurrection and overthrow of the bourgeois state power, thus following the model of the ‘Jacobin-bourgeois revolution’ in France (Korsch 1938/2016, 61). The praxeological concept, on the other hand, starts out from the emergence of class organisations through social struggles, by which institutional counter-power and social-political reforms are already achieved within capitalism that can point beyond capitalism. In the words of Bourdieu (1998, 11): ‘One moves from class-on-paper to the “real” class only at the price of a political work of mobilization. The “real” class [...] is nothing but the realized class, that is, the mobilized class, a result of the struggle of classifications, which is a properly symbolic (and political) struggle’.

The various concepts became the basis for, on the one hand, the evolutionist perspective that trusts in the course of history, and on the other hand, the activist view that relies on a military seizure of power. The movements, or their avant-garde, repeatedly fell apart into “objectivist” and “subjectivist”, “evolutionary” and “activist”, “reformist” and “revolutionary” currents. The praxeological way of thinking cuts across these dualistic alternatives. Some important though marginalised developments in historical class analysis have arisen on this basis, such as Rosa Luxemburg and Antonio Gramsci, and also Thompson, Bourdieu, Raymond Williams, and Barrington Moore.

2. In 1847 on the final pages of *The Poverty of Philosophy* (MECW 6/210 et sqq.), Marx drafts the *praxeological concept* in a way that already conceives the development of class in all its analytical dimensions. According to the concise formulations by which the Marxian concept of class has become known, 'it may appear as if we had before us a mere a priori construction' (MECW 35/19). In fact, it arises as a 'summary recapitulation of long developments previously set out [...]' (MECW 24/200), that is, as the quintessential summary into which differentiated historical and contemporary investigations of the author are conceptually condensed. These summaries often later appear as set pieces in the scholarly and, above all, political writings of Marx and Engels.

In such quintessential texts, a distinction must be made as to whether the omitted analytic distinctions and empirical references can be restored with recourse to the background of the text, or if they are also lacking there. That is to say, is the text *in fact* based on a "reductionist" analysis that leaves out important mediations and distinctions? This may be illustrated by a paragraph from *Poverty*, where Marx conceives the development of the working class towards a 'class for itself' (the numerals and italics mark the analytical dimensions to be presented more fully in the following subsections): 'Economic conditions had first *transformed* the mass of the people of the country *into workers* [1]. The domination of capital has created for this mass a *common situation* [2], *common interests* [3]. This mass is thus already a class as against capital, but not yet for itself. In the *struggle* [4], of which we have noted only a few phases, this mass becomes united, and constitutes itself as a class for itself. The interests it defends become class interests. But the struggle of class against class is a *political struggle* [5]' (MECW 6/211).

These often quoted lines are framed by two other important passages indispensable for the overall understanding. These other passages clarify historical references and emphasise the fact that class is not only created, but self-created through struggle, combination and formation into a counter-power. As a conceptual-analytical summary according to Marx's method, the text framing the lead quote forms the conclusion to the chapter on 'Strikes and Combinations of Workers': 'Large-scale industry concentrates in one place a crowd of people unknown to one another. Competition divides their interests. But the maintenance of wages, this common interest which they have against their boss, unites them in a common thought of resistance – *combination*'. (MECW 6/210) This fulfils 'a double aim': on the one hand, 'stopping competition among the workers', therefore achieving 'the maintenance of wages'; on the other hand, to acquire a lasting constitution as a representation of interests in conflict with capitalists. Thus, they 'constitute themselves into groups as the capitalists in their turn unite for the purpose of repression, and in face of always

united capital, the maintenance of the association becomes more necessary to them than that of wages'. (MECW 6/210 et sq.)

The second framing text, which uninterruptedly follows the lead quote, draws on the classical model of the bourgeois revolution, which constituted itself in an approximately eight-hundred-year-old struggle for emancipation within the preceding social formation: 'In the bourgeoisie we have two phases to distinguish: that in which it *constituted itself as a class* under the regime of feudalism and absolute monarchy [4, 5], and that in which, already constituted as a class, it *overthrew* feudalism and monarchy [6] *to make* society into a bourgeois society [7]. The first of these phases was the longer and necessitated the greater efforts. This too began by partial combinations against the feudal lords [...], from the commune up to its constitution as a class. [...] An oppressed class is the vital condition for every society founded on the antagonism of classes. The *emancipation* of the oppressed class thus implies necessarily the *creation of a new society* [7]' (MECW 6/211).

Seven dimensions are distinguished in total. First, the three dimensions of the 'class as against capital': the position as wage-labourers, a common situation under the domination of capital, and common interests. Then, the two dimensions of constitution and organisation as 'class for itself': combining first in trade union struggle and then in political struggle. Finally, the two dimensions of revolution: capturing political power and forming the new society. Underlying the first four dimensions are **Marx** and **Engels's** extensive historical analyses up to 1847 (especially *Condition, GI, and Poverty*) which were carried on later in *Grundrisse, C I, and Origin*. These analyses illustrate the extent to which these dimensions definitely are not idealistic-teleological constructs, but rather follow the '*real* movement' of historical structures and actors (MECW 5/49). After 1848, the remaining dimensions were also empirically filled out.

The conceptual distinctions used as working concepts for empirical analysis correspond quite closely to the international terminology of stratification and class-sociology in the 20th cent. These concepts however are mediated in a more nuanced way with the historical-social context as a whole. They include the following: '*Stellung*' (in sociological parlance: "position"), '*Lage*' ("situation"), '*Praxis*' ("action", "*Handeln*"), '*Kampf*' ("conflict", "struggle"), '*Organisation*' ("organisation"), '*Koalition*' ("combination", "coalition"), '*Einrichtung*' ("institution"), '*Kommunikation*' ("communication"). They are supplemented by overarching concepts such as 'forces of production', 'relations of production', 'mode of production', etc.

Furthermore, these concepts have stimulated new developments where gaps remain with **Marx** and **Engels**, extending the analytical method and the

praxeological point of view to new objects of class analysis. For example, the concept of historical non-simultaneity was extended to advanced class societies (Geiger 1932 and 1949); the class-specific way of life or culture was combined with the concept of the mode of production (Williams 1958, Thompson 1963); the term capital was used for the non-economic power resources of classes ('cultural capital') (Bourdieu 1979); and the differentiation of classes into new 'class fractions' was explained in the context of the development of the societal forces of production (Bourdieu 1979, Vester 1998, Vester et al. 2001). Some of these new developments were prepared in the later writings of Marx and Engels, in which they examined recent political and economic developments as well as research of ethnologists and of the history of modes of production and social formations.

2.1 *Class position* is a "relational" concept that describes the relative position of a class in the organisation of institutionalised class domination (relations of production) and the functional societal division of labour (forces of production). These two moments of the capitalist mode of production may come into contradiction with each other if the forms of intercourse, relations of domination and legal regulations which justify the authority of the actors do not develop with the forces of production, but rather hinder their development in order to preserve power.

Relations of Production – The prerequisite of capitalist class domination and class relations is the historical emergence of capitalist relations of production, and, with that, the doubly "free" wage-labourers – who are unshackled and propertyless. As peasants, artisans, etc., they have been "liberated" from their own means of production and from the institutional 'guarantees of existence' (MECW 35/706), such as common land, in a centuries-long historical process of expropriation by violent and legal levers. They have also been freed from the personal obligations of the feudal and estate systems of law. In this way, 'labourers are turned into proletarians, their means of labour into capital' (750), so that 'the conditions of labour are concentrated in a mass, in the shape of capital, at the one pole of society, while at the other are grouped masses of men, who have nothing to sell but their labour power' (726).

Forces of Production – At the same time, the bourgeoisie in the 18th cent. 'during its rule of scarce one hundred years has created more massive and more colossal productive forces than have all preceding generations together' (MECW 6/489). This not only includes the development of the natural forces, the domestic and world market, new technologies and systems of intercourse, but also, by means of new technologies and organisation of labour, the development of the productive power of wage-labour by increasing socialisation and cooperation from the enterprise to the world market.

Contradiction – As summarised in the classic formula of the 1859 *Preface*: ‘At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production or – this merely expresses the same thing in legal terms – with the property relations within the framework of which they have operated hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution’ (MECW 29/263). These are not developments according to natural laws independent of the practical activities and struggles of social actors. **Marx**’s historical analyses explicitly emphasise that this revolutionising of the mode of production has been imposed politically through the active practice of a social class, that is, by means of violent and increasingly legal-institutional levers since the 16th cent. (see MECW 23/704 et sqq.). It is precisely these means that become a fetter as the forces of production become more and more social while the forms of appropriation and domination remain private. **Marx** and **Engels** therefore devote considerable attention to the struggles for the legal-institutional regulation of the rights of combination, labour legislation, and property rights. The pivotal point (and mediation between the ‘objective’ and ‘subjective formula’) is the struggle for institutional regulation of the class constellation.

2.2 *Class Condition* – A decisive problem for the theory of class constitution lies in the concept of class situation (*‘Klassenlage’*) or living condition (*‘Lebenslage’*). The living condition is the intermediary between the occupational class position and class practice. Here, people practically experience their class position in many dimensions and can develop their interest in practical resistance. The occupational class position not only has a direct effect on the living conditions of workers, but is also mediated through a variety of violent and institutionalised power relations. Thus the empirical living condition depends greatly on trade union struggles for better wages and political struggles for social security. Here a remarkable development of concepts can be seen. In the 1840s, **Engels** focused on the declining quantitative levels of the living condition occurring at that time. But in the following decades, as better living conditions were increasingly fought for and won, he instead emphasised the ‘insecurity’ (MECW 27/223) of these undeniable achievements.

According to **Marx** and **Engels**, the living condition of the working class is fundamentally dependent on their occupational class position as free wage-labourers who sell their labour power as a commodity, and who must therefore allow the product of their surplus-labour to be appropriated and accumulated by the owners of capital. Nevertheless, according to their analyses, naked economic interests alone or natural laws do not determine how and to what extent

this exploitation happens. On the contrary, the relations between classes take on historically variable forms via specific relations of power, domination, and law, which are produced and changed in social and political struggles between the actors.

The analysis of class position elaborated by **Marx** mainly up to the 1860s is based on a theoretically penetrating analysis of social contradictions and very long-term, multi-faceted historical changes (especially in *GI*, *Grundrisse*, and *CI*). **Engels's** comprehensive account of the living condition of the English working class, first elaborated in 1845 using contemporaneous research materials (in *Condition*), applies instead a methodically rather descriptive analysis not based on contradictions. The study is unique as a description of various developments in England, but has little reflection on the methodology of its underlying interpretation. Two leading assumptions, later relativised by Engels, are particularly problematic: the assumption concerning the immature mentality of the working class and the prognosis of a linear tendency of immiseration and class polarisation.

The prognoses are mostly based on the experiences that the early English working-class movement underwent in the crisis years up to 1848. The suffrage movements and labour struggles had been on the rise since 1820, but had suffered considerable defeats from 1832 onwards (cf. **Vester** 1970a, 281–396). Both requirements for an improved living condition – successful wage struggles and the development of state social policies through a workers' majority in the House of Commons – remained unrealised. A renewed upswing of the labour movement from this historical situation was difficult to imagine. The deterioration of the social condition was thus projected as a linear tendency of development into the future, as can be seen from one of **Engels's** first correspondent reports from Lancashire in 1842: 'The condition of the working class in England is becoming daily more precarious' (MECW 2/378). In *Condition* and the *Manifesto*, this perspective is arranged in the model of a causal sequence developing with natural necessity: propertylessness, immiseration, revolt, seizure of political power, and social transformation.

In this descriptive scenario of linear tendencies, the *Manifesto* (MECW 6/488–92), based on the more comprehensive investigation in *Condition*, distinguishes between four particular dimensions of the conditions of life: class polarisation (downward mobility), standardised depression of working and living conditions, fragmentation of emotional social bonds, but also abolition of this fragmentation through socialisation of the means of production, means of intercourse, and means of communication.

Polarisation – With the centralisation of capital, the polarisation of society grows into more and more propertyless wage-labourers and ever fewer power-

ful magnates of capital. An increasing number of members of the 'lower strata of the middle classes [...] sink gradually into the proletariat', since their economic capital does not suffice for the new mode of production and their work qualification ('specialized skill') is thereby 'rendered worthless' (491 et sq.). Even members of the academic professions – doctors, lawyers, priests, poets, scientists – are 'converted into wage-labourers' (487). Sections of the 'ruling class' are 'precipitated into the proletariat', supplying them with 'fresh elements of enlightenment and progress', including a 'portion of the bourgeois ideologists, who have raised themselves to the level of comprehending theoretically the historical movement as a whole' (493 et sq.).

Standardised Depression – For proletarianised groups (besides the lumpen-proletariat depending on occasional work), 'modern industry' (486) and the domination of capital now create uniform, depressed 'conditions of life' (492 et sq.): deskilling (work becomes dependent, unappealing, and reduced to simple manual operations); despotic factory discipline (exercised by the supervisor and the pace of the machines); insecure employment (depending on market fluctuations and competition between fragmented workers); wages depressed down to the level of subsistence; finally, a growing pauperism in the slum quarters of the industrial cities. At the same time, this depression is also understood as a tendency of standardisation of the situation in other sectors of the economy as well, according to the model of labour conditions in the large textile industry (MECW 4/428–501) and the living conditions in the factory towns (328–75). The causes are seen in technology, that is, 'machinery'. Thus, 'the various interests and conditions of life within the ranks of the proletariat are more and more equalized, in proportion as machinery obliterates all distinctions of labour, and nearly everywhere reduces wages to the same low level' (MECW 6/492).

Fragmentation of Social Ties – In *Condition*, Engels develops a kind of dissolution or fragmentation thesis in his detailed account of 'society, composed wholly of atoms' (MECW 4/373), the 'giving way of all social ties' (426), 'immorality', and demoralisation (412 et sq.). According to the *Manifesto*, which formulates the essence of this presentation, the bourgeoisie by its domination has 'put an end' to all the estates, all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations and torn asunder the ties of men to their superiors; it has 'swept away' their corresponding prejudices and opinions, drowning them in the 'icy water of egotistical calculation', and has left remaining nothing other than 'naked self-interest, than callous "cash payment"' (MECW 6/486 et sq.). The scenario of the anomic dissolution of social relationships in the sense of Émile Durkheim does not only affect vertical class relations, but also the horizontal community bonds of everyday life. Thus, 'by the action of Modern Industry, all the family ties

among the proletarians are torn asunder' (502). The working class is interpreted according to the image of an atomised, passive mass.

Communication – **Marx** as well as **Engels** emphasise that this homogeneity of a common depressed living condition of the 'class as against capital' by no means leads on its own to the unification of this fragmented mass. In order to become a 'class for itself', they must overcome the state of isolated individuals, 'broken up by their mutual completion' into an 'incoherent mass' (492). That is, they have to achieve the socialisation of their relations. The industrial capitalist mode of production itself makes this possible by physically bringing workers together in large enterprises, large urban agglomerations, and through the growing means of intercourse and communication (488).

Marx clarified this in 1852 in the *18th Brumaire* through a comparison with French small holding peasants. They 'form a vast mass, the members of which live in similar conditions but without entering into manifold relations with one other. Their mode of production isolates them from one another instead of bringing them into mutual intercourse. The isolation is increased by France's bad means of communication and by the poverty of the peasants. [...] Each individual peasant family is almost self-sufficient [...]. Insofar as millions of families live under conditions of existence that separate their mode of life, their interests and their culture from those of the other classes, and put them in hostile opposition to the latter, they form a class. Insofar as there is merely a local interconnection among these smallholding peasants, and the identity of their interests begets no community, no national bond and no political organization among them, they do not form a class. They are consequently incapable of enforcing their class interests in their own name, whether through a parliament or through a convention. They cannot represent themselves, they must be represented' (MECW 11/187).

2.3 *Class Interest* – The different ways that social classes practically experience the dimensions of the social condition, and to what extent these can be converted into class action, is not elaborated coherently or with much conceptual rigor. **Marx** and **Engels** are still largely confined to the limits of scientific development in the 19th cent. It was not until the 1890s that the elements of a sociology and psychology of mass behaviour and of the cultures, mentalities, and habitus of class milieus were developed, not least provoked by the workers' movements themselves. **Thompson** (1963), who investigated the emergence of the early working class on the hitherto broadest empirical basis, does not regard the external conditionality and the practical self-creation of the working class as mutually exclusive opposites: 'The working class made itself as much as it

was made' (1966, 194, cf. 7). He uses the contrasting opposites heuristically and not as a doctrine, and can thus present their complementary interaction.

As a matter of fact, in *Condition* both perspectives were not mutually exclusive at first, but developed as two possible alternative cases or scenarios. These scenarios combine dispositions for action, class constellations, and economic developments into historically concrete, but not yet methodologically reflected, pictures. The two scenarios were formulated in *Poverty* and in the *Manifesto* and were used side by side as if they were compatible heuristic concepts.

In *Condition*, Engels diagnoses a condition of immiseration aggravated by economic crises and international competition. If England's ranking in the world market drops, 'the majority of the proletariat must become forever superfluous, and has no other choice than to starve or to rebel' (MECW 4/580). Assuming England can retain its position, the commercial crises 'would continue, and grow more violent, more terrible, with the extension of industry and the multiplication of the proletariat. [...] The proletariat would soon embrace the whole nation, with the exception of a few millionaires', and would then see 'how easily the existing power may be overthrown, and then follows a revolution' (580). In fact, there is every reason to believe that 'the commercial crises, the mightiest levers for all independent development of the proletariat, will probably shorten the process, acting in concert with foreign competition and the deepening ruin of the lower middle-class'. (580 et sq.)

Nevertheless, Engels knew that he was only describing one possible scenario tied to the "if" of a particular behaviour of the bourgeoisie and proletariat: 'If, up to that time, the English bourgeoisie does not pause to reflect – and to all appearance it certainly will not do so – a revolution will follow with which none hitherto known can be compared. [...] The war of the poor against the rich will be the bloodiest ever waged' (581). The chances for the contrary, comparatively peaceful alternative will be determined by the empirical example of trade union struggles in England, which may lead to an improvement in the situation of the workers, and by the increase of education and rational negotiating capacity among the workers. If the English workers would absorb socialist ideas, then 'their action against the bourgeoisie will lose its savage cruelty' (582).

In *Poverty*, Marx makes the descriptions and assessments of Engels's *Condition* the basis for a conceptual-analytical explication. This results in the idea of a development into a 'class for itself' (MECW 6/211) through trade union struggles and confrontational organisations. The *Manifesto* attempts to present both scenarios as no longer mutually exclusive alternatives, but rather as combined successive phases of class development. The scenario of the inevitable revolution was also conceptually sharpened by 1867 in *C I* with the idea of a "shortened revolution": the proletarian revolution, born of extreme social

polarisation, would necessarily omit and leap over the long phase of historical development into a counter-power, a phase that the bourgeoisie had still needed. In the influential work *Anti-Dühring* of 1877/78, another attempt was made to subordinate the model of active counter-power development to the model of inevitable development.

Inspired by new international developments after 1848, **Marx** and **Engels** in parallel refined their counter-power model into a perspective of autonomous formation of political and economic self-government beyond capitalism. The contradiction between the two scenarios remained. Engels finally resolved it at the end of his life, in the 1892 foreword to *Condition* (MECW 27/257 et sqq.), by returning to his original argument that there are different, historical and country-specific paths to a new society.

Despite these theoretical difficulties, the different classes and class fractions as well as country-specific conditions of struggle became clearer in the development scenarios and in the historical work of **Marx** and **Engels** over the decades. The developments of class theory and class analysis developed by later authors were based on these partly helpful differentiations and partly problematic simplifications.

Subgroups of Popular Classes – On the one hand, the fundamental typological differences of interests or views of the popular classes are discussed as problems of the workers' movements. Thus, the *Manifesto* (MECW 6, 487, 493 et sqq.) distinguishes three large subgroups of the popular classes – besides that section of the critical academic-bourgeois intelligentsia joining the workers' movement. **Marx** and **Engels** differentiate these subgroups according to their class position and socio-political orientation: 1. the declassed lumpenproletariat, who maintain a volatile orientation to external opportunities and rely on stronger protective powers; 2. the declining conservative petty-bourgeois popular milieus, who advocate a return to feudal or reactionary orders, and finally, 3. the genuine industrial working class. This last one is regarded, at least in the *Manifesto*, as the only part of the popular classes which strives for an "independent" trade union and political representation of interests against the bourgeoisie.

The emergence of these three points of view is not explained in terms of mentality here. However, it is clear that they are also not characterised by their current situation as wage-labourers; that would correspond more to a "reflection theory" or a "rational choice" interest-led approach. These standpoints are rather historically acquired and solidified by their prehistory as different factions of the popular classes.

Patterns of National Development – Differences in militancy are ultimately attributed not only to personal characteristics, but also to different patterns

of national development anchored in institutions and forms of behaviour. Engels in *Condition* already discussed the basic question of class theory, how the working-class movement can become an independent political force, with respect to the difference between the French and the English working-class movements. For him, the radicalism of the workers is a question of the aims of struggle and not just the militancy of the means of struggle. The fact that the English workers fight more with unions and strikes, and the French workers struggle more politically in the form of violent uprisings, does not mean that the British workers are lacking in militancy and 'revolutionary courage' (MECW 4/514). He sees the difference less in the moral qualities of the workers themselves than in the different patterns of national development: 'The English working-men are second to none in courage; they are quite as restless as the French, but they fight differently. The French, who are by nature political, struggle against social evils with political weapons; the English, for whom politics exist only as a matter of interest, solely in the interest of bourgeois society, fight, not against the Government, but directly against the bourgeoisie; and for the time, this can be done only in a peaceful manner' (512).

2.4 *Trade Union Counter-Power* – The theory of the development into a 'class for itself' in *Poverty* is based on the historical model of the bourgeois revolution. The preconditions for the implementation of a new social order should already be realised in the womb of the old: a high development of the economic forces of production and thus of the working class, the establishment of institutional counter-power through the trade union movement and the development of rational forms of action and perspectives amongst the workers.

The Parallel of the Bourgeois Class Development – In the development of the bourgeoisie, the phase of the political revolution in which the old order has been overthrown and the new society is being shaped is preceded by a longer phase of class constitution connected with intense struggles. In this preceding phase, the new forces of production were developed and the institutional counter-power was achieved, beginning with partial coalitions against feudalism and self-governing urban communities (MECW 6/211). In the *Manifesto*, 'each step in the development of the bourgeoisie' is presented in more detail: as the 'product [...] of a series of revolutions in the modes of production and of exchange', 'accompanied by a corresponding political advance of that class. An oppressed class under the sway of the feudal nobility, an armed and self-governing association in the medieval commune; here independent urban republic (as in Italy and Germany), there taxable "third estate" of the monarchy (as in France), afterwards, in the period of manufacture proper, [...] as a counterpoise against the nobility [...], the bourgeoisie has at last [...] conquered for

itself, in the modern representative State, exclusive political sway' (486). The *Manifesto* thus already contains the idea of a stagist historical formation into a counter-power of self-governing associations and institutions. This concept also applies to the emerging working class.

High Degree of Maturity of the Forces of Production – In Poverty, the maturity of the forces of production is a precondition for the political conquest of power. It is not only the means of production that belong to the forces of production, but also the wage-labourers themselves: 'For the oppressed class to be able to emancipate itself it is necessary that the productive powers already acquired and the existing social relations should no longer be capable of existing side by side. Of all the instruments of production, the greatest productive power is the revolutionary class itself. The organization of revolutionary elements as a class supposes the existence of all the productive forces which could be engendered in the bosom of the old society' (211). This means forms of socialised, co-operative production in and across enterprises on the basis of highly developed labour skills and technologies which are no longer compatible with the institutional forms of autocratic operational management and the private appropriation of the surplus product.

Trade Union Struggles and Forms of Negotiation – Already in the 1840s, **Marx and Engels** focused on how the working class can be constituted not only as a factor of production, but also as a struggling and institutionalised counter-power. They show that class practice above all is not simply a subjective activity that follows an objective class condition, but that it creates objective institutional realities itself. Class practice begins by processing the experience of one's social condition, thus in one's head, with a 'common thought', that is, an idea of action ('resistance', 'struggle'); a course of action ('combination', 'organization', stopping 'competition'); and the corrective means of a legal-institutional counter-power (210 et sq.). However, what is crucial in economic class struggles is the emergence of a relatively independent social reality, a battlefield where incorporated, associated, organised workers and employers confront each other, communicate and create their own long-lasting socio-cultural, organisational, and legal institutional forms. In this autonomous, multi-stage process of practice, the more advanced perspectives gradually become clearer, as the individual workers, through their own struggling practice, join together in coalitions and link up with each other nationally at least, beyond the limitations of local and separate industries. The actions of the workers or their representatives are therefore not explained as a direct reaction to an oppressed class condition. It is rather mediated by the conditions as well as institutional and non-institutional rules of a separate, relatively autonomous field of action.

In the chapter on 'Labour Movements' in *Condition* (1845), Engels analyses the emergence of this field of action as a multi-stage process of finding an appropriate 'form of opposition' (MECW 4/503). This can also be described as a 'struggling-' and 'learning-process' (Vester 1970a, 18–29, cf. 1981). The opposition began, according to Engels, with individual theft as 'the most primitive form of protest' (MECW 4/502 et sq.). During the prohibition of coalitions (1800–24), it became the action of the 'working class' which initially and locally 'resisted the introduction of machinery'. Then, with the help of illegal trade unions at first, the working class fought for the '*right of free association*' until the fall of the coalition ban in 1824 (503). This in turn legalised associations and solidarity funds (for the case of strikes and unemployment), and institutionalised the right '[i]n all branches of industry [...] to deal, *en masse*, as a power, with the employers' concerning 'a scale of wages to be universally adhered to', in other words, an industry-wide multi-employer agreement. Furthermore, the right to negotiate over the recruitment of apprentices was won (504, cf. MECW 6/209 et sqq.).

In *Poverty*, Marx emphasised that the maintenance of trade union associations for workers can become more important 'than that of wages' (MECW 6/211). It is about the process of legalisation, institutionalisation, and independence. In the Trade Union Act of 1825, 'combination is authorized by an Act of Parliament', and an 'economic fact' is transformed into a 'legal fact' (209). As the process continues, the 'organization and upkeep of the combinations' (210) becomes an end in itself. This legalisation – which Geiger (1949) analyses as an 'institutionalisation of class antagonism' (182) – serves both sides' interest in a reliable working relationship. As a result of institutional collaboration, however, the dead weight and self-interest of the associated organisations can become increasingly solidified.

Elite-Mass-Stereotypes – According to Engels's interpretation, the institutionalisation of struggle also makes the forms of intercourse more rational. Engels calls 'the exasperation of the proletariat towards its oppressors', as well as 'bloodshed, revenge, and savagery' the features of a 'labour movement just beginning' (MECW 4/581 et sq.). The 'failings of the workers in general' are traced to 'an unbridled thirst for pleasure, to want of providence, and of flexibility in fitting into the social order, to the general inability to sacrifice the pleasure of the moment to a remoter advantage' (424), that is, to the lack of an ascetic postponement of emotional urges. Overcoming this 'savage cruelty' (582) is possible through 'moral training' (412, cf. 543) or 'moralisation' (Geiling 1985, 40–63). The struggle would be 'very peaceful' if among the workers socialist and communist elements of education would increase and if the bourgeoisie would also 'pause to reflect' (MECW 4/581 et sq.). The scheme used by Engels here of

an affect-guided, “immature” mass and an ascetic elite is no longer applied to the workers’ movement after 1848. Furthermore, it is called into question by research on the early working-class movement.

2.5 *Political Struggle* – **Marx** and **Engels**, like the later workers’ movements, grappled throughout their lives with the problem of the transformation of economic struggles of the workers’ movements into struggles for political power, a process as difficult as it was delicate. Despite such difficulties, they did not consider the view (later central to **Lenin**) that the wage workers would not, of their own accord, get beyond an economistic trade union consciousness. On the contrary, already before 1848 they shrewdly diagnosed a dynamic of politicisation inherent in trade union struggles. However, their perspective shifted. In *Condition*, **Engels** still dealt extensively with the physical and moral methods of struggle and pressure employed by the English workers in labour struggles. He regards these struggles as a ‘military school’ with the aim of political revolution (MECW 4/512). In addition, pushing through labour law and social reforms within the bourgeois-dominated representative system was, of course, already part of the objectives of struggle, for instance, in the fight for the Ten-Hour Act and the Poor Law (519).

After the electoral reform of 1832, the bourgeois-dominated parliament by and large blocked any social-welfare policy. Thus, in 1834 the charter for universal suffrage and the chartist movement were born with the hope of winning a majority of workers in the House of Commons (517–47). However, this path of politicisation appeared to be blocked until the 1840s. Despite their vehemence, trade union class struggles in England could not be converted into a political struggle, with the working class appearing as a political power or party of its own separate from the bourgeoisie. Such a party could have strived for its own societal transformation as a parliamentary and governmental power (518–22, 527 et sq.). The hopes placed in the Chartist movement were not fulfilled (cf. 545, MECW 6/219). Until 1848, the project of an independent political party could only be realised in the form of the very small and mostly illegal League of Communists.

Corresponding to this blocked situation is the abrupt juxtaposition of two perspectives in the *Manifesto*, the concept of counter-power and that of the short-cutting revolution. On the one hand, the *Manifesto* is based on the fact that the workers form ‘coalitions’ and, through struggle, overcome their fragmentation according to local and regional, industrial and branch-specific particular interests. Despite setbacks, the ‘organization of the proletarians into a class [...] rises up again’, becoming political, central, national and ‘compel[ling] legislative recognition of particular interests of the workers [...]’. Thus

the ten-hours' bill in England was carried' (MECW 6/493). Finally, the 'proletarian movement' is constituted as an 'independent movement of the immense majority, in the interest of the immense majority' (495). – On the other hand, this presentation of an active, struggling coalition and movement repeatedly interrupted by setbacks leads four paragraphs later to a summary that grasps this process almost as an inevitable law of nature: 'The advance of industry, whose involuntary promoter is the bourgeoisie, replaces the isolation of the labourers, due to competition, by their revolutionary combination, due to association. [...] What the bourgeoisie, therefore, produces, above all, is its own grave-diggers. Its fall and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable' (496).

However, almost fifty years after the appearance of *Poverty*, Engels in the year of his death, 1895, experienced the confirmation of the other far-reaching prognosis for the politicisation of the trade union movement. Due to new tensions of economic class antagonisms, the English trade unions formed an independent workers' party. Fifty years later, in 1945, it finally won the political majority and introduced a modern social welfare state.

2.6 *Shorter or Longer Way to the Political Revolution* – After 1848, due to the unprecedented development of capitalism and the workers' movement, the concept of counter-power was further developed. Nevertheless, the idea of a short-cutting revolution was not abandoned but remained in place, even in *C.I.* On the one hand, Marx draws on the above-mentioned reflection from *Condition*, that the intensification of crises will 'shorten the process' (MECW 4/580 et sq.), insofar as the proletariat independently forms itself under pressure of extreme necessity. Referring explicitly to the prognosis of an inevitable revolution in the *Manifesto*, Marx comes to a condensed formula at the end of the chapters on capitalist accumulation, chapters which already stress the violent and political levers of capitalist class polarisation. In it, classes appear as involuntary carriers (*Träger*) of a natural law-like class polarisation which is so extreme that the lengthy path can only be shortened by a brief revolutionary act: 'Along with the constantly diminishing number of the magnates of capital, who usurp and monopolise all advantages of this process of transformation, grows the mass of misery, oppression, slavery, degradation, exploitation; but with this too grows the revolt of the working class, a class always increasing in numbers, and disciplined, united, organized by the very mechanism of the process of capitalist production itself. [...] But capitalist production begets, with the inexorability of a law of Nature, its own negation. It is the negation of negation' (MECW 35/750 et sq.). At the same time, the 'transformation of scattered private property, arising from individual labour, into

capitalist private property' during centuries of primitive accumulation was, 'naturally, a process, incomparably more protracted, violent, and difficult, than the transformation of capitalistic private property, already practically resting on socialized production, into socialized property. In the former case, we had the expropriation of the mass of the people by a few usurpers; in the latter, we have the expropriation of a few usurpers by the mass of the people' (751).

On the other hand, **Marx** also describes in *C I* the strategy of counter-power and politicisation, which applies to the following cases: the struggle for legal institutionalisation of workers' coalitions (727–31); the ongoing battles, even after the legalisation of unions in 1825, around the criminalisation of the workers' practices such as strikes, oath taking, and symbolic violence or intimidation (729 et sq.); the struggle for the normal working day (239–307); and, last but not least, the cooperation of specialised skilled workers based on the division of labour which counteracts the control from above exerted by the industrial command hierarchy (341–74).

2.7 *Transformation of the Societal Order* – Up to 1848, the ambitious demands for a society free of domination created after seizing political power were usually formulated without any historical specification. Individual emancipation and a high level of development of the forces of production are postulated instead. Under these preconditions, as it says in *Poverty*, 'the fall of the old society' will not bring about a 'new class domination' or a 'new political power' (MECW 6/212). This too cannot be suddenly realised: 'The working class, in the course of its development, will substitute for the old civil society an association which will exclude classes and their antagonism, and there will be no more political power properly so-called, since political power is precisely the official expression of antagonism in civil society' (212).

It is remarkable that, as formulated by **Marx** in *Capital*, the historical result of this radical change should not be collective or state property, but rather 'individual property based on the acquisitions of the capitalist era: i.e., on co-operation and the possession in common of the land and of the means of production' (MECW 35/751). These formulations are not further explained. They probably allude to certain forms of co-operative and communal self-government, described in the Manifesto as 'an association in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all' (MECW 6/506). And Marx is probably also referring to the anarchist utopia *Political Justice* (1793) by William **Godwin**, who, as noted by **Engels** (MECW 4/528), was very influential in the English working-class movement. According to **Godwin**, in the distant future a high level of technical development and human capabilit-

ies could make it possible for much work to be carried out by individuals alone without the cooperation of other workers (see Vester 1970a, 154–58, and 1970b, 10–25).

The philosophical formulation of the 1840s still leaves the question open of which organisational and institutional forms could fulfil these demands, and whether the central state apparatus that was to be conquered would be at all willing and appropriate to establish them. After the traumatic failure of the revolution of 1848, **Marx** and **Engels** dealt with these questions, studying the forms of direct democracy and social-welfare policies achieved and extorted through the real social struggles under the dominance of capitalism.

3. *Concepts of Counter-Power and the Relative Autonomy of the Political Field after 1848* – The English workers' movement, due to its defeats in the 1840s, languished and fell apart so much that the European revolutions of 1848 did not echo there at all. In the rest of Europe these revolutionary struggles took place but failed. The expectation of a great economic crisis remained unfulfilled due to the sustained growth spurt of the capitalist world economy until 1870. During this period, **Marx** and **Engels**, who had seceded from "sectarian" socialism of the craftsmen's movements, turned their attention to new social movements (**Na'man** 1979, 10–33). These were, on the one hand, the movements of the economy, the analysis of which was first published in 1859 in *Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy*, and, on the other hand, especially in England, the emergence of a counter-power to change society gradually from within. However, these observations did not receive any conceptual status until **Marx's** time with the International Workingmen's Association (IWA), which enabled him to gain intensive knowledge and appreciation for the struggles of institutional counter-power by English skilled workers.

3.1 *The Political Economy of Labour: Co-operative Production and Working Time Laws* – In the *Inaugural Address* of 1864, **Marx**, after looking back to the devastating European defeats, pointed to 'two great facts' (MECW 20/10) which point to a 'greater victory of the political economy of labour over the political economy of property' (11). He speaks of the ten-hour day's legislation, achieved after thirty years of struggle, and 'of the *co-operative movement*, especially the co-operative factories raised by the unassisted efforts of a few bold "*hands*". The value of these great social experiments cannot be over-rated. By deed, instead of by argument, they have shown that production on a large scale, and in accord with the behests of modern science, may be carried on without the existence of a class of *masters* employing a class of *hands*; that to bear fruit, the means of labour need not be monopolised as a means of dominion over, and of extortion

against, the labouring man himself; and that, like slave labour, like serf labour, *hired labour* is but a transitory and inferior form, destined to disappear before *associated labour* [...]' (11). At the same time, however, the political side of the struggle – the 'reorganization of the working men's party' (12) and the internationalisation of the labour movement (12 et sq.) – remains on the agenda.

The positions of the *Inaugural Address* are explained in more detail in the 'Instructions for the Delegates of the Provisional General Council' of the IWA (MECW 20/185–94). Above all, 'co-operative production' is recommended to the workers, since it attacks the given economic system in 'its groundwork' (190). The Trades' Unions, 'too exclusively bent upon the local and immediate struggles with capital, [...] have not yet fully understood their power of acting against the system of wages slavery itself'. Through their 'participation in [...] political movements', however, the working class can 'awaken to some sense of their great historical mission, [...] in the broad interest of [their] complete emancipation' (191 et sq.).

3.2 *The Political Form: Self-Government not State Centralism* – Marx's work on the Paris Commune of 1871 (*The Civil War in France*) emerged also from the experience of practical struggles in the period of the First International. In this government fought for by the working class, Marx saw 'the political form at last discovered under which to work out the economical emancipation of Labour' (MECW 22/334). He found the most important element of this example of a 'completely new historical creation' (333) in its policy not to take over the conventional domination of capital and the state apparatus, but to replace it with economic and political self-governing institutions and a planned coordination according to the federal principle rather than the centralist one (328–38). This self-government also included freeing educational institutions from the influence of the central state and the church (331). With these measures, the working class did not have any doctrines or 'ideals to realize', but rather had 'to set free elements of the new society with which old collapsing society itself is pregnant' (335).

Engels emphasised these features once again in his 1891 introduction to Marx's writing on the commune. He stressed that in the revolutionary situation, the leading factions of the Commune – the Proudhonists and the Blanquists – followed their practical experiences and thus 'did the opposite of what the doctrines of their school prescribed' (MECW 27/187). It was thus possible that, contrary to the anti-co-operative doctrine of Proudhon, the 'Commune instituted an organization of large-scale industry and even of manufacture which was not only to be based on the association of the workers in each factory, but also to combine all these associations in one great union; in short, an

organization which [...] must necessarily have led in the end to communism' (188). Accordingly, the Blanquists, contrary to their credo, did not advocate the 'dictatorial centralization of all power in the hands of the new revolutionary government', but rather that the 'oppressing power of the former centralized government' created by **Napoleon** in 1798, which **Marx** had already scathingly criticised in the *18th Brumaire*, should 'fall everywhere' in favour of a 'free federation of all French Communes with Paris' because 'the working class, once come to power, could not go on managing with the old state machine' (188 et sq.).

3.3 *Democratic Control: Against a New Class of State Functionaries* – At the time of the Paris Commune, the consciousness of **Engels** and **Marx** had already been sharpened by the danger that a revolution could create a new system of bureaucratic control. Thus **Engels** stressed 'that in order not to lose again its only just conquered supremacy, this working class must, on the one hand, do away with all the old repressive machinery previously used against it itself, and, on the other, safeguard itself against its own deputies and officials, by declaring them all, without exception, subject to recall at any moment' (MECW 27/189) and to pay them 'only the wages received by other workers' (190). At the same time, he criticised 'the superstitious belief in the state' (190) of many workers' parties. Even democratic parties and countries like the United States are not immune to the 'process of the state power making itself independent in relation to society, whose mere instrument it was originally intended to be' (189).

3.4 *Decentralisation of Social State-Functions: Self Government* – The same tenor governed the *Critique of the Gotha Programme*, written in 1875 and directed mainly against Lassalleanism's faith in the state. On the one hand, 'in proportion as the new society develops', state functions should shift from regulatory or administrative tasks to social tasks, primarily 'intended for the *common satisfaction of needs*, such as schools, health services, etc.' (MECW 24/85). This should not strengthen a new state bureaucracy, but rather fortify the organisational form of autonomous counter-power and self-government. As in the Paris Commune, 'Government and Church should rather be equally excluded from any influence on the school' (97). Even 'the present co-operative societies' should develop as autonomous counter-powers, for they 'are of value *only* insofar as they are the independent creations of the workers and not protégés either of the governments or of the bourgeois' (94).

Unions should play a special role in acquiring the ability to self-govern. They are, as **Engels** wrote in 1875 to August **Bebel**, 'the proletariat's true class organization in which it fights its daily battles with capital, in which it trains itself

and which nowadays can no longer simply be smashed' (MECW 24/70). The aim should not be just legislation but '*administration* by the people – that would at least be something' (70).

3.5 *Heuristic instead of Derivative Class Analysis* – Inspired by the commune, **Marx** and **Engels** intensified their efforts at conceiving their class concept not as a doctrinal prophecy, but rather as a heuristic method to discover historical movements. Thus Engels did not shy away from conceding in 1872, in his preface to the *Manifesto*, that although 'the general principles' of the *Manifesto* 'are, on the whole, as correct today as ever', however 'the practical application of the principles will depend [...] everywhere and at all times, on the obtaining historical conditions', and thus 'no special stress is laid on the revolutionary measures' (MECW 23/174 et sq.). With the 'gigantic strides of Modern Industry', the political situation and party organisation of the working class, and 'in view of the practical experience gained [...] in the Paris Commune, where the proletariat for the first time held political power for two whole months, this programme has in some details become antiquated' (175).

With the same heuristic intent, **Marx** and **Engels** systematically studied the historical precursors of democratic self-government and the possibility of their return (contrary to their earlier assumption that capitalism would dissolve all previous social bonds). In his drafts of a letter to Vera **Zasulich**, **Marx** in 1881 recalls the traces of the German village co-operative studied by Georg Ludwig **von Maurer** (1854 and 1865/66) based on the village constitutions collected by the Grimm brothers: the 'communal property of a more or less archaic type' (MECW 24/349), which became, in the Middle Ages, the 'sole centre of popular liberty and life' (350), and possibly, as **Marx** quotes Lewis Henry **Morgan**, a 'revival in a superior form of an archaic social type' (350). Eventually **Engels** too, in the 1888 preface to the *Manifesto*, refers to this research as well as his own investigations into the origin of private property.

In his letters from old age, Engels criticises the dogmatic derivation of the political from the economic, which 'serves as a pretext for *not* studying history' (to C. **Schmidt**, 5 August 1890, MECW 49/7) and for ignoring the 'relative independence' and 'proper motion' of the forces of the political field (27 October 1890, MECW 49/60 trans. modified), opposed to which 'the production and reproduction of actual life' is only 'the determining factor [...] *in the final analysis*' (to J. **Bloch**, 21 September 1890, MECW 49/34).

3.6 *Cyclical instead of Linear Developments* – One of **Engels's** new insights is that he abandons the assumption of linear and relatively uniform trends and turns to the cyclical and differentiated developments of capitalism and the working

class. This comes out most clearly in the 1892 preface to the English edition of *Condition*, which incorporates an article from 1885 (MECW 26/295–301). This retrospective analysis elaborates the grand lineage of the English working-class movement of the preceding half-century. According to this preface, ‘the state of things described’ in 1845 belongs ‘in many respects to the past’ (MECW 27/257). At that time, ‘[m]odern international Socialism [...] did not as yet exist [...]. My book represents one of the phases of its embryonic development’ (261). Also, some of the ‘prophecies’ which his ‘youthful ardour’ induced in him, such as the ‘imminent social revolution in England’, had gone astray (262). At that time, England was in a severe economic crisis, ‘solvable to all appearances by force only’ (262), to which the Irish famine came. However, in the revolutionary year of 1848, the chartist suffrage movement collapsed, and from 1850 to 1870 came the beginning of ‘a new industrial epoch’ (258), with a ‘mass of productions’ so ‘unheard of’ (265) that it fully eclipsed the 1840s. The large manufacturers abandoned the previous petty oppressive measures such as the truck system and long working hours, and in order to avoid costly conflicts they made arrangements with the trade unions ‘at least in the leading industries’ (259). They even adopted the aims of the People’s Charter by supporting the parliamentary reforms of 1867 and 1884. Engels, drawing a parallel to earlier diagnoses of Marx (cf. MECW 16/404 et sqq.), emphasises that concerning the ‘revolution of 1848 [...] the very people who put it down have become, as Karl Marx used to say, its testamentary executors’ (MECW 27/264 et sq.). Accordingly, living conditions improved, at least materially (260). But this collaboration ‘turned the English working class, politically, into the tail of the “great Liberal Party”’ (264).

However, this was not a final, comprehensive, nor, nationally and internationally, a uniform development, but a division into winning and losing actors. Within England, there was a ‘permanent improvement [...] for two “protected” sections only of the working class, the factory workers protected by legal restrictions on the working day, and the skilled male workers protected by the ‘great Trades Unions’; the latter – engineers, carpenters, joiners, and bricklayers – ‘form an aristocracy among the working class; they have succeeded in enforcing for themselves a relatively comfortable position, and they accept it as final [...] But as to the great mass of working-people, the state of misery and insecurity in which they live now is as low as ever, if not lower’ (265 et sq.). And while ‘England has thus outgrown the juvenile state of capitalist exploitation described by me, other countries have only just attained it’, particularly France, Germany, and the USA (260). Here we find ‘the same struggles for a shorter working-day, for a legal limitation of the working-time, especially of women and children in factories’, against the ‘truck system’, and so on (260 et sq.).

At the same time, **Engels** goes beyond the earlier conception of a simple cyclical change between short-term recovery and crisis phases and describes the effectiveness of long-lasting waves of expansion and the stagnation of capitalism over decades. Following the expansive decades after 1848, the international constellation for England fundamentally changed after 1870. A state of affairs occurred beyond the previous oscillation between ‘full crash’ and ‘prosperity’, namely ‘a dull depression, a chronic glut of all markets for all trades’ because ‘the manufacturing monopoly enjoyed by England for nearly a century is irretrievably broken up’ through competition with the emerging new industrial nations of ‘France, Belgium, Germany, America, even Russia’ (266 et sq.). It is to be feared that the stagnation will finally bring the earlier “dazzling period” to a close. The English working class ‘will find itself generally – the privileged and leading minority not excepted – on a level with its fellow-workers abroad. And that is the reason why there will be Socialism again in England’. The East End of London ‘has shaken off its torpid despair, has returned to life, and has become the home of what is called the “New Unionism”, that is to say, of the organization of the great mass of “unskilled” workers’ (268). They have had their minds freed from ‘the inherited “respectable” bourgeois prejudices which hampered the brains of the better situated “old” Unionists. And thus we see now these new Unions taking the lead of the working-class movement generally’ (269). – In fact, this development led to the founding of a workers’ party in 1895, independent of bourgeois hegemony (MECW 50/125, 355 et sq., summarising **Jürke** 1988).

Engels here brings the specific phases of the workers’ movement together with the booms and busts of the long waves of capitalist development, as later worked out by Nikolai **Kondratieff** (1926) in economic theory and Ernest **Mandel** (1962, 1972) for the development of class constellations. On this basis, the constitution of the working class itself can be understood as a cyclical phenomenon rather than a linear tendency of development. This already makes sense of the first long-term growth wave of the industrial revolution from the 1790s to the 1840s (see **Vester** 1970a). **Marx** and **Engels** learned from their own views only of the phase of contraction and stagnation that began after 1825, and this also explains their scenario of setbacks in the 1840s.

3.7 *Plurality of Development Paths* – The distinctive element of class analysis after 1848 is not that a reformist path of the workers’ movement becomes dogma instead of a revolutionary one. Rather, a plurality of developmental paths opens up, paths that may vary according to phases of economic and political development, and the country at hand. It is not primarily the form of implementation – peaceful or violent – but whether or not a post-capitalist

society is substantially prepared. Accordingly, the idea of seizing a centralised state apparatus, as with the French and Prussian examples, is strongly criticised. Such ideas are opposed to the strategy of autonomous self-government generated by the movements themselves.

If improvements in living conditions can be won within capitalist society, this does not mean for **Engels** that overcoming the capitalist social order would become unnecessary. In his commentary on the *Erfurt Program* (1891), he makes it clear that only the counter-power of the workers' movement can counteract the tendency of immiseration in capitalism, even if it cannot end the fundamental insecurity of the social condition. Engels proposes the following as a formulation of the programme: 'The organization of the workers and their constantly growing resistance will possibly check the *increase of misery* to a certain extent. However, what *certainly* does increase is the *insecurity of existence*'. (MECW 27/223)

4. *Reappraising the Emergence of the Working Class in the Research* – The first century of working-class development, especially in England, has been extensively reappraised in the Marxist tradition. In so doing, various assessments that **Marx** and **Engels** had advocated before 1848 were disregarded or corrected while their subsequent assessments were often confirmed or developed further. This reappraisal began during the new upswing of movements after 1890, working out more closely and in more detail the 'ups and downs' (MECW 50/422) observed by Engels and changing power constellations between classes (MECW 26/126 et sq.).

The fundamental investigations into the origin of the English working class until 1832 are often attributed to **Thompson** (1963). In fact, his monumental investigations are the conclusion of a long line of research by numerous authors close to the movement since the 1890s. Thompson explicitly understood his contribution as part of this grand cooperative endeavour. It is also unjustified to attribute to Thompson a particular subjectivism (**Anderson** 1980, 42), or an 'extremely subjectivist class definition that defines the working class through working culture' (**Kocka** 1979, 9, fn. 7). **Thompson** did not want to replace the other investigations, such as those concerning the critique of political economy and the implementation of the capitalist mode of production, with a radical subjectivist approach. In fact, he vehemently opposed the idea that 'the formation of class is independent of objective determinations, that class can be defined simply as a cultural formation, etc.' (1978a, 149). Instead, he wanted to supplement it by including the practical side of class relations and struggles, and therefore developed new analytical concepts of a praxeological approach.

4.1 *Critique of the Immaturity Thesis* – The early research revolving around the **Marx**-influenced Labour Left since the 1920s has been summarised and completed especially well by George Douglas Howard **Cole** (1927, 1941, 1948, 1953 a/b) after Max **Beer** (1919/1984) in comprehensive works of economic history, social history, movement history, and the history of ideas from the beginning of the industrial revolution in the 18th cent. onward (summarising **Vester** 1970a/b). This particularly invalidated **Engels's** assessment that in the early 19th cent. there was only a passive, suffering “working class as against capital” in itself, blindly opposed to new technologies, incapable of independent class action and to be guided by bourgeois philanthropists and theorists such as **Robert Owen**.

The research confirms that since the 1820s **Owen** found special resonance with his criticism of the capitalist economy and his propaganda for co-operative factories to be introduced by enlightened entrepreneurs and for modern social state institutions (cf. **Vester** 1970a, 187–233). This echo, however, was embedded in politically broader and active trade union movements as well as co-operative, cultural, and popular movements of workers. These arose parallel to the French Revolution and coalesced particularly in the struggles against press censorship, against the dismantling of social protection laws, against the draconian prohibitions on coalitions from 1800 to 1824 (which were supposed to prevent the French Revolution from jumping over there) and in the struggle for electoral reform. The trade union organisations, which by no means only grew up in the factory industry, turned from 1820 onwards to a left-wing political economy based on **Ricardo** through the workers' press and education associations. What appealed to them especially was the labour theory of value (**Hodgskin** 1825) and the perspective for replacing capitalism with co-operative production (**William Thompson** 1824, **Bray** 1839), initiated by the working class itself and not by philanthropists. The early workers' movement transformed Owenism into a theory of independent class action based on co-operative socialism and a workers' majority in parliament that was supposed to implement a new social state (see **Vester** 1970a, 234–80).

Thus a ‘working class for itself’ had already been created by 1832 (see E.P. **Thompson** 1966, 194 et sq., 807–32). Inspired by the July Revolution of 1830 in France, the suffrage demonstrations temporarily increased to the point of a pre-revolutionary situation (817). The movement collapsed – not because it was incapable of an independent class politics, but because it was not strong enough against the bourgeoisie. The electoral reform of 1832, which had been fought for by the workers, only included the property-owning petty bourgeoisie among the electorate. More than a million organised workers in trade unions were left empty-handed, and so many of them increasingly engaged in extra-

parliamentary and trade union struggles with anarcho-syndicalist features. By 1834, they were demoralised by heavy strike defeats and the deportation of “ringleaders”, leaving union leaders feeling like “generals without troops” (see **Vester** 1970a, 328, 331, **Bray** 1839, 99 et sq.). Although the liberal bourgeoisie was under pressure from economic sales crises, they were politically so strong that by 1848 virtually all struggles for unions and voting rights were unable to make headway. A policy of arrangements with trade unions only returned during the new phase of economic recovery (cf. **Vester** 1970a, 261–333, 392–96).

Marx and **Engels**'s impression in the 1840s that the ‘working class for itself’ had not yet emerged can be explained by these devastating defeats and not by any “immaturity” (cf. **Na’aman** 1979, 13–6). They may have found documented traces of the defeated movements in published works of early critiques of capitalism, which **Marx** compiled under the title ‘Opposition to the Economists’ in *Theories of Surplus Value* (MECW 32/373–449) – published in German between 1903 and 1922 (see **Vester** 1970b, 10–147). But **Marx** and **Engels** explained the reluctance of the movements towards large confrontations with the thesis of an immaturity of the working class, the long-suffering ‘crude giant’, not yet awakened to ‘full consciousness’, as their comrade **Georg Weerth** put it (1957, 237, 234, 310). Despite many adversities, the workers’ movement found more stable forms of organisation that built the foundations of their subsequent recovery after 1848. **Marx** first experienced this after 1860 as he became more familiar with stabilised trade unions and co-operative movements in the context of the International Workingmen’s Association.

The overview of the entire development of the emerging working class from the 1790s to the 1890s enabled two further developments of class theory. First, the praxeological approach was further developed. Such a view does not immediately derive independent class action from “objective” characteristics of the social condition, but seeks to explain and understand it through everyday cultural and political class relations and conflicts (**Beer** 1919/1984; **Thompson** 1963, 1971, 1978a/b; **Bourdieu** 1970, 1979). And second, it was thereby possible to abandon the assumptions of linear developmental tendencies. This allows one to study the contradictory nature and cyclical character of social developments and struggles, in which upswings and downturns of the movements follow one another (**Mandel** 1962; **Vester** 1970a/b).

4.2 The Historical Continuity of Counter-Power Solidarity and Popular Class Culture – Already with the early movements, it became clear that their intensity was not a direct result of particular material needs, but socio-culturally and politically mediated. **Thompson** confirms this in data- and information-rich

studies of the transition from the 18th cent. to the new capitalist class constellation of the 19th cent. This transition was marked by a decidedly liberalist policy of economic deregulation and political repression. The investigations into long-term developments quite confirm **Marx's** diagnosis of the implementation of capitalist relations of production with their dramatic changes of class position, i.e. the transformation of small farmers, craftsmen, homeworkers, and the poor including their wives and children into free wage-labour. But it does not confirm the perspective of a standardised depression and fragmentation of the class condition.

Supported mainly by the work of Andrew **Ure** (1835), **Engels** in *Condition* and **Marx** in *C I* observed a standardised depression of work qualifications and wages in the textile industry, especially for women and children. Although it was applicable there, they generalised this trend into a prognosis for all industries and wage labourers. **Thompson** (1966, 189–212) instead noted a very mixed development of wages and no general deskilling of labour. Subsequent data analyses confirm the fact that the average number of qualified skilled workers also rose in other capitalist countries in the long-term; furthermore, this happened without large groups of low-skilled and salaried workers disappearing (cf. **Geiger** 1949, **Blauner** 1964, **Kuczynski** 1961–72).

The heterogeneity of these external conditions however did not have to lead to social fragmentation, since the workers' and people's milieus were largely held together through frameworks of solidarity and interpretative patterns of cohesion. **Thompson**, on this basis, refused to accept the thesis of material immiseration. He did not play down class domination, but rather defined it more comprehensively as a dramatically experienced transformation in the entire cultural and material 'quality of life'; thus 'the older "cataclysmic" view of the Industrial Revolution must still be accepted. During the years between 1780 and 1840 the people of Britain suffered an experience of immiseration, even if it is possible to show a small statistical improvement in material conditions. [...] The experience of immiseration came upon them in a hundred different forms; for the field labourer, the loss of his common rights and the vestiges of village democracy; for the artisan, the loss of his craftsman's status; for the weaver, the loss of livelihood and of independence; for the child, the loss of work and play in the home; for many groups of workers whose real earnings improved, the loss of security, leisure and the deterioration of the urban environment' (Thompson 1966, 444 et sq.).

The great protest came not only from the factory workers and not just from those who suffered most from material and moral misery, but from the "respectable" working classes of the nation, those whose social position and political rights were at risk through the liberalist turn in economics and politics. It was

not the facts of living standards that were crucial, but the experiences of losing former liberties and the quality of life with the resulting social tensions.

Thompson (1966, 401–47) also refutes the diagnosis of a general anomic and demoralising fragmentation and dissolution of everyday class milieus and community cohesion. He shows that the emergence of the workers' movement could draw on long-standing 'community' traditions, solidarity organisations, egalitarian interpretations of society and protest (religious associations, support funds, communal livelihood safeguards, clubs, correspondence networks, symbolic forms of protests, etc.). However, these elements of cultural class solidarity went through a decisive transformation with the economic and political implementation of industrial capitalism. Until well into the 18th cent., class antagonisms had been tempered by older historical compromises (Thompson 1971; **Moore** 1966). The ever-tougher liberal policy of destroying communal lands, social safeguards and liberties of opinion and combination struck the various popular minorities in equal measure. Hence, in the resistance struggles since 1800, more and more modernised concepts of solidarity were developed that better corresponded to the new liberal-capitalist conditions. Instead of traditional, religious, and natural law arguments, the liberal reconstruction of the social order was increasingly opposed by legal and political-economic concepts of a democratic order based in solidarity (**Vester** 1970a, 25–9, 234–333; 1970b, 7–147). This was particularly true of the growing trade union movement.

Thompson (1966, 472–602) even demonstrates that sabotage and machine breaking by the so-called Luddites was an alternative means of fighting under the condition of the illegalisation of trade unions. The Luddites were not blindly opposed to the new, more productive technologies as such, but to the lack of accompanying social regulations. More than a few "machine-breakers" still practiced formally peaceful wage-politics for decades after the re-legalisation of their trade unions. On the whole, Thompson shows that class development was a process of building political coalitions out of diverse popular milieus connected through a common everyday culture. This class only came together in solidarity and adapted to more modern conditions when challenged by a relentless liberal opponent. These coalitions could also fall apart when the political opponent could pull a group over into forming a coalition – like small homeowners, who got the right to vote in 1832.

4.3 *Disposition to Act and Field of Action in a Praxeological Approach* – **Thompson** (1971, 1978a/b), largely in agreement with **Bourdieu**, supplements Marxism with two interrelated concepts of a theory of praxis. How actors behave in practice cannot be immediately derived from interests related to their societal position or material and cultural resources – that is, to their economic, cultural

and social 'capital' (Bourdieu 1979, 1986). How these interests are interpreted and how these resources are utilised depends rather on independent dispositions to act, which the actors have historically acquired, passed down, and also actively shaped in the form of their common culture. Culture is understood here ethnologically or materialistically, as in **Williams** (1958, 283–358) and **Bourdieu** (1984, 1), as a culture of everyday behaviour in distinction from high culture. Individually internalised, it solidifies and manifests itself in the personal habitus. **Thompson** shares in substance the concept of class habitus (although under the names of 'culture' and 'disposition') with **Bourdieu**, who understands it as a 'practice-unifying and practice-generating principle' and 'the internalized form of class condition' (1984, 101), and with **Geiger** (1932, 13–6, 77–82), who uses it synonymously with 'mentality'. However, the classification, evaluation, and dispositions to act of habitus are not immediately and always equally translated into real practice. This depends rather on the historically changing power relations of the field of action as a whole. Social practice is thus not necessarily predetermined, but exists within a certain spectrum of possibilities and historical alternatives. **Bourdieu** grasps this complex context with the simplifying formula: '[(habitus)(capital)] + field = practice' (1984, 101). Approaches to this theory of practice including field, habitus and milieu can also be found in **Marx** and **Engels** (see **Oertzen** 1994/2014, 45 et sqq.; **Vester** 2018, 890–6).

Thompson distances himself from the static class concepts of orthodox Marxism and sociological positivism, which he regards as epistemological twins. He takes class to be a '*historical* category' that must involve 'the real experiential historical process of class formation'; to Thompson, 'far too much theoretical attention (much of it plainly a-historical) has been paid to "class", and far too little to "class-struggle". Indeed, class-struggle is the prior, as well as the more universal, concept [...] Classes do not exist as separate entities, look around, find an enemy class, and then start to struggle. On the contrary, people find themselves in a society structured in determined ways (crucially, but not exclusively, in productive relations), they experience exploitation [...], they identify points of antagonistic interest, they commence to struggle around these issues and in the process of struggling they discover themselves as classes, they come to know this discovery as class-consciousness. Class and class-consciousness are always the last, not the first, stage in the real historical process' (1978a, 147–9).

According to **Thompson's** relational or field-relations class concept, which he shares with **Bourdieu** (1984, 109–12), classes are not, as with positivist 'sociologists who have stopped the time-machine', found in static characteristics such as 'occupations, incomes, status-hierarchies, and the rest [...], since class is

not this or that part of the machine, but *the way the machine works* once it is set in motion – not this interest and that interest, but the *friction* of interests – the movement itself, the heat, the thundering noise. Class is a social and cultural formation (often finding institutional expression) which cannot be defined abstractly, or in isolation, but only in terms of relationship with other classes; and, ultimately, the definition can only be made in the medium of *time* – that is, action and reaction, change and conflict. When we speak of *a class* we are thinking of a very loosely defined body of people who share the same congeries of interests, social experiences, traditions and value-system, who have a *disposition to behave* as a class, to define themselves in their actions and in their consciousness in relation to other groups of people in class ways. But class itself is not a thing, it is a happening' (Thompson 1965, 357).

With the concept of disposition, Thompson, like Bourdieu, takes into account the abilities, inclinations, and possibilities of the habitus which actors can practically follow in various ways, depending on the power relations in the field. Thompson exemplifies this empirically through the historical transformation of class relations in England (which Moore investigated in 1966 in his comparative historical class analysis over an even longer period of time). Up to the 18th cent., class constellations were still not very polarised due to older balancing social arrangements. By the early 19th cent., communal and state-centralised social policies as well as corporate and individual rights, etc., were largely dismantled in the name of laissez-faire capitalism. This power-powerlessness gap between classes culminated in the 1840s and was then relativised again for decades. Nevertheless, the antagonistic constellation of the 1840s shaped the class concept that became dominant in Marxism. Thompson counters this: 'Class, as it eventuated within nineteenth-century industrial capitalist societies, and as it then left its imprint upon the heuristic category of class, has in fact no claim to universality. Class in that sense is no more than a special case of the historical formations which arise out of class struggle' (Thompson 1978a, 150).

In his theoretical essays, Thompson further develops his concept of a 'field of force' (Thompson 1978a, 151) on a historical-empirical basis and connects it, again in parallel to Bourdieu (1980, 98–106), with the category of the not entirely predetermined historical possibility: 'When analysing gentry – plebs relations [in the 18th cent.] one finds not so much an uncompromising ding-dong battle between irreconcilable antagonists as a societal "field-of-force". I am thinking of a school experiment [...], in which an electrical current magnetized a plate covered with iron filings. The filings, which were evenly distributed, arranged themselves at one pole or the other, while in between those filings which remained in place aligned themselves sketchily as if directed towards

opposing attractive poles. This is very much how I see eighteenth-century society, with, for many purposes, the crowd at one pole, the aristocracy and gentry at the other, and until late in the century, the professional and merchant groups bound down by lines of magnetic dependency to the rulers, or on occasion hiding their faces in common action with the crowd. This metaphor allows one to understand [...] the limits of the possible beyond which power did not dare to go. It is said that Queen Caroline once took such a fancy to St. James's Park that she asked Walpole how much it would cost to enclose it as private property. "Only a crown, Madam", was Walpole's reply' (Thompson 1978a, 151).

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→ anarchism, aristocracy, association, bourgeois revolution, bourgeoisie, Charism, class analysis, class consciousness, class domination, class struggle, class compromise, class condition, Communist Manifesto, competition, contemplative materialism, contradiction, cooperation, cooperative, council communism, councils/council system, counter-power, critique of political economy, Cultural Studies, division of labour, early socialism, empirical research/theory, external, folk culture (pre-capitalist), formation theory, forms of (trade) unionist struggle, habitus, hegemony, immiseration, insurrection, interest, labour movement, labour time, labourism, Lassalleanism, lumpenproletariat, manufacture, masses, milieu, misery, mode of life, moral economy, organisation, Paris Commune, polarisation thesis, praxis, pre-capitalist modes of production, precariat, Pre-Marxian socialism, proletariat, proletarianisation, reduction of working time, revolutionary syndicalism, revolutionary theory, ruling class, self-management, self-organisation, solidarity, state, strike, struggle, subject, trade unions, village community, Vormärz, wage-labour, welfare state, work, labour, workers control, workers' self-management, working class, working class culture

→ Anarchismus, anschauer Materialismus, Arbeit, Arbeiteraristokratie, Arbeiterbewegung, Arbeiterklasse, Arbeiterkontrolle, Arbeiterkultur, Arbeiterselbstverwaltung, Arbeitsteilung, Arbeitszeit, Arbeitszeitverkürzung, Assoziation, Aufstand, Bourgeoisie, bürgerliche Revolution, Chartismus, Dorfgemeinschaft, Elend, Empirie/Theorie, Formationstheorie, Frühsozialismus, Gegenmacht, Genossenschaft, Gewerkschaften, gewerkschaftliche Kampfformen, Habitus, Hegemonie, herrschende Klasse, Interesse, Kampf, Klassenanalyse, Klassenbewusstsein, Klassenherrschaft, Klassenkampf, Klassenkompromiss, Klassenlage, Kommunistisches Manifest, Konkurrenz, Kooperation, Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, Kulturstudien, Labourismus, Lassalleanismus, Lebensweise, Lohnarbeit, Lumpenproletariat, Manufaktur, Massen, Milieu, moralische Ökonomie, Organisation, Pariser Kommune, Polarisierungsthese, Praxis, Prekariat, Proletariat, Proletarisierung, Räte/Rätesystem, Rätekommunismus, revolutionärer Syndikalismus, Revolutionstheorie, Selbstorganisation, Selbstverwaltung, Solidarität, Sozialstaat, Staat, Streik, Subjekt, Verelendung, Volkskultur (vorkapitalistische), von außen, vorkapitalistische Produktionsweisen, vormarxistischer Sozialismus, Vormärz, Widerspruch

Communism

A: šuyū'iyah. – F: communisme. – G: Kommunismus. – R: komunizm. – S: comunismo. – C: gòngchǎnzhǔyì 共产主义

With the end of the Soviet Union it appeared that the fate of C had been sealed. Stalinist terror and authoritarian stagnation in the phase after **Stalin** was followed by the failure of **Gorbachev's** attempts at reform, and finally the restoration of state capitalism with a different kind of authoritarianism. The dissolution of the socialist bloc and the Soviet Union after 1989 threw Russia back behind borders which are drawn significantly narrower than those under **Peter** the Great, especially after the secessions of Ukraine and Georgia. For many it seems clear that C in the thinking of **Marx**, and the historical C which refers to him, have turned out to be something that is realised either in a type of totalitarian society or else as an unattainable utopia. From this point of view, its impossibility has been proven in both cases. The conception of an historical movement toward C had been extinguished with one stroke, and it has landed in the dustbin of history. As any bourgeois dictionary would say, C is one of the three ideologies which have shaped the modern world. It attempted to criticise liberalism and go beyond it in the direction of an egalitarian socialisation; and it formed the counterpart to conservative criticism of liberalism, which defended the tradition of the Ancien Régime. Liberalism, in its double economic and political-ethical manifestation, remained the main point of reference. As **Benedetto Croce** noted, since the 19th cent. liberalism has been the central world view in the sense of a secular 'religion of liberty' (1932/1963, chapter 1), and it is that which forces its critics – left and right – to define themselves in relation to it.

Croce foresaw a fusing of socialism and C on the one hand, and on the other, the merging of conservatism into liberalism. This was a bold prognosis in view of the crisis of capitalism and the liberal democracies under the pressure of Stalinist C and Nazi fascism. After 1989 it gained relevance inasmuch as liberalism can appear sometimes as social, and then as authoritarian, while conservatism is forced to present itself as liberal conservatism, and socialism as liberal socialism. And yet, one must be aware of the challenge originally written into C by **Marx** and **Engels**, in order to estimate what became of it in the socialist and then, in the "short 20th Cent." from 1917 to 1989, in the movement that called itself communist.

During a scant century historical C embodied the success and the failure of the greatest attempt to change the world since Christianity, which initially mobilised the dominated and degraded masses. Born from the disaster of a war that had positioned the largest nations of the so-called civilised world against each other with unparalleled barbarity, C nourished itself from the criticism of the large social-democratic parties, which had capitulated and let themselves be nationalistically-corporatistically assimilated by the capitalist and imperialist elites. In a tragedy which has meanwhile ended, this C allowed the commitment of a political-ethical idealism, which was ready for enormous sacrifices, to be followed by a cynical politics which legitimised massive crimes. It cannot be charged against **Marx**, who always tied the liberation of the individual and that of society together, and who aimed at a radical democratisation of bourgeois democracy in an 'association' of free producers (*The Communist Manifesto*, 1967/2002, 244 [4/482]). Nevertheless, the complexity and the ambiguity of the Marxist critique of modern society permitted contradictory interpretations, and also retained theoretical contradictions within the enlightened enthusiasm which the faith in the synergy between theoretical criticism and the praxis of the workers' movement had generated.

Since the concept and the object of this 'C' have disappeared, the relative separation of socialism from C, which led to the fact that C did not develop beyond a nebulous proto-socialism, must be explained. In addition, **Marx's** understanding of C must be sounded out without forgetting **Engels** in the process. Later, the communist idea passes through the socialist collectivism of the II. International with its cleavages into revisionists and orthodox, reformists and revolutionaries. It was the October Revolution of 1917 that first put C on the agenda and established its difference from socialism. From now on communist theory becomes involved in the problems of the so-called revolutionary transition, without becoming the subject of comprehensive reflection. With **Lenin** and the building of socialism in one country in preparation for C world-wide, C stands on the test bench, from initial success through Stalinism up to its final defeat. The refusal to equate C with either Bolshevism or Stalinism finds its expression in utopian criticism from the point of view of the council movement, and in the partisanship for the mass strike from Rosa **Luxemburg** to Karl **Korsch**, Anton **Pannekoek**, as well as Peter **von Oertzen**. This tendency is quickly exhausted in the mainstream of the European workers' movement. **Gramsci** alone tries to reformulate C both realistically and dynamically by bringing councils and party together in the strategy of the hegemonic struggle. This includes both a revised version of **Marxian** theory and an intellectual-moral reform – suggestions whose political effects remain limited. A window seems to open for them with the popular front strategy, but they are absorbed

by the transformism of the parties, which seek to distinguish themselves from the Soviet system and call themselves Eurocommunist without really being able to renew themselves.

The fact that there was an historical C does not justify simply concluding that C is obsolete. Globalised capitalism is nourishing a communist tendency again. Nevertheless, the new face of C still remains relatively formless, dependent on a comprehensive historical self-criticism and a theoretical reinvention of the search for the common good, one that does justice to the diversity of human relationships, and is able to confront its own ideologisation critically and renounce any fantasies of domination.

1. The comparison of three French dictionaries provides a snapshot of the present situation. In the well respected *Lalande* C still generally designates 'that economic and social organisation, whose basis is common property in contrast to individual property, as well as the active intervention of society in the life of the individual' (1988, 152 et sq.). As far as conceptions of **Marx** are mentioned, as is typical for bourgeois dictionaries, they appear to be reduced to the statism which characterises the 'Soviet system'. Two critical notes correct this definition. The first one emphasises that 'the communist ideal according to Marx and **Lenin** is anarchist' (152). It seizes on the classical distinction of the II. International between the two phases of the transition to C, whereby only the first maintains the state apparatus, thereby characterising Socialism as 'incomplete C'. The second note, by **Lalande** himself, denies that the communist ideal is a goal which can be aimed at: '**Marx** noted that scientific Socialism, as he understands it, is the establishment of a transformation and the prospect of its next phase, not however the efforts toward an ideal society, and that any speculation about this is a reactionary illusion because it takes its material from the images of earlier forms of society' (153). Despite being limited to its socio-economic dimension, the concept of C here is still judged worthy to be entered into a dictionary of philosophy. – The change of the historical conjuncture has become apparent since the 1990s. The *Dictionnaire de philosophie politique* (1996) does not contain an entry for 'C'. It is completely in line with political and economic liberalism. François **Furet**'s final reckoning, published one year earlier, in which it is suggested that for people coming from the 'communist world' 'not a trace remains of their earlier experiences' (1995/1999, vii), seems to have accomplished its work well. In the entry 'Socialism' by Jean Paul **Thomas**, **Marx** is regarded as a modern socialist, who has much in common primarily with **Fourier** and **Saint Simon**. The texts on the *Critique of Political Economy* are similarly ignored, as are the political historical writings on the Paris Commune and the criticism of the programme of the German labour

parties. **Marx's** anti-democratic ambiguities are condemned, nothing is said about the advances in understanding shown by the old **Engels** in his introduction of 1895 to *The Class Struggles in France* (MECW 27/506–24 [22/509–27]). On the other hand, Karl **Kautsky's** polemic against Bolshevism (1922) is met with agreement, because it fits the idea that there is apparently no alternative to the connection between capitalism and parliamentary democracy – as opposed to enthusiasts such as **Marx**, who publicised Socialism as a kingdom of God on earth. – Somewhat similar is the case with the *Vocabulaire européen des philosophies* (2004), in which the entry 'C' is likewise missing. To be sure, there are entries which treat of **Marx**, for example 'praxis' by Étienne **Balibar**, or 'civil society' by Philippe **Raynaud**. However, the latter refers exclusively to texts of 1843 in order to support the opinion that **Marx** has 'put a radicalisation of the point of view of English political economy into the service of a radical critique of the social divisions of mankind', which amounts to 'a radical negation of the legal and political conditions of civil society' (*Vocabulaire*, 1194) – an assumption which only functions because the fundamental distinction between bourgeois and civil society is ignored, and **Marx's** criticism of the former is understood as a negation of the latter. This appeal to the moral order of liberalism doesn't even take the trouble to work out the difference between Socialism and C.

This question was asked when the workers' movement was on the rise. In France, for instance, by Émile **Durkheim**, who located **Marx** without further ado in the current of Socialism represented by the II. International. The relative interchangeability of both terms in the years 1880–1914 can be attributed in a certain sense to **Engels**, who, in the political section of the *Anti-Dühring* spoke of Socialism. It was **Lenin** who first brought up again the distinction made by **Marx**, whereby he was supported within the International only by Antonio **Labriola**, who used the term 'critical C' (MCM, 13) to specify the Marxist position. For **Durkheim**, however, it is not a matter of two subgenera of the same species, but the two are 'in certain essential ways [...] poles apart' (1896/1962, 67) as perspectives and practices. C is not the distant relative of Socialism, which it could rejuvenate: the latter is radically new and modern. C on the other hand is an answer to the 'question [which] is eternal', which in view of the permanent evil, i.e. 'economic particularism' (74 et sq.) always presents itself anew. The moral attitude of seeing the evil in private property as a negation of the public interest is unavoidable – therefore the permanence of C from antiquity with **Plato**, and later religious movements in the Middle Ages, the Renaissance (**More** and **Campanella**), and the Enlightenment (**Morelly** and **Mably**), up to the modern workers' movement. It is connected with various social groups, which are all frightened by the power of economic development,

and demand of the state that it limit or abolish private property and subordinate it to economic activity. Socialism, however, would surface only at the beginning of the 19th cent., with industrial society. In 'economic particularism' he sees not 'the source of all immorality' (75), but only criticises the abuse of private property, which he wants to limit through a large sector of common property. The goal of Socialism is the social integration of economic interests, not their suppression. Whereas C builds in abstraction on a series of timeless demands, Socialism arises bound to a certain type of welfare state; its affiliation with the modern world of large-scale enterprises and the state is taken for granted. It believes it is the form of social organisation most suitable for a modern society, because it corrects its pathologies and cleans it of its anomies.

2. *A discontinuous history.* – **Durkheim's** analysis approximates the criticism which the young **Marx** directed at 'crude and thoughtless C' which 'negates the *personality* of man in every sphere' and promotes a 'regression to the *unnatural* simplicity of the *poor* and crude man' (MECW 3/295 [40/534 et sq.]). If **Marx** understands himself as a communist, then only in the modern sense, as is reserved for Socialism by **Durkheim**. But **Marx** affirms the possibility of a C which is just as modern as Socialism, and is even better suited than it to carry out the reorganisation of society. Otherwise why would he have called his most famous and frequently read text the 'communist' and not the 'socialist' manifesto?

The discontinuous tradition of communist ideas and practices can be traced back to a common life within communes or communities without social hierarchy, one that does not recognise differences according to (biological or social) sex or age. The lack of differentiation correlates with the absence of a state institution which would justify the domination of man over man, and it is based on the common allocation of the soil and the fruits of labour. Since the 19th cent. ethnology has studied so-called primitive societies, which are reminiscent of this archaic community without a state. Supported by the work of Lewis **Morgan**, Henry **Maine**, Maxim **Kowalewski**, Edward B. **Tylor** among others, **Marx** and **Engels** in the 1850s assumed the existence of a primitive communism. The *Grundrisse* treat the development of 'Forms preceding capitalist production' (GR, 1973/1993, 471–79 [42/383–421]). This is an analysis of the dissolution of the primordial community, whose C, which was tied to the direct domination of natural conditions of production, **Marx** certainly never glorified. On the contrary, he specifies exactly the conditions under which the release from these relations is accomplished by means of the autonomisation of production and an environment created by humans. Their replacement enables the progress of production and civilisation, with which class rule is also introduced. Here

no historical philosophy is imputed which believes it can already recognise the germ of the future communist society in the primordial community. The development knows interruptions and regressions. Marx examines how the unity breaks open and articulates itself in a plurality of forms. But the general framework of the stage theory and its faith in progress remains: This considers 'Asiatic, ancient, feudal and modern bourgeois modes of production [...] as epochs marking progress in the economic development of society', which conclude 'the prehistory of human society' (MECW 29/263 et sq. [13/9]). After the dissolution of the primordial community the communist idea emerges only sporadically in social movements, usually in the form of insurgency movements of the subaltern classes, which demand a fairer distribution of wealth and work, but in addition – within the political area – demand self-government. In Europe these movements are often religiously shaped and invoke the universalism of the Jewish prophets and the Christian gospel. If all men are sons of the same god, they are also brothers. But even if they feel obligated to the common good, there are nevertheless the dominated and subaltern, the poor and humiliated. The controversy over poverty that drove the movement of the Franciscan Fraticelli in the 13th cent. into opposition to bishops and pope, renews the demand for a communal life which renounces the power of money, shares with others, and is led in voluntary poverty. Even if they could be integrated quickly by the church again, it is nevertheless not surprising that such communist movements of believers found the attention of **Engels** and after him **Kautsky** and Ernst **Bloch**. The distribution of wealth, not its production, is still the intention of Thomas **Müntzer**. These movements are important, because they connect the demand for economic and political communality with class struggle and go beyond the framework of the reforms that are allowed from above.

Modern C begins with the popular movements of the Diggers and Levellers, which radicalised the English revolution, and above all with the French revolution, with the Sansculottes, the radical Jacobinism of **Robespierre** and the conspiracy of equals of **Babeuf**. This C does not want to give up the demands for equality, liberty, and fraternity which the revolutionary natural law set on the agenda. It demands its practice for the advantage of all, by and in a social, republican state, and contends against bourgeois private property. Jacques **Grandjanc** proved that the expression 'communist' is used after 1797 again for the first time in 1835 in a legal document 'in the sense of a republican, who is a supporter of a community of property' (1989, 143). As a great authority on the French revolution **Marx** values its historical courage, yet criticises, as **Hegel** had already done, its unawareness of the mechanisms of modern bourgeois society. These begin to be discovered by social theorists in the first third of the

19th cent. who consider themselves not as economists, but as critics and socialists, such as **Saint Simon** and **Fourier**, who **Marx** both esteemed and studied. There are circles of English workers (e.g. around **Robert Owen**), French revolutionary groups like the neo-Babouvists, non-violent spiritualists such as **Cabet** and the Icarists, as well as the German workers living in exile in Paris, Brussels, and London, who bring the term of C into circulation again in the 1830s, without separating it clearly from that of Socialism. These circles set it on the agenda in order to criticise a society dominated by private interests and class egoism. They support the struggles of the emerging proletariat, the demands for common property and benefit from the goods, exchange of experiences, and control of production. Their independent political struggle should be free from the false solutions of utopian projects, whereby they develop their own forms of association and organisation and practice solidary forms of action, such as demonstrations and strikes. They want to shake off the character of secret societies, which forces them to a sectarian existence, and present themselves as a publicly recognised party in the midst of a genuine republic. In this sense C and republic do not stand opposed to each other.

3. *The Emergence of C.* – Beginning in the 1840s **Marx** and **Engels** take part in the London meetings of the German workers' circle. **Marx** joins the League of the Just in 1847, which will commission him, together with **Engels**, to write the *Communist Manifesto*. But why the reference to C? The League itself had chosen the term on the one hand under organisational criteria, because it had organised itself in basic units called 'communes', in order to express an appreciation for solidary practices. On the other hand, the term was chosen in order to distinguish themselves from the vague socialist movement, which demanded justice without asking questions about the causes of injustice. The circular of the first congress of the League of June 9, 1847 specifies: 'How many there are who want justice, that is, what they call justice, without necessarily being Communists! We are not distinguished by wanting justice in general – anyone can claim that for himself – but by our attack on the existing social order and on private property, by wanting community of property, by being Communists. Hence there is only one suitable name for our League, the name which says what we really are, and this name we have chosen'. (MECW 6/595) Because of the indefinite moralism **Marx** expressed doubts about the reference to justice, accepted it nevertheless as compromise. **Engels**, for his part, clarified the new connection, when he was assigned to write the 'Principles of C'. It assigns to the proletariat the universal task to be carriers of C and calls it 'that class of society which procures its means of livelihood entirely and solely from the sale of its labour and not from the profit derived from any capital' (MECW 6/341

[4/363]). This text, which emerged shortly before the *Communist Manifesto*, conceptualises C as the negation of past society up to the point that 'the management of production by the whole of society and the resulting new development of production require and also produce quite different people' (353 [376]). Consequently there is no return to the traditional community. The new name designates something new, without rejecting the socialist tradition. In the chapters of the *Manifesto*, which are dedicated to the other forms of Socialism (MECW 6/507 et sqq. [4/482 et sqq.]), **Marx** and **Engels** position themselves at the side of C in order to avoid the cooptation of the new theory by the competitive forms, which they regard either as conceptionally unsuitable or politically ineffective, as Engels emphasises in his introduction to the English edition of 1888: 'Whatever portion of the working class had become convinced of the insufficiency of mere political revolutions, and had proclaimed the necessity of a total social change, that portion then called itself communist. It was a crude, rough-hewn, purely instinctive kind of C; still, it touched the cardinal point and was powerful enough amongst the working class to produce the Utopian C, in France, of **Cabet**, and in Germany, of **Weitling**. Thus, socialism was, in 1847, a middle-class movement, C a working-class movement. Socialism was, on the Continent at least, "respectable"; C was the very opposite. And as our notion, from the very beginning, was that "the emancipation of the working class must be the work of the working class itself", there could be no doubt as to which of the two names we must take. Moreover, we have, ever since, been far from repudiating it' (*Communist Manifesto*, 1967/2002, 202 [21/357]). At a point in time when only socialist or social-democratic parties exist, since C seems to merge with Socialism, it will be necessarily to confirm a forty year old semantic and theoretical choice. As late as 1852 **Marx** criticises French social-democracy after the failure of the revolution of 1848. Its 'peculiar character' is epitomised in 'the fact that democratic-republican institutions are demanded as a means, not of superseding two extremes, capital and wage labour, but of weakening their antagonism and transforming it into harmony'. (MECW 11/130 [8/141]) However, **Marx** and **Engels** accept subsequently without problems the reference to Socialism, which generalises itself with the formation of labour parties in the years 1875–90. It is the claim to scientific character which constitutes the difference: 'to impart to the now oppressed class a full knowledge of the conditions and the meaning of the momentous act it is called upon to accomplish, this is the task of the theoretical expression of the proletarian movement, scientific Socialism' (MECW 25/270 et sq. [20/265]). Three chapters of that which became the manual of Marxism for thousands of followers were translated into French with the title 'Utopian Socialism and Scientific Socialism' (1882), without its founding fathers having any objections to it.

4. *Marx's way to C* – Marx works himself into a real historical movement. The decision for C is certain after 1843. The proletarian who demands the negation of private property, 'finds himself possessing the same right as the *German king* in regard to the world which has come into being when he calls the people *his* people as he calls the horse *his* horse' (MECW 3/187 [1/391]).

4.1 Marx encounters C both as the point of conclusion of the modern world, that of emancipation, and as the reality of a universal class whose basic needs the state and the bourgeois civil society have failed to satisfy. The critique, this form of theory connected to enlightenment, merges with Marx in an anthropology which is shaped by a more strongly Feuerbachian than Hegelian category of alienation. 'The immediate *task of philosophy*, which is at the service of history, once the *holy form* of human self-estrangement has been unmasked, is to unmask self-estrangement in its *unholy forms*. Thus the criticism of heaven turns into the criticism of the earth, the *criticism of religion* into the *criticism of law*, and the *criticism of theology* into the *criticism of politics*' (MECW 3/176 [1/379]). Marx insists on politics, because the continuation of the Ancien Régime in Germany makes him angry. But the criticism of politics implies the criticism of the bourgeois civil society, which produces a class excluded from all political rights and means to the satisfaction of its needs. The class of the proletarians is the 'class with *radical chains*, a class of civil society, which is not a class of civil society, an estate which is the dissolution of all estates' (MECW 3/186 [1/390]). This class claims '*no particular right*', 'because no *particular wrong*, but *wrong generally* is perpetrated against it'; it is 'in a word the *complete loss* of man'. Marx does not use the term of C here, but he makes '*the complete rewinning of man*' (ibid.), universal human emancipation, the anchor point of his criticism. A little later C – now expressly mentioned by name – is at its core the '*transcendence of private property as human self-estrangement*' (MECW 3/296 [40/536]); the common meal of workers becomes the image of the sublation of the alienation. C, 'as fully developed humanism equals naturalism [...], the genuine resolution of the conflict between man and nature and man with man [...], the riddle of history solved and knows itself to be this solution' (MECW 3/296 et sq. [ibid.]). History resolves itself here in the logical movement of the abolition of the alienation, and in the metaphysics of presence. There is a logic underlying history.

Something of this speculative thesis remains in Marx's work. It does not disappear in the *German Ideology*, where an initial theory of history based on the idea of modes of production that originate from one another is sketched. To be sure, Marx maintains the term of estrangement, 'to use a term which will be comprehensible to the philosophers' (MECW 5/48 [3/34]), yet this functions

as a kind of meta-category with a comprehensive hermeneutic function. Alienation always rules when it comes to ‘a cleavage [...] between the particular and the common interest’; it exists ‘as long, therefore, as activity is not voluntary, but naturally, divided, man’s own deed becomes an alien power opposed to him, which enslaves him instead of being controlled by him’ (MECW 5/47 [33]). Alienation forms a kind of natural state, in which ‘social power [...], which arises through the co-operation of different individuals as it is caused by the division of labour, appears to these individuals [...] not as their own united power, but as an alien force existing outside them, of the origin and goal of which they are ignorant’ (MECW 5/48 [34]). Because in the ‘communist society’ each one ‘can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic’, the ‘consolidation of what we ourselves produce into a material power above us’ is broken (MECW 5/47 [33]). Thus C, tied to the overcoming of alienation, is not simply an ‘*ideal*, to which reality [will] have to adjust itself’, but ‘the *real* movement which abolishes the present state of things. The conditions of this movement result from the now existing premise’ (MECW 5/49 [35]). Three conditions are necessary: the completion of the world market, the contradiction between forces of production and the relations of production, the opposition between the masses of workers excluded from property and the ruling class, which has at its disposal the power of the state, the wealth, and education. Only when ‘the limited bourgeois form is stripped away’, as is written later in the *Grundrisse*, can wealth as ‘the universality of individual needs, capacities, pleasures, productive forces, etc., created through universal exchange’, show itself (1973/1993, 488 [42/395 et sq.]).

C as the dissolution of the antagonism between bourgeoisie and proletariat is in the *German Ideology* ‘only possible as the act of the dominant peoples “all at once” and simultaneously’ (MECW 5/49 [3/35]). ‘The Proletariat can [...] exist only *world-historically*, just as communism, its activity, can only have a “world-historical” existence’ (ibid.). The *Manifesto* tries to connect the general philosophy of the emancipation and the concrete-historical analysis by grasping C at the same time as the result of capitalist development and its contradictions, and as the means of production adequate to human nature. The “logical” and the historical overlap. Capitalism produces the revolutionary class and class struggle – the political means in order to protect the workers against mutual competition, and to develop a form of association of free producers, who initiate the classless society. C does not refer to the priority of the community; it remains the child of the civil society and its cooperative individualism. There-

fore in the new society ‘the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all’ (*Communist Manifesto*, 1967/2002, 244 [4/482]) and not the other way around. Nevertheless there is a tension remaining between the specific analysis and the metaphysical postulate, between C as a possibility written into the historical tendency and C as the phantasm of the absolute mastering of all social interactions.

4.2 The latter idea still resonates in *Capital*, with Marx’s challenge to imagine ‘an association of free men’ who ‘with the means of production held in common, and expending their many different forms of labour-power in full self-awareness as one single social labour force. [...] The social relations of the individual producers, both toward their labour and the products of their labour, are here transparent in their simplicity, in production as well as in distribution’. (*C1*, 1977/1990, 171 et sq. [23/92 et sq.]) C takes the form of a general work contract on an economic level, therefore the producers themselves form a general will and no longer require the mediation of the market, which disappears with the value form. Thus, however, that which marked all social life and each type of relations of production for Marx so far also disappears, namely ‘definite relations, which are independent of their will’ (MECW 29/263 [13/8]). There can be different stages of determination, which permit dependencies between free men and options. Everything depends on these gradations. But Marx confounds the transsubjective consistency of a social relationship with the intersubjective degree of freedom which this relationship permits. Communist society is held to be perfectly intersubjective, and seems thereby determined beyond every relationship of production, therefore relieved of the transsubjectivity which comes to each social relationship. Thus a communist sociality runs the risk of proving to be something beyond any kind of sociality. It is, first of all, a society determined by negations and subtractions. It is ‘without’ – without classes, without state, without law, without religion, without market, and without inter-individual contractual relations. However, the question reads: Which form of transsubjective relationship can determine such a society, without opening itself to the constitutive intersubjectivity of a new kind of social contract? C threatens to become an activist or operaist variant of an absolute knowledge in the sense of the Hegelian objective spirit. A united human will now controls the world, which it nevertheless has produced to a large extent unintentionally. The new world which it gives birth to is, from this perspective, absolutely made by it, its common property. C is not a social relationship of production any more, but rather – for Engels – technical organisation of the society; it stops being an administration of humans in order, as Saint Simon says, to become ‘an administration of things’ (quoted in: Euchner/Grebing 2005, 34). All activ-

ities, which until then were shaped by exploitation and domination – politics, law, religion – will die out as such and dissolve into the unity of a total social production. Production will become the direct embodiment of its subjectivity. C becomes a fantasy of omnipotence. This orientation makes thinking about the revolutionary transition more difficult. Because **Marx** entrusts a political organisation, the labour party, with the task of guaranteeing the historical continuity of the communist movement, he must fall back on the means of politics which is suspected of maintaining the separation between rulers and ruled. The communist association can situate itself only beyond politics. Connected to this question is the political and economic organisation of the phase which follows after the revolutionary conquest of state power. For the reconstruction of social relationships the *Communist Manifesto* relies on the nationalisation of the industrial and financial means of production at one with the planning of the productive activities and the social needs. This is the path the social-democratic parties will take. It presupposes that the forces of capitalist production will, ‘with increasing energy, press forward to the removal of the existing contradiction, to the abolition of their quality as capital, to the practical recognition of their character as social productive forces’ (MECW 25/264 [20/258]). After the transfer into state property social appropriation will follow. But the question arises how can one avoid the prison of state capitalism. How change the capitalist organisation of work in the enterprises? How to overcome the real subsumption of the workers under the means of labour set in motion by capital – briefly, the question of the factory system, in which ‘the employer is absolute law-giver’ (C I, 1977/1990, 550, fn 9 [23/447, fn. 190])? **Engels** finally judged that it was the insurmountable fate of large industry. The situation that people are treated in the factory as in the army threatens to continue. The historically necessary category of organisation pushes the communist association onto the back burner. The transition is obstructed. The distinction between a ‘first phase of communist society’ and of a ‘higher’ (MECW 24/87 [19/21]) one was not coincidentally the occasion for the two phases to make them independent of each other. In the first, that of Socialism, social activity is still subject to the organisation by state planning; in the second, ‘labour has become not only a means of life but life’s prime want’, functioning according to the motto: ‘From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs!’ (Ibid.). C becomes a ‘Robinsonade of abundance’ (Robelin 1986, 672).

4.3 In *Capital*, however, there is yet another view of C: that of a historical tendency immanent in the resistance against the real subsumption. Far from nullifying the power of capital, the crises re-establish the conditions for accumulation by destroying unprofitable capital and produce an ‘industrial reserve army on a scale corresponding with the progress of social accumula-

tion' (*C I*, 1977/1990, 789 et sq. [23/666]). Accumulation is a destructive process, it produces in no way the unity of the working class, but splits it and subjects it to internal competition. In the actual economic struggle capital is superior. It requires political action in order to bring opposition to the real subsumption of labour and reverse the splitting. But this struggle proves frequently to be only a means for the regulation of the systemic constraints of capital. Thus the determination of a normal working day, 'the result of a centuries of struggle between the capitalist and the worker' (*C I*, 1977/1990, 382 [23/286]) impedes capital from overexploiting the worker and thereby destroying its own basis of existence. Thus **Marx** questions the continuity, which he sees between capital accumulation, organisation of the labour struggle, and C. However, with this the allegedly inherent ability of the proletariat to negate the existing society also becomes questionable, since 'with the development of the *real subsumption of labour under capital* [...] not the individual worker but rather a *socially combined labour capacity*' becomes 'more and more the *real executor* of the labour process as a whole' (MECW 34/443 [MEGA II.4.1/65]), and there takes place a 'complete [...] revolution in the mode of production itself' (MECW 34/439 [II.4.1/61]), which removes from the worker any control and makes him an inherent element of capital as a variable part of it. The perspective of the formation of a 'general intellect' (*Gr*, 1973/1993, 706 [42/602]) will be constantly undermined by the destruction of the means of production, which is caused by the permanent crisis accompanying the maintenance of the rate of profit.

Is the communist perspective in **Marx's** main work meaningless and reduced to a utopia? No. Marx opens a further way, which becomes visible in the famous section over the connection of the realm of necessity with the realm of freedom. The latter 'begins only where labour which is determined by necessity and mundane considerations ceases; thus in the very nature of things it lies beyond the sphere of actual material production' (MECW 37/807 [25/828]). It has its roots in the resistance of the workers against the real subsumption. According to the quotation, freedom begins not beyond labour generally, but beyond labour 'determined by necessity'. Only beyond the realm of necessity 'begins that development of human energy which is an end in itself' (*ibid.*). C is a mode of production which guarantees the social reappropriation of labour by putting an end to the capitalist opposition of necessary labour and surplus labour. In class societies surplus labour has two functions: It secures the extended reproduction of production, and going beyond given needs, it produces the elements of an unproductive consumption which is the basis for material and mental development, primarily that of the ruling classes. With C the antagonism disappears, yet a difference between the two functions continues

to exist. The extended reproduction of production remains and belongs to the realm of necessity; the function of the material and mental development of the human energies strips off the antagonistic form and becomes free labour. This tendency for the production of disposable free time supports the resistance of the workers, just as their dependence on it. The realm of necessity, which satisfies the economic needs, has its engine in the cultural and intellectual development of the individuals. The realm of freedom, for its part, can unfold only on this basis. C is not only production for needs, it is a practice which changes needs in unison with the cultural and intellectual capacities of the producers. It is not only the technical administration of production, but a process which at the same time produces the subject capable of the appropriation of the surplus labour and its administration. Resistance against the real subsumption is the first step on the way to the 'self-government of the producers' (MECW 22/332 [17/339]), which as 'responsible agents of society' (MECW 22/333 [340]) organises the community. This communist tendency does not have to be formulated any longer in the general logic of alienation, which still survives in the dialectic of the negation of the negation: 'The monopoly of capital becomes a fetter on the mode of production which has flourished alongside and under it. The centralisation of the means of production and the socialisation of labour reach a point at which they become incompatible with their capitalist integument. This integument is burst asunder. The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The Expropriators are expropriated. [...] This is the negation of the negation. This does not re-establish private property, but it does indeed establish individual property on the basis of the achievements of the capitalist era: namely co-operation and the possession in common of the land and the means of production produced by labour itself'. (CI, 1977/1990, 929 [23/791]) The dialectic of the negation of the negation has its own persuasive power, which however fades to the extent that the metaphysical subject/object tends to be replaced tendentially by labour force/capital and by a number of specific terms, which require concrete analyses.

Thus **Marx**, without the security by a predetermined dialectic, develops an experimental approach with great openness for the forms in which the communist tendency could realise itself, so for instance in stock companies and cooperatives. In the first Marx sees an anticipation of social control of production, a phase of the fall of capitalism, a kind of abolition of capital by capital itself. On the other hand, he does not exclude that they could be an answer of capital to the crisis and a means to broaden the borders of capital. Likewise the production cooperatives are examined as historical forms, which contain elements that are 'directly social, socialised work or direct co-operation' (MECW 37/105 [25/113]). All functions of the production process tied

to capitalist property transform themselves in perspective into simple functions of 'associated producers' (807 [828]). Thus co-operation becomes the heart of historical-social existence. Thus for Marx the 'great experiments' of the cooperative movement are a 'still greater victory of the political economy of labour over the political economy of capital' than the implementation of the ten-hour day (MECW 21/330 [16/11]). The Paris Commune, which intended the 'expropriation of the expropriators' wanted 'to make individual property a truth by transforming the means of production, land and capital [...] into mere instruments of free and associated labour' (MECW 22/335 [17/342]). How would that be anything different than 'C', writes Marx, 'if united cooperative societies are to regulate national production upon a common plan, thus taking it under their own control, and putting an end to the constant anarchy and periodical convulsions' of capitalist production (ibid. [343]). But there are also objections. Of course the cooperative factories are 'within the old form the first sprouts of the new', but now the labourers are 'as association their own capitalists' and forced 'to use the means of production for the employment of their own labour' (MECW 37/438 [25/456]). The most extreme means considered by Marx for the realisation of the communist movement beyond the borders of the stock companies and the cooperatives put under state control is the conquest and transformation of the state apparatus. The experience of the Commune teaches that the insufficient socialisation and the lack of the cooperative system are to be corrected. The State is the organised social power, which must ensure that the social forces link themselves in cooperation and socialisation is carried out in co-operatives. It is incumbent on the State to ensure that the cooperative does not favour private property and does not become an entity overruling society. Thus C would be a synthesis of state property and cooperative action. This synthesis implies the withering away of the State and the conversion of the communities into equally economic and also political units, which are shaped by direct democracy and make possible a republican system of representation permanently controlled by the people.

The communist tendency is not only expressed in the resistance of the worker against real subsumption. Because the capitalist system of production continually transforms disposable social time into surplus labour, without being able to subject it completely to valorisation by capital, it will be possible 'to reduce labour time for the whole society to a diminishing minimum and thus to free everyone's time for their own development' (GR, 1973/1993, 708 [42/604]). If the 'mass of workers' themselves appropriates their own surplus labour, 'on one side necessary labour time will be measured by the needs of the social individual, and, on the other the development of the power of social pro-

duction will so rapidly grow that [...] *disposable time* will grow for all. [...] The measure of wealth is then not any longer, in any way, labour time, but rather disposable time'. (Ibid.)

5. *Second International*. – The representatives of the “Marxist” socialist or social-democratic parties could not take into account the complexity of Marx’s C. Only the socialist left wing maintained the original communist demand, having been satisfied at first with the joint reference to socialism. After the October Revolution in 1917, only Lenin, in unison with Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, will reflect on and push through the reference to C. They will also criticise the surrender of socialism, in which only few – for instance Antonio Labriola – preceded them. The contradictory development of the socialist parties is connected with the work of Marx (to the extent that it was then known), which has become a kind of common property. Marx trusted in the new science of critical C, whose horizon was capable of taking up the analysis of current problems and new historical situations. Whereas in Marx’s dialectical thinking science, natural law, political economy, speculative philosophy, and revolutionary commitment formed a unity, that which in the II. International called itself ‘Marxism’ was an ensemble of conceptions held together by the faith in the recognisability of history, connected with a political pragmatism without certainty. The common convictions of ‘Marxism’ after Marx’s death can be summarised in seven ideas, which were discussed, or rather questioned by international, especially European socialism, until 1914 (see Salvadori 1991): the idea of progress, which accompanies the faith in an increasing domination of nature and the final end of the domination of man over man; the idea of a political and social revolution which will lead to the realm of freedom; the idea that force plays a necessary role during this process; the idea that the labour party is indispensable, but must not set itself up in place of the educated and educating masses; the idea of the development of a new kind of intellectual; the idea that the new structure is built in the national framework, but in internationalist perspective; the idea of a new fraternity, which crowns the internationalism of the workers and the cosmopolitanism of the Enlightenment. In 1895 Engels comes – in view of enormous electoral successes of German social-democracy – to the conclusion that ‘we prosper far better ‘on legal methods than on illegal methods’ (MECW 27/522 [22/525]). It seemed the ‘Social-Democratic overthrow’ could only be accomplished by their ‘keeping the law’ (523 [ibid.]). Thus within the II. International it becomes normal to talk of Socialism and to identify the transition with peaceful means. Socialism, understood as a relatively autonomous society, is regarded as the endpoint of the socialisation of the forces of production. The programme of the socialist

parties contains elements such as the nationalisation of banks and industry, the development of trade unions and cooperatives, the establishing of public services, reforms which improve the living conditions of the wage labourers, social security, a parliamentary and secular republic, political liberties, and the right to work. The propaganda work and organisation of these parties and trade unions provides them with contracting power and parliamentary strength, and makes them serious participants in the political and social system.

The “revisionism crisis” initiated by Eduard Bernstein makes the consequences of this practice of socialism visible. His book *The Preconditions of Socialism and the Tasks of Social Democracy* (1899) takes into account the reality of a workers’ movement which is satisfied with these reforms, and tends to evaporate C into a Kantian regulative idea. To be sure, “orthodox” Marxists such as Kautsky contradict the idea that the movement is everything and the goal nothing, and hold on to the reference to revolution and the communist final goal. Yet in this way socialism becomes a mode of production, which Marx never claimed. It understands itself as an organisation of labour under a regime, which grants the producer administrative rights. Whether this is sufficient to transform class content is not asked, although – as Marc Angenot showed – ‘all great leaders of European socialism’ have published works, according to which, with “the socialisation of the means of production”, common wealth and justice should be introduced’ (1993, 12). The principle of elite leadership is strengthened on two levels, that of the parliamentary state, which scorns any direct democracy as anarchist, and that of the party, which delegates the exercise of power to ‘rational’ bureaucracies. Kautsky, in his texts before the revisionism crisis (*Parliamentarism and Democracy* [*Parlamentarismus und Demokratie*], 1892) as in those criticising bolshevism (*The Dictatorship of the Proletariat*, 1918), commits himself to the democratic nationalisation of the forces of production. The national state is in fact the centre of the appropriation within the legal framework of public property. Certainly the legal transfer of property leaves the real subsumption of labour untouched. While Marx showed how the movement of capital engenders the revolutionary class, its organisation, the necessity for its practical action, and the material conditions for its victory, Kautsky tears apart the unity of this process. Capital produces only the objective necessity for the struggle. Victory requires the subjective intervention of the proletariat, which is based on the maturity of the class and on its capacity to set goals and sweep people along. The unity of the process disintegrates into two moments, one objective and one subjective. The objective refers to the socialisation of the forces of production, the subjective to class consciousness, how it concentrates itself in the party with its discipline and hierarchy. The organisation becomes the mediation between the two

sides, the operator of its dialectic. It embodies the unity of the working class as representative organ, comparable to the democratic representative state. The proletariat is to submit to its representatives voluntarily – to the conscious class comrades and along with them the progressive intellectuals. The intellectuals bring to the proletariat from outside the elements of its consciousness. The organisation is the carrier of the long-term revolutionary goals, and it alone represents the universality of the class. The party is not, as **Marx** still assumed, the synthesis of the experiences of the workers and the experimental field of their creativity. The organisation, together with the representative democracy, is the condition that the subjective becomes objective. Thus it is a matter of waiting for this subjective maturity to be reached through the utilisation of the seeds of socialism (cooperatives, communal socialism) developed by capital. Through the introduction of labour representatives, political democracy can be expanded to the economic realm, and the State, placed under pressure by the workers' organisations, turns automatically to a strategy of gradually increasing influence and the conquest of new liberties. But there is no longer talk of overcoming real subsumption or putting an end to wage labour. Without saying it aloud, the orthodoxy gives up C and joins with the frequently criticised – and open – revisionism of **Bernstein**. Representation becomes the ruling form of social relationship. The organisation – at first indispensable in order to help the workers' movement to its existence – begins to become a fetish. On this point **Kautsky** is in line with **Stalin**: 'A class can rule, but not govern, for a class is a formless mass, while only an organisation can govern' (**Kautsky** 1918/1920, 31).

6. *Third International*. – Socialism's idealisation of nation and state contributes to the catastrophe of the first inter-imperialist war of 1914. The internationalism of the II. International is just as weak as its liberal pacifism. In the meantime, criticism by the socialist left renews itself with the October Revolution. **Lenin** takes up the question of the transition to C in his interpretation of the political theories of **Marx** and **Engels**. He supports himself with the texts in which they differentiate 'between the lower and higher phases' (CW 25/469), and opposing the revisionists who want to use **Engels's** preface of 1895 for their own purposes, specifies that **Engels** allowed the 'democratic republic' to exist "for a time" solely from an agitational point of view' (403). Even the democratic capitalist state apparatus is structurally bound to the real subsumption of labour, and serves to unify the competing capital fractions by establishing the most appropriate form of politics pursuant to the relations of force. The dictatorship of the capitalist relations of production is structural in kind. Also the democratic-republican form of this dictatorship requires the political will

to smash the state apparatus, in order to achieve molecular control of economic production and political life. Even **Lenin**, during a short phase of the October Revolution, considered the peaceful parliamentary way passable. But the attitude of the opponents also decides whether the dictatorship is necessary. Starting in April 1917 Lenin advocates a change in the name of the Social-Democratic Labour Party of Russia (SDAPR), which on the VII. Party Congress on March 8, 1918 was renamed the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). The old designation is 'wrong' (CW 25/459), he says, following **Engels**, who accepted the word 'Social Democrat' only reluctantly, because it seemed to him 'unfitting' for a party 'whose economic programme is not just generally socialist, but directly communist, and whose ultimate political aim is to surpass the entire State, and thus democracy too' (MECW 27/417 [22/418]). The revolution of the Bolsheviks, however, created a new type of democracy in emulation of the Paris Commune. As soon as 'all members of society or at least the vast majority have learned to administer the state *themselves*, [...] from this moment the need for government of any kind begins to disappear altogether. The more complete the democracy, the nearer the moment when it becomes unnecessary' (**Lenin** CW 25/479).

In fact **Lenin** tried to unite two contradictory aspects of the historical movement: on the one hand its strength, resisting real subsumption as concentrated in the imperialist and military policy of czarism, and, on the other hand, the cult of the external organisation with its mechanisms of delegating and expropriation. The first aspect leads at least for a short time to something new: the creation of soldiers', workers', and peasants' councils that refuse to continue the war, who take power and after the war try to constitute themselves as councils of direct democracy and labour organisations – incidentally the only institution actually invented by the workers' movement. The second aspect is associated with **Kautsky** and the orthodoxy of the II. International, the question of organisation, the party. One must not forget the efficiency of this apparatus, which accomplished extraordinary things under **Lenin**. But the problem remains that the party seeks to determine the formation of the consciousness of the workers by means of outside intervention. It is held to be custodian of the theory and epitome of the ability to analyse the historical development objectively. The party fails at the contradiction that it is a parliamentary faction of the working class, and at the same time seeks to be the ideal-typical embodiment of their consciousness. It emerges from the class and must nevertheless constantly connect itself with it, because the contact threatens to be lost. It "is" this class and yet exists at a remove from it. On the question of workers' control, the central point of Leninism, the contradiction becomes tangible. The Soviets – this invention of the revolution of 1905, revived in the October Revolution

of 1917 – chosen from their grassroots and accountable to it, controlled economic events and at the same time exercised political power, when after all it was a matter of ensuring the unity of social appropriation. But the convergence of revolutionary state with council democracy along the lines of the Paris Commune does not succeed in the long run. The rift between rulers and ruled, just as that between workers and means of production, reproduces itself. Left alone, the soviets disintegrate into anarchical units separated from each other. Workers' control of production and trade requires mediation. Everywhere what is missing are 'specialists', who are all too often scared off by the 'issuing of orders', which accumulate on the side of the 'Communists' exercising management functions (CW 32/144). In order to make the control of the working process more effective, factory directors are appointed, thus specialists, who can come into conflict with the political commissioners. Work discipline is to be restored by the introduction of Taylorism and the restriction of all direct democracy. The new economic state apparatus is an impossible synthesis, because it wants to keep up the active interference of the workers while preserving the commanding State. The communist elements are at a disadvantage in relation to a kind of state capitalism with which, in a gigantic country plagued by backwardness and illiteracy, a minimum of public and social services is to be ensured at the same time as industrialisation is to be advanced. Lenin tried throughout his life without success to mediate dialectically between the organisational centre and the spontaneity of the people; always the organisation dominates anew. With a keen eye he notices in March 1923 that the missing 'elements of knowledge, education, and training' (CW 33/488) cannot be offset by the enthusiasm for socialism. C remains as a goal, but this shifts into an uncertain future. The apparatus – as written in the notes from the end of 1922, designated the 'political testament' – we 'took over from tsarism and slightly anointed with Soviet oil' (CW 36/605), so that 'the typical Russian bureaucrat', manifest in **Stalin's** 'infatuation for pure administration' (606), suppressed the fundamentally important 'ability to recruit men' (600). 'There is no doubt that the infinitesimal percentage of Soviet and sovietised workers will drown in that tide of chauvinistic Great-Russian ruffraff like a fly in the milk.' (606)

Indeed, **Stalin's** seizure of power in party and state seals the failure of worker control desired by **Lenin**. Socialisation becomes nationalisation under the dictatorship of the party. The organisation becomes the object of a cult and embodies the General. In this regard historical C does not advance beyond socialism. **Stalin** intensifies the dictatorship by increasing the repression through the Gulag already set up under **Lenin** – forced labour camps as death camps. The Soviet Union nevertheless attains economic successes, which impress the West during the great capitalist crisis in the 1930s. The five-year

plans realise a kind of primitive accumulation, accompanied by a great literacy project. The communist idea can be expressed as a distant perspective and sees itself confirmed by the relative successes of “socialism in one country”, all the more after the victory over Nazism, which was bought by terrible losses. Even if the five-year plans after the war did not succeed in avoiding the wild forms of the market in which those consumer needs unsatisfied by the official economy broke fresh ground, the Soviet Union exerted a fascination because it represented a real existing alternative to capitalism for the first time in history. The victory of 1945 and the socialist bloc building, which made the wave of liberation movements possible, could lead one to believe that this hybrid system preserved the revolutionary communist idea against all denials. The implosion of the system finally destroyed the myth of the Soviet Union as an alternative in the history of emancipation. The analysis of the Soviet experience is still pending; it is not done by a reduction to the problem of two hostile totalitarianisms. First the communist creed and the initial dynamics unique to the new system fell victim to the mixture of authoritarian industrialisation, Russian state absolutism and the speed of this enormous historical change.

7. *The survival of the communist idea in Left Socialism and in Council C.* – In addition to **Lenin** and his companions there were also others who carried the communist idea further. It would also be appropriate to mention the Russian opposition to **Stalin** here, especially **Trotsky** and **Bukharin**, yet their specific ways of posing the problems remain within the Marxism of the III. International, and their contribution extends primarily to questions of strategy regarding the rebuilding of the Soviet Union. They discuss political and economic questions in view of what is to be done. Thus the communist idea was not their topic – contrary to the theoreticians of the II. and III. Internationals, which kept the spontaneity of the people and radical democracy in view. This involves left-wing socialists such as Rosa **Luxemburg**, Paul **Levi**, and Karl **Liebknecht** and Council Communists such as **Korsch** and **Pannekoek**.

7.1 As a decided opponent of revisionism and the orthodox wait-and-see attitude, **Luxemburg** welcomes the Russian October Revolution, as she had also done with the failed revolution of 1905. She defends against **Kautsky** the initiative of **Lenin** and the Bolsheviks, who succeeded in giving form to the democratic thrust of Russian society. She sees her criticism of the reformism and opportunism of German social democracy confirmed in the break-through of 1917. After the defeat in 1918 she contributes to the upswing of the left opposition and becomes one of the founders of the Communist Party of Germany. Just as she saw the mass strike in 1905 as the adequate revolutionary means for overcoming mere parliamentary bargaining, she sees in the arising of the councils

the germ of both political and social grassroots democracy. Against this backdrop she criticises very early on the dangers of authoritarian centralism and counterproductive dictatorial measures, in particular the forced dissolution of the constituent assembly which emerged from general elections: 'To be sure, every democratic institution has its limits and shortcomings [...]. But the remedy that **Trotsky** and **Lenin** have found, the elimination of democracy as such, is worse than the disease it is supposed to cure; for it stops up the very living source from which alone can come the correction of all the innate shortcomings of social institutions. That source is the active, untrammelled, energetic political life of the broadest masses of the people' (**Luxemburg**, *The Russian Revolution*, 1918/2006, 210 [GW 4, 355 et sq.]). The organisation threatens to become an end in itself. The conquest of power must not come down to the suppression of democracy. **Lenin's** 'ultra-centralism' (*Leninism or Marxism?*, 1904/2006, 87 [GW 1.2, 433]), feared **Luxemburg**, sets up an 'air-tight partition between the class-conscious nucleus of the proletariat already in the party and its immediate popular environment' (82 [429]). Endeavouring to prevent any fixation in the relationship between party and movement, for **Luxemburg** social-democracy is not first an organisation, which would be only 'joined' to the workers' movement, rather 'it is itself the proletariat', the movement of the working class itself (83 [ibid.]). Any 'regulated docility' (84 [430]) is condemned to make the autonomous activity of the proletariat fruitless. Of course one can criticise the almost mystifying idealisation of the masses, but **Luxemburg** has the immense merit of stressing the supporting function of the party which must have an 'understanding' for the 'inevitable increase of revolutionary tensions as the final goal of class struggle is approached' (86 [433]). The revolution of 1917 confirms the correctness of this analysis. If the Russian revolution intends to keep the promise of restoring Western civilisation destroyed by the war, the 'dictatorship' at the moment of taking and securing power must also be 'the work of the class and not of a little leading minority in the name of the class' (1918/2006, 220 [GW 4, 363]). Socialism or barbarism – this is the alternative in which **Luxemburg** conceptualises the historical situation; but she cannot avoid warning against a Socialism that in the fight against barbarism itself becomes barbarous. In 1921 **Lenin** reacted strongly to these criticisms, which were brought up elsewhere and in the Soviet Union itself by the left-wing communists, these defenders of the council movement. Apart from the intensity of his answer, **Lenin** raises strategic problems which **Luxemburg** left open. If it is correct that the 'force of habit [...]' is a most formidable force, then is it not most important that 'a party of iron that has been tempered in the struggle' (**Lenin** CW 31/44) takes over leadership and '*soberly*' estimates the '*actual* state of class consciousness and preparedness [...]' of all the *working*

people' (58)? From a 'revolutionary mood alone' no 'revolutionary tactics' can be developed (63). In Russia it was 'easy' to begin the revolution, but here it is more difficult than it will be 'for the European countries to *continue* the revolution and bring it to its consummation' (64). The abolishing of freedom of the press and of assembly, which for **Luxemburg** means that the bases of 'healthy public life' will be undermined (1918/2006, 213 [GW 4, 358]), is justified by **Lenin** as the 'proletarian democracy', which only affects 'the exploiters', but 'gives the working people *genuine democracy*' (CW 28/108). But what kind of institutions would there have had to be, which in this situation could guarantee plurality and socialism at the same time? How should one approach the question of the peasants, if one did not have resources, which would have allowed making compromises and reaching consensus? The answer of the Bolsheviks and that of **Stalin** are well-known: It consisted in suppressing the question.

7.2 The communist idea in its radical-democratic variant is represented after 1917 by Council Communists, who turn against the force of the state and the dictatorship, thereby coming to occupy a marginalised position. **Karl Korsch** is most worth mentioning as a representative of this tendency. As a member of the Communist Party of Germany he defends grassroots democracy, which must be rooted in the shopfloors themselves, in order to make out of 'wage slaves fully entitled citizens of labour', who are actively involved in operations management as the 'administration of the affairs of the workers by the workers' (GA 2, 94 et sq.). Sceptical of the progressive bolshevisation of the Communist Party of Germany, the stability of capitalism becomes clear to him, the bond of broad layers of the population to social democracy, and the weight of the opposition against communist projects springing from liberal-democratic traditions. So he proceeds again from the basis – the factory – in order to develop a political strategy at the level of modern capitalist production. He criticises any socialisation of the means of production 'from above' and assigns priority to class action at the workplace. It alone gives organisation its power and makes the self-education of the producers possible. The plan has a chance for success only if it refers to a net of direct democratic structures in which the workers control each enterprise and each branch of production. The bureaucratic centralism of the Bolsheviks turns the movement on its head by robbing the working class of its independent experiences. The 'dictatorship of the proletariat' was turned into one 'over the proletariat' (1923/2012, 143). The realisation of C can be undertaken only if the participants are able to reflect on their actions on the basis of a critical interpretation of the changing totality of social relations. The proletariat cannot be the passive object of a knowledge that comes from without – from the party – and still less that of a manipulation which degrades it to the status of a pawn. In view of the consolidation of **Stalin's** dic-

tatorship, **Korsch** radicalises his analysis. In 1930 he presents in his *anti-critique* the opinion that the III. International was a failure, just as was the II., because the “‘philosophical” domination covers all the sciences’. Practised by ‘**Lenin’s** epigones’, it led to an ‘ideological dictatorship’ so that ‘under the slogan of so-called “Marxism-Leninism” this dictatorship is applied in Russia today to the whole intellectual life [...]’ (1923/2012, 138). While according to **Korsch**, it would depend on pursuing ‘the application of the materialistic conception of history to the materialistic conception of history itself’ (102), **Stalin** and **Kautsky** act as hostile brothers who represent only two variants – a communist, a social-democratic – of the same Marx-orthodoxy. It comes as no surprise that **Korsch** decided in his career after 1945 to give up hope for Marxism, and to regard the masses as incapable of historical initiative. Nor can the Council C of the left-wing opposition put down roots in the Soviet Union. Its refusal to enter into an alliance with the peasantry, which seeks primarily the development of private property and confronts the revolution with hostility, leads it to make the unification of the proletariat its principal purpose. Not without cause does **Lenin** accuse it of having no answer to the question of alliances and of reducing culture to a cult of the worker. However, in the Soviet Union the solution of the question involves violent force against Kulaks and worker dissidents. Through its better representatives such as **Pannekoek**, **Herman Gorter**, and **Paul Mattick**, Council C has to its credit that it has kept alive the idea of an anti-state and anti-bureaucratic C for which an organisation is ‘a body of self-determining people’ (**Pannekoek** 1936, 21). It holds to the priority of the mass movement and sees the task of the party as the education of a conscious, non-bureaucratic elite. This movement, rejected by the social democrats and combated by the Bolsheviks, is rapidly marginalised, and eventually all its followers advocate the thesis of the Soviet Union’s state capitalism.

8. *C as the intellectual and moral reform of praxis with Gramsci*. – The communist idea had in the 20th cent. in **Gramsci** its brightest and most self-critical theoretician – theoretician only because his position was hardly really put into practice, even if it later inspired the politics of the Communist Party of Italy under Palmiro **Togliatti**. This politics, shaped by the experiences of the anti-fascist popular front, converges, after remarkable successes, ever more with classical social-democracy, in order to merge with it finally in ‘Eurocommunism’. The latter had no future and went under shortly after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Although there is no open mention of C in the *Prison Notebooks* because of censorship, it is the constant point of reference in the broad attempt to establish Marxism anew under the name Philosophy of Praxis. Soon **Gramsci** finds

himself confronted with the difficulties of building Socialism, in whose success in the Soviet Union he would like to believe despite everything, particularly since he is aware of the defeat of the communist movement in Western Europe, above all in a country such as Italy where fascism triumphed. Such strategic problems in east and west have priority for him. Their analysis leads to a critical reconstruction of historical materialism and a reformulation of the communist idea.

8.1 First of all, **Gramsci's** experience with Turin's council movement, in which he was actively involved and on which he reflected often, is crucial. Because 'the traditional institutions of movement have become incapable of containing this great blossoming revolutionary life', he writes in July 1919, 'a new type of institution must begin to be created and developed', which is suitable 'to guarantee the autonomy of the producer in the factory, on the shop floor' (*PPW*, 112 et sq.). Because – in 1919 – there is no lack of 'revolutionary enthusiasm' (*AGR*, 117), it appears to him that 'the communist revolution is essentially a problem of organization and discipline' (*AGR*, 118), the factory council to be 'the nucleus' (*PPW*, 117). At the same time 'these Councils can bring about the unification of the working class. They can give the masses a cohesion and a shape' (*ibid.*), it almost becomes the 'model of the proletarian State' (*PPW*, 118). The council 'creates the mentality of the producer, the maker of history' (*PPW*, 119); it is 'the solid foundation for the process, which must culminate in the workers' dictatorship and the conquest of State power' (*SPWI*, 166) – must, because Gramsci, for his part fired with revolutionary enthusiasm, still believes that the communist society will form a 'world' that is organised like 'a large engineering plant' (*PPW*, 167) and in the one system the division of labour and the administration will ensure that 'the wealth of the whole world in the name of the whole of humanity' is produced and distributed (*PPW*, 167).

The author of the *Prison Notebooks* will not for a moment doubt the communist perspective, yet the development of that 'autonomy of the producers' becomes an object of much greater complexity, and all questions present themselves anew: Is it better to "think" [...] in a disjointed and episodic way? [...] [T]o take part in a conception of the world mechanically imposed by the external environment [...]? Or, on the other hand, is it better to work out consciously and critically one's own conception of the world, and thus, [...] be one's own guide [...] (*SPN*, 323; N. 11, §12)? The rapid victory of fascism – its ability to integrate specific social classes in the industrial and agrarian bloc – and the New Economic Policy (**NEP**) prompt **Gramsci** to reconsider the question of alliances raised in Italy, split into an industrialised North and an agrarian South, similar to Russia. The distribution up of the property of the great landed estates is not enough, because 'without machinery, [...] without credit to tide

him over until harvest-time, without cooperative institutions' (*PPW*, 315), in short, without a revolution of the relations of production and of living altogether, the small peasant is not helped. However, for the proletariat of the North to become 'the ruling, the dominant class, it must succeed in creating a system of class alliances' (*PPW*, 316). In this situation the party – the 'modern prince', as it says in the *Prison Notebooks* referring to **Machiavelli** – must take over leadership. It must form 'a national-popular collective will, of which the modern Prince is at one and the same time the organiser and the active, operative expression' (*SPN*, 133; N. 13, §1). It has to 'dominate antagonistic groups'. 'It leads kindred and allied groups' – 'when it exercises power, but even if it holds it firmly in its grasp, it must continue to "lead" as well' (*SPN*, 57 et sq.; N. 19, §24). **Gramsci** assimilates here also the experiences of **Lenin**, 'the greatest modern theoretician of the philosophy of praxis [...] – on the terrain of political organisation and struggle' (*FS*, 357; N. 10.1, §12), who knew that – regarding the peasantry – the distinction between 'antagonistic' and 'allied' groups is a question of practical policy – the politics of alliances.

8.2 C, termed by **Gramsci** as 'regulated society' (e.g. *SPN*, 263 et sq.; N. 6, §88), refers to the formation of a new 'historical bloc', whose function consists in realising the hegemony of the subaltern masses. In order to control the antagonistic classes, which embody capitalistic rule, the producers must cleanse their individual class interest, in order to generalise it concretely and to transform the forms of political leadership of civil society and the state. A 'cultural reform and the cultural improvement of the position of the depressed strata of society', i.e. an 'intellectual and moral reform' (*SPN*, 133; N. 13, §1), forms the core of the corresponding conception of the world. Thereby it is not a matter of a world view [*Weltanschauung*] in the sense of an ensemble of conceptions, but of a political-theoretical ensemble. By way of education it creates a new human world by promoting the activity of the people, criticising common sense and giving rise to a new 'good sense'. By virtue of it the workers understand themselves as producers who are able to administer in the future a Fordised and Taylorised production as citizens of a political-ethical State, which is aware of its international obligations, and as participants of a high culture, which they assimilate. The party must ensure the transition between these moments, which can come about solely by an 'organic', not bureaucratic 'centralism', and it must effectively represent the social plurality, by orienting it in the sense of a hegemony of the citizens as producers. This primacy of the party is to be justified only by the fact that it bears in mind the overcoming of the centuries-old separation between rulers and ruled: 'In the formation of leaders, one premiss is fundamental: is it the intention that there should always be rulers and ruled,

or is the objective to create the conditions in which this division is no longer necessary?' (*SPN*, 144; N. 15, § 4) The political-ethical State de facto contradicts **Marx's** assumption of a complete withering away of the State.

This renewed conception, a high point of Marxist C of the 20th cent., does not neglect the economic moment. 'Hegemony here is born in the factory' (*SPN*, 285; N. 1, § 61). It must take the actual 'determined market' into account, which reinforces, along with Fordism, the real subsumption of labour 'to overcome the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall' (*SPN*, 280; N. 22, § 1). On the agenda stands a struggle for the ending of this subsumption while guaranteeing the efficiency of production. C must be established in an era in which the 'war of manoeuvre' against capital failed, which in 1917 was won in the East, where 'the State was everything, civil society was primordial and gelatinous' (*SPN*, 238; N. 7, § 16). Now, in a long 'war of position' in the West the reorganisation of the modern capitalist society must be defied in its two forms, fascism and American democratic liberalism, which maintain power through a variable combination of coercion and persuasion and bring all organisations of civil society under their influence. It is the promotion of their hegemony in the form of a permanent passive revolution. Hegemony is constituted in the situation of a war of position at the same time from above – originating from State and party – and from below, on the basis of a civil society renewed in the sense of an intellectual and moral reform. The new 'historical bloc' can only arise where 'the relationship between intellectuals and people-nation, between the leaders and the led, the rulers and the ruled, is provided by an organic cohesion' (*SPN*, 418; N. 11, § 67). This task requires the transformation of the intellectuals. It is safe to say 'that all members of a political party should be regarded as intellectuals', because one stresses 'the function, which is directive and organisational, i.e. educative, i.e. intellectual' (*SPN*, 16; N. 12, § 1). All this is not to be accomplished by a charismatic leader, but 'by the collective organism through "active and conscious co-participation", through "compassionality", through experience of immediate particulars, through a system which one could call "living philology". In this way a close link is formed between great mass, party and leading group; and the whole complex, thus articulated, can move together as "collective-man"' (*SPN*, 429; N. 11, § 25).

In defiance of a fascism which is preparing to conquer the world and an American liberal democracy with its overpowering capitalism and political system which makes believe it is the universal and lets its permanent corruption be forgotten, **Gramsci** holds to the idea that his epoch is not one of the renewal of capitalism, but one of communist revolution and the capacity of the subaltern masses for autonomous action. But this C is free from any kind

of deterministic conception of necessity, from any historical teleology and any messianism. It is a possibility, dependent on the praxis of the social forces which are to shape it. It is without guarantee, not the subject of a forecast. The tragedy of a contingent and uncertain struggle has the final word to say: 'In reality one can "scientifically" foresee only the struggle, but not the concrete moments of the struggle, which cannot but be the results of opposing forces in continuous movement, which are never reducible to fixed quantities since within them quantity is continually becoming quality. In reality one can "foresee" to the extent that one acts, to the extent that one applies a voluntary effort and therefore contributes concretely to creating the result "foreseen"' (*SPN*, 438; N. 11, § 15).

9. *Utopia and reshaping of the communist idea?* – Apart from the remarkable historical experience of Chinese C and **Mao** Zedong's revolution in a colonised and agrarian country, the second half of the 20th cent. has brought no outstanding innovations of the communist idea. The fall of the Soviet model during the entire century was not accompanied by the fall of the communist idea, whether as critical utopian ideal, or in the expectation of an historical break. The Jewish-Christian imaginary also resonates here secularly. Both perspectives created a critical distance to the Soviet dictatorship, as well as to triumphant capitalism. The first, that of a critical utopia, had its most outstanding representative in Ernst **Bloch**. Even if 'only from the vantage point [...] of a classless society does the goal of freedom itself come clearly into our sights as definite Being-in-possibility' (*PH*, vol. 1, 210), still in Marxism 'coldness and warmth of concrete anticipation' are mediated with one another, the 'cool analysis' and the 'enthusiasm' (208). The second perspective replaces the idea of a revolution inscribed into the continuity of production and the forces of production with the event, which blasts open 'the continuum of history' (**Benjamin** 1940/2007, 262) and thus renounces the concept of progress so dear to the II. and III. International, in which the 'image of liberated grandchildren' had displaced 'the image of enslaved ancestors' (260), which is more important for endurance. Thus Benjamin preserves the communist idea for the times of hopelessness, as the unexpected possibility of a breach in the existing. If 'the "time of the now" [...] is shot through with chips of Messianic time' (263), then this simply refers to the 'task of liberation' still to be fulfilled in practice. The 'oppressed class' becomes thereby the 'depository of historical knowledge' as it turns to be 'the avenger that completes the task of liberation in the name of generations of the downtrodden' (260). – Both ways of thinking brought no political "posterity", beyond a still living power of asking questions regarding C. A middle position between utopia and criticism was taken by

Henri Lefebvre, who sought to show 'that the revolution consists not only in a change of the State, of political structures and a replacement of the ruling circle of persons', but in a change of 'life', a reshaping of 'everydayness' (1987, 10).

On the political level Eurocommunism was the last expression of historical C. Despite its will for democratic renewal it merged rapidly with social-democracy, which for its part was in the process of dissolving into social liberalism. It appears that Croce was right. Louis Althusser, who remained faithful to the communist movement, showed several times that social relations cannot exist without ideological relations, which function as imaginary. C is a possible social existence, but it is in danger of being based on a humanistic illusion which is a phantasm of total domination of reality. Therefore the communist idea cannot be developed further without this function of self critique.

How further? Is the only choice that remains one between various gentle forms of the disappearance of the communist idea and the critical utopia? There is a narrow path out of this dilemma. The brutality and the nihilism of capitalist globalisation, which changes the world 'for many into a non-world, into an abyss' (Tosel 2008, 11), let the idea of C become conceivable again – beyond the phantasm of complete control and transparency, in that the humanistic thesis of the self production of humankind is taken up self-critically. It is no longer a matter of denying the dependence on nature, or of imagining once and for all to dissolve the opaque unwieldiness of the relations into contractualism. The thinking that considers itself radical tends meanwhile to replace the perspective of the all too compromised C with a radical democracy based on liberty and equality. It lets itself be inspired by the social republicanism of the French revolution, and submits the great liberalism of Locke or Mill to a positive re-evaluation. In a time which is determined by neo-capitalist apartheid and imperial hegemonism, in a multi-cultural society in which nationalistic, sexist, ethnical and racist violence are constants, it is more than useful to emphasise the right of all – 'to have rights' – to be treated everywhere as citizens of the world. It is beneficial to rescue the idea of the public and respect for singularity, to parse the affiliation to the same world in the context of a cosmopolitanism. But radical democracy always pushes up against its barriers before the gates of the factories and enterprises. Without the perspective of the liberation of labour and an alternative relationship to free time, democracy will lose any kind of radicalness and degenerate into a regime. Radical democracy will have to lead the fight against the real subjection of practice under capital. It can be challenged productively by the C-question of the old and inexhaustible Marx. If C implies radical democracy, then in reverse the latter remains incom-

plete and cannot be completed if it disassociates itself from C. To that extent Claude Lefort is right: 'C belongs to the past, but the question of C remains central to our time' (1999/2007, 21).

In the midst of the extreme dangers caused by capitalist globalisation, the communist tendency can be thought of anew. Negatively, it makes itself heard as the demand to stop creating a superfluous mankind through hunger and war, wasting production and squandering the free time potentially available for human development, and finally as the demand to stop ecological devastation. Positively, it appears as a culture of collaborative existence, common property, as a culture of the struggle against the real subsumption of labour and as the search for alternatives. The main theoretical problem lies in the question of how an economics and politics of boundlessness aligned with unlimited profits for capital can be replaced by an economics and politics of positive finiteness. Without giving short shrift to the unlimited transformability of human capacities, without setting apriori barriers, a C of positive 'finiteness' (Tosel 1996) would have to adjust production to a standard which is determined by the satisfaction of the most urgent needs and the activation of the subalterns. How is this power to be conceived and uncoupled from the blind destruction-production process of capitalism? How to conceive it in the appropriate limits and find the wisdom of proportion in view of the indeterminacy of the future? Hic Rhodus, hic salta.

André Tosel

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→ administrative command system, alienation, apathy in the authoritarian administrative socialism, association, barracks communism, cadre party, civil society, classless society, collective, commune, Communist Manifesto, community, council communism, democratic centralism, democratic socialism, despotic socialism, destructive forces, dictatorship of the proletariat, disposable time, ecology, elements of the new society, equality, eurocommunism, exappropriation, feudal socialism, formal/real subordination, hegemony, historical bloc, immediacy communism, Yugoslavian Socialism, labour movement, left communism, Luxemburgism, national communism, party of a new type, passive revolution, persecution of communists, postcommunism, Pre-Marxian Socialism, primitive communism, Prison Notebooks, reform communism, revisionism, Saint-Simonism, social formation, socialisation, socialism, socialism in one country, Stalinism, state, subsumtion, transformation, utopia, war of position/war of manoeuvre, war communism, workers control, workers' self-management, workers' state, world revolution

→ Apathie im befehlsadministrativen Sozialismus, Arbeiterbewegung, Arbeiterkontrolle, Arbeiterselbstverwaltung, Arbeiterstaat, Assoziation, befehlsadministratives System, demokratischer Sozialismus, demokratischer Zentralismus, despotischer Sozialismus, Destruktivkräfte, Diktatur des Proletariats, disponible Zeit, Elemente der neuen Gesellschaft, Entfremdung, Eurokommunismus, Exappropriation, feudaler Sozialismus, formelle/reelle Subsumtion, Gefängnishefte, Gemeinwesen, geschichtlicher Block, Gesellschaftsformation, Gleichheit, Hegemonie, jugoslawischer Sozialismus, Kaderpartei, Kasernenkommunismus, klassenlose Gesellschaft, Kollektiv, Kommune, Kommunistenverfolgung, Kommunistisches Manifest, Kriegskommunismus, Linkskommunismus, Luxemburgismus, Nationalkommunismus, Ökologie, Partei neuen Typs, passive Revolution, Postkommunismus, Rätekommunismus, Reformkommunismus, Revisionismus, Saint-Simonismus, Sozialismus, Sozialismus in einem Land, Staat, Stalinismus, Stellungskrieg/Bewegungskrieg, Subsumtion, Transformismus, Unmittelbarkeitskommunismus, Urkommunismus, Utopie, Vergesellschaftung, vormarxistischer Sozialismus, Weltrevolution, Zivilgesellschaft

Cook

A: *taḡaḡa*. – F: cuisinière. – G: Köchin. – R: kucharka. – S: cocinera. – C: nǔ chúshī 女厨师

The dictum attributed to **Lenin**, that *the woman C should govern the state*, strikes an emancipatory path for women and at the same time points towards a socialist-democratic politics as a learning project. The phrase was often adopted, interpreted, even brought into poetry, and finally metaphorically used as a book title – *Kitchen and State* – encouraging women to politically intervene with the aim of ‘transforming social relations in such a way that all domains can be governed by all without domination and therefore collectively’ (**Haug/Hauser** 1988, 7). In order to historically and critically situate this dictum and its reception between state-, emancipatory-, and revolutionary politics, a digression into the social and cultural history of the (female) C is necessary.

Terminology and sources. – In the usual reference works, including the *Catholic Social Lexicon* (1980) and the *Evangelical State Lexicon* (1987), the term “C” does not exist; even feminist manuals have no such entry. For instance **Bonnie Anderson** and **Judith P. Zinsser** (1988) discuss neither Cs nor kitchens nor cooking. Astonishingly, even in *The Woman’s Encyclopedia of Myths and Secrets* (1983) by **Barbara Walker**, cooking appears as little as the kitchen, and the C not at all, although there is an entry on ‘kingship’. **Annette Kuhn** (1992) lists cooking and the kitchen in the index of her *Chronicle of Women*, but no woman Cs. However, she does deal with the cooking activities of women, among other things. She attributes to women the fact that ‘they developed the art of cooking’ (32) and heat-resistant vessels and invented ‘the steam pressure pot’ (56) in China as early as 2000 BC. – **Barbara Olsson** examines the literary representation of the kitchen as ‘the woman’s own space (and a foreign space for men)’, which secures ‘female cultural identity as a food giver and housewife’ (2001, 134) and for that very reason must inevitably be abandoned (144). Due to this way of looking at the problem, both the male C in his kitchen and the specificity of the woman C escapes her. – In the five-volume *History of Women in the West* by **Georges Duby** and **Michelle Perrot**, there are essentially blank spaces where cooking takes place. The first three volumes, which go up to the early modern period, have no entry at all for the entire field. In the fourth volume (19th cent.), under the question of how women’s work can be portrayed, it simply says: ‘Manifestly working-class women tended to be represented in the kitchen,

engaged in the reassuringly domestic tasks of sewing or cooking'. (1993, 314) In the fifth volume (20th cent.), *cooking* can be found in the index, but not woman C or kitchen. As the conclusion to a chapter on the development of home technology, it is written: 'In the kitchen and in Cooking, both traditionally women's domain, contradictory effects appear' (1994, 103). For example, women would save time by no longer baking bread and by using canned goods; the husband would go to the canteen and people would no longer eat two hot meals a day. The interest concerns only the budgeting of time. – Even the five-volume *History of Private Life*, edited by Philippe Ariès and Georges Duby, includes no woman C, although it offers lots of material on the development of the kitchen as a social space. – Advanced architecture attends to the rational design of the kitchen. The kitchen becomes a paradigm for needs-oriented construction by leftist architects. Influential was the 'Frankfurt kitchen' (1930) by Margarete Schütte-Lihozky. – Jürgen Kuczynski, who wrote the *History of Everyday Life of the German People* (1980 et sqq.) (without a subject index), should be aware of the woman C, with his view from below. But, until after the Thirty Years' War, he sees only misery and poverty. Then, concrete labour comes into view: 'Preparing meals' (vol. 1, 226), 'baking, preparing beer and mead', 'the housewife cooks while she does other things like spinning' (232). In the volume on the 19th cent., Kuczynski comes to the kitchen: 'It is unnecessary to describe in detail these different hand tools [crocery, spoons, baking trays], since they are neither significant for our period, nor useful for sustaining socio-economic relations' (349). Kuczynski's view of ways of life explores eating habits, the nutritional situation and above all the time budget, namely, that not much time could be spent on cooking for the lower classes (280 et sqq.). 'Cook faster, eat faster, that's the device' (292). He is not interested in the development of female forms of individuality such as the woman C.

In Grimm's dictionary, finally, it says that the woman C appears in the 15th cent. as a 'cook-maid', 'parson-cook', and in addition: 'even better to have a cookess than a wife' (vol. 11, 1562). – Whenever there is talk of a woman C, it is self-evidently discussed from a class standpoint: one *is* not a C, one *has* a C, just like one has other servants. Bourgeois disesteem is mixed with respect: kitchen fairy, pearl or jewel. Moreover, the kitchen is also a metaphor for inferior things, as can be traced in the expression 'kitchen Latin' or in Ludwig Büchner's discourse on the 'philosophical kitchen', where 'modern philosophers rehash cold meat with new phrases, and dishing it up as the last invention' (1855/2011, 194). – Since dietary awareness and naturopathy have become increasingly popular of late, some people are also looking back on the medieval abbess and naturopath Hildegard von Bingen with the claim that she was a woman C. In truth, she wrote books on nutrition – about spelt, among other topics. – In the *Brock-*

haus encyclopaedia, one finds cooking as a 'preparation of food products' and the art of cooking 'as the harmonious composition of food' and a C as a 'recognized occupation for men and women' (1993, 173). However, according to the German Federal Employment Agency, this profession has only been recognised since 1940. Cooking first received training regulations in West Germany in 1979; in East Germany, cooking was included in vocational training documents as early as 1963 and again in 1975 as 'skilled work' (**Council of Ministers**). In 1998, this occupation was expanded to include the qualifications of 'guest-oriented service'. Public catering is the occupational field.

2. *Cultural- and socio-historical moments.* In his 1602 utopia, *The City of the Sun*, **Campanella** designs a society in which 'no one considers it disgraceful to wait at tables or to serve in the kitchen or to nurse the sick etc. but they call every task a service. Whatever work with the body they call quite honourable' (63). Reconstructing a social history of the woman C involves the double difficulty of tracking an activity (of serving) in its development which was long considered to be minor, and of writing this on women whose overall position is additionally subjugated, and for whom the historical sources are completely insufficient. Sometimes a woman C is mentioned to indicate a low status and to warn against transgressing the class barriers. For example, in the sixteenth century, **Paracelsus** criticized a man who 'adorns his wife with golden chains – she who may have been a peasant, a woman cook, a maid, a servant girl, even a whore – treating her like a duchess' (*Das Buch Paragranum*, 261) – Easier to find is the history of the C and cooking as an art. In the Middle Ages, the kitchens were 'almost a purely male world. There were certainly woman cooks, but not in the service of the aristocracy. In miniatures, women are depicted who cook for bourgeois families. Woman cooks are also mentioned in Spanish communities, such as Na Gordana, who with two servants in 1338 prepared the food for the poor for a pious foundation in Lerida' (**Laurioux** 1999, 100; cf. **Brodman** 1998, chapter 2). In the 16th cent., the physician **Agrippa von Nettesheim** reflected on the fact that the C in ancient Rome was at first a disregarded slave, but then had risen at the same degree as 'superfluous feasts [...] were introduced. And that which before was accounted but a vile Slavery, was estimated a felicitous art: whose care and concern is only to search out everywhere for stimulations of the throat [...]. The glory and fame of this art Apicius above all others claim'd to himself; (as **Septimus Florus** witnesses), cooks were call'd Apicians, as if they were a philosophical school; of which thus **Seneca** reports in his writing' (*The Art of Cookery*, 307 et sq.). – 'In the 17th cent., a new "art" of eating developed in France, which called itself "gastronomy or gastrosophy" [...]. Great sirs of high rank now excelled as cooks. [...] A great marshal knew as much about

cooking as about warfare', and the most famous cook supposedly hurled himself into his sword when the roast did not suffice (**Teuteberg/Wiegelmann** 1972, 37–40, cited by **Kuczynski** 1981, vol. 2, 290). The line of great Cs continues into the 21st cent. A capable C is a man, and his art can be enjoyed by the upper class, first at court by the nobility, and later by the bourgeoisie. While the development of the culinary art and its enjoyment can be traced as a class question and as occupied by men, women as woman Cs count only as unqualified maids and belonging to property. Cooking is a vital practice, but with regard to the common people, not transmittable. In the 18th cent., it was the 'social consensus that the preparation of food belongs to the typical female obligations – however only in the private domain [...]. Despite this, little effort had been made to qualify women in food preparation [...]. The daughters were considered unpaid household servants to their mother, who instructed them how to later take care of their husband, family, or their masteries as a maidservant' (**Titz-Matuszak** 1994, 187). Struggles for paid work between female and male Cs are confirmed from the German city of Goslar, with the latter being regarded as 'trained', and the former wanting to cook cheaper for the poor out of their own sheer need; the magistrate decided in 1714 that a festivity with 'more than four courses' could only be arranged by male Cs, woman Cs however were allowed to cook for more modest festivities. They were obliged to report to the male Cs (189).

The women of the emerging bourgeoisie cook for themselves; as soon as they can afford it, a woman C is added to the rest of the servants. This way cooking does not become an art, but a subaltern and inferior activity like other houseworks. – In 1806, Carl-Friedrich von **Rumohr** ties the woman C's bad reputation to the lack of 'all profoundness of education': 'Secretly, today, they run their business with displeasure [...]. Deception in purchasing sadly is daily fare since housewives have become too lazy, too ignorant, too sentimental to stock up; since then, every day of the year, there have been expenses in which the woman cooks rarely forget themselves' (**Bluth** 1979, 61). – **Julie Kaden** recalls for the beginning of the 20th cent.: 'If a girl helps with the daily work in her mother's economy, she will quickly master the ABC of the art of cooking without ever having learned it. But when you are 17 years old, in a large kitchen where all kinds of willing hands are active, you are placed as an "au pair" next to a perfect woman cook – not to help her, because that's not necessary, but to learn how to cook from her – so you stand around somewhat helpless and unhappy there. [...] You must not touch it yourself, because the cook cannot risk burning the roast or spoiling the dessert with its many good ingredients. The "housekeeper" [*Mamsell*] is not engaged as a teacher, but as a cook and has no desire to reveal her secrets' (1992, 71). Learning the

labour of a C was thus made difficult by a multiple blockage: a strictly hierarchical division of labour in the kitchen, informality and a kind of guild secret.

In the history of literature and philosophy, the figure of the woman C wavers. She moves in an overdetermined contradiction, in which the emerging bourgeoisie mixes contempt for “lower services”, the gradual development of taste, custom, temperance, the misery of the lower classes and overwork, and the women question. – **Rousseau** links the division of labour that produced cooking as inferior female work with the particular essence of the bourgeois woman: ‘For example, although she is a gourmet, she does not take pleasure in kitchen-business. The necessary gross works are disgusting for her; no kitchen work is clean enough for her. In this regard she has an extreme delicacy, which [...] has literally developed the character of a failing. She would rather let the whole meal spill into the fire than get a spot on her cuff’ (*Emile* 1979, 394 et sq.). – As soon as there is an extra person in the bourgeois family for cooking, the pleasure can also be related to the sexual. With **Goethe**, the woman C often appears mostly as a “Weib”, a female that one can have, that visits one at night, an accessory that is full of relish, like the food she prepares, and whose use can be economically advantageous at the same time. This is what the *Anniversary Song* (1801) says: ‘My cousin is a prudent wight / The cook’s by him ador’d / He turns the spit round ceaselessly / To gain love’s sweet reward’. To the hero of *Wilhem Meister’s Travels*, he ascribes the habit ‘on entering any inn, to look round for the landlady or even the cook, and wheedle myself into favor with her; whereby, for most part, my bill was somewhat reduced’ (1842, 403). In his *Apprenticeship*, **Goethe** lets a landlord think about the many jobs of the woman C and the winegrower and the ‘carelessness’ with which their products are ‘gulped down’ (2016, 563). From the lord’s point of view, the woman C is one of the prerequisites for a pleasurable life. – In Theodor **Storm**’s poem *Of Cats*, the woman C stands for good sense in the conflict between an affected ‘humanity’ and fertile nature, because she wants to drown the newborn cats: ‘But the woman cook – woman cooks are cruel / and humanity does not grow in a kitchen’ (cited in **Matt** 2009, 103). No less ironically does **Kierkegaard** speak from the soul of the philistine bourgeoisie: ‘So he marries. The neighbourhood claps its hands, considers that he has acted wisely and sensibly, and after that he joins in talking about the most important aspect of home management, the greatest earthly good: a good-natured and reliable woman cook one can allow to go to the market on her own, a handy maid who is so clever that she can be used for everything’ (*Either – Or*, Part II, 77, transl. corr.). – **Nietzsche** combines contempt for women with a high regard for cooking. He blames the poor quality of domestic cooking – turning a blind eye to social conditions and

class questions – on the alleged stupidity of the female sex. Like an inversion of **Lenin's** woman C-dictum, he writes: 'But whoever wants to share in the eating must also lend a hand, even the kings. In Zarathustra's home, even a king may be a cook' (*Zarathustra*, 2006, 231). He then turns to women: 'Stupidity in the kitchen: woman as cook: the horrifying thoughtlessness that accompanies the feeding of the family and the master of the house! Woman does not understand what food *means*: and yet she wants to be the cook! If woman were a thinking creature, then as cook for thousands of years she would have had to discover the greatest physiological facts, as well as gain possession of the art of healing! Because of bad woman cooks [...] the development of human beings has been delayed longest and impaired most' (*Beyond Good and Evil*, 2014, 138 et sq., transl. corr.).

Without himself being free of contempt for the woman C, **Adorno** detects self-hatred in **Nietzsche's** **Kant**-critique: 'The path is not far from the Königberg woman cook to the Polish aristocracy, from whose blood **Nietzsche** loved to derive himself. But also to *ressentiment*. It could happen to even the freest spirit that he becomes weary of his own origin if the possibility arises that the best, most genuine of his own nature – the noble has needed the mediation of a small bourgeois soul and poor cookess. So what if the hatred of **Kant** meant nothing other than the hatred against the cookess in himself? What if the dishonesty of the system, which the good European distrusts, turned out to be the dishonesty of the ancestress in the accounting book? If even, finally, the remotest possibility, that master morality itself were only a kind of higher slave morality, in which the servant Louise experiences her late, if questionable right over the categorical imperative of the oppressor?' (GS 20.2, 555 et sq.) The woman C as denied origin, as the opposite pole of bourgeois education, becomes a kind of projection surface onto which the contradictions of the bourgeoisie in dealing with their own nature are inscribed. 'Someone appalled by the good-breeding of his parents will seek refuge in the kitchen, basking in the cook's expletives that secretly reflect the principle of the parental good breeding. The refined [...] do not know that the indelicacy that appears to them as anarchic nature, is nothing but a reflex-action produced by the compulsion they struggle to resist' (*Minima Moralia*, 2005, § 117, 183, transl. corr.).

3. *Early Labour Movement*. – The negative appraisal of the woman C's work in the early labour movement draws on the miserable condition of the working class and the priority that the care for physical survival had under these conditions. **Engels** describes in detail the living conditions, especially the kitchens, which were mostly dark and contained, besides a stove, the dining and sleeping area: 'one-roomed huts, in most of which there is no artificial floor; kitchen,

living and sleeping-room all in one. In such a hole, scarcely five feet long by six broad, I found two beds [...] which, with a staircase and chimney-place, exactly filled the room' (MECW 4/353 [MEW 2/283]). Marx quotes factory reports which speak of the overwork of the parents to the point of complete exhaustion and the handover of kitchen and household to the very young daughters: 'The oldest girl who is 12, minds the house. She is also cook, and all the servant we have. She gets the young ones ready for school. My wife gets up and goes along with me' (35/700 [23/737]). Marx shows that capitalist relations prevent the possibility of cooking becoming a qualified practice of proletarian women by conversely demonstrating its paradoxical im/possibility as a result of the economic crisis in which working-class women now have the time 'to learn to cook. Unfortunately, the acquisition of this art of cooking occurred at a time when they had nothing to eat. But from this we see how capital, for its own self-valorization, has usurped the family work necessary for consumption' (398, fn. 1 [416 et sq., fn. 120], transl. corr.). – According to Engels, the 'emancipation of women becomes possible only when women are enabled to take part in production on a large, social scale, and when domestic work requires their attention only to a minor degree'; he expects this from the fact that 'modern large-scale industry [...] strives more and more to dissolve private domestic work into a public industry' (26/262 [21/158]). This perspective leaves no room for a qualitative consideration of cooking and housework.

'In the modern proletarian woman', for Rosa Luxemburg as well, 'the woman becomes a human being for the first time, because the struggle is what makes the human being, the share in the cultural work, in the history of humanity'. (RLR, 243 [GW 3, 411], transl. corr.) – In light of the increase in male unemployment and female factory work, August Bebel stigmatises terms that produce ill-considered side effects: 'she-towns' or 'women's cities' were places of residence in which, according to a journal note he quotes, men as "housekeepers" [...] attend to the household for the *simple* reason that their wives can *earn more in the factory than they*, and it means a saving of money if the women go to work' (1878/1910, § 9.2, fn. 8, 128). The C does not appear, but the 'cooking stove' emerges as 'the place where accounts are sadly balanced between income and expense, and where the most oppressing observations are made concerning the increased cost of living and the growing difficulty of raising the necessary funds' (§ 10.3, 144, transl. corr.). Bebel is further interested in the development of productive forces in the household, especially in cooking and the industrialisation of products – 'better, more practical and cheaper' (§ 14.1, 235) – as an element of women's liberation and the revolutionising of family life (§ 14.1). He collects examples of the cooperative kitchen and refers to the rich who eat at the hotel, where male chefs cook, as proof that the activity of cooking is not 'a

part of woman's "natural sphere". Indeed, the fact that royal and noble families and large hotels employ *male* cooks makes it appear as if cooking were man's work. Let these facts be noted by those who cannot conceive woman except surrounded by pots and pans' (§ 14.1, 236, transl. corr.). He pleads energetically for the liberation of the 'private kitchen' as a place of female activity, because it is 'not merely troublesome and improper, but not even profitable to the purse, for the wife to bake bread and brew beer' (ibid.). – In the tradition of the workers' movement, the kitchen is not a place where pleasures are prepared, where life is sensuously shaped; the C is no giver of joy, but rather the 'private kitchen' is a metaphor for the insignificant and inferior, a place of stultification and enslavement. This is the context for the appearance of the slogan: *the woman C should govern the state*.

4. The sentence 'the woman C should govern the state' has become a well-known saying of **Lenin's** even though it cannot be found in his written work. It sounds like a distant reply to Johann Gottfried **Herder's** statement that 'if cooks in Germany were to pose as heads of a learned republic', this would be an evil (1797, *Humanitätsbriefe*, No. 113,3). In *Ideas on the Philosophy of the History of Humanity* (1784), he writes about the Tatar imperial constitution: 'The old fiction of state was converted into a naked truth: the whole empire was metamorphosed into the hall, the kitchen, and the stable of the king. [...] Neither Greeks nor the Romans [...] knew anything of such a fiction of state, which made the household of the regent the sum and substance of the kingdom' (*Outlines*, vol. II., Book 18, chapter VI.4, 488 et sq.). **Hegel** too could be included as an antithesis: 'When women are in charge of government, the state is in danger' (*PhRight*, § 166A, 207).

4.1 The Russian word *kucharka*, used by **Lenin** and **Bukharin**, among others, does not refer to a professional C, but to a maid or kitchen maid as a cook. According to **Trotsky** (1937/1970, 98, 203 et sq., 280), when **Lenin** called **Stalin** a 'cook who will prepare only spicy dishes' in 1921, he used the word *povar*, whereas the feminine form would have been *povaricha*. The word *kucharka* belongs to the group of names used to describe the lowest and disenfranchised people, like in *kucharkiny deti* – the 'children of the woman cook'; these are people without the "correct" background, without education, without culture. The expression can be found in a circular by the Minister of Education **I.D. Delyanov**, signed by Tsar **Alexander III** (1887), according to which only children from "good families" were allowed to be admitted to grammar schools, emphatically not children of 'flunkeys, woman cooks, laundrywomen, peddlers, and similar people' (cited in **Aschukin/Aschukina** 1987, 181).

According to N.S. **Aschukin** and M.G. **Aschukina** (1987, 153) the widespread slogan (which subsequently spread as **Lenin's** woman C-phrase) is based on his 1917 article 'Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?' There it says: 'We are not utopians. We know that an unskilled labourer or a woman cook cannot immediately get on with the job of state administration. In this we agree with the Cadets, with Breshkovskaya, and with Tsereteli. We differ, however, from these citizens in that we demand an immediate break with the prejudiced view that only the rich, or officials chosen from rich families, are capable of *administering* the state, of performing the ordinary, everyday work of administration. We demand that *training* in the work of state administration be conducted by class-conscious workers and soldiers and [...] that a *beginning* be made at once in training all the working people, all the poor, for this work' (CW 26/113). The woman C-phrase is first of all a statement not only about making politics, but a class statement about learning; it is part of a programme for the appropriation of relations through practice. In this context, **Lenin** speaks of the 'apathy and indifference' (184) that afflicts those who are excluded from the formation of society, a theme almost adopted word for word by **Gramsci**. **Lenin** sees the transformation of the lower classes into active members of society as a learning process of 'original democracy'; it is possible 'from the moment all members of society, or at least the vast majority, have learned to administer the state *themselves*, have taken this work into their own hands', with the result 'that the necessity of observing the simple, fundamental rules of the community will very soon become a *habit*' (CW 25/479).

In 1919, **Lenin** deals with the transformation of certain domestic tasks into social labour as well as the economic and political role of women: 'We are setting up model institutions, dining-rooms and nurseries, that will emancipate women from housework. And the work of organising all these institutions will fall mainly to women' (CW 30/44). The sentence pulls the statement in two directions. On the one hand, because of women's experience in the domestic economy, they seem particularly suited for carrying out the transformation on a societal level, of expanding the state with facilities for managing life and raising children, so that the woman Cs themselves take over the socialisation of domestic work, 'a job that will take us many, many years' (43), because they know it from the ground up; on the other hand, in this context, the liberation of women is linked to the abolition of 'household slavery' (44) so that they can participate in 'common productive labour' (43).

Lenin combines the task with **Marx's** slogan: 'We say that the emancipation of the workers must be effected by the workers themselves, and in exactly the same way the emancipation of working women is a matter for the working women themselves. The working women must themselves see to it that

such institutions are developed, and this activity will bring about a complete change in their position as compared with what it was under the old, capitalist society' (44). Accordingly, the woman C will govern the state to the extent that she makes its previous tasks public. Correspondingly, Lenin never tires of demanding that the domestic economy – 'the most unproductive, the most barbarous and the most arduous work a woman can do' (43) – develops into a 'communal economy' and the transition from 'small-scale economies to communal economy' (CW 28/181) must be accomplished. This brings the woman C-statement into the centre of the socialist or communist perspective, which 'demands a radical reconstruction both of social praxis and of conception' (CW 30/409, transl. corr.). Lenin's further remarks on women's liberation bring the C-statement into the context of revolutionary theory, in which women are conceived of as subjects shaping society; their previous activities, however, insofar as they concern the kitchen and children, are depicted as 'stupefying', 'humiliating', and so on (409). Even the lowest wage labour is not labelled as such. Domestic women's work, in Lenin's characterisation, seems to belong to a more primitive social formation. 'Notwithstanding all the laws emancipating woman, she continues to be a *domestic slave*, because *petty housework* crushes, strangles, stultifies and degrades her, chains her to the kitchen and the nursery, and she wastes her labour on barbarously unproductive, petty, nerve-racking, stultifying and crushing drudgery. The real *emancipation of women*, real communism, will begin only where and when an all-out struggle begins (led by the proletariat wielding the state power) against this petty housekeeping, or rather when its *wholesale transformation* into a large-scale socialist economy begins' (CW 29/429). – In his speech on *International Working Women's Day* in 1921, Lenin also emphasises the particularity of women's involvement in the socialist project: 'But you cannot draw the masses into politics without drawing in the women as well' (CW 32/161). A year earlier on the same occasion, it was thus said that not only capitalist oppression but also legal oppression had to be eliminated, and especially – 'this is the main task' – "domestic slavery" (CW 30/409). Accordingly, the March 1919 *Program of the Communist Party of Russia (Bolsheviks)* announces: 'For centuries bourgeois democracy has been proclaiming the equality of humans, irrespective of sex, religion, race and nationality, but capitalism never allowed this equality to be realised in practice anywhere and during its imperialist stage brought about the most intense oppression of races and nationalities. Only because the Soviet government is the government of the toilers was it able for the first time in history to introduce this equality of rights completely and in all spheres of life, including the absolute elimination of the last traces of inequality of women in the sphere of marriage and general family rights. The task of the Party at the present moment is mainly to carry on intel-

lectual and educational work for the purpose of finally stamping out all traces of the former inequality and prejudices, especially among the backward strata of the proletariat and the peasantry. Not satisfied with the formal equality of women, the Party strives to free women from the material burden of obsolete domestic economy, by replacing this with the house-communes, public dining-halls, central laundries, creches, etc' (*The 1919 Lenin Program*, 117, transl. corr.).

4.2 Thus, **Lenin's** assessment of the situation of women and the quality of kitchen-work gives a clear mandate to the sentence about the woman C who governs the state. He speaks of the emancipation of women and develops therein a grassroots democratic perspective. The lower classes must revolutionise the existing state and its division of labour. By doing so, they learn how to arrange it anew. Lenin therefore does not think that one can leap directly from the cooking pot into state affairs. – Although very general, Lenin's statements on the transformation of the individual household into a communal economy with national kitchens and so on were initially based on the experience of domestic work, but subsequently in the learning of political power through the practice of its exercise, only the radical democratic impulse remains: everyone should participate in governing.

In the disputes over labour discipline and compromises with the old company owners and managers, **Bukharin** (from 1918), as a representative of the inner-Bolshevik left, initially pushed for a radical democratic approach to building socialism. Every time, he refers to the C-phrase, which had become a keyword for left-communists. In 1918, he criticised **Lenin's** slogan of 'taking a lesson in socialism from the trust managers' (CW 42/77), because it is incompatible with building socialism from below. The abolition of the 'socialist commune-state' (*gosudarstvom-kommunoj*) in the direction of state capitalism contradicts **Lenin's** 'excellently formulated slogan of teaching every cookess to govern the state' (*Kommunist* 3, 1918/1990, 150). Against the imminent bureaucratisation of Soviet power and production, **Bukharin** again takes up the woman C-phrase, this time with a critical sharpening: 'It is good that the cook will be taught to govern the state; but what will there be if a Commissar is placed over the cook? Then she will never learn to govern the state' (cited in **Cohen** 1971, 75). Only a little later, in *The ABC of Communism* (1920), he shifts the question of radical democracy and learning (by woman Cs in particular) into a more general question of raising the cultural level of the proletariat, especially the rural ones; but he continues to refer to the woman C: 'We must do our utmost to secure that the widest strata of the proletarians and the poor peasants shall participate to the utmost of their power in the work of the soviets. In one of his pamphlets, published before the November revolution, Comrade

Lenin wrote very truly that our task was to see that every cook should be taught to take her share in governmental administration. Of course this is by no means an easy job, and there are many hindrances to its realisation. First among such obstacles comes the low cultural level of the masses' (§ 47, 171). 'But in Russia, working women are far more backward than working men. Many people look down upon them. In this matter persevering efforts are needed: among men, that they may cease blocking women's road; among women, that they may learn to make a full use of their rights, may cease to be timid or diffident. We must not forget that "every cook has to be taught to take her share in governmental administration"' (§ 50, 179).

While the emphasis here is on education through democratic participation, **Alexandra Kollontai** (1919) places it on the abolition of old forms: In communism, family and housework would become extinct because cooking would take place in communal kitchens, and meals would be taken in restaurants (253–55). **Trotsky** takes up **Lenin's** impetus in 1935, referring also to the C-phrase, but no longer as a particular example of women's emancipation: 'In order to bring about a great social revolution, there must be for the proletariat a supreme manifestation of all its forces and all its capacities: the proletariat is organized democratically precisely in order to put an end to its enemies. The dictatorship, according to Lenin, should "teach every woman cook to govern the state"' (*Whither France*, 1979, 140).

5. **Rosa Luxemburg** orients decidedly toward conquering 'political power not from above but from below', whereas she understands mass education not as a precondition but as an accompanying consequence: 'The masses must learn how to use power by using power. There is no other way to teach them' (*RLR*, 372 et sq.). – **Clara Zetkin** sees the transformation of millions of 'housemothers into workers' (1920/1974, 432) as the prospect of mass emancipation of women. In her *Reminiscences of Lenin* (1929), she emphasised these ideas in particular and vigorously advocated the socialisation model against private households and their associated patriarchy: 'Could there be a more damning proof of this [that the Communists are philistines] than the calm acquiescence of men who see how women grow worn out in the petty, monotonous household work, their strength and time dissipated and wasted, their minds growing narrow and stale, their hearts beating slowly, their will weakened? [...] We are bringing the women into the social economy, into legislation and government. All educational institutions are open to them, so that they can increase their professional and social capacities. We are establishing communal kitchens and public eating-houses, laundries and repairing shops, infant asylums, kindergartens, children's homes, educational institutes of all kinds. In short, we are seriously

carrying out the demand in our program for the transference of the economic and educational functions of the separate household to society' (68 et sq.).

Concretely, **Zetkin** describes how the experiences and knowledge of peasant women are especially useful for the socialist project: 'Women's work is of great importance for collectivising potato and beet farming, dairy farming and creamery, and the cultivation and first processing of industrial crops such as flax, cotton, and more. Vegetable, fruit and berry growing, floriculture, poultry and small animal breeding, and agricultural business – for which women have acquired extensive experience and special skills in mastering them – can increase their yields considerably through collectivisation' (Letter to Edda **Baum** 1930, *Zur Theorie*, 463). If the critique is essentially based on the unproductive nature of women's work, then qualifications come into focus and the final consideration is that this development is precisely the way to conquer state power. As a result, she emphasises the change in feminine mentality: the attitudes to family, men, and society are 'revolutionised', and 'hundreds of thousands of women who used to blare their patter that the man is the breadwinner of the family and that woman belongs at the hearth of the home – they have relearned through experience' (433).

Bertolt **Brecht** in *The Mother* (1931) also calls upon the 'wife in the kitchen' to learn, because she 'must be ready to take over the leadership' (*CP* 3, 120, transl. corr.). As well as: 'Don't think the question of why your kitchen lacks meat / Will get decided in the kitchen' (96, transl. corr.) **Brecht**, however, is not content with the abolition of the kitchen, and so he takes up the various dimensions of **Lenin's** statements and expands them to include the perspective of a possible convergence of kitchen and state, so that one can learn from the other. 'Mi-en-leh [Lenin] said, every woman cook ought to be able to govern the state. He was thinking of a change in the state as well as the woman cook. But you can also conclude from this that it's advantageous to arrange the state like a kitchen, but also the kitchen like a state' (*Me-ti*, 2016, 125). – The publishers of **Brecht's** Complete Works claim that his source is Vladimir **Mayakovsky's** 1925 poem called *Vladimir Ilyich Lenin*: 'We'll train every cook / so she might / manage the country / to the worker's gain' (1972, 227). Yet **Brecht's** nuanced elaboration, standing in contrast to **Mayakovsky's** one-line shortening, contradicts this. It is more likely that Brecht knew the C-phrase from **Bukharin's** *ABC of Communism*, which appeared in German as early as 1920, and to which he refers in *The Measures Taken* (34).

After de-Stalinisation under **Khrushchev**, Ernst **Bloch** positioned the C-phrase against the ensuing continuation of the Stalinist repeal of **Engels's** thesis of the withering away of the state. Even if the justification for the repeal – that socialism 'has been victorious in one country while capitalism domin-

ates in all [other] countries' (Kerimov 1959, 142) – 'itself was not counted as having withered away', as Bloch notes with a clearly ironic undertone, 'Engels's formula – one of the rare (and this is quite interesting) ones that provoked official revision – is contained at the culminating point of his thought, that it is as difficult to hide as a mountain peak in the valley where it sits as a reminder of the goal [...], in this there resides not only good conscience for the omnipotence of the state' (*Natural Law*, 1961/1987, 226): 'It can in fact be established that socialistic legal norms present themselves as codified solidarity pro rata for the production of an economic-political condition wherein, as Lenin said, every cook can rule the state and the state itself would no longer require any [juridical] codification' (227). This condition 'would be the first polis, because it is without *politeia*' (228).

Gail W. Lapidus (1977) traces the political and economic background of Lenin's politics. In 1922, only eight percent of the party members were women; the female population was largely illiterate and therefore could not be reached through newspapers and leaflets. Lapidus understands Lenin's project of women's inclusion as a completely new alliance of feminism with revolutionary socialism: the appeal to women to help support the economy in the state and to interfere in politics is seen as a struggle against old family structures and the ruling patriarchy (119).

6. Almost all of the transformations envisaged in the C-dictum – democracy from below, the learning of politics and economics, the socialisation of domestic work – remain unrealised or are stuck half-way; most of the work was already broken off in Soviet Union before it really started; only housework was largely socialised. In the GDR, for example, many institutions provided state-subsidised hot meals, for example in education, agriculture, industrial production, and administration. In the course of the capitalist restoration, the socialisation of housework and child-rearing that had begun was largely reversed, even though Western democracies strive to "reconcile career and family life" for women – but precisely within the boundaries of a private family solution.

In all the many-faceted ways that the C-dictum has been invoked, and although it was initially used to support the liberation of women, it remains on the whole true that it lacks any knowledge of cooking and domestic work; thus, here, a source can be identified for the forgetting of domestic work in Marxism. It cannot be assumed that women practised cooking as a skilled art in the kitchen and in the household. Nevertheless, the disregard of any practical qualifications in this field, which after all concerns essential elements in the shaping of life and the raising of the next generation, justified it being called 'petty', 'dull', etc. This remained a long tradition in the history of the workers'

movement, until the Second Women's Movement in the 1970s stood up vigorously against it with the domestic labour debate.

In 1974, in the context of the reaction to the 1968 movement and its offshoots, André **Glucksmann** wrote a history of socialism from the point of view of the Gulag archipelago, as a horror scenario of 'man-eating' power. The woman C appears between the testimonies of survivors, remaining quite marginal, but is able to bring tension into the title of *The Cook and the Cannibal*. 'Perhaps you already suspect that the famous cook, of whom **Lenin** writes that she should learn to run the socialist state – is quite capable of judging these fifty years of socialist life, even if she is mute, wedged between her old Russian oven, the work in the collective farm, the peat mines in which she must steal her fuel for the winter, and the memory of the man she lost in the war' (1976, 22). In the arrest of hope, which was bound up with the cook, lies the criticism that surrenders even the unredeemed to absurd hopelessness.

In his film *Babette's Feast* (1987), adapted from a novella by Karen **Blixen**, the Danish director Gabriel **Axel** has made an impressive monument to the figure of the woman C. After the defeat of the Paris Commune, a famous Parisian C and communard has to flee from the murderous reaction. In 1872, she comes to a remote Danish island village into a Protestant sect whose members live ascetically. After winning a lottery, she asks to be allowed to "cook French" for once. The feast, which begins in the agreed upon silence, turns into a major transformation. The C imparts to the bigoted, increasingly resentful community that salvation is not found beyond, but in this world. This C is an artist, her cooking is great art. – Once again, the C appears as a form of articulation of political protest – albeit without reference to **Lenin** – in the *Buback Obituary* as a criticism of the RAF's strategy. 'Why this politics of personalities? Couldn't we all kidnap a woman cook together someday and see how they then respond, the upright democrats? Shouldn't we be putting more of our focus on woman cooks?' (*Buback*, 3) – The figure of the C also fascinates writers in Russian post-communism. In his novel *Children of the Arbat* (1987), Anatoly **Rybakov** allows **Stalin** to say that it would be better for the C to manage the kitchen well than to want to govern the state. – Yegor **Gaidar**, the neoliberal former prime minister of post-communist Russia, however, saw in 2006 'as the greatest risk that the woman cook enters political economy with a pistol' (*Isvestia*, 7 May 2006). – In view of capitalism, which destroys life and resources, the discourse of the woman C as head of state ultimately reveals the gateway to the utopia of a liberated world.

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→ alienation, body, communal economy, democracy, destalinisation, dictatorship of the proletariat, dismantling of the state, division of labour, domestic labour debate, double burden, everyday, food, family, family work/housework, female education, feminism, feminisation of labour, gender relations, historical forms of individuality, housewife, kitchen, marriage, Marxism-Feminism, masses, materialist feminism, mind and hand, patriarchy, private/public, profession, public goods, revolution, socialism, socialisation, state, utopia, women's emancipation, women's labour, women's movement, work

→ Abbau des Staates, Alltag, Arbeit, Arbeitsteilung, Beruf, Demokratie, Diktatur des Proletariats, Doppelbelastung, Ehe, Entfremdung, Entstalinisierung, Essen, Familie, Familienarbeit/Hausarbeit, Feminisierung der Arbeit, Feminismus, Frauenarbeit, Frauenbewegung, Frauenemanzipation, Gemeinwirtschaft, Geschlechterverhältnisse, Hausarbeitsdebatte, Hausfrau, historische Individualitätsformen, Kopf und Hand, Körper, Küche, Marxismus-Feminismus, Massen, materialistischer Feminismus, öffentliche Güter, Patriarchat, privat/öffentlich, Revolution, Sozialisierung, Sozialismus, Staat, Utopie, weibliche Bildung

Crisis Theories

A: naẓarīyāt al-'azma. – F: théories des crises. – G: Krisentheorien. – R: teorii krizisov. – S: teorías sobre la crisis. – C: wēiji lǐlùn 危机理论

In bourgeois political economy, crises are generally considered to be accidental phenomena unrelated to the mode of functioning of the “market economy” as such; they are said to be caused by “mistaken” economic policy or “exogenous” factors of all sorts. In contrast, **Marx’s** critique of political economy seeks to account for the possibility and necessity of crises by describing the immanent contradictions of the capitalist mode of production. Like the critique of political economy as a whole, Marx’s crisis theory, too, remained incomplete. The various remarks and arguments about crisis theory in *Capital* and the manuscripts on the critique of political economy bear witness to Marx’s research process over a period of some three decades. Since, at first glance, they appear to be somewhat disjointed or even contradictory, they have given rise to controversies about “the right” crisis theory. There are, accordingly, a number of different CT in Marxism, all more or less based on statements of Marx’s in the critique of political economy. Their objective is to explain the causes, mechanisms, and consequences of crises. In the Marxist debate, one distinguishes, in connection with the explanation of economic crises, between underconsumption theories, overproduction theories, disproportionality theories, profit-squeeze theories, and overaccumulation theories which take the ‘law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall’ as their starting point. CT are further distinguished by the importance they assign to the financial sector’s role in the dynamics of crisis.

In historical-materialist perspective, the development of CT is itself not accidental, but bound up with the changing forms of capitalism and its crises. Capitalism reproduces and transforms itself through crises, repeatedly plunging Marxism into crisis as well. CT have been mobilised to explain both ‘minor’, conjunctural or cyclical crises as well as ‘major’, structural crises and long-term trends of capitalist development. One little explored problem turns on explaining the interrelation and non-contemporaneousness of economic, political, and ideological crises. As relatively open-ended situations, crises can facilitate emancipatory processes, but can also harbour dangers for the subaltern. Economic crises can lead to ideological and political crises, that is, precipitate

a crisis of domination; but discourses on crisis can also legitimatise measures intended to maintain domination. The power to define the causes of crises and appropriate political responses to crises can thus itself be an instrument of domination.

1. *The possibility and necessity of crises* – Whereas, before the capitalist era, crises were usually due to a scarcity of resources – bad harvests, for example – capitalist crises characteristically take the form of simultaneous gluts of commodities, labour power, and capital. In early 19th cent. classical political economy, however, it remained a matter of debate whether general, as opposed to merely sectoral, overproduction was at all possible. Most authors denied that it was, Jean-Baptiste Say and David Ricardo among them. To understand why, one must bear in mind that typically capitalist cyclical crises in fact emerged only in the 1820s (cf. Engels, MECW 35/35 [MEW 23/40]; Tugan-Baranowski 1901, 66).

Say broaches the problem of outlets for production in his *Traité d'économie politique* (1st ed., 1803). According to Say (1836/2001, 138 et sqq.), it is not because of a supposed scarcity of money that commodities cannot be sold. Money is just a means of exchange; what is exchanged are products. To be able to buy, one must sell; that is, one must first produce something oneself. Say contends that purchasing power originates in production; supply thus creates demand. If, therefore, commodities of a particular kind cannot be sold, the reason is that there has been insufficient production of commodities of some other kind. It is true that there can be overproduction in particular sectors of the economy, but, according to "Say's Law", generalised overproduction is impossible. Ricardo adopts this simple and, indeed, tautological argument, extending it to savings and investment: 'M. Say has [...] shown that there is no amount of capital which may not be employed in a country, because a demand is only limited by production. No one produces but with a view to consume or sell, and he never sells but with an intention to purchase some other commodity, which may be immediately useful to him, or which may contribute to future production. By producing, then, he necessarily becomes either the consumer of his own goods, or the purchaser and consumer of the goods of some other person' (1817/1973, 192 et sq.).

To Engels, in contrast, it was already clear by 1844 that 'periodically recurring' crises are an inherent feature of the capitalist mode of production: 'In the present unregulated production and distribution of the means of subsistence, which is carried on not directly for the sake of supplying needs, but for profit, in the system under which every one works for himself to enrich himself, disturbances inevitably arise at every moment' (4/381 [2/312]). Engels singles out

uncertainty as the characteristic feature of capitalist production: 'Everything is done blindly, as guess-work, more or less at the mercy of accident' (382 [ibid.]).

In the *Communist Manifesto*, **Marx** interprets crises as an expression of 'the revolt of modern productive forces against modern conditions of production, against the property relations that are the conditions for the existence of the bourgeoisie and of its rule. It is enough to mention the commercial crises that by their periodical return put on its trial, each time more threateningly, the existence of the entire bourgeois society. In these crises a great part not only of the existing products, but also of the previously created productive forces, are periodically destroyed. In these crises there breaks out an epidemic that, in all earlier epochs, would have seemed an absurdity – the epidemic of over-production. [...] And how does the bourgeoisie get over these crises? On the one hand by enforced destruction of a mass of productive forces; on the other, by the conquest of new markets, and by the more thorough exploitation of the old ones. That is to say, by paving the way for more extensive and more destructive crises, and by diminishing the means whereby crises are prevented' (6/489 et sq. [4/467 et sq.]).

Marx demonstrates the general possibility of crisis in the opening section of *CI*, about simple commodity circulation. Here he criticises economists such as **Say**, who deny the possibility of crises by abstracting from the existence of money and reducing commodity exchange to a simple exchange of products. 'Nothing can be more childish than the dogma, that because every sale is a purchase, and every purchase a sale, therefore the circulation of commodities necessarily implies an equilibrium of sales and purchases. [...] No one can sell unless some one else purchases. But no one is forthwith bound to purchase, because he has just sold. Circulation bursts through all restrictions as to time, place, and individuals, imposed by direct barter, and this it effects by splitting up, into the antithesis of a sale and a purchase, the direct identity that in barter does exist between the alienation of one's own and the acquisition of some other man's product. To say that these two independent and antithetical acts have an intrinsic unity, are essentially one, is the same as to say that this intrinsic oneness expresses itself in an external antithesis. If the interval in time between the two complementary phases of the complete metamorphosis of a commodity become[s] too great, if the split between the sale and the purchase becomes too pronounced, the intimate connexion between them, their oneness, asserts itself by producing – a crisis.' (35/123 [23/127 et sq.]; similar passages occur earlier in: *Grundrisse*, MECW 28/86, 133 [42/83, 128]; *A Contribution*, 29/332 [13/77]; *Ms 61–62*, 32/131 et sqq. [26.2/500 et sqq.]) **Michael Heinrich** (1999, 347) regards this abstract definition of the concept of crisis – a violent forging of the intrinsic unity of moments that belong together, but have become

independent of each other (for example, purchase and sale, production and consumption, and so on) – as ‘the invariant in the evolution of **Marx**’s theory of crisis’ (cf. II.1.2/357; MECW 28/329 et sqq. [42/360]; II.3.3/1123; MECW 32/131 [26.2/501]; II.4.1/371; II.4.2/377; MECW 37/303 [25/316]).

Marx is aware that to demonstrate the *possibility* of crises is not yet to demonstrate their *necessity*. Thus he affirms that economists such as John Stuart **Mill** are no better than **Ricardo** or **Say**, who deny the possibility of crises; for **Mill** and his like ‘want to explain the crises by these simple *possibilities* of crisis contained in the metamorphosis of commodities – such as the separation between purchase and sale. These definitions which explain the possibility of crises, by no means explain their actual occurrence. They do not explain *why* the phases of the process come into such conflict that their inner unity can only assert itself through a crisis, through a violent process. This *separation* appears in the crisis; it is the elementary form of the crisis. To *explain* the crisis on the basis of this, its elementary form, is to explain the existence of the crisis by describing its most abstract form, that is to say, to explain the crisis by the crisis’ (32/133 [26.2/502]).

2. *Underconsumption, overproduction, and disproportionality* CT. – 2.1 Jean Charles Léonard Simonde **de Sismondi** (1819) was one of the first to raise the problem of the realisation of produced value and of effective demand. ‘It is’, **Sismondi** contends, ‘a great mistake, into which the greater number of modern economists have fallen, to represent consumption as a force without limits, always ready to absorb an infinite production’ (*New Principles*, 1991, 74). **Sismondi** observes that ‘a consumption increase may alone determine an increase in production, and that on its part consumption can only be determined by the income of the consumers’ (107). He analyses the exchange relations between capitalists and wage-workers and the effects of dislocations between wages and profits on the demand for labour power as well as on the consumption of both classes (91–96). However, his attempt to formulate conditions of equilibrium for the relationship between production and consumption does not consider constant capital and the significance of the demand for means of production. Rather, **Sismondi** treats total production, income, and the consumption fund as equivalent (102). Hence he holds that ‘the wealthy [...] benefits the poor when he saves from his income to add to his capital [...] because the work he gives is larger’ (94). But if capitalists were to break into their capital in order to consume more, ‘they would take away from the present income of the poor, and from their own future incomes’ (103). Since consumption is not determined by needs alone, but also by available incomes, grain can ‘remain unsold in the midst of a multitude who [...] suffers hunger’ (103). Every ‘derange-

ment of the mutual proportion subsisting among production, revenue, and consumption' becomes 'prejudicial to the nation'; 'to cause distress in the state, it is enough that the equilibrium be broken' (105). Unlike **Ricardo** and **Say**, **Sismondi** realises that a lag between consumption and production can result in generalised overproduction, because he clearly distinguishes between the material and monetary forms of wealth, the mass of produced commodities, and income. For **Sismondi**, development of the forces of production is beneficial only when, thanks to an increase in population and incomes, outlets, too, can increase (557 et sq.). Just as **Sismondi** is ultimately of two minds about development of the forces of production, so he is ambivalent about generalisation of the capitalist mode of production. He accepts private ownership of the means of production, but criticises its destructive effects. He calls for state intervention to protect the populace from the effects of competition (569–73). He points out the opposed interests of workers and capitalists and demands that entrepreneurs provide safeguards for workers (577–84), yet knows of no other means of bringing justice about (584). **Sismondi** does not yet distinguish in consistent, conceptually clear fashion between labour power and labour, constant and variable capital, and fixed and circulating capital, or value-product and the value of the product. Hence his crisis theory too remains rudimentary. **Marx** declares that '**Sismondi** is profoundly conscious of the contradictions in capitalist production; he is aware that, on the one hand, its forms – its production relations – stimulate unrestrained development of the productive power and of wealth; and that, on the other hand, these relations are conditional, that their contradictions of use value and exchange value, commodity and money, purchase and sale, production and consumption, capital and wage labour, etc., assume ever greater dimensions as productive power develops. He is particularly aware of the fundamental contradiction: on the one hand, unrestricted development of the productive power and increase of wealth which, at the same time, consists of commodities and must be turned into cash; on the other hand, the system is based on the fact that the mass of producers is restricted to the necessaries. Hence, according to **Sismondi**, crises are not accidental, as **Ricardo** maintains, but essential outbreaks – occurring on a large scale and at definite periods – of the immanent contradictions. He wavers constantly: should the State curb the productive forces to make them adequate to the production relations, or should the production relations be made adequate to the productive forces? He [...] seeks to exorcise the contradictions by a different adjustment of revenue in relation to capital, or of distribution in relation to production, not realising that the relations of distribution are only the relations of production seen *sub alia specie*. He forcefully criticises the contradictions of bourgeois production but does not understand

them, and consequently does not understand the process whereby they can be resolved' (MECW 32/247 et sq. [26.3/50 et sq.]; cf. **Luxemburg** 1915/2016, 120 et sqq.).

Thomas Robert **Malthus** is often regarded as the founder of underconsumption or overproduction theory (see, for example, **Diehl/Mombert** 1979, 6, 11). **Marx**, however, points out that his *Principles of Political Economy* are 'simply the Malthusianised translation', the 'caricature', of **Sismondi's** *Nouveaux principes*, the first edition of which had been published a year earlier, in 1819 (MECW 32/245 [26.3/47]). The 'plagiarist' (ibid.) tries to show that neither population increase (**Malthus**, 1820/1836, 311 et sqq.), nor capital accumulation (314 et sqq.), nor fertility of the soil (331 et sqq.), nor labour-saving devices (351 et sqq.) ensure durable growth in production. Malthus considers these to be factors that increase supply, to be sure, but not demand. Thus he observes that 'the consumption and demand occasioned by the workmen applied in productive labour can never *alone* furnish a motive to the accumulation and employment of capital' (315). 'The demand created by the productive labourer himself can never be an *adequate* demand, because it does not go to the full extent of what he produces. If it did, there would be no profit, consequently no motive to employ him. The very existence of a profit upon any commodity presupposes a demand *exterior* to the labour which has produced it' (405). Like **Sismondi**, **Malthus** holds that generalised overproduction is possible and likewise explicitly poses the question of effective demand. Yet '**Sismondi** is a critic of capitalist production, and launches powerful attacks on it. [...] **Malthus** is an apologist for it. However, his apologies on behalf of capitalist production do not consist in the denial of its contradictions [...] on the contrary, he raises these contradictions to the status of a brute natural law and absolutely sanctifies them' (**Luxemburg** 1915/2016, 153). From his diagnosis of the existence of a demand gap, **Malthus** concludes that an increasingly greater share of what is produced can be sold only if a portion of the product goes to unproductive social groups (1836, 372 et sqq.). 'It is most desirable that the labouring classes should be well paid. [...] But as a great increase of consumption among the working classes must greatly increase the cost of production, it must lower profits, and diminish or destroy the motive to accumulate' (405). 'There must therefore be a considerable class of persons who have both the will and power to consume more material wealth than they produce. [...] In this class the landlords no doubt stand pre-eminent; but if they were not assisted by the great mass of individuals engaged in personal services, whom they maintain, their own consumption would of itself be insufficient to keep up and increase the value of the produce, and enable the increase of its quantity more than to counterbalance the fall of its price' (400). **Luxemburg** comments: '**Malthus** is the

ideologue of the interests of that layer of parasites on capitalist exploitation that feed on ground rent and state revenues, and the goal that he advocates is the allocation of as large a portion of surplus-value as is possible to these “unproductive consumers”. **Sismondi**’s general standpoint is predominantly an ethical one oriented to social reform: he “surpasses” the classical economists by stressing, in opposition to them, that “consumption is the only end of accumulation”, and he makes a plea for accumulation to be curbed. **Malthus**, on the other hand, bluntly asserts that accumulation is the only goal of production and advocates unrestrained accumulation on the part of the capitalists, which he proposes to augment and guarantee through the unrestrained consumption of the parasites on this accumulation’ (*Accu*, 1915/2016, 154; transl. corr.; cf. **Marx**, MECW 32/209 et sqq. [26.3/7 et sqq.]).

In its main lines, the underconsumptionist argument runs as follows. The volume of the capitalist process of reproduction is determined by the volume of the effective demand for commodities. In the final analysis, the production of means of production is geared to the production of consumer goods, making consumer demand the decisive factor. As a consequence of the antagonistic relations of production and distribution, however, wage earners, who make up the great bulk of society, can buy only part of the net product that they themselves turn out: the shadow side of the production of surplus value is a “demand gap”. Great excess and luxury notwithstanding, consumption by the capitalists cannot close this gap. The dynamics of the capitalist mode of production implies that, with growing productivity, productive capacity grows faster than consumer demand. The result is a tendentially widening demand gap.

2.2 **Marx** himself seems to argue in terms of underconsumption theory in a number of passages. In *C II*, for example, he affirms: ‘Contradiction in the capitalist mode of production: the labourers as buyers of commodities are important for the market. But as sellers of their own commodity – labour power – capitalist society tends to keep them down to the minimum price. – Further contradiction: the periods in which capitalist production exerts all its forces regularly turn out to be periods of overproduction, because production potentials can never be utilised to such an extent that more value may not only be produced but also realised; but the sale of commodities, the realisation of commodity capital and thus of surplus value, is limited, not by the consumer requirements of society in general, but by the consumer requirements of a society in which the vast majority are always poor and must always remain poor’ (36/315, fn. 32 [24/318]). Again, he declares in *C III* that ‘the ultimate reason for all real crises always remains the poverty and restricted consumption of the masses as opposed to the drive of capitalist production to develop the product-

ive forces as though only the absolute consuming power of society constituted their limit' (37/483 [25/501]; cf. II.1.2/323 et sq., 333 et sq.; II.3.3/1090, 1154 et sq.; II.3.4/1248).

On the other hand, **Marx** himself sharply criticises underconsumptionist reasoning elsewhere. In the *Grundrisse*, he takes issue with Jean-Pierre **Proudhon's** argument (*Qu'est-ce que la propriété?*, Paris, 1841, 202, cited in MECW 28/352 [42/338]) that overproduction occurs because 'the worker cannot buy back his product'. The argument is, he says, 'false at this level of abstraction' (362). It is always the case that, under capitalism, the worker cannot buy back his product; yet there is not a permanent crisis of underconsumption or overproduction. For **Marx**, **Proudhon's** static argument cannot adequately explain overproduction: 'It is sheer tautology to say that crises are caused by the scarcity of effective consumption, or of effective consumers. The capitalist system does not know any other modes of consumption than effective ones, except that of *sub forma pauperis* or of the "thief". That commodities are unsaleable means only that no effective purchasers have been found for them [...]. But if one were to attempt to give this tautology the semblance of a profounder justification by saying that the working class receives too small a portion of its own product and the evil would be remedied as soon as it receives a larger share of it and its wages increase in consequence, one could only remark that crises are always prepared by precisely a period in which wages rise generally and the working class actually gets a larger share of that part of the annual product which is intended for consumption. From the point of view of these advocates of sound and "simple" (!) common sense, such a period should rather remove the crisis. It appears, then, that capitalist production comprises conditions independent of good or bad will, conditions which permit the working class to enjoy that relative prosperity only momentarily, and at that only as the harbinger of a coming crisis' (MECW 36/409 et sq. [24/409 et sq.]).

The 'reproduction schemas' in *C II* can likewise be read as an implicit critique of underconsumption theory. They show, in principle, that expanded reproduction of capital is possible when – but only when – certain conditions of proportionality between departments are met. On the basis of the reproduction schemas, therefore, crises are more likely to be interpreted as disproportionality crises resulting from the "anarchy of the market"; in other words, the question tends less to be why crises occur than how it happens that the conditions of expanded reproduction are ever met, 'since a balance is itself an accident owing to the spontaneous nature of this production' (36/494 [24/491]). To be sure, one misunderstands the methodological import of the reproduction schemas when one supposes that the actual historical course of capital accumulation can be deduced from them, as did, in the early socialist debate, not

only proponents of “breakdown theories”, but also those who held that a crisis-free, “organised” capitalism was possible (cf. **Rosdolsky** 1977, 445 et sqq.; **Hickel** 1973).

The basic objection to underconsumption theory is that it treats the production of means of production simply as a function of demand for consumer goods, as if capitalism were a planned economy with a vertically integrated productive apparatus. This critique ultimately comes down to the claim that the ‘demand gap’ can in principle be closed by increased investment demand on the capitalists’ part, making expanded reproduction possible. To explain the overproduction of commodities, the contradictory relationship between production and circulation must be examined in context, and the distinct components of effective demand must be analysed in their relative autonomy.

In *C II*, **Marx** argues that the turnover of fixed capital creates ‘a material basis for the periodic crises’ (36/187 [24/185]). Thus the alternation of ‘periods of depression, medium activity, precipitancy, crisis’ does not arise directly from inadequate effective demand on the part of workers, but from fluctuating investment demand on the part of capitalists. ‘On the one hand the mass of the fixed capital invested in a certain bodily form and endowed in that form with a certain average life constitutes [...] an obstacle to the rapid general introduction of improved instruments of labour. On the other hand competition compels the replacement of the old instruments of labour by new ones before the expiration of their natural life, especially when decisive changes occur’ (173 [171]). While it is true that the average life of fixed capital in the different sectors of production varies, ‘a crisis always forms the starting-point of large new investments. Therefore, from the point of view of society as a whole, more or less, a new material basis for the next turnover cycle’ as well (188 [186]).

In *C III*, **Marx** formulates the contradiction between an *expanding* dynamics resulting from the conditions of production and a *contracting* dynamics brought on by antagonistic distribution on the one hand and a variable ‘tendency to accumulate’ on the other: ‘The conditions of direct exploitation, and those of realising it, are not identical. They diverge not only in place and time, but also logically. The first are only limited by the productive power of society, the latter by the proportional relation of the various branches of production and the consumer power of society. But this last-named is not determined either by the absolute productive power, or by the absolute consumer power, but by the consumer power based on antagonistic conditions of distribution, which reduce the consumption of the bulk of society to a minimum varying within more or less narrow limits. It is furthermore restricted by the tendency to accumulate, the drive to expand capital and produce surplus value on an expanded scale. This is law for capitalist produc-

tion, imposed by incessant revolutions in the methods of production themselves, by the depreciation of existing capital always bound up with them, by the general competitive struggle and the need to improve production and expand its scale merely as a means of self-preservation and under penalty of ruin. The market must, therefore, be continually extended, so that its interrelations and the conditions regulating them assume more and more the form of a natural law working independently of the producer, and become ever more uncontrollable. This internal contradiction seeks to resolve itself through expansion of the outlying field of production. But the more the productive power develops, the more it finds itself at variance with the narrow basis on which the conditions of consumption rest. It is no contradiction at all on this self-contradictory basis that there should be an excess of capital simultaneously with a growing surplus of population. For while a combination of these two would, indeed, increase the mass of produced surplus value, it would at the same time intensify the contradiction between the conditions under which this surplus value is produced and those under which it is realised' (37/243).

2.3 Friedrich Engels's explanation for crises is primarily based on an overproduction theory. 'The extension of the markets cannot keep pace with the extension of production. The collision becomes inevitable, and as this cannot produce any real solution so long as it does not break in pieces the capitalist mode of production, the collisions become periodic' (25/263 [20/257]). 'Their political and intellectual bankruptcy is scarcely any longer a secret to the bourgeoisie themselves. Their economic bankruptcy recurs regularly every ten years. In every crisis, society is suffocated beneath the weight of its own productive forces and products, which it cannot use, and stands helpless face to face with the absurd contradiction that the producers have nothing to consume, because consumers are wanting' (269 [263]). Engels criticises Dühring's underconsumption theory, attempting to distinguish his own overproduction theory from it: 'But unfortunately the under-consumption of the masses, the restriction of the consumption of the masses to what is necessary for their maintenance and reproduction, is not a new phenomenon. It has existed as long as there have been exploiting and exploited classes. Even in those periods of history when the situation of the masses was particularly favourable, as for example in England in the 15th cent., they under-consumed. They were very far from having their own annual total product at their disposal to be consumed by them. Therefore, while under-consumption has been a permanent feature in history for thousands of years, the general shrinkage of the market which breaks out in crises as the result of a surplus of production is a phenomenon

only of the last fifty years; and so Herr Dühring's whole superficial vulgar economics is necessary in order to explain the new collision not by the new phenomenon of over-production but by the thousand-year-old phenomenon of under-consumption. It is like a mathematician attempting to explain the variation in the ratio between two quantities, one constant and one variable, not by the variation of the variable but by the fact that the constant quantity remains unchanged. The under-consumption of the masses is a necessary condition of all forms of society based on exploitation, consequently also of the capitalist form; but it is the capitalist form of production which first gives rise to crises. The under-consumption of the masses is therefore also a prerequisite condition of crises, and plays in them a role which has long been recognised. But it tells us just as little why crises exist today as why they did not exist before'. (272 [266]).

3. *Overaccumulation theories.* – Whereas underconsumption and overproduction theories foreground the problem of the realisation of produced value and surplus value, overaccumulation theories, which appeal to the fall of the rate of profit, focus on changes in the conditions of production. Two varieties of overaccumulation theory may be distinguished: the crisis theory that sets out from the 'law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall', and profit-squeeze theory.

3.1 The constant technical and organisational transformations of the process of production, which equilibrium-oriented economic theories more or less ignore, play a central part in Marx's theory of capitalism. Fundamental in his description of long-term development trends is the assumption that the value composition of capital rises steadily in step with growing labour productivity (35/613 et sqq. [23/645 et sqq.]). Although Marx himself also notes the significance of savings on the means of production, that is, on *constant capital* (37/80 et sqq. [25/87 et sqq.]), he appears to assume that the dominant form of reducing the costs of production and raising the productive power of labour consists in the increasing use of machinery. Machinery is introduced to bring down costs whenever the additional expenditure on constant capital is less than the savings on variable capital. Savings on labour power (in the form of direct redundancy of labour power or of greater output with a constant quantity of labour power) owing to the use of machinery lead directly to growth in constant capital vis-à-vis variable capital, that is, to a rising value composition of capital.

One must, however, take into consideration the contradictory indirect effects of the social generalisation of these transformations in production techniques. On the one hand, the new production methods, which naturally bring

gains in labour productivity in their wake, make the foodstuffs required to reproduce labour power cheaper – in other words, they lead to a decrease in the value of labour power, which results, in turn, in a rising value composition of capital. On the other hand, they make the components of constant capital cheaper, and thus lead to a falling value composition of capital. It follows that to justify the idea that the value composition of capital tends to rise in the long run, one would have to show that the cheapening of the components of constant capital accompanying gains in labour productivity fails to offset the other moments. **Marx** never provided this demonstration (cf. 33/288 et sqq. [23/651 et sq.]; 35/617 et sqq. [26.3/356 et sqq.]).

A further consideration – one that **Marx** himself did not spell out – shows that a long-term rise in value composition is at least plausible. The cheapening of the components of constant capital could induce a fall in value composition only if the increase in the productivity of labour were in the long term greater in the production of *means of production* (Department I) than in that of *consumer goods* (Department II). Even in this case, however, the productivity increase in Department I would indirectly lead to a cheapening of consumer goods, that is, a fall in the value of labour power. The acceleration of the increase in productivity in Department I would therefore have to offset not just the effects so far mentioned, but also the indirect effect on the value of labour power due to this increase itself. Although this is doubtless not inconceivable, it is rather improbable (cf. **Heinrich** 1999, 322).

Marx appeals to the rising value composition of capital to explain the tendency to production of a ‘relative surplus population’ or an ‘industrial reserve army’, that is, a workforce superfluous from the standpoint of the requirements of the valorisation of capital (35/623 [23/657 et sqq.]). This concept is directed against the theory of population defended by **Malthus** (1798), who maintained that the reason for unemployment and poverty was that the working-class birthrate was too high. **Marx** tries to show that capital accumulation itself leads to growing unemployment. The implication is that the redundancy effects bound up with the rising value composition of capital outweigh the employment effects bound up with capital growth. It is true that this corresponds to developments in the past few decades in Europe, where unemployment has reached higher levels with each new cyclical crisis. **Marx**, however, does not provide adequate theoretical justification for his claim that a long-term increase in ‘relative surplus population’ is a general tendency in capitalism. Yet it is plausible that an ‘industrial reserve army’ is produced again and again, with each new business cycle, since ‘full employment’ leads to rising wages, which put a brake on accumulation and thus constitute an incentive to introduce new, labour-saving production technologies. ‘Full employ-

ment' is thus always just a temporary state of affairs; as a rule, there exists an army of the unemployed, now bigger, now smaller (cf. **Heinrich** 1999, 323 et sq.).

Marx also appeals to the steady rise in the value composition of capital to justify the 'law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall', which he calls on to show that the necessary development of the forces of production and the unrestricted valorisation of capital stand in irreconcilable contradiction, and that capital accumulation produces its own immanent barriers (37/209 et sqq. [25/221 et sqq.]). He does not, however, provide sufficient justification for the idea of a fall in the rate of profit. To do so, he would have had to show that, in the long run, the value composition of capital rises faster than the rate of surplus value, or, what comes to the same thing, that total capital grows faster than the mass of surplus value. It is, however, impossible to show this. One can, to be sure, state the direction in which the different variables determining the rate of profit tend, but not their relative rates of motion (see **Heinrich** 1999, 327 et sqq. for a detailed discussion).

On the basis of **Marx's** own argument that new machinery is introduced only when greater savings in variable capital offset the additional expenditure in constant capital (cf. 35/396 [23/414]), it appears that, when new technologies are introduced to raise productivity, the rate of profit not only does not fall, but initially rises, both for the individual capital involved and also for total social capital (cf. **Okishio** 1993; **Heinrich** 1999, 337 et sqq.). A fall in the rate of profit is possible nonetheless, if, as a result of class conflict, real wages rise faster than labour productivity. It is not, however, possible to derive a general law of the long-term tendential development of the profit rate even when these factors are taken into consideration.

In defence of **Marx's** account, it might be objected that he himself did not wish to see the 'law' understood in a deterministic way. If, on the one hand, **Marx** derives the fall in the rate of profit from the rising value composition of capital, he grants, on the other, that 'counteracting influences' are at work, 'which cross and annul the effect of the general law, and which give it merely the characteristic of a tendency, for which reason we have referred to the fall of the general rate of profit as a tendency to fall' (37/230 [25/242]). The tendency of the rate of profit to fall can consequently have effects even when there is no empirically observable fall in the rate of profit. The theoretical formulation of the tendency and the countervailing tendencies can be mobilised to explain the empirically observable fluctuations in the profit rate. These considerations on the tendential fall of the rate of profit are also relevant to crisis theory, since the 'rate of profit' is the 'driving force' (258 [269]), the 'goad of capitalist production' (240 [251]), influencing investment decisions and thus the process of capital

accumulation. Crises may be understood as moments in which the fall of the profit rate thwarts accumulation (240 et sq. [251 et sq.]) and, at the same time, as moments in which the countervailing tendencies come into play. Thanks to the depreciation of capital accompanying crises, the fall in the rate of profit is checked (248 et sq. [260]).

The manuscripts of *C III* make it clear that **Marx** himself did not have the time to produce a definitive account of the implications, for crisis theory, of the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. The presentation of the 'law as such' and the 'counteracting tendencies' are followed by a series of reflections on crisis theory; but they go off in different directions, resemble research notes, and bear only partially on the 'law', even if **Engels** published the corresponding passages as Chapter 15, under the title 'Exposition of the Internal Contradictions of the Law' (239).

At a very general level, **Marx** observes that the 'different influences' on capital accumulation – an 'increase in the labouring population' and, at the same time, 'relative overpopulation', a fall in the rate of profit and 'depreciation of existing capitals which checks the fall', a simultaneous development of labour productivity and higher organic composition of capital – 'may at one time operate predominantly side by side in space, and at another succeed each other in time'. Periodically, 'the conflict of antagonistic agencies finds vent in crises'. These crises are 'always but momentary and forcible solutions of the existing contradictions. They are violent eruptions which for a time restore the disturbed equilibrium' (247 et sq. [259]).

According to **Marx**, it is characteristic of accumulation that it simultaneously brings about an excess of capital and an excess of unemployed workers. To explain the mechanisms at work in this process, Marx takes the hypothetical case of absolute overproduction or overaccumulation of capital: in other words, 'overproduction which would affect not just one or another, or a few important spheres of production, but would be absolute in its full scope, hence would extend to all fields of production'. He shows that it is precisely full utilisation of all available possibilities for the production of surplus value and accumulation – in other words, full utilisation of all 'factors of production' as well as 'full employment', to speak the language of bourgeois economics – which would lead to absolute overproduction of capital. Such overproduction would obtain once no more capital could be accumulated, because, for a given labouring population, 'neither the absolute working time supplied by this population, nor the relative surplus working time, could be expanded any further' (250 [261 et sq.]). In that case, a growing capital would produce no more profit than a capital that remains constant. In that case, the rate of profit would fall, not as the result of an increase in the productivity of labour, but

because of rising wages, that is, the rising monetary value of variable capital. Competition would grow sharper thanks to the falling rate of profit. A portion of capital would remain idle and be depreciated. A new equilibrium would be established thanks to destruction of capital under crisis conditions. ‘That portion of the value of capital which exists only in the form of claims on prospective shares of surplus value, i.e., profit [...] is immediately depreciated by the reduction of the receipts on which it is calculated. [...] Part of the commodities on the market can complete their process of circulation and reproduction only through an immense contraction of their prices, hence through a depreciation of the capital which they represent. The elements of fixed capital are depreciated to a greater or lesser degree in just the same way. It must be added that definite, presupposed, price relations govern the process of reproduction, so that the latter is halted and thrown into confusion by a general drop in prices. This confusion and stagnation paralyses the function of money as a medium of payment, whose development [...] is based on those presupposed price relations. The chain of payment obligations due at specific dates is broken in a hundred places. The confusion is augmented by the attendant collapse of the credit system, which develops simultaneously with capital, and leads to [...] sudden and forcible depreciations, to the actual stagnation and disruption of the process of reproduction, and thus to a real falling off in reproduction. But there would have been still other agencies at work at the same time. The stagnation of production would have laid off a part of the working class and would thereby have placed the employed part in a situation where it would have to submit to a reduction of wages even below the average. This has the very same effect on capital as an increase of the relative or absolute surplus value at average wages would have had. [...] Ultimately, the depreciation of the elements of constant capital would itself tend to raise the rate of profit. [...] The ensuing stagnation of production would have prepared – within capitalistic limits – a subsequent expansion of production. And thus the cycle would run its course anew’ (253 et sq. [264 et sq.]).

More realistic than the case of absolute overaccumulation of capital is relative overaccumulation – relative with respect to the conditions of valorisation in a particular place at a particular time. Not every instance of relative overaccumulation also involves a crisis for capital. For the workforce affected by it, however, this does not necessarily make any difference, as **Marx** points out in discussing the example of capital export: ‘If capital is sent abroad, this is done not because it absolutely could not be applied at home, but because it can be employed at a higher rate of profit in a foreign country. But such capital is absolute excess capital for the employed labouring population and for

the home country in general. It exists as such alongside the relative overpopulation, and this is an illustration of how both of them exist side by side, and mutually influence one another' (255).

3.2 Profit-squeeze theory sets out from **Marx's** remark that rising wages are the 'harbinger of a crisis' (36/410 [24/409]), and also from his account of the relationship between accumulation and the industrial reserve army (35/613 et sqq. [23/645 et sqq.]), together with the corresponding passages in *C III* in which he explains the overaccumulation of capital by a rise in the cost of labour power (37/250 et sqq. [25/262 et sqq.]). This theory considers fluctuations in the size of the 'industrial reserve army' due to accumulation and the ensuing evolution of the wage rate to be the basic reason for cyclical crises (cf. **Goodwin** 1967; **Glyn/Sutcliffe** 1972; **Armstrong et al.** 1984; **Itoh/Lapavitsas** 1999, 128 et sqq.).

Profit-squeeze theory's basic model may be described as follows. With growing accumulation, the demand for labour-power increases and unemployment declines, until a shortage of labour-power comes about and the share of the value product represented by wages rises. If the cheapening of the components of constant capital owing to gains in productivity is left aside, a rising wage rate means a sinking profit rate. This leads to falling investment, and accumulation grinds to a halt. As a result, unemployment increases once again, wages fall, and profits recover, creating the conditions for a new upturn. Thus the model provides an endogenous explanation for the peak and trough of a business cycle. Philip **Armstrong et al.** (1984) have also applied this approach to the supracyclical development of capitalism after the Second World War; central to their approach is the thesis that the 'cathartic' function of the 'industrial reserve army' is thwarted.

This theory bears a superficial resemblance to neoclassical explanations of 'voluntary' unemployment as a consequence of wages that are 'too high'. But neoclassical theory explains the latter with reference to ostensibly exogenous factors, particularly the quasi-monopolistic power of labour unions, whereas profit-squeeze theory offers an endogenous explanation in which wages depend on accumulation. To the extent that, in this view, rising wages reflect the scarcity of the offer of labour power, they, too, are market-driven. In an 'operaistic' version of the theory that is more heavily oriented toward class struggle, the workers do indeed plunge capitalism into crisis with high wage demands. The circumstance that neoclassical economists bewail is here cast in a positive light.

Various objections can be brought against the simple version of profit-squeeze theory just sketched (cf. **Shaikh** 1978, 237 et sqq.; **Priewe** 1988, 30 et sqq.). Two of the main objections should be mentioned. Firstly, the the-

ory should take gains in productivity into consideration. A shortage of labour power arises only when growth out-paces productivity gains; a profit-squeeze presupposes that wages rise faster than productivity. Moreover, the increase in the wage-rate would have to more than offset the cheapening of the elements of constant capital which likewise results from gains in productivity. Secondly, although wages are perceived to be a cost factor, they are ignored as a demand factor. Overall, problems of demand and realisation would also have to be taken into consideration. In determining the peak and trough of the business cycle, it would have to be demonstrated that the cost effect of rising or falling wages is in each case more powerful than the countervailing effect of full demand and full capacity utilisation. These objections are met to some extent in more sophisticated versions of the profit-squeeze approach (Itoh/Lapavitsas 1999, 128 et sqq.).

4. Frequently, in the crisis theory debate that sets out from Marx, only certain of his ideas are taken up, and the discussion turns again and again on which Marxist crisis theory is the “right” one: underconsumption theory, overproduction theory, overaccumulation theory, etc. (cf. Itoh 1976; Hoffmann 1983; Prokla et al. 1986; Priewe 1988; Evans 2004). Participants in the debate often take these terms to mean different things, and confusion reigns, above all, about the relative importance of particular arguments in the logic of Marx’s presentation of the critique of political economy. Knowledge at a certain level of abstraction, bearing on particular relationships in the capitalist mode of production, is summarily transposed to more concrete levels, and crises are deduced *in general* from *particular* contradictions of this mode of production. No attention is paid to the fact that Marx describes *different* contradictions of the capitalist mode of production, which can induce crises calling for *different explanations*. ‘In world market crises, all the contradictions of bourgeois production erupt collectively; in particular crises (particular in their content and extent) the eruptions are only sporadic, isolated and one-sided’ (32/163 [26.2/535]).

4.1 The one-sided treatment of crisis theory began with Engels’s popular account in *Anti-Dühring*, where he bases his argument on overproduction theory alone (see *supra*). For Karl Kautsky, too, ‘the great modern crises which convulse the world’s markets’ spring from overproduction, which, however, arises in its turn ‘from the planlessness that inevitably characterizes our system of commodity production’ (1892/1971, 71 et sq.). This emphasis on planlessness paved the way for a major discursive shift and an oversimplification of crisis theory. The discussion in the Second International revolved largely around the question as to whether ever deeper and more comprehensive crises must

sooner or later bring on the breakdown of capitalism, or whether, rather, the elimination of market anarchy that had supposedly accompanied monopolisation could lead to an attenuation of the tendencies to crisis and 'organised capitalism' (Hilferding 1927). Kautsky tries to show that not even the cartelisation of industry can eliminate contradiction and overproduction (80 et sq.).

Eduard Bernstein finds a contradiction in Marx. On the one hand, he says, Marx criticises underconsumption theory in *C II*. On the other, he himself argues in *C III* that the ultimate reason for all crises is the masses' poverty and the restrictions on their consumption, which come into conflict with the development of the forces of production. According to Bernstein, Marx's argument does not substantially differ from Rodbertus's, although Rodbertus, too, was attacked by both Marx and Engels for explaining crises on the basis of the relationship between the masses' underconsumption and the growth of the productive forces (*Preconditions*, 1899/1993, 79 et sq.). Bernstein essays a historical-critical explanation for the contradiction he detects in Marx: the manuscript of *C III*, he claims, antedates the critique of underconsumption theory in *C II*, which, generally speaking, 'contains the latest and ripest fruits of Marx's research' (81).

Bernstein's line of argument becomes problematic above all when he tries to justify the idea of an attenuation of the tendencies to crisis. Initially, he refers approvingly to Engels's remark in *C III* that the expansion of the means of transportation and communication and also of fields open to the investment of capital has 'eliminated or strongly reduced' 'most of the old breeding-grounds of crises and opportunities for their development' (37/488, fn. 8 [25/506]), and that the formation of cartels and trusts has reduced domestic competition in the nation-states. He does not, however, share Engels's judgement that 'every factor which works against a repetition of the old crises' contains 'the germ of a far more powerful future crisis' (ibid.): 'no signs of a worldwide economic crash of unprecedented violence have been detected', Bernstein writes, 'nor can the improvement of trade between crises be characterised as particularly short-lived' (Bernstein 1899/1993, 83 et sq.). The question is '(1) whether the enormous geographical expansion of the world market in conjunction with the extraordinary reduction in the time required for transport and the transmission of news have not so increased the possibilities of *levelling out* disturbances, and (2) whether the enormously increased wealth of the European industrial states in conjunction with the elasticity of the modern credit system and the rise of industrial cartels have not so diminished the *reactive force* of local or individual disturbances on the general state of business that, at least for some time, general trade crises similar to the earlier ones are to be regarded as unlikely'. (84)

Bernstein criticises **Luxemburg's** view (1899/2004, 136 et sqq.) that credit does not mitigate, but exacerbates crises. He refers here to **Marx's** reasoning in *C III*, correctly pointing out that it is at the very least one-sided to ascribe only destructive effects to credit. It is, however, just as one-sided to hold up only the stabilising function of credit, as he himself does (**Bernstein** 1899/1993, 85–88). Not only does Bernstein fail to provide adequate justification for his thesis that 'credit nowadays is subject not to more but to fewer of the contractions that lead to a general paralysis of production and is to that extent becoming less of a factor in the creation of crises' (90); his thesis has also been empirically invalidated, as historical developments have shown.

Luxemburg upholds the thesis that the global market cannot expand forever and that the result of the 'market's extension and subsequent exhaustion' is that the forces of production 'inevitably butt up against the limits of the market'. The result is, in other words, 'genuine capitalist old-age crises' (GW 1/1, 385). **Bernstein** disagrees: 'there is', he points out, 'not only an extensive but also an *intensive* expansion of the world market and [...] nowadays the latter is of much greater importance than the former. In the trade statistics of the major industrial countries, exports to countries with long-established populations play by far the greatest role. [...] The extension of the world market takes place much too slowly to provide a sufficient outlet for the actual increase in production, were it not for the fact that the countries already involved offered it an ever larger market. No a priori limit can be set for this intensive expansion of the world market, which takes place at the same time as its spatial extension' (1899/1993, 89 et sq.).

Bernstein's and **Luxemburg's** assessments of cartels likewise diverge. Above all, **Luxemburg** contests the view that cartels can 'become, even approximately, the dominant form of production' (1899/2004, 136). She rightly observes that monopoly profits 'can only increase the rate of profit in one branch of industry at the expense of another' and that, consequently, cartelisation 'cannot be generalized' (137). There can be no question of 'the elimination of industrial anarchy' (*ibid.*), for 'cartels ordinarily succeed in obtaining an increase of the rate of profit in the internal market at the cost of having to sell the product of the excess portion of their capital – that which couldn't be absorbed by the internal market – on foreign markets at a much lower rate of profit. [...] The result is the sharpening of competition abroad' (*ibid.*). **Bernstein**, in contrast, regards cartels as 'an enhancement of all previous remedies for overproduction' (1899/1993, 94). He pronounces no final judgement about the extent to which 'cartels can have a modifying effect on the nature and frequency of crises' (*ibid.*), arguing that not enough experience has been amassed to justify one (*ibid.*). It is, however, plain to him that, under these circumstances, 'there are

even fewer fixed points of reference for the predetermination of future *general* crises, as **Marx** and **Engels** originally envisioned them, as aggravated repetitions of the crises of 1825, 1836, 1847, 1857, and 1873' (ibid.). Indeed, the fact that socialists long considered contraction of the industrial cycle to be 'a natural consequence of the increasing concentration of capital – a spiral development', whereas Engels, in 1894, 'felt obliged to ask whether we were not facing a new *extension* of the cycle. [...] serves as a warning against the abstract inference that these crises must repeat themselves in the old form' (94 et sq.). Since then, history has shown that the forms of crisis have indeed changed. There can, however, be no question of eliminating crises in general by modifying the way capitalism is regulated.

Bernstein subscribes to **Marx's** affirmation that the turnover of fixed capital harbours a significant moment of crisis, but contends that 'it is no longer correct that these periods of renewal occur at the same time in the various industries. And thus a further factor of the great general crisis is eliminated' (1899/1993, 95).

In a certain sense, **Bernstein's** critique of breakdown theory is also aimed at Social Democracy's wait-and-see attitude: 'From the standpoint of the workers, it seems to me to be much more important at present to keep in mind the potentialities of cartels and trusts than to prophesy their "impotency". Whether in the long run they are able to achieve their prime objective, the prevention of crises, is in itself a minor question for the working class. But it becomes a very significant question as soon as expectations of any kind as regards the movement for the liberation of the working class are linked to the general crisis. For then the idea that cartels can do nothing to prevent crises can be the cause of fatal neglect' (96).

Overall, according to **Bernstein**, we can 'only establish what elements in the modern economy promote crises and what forces impede them. It is impossible to decide a priori the ultimate relation of these forces to one another, or their development. Unless unforeseen *external* events bring about a general crisis – and as we have said, that can happen any day – there is no compelling reason to conclude, on purely economic grounds, that such a crisis is imminent' (ibid.).

4.2 In *Social Reform or Revolution* (1899/2004), **Luxemburg** asks why there has been no acute commercial crisis for over two decades since 1873, and whether this is an indication that crises have been eliminated, as **Bernstein** assumes. She distinguishes the 'essence' of **Marx's** theory of crisis from 'one of its secondary exterior aspects', the ten-year cycle (2008, 52) characteristic of the pre-1873 period. 'If we take a closer look at what, each time, caused all the big global crises to date, we will be persuaded that they were without exception expres-

sions of the weakness of the capitalist economy not in its old age, but, rather, in its childhood' (GW 1/1, 383). Thus 'up to now, the sudden extension of the domain of [the] capitalist economy, and not its shrinking, was each time the cause of the commercial crisis. That the international crises repeated themselves precisely every ten years was a purely exterior fact, a matter of chance' (2008, 53).

In *Finance Capital* (1910), **Hilferding** maintains that explanations of crises based on overconsumption or overproduction are inadequate. 'Anyone who simply equates crises with the overproduction of commodities misses precisely the essential point. [...] The products are not simply commodities, but products of capital, and overproduction during a crisis is not just overproduction of commodities, but overproduction of capital. This simply means that capital is invested in production in such volume that the conditions of its utilization have come into contradiction with the conditions of its valorization, so that the sale of products no longer yields a profit sufficient to ensure its further expansion and accumulation' (1981, 295). Hilferding endeavours to come up with an integral account of the causes of crises that takes into consideration the tendential fall of the rate of profit due to the growing organic composition of capital, the rise in wages during boom periods, and problems of realisation (257–66). Above all, he attempts, setting out from **Marx's** fragmentary discussions in *C III*, to take credit relations systematically into account (267–81). He also seeks to show that the extension of capitalist production and the concentration and centralisation of capital attenuate crises. His assumption is that, with the suppression of production for domestic needs and of simple commodity production, as well as the increasing dependence of social reproduction on capitalist commodity production, the proportion of capitalist production that continues even during a crisis grows (289). He considers the production of commodities to meet everyday necessities to be more stable than the production of means of production. This is plausible only in a qualified sense. What tends to make it unlikely is the fact that, as development proceeds, there is a rise in the organic composition of capital and also in the proportion of consumption represented by durable consumer goods. Furthermore, **Hilferding** believes that the concentration and centralisation of capital lead to greater stability of firms and also banks (289–93), making speculation less significant. These theses do not appear plausible in light of the crises that have occurred since.

Although **Luxemburg**, in *The Accumulation of Capital* (1913), does not go into **Hilferding's** account, her work is directed against such conceptions, which are premised on the notion that crises are attenuated in the course of capitalist development. Yet her aim in *Accu* is not really to elaborate a theory of crisis, but, rather, to clarify the question as to how extended reproduction of total social

capital is possible at all. 'Although the periodic economic cycle [...] and crisis', according to **Luxemburg**, 'are essential moments of reproduction, they do not constitute the problem of capitalist reproduction in itself. In order to present the problem of capitalist reproduction in its pure form, it must instead be considered quite apart from this periodic cycle and crises' (11). The effect of crises, she argues, is to make 'capitalist reproduction fluctuate [...] around the level of the total requirements of society that are backed by the ability to pay' (ibid.) It is possible to establish 'an average, a mean volume of reproduction [...] for the whole cycle', and Luxemburg seeks to discover how this average comes about (13 et sq.). However, her conception of the problem of reproduction, which she works out by way of a critique of **Marx's** reproduction schemas in *CI*, has major implications for crisis theory. She wishes to show that extended reproduction is impossible on the sole basis of the exchange between workers and capitalists. Workers and capitalists 'can only ever realize the variable capital, the part of constant capital that is used up and the part of surplus value that is consumed, thus merely satisfying the conditions for the renewal of production on the previous scale. By contrast, the part of surplus value that is to be capitalized cannot possibly be realized by the workers and capitalists themselves. The realization of surplus value for the purposes of accumulation is thus an impossible task in a society consisting only of workers and capitalists' (252). **Luxemburg** concludes that 'if the consumption fund of the capitalists is disregarded altogether in order to simplify the problem, then the realization of surplus value requires a circle of purchasers beyond capitalist society. [...] The decisive moment here is that surplus value can be realized neither by workers nor by capitalists, but by social strata or societies that do not engage in capitalist production' (253). 'The accumulation process of capital', she goes on to say, 'is tied to noncapitalist forms of production in all of its value relations and material relations – i.e. with regard to constant capital, variable capital, and surplus value. These non-capitalist forms of production form the given historical setting for this process. The accumulation of capital cannot adequately be presented under the presupposition of the exclusive and absolute dominance of the capitalist mode of production – in fact it is inconceivable in every respect without the noncapitalist spheres that form its milieu' (262).

Luxemburg conceives of colonialism, militarism, and imperialism as functionally necessary to capitalist reproduction. With increasing capitalist penetration of the whole world and the dissolution of non-capitalist forms and modes of production, expanded reproduction eventually reaches its limits. 'The more violently capital uses militarism to exterminate noncapitalist strata both at home and abroad, and to worsen living standards for all strata of workers, the more the day-to-day history of capital accumulation on the world stage

is transformed into a continuous series of political and social catastrophes and convulsions, which, together with the periodic economic cataclysms in the form of crises, will make it impossible for accumulation to continue, and will turn the rebellion of the international working class against the rule of capital into a necessity, even before the latter has come up against its natural, self-created economic constraints. Capitalism is the first form of economy with propagandistic power; it is a form that tends to extend itself over the globe and to eradicate all other forms of economy – it tolerates no other alongside itself. However, it is also the first that is unable to exist alone, without other forms of economy as its milieu and its medium. Thus, a[t] the same time as it tends to become the universal form, it is smashed to smithereens by its intrinsic inability to be a universal form of production' (341).

4.3 **Luxemburg's** thesis has been widely criticised (cf. e.g. **Bukharin** 1926/1972). **Otto Bauer** (1912/13) tried to construct a reproduction scheme which meets **Luxemburg's** objections to **Marx's** reproduction schemas and demonstrates the possibility of extended reproduction in a closed capitalist system. According to **Paul Sweezy** (1942), **Luxemburg** analyses *extended* reproduction while setting out from the premises of *simple* reproduction: 'The dogma, which she never questions for a moment, that the consumption of workers can realize no surplus value implies that the total amount of variable capital, and hence also the consumption of workers, must always remain fixed and constant as in simple reproduction. Actually accumulation typically involves adding to variable capital, and when this additional variable capital is spent by workers it realizes a part of the surplus value which has the physical form of consumption goods' (204). **Luxemburg** also underestimates the possibilities for exchange among capitalists in Department I (means of production) as well as the possibilities for realisation created by credit. Despite her rather unconvincing critique of **Marx's** reproduction schemas and the objections that her theory of accumulation invites, that theory has, in light of historical developments, always had a stimulating effect on subsequent theorisation (for a critical appreciation and defence of **Luxemburg's** theory of accumulation, see **Bellofiore** 2009). **Burkart Lutz** (1984) takes up **Luxemburg's** ideas in his depiction of the 'domestic land grab' and its limits after the Second World War, with a view to explaining the reasons for the end of the 'short dream of perpetual prosperity' under Fordism. For feminist analyses of 'the ongoing primitive accumulation of capital', which concern themselves with the relationship between capital accumulation and gender relations, social relations to nature, and the "Third World", **Luxemburg's** theory has proven to be of fundamental importance (cf. **Mies** 1986, 34–36). **David Harvey**, too (2003), takes up her theory in his account of 'accumula-

tion by dispossession' under the 'new imperialism'. Wolfgang Fritz **Haug** applies **Luxemburg's** thesis on the necessary existence of a precapitalist environment to capitalism's penetration of the post-communist countries (HTK II, 148). He also applies it to 'the expansionary thrust, based on high technology, into natural domains opened up for the first time by science and technology; to the appropriation and valorisation, protected by patents, of such virgin territory' (HTK I, 38 et sq.); and to the 'technological-economic development gap' that makes it possible for 'more highly developed capital to gobble up less highly developed capital' (HTK II, 149 and *passim*).

Henryk **Grossmann** (1929) conceives of crises as situations in which the tendencies counteracting overaccumulation take effect – in other words, as 'passing deviation[s] from the trend of capitalism' (85). Unlike **Luxemburg** and earlier underconsumption theorists, **Grossmann** tries to justify the notion that capitalism must necessarily collapse due to a long-term decrease in the *mass* of profit that can be accumulated. With the help of the reproduction scheme elaborated by Otto **Bauer** (1912/1913), **Grossmann** attempts to show that a decrease in the mass of profit (and not just in the rate of profit) is inevitable (1929, 59 et sqq.). *Despite* crises, 'despite the periodic interruptions that repeatedly diffuse the tendency towards breakdown, the mechanism as a whole tends relentlessly toward its final end with the general process of accumulation. As the accumulation of capital grows absolutely, the valorisation of this expanded capital becomes more difficult' (85). **Sweezy** comments that '**Bauer's** scheme breaks down from a shortage of surplus value. By a breath-taking mental leap **Grossmann** concludes that the capitalist system must also break down from a shortage of surplus value. [...] Grossmann's theory exhibits in extreme form the dangers of mechanistic thinking in social science. Reproduction schemes [...] are useful as a method of making comprehensible the character of a certain set of relations. But to take any particular, and necessarily arbitrary, scheme and assume that it faithfully represents the essentials of the real process of capital accumulation is to invite theoretical disaster' (1942/1962, 210 et sq.; for a defence of **Grossmann** against **Sweezy**, see **Kuhn** 2005.)

4.4 With his quarterly reports on 'The Economy and Economic Policy', published from 1922 on, Eugen **Varga** may be considered the founder of Marxist analysis of the business cycle (see **Varga** 1977). Departing from the usual practice of bourgeois business-cycle research, his analyses of the business cycle are not based on the evaluation of statistical data alone, but also go into political developments and attempt political prognoses. Following **Lenin's** *Imperialism*, they are based on the notion that capitalism is in a 'period of decline', a 'general crisis' that 'cannot be pinned down to a specific year, month, or day' (**Varga**

1969, 424). The ‘first stage’ of this decline, Varga argues, coincides ‘with the full development of the monopoly stage of capitalism’ (425). Thus crisis as one phase of the business cycle must be distinguished from ‘general crisis’, a feature of a stage of capitalism that is as a whole characterised by the fact that the relations of production can henceforth be maintained only by means of ‘deliberate limitation of production and of the development of the forces of production’ (215). After the Second World War, Varga contributed to elaborating the theory of “state monopoly capitalism” (stamocap), which became official doctrine under Soviet-style state socialism. The analyses of the business cycle that he published in the 1920s and 1930s had pointed out the contradictions between the interests of different fractions of the capitalist class and the attendant dilemmas for state policy. Stamocap theory, in contrast, presents monopoly capitalism and the state as ‘intertwined. [...] the close interconnection between the state and the monopolies finds further expression in the fact that they take joint decisions on important economic questions’ (430 et sq.). In the framework of stamocap theory, Varga thematises new phenomena such as the flattening out of business cycles after the Second World War, continuing underutilisation of productive capacity, and inflationary price increases due to state-monopoly regulation (cf. **Wygodski** 1972, 477 et sqq.; **Hemberger** et al. 1965, 325 et sqq.). In 1982, Hans **Mottek** put forward an account of overproduction theory that was characterised above all by its differentiation of levels of abstraction.

4.5 Paul **Baran** and **Sweezy** (1966) work out a peculiar variety of underconsumption theory by combining Marxist and (post-)Keynesian ideas. They argue that it is not the fall in the rate of profit or a shrinking mass of profit that leads to problems of reproduction in ‘monopoly capitalism’, but, rather, the need to ‘absorb’ a growing ‘surplus’ (for a critique, see **Hermanin** et al. 1969). Owing to insufficient opportunities for consumption and investment, they contend, ‘the *normal* state of the monopoly capitalist economy is stagnation’ (**Baran/Sweezy** 1966, 108). They interpret planned obsolescence of commodities as well as the expansion of advertising and state spending, above all on arms, as attempts to ensure absorption of the surplus. From a similar point of view, Harry **Magdoff** had made the need for constant expansion of credit and the resulting problem of over-indebtedness a subject of discussion as early as 1965. **Sweezy** and **Magdoff** repeatedly utilised this approach in empirical analyses of crises (see **Sweezy/Magdoff** 1972; **Magdoff/Sweezy** 1981, 1987, 1988). On the same basis, **John Bellamy Foster** and **Fred Magdoff** (2009) have put forward an explanation of the crisis that began in 2007 and the ‘financialisation’ that preceded it.

In his analysis of ‘late capitalism’, Ernest **Mandel** (1972) criticises theories that derive the dynamics of capitalism from a single variable, emphasising that

Marx conceives of 'world trade crises [...] as the real concentration and forcible adjustment of all the contradictions of bourgeois economy' (32/140 [26.2/510]; **Mandel** 1975, 38). **Mandel** distinguishes 'six basic variables of the [capitalist] mode of production' (39): the organic composition of capital, the distribution of constant capital between fixed and circulating capital, the development of the rate of surplus value, the development of the rate of accumulation (the relation between productively and unproductively consumed surplus value), the development of the turnover-time of capital, and the relations of exchange between the two departments of production of means of production and production of consumer goods (ibid.). In **Mandel's** view, 'all the basic variables of this mode of production can partially and periodically perform the role of autonomous variables' (ibid.); they are 'partially independent and partially interdependent in function' (43). 'Fluctuations in the rate of profit are the seismograph' of the history of capitalism, but they are 'only results which must themselves be explained by the interplay of the variables' (39). **Mandel** accordingly attempts to present problems of production and problems of the realisation of surplus value synthetically. After **Parvus**, **van Gelderen**, **Kondratieff**, and **Trotsky**, he distinguishes between 'long waves' and cyclical crises of capital accumulation, which overlap (1975, Chapters 4 and 14, 108–46, 438–73). Long waves, which break down into a phase of accelerated and a phase of decelerating accumulation, are determined, as **Mandel** understands it, by technological revolutions, but also political events such as world wars and revolutions, as well as by the inner logic of the process of capital accumulation (120 et sq., 130 et sqq., 144–46). Capital accumulation, according to **Mandel**, proceeds in discontinuous fashion because 'conditions promoting the valorization of capital [...] must in time turn into conditions determining a deterioration in this valorization (in other words, a fall in the average rate of profit)' (145). Crisis cycles in late capitalism are in his view determined by novel phenomena such as the expansion of consumer credit (447 et sq.) or the '*combination of inflationary creation of money to mitigate crises and growing competition on the world market*', which interlock the industrial cycle and the credit cycle in a particular way (454).

4.6 *Regulation theory* stresses the temporal and spatial variability of capitalist relations, proceeding on the assumption that crises can take various forms, each of which is marked by a historically specific capitalist *mode of development*. Robert **Boyer** (1990, 50 et sq.) distinguishes *cyclical* or "minor" crises, which are an integral part of the regulation of a mode of development, from *structural* or "major" crises (**Altvater** 1983 makes a similar argument). Since every mode of development is conceived of as the combination of a regime of *accumulation* and a *mode of regulation*, structural crises can be distinguished

according to whether they originate in the former, the latter, or both (**Boyer** 1990, 52 et sqq., 125). For example, a mode of regulation can go into crisis when there appear disturbances of a novel kind that it cannot overcome, or because social conflicts undermine standing institutional compromises. The dynamics of accumulation itself can destroy the social forms that had previously sustained it. Depending on which contradictions of the capitalist mode of production come to the fore, crises can result from problems of realisation or a fall in the rate of profit due to the rising organic composition of capital, but also from changes in distribution unfavourable to capital. The working class can be either too weak (underconsumption) or too strong (the profit-squeeze) from the standpoint of accumulation.

Thus **Alain Lipietz** (1988, 26 et sq.) understands the crisis of the 1930s as, above all, a crisis of overproduction, because the techniques of Fordist mass production had not yet been combined with an adequate mode of regulation that would have allowed sufficiently dynamic development of wage-worker mass consumption. In contrast, he traces the crisis of the 1970s back, first and foremost, to the exhaustion of the productivity gains achievable on the basis of the Taylorist-Fordist organisation of labour. A slowdown in the growth of productivity led to falling rates of profit and stagflation. The causes of the crisis, rooted in production, could not be overcome by crisis resolution policies that, initially, had a Keynesian slant. The late 1970s neoliberal offensive and the destruction of the Fordist mode of regulation were thus anything but accidental (31 et sqq.; cf. **Boyer** 1990, 53 et sqq.; **Aglietta** 1979; **Mazier** et al. 1982).

4.7 In 1998, **Robert Brenner** sparked controversy with an original approach to explaining economic developments in the leading capitalist countries after the Second World War. Like members of the regulation school, he discerned a long-term decline in capital accumulation in the 1970s and 1980s after the extraordinary phase of prosperity of the 1950s and 1960s. At the same time, **Brenner**, who had presented a thoroughgoing critique of regulation theory with **Mark Glick** in 1991, rejected all “offer side” explanations of crisis that turned on declining productivity gains, a rise in the organic composition of capital, or a profit-squeeze brought on by a relative increase in wages. He likewise rejected Keynesian underconsumption theory. At the centre of his account of the dynamics of the global economy, **Brenner** put the intensification of international competition due initially to the catch-up industrialisation of Japan and Western Europe, followed by that of the “newly industrialising countries” of East Asia; this had led, he argued, to a build-up of overcapacity in manufacturing industry and thus to a fall in profit rates. He attributed the persistent tendency towards stagnation to the fact that depreciation of capital and thus reduction of overcapacity had been blocked. For, in **Brenner’s** view, insofar as

producers owned fixed capital, it made sense for them to continue producing even with outmoded methods, defending their market shares, as long as they continued to make an average profit on their circulating capital. Weaker competitors could be eliminated and the market shaken out only at the price of a declining average rate of profit. Brenner regards the major dislocations in currency relations after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system as turning points at which the opportunities for export and growth were redistributed, making it possible for one economy or one region of the triad temporarily to overcome its problems of overcapacity at the expense of the others.

Brenner's account set off a lively debate and elicited a flurry of critiques (cf. *Historical Materialism* 4 and 5). Among the points that drew criticism were, for instance, the fact that he focused on competitive relations rather than the dynamics of production; that he ignored the internationalisation of capital and the importance of credit; and that his analysis was not grounded in value theory (Fine et al. 1999). By way of an empirical study of the steel industry, Ben Fine and others (2005) contested **Brenner's** thesis that the depreciation of capital and the destruction of productive capacity had been blocked.

4.8 With the great crisis that began in 2007, the crisis theory debate has acquired renewed significance. This crisis was interpreted as resulting from a fall in the rate of profit due to the rising organic composition of capital (Kliman 2012); as a crisis of overproduction caused by increasing redistribution to the detriment of wage workers (Husson 2009; Huffschnid 2010, 21 et sqq.); as the result of a 'financialisation' of capitalism (Lapavitsas 2009); as a structural crisis of a 'finance-dominated accumulation regime' (Sablowski 2009; Demirović/Sablowski 2012); as the 'Great Crisis of High-Tech Capitalism' (Haug 2012), and so on. Connections were also drawn between the worldwide financial and economic crisis and the crises in gender relations and in society's relations to nature; they suggest that we should speak about a 'multiple crisis' of capitalism (Wolf 2009, Altvater 2010, Demirović et al. 2011).

5. *Economic and political crises, organic crises, crises of hegemony.* – In analysing situations, Antonio Gramsci distinguishes 'organic movements', which are 'relatively permanent', from 'movements which may be termed "conjunctural"'. Here 'organic' refers to a crisis that 'sometimes last[s] for decades', the 'exceptional duration' of which 'means that incurable structural contradictions have revealed themselves' (SPN, N. 13, § 17, 177 et sq.).

5.1 Gramsci asks 'whether the fundamental historical crises are directly determined by economic crises'. His answer is that they are not: 'it may be ruled out

that immediate economic crises of themselves produce fundamental historical events; they can simply create a terrain more favourable to the dissemination of certain modes of thought, and certain ways of posing and resolving questions involving the entire subsequent development of national life' (184). Thus organic crises are an object in their own right, calling for special study. They are characterised by the fact that 'social classes become detached from their traditional parties', and that these parties, 'in that particular organisational form, with the particular men who constitute, represent, and lead them, are no longer recognised by their class (or a fraction of a class) as its expression' (*SPN*, N. 13, § 23, 210). The process in which 'these situations of conflict between "represented and the representatives"' come about is different in every country, 'although the content is the same. And the content is the crisis of the ruling class's hegemony, which occurs either because the ruling class has failed in some major political undertaking for which it has requested, or forcibly extracted, the consent of the broad masses (war, for example), or because huge masses (especially of peasants and petit-bourgeois intellectuals) have passed suddenly from a state of political passivity to a certain activity, and put forward demands which taken together, albeit not organically formulated, add up to a revolution' (*ibid.*). Organic crises are therefore authentic political processes, but they are not altogether independent of economic crises. In his analysis of Americanism, Gramsci observes that an organic crisis can be 'much more accelerated than normal because of the introduction and [sudden] spread of a new mode of production' (*PN*, vol. 2, 1996, N. 3, § 11, 18).

Gramsci regards organic crises as dangerous 'because the field is open for violent solutions, for the activities of unknown forces, represented by charismatic "men of destiny"', and because 'the various strata of the population are not all capable of orienting themselves equally swiftly, or of reorganising with the same rhythm. The traditional ruling class, which has numerous trained cadres, changes men and programmes and, with greater speed than is achieved by the subaltern classes, reabsorbs the control that was slipping from its grasp' (*SPN*, N. 13, § 23, 210). Thus if economic crises do not directly lead to social revolution, the same holds for organic crises as well. Rather, it is possible for the state form to change, but for the dominant class to maintain its hold over state power. In his discussion of these questions, Gramsci evokes Bonapartism, military dictatorships, and fascism.

5.2 Gramsci's ideas were taken up by Nicos Poulantzas (1976). Poulantzas distinguishes between economic, political, and ideological crises, as well as state crises. To explain economic crises, he appeals to the 'law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall' (2000, 173), while affirming his opposition to any determ-

inistic understanding of this 'law'. According to Poulantzas, it is not intended to predict an empirical fall of the rate of profit. The extent to which the tendency to a fall in the profit rate prevails, or is counteracted by opposed tendencies such as depreciation of constant capital or a rise in the rate of surplus value, depends on the class struggle, in Poulantzas's view (173 et sq.). Crises are the mode in which these countervailing tendencies come into play in concentrated, 'spontaneous' fashion. Economic crises, so Poulantzas, are necessary for the reproduction of capitalism, as long as they do not translate into political crises in which the overthrow of capitalism might be on the agenda.

Poulantzas argues against the mechanistic, economistic conception of crisis that, he says, was dominant in the Communist International and, in his view, not completely abandoned even later. Since, for the Third International, capitalism in its monopoly-capitalist stage was in crisis generally, it was customary to talk about a 'general crisis of capitalism' that would go on until capitalism had been overcome. Here the specificity of the concept of crisis goes by the boards. To avoid that consequence, Poulantzas distinguishes between elements that *generate crisis*, which are always at work in the reproduction of capitalism, and crisis as such, which he conceives of as a special situation involving the condensation of capitalism's contradictions (1976, 296). Against teleological conceptions of crisis, he asserts that it is not crisis which leads to the end of capitalism, but class struggle (*ibid.*).

For **Poulantzas**, political crises are situations in which contradictions in the political sphere are condensed in a way that calls the existing mode of political domination into question (298 et sq.). This implies, according to his theory of political domination, that relations between leaders and the led, representatives and the represented enter into crisis on two levels. Firstly, the previously hegemonic class or class fraction of the power bloc is no longer able to exercise its hegemony in that bloc. Secondly, the power bloc's hegemony over the dominated classes begins to crumble. The analysis of political crises is of strategic importance, inasmuch as these crises create relatively open-ended situations allowing of different solutions: the existing state form can be reproduced or replaced by another, while certain situations can usher in a transition to another mode of production and thus to revolutionary change in the social formation as a whole. Not every political crisis, however, is identical to a revolutionary situation or a crisis of fascistisation (*ibid.*). For Poulantzas, political crises are first and foremost based on substantial modifications of the relations of force in the class struggle. Where the power bloc is concerned, this involves contradictions between classes and the configuration of class alliances; where the exploited and dominated are concerned, it constitutes the condition for the emergence of new social forces, the relations between the forms of organisa-

tion and representation of the classes and between the classes themselves, and also, finally, new contradictions between the power bloc and certain classes supporting it (299 et sq.).

Poulantzas distinguishes state crises from political crises. In the former, the state can no longer fulfil its function of organising the power bloc and disorganising the dominated classes. Political crisis includes state crisis as one of its elements, but is not reducible to it. Poulantzas underscores the difference as well as the interconnection between the two types of crisis, because bourgeois science, in his view, conceives of political crises above all as institutional crises or crises of the “political system”, which is to say that it tends to reduce political crises to state crises. Poulantzas, in contrast, attributes state crises to crises of state power, and the latter, in turn, to modifications in the relations of force in the class struggle. However, because of the capitalist state’s relative autonomy from the power bloc, and the specific separation of the state’s organisational framework from the economic sphere, this determination operates neither directly nor univocally (300). Over against economic conceptions, Poulantzas conceives of political class struggle, the object of which is state power and the state apparatus, as irreducible to economic struggle, with the result that an economic crisis does not translate necessarily and in a unified way into a political crisis and a state crisis (298). *Whether* and *when* an economic crisis grows over into a political crisis cannot, consequently, be determined in a general way.

To the extent that economic crises translate into political crises, **Poulantzas** speaks of *structural crises* or, in **Gramsci**’s sense of the word, *crises of hegemony* or *organic crises*. The term ‘structural’ should not be understood here in the sense in which ‘structure’ is opposed to ‘conjuncture’. Rather, it expresses the fact that the whole set of social relations finds itself in crisis, in other words, that what is in question is *both* an economic *and* a political crisis. This crisis, however, manifests itself in a *conjuncture*, in the sense of a concrete situation of the condensation of contradictions inherent in the social structure (299).

The translation of an economic into a political crisis by no means implies the simultaneity of the two crises or the processes specific to each. Because of the specificity of the political field, displacements often occur. A political crisis can begin belatedly, that is to say, after the economic crisis has peaked, as is exemplified by the relationship between the 1929 economic crisis and the political crisis in Germany that led to the Nazis’ seizure of power in 1933. However, the political crisis can also precede an economic crisis, drawing the economic crisis in its wake: according to **Poulantzas**, this happened in the France of the May 1968 Paris events and in Salvador **Allende**’s Chile (299 et sq.).

Poulantzas holds that a political crisis is always bound up with an *ideological crisis*, and that the latter is one of the constituent elements of the former,

above all because ideological relations are directly present in the constitution and reproduction of the social classes. These ideological relations – in particular, the dominant ideology – are organically present in the very constitution of the state apparatuses. Conversely, one of the state apparatuses' roles consists in reproducing the dominant ideology in its relations to the ideologies or ideological subsets of the dominated classes. Ideology is for Poulantzas, as it is for Gramsci and Althusser, embodied in material practices, in a social formation's customs and ways of life. The fact is that the dominant classes cannot dominate the exploited classes by means of sheer force; rather, the use of force must always be portrayed as legitimate by the dominant ideology, and this presupposes a consensus of the dominated classes or class fractions that is brought about by the state (Poulantzas 1976, 301; 2000, 31). When the class struggle does not lead to a transition to socialism, crisis can pave the way for the restoration of the dominant class's hegemony and the adaptation of the capitalist state to the new realities of the class struggle (1976, 296 et sq.). Thus not only economic, but also political crises can play a functional role in capitalist domination; whether or not they do can, however, be ascertained only *ex post facto*.

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→ accumulation, autonomisation, bank, bank note, capital, Capital-editions, capital export, capitalist mode of production, casino capitalism, central bank, circulation, class struggle, classical political economy, commodity, composition plans, conditions of reproduction, credit, credit crisis, crisis, crisis of fordism, critique of political economy, cycles in planned economy, depreciation, destruction of capital, debt crisis, economic crisis, economic cycle, factors of production, fictitious capital, financial crisis, finance capital, financial markets, fordism, fractions of capital, impoverishment, immiseration, industrial capital, industrial reserve army, inflation, interest, international mobility of capital, Keynesianism, labour market, land seizure/land grab, legitimation crisis, long waves of conjuncture, Luxemburgism, Malthusianism, market, market economy, military keynesianism, mode of production, money, monopoly, monopoly capital, moral depreciation, nationalisation, organic composition, organised capitalism, overaccumulation, political economy, postfordism, productive forces, productivity, profit, radical economics, rate of interest, rate of profit, rate of surplus value, regulation school, relations of production, reproduction, reproduction schemes, revolution, simple circulation, stagflation, state capitalism, state monopoly capitalism, stock exchange, surplus value, Taylorism, tendential fall of the profitrate, theory of revolution, theory of the collapse [of capitalism], turnover of capital, underconsumption, unemployment, vulgar economy, world economy, world market

→ Akkumulation, Arbeitslosigkeit, Arbeitsmarkt, Aufbaupläne, Bank, Banknote, Börse, einfache Zirkulation, fiktives Kapital, Finanzkapital, Finanzkrise, Finanzmärkte, Fordismus, Geld, industrielle Reservearmee, industrielles Kapital, Inflation, Kapital, Kapital-Editionen, Kapitalentwertung/-vernichtung, Kapitalexport, Kapitalfraktionen, kapitalistische Produktionsweise, Kapital, konstantes und variables, Kapitalmobilität (internationale), Kapitalumschlag, Kasino-Kapitalismus, Keynesianismus, Klassenkampf, klassische politische Ökonomie, Konjunktur (ökonomische), Kredit, Kreditkrise, Krise, Krise des Fordismus, Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, Landnahme, Lange Wellen der Konjunktur, Legitimationskrise, Luxemburgismus, Malthusianismus, Markt, Marktwirtschaft, Mehrwert, Mehrwertrate, Militärkeynesianismus, Monopol, Monopolkapital, moralischer Verschleiß, ökonomische Konjunktur, organische Zusammensetzung, politische Ökonomie, organisierter Kapitalismus, Postfordismus, Produktionsfaktoren, Produktionsverhältnisse, Produktionsweise, Produktivität, Produktivkräfte, Profit, Profitrate, Radical Economics, Realisation, Regulationstheorie, Reproduktion, Reproduktionsbedingungen, Reproduktionsschemata, Revolution, Revolutionstheorie, Schuldenkrise, Staatskapitalismus, staatsmonopolistischer Kapitalismus, Stagflation, Taylorismus, ten-

denzieller Fall der Profitrate, Überakkumulation, Unterkonsumtion, Verelendung, Verselbständigung, Verstaatlichung, Vulgärökonomie, Ware, Weltmarkt, Weltwirtschaft, Wirtschaftskrise, Zentralbank, Zins, Zinsfuß, Zirkulation, Zusammenbruchstheorie, Zyklen in der Planwirtschaft

Cybertariat

A: kibartāriya. – F: cybertariat. – G: Kybertariat. – R: kibertariat. – S: cibertariado. – C: gāokējì wúchǎn jiējí 高科技无产阶级

What changes would the transformation to a high-tech mode of production on a capitalist basis bring with it? A snapshot of this question: the ruptures in the working classes, the formation of new groups of employees, and the mass inclusion of women in the process of production drove Ursula **Huws** to introduce the neologism C. Her book, named after Edward P. **Thompson's** *The Making of the English Working Class* (1963), is titled *The Making of a Cybertariat* (2003). Like Thompson, she assumes a long learning process before the C perceives 'itself as such' (2001, 20). The expression points to the emergence of a distinguishable group of employees in data processing, while simultaneously postulating an epochal tendency whereby the working class prospectively merges into the C.

1. 'Having to invent a new word' seems to **Huws** as 'a sort of failure – a failure to use the existing language intelligently enough' (2010a). The prefix 'cyber' stems from the Greek κυβερνήτης – navigator – or rather the later cybernetics, the science of control and information transmission; its ending refers to the proletariat. The new configuration is the result of a 'desperate' search for a term to describe how digital technology transforms 'the global army of workers whose jobs involve processing information'. **Huws** inquires as to whether the groups subsumed under this label 'might constitute a common class which is not delineated in most orthodox sociological taxonomies of class' (ibid.). By this, she means the 'groups standing between the paradigmatic proletariat and bourgeoisie', brought forth by 'a growing complexity in the division of labour' and performing "office work" transformed by information and communications technologies (2001, 2).

Huws poses the question of their conditions, division and unity, their self-understanding and their transnational organisation in the ongoing de- and recomposition of the working classes. From a feminist perspective, she devotes particular attention to the new possibilities of work 'from home', telecommuting or homeworking. Both computer and Internet suggest improved compatibility of waged and domestic labour. The effects, however, are contradictory. The isolated form of work generally leads to renewed disorganisation of the

primarily female homeworking labour forces, not least because the computer as an instrument of production and consumption further blurs 'the boundaries between work and consumption' (2001, 16).

Huws critically investigates the proposed terms for high tech workers: talk of 'information workers' with its implicit 'non-manual' attribute conceals 'the physical reality of pounding a keyboard all day' (2). Against the notion of immaterial labour, she maintains the determination of value through living labour and opposes a 'new orthodoxy [...] in which it becomes taken for granted that "knowledge" is the only source of value', 'that globalisation is an inexorable and inevitable process', in which 'resistance is futile and any assertion of the physical claims of the human body in the here-and-now is hopelessly old-fashioned' (1999, 30). She demonstrates how informatisation increasingly blurs the boundaries between production and the service industry, while simultaneously transforming paid service work into 'unpaid, "consumption" work', such as with online travel booking or computerised airport check-in (2001, 16).

Huws seeks to use the term C to capture a global development. She proceeds from the increasingly complex forms of international division of labour and from here investigates potential starting points for a transnational organisation of the C along production chains (2006, 1 et sqq.). She distinguishes between five moments of investigation and determination of the C: 1. the objective class condition in the form of the 'relationship of their work to capital' ('the ownership or non-ownership of the means of production'); 2. their 'place in the social division of labour (including the gender division of labour in the household)'; 3. their 'comparative income' and their 'social "status"'; 4. their qualifications; 5. their 'consumption habits', 'where they live', or 'the clothes they wear' (2001, 8). Individual groups of cybertarians can be distinguished from one another in these dimensions to a considerable extent. In terms of their relation to capital, they can be formally independent specialists, occupy a dependent but central position within the organisation and development of production, or carry out subordinate tasks in areas such as programming, etc. 'They may be paid a salary, a fee, a commission, a royalty or a lump sum for what they produce' (2010b, 515). Their activities can encompass broad, strategically-oriented leadership and planning duties to highly specialised functions, or rather combinations of different tasks. They can preside over central means of production, such as in software development, which provide them with a large degree of independence, or occupy a subordinate directional function within computer-integrated manufacturing as part of a centrally planned machine system. They can occupy central value-producing positions within the social division of labour or be pushed into necessary but less lucrative positions within reproductive labour. They can, thanks to their

central positioning, potentially enjoy high incomes and raised social status due to their position and occupation, or be reduced to poverty wages in insecure employment and living relations. Their formal qualifications can encompass all possible academic and specialised training – commercial, technical, social-scientific, artistic, etc. Equally diverse are their specific consumption styles, places of residence or clothing. Accordingly, the C is a highly differentiated conglomeration of class segments in each of these dimensions – between a small number of successful “self-managers” with high incomes, more or less established specialists, and a large, growing, and insecure segment of a globalised computer proletariat, or rather an insecure urban cyber-preariat between shifting relations of employment, solo-freelancing, and unemployment.

‘When the only thing which can be predicted with certainty is that there will be more change it is difficult to generalize broadly about occupational trends’, as **Huws** puts it (2001, 12). She nevertheless identifies a potential ‘for the emergence of a common class consciousness amongst information-processing workers, based in a common labour process, common employers and a common relation to capital’ (2001, 19). The strongest forces working against this development are racism and nationalism (*ibid.*).

2. With the ongoing capitalist restructuring of the relation between forces of production and relations of production, workers in the control centres moved into ‘strategic posts’ (**PAQ** 1980, 87), linked to a ‘new self-consciousness’ of the workers that ‘rests on the brain as productive organ’ (**PAQ** 1987, 95). Production costs are shifted from manufacturing to development, from hardware to software production, from industrial production to “services”, while the ‘scientification of industry’ is accompanied by the ‘industrialisation of science’ (**Hack and Hack** 1985, 412 et sqq.). The growing complexity of production brings with it new forms of labour organisation and division. It demands active self-organisation from the workers (even in terms of self-improvement), more individual responsibility alongside simultaneously increasingly cooperative planning, as well as specialisation and an understanding of the total product, fostering ‘cooperative individuality’ above and beyond the status quo (**PAQ** 1978, 135).

2.1 *The Contradictory Relation Between De- and Re-Qualification.* – A ‘new type of qualification’ as analysed by **Gramsci** with a view to the transformation to the Fordist mode of production (*SPN*, N. 22, §13, 311) requires the scientification of production. **Huws** demonstrates the contradictory manner in which the automatising of production processes and computer-aided production-

centric services affects the C. Among other things, it leads to a precarisation of work and reproduction, particularly for women. While management and technical processes are largely reserved for male “experts”, tasks are more likely to be given to women the more standardised, precarious, and performed further away from the company’s location they are – such as from home.

The debate around the consequences of informatisation for worker qualification dates back quite far: Horst Kern and Michael Schumann (1970) predicted a dequalification; Enzo Modugno (1994) or Gianfranco Pala (1997, 59) expected a substitution of intellectual tasks through automation and computerisation, while the PAQ foretold a ‘reduction of unqualified labour’ (1978, 13 et sqq.). Huws also points to the fact that the ‘amount of tacit knowledge’ needed to keep even automated production processes running (2010b, 514) is primarily underestimated. This tends to lead to ‘an unseen slippage of tasks from “knowledge workers” to others, further down the chain’ (ibid.). Modugno, by contrast, claims that ‘the new informatic machine replaces the mind’, as it can “think” without a brain’, whereby ‘the final separation of the human mind from “*general intellect*” is sealed’ (1994, 14 and 16, cited in Haug 2003, 56). By merely seeing the old capital regime reproduced in an intensified form, it misses the newness of the relations due to an inability to grasp the processes as contradictory.

2.2 Autonomy vs. Control. – The repositioning of knowledge and subjectivity through the central instrument of production, the computer, is connected to an expanded relative autonomy of workers in the labour process, in which ‘moments of direction and planning’ are included in their activity (see PAQ 1987, 57 et sqq.). The higher the degree of scientification of the tasks and the more tasks performed on one’s own computer, the more difficult it becomes to maintain direct control over the labour process from above. The precise sequence of activity is no longer dictated, but rather by and large left to the employees themselves to decide as long as they meet proscribed targets. Flat hierarchies, individual target-setting, autonomous groups, and indirect leadership are the new management forms, at least in the most advanced sectors. The incorporation of workers’ knowledge and expanded autonomy make tasks generally more interesting and diverse, the distinction between working time and ‘disposable time’ (Marx 1993, 708) is blurred, particularly in the case of telecommuting which shifts flexibly between home, on the go, and in the office. As work becomes intellectual labour, it cannot ‘stop at the factory gates and office doors. Problems are taken home. They permeate free time’, and demand to be resolved. ‘Such praxes change family life should they become generalised’ (F. Haug 1996a, 75).

Wedged into heteronomous and controlled borders, autonomy is however limited to a narrow sphere deemed advantageous to company competitiveness. This forces employees to internalise views on flexibility and efficiency as well as entrepreneurial thinking into their own thought and action patterns (PAQ 1981, 426 et sq.). Winfried Glissmann and Klaus Peters (2003) describe this process as ‘more pressure through more freedom’. The real subsumption of labour under the capital relation reaches a new qualitative stage: the exploitation of dependent labour forces by capital is shifted onto the active subject towards “self-exploitation” via expanded and simultaneously restricted scopes of action – as Gramsci describes with view to the introduction of the assembly line, the matter at hand here is the creation of a flexible ‘new type of worker and of man’ (SPN, N. 22, §11, 302) on an entirely new scale. This new type of the high-tech age is described by Huws as the flexible cybertarian. The extent of “self-exploitation” and autonomy remains contested. The market becomes the central control instrument, its impact extended into shop floor organisation: control via indices and permanent benchmarking, an orientation towards results and cost efficiency as well as the profit centre principle in every company department leads to forms of internalisation of external demands. The threat of outsourcing further heightens the pressure: primarily ‘in the middle of the value chain’, companies outsource many simple, standardisable activities to cheaper locations (Ramioul/De Vroom 2009, 20; Boes/Kämpf 2011, 132). Internal company as well as global competition secure the utilisation of expanded autonomy for capitalist aims.

The highly qualified are not the only ones to welcome the end of the “nine-to-five trot” and appreciate flexibility. Many cybertarians ‘no longer feel like employees or even workers, but rather like self-responsibly acting, entrepreneurially thinking individuals capable of representing their own interests’ (Candeias 2004a, 398). They often exhibit higher levels of occupational identity, identifying more with their job than was the case for “mass workers” in large factories, albeit in a different, more “abstract” way than traditional skilled workers. The high degree of autonomy and self-organisation contributes significantly to concealing workers’ alienation from their activity, as the activity itself becomes a determining characteristic of their personality. New forms of social control also emerge: because control is partially shifted onto the employees themselves rather than imposed by external functionaries, the structure appears more self-determined and democratic. Benjamin Coriat diagnoses a strong ‘ostracism’ which facilitates the internalisation of company targets, a ‘pressure, exerted collectively by a group onto a group member who fails to abide by targets either imposed or freely established by said member’ (1991, 177). The employees are the ones to force deviant behaviour and non-conformi-

ty back into appropriate conduct, exclude, or even remove if necessary. Marco **Revelli** points to the fact that autonomy and freedom of decision as preconditions of democratic procedures are not granted here. 'It is rather a subaltern democracy, founded on the cooperation of the working group as a peripheral function of entrepreneurial authority' (1997, 34). The world of work's conformist pressure extends into the circle of family and friends, free time, sports, etc. – those who 'fail to keep up have the option of making themselves "fit" again through a diverse supply of therapies' (**Candeias** 2004a, 197). Work and free time are increasingly directed towards maximising one's ability to perform and economic exploitability. The demanded 'stabilisation of the self' [Ich-Stabilisierung] (**Voss/Pongratz** 1998, 132) is supported by neoliberal personal technologies and self-help literature: the latter provides 'not only techniques of efficient time planning, work organisation, or coping with stress', but also outlines 'an exhaustive Leitbild of neoliberal subjectivity – that of the entrepreneur as such' (**Bröckling/Krasmann/Lemke** 2000, 33).

Against the idea that workers can be fully integrated through internalising external control, Nadine **Müller** emphasises that complex creative or developmental labour is 'not entirely decomposable and plannable'. Management usually 'only possesses a rough overview' of (knowledge) production (2010, 281 et sq.). Jörg **Flecker** et al. object to the attempt to increasingly standardise creative labour and make knowledge transferable through the utilisation of wide-ranging documentation and software tools, noting that new sources of errors emerge with it which must be compensated through employee intervention (2009, 94). Whether employed or freelance, these specialists perceive standardisation as a 'threat for their own expertise' (**Valenduc** et al. 2007, 86). It is not only that the transfer of such standardised evaluations is difficult because every development project 'is innovative and thus unique to some degree', so much as 'the lack of willingness to share knowledge is the main obstacle' to transferring this producer knowledge into standardised processes (**Müller** 2010, 288). For this reason, greater autonomy is either granted from the outset or a portion of individual work tasks are dedicated to creating free spaces. The limit of the technical-organisational subsumption of human labour power under capital surfaces in the C.

'Managing creativity involves a series of difficult balancing acts: giving people the freedom to come up with new ideas but making sure that they operate within an overall structure, creating a powerful corporate culture but making sure that it is not too stifling' (*Economist*, 17 June 2010, quoted in **Huws** 2010b, 517). Capitalist form determination brings forth methods intended to mediate between 'the hierarchy in the form of line organisation and (relative) autonomy in the form of projects' (**Müller** 2010, 292). The remaining division between dir-

ection and execution led to inefficiencies, bottlenecks, and mistakes, ultimately to a 'permanent crisis management' and overworking (ibid.).

Discrepancies between actual work demands (that is, the actually necessary work tasks), customer needs, and limited possibilities for their realisation due to management decrees (see PAQ 1987, 19 et sqq.) lead to further stress and injury to the 'pride of the use value of one's own labour power' (Candeias 2006, 20). This is accompanied by the extreme strains imposed by pressure from younger competitors (ibid.). Nevertheless, the company serves as a kind of "community of solidarity and competition" for many within generalised global market competition. Due to competition between production sites, 'concern for one's own position' strains cooperation with foreign colleagues and knowledge transfer in transnational production networks (Boes/Kämpf 2011, 132): Huws identified racisms and economic nationalism [*Standortnationalismus*] as obstacles to the development of a conscious global C. Gender relations are an additional factor. Women tend to be considered less technically competent and limited to subordinate positions. At the same time, the borders of gender identity are blurred at work. Technically trained male experts find themselves subjected to the demands of communicative and "affective labour" in relation to customers generally connoted as "female". Personal overloads caused by the internalised, impersonal pressure of the market and contradictory demands are often perceived as personal failures and linked to the feeling of not being "able to keep up". The 'psycho-physical equilibrium nexus' (Gramsci SPN, N. 22, § 11, 302 et sq.) begins to unravel.

The rapid 'devaluation of one's own knowledge' through accelerated technological development adds further disruption to the equilibrium (Candeias 2004a, 198). Should a computer program change faster than it can be understood and applied in its extensive possibilities, experience and acquired knowledge decline in value, as 'learning by doing' becomes practically impossible. Highly fluctuating employment in technology industries and the equation of innovation with youth are evidence of this devaluation process. With reference to Walter Benjamin, one could say 'experience has fallen in value' (2007, 83 et sq.). Huws assumes that companies can 'tap into an expanding global creative workforce' (2010b, 512). 'Life-long learning' becomes an 'educational endurance test' in which subjects chase after their ever more rapidly expiring utility (Geissler 1998, 79). This kind of permanent qualification, devaluation, and requalification deepens humanity's division between those who succeed and those left behind by this development. This is true of capitalist societies worldwide: Frigga Haug exemplified this with view to 'a country like Mexico, in which [...] use of microelectronics is at the highest level, where the Internet is more integrated at universities than in, for example, wealthy Germany, while

simultaneously roughly half of the population [...] has not even reached the previous state of the forces of production, the transition from agricultural to industrial society, and is probably not envisaged for it' (1996b, 689).

2.3 *Transnational Dispersion.* – Due to the transnationalisation of production, the working class invoked by **Huws** as the C is both further dispersed as well as integrated across borders via cooperative relationships. Global production networks are increasing in both number and density, as the examples of GM, VW, Hoechst, Microsoft, or SAP prove. Outsourcing no longer exclusively concerns the production of parts or component products, but research and development and increasingly IT services as well. Simultaneously or subsequently, developers work in shifts spread across five continents. One draft will be worked on by the next developer before being sent to a third, always in rhythm with the sun's path across the time zones (**Revelli** 1997, 59).

Richard **Sennett** diagnoses a growing 'fragmentation' – while directly productive activities are decomposed and decentralised, modern networked companies take on the operational management and networking of individual production sites: 'The join between nodes in the network is looser; you can take away a part, at least in theory, without destroying other parts' (1998, 48). Flexibility is reached precisely through the *management of incoherence*. But according to **Huws** (2010b, 506), continuously shifting relationships of control and global restructuring make it more difficult for suppliers and particularly employees to position themselves. The integration of a multitude of small and larger units as well as different sites into a translational network raises the complexity of the production process and demands increased cooperation, so that the territorial decentralisation of production brings forth the need to expand central control structures (along with specialised services related to them). The process is thus contradictory, according to **Boy Lütjhe**: the centralism of production planning growing out of the need to cope with the enormous insecurities and risks of transnationalised production counteracts local labour-organisational autonomy (1998, 574; 2001).

The permanent reconfiguring of production structures, transnational relocations, in- and outsourcing of individual departments, high rates of fluctuation, lay-offs and frequent job changes make it difficult to establish stable relations of communication between individuals. **Andreas Boes** and **Tobias Kämpf** (2011, 131) point to the rise of the global semi-periphery, particularly India (but also Central America in relation to outsourcing from the US), as a 'strategic site' for IT services with which a global labour market has emerged for the highly-qualified C. This increases internal company and cross-border pressure and conveys an 'experience of exchangeability' – even relations of per-

manent employment barely manage to provide a sense of security (203). For **Huws**, this belongs to the hallmarks of the new C: every employee is dispensable and replaceable, work can be ‘relocated to any point on the globe where the right infrastructure is available together with a workforce with the appropriate skills’ (1999, 42).

Against the backdrop of growing transnationalisation and standardisation, new forms of labour organisation have been scaled back in recent years: a ‘cultural break’ in the companies themselves, introduced as early as the crisis of the new economy but which had since led to wide-ranging ‘shifts in the order of recognition’ (**Boes/Kämpf** 2011, 204). A ‘system of permanent testing’ had been consolidated (**Boes/Bultemeier** 2008). A roll-back of spaces of autonomy, intensification of control, intensification and precarisation of work along with hyperexploitation followed from the capital side. On the wage earners’ side, this led to widespread demotivation and creative blockages, both through “self-exploitation” in flexible, de-hierarchised labour relations as well as through the narrow limits of company rules and despotism, constant insecurity or a lack of prospects. In many cases, this meant exhaustion and chronic illness ranging from depression to stomach ulcers, along with insufficient requalification. Labour productivity declines in these areas as a result. ‘The potentials of the new productive forces cannot be further realised under neoliberal relations of production.’ (**Candeias** 2010, 8)

3. *Organisational Requirements.* – No class-conscious C has thus far flocked to works councils elections or into the trade unions. Alongside occupational organisations such as the *Confédération Générale de Cadre* or the *Marburger Bund*, individual forms of praxis dominate. Yet even the ‘self-entrepreneurs’ reach their limits: the implicit “contract” (full engagement in exchange for “recognition” and “self-realisation” in work) is abandoned by a management increasingly oriented towards rationalisation and control. Those working in this segment increasingly reflect upon their own interests, struggle for more autonomous determination and limitation of working time, and experience a clash of interests between labour and capital (**Boes/Trinks** 2006, 31 et sq.). A transformation of social relations ‘from community to contradictory interests’ appears to loom. In the meantime, the formation of works councils is also viewed as an ‘important moment’ of asserting common interests (305).

Huws has found ‘little evidence’ (2010b, 518) for new forms of the C’s collective organisation and self-defence thus far, yet ‘Indian software engineers are able to use the Internet to inform themselves of global rates of pay for the work they are doing and use this to their advantage in the global labour market’ (519). **Huws** suggests that ‘the main form of resistance here lies in the

creation of professional associations, guilds, or specialised occupational unions in which segments of the C converge (516 et sq.). Yet sharp delimitations vis-à-vis the old (industrial) labour movement as well as the more disadvantaged or marginalised groups of the subproletariat and precariat dominate the frame. These are accompanied by ethno-national divisions along transnational production chains. A solidary form beyond narrow class fragments and occupational groups as well as national borders has yet to emerge. Nevertheless, the global expansion and recombination of wage forms changed through cybernetics and information technologies created a global C with common social conditions and thus potential commonalities for attempts at cross-border organisation. Lastly, as we can learn from Gramsci's analysis of Americanism, 'it is not from the social groups "condemned" by the new order that reconstruction' of a humane order 'is to be expected, but from those on whom is imposed the burden of creating with their own suffering the material bases of the new order' (*SPN*, N. 22, §15, 317).

Only 'in its democratic form as cooperative individuality' can a new form of the division of labour unfold its potentials (Müller 2010, 312). Open source productions and free software movements seek to anticipate such forms within the niches of capitalism. They strive not only for different relations of production, but rather point to a higher form of productivity in which open systems like Linux – that is, 'mass intellectuality' combined via the Internet (Ohm 2000, 738) – are favoured over the failure proneness and inflexibility of private-capitalist conceived programs (such as Microsoft's). Drawing on the form of production of the latter, business models are developed which seek to merge open forms of knowledge production with capitalist practices. Sabine Nuss contends, however, that these alternative forms of valorisation only raise the 'scarcity necessary for commodity circulation onto another level' (2002a, 23). Parts of the total product are openly available not only for use, but for collective further development as well. The results of the latter and the total product, however, remain in private hands. While ever more component products are offered for free in the Internet economy, access to services surrounding the product, etc, that is the total product, are commercialised (2002b, 653 et sqq.). – The consolidation of the 'cooperative creativity' of complex labour in the process of informatisation and computerisation constitutes the core of the new forces of production, signifying 'a new stage of socialisation' (Müller 2010, 285). The concept of the C – insofar as it seeks to grasp a process of class constitution – is dominated by productive forces over relations of production, which continually place limits on this process of constitution (for now).

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→ automation, class analysis, class consciousness, class condition, class struggle, commodification, conformism, control, cooperation, direction I, disposable time, division of labour, feminisation of labour, gender relations, general intellect, globalisation, hacker, high-technological mode of production, homework/telecommuting, immaterial labour, information society, information worker, intellectual property rights, international division of labour, internet, labour aristocracy, labour movement, labour organisation, labour power, labour relations, learning, leisure, living labour, mental and manual labour, precariat, proletariat, subsumption, technical intelligence, teleworking, transnational capitalism, women's politics, working class

→ Arbeiteraristokratie, Arbeiterbewegung, Arbeiterklasse, Arbeitsbeziehungen, Arbeitskraft, Arbeitsorganisation, Arbeitsteilung, Automation, dispoible Zeit, Feminisierung der Arbeit, Frauenpolitik, Freizeit, geistige und körperliche Arbeit, general intellect, Geschlechterverhältnisse, Globalisierung, Hacker, Heimarbeit/Telearbeit, hochtechnologische Produktionsweise, immaterielle Arbeit, Informationsarbeiter, Informationsgesellschaft, intellektuelle Eigentumsrechte, internationale Arbeitsteilung, Internet, Klassenanalyse, Klassenbewusstsein, Klassenkampf, Klassenlage, Kommodifizierung, Konformismus, Kontrolle, Kooperation, lebendige Arbeit, Leitung I, Lernen, Prekariat, Proletariat, Subsumtion, technische Intelligenz, Telearbeit, transnationaler Kapitalismus

Dialectics

A: djadal, dīyāliktik. – F: dialectique. – G: Dialektik. – R: dialektika. – S: dialéctica. – C: biànzhèng fǎ 辩证法

The ‘Algebra of Revolution’ was the name given to the Hegelian dialectic by Alexander **Herzen**, and the materialist dialectic is often called, particularly following **Lenin**, the ‘living soul’ of Marxism. D is a key to the philosophic thought and the linguistic-aesthetic production of **Brecht**, who named it *the Great Method*. What D means is contested, and the dispute concerning D has always been at the same time a struggle over the correct way.

‘In its mystified form’ – that is, the Hegelian – ‘dialectic became the fashion in Germany, because it seemed to transfigure and to glorify the existing state of things’. In the form which **Marx** gave it and which he named in the *Afterword* to the second edition of *Capital* (1873), ‘its rational form’, ‘it is a scandal and an abomination to bourgeoisdom and its doctrinaire professors’. It is ‘a scandal and an abomination’, because it is *subversive*, because it brings movement *into* the dominating order *as* the order of domination, ‘because it includes in its comprehension and affirmative recognition of the existing state of things, at the same time also, the recognition of the negation of that state, of its inevitable breaking up; because it regards every form in the flux of movement, and therefore takes into account its transient nature not less than its momentary existence; because it lets nothing impose upon it, and is in its essence critical and revolutionary’ (MECW 35/20; transl. corr. [MEW 23/27 et sq.]). – D practised in this sense also became a ‘scandal and an abomination’ to the ruling order of state socialism.

It appears almost impossible to speak *about* D without speaking *un-dialectically*, and thus, as the dialectician **Brecht** warned, to transform ‘the flux of the things itself into a static thing’ (*Jrnls*, 6 January 1948; transl. corr.). On the other hand, if D is meaningful, it is quite impossible to speak correctly about the things themselves without speaking about them dialectically, and thus to bring the fixed things back into flux. The possible meaning of D must therefore be demonstrated by what all of the articles of a Marxist dictionary can contribute to D in practice, how, that is to say, D appears in the presentation of *autà tà prágmata*, ‘the things themselves’.

Marx practised D at first *negatively* against metaphysical thinking, by which he understood a static mode of thought which assumes fixed divisions, which

is dualistic, and which attributes to things a fixed being, instead of comprehending them in movement and transition, in conflict and interaction. His version of D opposed any form of thought which, particularly when it turned its attention to human things, did not direct its attention to their becoming and passing away, conflicts and contradictions, relations of domination and their subversion. Three aspects in particular are to be considered: 1. In terms of the *history of philosophy*, it is necessary to think the breaks and continuities in relation to the previous traditions of dialectical thought. 2. In terms of *epistemology*, it is necessary to examine what D concretely achieves for the theoretician and scientist Marx. 3. In terms of the *history of its effects*, it is necessary to think the almost universal reversal, the lack of D, which, taking up above all Marx's talk of 'laws' of D, occurred in the official main currents of Marxism, and to contrast it with examples of liberating productivity. Overall, we are concerned to present the dialectic of the versions of D in the history of Marxism.

1. Marx took up D from Hegel, but also directly from ancient philosophy, which was the subject of his dissertation.

1.1 Heraclitus, who declared the uncreatedness of the world, universal becoming and passing away and the unity of opposites, is commonly regarded as one of the pre-Socratic dialecticians. This would not have seemed to be the case to the ancients, however. The aphorisms of Heraclitus appear like dark puzzles in direct opposition to common sense, closed off from any discussion or dialogue [*durchsprechen*, 'talking sth. through'], while this was exactly what the word 'D' meant: the word 'D' is derived from the Greek verb *légô* [to talk] and the preposition *diá* [through]; the middle form *dialégesthai* means just as much as to discuss or dialogue, the mutual discussion of something, 'often used in conversation, thus practising D, by Socrates and his students' (Benseler); from this is derived the adjective *dialektikós*, ['to dispute, pertaining to D, proficiency or skill in D', (ibid.)].

1.2 Socrates, or rather, Plato in the form of the Socrates of his dialogues, practised *dialektikê téchnê* (*Phaidros*, 276e) as a competence in conversation, conducted in the form of a question and answer game aimed at consensus [*homologeîn*] regarding *truth*. This version of D was directed against *rhetorikê téchnê* as a form of public speaking. *Rhetorikê téchnê* was concerned immediately with the means of speech, in order to win votes from the assembled masses in the institutions of the Attic democracy. Rhetoric aimed at *obtaining power by means of persuasion of the masses: peithein tà pléthê* (*Gorgias*, 452e). Practised professionally and taught (for money), rhetoric was literally a dem-

agogic argumentative technique i.e. public speaking which strives after leadership of the people (the *demos*), otherwise named eristic [*téchnê eristikôn*]. Its mission was the correct organisation of the polis.

Plato spoke out against this argumentative technique with the claim to overcome, by means of D, political conflict and thus also eristic itself. He named this project Philosophy. One can, therefore, speak exactly of a birth of philosophy from the spirit [*Geist*] of D. – Of course, it is assumed, that dialogue (*talking-through*) must not fail to be appropriate to the matter under investigation. **Nietzsche** named that the ‘optimism of D’ (KSA 7, 134). The ‘discoverability’ assumed here implies a coherent composition of “things” and of the relation of thought to them: ‘Hence the metaphysics of logic: identity of thought and being’ (ibid.). – It is to be observed, however, how this doubled coherence (without the detour via labour and socially transformative praxis) could be claimed by **Plato** only by force. The “technical” dialectic fell prey to a dialectic of technique and was transformed into its opposite. Certainly, Plato sought to realise a reorganisation of thought with the help of the ‘what is’ question, which was supposed to lead to a non-contradictory sphere of ideas. But thus arose out of dialogue oriented towards consensus a view which, appealing to authority, was ‘un-dialectical’ or even inexpressible. What should have ended the argument once and for all was transformed into an institution of the war of position. **Nietzsche** characterised in this way the fourth (and last) period in the genealogy of Greek philosophy: ‘D as the great security. Without knowledge, no competence. Philosophy becomes reformatory and imperative and aggressive’ (388).

1.3 In the first book of the *Metaphysics*, **Aristotle** credited **Plato**, in opposition to the Pythagoreans, with the ‘introduction of the Forms [...] due to his inquiries in the region of definitions’: *hê tôn eidôn eisagogê dià tèn en toîs lôgois egéneto sképsin* (*Met* 1.6, 987b. 31 et sq.). He added: ‘the earlier thinkers had no tincture of dialectic’: *hoi gàr próteroi dialektikês ou meteîchon* (ibid.). But in the fourth book he threw the Sophists and Dialecticians together in the camp opposed to Philosophy: *dialégontai dê perì hapántôn*, ‘They talk about everything’, ‘sophistic and dialectic turn on the same class of things [*perì mèn gàr tò autò génos*] as philosophy, but this differs from dialectic in the nature of the faculty [*tô trópô tês dunámeôs*] required and from sophistic in respect of the purpose of the philosophic life’ [*tês dê toû bíou tê proairései*] (*Met* IV.2 1004 b. 17). D, which was supposed to remove ambiguity, now symbolised ambiguity itself. The opposition to rhetoric was undone. – During the Hellenistic period D was ranked among the seven liberal arts. In the early middle ages the formula *grammatica + rhetorica + dialectica = logica* had currency (HWPh 2, 166).

1.4 The birth of modern experiment-based science and its philosophy in the post-medieval world had to destroy this articulation. For, Francis **Bacon** claimed, the demonstrations ‘we have in logic (*in dialecticis*) do little else than make the world the bond-slave of human thought, and human thought the bond-slave of words’ (*The New Organon* I, Aph. 69, 66). ‘On the basis of the consideration that logic is supposed to operate essentially formally and not materially, and should deduce definite and not merely probably correct conclusions, the designation of logic as D has been given up since the seventeenth century’ (W. Risse in HWPPh 2, 167).

1.5 Nevertheless, even **Kant** still encountered D in the sense of a ‘general logic’ which was misused falsely as an instrument to produce objective claims and which thus became a deception (*CPR*, B85). The Socratic differentiation between D and rhetoric was not honoured by Kant. Rather, he explained ancient Greek D without further ado as a ‘*logic of illusion*’, ‘a sophistical art of giving to ignorance, and indeed to intentional sophistries, the appearance of truth’ (B86). In opposition to this, Kant’s critique had as its object ‘the safe-keeping of the pure understanding’ or the ‘critique of this dialectical illusion’, which was produced by the border-crossing or ‘unrestrained use’ of the understanding (B88). For him it was the (unhistorically represented) ‘ideas of pure reason, which become dialectical only through heedlessness and misapprehension’ (B708). For example, ‘unity of nature’ is a ‘regulative principle’ of reason; ‘to take it as being a constitutive principle ... is simply to confound reason’ (B721). However, Kant now transformed the expression ‘D’ from a name of an illusory logic to that of a theory of illusion, in so far as, because of the nature of our capacity for knowledge, this is natural and inevitable (B354) (and in as much as it is so, it is transcendental), and has to be brought under control. Kant distinguished the transcendental illusion from empirical illusion (for example, the optical A295) and from logical illusion, which consisted in the ‘mere imitation of the form of reason’, and was thus ‘the illusion of fallacies’ which disappeared as soon as one came upon it (B353). Not so the transcendental illusion, which was based on the ‘delusion’ that subjective necessities are objective (*ibid.*). Kant named this element of his theory of knowledge the ‘transcendental dialectic’.

1.6 **Hegel** sublated formal logic once more into a material logic, demolished the **Kantian** divisions and transformed D into the ‘moving soul’ of thought. He articulated D doubly, at the same time subjectively and objectively, in terms of the experience of consciousness and the development of the thing itself (which were, for Hegel, in the last analysis, one and the same thing). In the *Phenomenology of Spirit* consciousness develops through experiencing itself in the thing:

actively extending, it fails in its particular intention and through this experience it is forced to undergo a “sea change”. ‘D’ signifies here no mere method in the possession of an unchangeable subject. Rather, it indicates the progression through contradictory stages of experience, in which the subject ‘forms’ itself. What is valid for thought is also valid for the object which it investigates: the claim of D consists in developing the ‘Idea’, that is, ‘the rational factor in any object of study’, ‘out of the concept, or, what is the same thing, to look on at the proper immanent development of the thing itself’ (*PR*, N2, 14). ‘The dialectical constitutes therefore the moving soul of scientific continuation and is the principle as a result of which alone *immanent connection and necessity* come into the content of science’ (*Enz*, § 81).

What needs to be examined is what that concretely means ‘in practice’, if it is supposed to be more than the ‘metaphysics of logic’ which **Nietzsche** detected in **Plato**: on the one hand, **Hegel** was concerned with ‘those common D of life, coming into being, growth, passing away und re-emergence from Death’, as happens ‘in almost all realms of natural and intellectual life’ (his examples are drawn from life cycle of plants: bud, bloom, seed etc., and also seasons as symbols of stages of life – *Aes* [Bassenge 1955], 352 et sq.). The graphic nature of the content predestined this natural cycle paradigm for a *popular* reception. On the other hand were the schemas which seemed to be perfectly suited for the (superficial) *intellectual* reception: the game of thesis, negating antithesis and the negation of this negation, the opposite of the sublating synthesis.

Beyond organic images and triadic formulae, however, **Hegel** was also concerned with the shadow which thought itself throws on the object, because, fixated with the mobility of the things and in its isolation, it fails to recognise their connections. Hegel can therefore say: ‘But it is far harder to bring fixed thoughts into a fluid state than to do so with sensuous existence’ (*PS*, *Preface*, 20). (This is the keyword for **Marx**’s definition of D as comprehending ‘every form in the flux of movement’ (MECW 35/20)). While **Hegel** defined the *Science of Logic* in the *Preface* to the first edition (1812) as ‘metaphysics proper or purely speculative philosophy’ (*SL*, 27), and in the *Introduction* as ‘the exposition of God as he is in his eternal essence before the creation of nature and a finite mind (*Geist*)’ (50), as ‘the realm of shadows, the world of simple essentialities freed from all sensuous concreteness’ (58), the *Preface* to the second edition (1831) hints at a paradigm change in the late Hegel (which, however, was not further developed in terms of content): as *thought forms* are the material of logic, *language* now becomes the matter of discussion. Spontaneously a ‘natural logic’ prevailed whose ‘use of categories ... is unconscious’ (35). On this terrain, Spirit, in the instinctive efficacy of thought, is ‘enmeshed in the bonds of its categories and is broken up in to an infinitely varied mater-

ial' (37). Hegel now articulates the programme of the 1831 *Logic* in this way: 'to clarify these categories' (which 'as impulses' 'are only instinctively active' and initially 'enter consciousness separately and so are variable and mutually confusing'), and through these categories 'to raise mind (*Geist*) to freedom and truth' (37).

D would now be, therefore, according to this immanently transforming view of the late Hegel, the liberation of thought out of the immobility of its supposition of an essence and out of its unconscious inhibition in the categorical net of language, thus becoming an adequate mental agility.

1.7 Against Hegel's dialectic of Absolute Knowledge, Feuerbach claimed to reintroduce D back into the dialogical situation (*ins Dialogische des Durch-Sprechens*): 'The true dialectic is no monologue of the solitary thinker with herself, it is a dialogue between me and you' (*Grundsätze einer Philosophie der Zukunft*, § 62). Plekhanov responded to this rather unconvincingly that, firstly, D in Hegel did not 'have the meaning of a monologue of the single thinker with herself', and secondly, that Feuerbach had correctly determined the *exit point of philosophy* with his anthropological materialism, but not its method, an omission which, according to Plekhanov, was supposed to have been filled by Marx and Engels (26). However, both the keywords *materialism* and *method* are not to be encountered in Marx's change of terrain as it is expressed in the *Theses on Feuerbach*.

2. Marx inherited the Hegelian legacy on the condition of a radical critique and rearticulation. In opposition to all speculative D he was concerned with 'scientific D' (1865, MECW 20/29). Proudhon's attempt 'to present the *system* of economic categories dialectically' was criticised by Marx because of its speculative philosophical foundations. 'In place of Kant's insoluble "*antinomies*", the Hegelian "*contradiction*" was to be introduced as the means of development'. The categories for Proudhon had been transformed into Ideas, instead of comprehending them as 'theoretical expressions of historical relations of production' (*ibid.*). Marx translated D into history, whereby all preconceived notions were abandoned. This categorical claim of a rational secularisation of D makes Marx's relation to Hegel, his stimulator, problematic.

2.1 At the time of his dissertation Marx was still under the spell of Hegel. 'Death and love are the myth of negative dialectic, for dialectic is the inner, simple light, the piercing eye of love, the inner soul which is not crushed by the body of material division' (MECW 1/498). – The *break* with Hegel was, therefore, experienced as a liberation, after which the situation appeared, at least negatively,

clear: 'Who annihilated the D of concepts, the war of the gods that was known to the philosophers alone? *Feuerbach*' (MECW 4/92). – But what replaces 'the D of concepts'? **Marx** spoke mostly about a 'dialectical method of development' (MECW 42/390), or simply of a 'method of development', concepts which he sometimes used synonymously with 'D' (544). But wherein lies the difference to **Hegel**?

2.2 **Marx** announced that he wanted to present the difference of his version of D from **Hegel**'s in his own words. While he was working on the *Grundrisse* (1858), he wrote to **Engels** that 'What was of great use to me as regards *method* of treatment was **Hegel**'s *Logic*' which he had 'flicked through again' by mere accident: 'If ever the time comes when such work is again possible, I should very much like to write 2 or 3 sheets making accessible to the common reader the *rational* aspect of the method which **Hegel** not only discovered but also mystified' (MECW 40/249; transl. corr.). Ten years later (9.5.68) he wrote to **Dietzgen**: 'When I have cast off the burden of political economy, I shall write a "Dialectic". The true laws of D are already contained in **Hegel**, though in a mystified form' (MECW 43/31). In what, then, does this non-mystical form of D consist?

Even though there are a number of texts criticising **Hegel**, especially in the early works of **Marx**, much remains implicit, and the explicit formulations consist of metaphors (inversion, placing on feet, freeing the rational kern from its mystifying shell etc.) which are ambiguous and misleading, and whose inappropriateness has been criticised by, for instance, **Korsch** (174) and **Althusser** (*FM*, 93 et sq.). Thus, for example, **Marx** declared **Hegel**'s dialectic to be 'the basic form of all dialectic, but only after being stripped of its mystical form' (MECW 42/544); its difference from the 'rational form' (MECW 35/19), which **Marx** claimed to have given D, was explained by him in that he was a 'materialist, and **Hegel** an idealist' (MECW 42/544). On the occasion of a praising reference by **Lange** (*Über die Arbeiterfrage ...*, Winterthur 21870), **Marx** wrote to **Kugelman** that **Lange**, under the influence of Darwinism, 'subsumes all history under the phrase "struggle for life"', understood nothing about **Hegel**'s method 'and, therefore, second, still less about my critical manner of applying it' (MECW 43/528). **Lange** praised **Marx** for the fact that he moved in the empirical matter with a rare freedom, without suspecting, as **Marx** noted, 'that this "free movement in matter" is nothing but a paraphrase for the *method* of dealing with matter – that is, the *dialectical method*' (ibid.). Thus, in the face of the emerging social Darwinism, the difference from **Hegel** was reduced to the critical application of his method = D.

When one investigates the writings, or rather the passages dedicated to the critique of **Hegel**, above all in the *1844 Manuscripts* (MECW 3/326 et sqq.), *Con-*

tribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Introduction (MECW 3/3–129), or less directly, in the *Introduction* of 1859 (*Gr*, 100 et sq.), taking into account also the *Theses on Feuerbach* and *The German Ideology*, one discovers that **Marx** carried out, in a series of phases, a complete change of terrain, an epistemological revolution, in which nothing of the old remains or rather, ought to remain. Marx even says exactly this in the *Afterword* to the second edition of *Capital*, where he claims that his version of D is ‘not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite’ (MECW 35/19). In this context, however, he appears to say that this ‘direct opposite’ consists in the fact that, against **Hegel**’s transformation of the thought process ‘under the name of “the Idea” ... into an independent subject’, **Marx** opposes a materialistic gnoseology, for which ‘on the contrary, the ideal is [supposed to be] nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought’ (ibid.). This introduces more confusion than it removes, because everything which goes beyond mind as the decisive instance of practical realisation – labour, activity, praxis – that is to say, exactly that which since the *Theses on Feuerbach* had been for Marx’s thought the specific terrain of praxis in the ensemble of social relations, remains excluded. Strictly taken, this formulation cannot be differentiated either from the sensualism of **Feuerbach** or from the mechanical materialism of a **Hobbes**, or even from the criticism of a **Kant**. Because **Hegel** turns thought into the ‘demiurgos of the real world’ which ‘is only the external, phenomenal form of “the Idea”’, the dialectic ‘with him ... is standing on its head’, **Marx** continues, clothing his critical appropriation in the seemingly transparent metaphor of ‘inversion’ (ibid.).

Alongside this are further unclear formulations. The Russian reviewer **Kaufman** remarked that, ‘[a]t first sight, if the judgement is based on the external form of the presentation of the subject, Marx is the most ideal of idealist philosophers’ (qtd. in MECW 35/17, transl. corr.). **Marx** responded by claiming that it was necessary to differentiate between *research* and *presentation*, while admitting that the later could give the impression that one was dealing with an a priori construction (19). But it is neither explained why the presentation is allowed to be like an a priori construction, nor whether D is merely a question of presentation or if it also plays a part in research. On the basis of such unclear formulations, the question of Marx’s relation to **Hegel**, which is so important for an understanding of **Marx**’s version of D, has led to the formation of controversial and opposed interpretative traditions. Against the popular interpretation of explicit formulations, it has continually been attempted to make explicit the *operative D* which are contained, above all, in Marx’s scientific master piece, *Capital*.

3. In order to treat **Marx's** version of D, one must examine: 1. for what it is necessary; 2. what it concretely achieves; 3. what its forms of articulation are; 4. where its boundaries are and what, consequently, its epistemological status is.

3.1 If **Marx** described the achievement of his version of D in passing as the interpretation of 'every form in the flux of movement', then corresponding to that is the problematic to which it is supposed to answer: the question concerning *the connection of that which at first appears to be without connection, the connection at the point of origin of the phenomena which appear as disparate in the result*. The most general problem of the critique of political economy: the dissolution of the 'mutual independence and ossification of the various social elements of wealth' (MECW 37/817). As a goal of knowledge, this is not, at any rate, specific to the critique of political economy. Rather, classical political economy also sought 'to reduce the various fixed and mutually alien forms of wealth to their inner unity by means of analysis and to strip away the form in which they exist independently alongside one another'. Classical political economy also wanted 'to grasp the inner connection in contrast to the multiplicity of the forms of appearance' (Marx 1972, 501 et sq.; transl. corr.). The difference lies in the mode of comprehending and resolving the question of connection. Classical bourgeois economy resolved it in the form of the analytic reduction of 'all independent forms and titles under cover of which the non-workers participate in the value of the commodity, to the one form of profit', which in its turn was reduced to surplus-value (ibid.). Marx observed that classical political economy occasionally contradicted itself in this attempt: 'It often attempts directly, leaving out the intermediate links, to carry through the reduction [...] It is not interested in elaborating the different forms genetically', because it 'conceives [...] production designed to appropriate other people's labour not as a *historical* form but as a *natural form* of social production' (ibid.). In this formulation the specificity of the Marxist critique of political economy is indicated: *genetic reconstruction instead of analytic reduction, historicisation of forms*, instead of leaving them unanalysed in their natural apparent immediacy. The primary question of knowledge is that of the 'genetic presentation, of grasping the real, formative process in its different phases' (ibid.).

3.2 Many passages support the view that when **Marx** called D a 'method of development', he used the term 'development' in the sense of a *presentation of the results of research*. Research attempts by means of critique 'to take a science to the point at which it admits of a dialectical presentation'. Excluded, on the other hand, is the application of 'an abstract, ready-made system of logic to vague presentiments of just such a system' (MECW 40/261). D finds expres-

sion, then, in the *construction* of the presentation, in the *sequence* of the treated categories and in the *transitions* from one to the other. – A by-product of his ‘dialectical method of development’, Marx noted, was that ‘it is constantly *setting traps* [for its bourgeois critics], which will provoke them into an untimely display of their idiocy’ (MECW 42/390).

3.3 That commodity production forms an *inner unity* which is torn apart and therefore moves and reproduces itself in ‘external antithesis’ (MECW 35/123), that such *contradictions* are comprehended as the driving force of development, for example, by making themselves a ‘form of movement’ (cf. 113), are forms of articulation of D often used by **Marx**. Especially important is the figure of ‘transformation’ (*das Umschlagen*). In these terms Marx analysed, for example, how ‘the laws of appropriation [...] become by their own inner and inexorable dialectic transformed into their very opposite’ through the repetition of the valorisation process and in the transformation into capital of at least a part of the surplus value, in which ‘each single transaction invariably conforms to the laws of the exchange of commodities’ (MECW 35/582, transl. corr.): under capitalist conditions, appropriation by virtue of one’s own labour becomes appropriation of the ‘unpaid labour of others’ (583). – Rosa **Luxemburg** praised this analysis as ‘a masterpiece of historical D’ (GW 5, 222), which required ‘the powerful dialectic of a scientific analysis’ (397). – In a letter to **Engels**, **Marx** pointed out that in the third chapter of *C I*, in the transition from craftsman to capitalist, he cited ‘Hegel’s discovery of the *law of the transformation of a merely quantitative change into a qualitative one* as being attested by history and natural science alike’ (MECW 42/383). In the 32nd chapter of *Capital Volume I* Marx used **Hegel**’s formulation of the *negation of the negation* for the supersession of the capitalist mode of production as the expropriation of the expropriator (MECW 35/751).

3.4 In the *Introduction* of 1857 **Marx** noted warningly that he was dealing with D ‘whose boundaries are to be determined, and which does not suspend the real difference’ (*Gr*, 109). Viewed from the position of **Hegel**, that is tantamount to a step backwards in the direction of **Kant**, for whom the “real distinction” – particularly of “the thing for us” and “the thing in itself” – cannot be abolished and is epistemologically fundamental (cf. **Colletti**). Historical materialist D are thus supposed to guard against falling back into the speculation of a philosophy of identity.

The question of the function and status of D for **Marx** became an issue of controversy for the first time through the attacks of **Dühring**, who reproached **Marx** with having fabricated the historical tendency of capitalist accumulation, ‘in default of anything better and clearer’, with ‘Hegelian verbal jugglery’ like

the negation of the negation (qtd. in MECW 25/120). In *Anti-Dühring*, Engels declared that ‘Herr Dühring’s total lack of understanding of the nature of D is shown by the very fact that he regards it as a mere proof-producing instrument’ (MECW 25/125). ‘Only after [Marx] has proved from history that in fact the process has partially already occurred, and partially must occur in the future, he in addition characterises it as a process which develops in accordance with a definite dialectical law’ (124). – Engels here appears to restrict the status of D to a *retrospective interpretation of scientific knowledge*. Nevertheless, he adds: ‘Even formal logic is primarily a method of arriving at new results, of advancing from the known to the unknown – and D is the same, only much more eminently so; moreover, since it forces its way beyond the narrow horizon of formal logic, it contains the germ of a more comprehensive view of the world’ (125). – For the Engels of *Anti-Dühring*, D provides, therefore: 1. retrospective interpretation of scientific results; 2. the function of a heuristic guide, comparable to *Findekunst*, the form in which Aristotle had comprehended Plato’s D; 3. the initiation of a *Weltanschauung*. – Engels did not make the relationship of the three functions explicit. The scientifically most important function appears to be the heuristic, which equips the researcher with determinate investigatory questions and expectations, which of course are to be worked out according to all the rules of historical experiment-based science. Nevertheless, Engels himself exceeded these limits of D and thus inadvertently ushered in the process of the de-dialecticisation of the Marxist version of D.

4. The formulation of the ‘application’ of D, also used by Marx, was extended by Engels to the systematisation of that which, from the 1880s, was called ‘Marxism’. ‘The materialist conception of history and its specific application to the modern class struggle between proletariat and bourgeoisie was only possible by means of D’ (MECW 24/459), he explained in 1882 in *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*. In his *Outline of the General Plan of Dialectics of Nature* he had affirmed D already in 1878 ‘as the science of universal inter-connection’ and had codified three ‘Main laws: transformation of quantity and quality – mutual penetration of polar opposites and transformation into each other when carried to extremes – development through contradiction or negation of the negation – spiral form of development’ (MECW 25/313).

4.1 Instead of leaving things ‘in their isolation’ (MECW 24/299), D showed them in the context of their coming into being and efficacy. Thus far Engels respected the limits of D which had been indicated by Marx, but only immediately to exceed them: ‘Nature is the proof of D’ (301). After the death of Marx, Engels explained in 1885 that he had taken advantage of his retirement to study math-

ematics and the natural sciences in order to ‘convince myself also in detail – of what in general I was not in doubt – that in nature, amid the welter of innumerable changes, the same dialectical laws of motion force their way through as those which in history govern the apparent fortuitousness of events; the same laws which similarly form the thread running through the history of the development of human thought’ (MECW 25/11). D was turned into a universal law of being. Nothing was changed by the fact that Engels affirmed, after just as before, that for him ‘there could be no question of building the laws of D into nature, but of discovering them in it and evolving them from it’ (13). In his studies of D in nature, only long after his death fabricated as a “Work”, Engels specified the criterion to the point that ‘an external side by side arrangement is as inadequate as Hegel’s artificially constructed dialectical transitions. The transitions must make themselves, they must be natural. Just as one form of motion develops out of another, so their reflections, the various sciences, must arise necessarily out of one another’ (529). With that, D was closed up into a universal cosmology.

4.2 D was regarded by Engels henceforth as the science of the ‘two sets of laws which are identical in substance, but differ in their expression in so far as the human mind can apply them consciously, while in nature and also up to now for the most part in human history, these laws assert themselves unconsciously, in the form of external necessity, in the midst of an endless series of apparent accidents. Thereby the dialectic of concepts itself became merely the conscious reflection of the dialectical motion of the real world’ (*Ludwig Feuerbach*, MECW 26/383).

4.3 A consequence in terms of the theory of knowledge of the thesis of the ‘two sets of laws’, of which the second was the reflex of the first, was the appearance of the *Abbildtheorie* (theory of the image). Moreover, D had thus become an *evolutionary Weltanschauung*, involving universal development and relativity, and departing from the ‘great basic thought that the world is not to be comprehended as a complex of ready-made *things*, but as a complex of *processes*, in which the apparently stable things, no less than their mental images in our heads, the concepts, go through uninterrupted change of coming into being and passing away, in which, for all apparent accidentality and despite all temporary retrogression, a progressive development asserts itself in the end’ (MECW 26/384). Engels adds that these ideas have, since Hegel, ‘so thoroughly permeated ordinary consciousness that in this generality they are now scarcely ever contradicted’ (*ibid.*; transl. corr.).

5. Among the Marxists of the first generation after **Marx**, the positions of **Kautsky**, **Bernstein**, **Plekhanov**, and **Labriola** are the most important.

5.1 Georg **Lukács** accused Karl **Kautsky** of ‘the deformation of revolutionary D into a peaceful evolutionism’ (*Werke* 2, 591). If **Steinberg** could say that **Kautsky** had ‘consequently banished the “Hegelianism”’ from his presentation of the ‘economic doctrines’ of **Marx**, he could do so because by Hegelianism he understood the ‘dialectical structure of Marx’s argumentation’ (XVII in **Kautsky**). **Kautsky**’s ‘non-dialectical mode of presentation’ (*ibid.*) constituted, according to **Steinberg**, the secret of the wide international reception of his book. **Lukács** struck upon the matter more accurately: **Kautsky** had declined into a vulgar Hegelian evolutionism.

“Undialectical” evolutionism was manifested already in **Kautsky**’s *The Economic Doctrines of Karl Marx*: exemplary, for instance, is the transition from money to capital. For **Marx**, an abyss of discontinuities must be leaped, since this transition is the ‘product of many economic revolutions, of the extinction of a whole series of older forms of social production’ (MECW 35/179) in which alone the condition for the possibility of the appearance of the free wage labourer ‘comprises a world’s history’ (180). **Kautsky**, on the other hand, simply claimed: ‘It develops with time’ etc. (52). The analysis of the form(s) of value, and the genetic reconstruction of its sequence, a classic example of dialectical presentation in *C I*, escaped **Kautsky**.

5.2 **Bernstein** explicitly pronounced that which **Kautsky** only did: ‘Hegelian dialectic’ was regarded by him as ‘the treacherous element in Marxist doctrine, the pitfall that lies in the way of any logical consideration of things’ (*Preconditions*, 36). Against the late **Engels**, he problematised the metaphor of ‘placing the dialectic upon its feet’ with the not to be simply dismissed argument that, if one followed ‘the laws of dialectic, as laid down by **Hegel**’, one ended up ‘once again enmeshed in “the self-development of the concept”’ (*ibid.*). He was aiming to criticise **Marx**, but managed only a caricature of his version of D (cf. 35).

5.3 The Italian philosopher Antonio **Labriola**, who became important for **Gramsci**, saw the key to understanding **Marx**’s break with **Hegel** in a change of terrain to a ‘philosophy of *praxis*’, which he comprehended as the ‘central point of the historical materialism’ of **Marx**. The way of **Marx**’s philosophy of *praxis*, which leads ‘from labour, which is knowledge through action, to knowledge as abstract theory’ contains ‘the secret of a formulation of **Marx** on which so many a head has broken themselves, namely, that he *inverted* the Hegelian dialectic’ (318). – In other places, however, **Labriola** described the

theory of historical materialism as the ‘dialectical view or the evolutionary or genetic *Anschaung*, or however one wants to describe it’ (348), and in *Capital* he praised ‘the particular agility and *souplesse* of spirit, namely the aesthetic of D’ (337). Apparently he saw no further need for clarification regarding the combination of these diverse approaches. Nevertheless, with the determining status of praxis, in the sense outlined in Marx’s *Theses on Feuerbach*, the course had been set for a reception of D that was as much non-metaphysical as it was anti-naturalistic.

5.4 In Russia, Georgi V. **Plekhanov**, who exercised a decisive influence upon **Lenin**’s philosophical formation, resumed **Engels**’s arguments in the sense of a philosophy of dialectical materialism. He saw the essential difference of D from the vulgar theory of evolution in **Hegel**’s thesis of sudden transformations in development (28). In *Mutationstheorie* (**De Vries**, 2 vols., Leipzig 1901–1903), **Plekhanov** saw the ‘dialectical leap’ now also recognised by Biology, though misunderstood in a teleological sense, and celebrated as dialectical the Neo-Lamarckian doctrine of the ‘Sensibility of Matter’, because it represented, ‘properly understood, only a translation into modern biological language of **Feuerbach**’s materialist doctrine concerning the unity of being and thought, of object and subject’ (29). ‘In **Hegel**’s system’, **Plekhanov** explained, ‘dialectic coincides with metaphysics. For us, dialectic is buttressed upon the doctrine of nature. In **Hegel**’s system, the demiurge of reality [...] is the absolute idea. For us, [...] only an abstraction from the motion by which all the combinations and all the states of matter are produced’ (118). **Plekhanov** still saw, at least, that movement (‘fundamental fact of being’ (113)) is a contradiction only as a concept in the context of a system of coordinates (112), and thus that one of the fundamental problems for the necessity of D must be sought exactly in the *non-identity* of thought and ‘being’.

6. For the second generation of Marxists, who emerged around the turn of the 20th cent. (**Luxemburg**, **Pannekoek**, **Lenin**, among others) and for those of the third generation, who were drawn to Marxism through the experience of the October Revolution (**Gramsci**, **Mariátegui**, **Lukács**, **Korsch**, **Bloch**, etc.), until the generation of **Brecht** and **Benjamin**, the reception of D carried a left wing, revolutionary sense. For **Adorno**, confronted by the totalitarian horrors of the century and the increasingly apparent failure of the revolutions which followed in the wake of 1917, D withdrew into a negative Hegelianism of “inner resistance”, while at the same time, in the lands of command administration socialism, a version of D converted back into metaphysics was enforced by the official ideology.

6.1 Rosa **Luxemburg** condemned harshly ‘applications of historical materialism which did not use **Marx’s D**’, without however defining what was meant by ‘D’ more exactly. It was precisely in economic history that she saw those who regard themselves as being outside of ideology, producing ‘that raw derivation of the most abstract ideological forms directly out of the soup-tureen’ (GW 1/2, 470). In **Sismondi** she praised ‘the broad horizon of the dialectical approach’, because he historicised the capitalist mode of production, comparing wage labour with other forms of unfree labour and declaring that it was possible that an age would arrive which would find the former just as barbaric as the latter (*Accumulation*, 183). D for **Luxemburg** were not something which can be formulaically applied, but rather, the sense for – that is, the heuristic orientation towards – contradictoriness. Thus she opposed the romanticisation of the village community: ‘The Russian peasant beaten by his own neighbours in the service of Tsarist absolutism with birch-rods – that is the cruellest historical critique of the narrow restraints of ur-communism and the most obvious expression of the fact that also this social formation is subject to the dialectical rule: reason becomes irrational, favour – misery’ (GW 5, 687). Against **Tugan-Baranowski** who, among others, declared **Marx’s** analysis of accumulation to be contradictory, **Luxemburg** responded: ‘One only needs, however, to translate into historical D the apparently rigid contradiction, as it corresponds to the spirit of all **Marx’s** theory and way of thinking, and thus the contradiction of the Marxist schema becomes the living mirror of the global career of capital, its fortune and end’ (GW 5, 518). It is a matter here of the ‘dialectical contradiction, that capitalism needs non-capitalist social organisations as the setting for its development, that it proceeds by assimilating the very conditions which alone can ensure its own existence’ (*Accumulation*, 346). Against the critics of **Marx’s** accumulation schema who argued that the calculation could not rise, she proposed the crisis-theory insight that this ‘is, precisely in its insolubility, the exactly posed prognosis of the economically inevitable downfall of capitalism as a result of the imperialist process of expansion’ which, though, as she immediately added, thus avoiding an economicist theory of collapse, ‘is a theoretical fiction, particularly because the accumulation of capital is not a merely economic, but rather, political process’ (GW 5, 519).

Nevertheless, **Luxemburg** demonstrated herself to be an important dialectician more in her practical theory than in her theoretical praxis: for example, in her mediation or doubled supersession of Revolutionism and Realpolitik in the concept of *Revolutionary Realpolitik*, or of necessary centrism and its anarchistic rejection in the orientation to the ‘self-centralism’ of the masses (cf. GW 1/2, 429).

6.2 Anton **Pannekoek** also reclaimed D for the revolutionary left in 1909. His discourse, though, did not actually order the positions dialectically, but rather, as a dichotomy: *'The proletarian point of view is materialist, the bourgeois, ideological. But dialectical and materialist belong just as much together as ideological and undialectical.* For the proletariat, material powers which lie outside the domain of any individual dominate development; for the bourgeoisie, the creative power of the human spirit. Material reality is dialectical because it can only be grasped fully as a unity of opposed concepts' (60). – **Lenin** opposed **Pannekoek** and at the same time joined him in such dichotomous thought paradigms.

6.3 For the young **Lenin**, the 'dialectical method' of **Marx** and **Engels** was 'nothing else than the scientific method in sociology, which consists in regarding society as a living organism in a state of constant development' instead of 'as something mechanically concatenated' (CW 1, 165). When he later invoked 'the materialist dialectic, the doctrine of development', which, he claimed, had been used by **Marx** (cf. *SR*, CW 25, 476), it was not differentiated in the slightest from the conventional rhetoric of the Second International, from **Karl Kautsky** to **Otto Bauer**.

Following **Engels's** notion of 'two sets of laws', **Lenin** interpreted its reflex category causally: 'D of things produces D of ideas' (*PN*, CW 38, 196). Dialectical thought comes at best onto the traces of the connection of movement and efficacy of things, but the nature of this connection does not make it easy. The mistake lies not in the answer, but rather, in the question: in the *Theses on Feuerbach*, **Marx**, from the standpoint of praxis, had blown open the philosophical grammar of the 'two sets of laws' and of that which **Descartes** called *commercium mentis et corporis*. **Labriola** was correct: whoever misunderstands this demolition, also misunderstands **Marx's** version of D.

Lenin summarised *practical* D in four laws: 1. comprehensiveness (almost Kantian in the sense of a regulative idea: 'That is something we cannot ever hope to achieve completely, but the rule of comprehensiveness is a safeguard against mistakes and rigidity'); 2. examination of the object 'in its development, in its "self movement" (as Hegel sometimes said), in its transformation' (noticing that this rule could not be applied meaningfully to an isolated object, **Lenin** replaced it with the thought that the object could change 'its connection with its environment'); 3. 'a full "definition" of an object must include the whole of human experience, both as a criterion of truth and a practical indicator of its connection with human wants'; 4. never to forget, 'that "truth is always concrete, never abstract", as the late **Plakhanov** liked to say after **Hegel**' (CW 32, 94).

– These rules obviously do not amount to concrete methodological steps, more a general framework of orientation, almost a disposition.

The theoretician **Lenin**, who, as such, remained the student of **Plekhanov**, fostered the re-Hegelianisation of Marxist D. Not so much through his insistence on organising ‘the systematic study of Hegel’s dialectic from a materialist standpoint’ (CW 33, 234), but rather, through remarks formed through taking up formulations from **Marx** such as the following: ‘*Marx applied Hegel’s D in its rational form to political economy*’ (PN, CW 38, 178). Or even through his explanation in the fragment *On the Question of Dialectics*: ‘D is the theory of knowledge of (Hegel and) Marxism’ (362). An evolutionary paradigm can be observed when **Lenin** comes to speak of **Marx’s Capital**: in his analysis of commodity exchange as the cell of bourgeois society, **Marx** showed, precisely, ‘the germs of all the contradictions’ and, further, ‘the development (both growth and movement) of these contradictions and of this society [...] from its beginning to its end’ (361). D has here lost all reference to the unexpected or the discontinuous, and denotes exactly a type of knowledge, derived from the “philosophy of history”, regarding the predetermination of the future. Reading **Hegel’s Logic**, **Lenin** coined the concept “the logic of capital”, which was later to form the foundational category of a tradition of interpretation of *Capital*. ‘In *Capital*, **Marx** applied to a single science logic, D and theory of knowledge of materialism [three words are not needed: it is one and the same thing] which has taken everything valuable in **Hegel** and developed it further’ (319). Especially rich in its effects was the following notice: ‘Aphorism: It is impossible completely to understand **Marx’s Capital**, and especially its first chapter, without having thoroughly studied and understood the whole of **Hegel’s Logic**. Consequently, half a century later none of the Marxists understood **Marx!!**’ (180). Here is one who, in the exuberance of a reading of **Hegel**, has the feeling to be the first (or rather, the second, after **Marx**) to catch a glimpse of a new world.

The explicitly ‘philosophising’ **Lenin**, however – similar to **Luxemburg** – is to be differentiated from the historically powerful politician. His discussion of D (‘dialectical logic unconditionally demands [...] teaches [...] requires’, CW 32, 94) is more conventional than his action. In political-tactical, as in communicative praxis, he was able to demonstrate another uncommonly agile side, directed to the concrete. Here is a masterly dialectician in the perception of the game of many-sidedness, of contradictions, of interdependency and latent potentials, of relationships of power and timely moments for intervention. The perception of unexpected applications is, though, the other side of a voluntaristic, seemingly zigzag, method in politics. After **Lenin’s** political Art came **Stalin’s** politics of violence.

6.4 Under **Stalin** D were codified into 4 'essential features' or 'guiding principles': 1. unity of nature; 2. universal movement in the sense of becoming and passing away; 3. 'an onward and upward movement [...] as a development from the simple to the complex, from the lower to the higher', which, 'rapidly and abruptly' but not 'accidentally', rather 'as the natural result of an accumulation of imperceptible and gradual quantitative changes', led to 'qualitative changes'; 4. internal contradictions of natural things and the struggle of opposites as the driving force of this higher development. (*Dialectical and Historical Materialism*, 838 et sqq.).

6.5 **Mao's** writings on D represent a special case. In his catechistic writing *On Contradiction* of 1937, he took up **Lenin** (though filtered through **Stalin**), translating him into easy to remember formulae, in which he combined 'Marxist terminology always more strongly with the content of traditional Chinese "native D"' (**Klimaszewsky/Thomas** 1972, 1213). This was possibly the element which encouraged **Brecht** to greet emphatically the publication of this text in German in 1954 and to use it for his own purposes (cf. **Schickel** 1968, 150 et sqq.). Contradiction was treated by **Mao** as a universal law of being, in which he differentiated the 'principal contradiction and the principal aspect of a contradiction' (*On Contradiction*, **Mao** 1953, 34): they determined all 'secondary contradictions', and 'the aspects of each contradiction develop unevenly' (36). **Mao** named above all the virulent contradiction between the old and the new, which ended with the supersession of each (a 'universal, forever inviolable law of the world' (37)). The practical meaning of this was **Mao's** teaching of the omnipresence of conflict between the old and the new, in which victory was supposed to be guaranteed to the later. He illustrated the 'law of identity and struggle of opposed aspects of a contradiction' with the following example: 'to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat or the people's dictatorship is precisely to prepare the conditions for liquidating such a dictatorship and advancing to the higher stage of abolishing all state systems' (45). The dialectic thus functioned as a form of rhetoric affecting the masses, legitimating contradictions between ends and means, theory and praxis.

If, however, contradictions were omnipresent, then at least contradiction in socialism became discussable. **Mao** did precisely this in his 1957 text *On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People* (*SelWks* 5, 384–421). Differently to earlier, he now discovered that 'the contradictions [...] between the exploited and the exploiting classes have a non-antagonistic as well as an antagonistic aspect' (385). The contradictions between the People and Enemies of the People were construed as antagonistic. But People just as Enemy and, certainly, contradictions regularly change their meaning, and **Mao** went through

the changes since the 1920s. Concepts do not signify essential differences, rather they derive strategic differentiations and oppositions out of the concrete situation. Contradictions also exist in socialist societies, contradictions which in and for themselves are not antagonistic (that is to say, they are resolvable within the system), but can become antagonistic through false treatment (cf. 391). Schematically, Mao claimed that within capitalism, on the other hand, the antagonistic contradictions are irresolvable within the system (388). – In 1964, in *Conversation about the Questions of Philosophy* (1974), Mao undertook a revision of Engels's doctrine of the three laws of D. Immediately at the beginning the foundational theme was announced (in terms of its influence on the Althusser-School, see Balibar 1977): 'Only when there is class struggle is there philosophy. It is a waste of time to discuss epistemology separately from praxis' (212). 'The juxtaposition, on the same level, of the transformation of quality and quantity into one another, the negation of the negation, and the law of the unity of opposites is "triplicism", not monism. The most basic thing is the unity of opposites, the transformation of quality and quantity into one another is the unity of the opposites quality and quantity. There is no such thing as the negation of the negation. [...] in the development of things, every link in the chain of events is both affirmation and negation'. For example, slave society negated pre-class society, but was an affirmation in relation to feudalism (226). D is 'the continual movement towards opposites'. One must therefore accept death in life and death and passing away as moments of life.

6.6 After the 20th party conference of the CPSU there was a discussion of contradiction in areas under Soviet influence which began from the recognition of the existence of contradictions in socialism and affirmed that they were the driving force of socialism. The law of the negation of the negation, which had been abolished under Stalin, was also reintroduced in the wake of de-Stalinisation (cf. Stiehler 1960, 3). Nevertheless, this discussion remained relatively without consequence as it was not accompanied by any politics of contradiction. The political leadership regularly supported research into D which, however, was severed from reality. The triumphal tone still dominated the official ideology: 'Materialist D prove irrefutably', declared the chief ideologue, extending one of Lenin's phrases to the point of caricature (cf. CW 22, 109), 'that the antiquated [...] capitalist society bears a passing character, that its dissolution by a new, more perfect social order is mature' (Suslow 1974, 48).

Official Marxism-Leninism stagnated in the shadow of such a regression of D back into vulgar metaphysics. Robert Havemann found himself in 1964 'surrounded by fossils which have absolutely no real content anymore' (168). 'The gentlemen who taught dialectical materialism from the professorial chairs of

the Soviet Union have gone back to the positions of vulgar materialism and of mechanical materialism. All D in their words is only to be regarded as a coy alibi before the classics' (12). – Vaclav Havel explained in 1966 that the cause for such a regression of D into an 'a priori and fundamentally abstract dialectical schema' (174) – that is to say, into a new metaphysics – was the 'precedence given to the theoretical principle over concrete praxis' (176). Against the triumphal manner of speaking ('sovereign domination and application of D'; cf. Stiehler 1960, 5) and irreplevisable claims ('the principle of the comprehensiveness of analysis'; cf. Wallner 1981, 636), he spoke out ambitiously in favour of a 'new, higher dialectic', a 'dialectical dialectic' (175), the sober, liberating truth: 'a comprehensive *Anschauung* is nonsense' (179).

While the 'passive dialectic' (Haug 1985) over took the communist project, there arose on its margins and in its gaps pluralistic dialectical thought, beginning afresh. Repressed in theory and political praxis, D returned above all in literature and art.

6.7 Despite all the institutional hindrances, a series of discussions of D (discussions of logic, of praxis, and of dialectic as method; cf. the overview in Bogomolow 1974) took place throughout the history of the GDR. The final results of these debates, however, were a great disillusionment. – Initially, D were defined 'with Lenin, briefly, as "the doctrine of development"', whose meaning, however, was 'constant progress, the unsuspending development of productive powers' etc. (Redlow et al. 1971, 182). Correspondingly, materialist D was taken for a method which was 'incessantly perfecting itself [...], a weapon which becomes ever more powerful with each of its deployments' (Rosental 1974, 6). But did this development therefore recognise no decline, defeat, regression, no destruction? Is not D for the classics of Marxism related to the thought that nothing lasts for ever, that everything also passes away? Doesn't there exist, therefore, a contradiction between such optimism of progress and D? – For Hermann Ley, D functioned as a successor to theodicy when he said that 'the dialectical standpoint justifies coming into being and passing away as moments of continual becoming', and when he thought to see 'realised D', with Engels, 'in the transitory character of the solar system, the earth, and humans' (1977, 765). As if he wanted to confirm Nietzsche's judgement of the optimism of the dialectic, he declared that the specific achievement of D was 'that no pessimistic conclusions are presented by the knowledge of nature' (766) etc. Wolfgang Eichhorn (1) interpreted Lenin's paraphrase of Engels – 'D of things produces D of ideas' – in the sense of an ontology of diverse spheres: dialectical laws are the most universal, under which fall the D of both spheres with a parallelism of interpellation and pre-stabilised correspondence, with the slight reservation

that they 'must agree on the whole' (1973, 13). For **Kosing** and others, this means 'that D in general exists in two fundamental forms: as *objective D* which are immanent in nature and society, and as *subjective D* which reflect objective D in the theory of D and the dialectical method which is derived from it' (1981, 32). Here the whole was closed up into a 'system', in the sense 'that the whole forms an independent phenomenon which imbues all parts and confronts them as their determining moment' (**Redlow** et al. 1971, 185). – In its late phase, the leading themes of such a theory of D, both scientific and in terms of the history of philosophy, went through a terrain-shift to, on the one hand, a *system* of thought (cf. **Warnke** et al. 1977a & b), and, on the other, a theory of *development* (cf. **Redlow/Stiehler** 1977).

M. Wallner sensed the elimination of the necessary effort from such a philosophy of identity. In 1981 he went over to a long-disputed fundamental position of the 'analytical theory' which was predominant in the West: one must distinguish between (prescriptive) method and theory, otherwise there results 'the construction of "ideal centaurs" which are at the same time knowledge and instructions for action' and which imply an abstract subject 'whose action is exclusively determined by knowledge of objectivity and which thus comports itself in reality without interest' (633). The assumption of direct reflection was also now charged with being mechanistic because it eliminated interests, and thus the relation of the subject to the object (635 et sq.). Methodology was ultimately seen in relation to the subject as 'the ideal concept of activity' (637 et sq.).

The operative sense of "dialectical method" was treated in investigations of the 'ascent from the abstract to the concrete' (cf. **Iljenkow** 1969), of the relationship of the logical and the historical (cf. **Gropp** 1970, **Iljenkow** 1974), or in **Narski's** study of **Marx's** treatment of aporiai etc. (cf. **Bogomolow** 1972). Nevertheless, no real clarity reigned. According to **E. Thomas** the function of 'the foundational laws of D' consisted in the fact that through them 'the investigation [...] is fixed theoretically in a general form' (1976, 161). It would perhaps be helpful to add: in a provisional theoretical framework with heuristic function. **G. Pawelzig** ascribed to the 'law of the negation of the negation in **Engels's** presentation of historical processes' the functional status of taking up 'the leading, guiding form of presentation in the structure of method when it is a matter of imparting historical understanding and thus allowing activity oriented to the future' (1981, 135). That appears, rather, to be a didactic-propagandist ("ideological") function. When **Götz Redlow** declared that 'the dialectical method is a universal method which in the first instance, in principle, is applicable to any and everything [...] but not in the sense of a master key [...], since the objective universality of D exists only in its concrete individuality' (1979, 10), **Wallner**

countered with the question: 'How does a universally applicable method function, if not as a universal skeleton key?' (1981, 638). That condemns all attempts 'to represent the dialectical-materialist method as an instrument which solves concrete research tasks alongside specialised methods' (639). Herbert Hörz was correct when he wrote that D 'is not a method ranged alongside others, but is, rather, suitable for the comprehension of the co-action of these methods' (1976, 344).

Thus the conscious application of D was finally restricted to directing 'the selection and the combination of more specialised methods, so that as a result a methodology is established which is able to reveal the objective D of the relevant field of investigation'. Wallner named this the 'subordination' of specialised methodologies, while conceding, however, that this is also possible 'without the scientific application' of the dialectical method, in as much as 'the single scientist spontaneously combines the more specialised methods correctly' (ibid.). If it had become apparent that D was 'no "paralogical wonder-weapon"' (640), this amounted to a reevaluation of the *spontaneous D* of (competent) scientists, which is otherwise named 'instinct' or 'intuition'.

7. *Western Marxism*. – In the emphatic moment of 1917 young intellectuals all over the world moved towards revolutionary Marxism under the aegis of D. The Bolshevisation of the international communist movement presented them all, sooner or later, with alternatives: either to pay lip service to the rising orthodoxy, to fall into silence, or to develop their projects outside of the countries of state socialism and the parties connected with them. For the pluralistic theoretical culture which developed outside of Stalinism the (misleading) name 'Western Marxism' has gained currency. Lukács, Korsch, and Gramsci are regarded as its 'real originators' (Anderson 1976, 29; cf. Haug 1985, 234–59).

7.1 In 1919 Lukács directed his critique (which later, due to *History and Class Consciousness*, exercised a many-sided subterranean influence) as far back as Engels, whom he accused of having 'extended the [dialectical] method to apply also to nature [...] following Hegel's mistaken lead'. Lukács declared himself to be firmly for the limitation of D 'to the realms of history and society' (*Hist-ClassCon*, 24). – Sartre, in the Introduction to his *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, developed the tendency of this argument regarding the effects of the regressive D of Engels's position (cf. 15 et sqq., 27 et sqq., 33 et sqq.). – Lukács's second fundamental critique was aimed against Engels's objectivism. The October Revolution had allowed the Proletariat to appear to Marxist theory as 'both subject and object of knowledge' and allowed 'theory in this way to intervene immediately and adequately in the revolutionary process of society'. In as much,

therefore, as the unity of theory and praxis was made possible for the first time, the way to theory's knowledge of 'its theoretical being – the dialectical method' – was open for the first time (*HistClassCon*, 3; transl. corr.). This idea is lacking in **Engels**, according to **Lukács**: 'He does not even mention the most vital interaction, namely the *dialectical relation between subject and object in the historical process*' (ibid.). 'The difference from "metaphysics" is then no longer sought in the necessity for any "metaphysical" treatment to leave the object unchanged, while for the dialectical method the central problem is the *transformation of reality*' (ibid.; transl. corr.). Otherwise 'the virtues of forming "fluid" concepts [would] become altogether problematic' (ibid.), and D would appear as 'a superfluous additive, a mere ornament of Marxist "sociology" or "economics" [...], as an empty construct in whose name Marxism does violence to the facts' (4). – Similarly, Ernst **Bloch** turned against the type of 'D which have all too often become pure decoration or even a schema' (GA 11, 393). – D became for **Lukács** when he was separated from praxis a form of totality thinking, which **Althusser** later challenged in his critique of the *expressivist totality*.

7.2 Against the thesis, defended by Franz **Mehring** and others, which claimed that method could not be separated from analysis of the matter, August **Thalheimer** explained in 1923 that 'the development of a version of D is "a pressing need", among other reasons because "the need for the creation of a comprehensive and strictly ordered world view has presented itself to the most advanced sections of the world proletariat"'. Karl **Korsch**, who cited these words, accused **Thalheimer** of positivism-idealism in 1924 and reaffirmed 'the total error of the idea of the possibility of an independent "system" of materialist D. Only an idealist dialectician can attempt to consider the totality of thought-forms (determinations of thought, categories) [...] as a particular subject matter for itself' (176). In 1930 **Korsch** extended his critique to **Lenin**, in whom **Korsch** found D to be one-sidedly placed in the object and the dialectic of theory and praxis destroyed, due to the *Abbildtheorie* (62). According to **Korsch**, **Lenin** saw his chief task not in D but in the 'defence of the *materialist position*, which has not really been seriously attacked by anyone' (65). 'The dialectical method used by **Marx** in *Capital*' points, according to **Korsch**, to 'the inner restlessness in all that which exists' (1932, 177). Nevertheless, he insisted increasingly upon a clarification of the terminology of D. In particular, *contradiction* 'exists not as such, but rather, only through a simulated, symbolically abbreviated, or unclear (due to other reasons) manner of expression' (197). Already himself now under the influence of logical empiricism, **Korsch** declared in 1932: 'The logically and empirically flawless clarification of all these concepts which are still used unthinkingly today, and a good num-

ber of further ones, is one of the most important tasks for the future of the socialist-proletarian science which appeals to the authority of **Marx**' (ibid.). – His later intellectual development saw him break with Marxism; but for his 'student' Bertolt **Brecht**, both the sense for D and the sense for its non-speculative deployment remained living forces.

7.3 *Brecht* – Like **Korsch** and other Marxist intellectuals from 1917, **Brecht** was a Leninian. It was precisely for this reason that he understood what sort of a degeneration the 'Leninism' institutionalised by **Stalin** represented. In 1926/27 **Brecht** noted 'an enormously characteristic episode: When **Lenin** had died, someone tried to gather together his immortal sayings and phrases. But there weren't any. All that was found were slips of paper with practical instructions scribbled on them'; consequently, the slips of paper were to be examined, to see if 'changes of world-historical significance' could be made of them (GA 21, 179). In a letter to **Korsch** from 1934 (**Brecht** 1983, 185 et sqq.) Brecht announced that 'good old D' was 'not yet so vanquished and antiquated' and attributed its 'deterioration' to the weakness of the workers' movement. In a similar fashion, he later gave priority of place in his critique of Stalinism to the 'withering away of D' (GA 23, 417).

7.31 Around the same time as **Korsch** turned away from D, **Brecht** sketched his programme for a 'dialectical drama' (GA 21, 431 et sqq.). It is a *philosophy of praxis under antagonistic conditions*, related to that of **Gramsci**, which emerges and is dialectical in as much as it avoids dissolution, uniformity, and overgenerality and not only claims agility, but makes it the very criterion of its expression. The capacity to describe something is founded upon the capacity to transform it. The idea of historical 'necessity' is criticised in that it conceals 'contradictory tendencies which have been decided upon pugnaciously' (GA 21, 523). D is necessary because of the unbridgeable difference between thought and reality, and because of the necessity of finding an orientation for action according to this condition. 'In general, processes don't come to an end in reality. It is observation which requires and establishes conclusions' (523). **Brecht** elaborated a reversed uncertainty principle: it is not intervention which makes an image unclear, but rather, the lack of possibility to intervene: 'Situations and things which cannot be transformed by thought (which are not dependent upon us) cannot be thought' (521). – In a letter to Erich **Engel** in 1949 **Brecht** proposed 'to study' the materialist-dialectical 'way of thinking as a way of life', with the consequence 'that D must not be derived or refuted from the previous way of thinking alone, just as the new way of thinking, in any case, cannot be derived' from previous thought forms: 'a leap is necessary, or (possibly more

auspiciously) a fall is due [*‘ein Fall ist fällig’*] It is ‘wiser to comprehend D from its political applicability, that is, to derive the new concepts [*die neuen Begriffe*] from attempts to intervene [*aus den Griffen*]’ (1983, [619], 591).

‘Dialectical criticism’ for **Brecht** consisted in bringing points of view ‘into crisis’ ‘by means of their results’ (GA 21, 520; GW 20, 153). In this sense he showed the crisis of the Soviet censorship regime, by confronting it with its results: ‘The state damages literature which is in favour of the state when it oppresses literature which is opposed to the state, it incapacitates Literature’s voice, it pulls its teeth and de-realises it’ (GA 22.1, 132).

7.32 Norman Levine’s claim that D for **Marx** were ‘the unifying concept, the central vision’ (1) is equally the case for **Brecht**. He adopted the expression ‘turning point’ [*Wendung*], used by **Lenin** in the context of self-criticism and reorientation, in the subtitle of his *Me-ti: Buch der Wendungen*. In this ‘small handbook’ of dialectical morals, or rather, dialectical manners, D are named ‘the great method’. D are concerned ‘to recognise processes in things and to use them. It teaches the art of asking questions which make action possible’ (GW 12, 475). **Hegel**’s dictum that identity is the identity of identity and non-identity is negated, transferred into the pressure of the things ‘under thought’ (493) and the dictum of difference: things don’t remain true to themselves, concepts don’t remain with the things (548). ‘Things are happenings. States of affairs are processes. Events are transitions’ (517). **Brecht** comprehended D anti-ideologically: subversive, against every and any ideological eternity of an established order. ‘Deployment of D for the destruction of ideologies’ (GW 20, 157).

Brecht felt a paradox in the liberation of the Germans from the NS by a defeat: ‘Once again this nation is swindling its way to a revolution by assimilation’ (*Jrmls*, 6 January 1948). Without materialist D the situation in Germany could not be comprehended: ‘for its unity can only be achieved through continued rending asunder, it will have freedom dictated to it etc etc [...]’ (ibid.). – He noted the danger that with the swindling of the revolution emerged a perverted D, transformed back into metaphysics: this pseudo-D, ‘which stirs everything up in order to calm it down, which transforms the things in flux into something fixed, “elevates” matter into an idea, is just the bag of magic tricks for such shit-awful times’ (ibid.)

7.33 The theatre which **Brecht** directed in the GDR was strongly oriented to D. ‘Everything connected to conflict, clash, and struggle cannot be treated at all without materialist D’ (GA 23, 376). The theatre ‘is able to make D a pleasure. The surprises of the logically progressive or leaping development, the instability of all states of affairs, the wit of contradictoriness and so forth, they are

delights in the liveliness of humans, things, and processes, and they raise the art of living well just as much as the joyfulness of life. All arts contribute to the greatest of all arts, the art of living well' (GW 16, 702). The reception of D in the theatre was not only beneficial. Cautiously formulated: 'the entry of D into the theatre triggered a perceptible shock among those who accepted D in other areas' (*Jrnls*, 25 December 1952).

7.4 In the *Prison Notebooks* Gramsci developed his version of D above all in his critique of Bukharin's 'objectivist disfigurement of Marx's theory of history' (Schmied-Kowarzik 1981, 116) and in his confrontation with the idealist D of Benedetto Croce.

7.41 Gramsci attacked Bukharin precisely in that place where he presented the theoretical structure which had been developed by Engels, Plekhanov, and Lenin, and which was later canonised by Stalin. In as much, this critique can be understood as a critique *avant la lettre* of Stalinist *Dialectical Materialism*. Gramsci saw the foundational problem in the assumption that 'the philosophy of praxis has always been split into two: a doctrine of history and politics, and a philosophy, which Bukharin says is dialectical materialism and no longer the old philosophical materialism' (Q 11, 22; *SPN*, 434; transl. corr.). 'But if the question is framed in this way, one can no longer understand the importance and significance of the dialectic' (*ibid.*). Expressed in positive terms: 'The true fundamental function and significance of the dialectic can only be grasped if the philosophy of praxis is conceived as an integral and original philosophy which opens up a new phase of history and a new phase in the development in world thought. It does this to the extent that it goes beyond both traditional idealism and traditional materialism, philosophies which are expressions of past societies, while retaining their vital elements. If the philosophy of praxis is not considered except in subordination to another philosophy, then it is not possible to grasp the new dialectic, through which the transcending of old philosophies is effected and expressed' (435). Gramsci saw in the pre-Stalinist "theoretical grammar" of Bukharin, which posited and gave precedence to a foundational materialist philosophy which determined historical materialism, also a capitulation before common sense [*senso commune*]: 'It is felt that the dialectic is something arduous and difficult, in so far as thinking dialectically goes against vulgar common sense, which is dogmatic and eager for peremptory certainties and has as its expression formal logic' (*ibid.*). Referring to the third of the *Theses on Feuerbach* (MECW 5/3), he continued: 'The uneducated and crude environment has dominated the educator and vulgar common sense has imposed itself on science rather than the other way

round. If the environment is the educator, it too must in turn be educated, but the *Manual* does not understand this revolutionary dialectic' (*Q* 11, 22; *SPN*, 435).

The reclamation of D, according to Gramsci, consisted in the critique of evolutionism and all views which supposed an unbroken, goal directed, predictable development, and which were not able to recognise 'the dialectical principle with its passage from quantity to quality', a passage which 'disturbs any form of evolution and any law of uniformity understood in a vulgar evolutionist sense' (*Q* 11, 26; *SPN*, 426). Against the objection that if this was the case, D could not even be conceived, Gramsci answered: 'But a theory of history and politics can be made, for even if the facts are always unique and changeable in the flux of movement of history, the concepts can be theorised. Otherwise one would not even be able to tell what movement is, or the dialectic, and one would fall back into a new form of nominalism' (427).

7.42 Croce was accused by Gramsci: 1. of having regressed from Marx's *real D* to *ideal D* ('in becoming does he see becoming itself or the "concept" of becoming?' – *Q* 10.11, 1); and 2. of having gone to great pains 'to reduce the antithesis and to split it up in a long sequence of moments, that is, to reduce the dialectic to a process of reformist evolution of "revolution-restoration", in which henceforth only the second term is valid, because it is concerned to repair continually (from the outside) an organism which does not have its own sources of recuperation within itself' (*Q* 10.11, 41.XVI). Gramsci saw this liberal-conservative domestication of Hegel's D in the sense of a reformist 'passive revolution' (cf. *ibid.*), above all in the 'dialectic of distinct', which Croce 'introduced in addition to a dialectic of opposites' (*Q* 10.11, 1). 'The philosophical error (of practical origin!) of such a conception consists in the mechanical assumption that in the dialectical process the thesis must be "conserved" by the antithesis, in order not to destroy the process itself. The dialectical process is therefore "foreseen" as a mechanical, arbitrarily, pre-arranged repetition into the infinite. [...] In real history the antithesis tends to destroy the thesis, the synthesis is a sublation (*Aufhebung*). However, this does not mean that it can be established a priori which elements of the thesis will be "conserved" in the synthesis, nor that the blows could be "measured" a priori, as in a conventionally organised "boxing ring". That this in the end actually occurs is a question of immediate "politics", because the dialectical process in real history breaks down into countless partial moments' (*Q* 10.1, 6). Gramsci allowed that Croce's 'dialectic of distinct' was a 'purely verbal solution of a real methodological requirement which is to be criticised' (*Q* 10.11, 41.X): 'There is a real requirement in the differentiation of oppositions from distinctions, but there is also a contradiction in

terms, because there is a D only of oppositions' (ibid.). Here is disputed, above all, the Marxist differentiation between structure and superstructures. Croce thought the relationship *speculatively*, while Gramsci comprehended it in *realistic* terms with the concept of an 'historical block' (cf. ibid.).

7.43 Gramsci reconstructed D from active behaviour in nature and thus avoided reducing D to subject-object D. He sought a path between objectivism and subjectivism. He noted an indirect critique of the objectivist Plekhanov when he was making excerpts from a neo-Thomist text in which D were comprehended as a part of formal logic and rhetoric: Plekhanov, in *The Fundamental Problems of Marxism*, defined D, departing from a classification of objectivity and disregarding the primacy of praxis, 'as a part of formal logic, as the logic of movement in distinction to the logic of stasis' (Q 11, 41; cf. Bogomolow 1974, 236).

Regarding Lukács's view 'that one can speak of the dialectic only for the history of men and not for nature' (Q 11, 34; SPN, 448; cf. *HistClassCon*, 24) Gramsci argued that 'if his assertion presupposes a dualism between nature and man he is wrong because he is falling into a conception of nature proper to religion and to Graeco-Christian philosophy and also to idealism which does not in reality succeed in unifying and relating man and nature to each other except verbally. But if human history should be conceived also as the history of nature (also by means of the history of science) how can the dialectic be separated from nature? Perhaps Lukács, in reaction to the baroque theories of the *Popular Manual*, has fallen into the opposite error, into a form of idealism. Certainly, there are many notes in Engels (*Anti-Dühring*) which can lead to the deviations of the *Popular Manual*. It is forgotten that Engels, even though he worked on it for a long time, only left behind sparse materials for the promised work, which is supposed to prove that D is a cosmic law. Furthermore, it is exaggerating to claim the identity of thought of the two founders of the philosophy of praxis' (ibid.).

7.5 Étienne Balibar opened the D conference in the research institute of the French Communist Party in 1975 with the notion, following Mao, of a double relation of D to the class struggle: 'At the same time, D has the class struggle as its primary (if not its only) *object* [...]; and, on the other hand, D is itself a product, or better, a particular *form* of class struggle', namely, a revolutionary form of class struggle (1977, 21). Balibar detected two opposed 'deviations', whose interplay of permanent 'transitions' and 'corrections' was, however, essential for the process of Marxism: 1. *Objectivism* (in the chief form of a D of nature and of evolution and of a universal ontology; and the secondary variant of positivism, of formalism of a theory of knowledge or of a dialectical meth-

odology); and 2. (not symmetrically opposed) constitution of a *philosophy of praxis* or a materialist *historicism* (with the weaker variant forms of subjectivism, a philosophy of freedom and of the subject, a theoretical humanism, etc.) (25). The most important form of the philosophy of praxis is ‘not that which thinks praxis as the praxis of a *subject* [...] but rather, that which thinks *praxis itself as anonymous internally split “subject” of the historical process*’ (by means of categories like: relations of power, forms of organisation, the ruling ideology and the opposed proletarian ideology) (35). The opposition of objectivism and historicism embodied in **Engels** and **Gramsci** is ‘*immanent* to materialist D’ (40). This opposition will therefore not disappear. Its maintenance is the very life of materialist D itself: no fixed definition can be given of it, however, inside materialist D, there is a complex theoretical struggle *for* the same (41). **Balibar** intervened in the struggle of these opposites with two complementary corrections: ‘1. There is only *objective* D, D is the contradictory movements of *the things themselves* and not the things “as they are reflected in consciousness”, *let alone* a mere movement of thought. 2. There is only D from the standpoint of praxis or rather, from a *practical standpoint*, a standpoint which subordinates theory to practical determinations’ (38).

Balibar regarded as foundational for materialist D ‘the thesis of the “unity of opposites” (*unité des contraires*), the thesis of the universality of contradiction (*contradiction*), and of the specificity (*spécificité*) of contradictions’ (60). If one grasped D, on the other hand, as the doctrine of movement etc., it remained within the criticised metaphysics and ontology. D is the theory of the emergence, development, and resolution (not reconciliation) of contradictions: ‘for *no* contradiction is ever “stable”, “eternal”, even though *the* contradiction, the contradictory character of the “essence of things” is, as such, eternal or rather *absolute*’ (ibid.). – ‘Specificity’ had already been demanded by **Brecht**: ‘For example, the dictum of “transformation” is simply castrated, if one quality is simply transformed into another. The dictum then becomes a mere platitude, that is, a trivial, ineffective truth. What is possibly needed is a conceivable, expectable incident, in which a new quality, of a quite specific type, emerges due to changes in a certain concentration; while that out of which the new quality has emerged was not able to be treated in this specific respect, that is, it was better to not name it as a quality at all’ (letter to Erich **Engel** 1949 in **Brecht** 1983, [619], 591). To make the things under consideration ‘treatable’ in a practical-transformative sense is the meaning of Brecht’s postulate ‘to derive the new concepts [*die neuen Begriffe*] from attempts to intervene [*aus den Griffen*]’ (ibid.). – **Balibar** developed his version of the specificity of *contraires* as an interpretation of **Engels’s** “reflex thesis” (the thesis that subjective D are a ‘reflex’ of objective D): that does not mean that there are two

D, whose relationship would have to be studied, but rather ‘that there is *one*, single, *objective dialectic* whose development of thought, of knowledge, is likewise a specific *aspect* and consequently a determinate *effect*’. Reflex signifies ‘that knowledge develops as itself an objective process’ (29). Thus **Balibar** could stand by the thesis of the universality of *the* contradiction, even though there are only ever specific oppositions or contradictions which appear only for and in praxis.

Obviously influenced by **Lenin’s** way of thinking, **Balibar** ended with the dictum: ‘D is for the theory of the proletariat that which the party is for the praxis of the proletariat, its *organisation* or its “concentrated form”’ (63). The sentence became an historical signature: four years later, the practical-theoretical political culture in France in which alone such a claim could be made collapsed.

7.6 **Wolfdietrich Schmied-Kowarzik** comprehended the ‘self-justification of materialist D’ (1981, 210) as a philosophy of praxis, which he reconstructed from **Marx’s** critical sublation [*Aufhebung*] of **Hegel’s** philosophy. His attention was directed to the practical-materialist ‘predominance’ [*das Übergreifende*] which he saw in *production*, understood in the broadest sense. He developed the concept of ‘predominance’ from the *Introduction* of 1857, in which **Marx** wrote: ‘The conclusion we reach is not that [... the determining moments] are identical, but that they all form the members of a totality, distinctions within a unity. Production predominates not only over itself, in the antithetical definition of production, but over the other moments as well [distribution, consumption]. The process always returns to production to begin anew [...]. A definite production thus determines [...] *definite relations between these different moments*. Admittedly, however, *in its one-sided form* [as a moment alongside the others], production is itself determined by the other moments’ (*Gr*, 99). **Schmied-Kowarzik** saw here the ‘central idea of **Marx’s** materialist D’ (1981, 97). Production is for him human self-production, at the same time production of human alienation [*Entfremdung*] and production of the tendency, to be realised practically, of the sublation [*Aufhebung*] of this alienation (cf. 116). With **Ernst Bloch** he comprehended the idea of D of nature in a new way, under the condition that ‘nature is posited not only as an object of social production’ (206). He concluded ‘that the dialectical predominance of social production, which represents always and necessarily the starting point of dialectical materialism, is itself dialectically included in the predominant D of nature. The D of nature, however, for its part, can only be fulfilled and defined by social praxis, that is, by a moment over which it has predominated’ (210).

8. The post-communist situation is characterised by blind D, which are hardly thought theoretically. D as a foundational concept of Marxism-Leninism appears to be discredited. In the ruins of the Soviet Union all that which was once thought remains indifferently buried, and the traditions of Western Marxism are threatened by abandonment.

8.1 Analytical Marxists such as Erik Olin **Wright**, among others (1992, 6), claim, in a fashion similar to that of Karl **Popper's** intended liquidation of D in 1940 (cf. **Habermas's** *Nachtrag zur Kontroverse zwischen Popper und Adorno* of 1963 [*The Analytical Theory of Science and Dialectics*, Habermas 1976]), to have found much 'obscurantism' in the discourses which claim a methodological 'distinctiveness' for Marxism, above all in the 'notoriously unclear' and 'widely repeated' claim that it is dialectical. 'It does seem that the skilful use of dialectical metaphors can serve worthwhile heuristic purposes' (6). Nevertheless, the mastery of a 'suggestive idiom' is something other than the deployment of a distinctive methodology, particularly since 'dialectical accounts either restate what could perfectly well be expressed in less esoteric ways, or else they are unintelligible' (ibid.). That there still isn't a concrete, exemplary analysis of operative D is taken by them as a 'reason for holding that there is no dialectical method at all' (ibid.). What they at best concede is 'a way of organizing and directing thinking at a pre-theoretical level, which, in some cases, facilitates the discovery of insights that can be well expressed in terms consonant with the norms of scientific culture' (ibid.).

That this judgement corresponds not *only* to a scientific or positivistic narrow concept of method is indicated by the fact that the historian Edward P. **Thompson** similarly judged the thesis that for **Marx** D was a method and 'that this method lies somewhere in the field of dialectical reason' and 'constitutes the *essence* of Marxism'. If Marx had found this 'clue to the universe', he would have written it down on paper. 'We may conclude from this that it was not written because *it could not be written*'. **Thompson** comprehended **Marx's** D, in contrast, as 'a practice learned through practising. So that, in this sense, D can never be set down, nor learned by rote' (306). – Richard **Gunn** called for the recognition in principal of a 'basic distinction between concept and object, between interpreting and changing the world [...]; between, in short, the teleological or purposive and the causal', and wanted to admit, at most, the conceptual as the primary field of application of D, which he found, at any rate, to be 'animistic and anthropomorphic'. Thus historical or social D at the best can be understood 'in relation to the (true or false) awareness of the concerned actors' (1977, 48 et sq.). 'A *dialectical materialist* monism is a contradiction in itself' (49).

As a counter manoeuvre, D are sublated as soon as they are represented (for example, by Hans Heinz **Holz** 1986, 11) as a 'system of statements about the structure of the world' and reinforced as an 'ontological theory', which functions *secondarily* as a 'meta-theory of thought' (cf. Narski 1973, 83). In 1990 **Holz** projected 'the development of an ontological foundational model of principles, categories, and guiding principles of theoretical construction' (562). Following **Stalin's** conception of the equivalence of both orders – the logical and its 'ontological correlate' (563) – he could say that 'the theory of reflection [*die Widerspiegelungstheorie*] [...] represents the foundation of D out of itself' (564). – An exceeding of the boundaries of D of a different nature can be observed in the work of Peter **Ruben**, when, taking up the concept derived from the philosophy of nature of *natura naturans*, he proposed 'to think nature in its totality as *its own site of production*' and argued that '[i]t is precisely that which constitutes D' (1978, 70). Since the 'self-movement of the whole' thus appeared as the theoretical problem of D, Ruben regarded the concept of 'interaction' as unsuitable (82).

8.2 'Warning: not to be misused' – Thus Theodor W. **Adorno** entitled his reflections on D in *Minima moralia* (no. 152): 'A mode of discussion stemming from the Sophists', 'whereby dogmatic assertions were shaken', D 'subsequently developed, as against *philosophia perennis*, into a perennial method of criticism, a refuge for all the thoughts of the oppressed, even those unthought by them. But as a means of proving oneself right it was also from the first an instrument of domination, a formal technique of apologetics [...] Its truth or untruth, therefore, is not inherent in the method itself, but in its intention in the historical process' (244). Unexpectedly for Adorno, this lays the accent upon orientation and commitment. Years later, in 1966 in *Negative Dialectics*, the accent had slipped. D were now regarded as 'the self-consciousness of the objective context of delusion; it does not mean to have escaped from that context. Its objective goal is to break out of the context from within. The strength required from the break grows in D from the context of immanence; what would apply to it once more is **Hegel's** dictum that in D an opponent's strength is absorbed and turned against him, not just in the dialectical particular, but eventually in the whole' (406).

In the same year (1966) at the Prague **Hegel** conference, Herbert **Marcuse** presented the thesis opposed to **Althusser's**, that 'materialist D is also still under the spell of idealist reason, remains in positivity, so long as it doesn't deconstruct the conception of progress according to which the future is always already rooted inside the present, so long as Marxist D doesn't radicalise the concept of transition to a new social stage, that is, so long as it doesn't build

into its theory reversal, the break with the past and the existing state of affairs, the qualitative difference in the direction of progress' (1969, 186). Marcuse registered a structural transformation of social D: 'To the extent that the antagonistic society closes itself up into an immense, repressive totality, the social location of negation "misplaces itself", so to speak. The power of negation grows outside of' and 'is today concentrated in no class' (190). Determinate negation is therefore for Marcuse historically overtaken (cf. 1954, 370 et sq.).

8.3 D would therefore be relevant for an orientation which combines agility and wisdom; although it does not give up its secrets in a methodological formulation, it would nevertheless be relevant as method in an elementary sense, understood as heuristics (*Findekunst*). Both functions are connected to a conception of the world which allows a contradictory, moving context to be thought. – 'Perhaps it is not too bold, in a Brechtian sense, to define the Sage as the quintessential location in which such D may be observed' (Benjamin, qtd. in Ruoff 1976, 39). The ability to practise D is, finally, an Art. 'Being a dialectician means having the wind of history in one's sails. The sails are the concepts. It is not enough, however, to have sails at one's disposal. What is decisive is knowing the art of setting them' (Benjamin, *ArcadesPrj*, 473).

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→ abstract/concrete, Althusser-School, Analysis/Synthesis, analytical Marxism, antagonism, anti-ideology, anti-philosophy, application, beginning, Camera obscura, Capital-logic, class-struggles, composition plans, concept, consciousness, contradiction, crisis, Critical Theory, critique, Debate on Positivism, Della-Volpe-School, development, dialectical image, Dialectical Materialism, dialectical theatre, dialectics of nature, doubling, empiricism/theory, ensemble of social relations, genesis, guiding thread, Hegel-critique, Hegelianism, historical-logical, image, interaction, intervening thought, language, limits of dialectics, logical-historical, Marxism, mediation, metaphysics, method, movement, negation of negation, ontology, philosophy, Positivism, research/presentation, revolutionary Realpolitik, stupidity, sublation, system, theory/praxis, thought-form, Umschlag, Western Marxism, Weltanschauung

→ Abbild, abstrakt/konkret, Althusser-Schule, Analyse/Synthese, analytischer Marxismus, Anfang, Antagonismus, Antiideologie, Antiphilosophie, Anwendung, Aufbaupläne, Aufhebung, Begriff, Bewegung, Bewusstsein, Camera obscura, Darstellung/Forschung, Della-Volpe-Schule, Denkform, Dialektischer Materialismus, dialektisches Bild, Dialektisches Theater, Dummheit, eingreifendes Denken, Empirie/Theorie, Ensemble der gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse, Entwicklung, Forschung/Darstellung, Genese, Grenzen der Dialektik, Hauptwiderspruch, Hegelianismus, Hegelkritik, Kapitallogik, Klassenkämpfe, Krise, Kritik, Kritische Theorie, Leitfaden, Logisch-historisch, Marxismus, Metaphysik, Methode, Naturdialektik, Negation der Negation, Ontologie, Philosophie, Positivismus, Positivismus-Streit, revolutionäre Realpolitik, Sprache, System, Theorie/Praxis, Umschlag, Verdoppelung, Vermittlung, Wechselwirkung, Weltanschauung, westlicher Marxismus, Widerspruch

Domestic-Labour Debate

A: al-mas'ala al-ḡauharīya fī al-falsafa. – F: débat sur le travail ménager. – G: Hausarbeitsdebatte. – R: diskussia o domašney rabote. – S: debate sobre el trabajo doméstico. – C: jiāwù láodòng tāolùn 家务劳动讨论

The “DLD” was one of the important controversies within Second Wave feminism. In the late 1960s, North-American and British women’s liberationists, mostly socialist-feminist in political perspective, launched an inquiry into “domestic labour”. In their usage, the term referred to the unpaid house-work and child-care performed in private family households by women family members, especially wives and mothers. Theorising domestic labour and its relationship to the reproduction of labour-power would be key, these feminists thought, to understanding women’s subordination from a simultaneously feminist and Marxist perspective. The voluminous literature produced in this international effort became known as the DLD.

1. In pursuit of an analysis of domestic labour and the reproduction of labour-power, feminists studied Marxist texts and wrestled with Marxist concepts. Two passages, written nearly forty years apart, seemed of particular importance. The first, from the never-published *GI* of 1846, occurred in the course of **Marx’s** and **Engels’s** discussion of the family as the site at which individuals are maintained and reproduced. ‘The production of life, both of one’s own in labour and of fresh life in procreation, now appears as a twofold relation: on the one hand as a natural, on the other as a social relation’ (MECW 5/37). The second passage was from the preface to Engels’s 1884 *Origin*. Here, Engels wrote of two kinds of production proceeding in parallel, ‘on the one side, the production of the means of existence [...] on the other side, the production of human beings themselves’ (26/131). Although the thesis of a two-fold production of things and people was not taken up later by the socialist movement, 1970s socialist feminists found it irresistible.

Several factors contributed to the attraction: first, it emphasised the importance of activities for which women held major responsibility; second, it implied that the process of the production of human beings has not only an autonomous character but also a theoretical importance equal to that of the production of things; and third, it seemed to authorise feminist efforts to theorise domestic labour and to build an autonomous women’s movement.

Marx's *CI* also drew the attention of domestic-labour theorists, for it suggested links between wages and domestic labour, the reproduction of labour-power, and household structure. As with every commodity, the price of labour-power fluctuates around its value. At the individual level, 'the value of labour-power is the value of the means of subsistence necessary for the maintenance of the labourer'. Uniquely, this value involves 'a historical and moral element' so that at any given historical moment there is a socially established normal level of subsistence. Because the worker is mortal, moreover, the means of subsistence that corresponds to labour-power's value 'must include the means necessary for the labourer's substitutes, i.e., his children' (35/180). For example, the introduction of machinery, 'by throwing every member of the [worker's] family onto the labour market, spreads the value of the man's labour-power over his whole family. It thus depreciates his labour-power' (398). Marx's discussions of "relative surplus population" and the "industrial reserve army" appeared pertinent to the DLD as well, for they placed the reproduction of the working class at the centre of overall capitalist social reproduction.

Lenin also had something to say of relevance to the DLD. In discussing women's subordination, he focused on the core role of household labour in perpetuating women's oppression. Peasant and proletarian women are overwhelmed by 'domestic slavery', subjugated 'by the savage demands of kitchen and nursery drudgery' (CW 29, 429). After 1917, Lenin noted that despite 'all the laws emancipating woman, she continues to be a domestic slave, because petty housework crushes, strangles, stultifies and degrades her, chains her to the kitchen and the nursery, and she wastes her labour on barbarously unproductive, petty, nerve-racking, stultifying and crushing drudgery' (ibid.). Lenin's emphasis on the material rather than ideological basis of women's subordination was highly unusual for the period.

2. Unbeknownst to most, the 1970s DLD had a direct predecessor in a controversy within the US Communist Party. In *In Woman's Defense* (1940) and subsequent polemics, CPUSA member Mary Inman explored the complexities of women's oppression under capitalism. For Inman, women's oppression had multiple aspects, cultural and psychological as well as economic, political, and legal. Most relevant to the DLD, Inman asserted that women's housework and childrearing produces present and future labour-power; that is, she claimed unpaid family labour participates in an independent form of production and, indeed, that it is productive labour for capital. Inman's arguments were at first favourably reviewed in CPUSA circles, but the CP soon repudiated the analysis and Inman resigned from the Party. According to K. Weigand (2001), her work nonetheless influenced women party members and, eventually, its postwar

work with women. Meanwhile, **Inman** continued to advocate for her positions, writing myriad letters and articles addressed to the Left, privately publishing *Two Forms of Production* (1964), following the burgeoning women's liberation movement, and even having some direct contact with young socialist feminists in California. It may be that the DLD was somehow directly influenced by **Inman** and her work. More likely, the influence was indirect, transmitted in some manner through the earlier impact of her ideas within the CP.

The DLD took the form of a series of papers, often widely disseminated and discussed long before publication. In the late 1960s, Margaret **Benston**, a US citizen living in Vancouver, Canada, and Peggy **Morton**, a Canadian feminist based in Toronto, circulated essays that launched the debate. In many ways echoing **Inman**, they identified family households as sites of production and housework and childrearing as labour processes. For **Benston**, women's secondary status has an "economic" or "material" root in women's unpaid domestic labour within the family. Women are 'that group of people who are responsible for the production of simple use-values in those activities associated with the home and family' (1969, 16). Hence the family is an economic unit whose primary function is not consumption, as was generally thought at the time, but production. **Morton's** article criticised and extended **Benston's** analysis. She sees the family 'as a unit whose function is the maintenance of and reproduction of labor power' (1971, 214), meaning that 'the task of the family is to maintain the present work force and provide the next generation of workers, fitted with the skills and values necessary for them to be productive members of the work force' (215 et sq.) In this way, **Morton** tied her analysis of the family to the workings of the capitalist mode of production, and focused on the contradictions experienced by working-class women within the family, in the labour force, and between the two roles. Her discussion of the contradictory tendencies in women's situation introduced a dynamic element that had been missing from **Benston's** approach.

An article by Mariarosa **Dalla Costa**, published simultaneously in Italy and the United States in 1972, took the argument several steps further. Polemicising against both traditional left views and the literature of the women's liberation movement, **Dalla Costa** argued that housework only appears to be outside the arena of capitalist production. In reality, it produces not just use-values for direct consumption but also the essential commodity labour-power. Indeed, she claimed, housewives are exploited 'productive workers' in the strict sense, for they produce surplus-value. Appropriation of this surplus-value is accomplished by the capitalist's payment of a wage to the working-class husband, who thereby becomes the instrument of woman's exploitation. Domestic labour is thus a 'masked form of productive labor' (1972, 34). **Dalla Costa** proposed two

strategic options: first, mobilise working-class housewives around the wagelessness of housework, the denial of sexuality, the separation of family from outside world, and the like; second, reject work altogether; women have worked enough and they must 'refuse the myth of liberation through work' (47). – The polemical energy and political range of Dalla Costa's article had a substantial impact on the women's liberation movement on both sides of the Atlantic. Unlike **Benston**, **Morton**, and other North-American writers, **Dalla Costa** seemed to have a sophisticated grasp of Marxist theory and socialist politics. Even more than **Benston** and **Morton**, she had situated the question of women's oppression within an analysis of the role of their unpaid domestic labour in the reproduction of capitalist social relations. Moreover, since her analysis functioned as the theoretical foundation for a small but aggressive movement to demand wages for housework, it offered an attractive connection to political practice.

As the DLD developed, discussion centred on three problems: the nature of the product of domestic labour; whether domestic labour is productive or unproductive; and the relationship of domestic labour to capitalist social reproduction and oppositional activism. Two general positions emerged. One claimed that the product of domestic labour is the commodity labour-power, bearing both use-value and exchange-value. This could be taken to imply that domestic labour is productive of surplus-value and that those who do domestic labour – women – are exploited. In this way, sex contradictions acquire a clear material basis and housewives occupy the same strategic position in the class struggle as factory workers. The second position maintained that domestic labour produces only use-values for direct consumption by household members, including the worker, and thereby contributes to the overall maintenance and renewal of the working class. Neither productive nor unproductive, domestic labour had to be theorised as something else, an undertaking few attempted. Likewise, this theoretical position had no obvious direct correlate in oppositional political strategy.

3. The DLD was from the beginning an international phenomenon (**Hamilton/Barrett** 1986 and **Armstrong/Armstrong** 1990 provide an overview of England and Canada). In France, it was conducted with great vehemence. Already in the narrow circle of theoretical feminist journals there were at least two contrary positions. 1) The work of housewives is unproductive, because it creates no surplus-value and does not occur directly under the command of capital. Precisely because it socialises for the capitalist production process in its backwardness, it should be abolished, socialised. A political strategy had to be developed which would analyse the patriarchal oppression system with its basis, the fam-

ily, also with the goal of abolishing the family. The representatives of this position referred extensively to **Marx** and **Engels**, and also to **Lenin**. This position in France found itself in opposition to the official politics of the CP, even though it was proposed by women from the Party. Since the argumentation of the PCF resembled that of the other Western-European CPs, there were feminist rebellions in all these parties. 2) In the main currents of the PCF, domestic labour in its private form was not placed in question in principle. Rather, equal division among the genders of domestic labour and technical alleviation was advocated, which would thus make professional activity and family life compatible for women. Danièle Léger (1982) argued that, in this way, the connection of content and form of labour would be broken and the family and its position in the totality of the relations of production would be naturalised.

The idea was also diffused that domestic labour constituted its own mode of production. Christine Delphy (1984), for example, proposed the conception that housewives produce no surplus-value. This did not mean, however, that women were excluded from the overall economy, but rather, that they only had greater difficulties in selling themselves freely (in the sense of the free wage-labourer) on the market. They did not possess their own labour-power, which belonged, rather, to the family. This was, in turn, connected to the capitalist mode of production as an independent mode of production. She thus concluded that women were to be mobilised as a class against men.

In the FRG, there was a much noted discussion with the chief thesis that women create less value as soon as they enter the market because a part of their labour-power is employed for the reproduction of male labour-power, which is thus unnoticeable as capitalist extra surplus-value. This argument was summarised by Sigrid Pohl (1984), not with the strategy, for example, of demanding wages for domestic labour, but of abolishing the sphere of extra profits, since it perpetuated the capitalist system together with its discrimination against female wages.

The DLD also reached the countries of the "Third World". Beginning from examples of domestic production in India, Gabrielle Dietrich (1984), for example, rejected arguments from Western feminism as inadequate; despite this, she emphasised that the socialist movements in the entire world would lose female members if they were not capable of taking up the questions thrown up in the DLD in a renewed Marxism.

The burgeoning domestic-labour literature seemed initially to confirm, even legitimate, socialist feminists' double commitment to women's liberation and socialism. Before long, however, a range of problems surfaced. Concepts and categories that had initially seemed self-evident lost their stability. For example, the meaning of the category "domestic labour" fluctuated. Did it refer

simply to housework? Or did it include childbearing and childcare as well? Circular arguments were common, as when domestic labour was identified with women's work, thereby assuming the sexual division of labour theorists wished to explain. In addition, the debate's almost exclusive concern with unpaid household labour discounted the importance of women's paid labour, whether as domestic servants or wage-workers. And its focus on the economic seemed to overlook pressing political, ideological, psychological, and sexual issues. Women's liberationists also found the abstractness of the domestic-labour literature frustrating. The debate developed in ways that were not only hard to follow but also far from activist concerns. Concepts appeared to interact among themselves without connection to the empirical world.

4. The DLD of the 1970s addressed two distinct audiences: feminists, especially socialist feminists, and the Left. By the end of the decade, most feminists concluded that the debate had been a misguided undertaking. Heidi **Hartmann** captured their disappointment in an immensely influential paper, 'The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism', whose first version began circulating in 1975. Noting that 'the categories of Marxism are sex-blind', Hartmann proposed that two theoretical paradigms be adopted. 'Both Marxist analysis, particularly its historical and materialist method, and feminist analysis, especially the identification of patriarchy as a social and historical structure, must be drawn upon' (1981, 2 et sq.). This "dual-systems" approach postulated a partnership of capitalism and patriarchy, each analysable by a distinct theoretical method. From this perspective, the DLD's effort to bridge the boundary between the two systems made little sense.

The idea of two different systems – capitalism and patriarchy – soon became hegemonic in socialist-feminist theorising. Yet this meant that Marxist theory remained untouched by feminist insight. As Iris Marion **Young** put it, 'dual systems theory allows traditional Marxism to maintain its theory of production relations, historical change, and analysis of the structure of capitalism in a basically unchanged form. [...] Thus, not unlike traditional Marxism [it] tends to see the question of women's oppression as merely an additive to the main questions of Marxism' (1981, 49). In any case, women's movement agendas were bursting with other theoretical and practical matters and interest in socialist feminism, much less domestic-labour theorising, dramatically declined.

In the 1980s, audiences for domestic-labour theorising contracted further. Playing a role in the downturn, certainly, were the increasingly conservative political climate and the decline or destruction of many radical social movements. Feminist intellectual work managed to advance, even prosper, but with far fewer links than earlier to women's movement activism. Surviving on col-

lege and university campuses, its practitioners encountered a range of disciplinary constraints and professional pressures. Younger generations of feminist scholars had missed, moreover, the chance to participate in a radical women's movement rooted in the upheavals of the 1960s.

Despite the retrenchments of the 1980s and 1990s, a certain level of interest in theorising domestic labour has persisted. Where there are relatively strong traditions of Marxist theory, for one reason or another, small communities of economists, sociologists, and historians, male as well as female, have continued to address questions descended from those posed in the DLD literature. Working within a Marxist framework, they offer a range of approaches that resist dual-systems analyses, on the one hand, and class-first theorising, on the other. The tone was perhaps set in Maxine Molyneux's 'Beyond the Domestic Labour Debate', which argues for a redirection of the socialist-feminist discussion along two paths. First, interest in domestic labour should move away from the abstract level of the mode of production towards the more concrete 'level of determinate social formations and their reproduction' (1979, 22). Second, theoretical inquiry should enlarge its object of analysis beyond domestic labour, since women's subordination 'cannot be reduced to economic or material factors alone' (*ibid.*). A continuing stream of articles and books show that both directions have been pursued.

In England, for example, Miriam Glucksmann undertook the more empirical of the two suggested routes. In *Women Assemble*, she examines how industrial restructuring between the Wars ultimately impacted upon British women's postwar position within both household and wage economies. For Glucksmann, 'structural changes in commodity production [...] can be explained adequately only by reference to the concomitant changes taking place both within the domestic economy and between the domestic economy and commodity production' (1990, 28). More generally, she proposes that her method of analysis could be applied to other historical cases. That is, 'the abstract question of the relation between gender and class division can be answered in terms of particular cases. An accumulation of these will aid in the formulation of a more general theory' (274).

Two recent studies, both by economists, incorporate discussions of the DLD within larger overviews of the literature on women and capitalism. In *Women's Employment and the Capitalist Family* (1992), Ben Fine rejects the presumed opposition between Marxism and feminism as well as the analytical schizophrenia of dual-systems theory. He criticises the earlier literature for an Althusserian structuralism that shaped its limitations. Unable to confront its problems, 'the DLD simply expired, with a flurry of often unflattering obituary notices' (17). Fine argues for a renewed Marxist-feminist effort. Jean Gardiner,

in *Gender, Care, and Economics* (1997) is less sanguine about such an effort, but offers a valuable survey and evaluation of the DLD. For Gardiner, the debate was 'an ambitious project launched from a weak, unresourced and marginalized base of Marxist feminist intellectuals' (97). It was able to clarify the issues that needed examination but it could not overcome its own failings.

Those who continue into the 1990s and beyond to use concepts associated with the DLD often do so without reference to the need to clarify and correct the debate's earlier weaknesses. Domestic labour, for example, is still taken to be something whose site, agents, and content are self-evident. Reproduction, a concept with meanings within several distinct intellectual traditions that were at first the subject of much discussion (see Edholm/Harris/Young 1977; Beechey 1979; Himmelweit 1983), has acquired a generic significance. Likewise, the notion of reproduction of labour-power has become surprisingly elastic, stretching from biological procreation to any kind of work that contributes to people's daily maintenance, whether it be paid or unpaid, in private households, in the market, or in the workplace. The new phrase, 'reproductive labour', now often covers a wide range of activities contributing to the renewal of people, including emotional and intellectual as well as manual labour, and waged as well as unwaged work. Evelyn Nakano Glenn summarises these developments (1992, 4).

Lise Vogel (1983; 2000) attempts to incorporate domestic labour within a significant reconstruction of Marxist political economy. For example, she positions domestic labour as a second, hitherto hidden, component of necessary labour and thus a category specific to capitalism. Alongside the necessary labour discussed by Marx (renamed 'the social component of necessary labour') lurks a second, hitherto hidden, 'domestic component of necessary labour, or domestic labour' – the unwaged work that contributes to the daily and long-term renewal of bearers of the commodity labour-power and of the working class as a whole (162). Although domestic labour lacks value, it is indispensable, together with the social component of necessary labour, to surplus-value appropriation and capitalist social reproduction.

Brief though it was, the DLD had an important and longlasting impact. Its identification of private households as production, not consumption, units, significantly shifted the framework within which women's activities were analysed. Using categories borrowed or derived from Marxist political economy, domestic-labour theorists began the work of delineating as labour processes the unpaid housework and child-care performed in private households by family members. More broadly, the domestic-labour literature sought to place domestic labour and the reproduction of labour-power in the context of capitalist social reproduction, specifying a range of tendencies and contradictions.

And, along with other developments (e.g. women's rising labour-force participation; the emergence of strong women's movements; mainstream economists' interest in households and human capital), it helped to both make domestic labour socially visible as work and put it onto the public policy agenda. The DLD sought to move women from the analytical periphery to the heart of Marxist theorising about capitalism. Domestic-labour theorists were thus among the first to begin exploring the limitations of then-current Marxist theory and to intuit the coming crisis of Marxism. Despite the DLD literature's considerable ambiguity and many loose ends, its challenge to feminist theory and to the tradition of Marxist political economy remains an unfinished project.

Lise Vogel

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→ capitalism, classes, crisis of Marxism, division of labour, family labour/house work, feminisation of wage-labour, feminism, housewife, identity politics, labour, mode of production, patriarchy, production of life, productive/unproductive labour, reproductive labour, reproductive rights, student movement, surplus-value, women's movement, women's studies, working class

→ Arbeit, Arbeiterklasse, Arbeitsteilung, Familienarbeit/Hausarbeit, Feminismus, Frauenbewegung, Frauenstudien, Hausfrau, Hausfrauisierung der Lohnarbeit, Identitätspolitik, Kapitalismus, Klassen, Krise des Marxismus, Mehrwert, Patriarchat, Produktion des Lebens, Produktionsweise, produktive/unproduktive Arbeit, Reproduktionsarbeit, reproduktive Rechte, Studentenbewegung

Fanonism

A: fikr Fanun. – F: fanonisme. – G: Fanonismus. – R: teorija Frantz Fanona. – S: fanonismo. – C: Fǎnóng zhǔyì 法农主义

Frantz **Fanon** (1925–61) was a major intellectual influence on Third-World revolutionaries and New-Left radicals during the sixties. '[T]he Third World discovers *itself* and speaks to *itself* through this voice', wrote Jean-Paul Sartre in 1961 (Sartre in **Fanon** 1961, xlvi). Fanon's thought is characterised by three aspects. *First*, he proposes a radical anti-imperialist theory, which emphasises the central significance of "race" in the context of colonial oppression; race is not a contingent determination that could be subsumed under the general category of class, but, rather – like nationality and gender – is a distinctive and autonomous form of social, economic, and political inequality. *Second*, Fanon stresses the significance of the revolutionary act as also a psychological and intellectual transformation, which must accompany material transformation, or the socialist reorganisation of production, as its *conditio sine qua non*. *Third*, Fanon argues for individual freedom as an essential component of a socialist synthesis that should guarantee democratic participation in the construction of socialism.

1. **Fanon**, descendant of African slaves, was born in Martinique, the son of a minor official in the French colonial service. Blacks were 97% of a population rigidly stratified along racial lines, the vast majority of whom worked on white-owned sugar-plantations. As part of the small black middle class, he attended the *lycée* in Fort-de-France where he came under the influence of Aimé Césaire, the Communist poet associated with the literary movement known as *négritude*. In 1944, **Fanon** left the island that was occupied by the French Vichy-government collaborating with Nazism, to join the Free French. In 1947, he began university-studies in Lyons, where he immersed himself in medicine, philosophy, and radical, Marxist politics. A major intellectual influence during this period was Hegel, but mainly existentialism: Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Jaspers, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and, most importantly, Jean-Paul Sartre. He also read extensively in classical Marxism as well as the works of Luxemburg, Lenin, Trotsky, and Kautsky, and became familiar with the conflicts surrounding the construction of socialism after the October Revolution. **Fanon** finished medical training in 1951 and began a specialisation in

psychiatry. His mentor, François **Tosquelles**, a refugee from Franco's Spain, advocated a treatment that emphasised the social environment of mental illness.

In 1952, he published *Peau noire, masques blancs* (*Black Skin, White Masks*), a powerful intellectual autobiography that details his discovery as to how deeply embedded racism was in Western culture, and the devastating effect it has on the black person's self-identity. It also elaborates the fierce internal struggle by which **Fanon** reconstructed his own sense of self. In 1953, he took a position as a psychiatrist in a government hospital in French Algeria. When the Algerian Revolution broke out the next year, Fanon's sympathies were strongly with the *Front de Libération National* (FLN). Between 1954 and 1956, while carrying out his normal duties, Fanon treated FLN-militants wounded and tortured by the French and engaged in other secret activities in support of the resistance. In 1956, he resigned from French government service and went into exile in Tunisia as a full-time FLN-militant. He became political editor of the French-language edition of the FLN's official organ, *El Moudjahid*, essays from which were compiled in two further volumes: *L'an cinq de la Révolution Algérienne* (1959; Engl.: *A Dying Colonialism*) and *Pour la révolution africaine* (posthumously, 1964; Engl.: *Toward the African Revolution*). In addition to his political work, he simultaneously undertook medical duties at seven different locations in Tunis and regularly travelled to guerrilla-camps on the Moroccan and Tunisian borders to give medical training and treat the wounded. Once, seriously injured by a land-mine, he was sent to Rome for medical care and narrowly escaped two assassination-attempts. Diagnosed with leukaemia, he died in December, 1961, just weeks after the publication of *Les Damnés de la terre* (*The Wretched of the Earth*).

2. *Theory of Violence*. – It was **Fanon's** discussion in *The Wretched of the Earth* of the role of violence in the anticolonial revolution that was by far the most controversial aspect of his political theory. What is often ignored is his differentiation of the concept of violence, into immediately physical, structural, and psychic violence. In particular, the context of his reflections has sometimes been neglected: namely, the extent of French barbarism in Algeria.

During the first four decades (1830–70) of colonialism, an estimated one-third of the Muslim population was eliminated; in 1945, 40,000 people were massacred in less than a month at Sétif alone. During the years of the liberation struggle (1954–62), over one million Algerians, overwhelmingly non-combatants, were killed; nearly 12% of the population. By comparison, fewer than 12,000 French lost their lives during the entire war and of these, 9,000 were soldiers (**Humbaraci** 1966, 2–55). In this context of massive colonial 'primary

violence' (Fanon 1961, 50), the use of physical violence to liberate the country was seen by Fanon as legitimate and morally justifiable, though he did not hesitate to warn in the penultimate chapter of *The Wretched of the Earth* of the dangers inherent in a reliance on mere physical violence.

Fanon employs the concept of "structural" violence to describe the existing international capitalist system. The expansion of Europe into Africa, Asia, and the Americas over the previous 500 years had created a global system of exploitation so rapacious that it forced billions of people into extreme poverty, hunger, and suffering.

The concept of "psychic violence" is used to comprehend the mechanisms through which racism and colonialism debase their victims to such an extent that they begin to doubt their own value as human beings, accepting and internalising their inferiority. The dominant culture denigrated the language, the religion, the social mores, the very biological-genetic composition of the conquered people. The colonised were declared to be mere savages, sub-humans, dependant upon the conqueror for tutelage and protection from themselves. Deprived of his or her very humanity and self-respect, the dominated person internalised a sense of shame and disgrace – the self-hatred of the colonised. In Fanon's view, the black man internalised the idea that the more he adopted the cultural standards and language of the white man, the closer he would come to being a *real* ("civilised") human being. In order to achieve an approximation of whiteness, he must denounce his own blackness (cf. 'The Negro and Language' and 'The Fact of Blackness' in *Black Skin, White Masks* and 'Concerning Violence' in *The Wretched of the Earth*).

For Fanon, the moment in which the "native" rejects his humiliation, his de-humanisation, his self-hatred, is *the* moment in which the revolution actually begins. Only through a radical claim of self-love could the disease of self-hatred be expunged. This self-redemption and self-purification could be accomplished by an uncompromising will toward action, which Fanon chose to call violence. Fanon's conceptualisation of human renewal is, in certain respects, an extension of the position that Marx and Engels formulate in *The German Ideology*, where they argue that both 'for the production on a mass scale of this communist consciousness, and for the success of the cause itself, the transformation of men on a mass scale is necessary, a transformation which can only take place in a practical movement, in a *revolution*' (MECW 5/52 et sq. [3/70]; transl. modified).

Fanon argues that this lost humanity can only be recovered through an absolute and uncompromising rejection of the *entire* concept of – external *and* internal – colonialism: its cultural values, its political principles, its economic system. The more or less spontaneous assertion of one's self-worth alone can-

not carry through a permanent transformation. It must be accompanied by organised resistance (Chapter 2, 'Spontaneity: Its Strengths and Weaknesses'). Organisation, in its turn, creates obstacles as the movement toward a collective national liberation is in danger of falling under the domination of particular elements, using nationalist slogans, who establish themselves in the name of the nation as a post-colonial "state class" and instrumentalise the revolution for their own narrow *class*-interests.

3. *Nationalism and the culture of liberation.* – Differently from the majority of the chief figures of African nationalism he met in recently independent Ghana in 1960 as a FLN-representative, **Fanon** pointed to the necessity of a dialectical relation of national liberation with internationalism: the national consciousness that needed to be created, in order for it not to turn into a new form of domination, must be articulated internationally. Aimed both against "progressives" who claimed that an emphatic demand on nationality corresponded to an obsolete stage of human development as well as against autocratic nationalists, **Fanon** saw the most urgent tasks of the African intellectual in the development of his nation, but which would only be able to represent the expressive will of the people if it were accompanied by the discovery and creation of universalising values. Here, **Fanon's** concept of "culture" is decisive: 'If culture is the expression of the national consciousness, I shall have no hesitation in saying, in the case in point, that national consciousness is the highest form of culture. [...] It is at the heart of national consciousness that international consciousness establishes itself and thrives. And this dual emergence, in fact, is the unique focus of all culture' (1961, 179 et sq.).

4. *Fanon and Marxism.* – Biographers differ regarding their assessment of **Fanon's** relation to Marxism. **Gendzier**, for example, argues that **Fanon's** writing fluctuated between Marxist and psychological categories (1973, 199). **Caute** says simply that he was not a "traditional" Marxist (1970, 76). **Jinadu** considers **Fanon** to be broadly within the Marxist-Leninist tradition (1986, 98), while **Woddis**, an orthodox Communist, rebukes **Fanon** as a Third-World upstart who was not sufficiently appreciative of socialism's European origins, and insists that he had no understanding of Marxism (1972, 173). **Geismar** argues that his concept of Communism was not that of joining a party, but of joining a revolution (1971, 19).

In fact, **Fanon** was influenced by and engaged in the non-Communist, Marxist Left during his student days. His antipathy toward the PCF had two sources: first, the Party's dedication to a chauvinist conception of French civilisation led it, at best, to vacillate on the colonial question and, at worst, to outright

racism; second, the rigidly hierarchical, “Leninist” form of party-organisation was at distinct odds with Fanon’s democratic conception of a socialist party.

Nevertheless, **Fanon** was deeply influenced by Marxism, which is attested to not only by the repeated use of **Marxian** categories and the explicit and implicit references to Marx and **Engels**. Even more decisive is the fact that **Fanon** argues that ‘Marxist analysis should always be slightly stretched when it comes to the colonial issue. It is not just the concept of the precapitalist society, so effectively studied by Marx, which needs to be reexamined here’ (1961, 5). “Classical” Marxism, whose treatment of race and nationality as mere epiphenomena concealed a Eurocentric approach, had not been able to do that.

5. “Race” and “class”. – Central to **Fanon’s** analysis of the colonial social formation was the phenomenologically comprehended concept of race, of being the other. One’s skin colour was an inescapable badge of subordination that determined the black person’s existence and forced him to accept his own inferiority. Consequently, the simplistic transferral to the colonies of class-categories developed in the European context and appropriate to an understanding of industrial societies that were racially relatively homogeneous was a significant intellectual error because it ignored the racial-national dimension (and could, in turn, lead to negative political consequences). Fanon saw the chief contradiction of colonial societies as that of *race*; those who ruled were those who came from *elsewhere*, those who declared themselves as belonging to a superior species. The essential criterion of their right to rule was not based on their ownership of capital, but on their belonging to a particular race. ‘Looking at the immediacies of the colonial context, it is clear that what divides this world is first and foremost what species, what race one belongs to. In the colonies the economic infrastructure is also a superstructure. The cause is effect: You are rich because you are white, you are white because you are rich’ (Fanon 1961, 5).

Fanon therefore did not simply ignore class as an analytical category. His argument was that, in the colonies, class and race had a symbiotic relationship; the latter was dominant, but *only* insofar as colonialism continues. In *The Wretched of the Earth*, Fanon makes it clear that, with independence, the barriers to socialism are no longer racially determined, and the revolution must be transformed into a *social* (class-) revolution (cf. 1961, 121, 131–44). In Fanon’s view, the colonial society in transition had two alternatives: either it could make a total break with imperialism and begin the construction of socialism based on a thoroughly humanist-democratic programme that addressed the political, spiritual, cultural, as well as the economic needs of the broad masses; or it could sink to the status of a neocolonial appendage of world-

capitalism that would keep the people in bondage. The alternative chosen would be determined by the configuration of class-forces as they were formed during the colonial period but, more importantly, as these forces were influenced and re-shaped morally and politically by the struggle for independence.

6. *Social analysis.* – In **Fanon's** model, colonial society was divided into two racial groups that were simultaneously expressed in five class-categories. At the summit of this pyramid the dominant race and the dominant class were interchangeable terms. He divided the colonised population into four classes: the peasant-majority, the large and growing lumpenproletariat, the tiny full-time working class, and the national middle class.

The perspective of the colonial or postcolonial reality required a revision of the Eurocentric dogmas canonised by Marxism-Leninism. The typical African colony was a vast sea of impoverished peasants surrounding relatively small islands of urbanisation. African cities were not areas of industrial production, but primarily administrative centres whose task was to supervise the extraction of wealth in the form of agricultural and mineral products. Third-World Marxists, following the “Leninist” model, argued that, despite its minuscule size, the *leading* revolutionary class must be the working class under the leadership of a proletarian party. The peasantry was seen as a necessary but subordinate ally.

The minuscule colonial working class, while nationalist, was not particularly revolutionary. They were relatively well off compared to the peasantry and the lumpenproletariat and more interested in preserving and increasing their existing privileges than they were in fundamental revolutionary change. In this context, **Fanon** deployed the theory of the “labour aristocracy” developed by **Engels** and then later **Lenin** (cf. **Fanon** 1961, 74–76). With his use of the term “working class”, **Fanon** was explicitly referring to only a small minority of all those engaged in wage-labour; those with regular, relatively skilled, relatively well paid, full-time employment (cf. *ibid.*). He was *not* referring to the thousands of migrant workers, casual and day-labourers, workers on white farms, nor the masses of personal and household-servants. In the typical African colony, these latter groups of workers constituted 95% of the wage-earning class. In order to designate this majority, **Fanon** reformulates the concept of “lumpenproletariat” that had been negatively deployed by **Marx** and **Engels** – motivated in part by the intention to provoke the French Left, whose cowardice and arrogance on the question of Algerian independence he despised.

Fanon clearly does not conceive of the lumpenproletariat in the European sense, as a marginalised minority, what **Marx** called a social scum made up of vagabonds and thieves. Rather, **Fanon's** lumpenproletariat was made up of peasants recently deprived of their land who had migrated to the urban areas

in search of work and survival (sometimes he refers to this class simply as a fraction of the peasantry). It was in the lumpenproletariat that social rebellion would find its 'urban spearhead. [...] this cohort of starving men, divorced from tribe and clan, constitutes one of the most spontaneously and radically revolutionary forces of a colonized people' (Fanon 1961, 81).

Fanon's analysis of the "national middle class" or "national bourgeoisie" is his most important and most prophetic contribution to an understanding of postcolonial society (cf. esp. 1961, 97–144). Fanon was referring to that portion of the colonised population who had benefited from a European education and were engaged as small businessmen, doctors, lawyers, teachers, and employees within the colonial bureaucracy. The upward mobility of this class was also inhibited by the racism inherent in colonial society. Consequently, they were the first to begin organised nationalist agitation and assumed the leadership of the emergent nationalist organisations that began demanding independence. Fanon saw this class, however, not as a potential revolutionary leadership, but as one whose primary interest was in assuming positions of political and economic dominance that would be available upon independence. Their interest was in taking the place of the Europeans in the colony, and then serving as middle-men, mere business-agents of European capitalism. The colonial middle class demanded the nationalisation of various sectors of the postcolonial economy, not in the interest of the new nation as a whole, but to gain control of the postcolonial state to advance its own interests. To accomplish this, they were perfectly willing to act as subordinates of international capitalism and continue the exploitation of the people as it had existed under colonialism.

It is important to realise that Fanon wrote his analysis of the emergent national middle class in early 1961: that is, at a time when it was only assuming power and the euphoria surrounding independence was nearly unanimous. Fanon was virtually alone in understanding the nature of this class and how it would function when in power.

7. *Revolution, party, democracy.* – Fanon's theory of revolution departed significantly from Lenin's model of the vanguard-party. He emphasises the significance of the radical intelligentsia and particularly its ability to bring leadership to the spontaneously revolutionary masses. In Fanon's model, however, the radical intelligentsia, while providing the initial leadership, also learns from and becomes as one with the masses. Fanon's idea of radical leadership means that as the exploited classes as a whole experience revolutionary politics they also gain the knowledge and skills to exercise self-leadership. The party, consequently, develops a completely different internal organisational culture. It

becomes a mass, radical, and democratic movement in which the “grass roots” feel power in their newly found self-confidence, in their ability to participate in decision-making and to determine the direction of the revolution they are creating (cf. Fanon 1961, 138) – a concept clearly marked by **Luxemburg’s** influence.

Having theorised his ideal party, **Fanon** embarks on a devastating criticism of the one-party state. He was referring not only to dangers he saw inherent in the evolving contemporary politics of the African revolution. His scathing reference to ‘[t]his dictatorship, which believes itself carried by history’ (Fanon 1961, 125) is an unmistakable allusion to the “Leninist” concept of the *proletarian dictatorship* and *democratic centralism*. ‘The shapeless mass of the people is seen as a blind force that must be constantly held on a leash either by mystification or fear instilled by police presence’ (ibid.). Leadership gains its possible ‘validity and strength solely from the existence of the people’s struggle. In practice it is the people who choose a power structure of their own free will and not the power structure that suffers the people’ (139). Similarly, Fanon undertakes a critique of the “cult of personality”: ‘The driver of people no longer exists today. People are no longer a herd and do not need to be driven. If the leader drives me I want him to know that at the same time I am driving him’ (127).

Fanon argues, in a way reminiscent of both **Luxemburg** and **Kautsky**, that, in a one-party state, free and democratic political life is gradually stifled so that eventually only the party-bureaucracy makes decisions. The single party is content to give orders and remind the people constantly that the government expects them only ‘to be obedient and disciplined’ (125). Socialism, in order to exist, must also incorporate a free and democratic political life: ‘the choice of a socialist regime, of a regime entirely devoted to the people, based on the principle that man is the most precious asset, will allow us to progress faster in great harmony, consequently ruling out the possibility of a caricature of society where a privileged few hold the reins of political and economic power without a thought for the nation as a whole’ (56).

That epigones of Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy quite clearly understood the implications of **Fanon’s** thinking explains the virulence of the attacks against him as well as the severe restrictions on access to his work. In the GDR, for example, Fanon’s writings were only published in 1986 (more than 20 years after they were published in the FRG) and, even then, in a severely truncated form (cf. Fanon 1986).

8. *The woman question.* – References to the women’s struggle are found throughout **Fanon’s** work, but he devotes particular attention to the question in *A Dying Colonialism* (1959). His points of departure are the veil (Chapter 1) and the fam-

ily (Chapter 3) and the ways in which the meaning and structure of these were changed by the revolutionary experience. Traditionally, the Algerian woman had been completely dominated by men: father, husband, brother. The veil had been one of the most significant symbols of that domination, but colonialism itself had transformed the symbolic meaning of the veil. French colonial policy was predicated on the destruction of Algerian culture and, in part, this necessitated gaining control over Algerian women (Fanon 1959, 35–67, 99–120). To this end, the French discouraged wearing the veil, in order to make women “allies” in the work of cultural destruction (37 et sq.). The colonised initially countered this with a ‘cult of the veil’ (47), on the one hand serving as a ‘mechanism of resistance’ (63) and on the other hand solidifying ‘feudal traditions that give priority to men over women’ (1961, 142). Nevertheless, Fanon believed that the traditional relations between men and women could find their resolution in the context of the revolutionary struggle, which itself requires changes in the female-male relationship. The success of the revolution required the active participation of women, as a consequence of which the veil lost its “inviolability”. The liberation-struggle thus, ultimately, led to entirely new perspectives in ‘the relations between the sexes’ (1959, 60, fn. 14) and to the breakup of the traditional ‘monolithic’ family (99). The historical process had produced conditions wherein men and women were changed and, in turn, were forced to change conditions. – The outcome of the revolution in postcolonial Algeria, however, turned out to be quite different from Fanon’s utopian vision (cf. **Humbaraci** 1966; **Scheil** 1969).

9. During his lifetime, **Fanon** was little known outside the ambit of the French left-wing intelligentsia and the Algerian Revolution. This changed dramatically with the 1963 English translation of *The Wretched of the Earth* (in 1966 it appeared in German). Translations of his other works into English as well as other languages followed shortly after. His fame spread in the political context of the mid-sixties, a high point of revolutionary optimism in the Third World. In the United States the civil-rights movement had become a potent political force, while, throughout Western Europe and North America, the New Left was posing a challenge both to bourgeois capitalism and authoritarian state-socialism.

In this situation, there developed a sort of proxy-war around and over **Fanon’s** theses. In the United States, the centre of the “Fanon controversy”, the assault was undertaken by an amalgam of liberals, social democrats, and some orthodox Communists, with the goal of maintaining ideological and political control over the activists in the new progressive movements, who referred to Fanon, alongside other figures.

Both sides concentrated their attention on a very narrow interpretation of **Fanon's** theory of violence. Critics charged Fanon with revelling in bloodshed, advocating a Sorelian fascism, and having an almost Satanic influence over young radicals. The best known of these critics was the philosopher, Hannah **Arendt**. In *On Violence*, a diatribe tinged with racism against the New Left and the revolts of the (in her eyes, unqualified both socially and intellectually) African-Americans, she argued that the influence of **Fanon** was responsible for endangering social peace. While polemicising against Fanon's supposed glorification of violence (**Arendt** 1969, 14–20, 65–96), she downplayed both the “naked violence” of the colonial powers as well as the role of violence in American history, above all, violence directed against humans with dark skin. Finally, she utterly failed to see the violence of a brutal, racist war the United States was then waging against the Vietnamese people. – Most of **Fanon's** defenders contented themselves with revolutionary posturing. Only a few interventions, often by African-American intellectuals, attempted to analyse Fanon within the historical context of his wide-ranging overall work. However, it was generally the anti-Fanon critics who published their views in widely read journals and, therefore, dominated the debate. The consequence was that Fanon was politically demonised.

By the seventies, the epoch of the neoconservative “roll-back”, **Fanon** played no role in the political debate any longer. This occurred at the very point that his prophetic analysis of the state-class in postcolonial society was proving so unerring in its accuracy. In a time in which his theory had lost political influence, a number of scholars began producing analytical biographies (**Gendzier** 1973, **Geismar** 1971, **Caute** 1970, **Perinbam** 1982) and studies of various aspects of his political and social thought (**Zahar** 1969, **E. Hansen** 1977, **Onwuanibe** 1983, **Bouvier** 1971, **Lucas** 1971, **McCulloch** 1983). These studies gave impetus to a return to **Fanon's** work for insights regarding the nature of neocolonialism, of continuing racism, of corrupt dictatorships, and the deterioration of the state in the Third World. A new generation of African intellectuals who were trying to analyse the disintegration of their own societies not only developed a far deeper understanding of Fanon's writing on violence, but also gave much needed attention to his thoughts on democracy, the party, and the postcolonial state. Since the mid-eighties, there has been a marked increase in Fanon studies, particularly in the United States, but also in Africa, the Caribbean, Britain, and, to a lesser extent, in Latin America. (**W.W. Hansen** 1996, **Bulhan** 1985, **Jinadu** 1986 and **Sekyi-Otu** 1997).

Fanon's writings have also influenced Third-World women's studies. African (as well as West-Indian and African-American) writers have acknowledged his influence on their fiction (**Lazarus** 1990). *The Wretched of the Earth* and

Black Skin, White Masks came to be regarded by literary theorists as important examples of modern protest-literature. – The collapse of soviet state-socialism has also led to a re-evaluation of Fanon's views on the revolutionary party in light of democratic theory and the failure of the "Leninist" proletarian dictatorship (Gordon 1995, id. et al. 1996). Fanon's thoughts on the symbiotic relationship of race, ethnicity, gender, and class become even more relevant the more the multiracial, multi-ethnic and multicultural nature of Euro-American societies is widely recognised.

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→ alliance-politics, anticolonialism, Black Marxism, cadre-party, chauvinism, chief contradiction, city/country, class-interests, class-reductionism, colonialism, colonial mode of production, cultural revolution, cult of personality, decolonisation, democracy/dictatorship of the proletariat, democratic centralism, developing countries, ethnocentrism, Eurocentrism, grassroots-revolution, human dignity, ideal, imperialism, internationalism, Islamic socialism, labour-aristocracy, leadership, left radicalism, liberation, lumpenproletariat, Luxemburgism, Marxism-Leninism, mass intellectual, masses, middle classes, national bourgeoisie, national identity, national liberation, nationalism, neo-colonialism, New Left, new man, orthodoxy, peasantry, petty bourgeoisie, populism, postcolonial socialism, race and class, racism, revolution, relations of force, self-organisation, slavery/slave-holding society, state-class, Third World, transitional societies, universalism, Western Marxism, woman question, working class, vanguard, violence

→ Antikolonialismus, Arbeiteraristokratie, Arbeiterklasse, Avantgarde, Bauern, Befreiung, Black Marxism, Bündnispolitik, Chauvinismus, Demokratie/Diktatur des Proletariats, demokratischer Zentralismus, Dritte Welt, Entkolonialisierung, Entwicklungsländer, Ethnozentrismus, Eurozentrismus, Frauenfrage, Führung, Gewalt, Graswurzelrevolution, Hauptwiderspruch, Ideal, Imperialismus, Internationalismus, islamischer Sozialismus, Kaderpartei, Klasseninteressen, Klassenreduktionismus, Kleinbürger, koloniale Produktionsweise, Kolonialismus, Kräfteverhältnisse, Kulturrevolution, Linksradikalismus, Lumpenproletariat, Luxemburgismus, Marxismus-Leninismus, Massen, Massenin-tellektueller, Menschenwürde, Mittelschichten, nationale Befreiung, nationale Bourgeoisie, nationale Identität, Nationalismus, Neokolonialismus, Neue Linke, neuer Mensch, Orthodoxie, Personenkult, Populismus, postkolonialer Sozialismus, Rasse und Klasse, Rassismus, Revolution, Selbstorganisation, Sklaverei/Sklavenhaltergesellschaft, Staatsklasse, Stadt/Land, Übergangsgesellschaften, Universalismus, westlicher Marxismus

Gender Relations

A: al-‘alāqāt baina al-ğinsain. – F: rapports de sexes. – G: Geschlechterverhältnisse. – R: polovye/géndernye otnošenija. – S: relaciones de los sexos. – C: xìngbié qíngkuàng 性别情况

“GR” is a common expression in many fields of research, yet it is hardly ever clearly defined in conceptual terms. It is therefore necessary to clarify the concept of “GR” itself while discussing different versions of it. The concept should be suitable for critically investigating the structural role that genders play in social relations in their totality. It presupposes that which is a result of the relations to be investigated: the existence of “genders” in the sense of historically given men and women. Complementarity in procreation is the natural basis upon which what has come to be regarded as “natural” has been socially constituted in the historical process. In this way, genders emerge from the social process as unequal. Their inequality then becomes the foundation for further transformations, and GR become fundamental regulating relations in all social formations. No field can be investigated meaningfully without complementary research into the ways in which GR shape and are shaped. When they are ignored – as is traditionally the case – an image of all relations as implicitly male gains general acceptance. Opposing this tendency and forcing the sciences to research the “forgotten women” was the great contribution of the feminist movement of the last third of the 20th cent. Often, though, the perspective is fundamentally obscured by the phenomenology of men and women as they relate to each other as effects of GR, which thus focuses analysis on relations between particular individuals, as if these could be founded upon themselves. In German, this is particularly noticeable when the concept of GR moves into the singular: “the gender relation [*das Geschlechterverhältnis*]” which appears in almost all scientific studies (of the 145 relevant titles which, according to an internet search, appeared in German in the period 1994–2000, only 4 use the concept in the plural. In English the plural is used exclusively, while “gender” appears only in the singular). The singular may be appropriate, if it is a matter of the proportional representation of men and women in selected areas. Whoever uses it in a broader sense, however, consequently has difficulties avoiding an assumed certainty regarding what genders are. In order to define the concept in such a way that it is able to comprehend the moving and transformative aspects of its object, the plural is appropriate. In the widest

sense, GR are, like relations of production, complex praxis relations. Their analysis considers both the process of formation of actors and the reproduction of the social whole.

1. The French Revolution was the scene of Olympe Marie de Gouges's publication of a manifesto entitled *Declaration of the Rights of Woman and the Female Citizen* (1791). (Born in 1748, she was executed in 1793 due to her protests and organisation of women's clubs.) Without having an expression such as "GR" at her disposal, she effectively thought total social reproduction as being determined by such relations. Public misery and corruption of governments, she declared, were a product of 'scorn for the rights of women' (89). 'A revolution is being prepared which will raise up the spirit and the soul of the one and the other sex, and both will work together in the future for the common good' (88). Without social and political equality of the sexes, the revolution would become a farce. GR appropriate to forms of domination were enforced by the law; thus the law would also be a means for the enforcement of emancipatory GR. The 'unnatural' domination of men over women was derived by de Gouges psychologically: the male, 'extravagant, blind, [...] bloated and degenerated, wants to command despotically a sex which possesses all intellectual capacities' (88). Women, kept like slaves in the contemporary society, would consequently, however, begin to rule as slaves over men (Friedrich Nietzsche later took up this point from an opposed standpoint, when he depicted the slave rebellion of women). De Gouges characterised that doubled reversal as the very quintessence of general ruination. Since its education had been neglected and it was without rights, the female sex developed deceitful forms of domination. Women thus became more destructive than virtuous; they applied their charm as a "political instrument" for the cultivation of corrupt power over men; their weapon was poison. In all previous politics, there had been a de facto domination of women in the Cabinet, in the Embassy, in the Command of the Armed Forces, in the Ministries, in the Presidency, in the Bishoprics and in the Sacred College of Cardinals, and 'everything which the stupidity of men constituted [...] was subjected to the greed and ambition of the female sex' (92). De Gouges did not pursue, therefore, a victim discourse; she thought, at an early stage, the interpenetration of domination and oppression while presupposing a fundamental equality of the capacities of the sexes. More clear-sightedly than later feminisms, she saw the necessity to include the concrete social situation in the idea of the social construction of gender. The form of GR determined morality [*Sittlichkeit*], justice, and freedom. Brutes developed in deformed relations. The fact that women used their beauty as a lever for the acquisition of power and money was a consequence of their exclusion from regular particip-

ation in these goods: 'Yet mustn't we admit that in a society where a man buys a woman like a slave from the African coast, any other way to gain prosperity is closed to her?' (93). Brecht later formed a similar judgement (*Me-ti*, GW 12, 474). De Gouges linked the oppression of women to their function in the reproduction of the species and further articulated both of these with the law of inheritance and women's lack of rights to the free expression of opinion. On the basis of their bondage (they were not allowed to name the father of their child), many women and, with them, their children, were thrown into poverty, an act ideologically reinforced by bigoted prejudices against public admission of fatherhood. 'The rich, childless Epicurean has no problem with going to his poor neighbour and augmenting his family' (94). The mingling that was actually occurring was hushed up in order to maintain the class barriers. However, de Gouges also declared marriage to be 'the grave of trust and love' (93). She demanded the entry of women into the national assembly (89), access to all public offices for all according to their capabilities as well as equal rights in paid occupations. The state's expenditure was to be publicly accounted for, the use of budgetary funds by women according to their needs to be demanded. A 'social contract' between the sexes was to protect the free decision of individuals on the basis of affection, protect their rights regarding joint assets and also give recognition to children born outside of wedlock. The opponents of these politics were 'the hypocrites, the prudes, the clergy and their entire infernal following' (94).

The following elements can be gained from de Gouges which strengthen a concept of GR: egalitarianism in relation to the sexes is heuristically fruitful; relations of subordination of one sex lead to brutality and the ruination of society; it is important to think actors in GR in their particular structures of power and subjugation (slave morality) and their consequences; law as a form in which the dominant relations are reproduced is to be noted in the *dispositif* of GR. The assignment of the reproduction of the species to women as a private affair instead of a social solution receives a fundamental significance.

2. Ethnological studies on GR in the development of humanity emerged with the evolutionism of the 19th cent. They referred in the first instance to matriarchy and patriarchy. The most well-known representatives are Johann Jakob Bachofen and Lewis Henry Morgan. The Jesuit Joseph-Francois Lafiteau (1724), who associated the image of feminine domination in antiquity and in Native-American groups with specific forms of social regulation such as autonomous self-governance of villages and a type of council system, is regarded as a precursor. He showed the connections between matrilineal systems of inheritance and descent, political rights of women, and a differentiated spectrum

of activities that undermined the focus upon the mother. While preparing his work *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*, Engels read **Bachofen**, alongside **Marx's** excerpts from **Morgan** and others. It was **Bachofen** who became the most influential for the reception of this field of research in Marxism. Among others, Paul **Lafargue**, August **Bebel**, Franz **Mehring**, Max **Horkheimer**, Walter **Benjamin**, and Ernst **Bloch** referred to him, and he also played a decisive role in later feminist discussions.

Bachofen presented (from 1861) material studies on the basis of a re-reading primarily of classical mythology. Central was the idea that the maternal principal was expressed in love, peace, freedom, equality, humanity, and commonality and therefore that the dominance of women which was based upon matriarchy represented the "civilised" part of humanity's history. He portrayed development as a violent-subversive dialectical process. Monogamous marriage was represented as a women's victory after a long drawn-out struggle against the humiliating institution of hetaerism. It was a victory that was difficult to win, because marriage as an exclusive association seemed to injure the divine decree. Hetaerism thus also appeared as accompanying atonement. Accordingly, he read Greek mythology as a history of the struggle between powers affirming the legality of marriage (Demeter) and those which sought to undermine it (those related to the hetaerism). The hard road from mothers to the domination of women conflicted, according to **Bachofen**, with the sensual and erotic dimensions of the 'life of women'; the latter eroded 'necessarily more and more the Demetrian morality and ultimately reduced matriarchal existence back to an Aphroditian hetaerism modelled on the full spontaneity of natural life' (102; transl. corr.). 'The progress from the maternal to the paternal conception of man forms the most important turning point in the history of the relations between the sexes' (109); 'the triumph of paternity brings with it the liberation of the spirit from the manifestations of nature, a sublimation of human existence over the laws of material life' (ibid.). – **Bachofen's** criteria became decisive for later debates concerning matriarchy: female lines of descent, group sexuality with the impossibility of determining the father; social and political communal participation, complemented by communal property, and including the contradictory gender stereotype of the woman-mother, morally superior, on the one hand, natural, on the other. This final element served further to romanticise matriarchy as the originary form of social organisation.

Bachofen used the concept of "GR" alternately in the singular or in the plural. He thought the sexes as fixed in their determinate qualities and limited his interpretations primarily to legal and religious forms. Departing from a strict attribution of that which is naturally female and male, he "found" in classical mythology precisely those commonly accepted thought-forms: the opposition

of reason and emotion, nature and sensuality, intellect [*Geist*] and culture. Here, it can be observed how veneration of women and enthusiastic appreciation of a feminine nature can act as the reverse side of the oppression of women, by romanticising them in compensation. – Ernst Bloch (1987) diagnosed that **Bachofen's** heart was for matriarchy, his head for patriarchy, so that, at the end, he finally prophesied abhorrent communism as a return to the figure of the mother. – Because Bachofen derived the real relations of life out of their celestial forms (myths, religion) instead of vice versa, the real work, that is, of deciphering domination and oppression in GR and the utopian forms in which they were figured, remained still to be done.

Morgan (1871) combined a re-reading of ancient and particularly Greek and Roman sources as well as those of the Old Testament with ethnological reports about tribes in Asia, Africa, and North and South America (his fundamental reference was the Iroquois). He depicted two lines of history: technical-civilising progress (invention and discovery) and the development of institutions from group marriage to the monogamous family and the state. The description of invention included livestock breeding, agriculture, pottery, in short, the whole of human life, since the question of the spread of humans over the whole of the earth depended on progress in the forms of sustenance of life (increase in the sources of sustenance). Morgan did not speak of matriarchy, but of descent in the female line; his chief criteria were economic: common occupation of land, work in common, a household of a communist type. According to his view, there had been an originary community consisting of equals. The development of private property led to the disintegration of collective structures. A chief focus of his research was the process of separation of family forms and lines of kinship; he comprehended the latter as passive, the family as active, and kinship structures as fossils of earlier forms of organisation. Forms founded upon descent in the female line interested Morgan because they preceded the emergence of property and its accumulation. – A theory of GR can gain from Morgan the ideas of the development of the forces of production, of the acquisition of the means of sustenance of life, and of the forms in which procreation and child-rearing are organised, all of which are to be thought in their mutual interpenetration.

3. In his first sketch of a critique of political economy, the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*, **Marx** spoke of 'both sexes in their social relations' (MECW 3/243 [40/479]). This formulation can be used for a theory of GR. The early **Engels** spoke of the relation of the sexes, but he meant essentially the relationship between men and women. From their early writings, both **Marx** and **Engels** were concerned with man-woman relationships free from domination,

anchoring this in the very foundation of their project of social emancipation. The famous sentence, taken up from **Fourier**, in which they argue that the 'degree of female emancipation' is 'the natural measure of general emancipation' (*HF*, *MECW* 4/195 [2/208]), established the principle that the development of humanity is to be read off from the development of the relationship of the sexes, 'because here, in the relation of woman to man, of the weak to the strong, the victory of human nature over brutality is most evident' (*ibid.*). According to the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*, 'the relation of the man to the woman', determines 'to what extent humankind's need has become a human need, to what extent humankind has become, in its most individual being, at the same time a social being' (*MECW* 3/294 [40/535]; transl. corr.).

The scenario of *The German Ideology* moves the problematic of the sexes onto centre stage. Among the 'moments', 'which have simultaneously existed from the beginning of history' is the one in which 'humans, who daily reproduce their material life, start to produce other humans, to procreate [...] This family, which in the beginning is the only social relation, later becomes subordinated when the increased needs create new social relations and the increased number of individuals creates new needs' (*GI*, 5/35 [3/29]). And, from the beginning, they state: 'The production of life, both of one's own in work and of others in procreation, already appears immediately as a double relationship – on the one hand a natural one, on the other hand a social one – social, in the sense that we can understand it as a cooperation of several individuals. From this we conclude that a certain mode of production or industrial stage is always connected with a certain mode of cooperation or social stage, [...] therefore the "history of humanity" always has to be written and elaborated in interrelation with the history of industry and exchange' (35 [29 et sq.]). Unrecognised here is only that the complementary rule must also be regarded as valid, namely, that political-economic history is never to be studied in abstraction from the history of that natural-social relation. The remark that 'the family' becomes a 'subordinated relation' demands that the process of this subordination be specially investigated. *The German Ideology* contains a series of remarks regarding how development in this area proceeds. The 'unequal, quantitative just as much as qualitative, distribution of labour and of its products [...], that is, property, which has its seed, its first form, in the family where women and children are the slaves of men' (35 [32]) is regarded as fundamental. The 'latent slavery in the family' was comprehended as 'the first property', which, the authors emphasised, 'here already corresponds perfectly to the definition of modern economists, according to which it is the power of disposing of the labour-power of others' (35 [*ibid.*]). The division of labour developed further together with needs on the basis of surpluses and, in turn, generated further

surpluses, just as independent production of the means of life was both a result of an 'increase in population' and, in its turn, promoted this (30 [21]). The division of labour further contained the possibility of the possession by different individuals of 'pleasure and labour, production and consumption' (33 [32]); it was, therefore, at the same time a precondition of domination and of development. Two forms of domination which overlap each other had determined the process of history: the power of some to dispose of the labour-power of many in the production of the means of life and the power of (the majority of) men to dispose of women's labour-power, reproductive capabilities, and the sexual body of women in the "family". The contradictory interpenetration caused the development of community to advance at the same time as the destruction of its foundations, supported and borne by GR, in which, for reasons bound up with domination, the socially transformed was claimed to be natural and the sensuous-bodily substance was subordinated together with nature.

In their works on the critique of political economy, **Marx** and **Engels** time and again ran into blockages that were forms in which GR were played out. Both noted carefully the composition of the new factory personnel according to sex. **Marx** made the following excerpt: 'The English spinning mills employ 196,818 women and only 158,818 men; [...] In the English flax mills of Leeds, for every 100 male workers there were found to be 147 female workers; In Dundee and on the east coast of Scotland as many as 280. [...] In 1833, no fewer than 38,927 women were employed alongside 18,593 men in the North American cotton mills' (MECW 3/244 [40/479]). After the analysis of a multitude of statistics, **Engels** came to the conclusion that in the English factory system in 1839 at least two-thirds of the workers were women. He called this a 'displacement of male workers', 'an over-turning of the social order', which would lead to the dissolution of the family and neglect of children. He did not consider further at this stage the gendered division of labour, leading him to think of the labour force as essentially male (MECW 4/434 et sq. [2/367 et sq.]). A little later, he discovered that, in the social division of domestic and non-domestic labour, the agent of the first, independently of the respective genders, was dominated by the agent of the second. Such a discovery grasped a fundamental element of GR of domination. Nevertheless, **Engels** gave an account of the outrage over the situation of the factory workers essentially with moral categories (deterioration of morals). This made it difficult to see the context as an effect of GR specific to conditions of capitalist exploitation. He recognised 'that the sexes have been falsely placed against one another from the beginning. If the reign of the wife over the husband, as inevitably brought about by the factory system, is inhuman, the original rule of the husband over the wife must have also been inhuman' (MECW 4/438 [2/371]). He located the problem in the community of

goods with unequal contributions, concluding that private property corroded the relationships of the sexes. Conversely, he thought that the proletarian family, because it was without property, was free of domination. 'Sex-love in the relationship with a woman becomes, and can only become, the real rule among the oppressed classes, which means today among the proletariat. [...] Here there is no property, for the preservation and inheritance of which monogamy and male domination were established' (MECW 26/180 [21/73]). The idea functioned as an ethical ideal in the workers' movement. As a pronouncement on an actual here and now, it was always contradicted by the facts. It misunderstood theoretically the function of the division of labour between house and factory and therefore the role of GR in the reproduction of capitalist society. Engels's further interest was directed in particular to the man/woman relation, not the investigation of how GR traverse all human practices. He expected from communist society that it would 'transform the relations between the sexes into a purely private matter [...] into which society has no occasion to intervene. It can do this since it does away with private property and educates children on a communal basis, and in this way destroys the two bases of traditional marriage, the dependence rooted in private property, of the women on the man, and of the children on the parents' (MECW 6/332 [4/377]; transl. corr.).

In *C I*, Marx noted that the maintenance and reproduction of the working class as a condition for the reproduction of capital remained left 'to the labourer's instincts of self-preservation and of propagation' (MECW 35/572 [23/598]). This is the case, except for forms of 'care for the poor' and 'social welfare', but can nevertheless mislead theory into no longer focusing its interest on the process as a private matter and possibly to treat it as a mere gift of nature. An effect of the control of men over women in the family consists in the lesser value of the labour of women compared to that of men. This situation makes women's work particularly suitable for capitalist exploitation as cheap labour.

Marx evaluated official reports in which the workers appeared grammatically, in the first instance, as gender-neutral; as soon as there were women and children, they were named as extras and as a peculiarity. Thus an implicit masculinity appeared in the diction; at the same time, Marx registered that woman and children were replacing male workers. In a context of unchanged GR, this practice brought about the destruction of the natural foundations of the working class. Since the masculinity of the proletariat was implicitly assumed in the texts, it was not really made explicit that the form of wage-labour actually presupposed the male wage-labourer, precisely because GR in which the labour of the production of the means of life (in so far as this occurred in commodity forms) is a social affair which occurs under private forms of domination. The reproduction of the workers (MECW 35/182 [23/186]), on the other hand,

entrusted privately to individual families, did not appear to be a social affair. The interpenetration of capitalist exploitation and the division of labour in traditional GR demonstrated that capitalist production is based, among other elements, upon the oppression and exploitation of women. – In the midst of concentrating on capitalism, Marx had a flash of inspiration: ‘However it still remains true that to replace them they must be reproduced, and to this extent the capitalist mode of production is conditional on modes of production lying outside of its own stage of development’ (MECW 36/108 [24/114]). (The idea was taken up by Rosa **Luxemburg** in *The Accumulation of Capital*.)

Already in the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*, **Marx** had noted ‘a greater economic independence’ of women, because ‘a wider area of employment opportunities has been opened up’ to them by ‘changes in the organism of labour’, as a result of which ‘both sexes [had been] brought closer together in their social relations’ (MECW 3/243 [40/479]; transl. corr.). In *CI*, he then directed his attention to the ‘peculiar composition of the body of workers, composed of individuals of both sexes’ (MECW 35/424 et sq. [23/446 et sq.]), and finally the placement of women ‘in socially organized processes of production outside the domestic sphere’ as a ‘new economic foundation for a higher form of the family and of the relation between the sexes’ (489 [514]). Here, the relation (in the singular) is actually meant as an attitude or disposition to one another, emanating out from relations in work into all fields. The co-operative labour of the sexes in close quarters and at night was regarded by Marx, under the given relations of production, as a ‘pestiferous source of corruption and slavery’ (ibid.; cf. **Engels**, MECW 4/438 [2/372, 465]); the hope remained, however, that they would become a ‘source of humane development’ as soon as ‘the process of production is for the worker’ (ibid.). – This perspective was restricted in the lands of state socialism to the professional occupation of women. Since the totality of labour necessary for reproduction and its reinforcement in morality, law, politics (in shorthand: ideology), sexuality, and so forth did not enter into the analysis, this solution misunderstood the persistence and complexity of GR. – In the workers’ movement, that foreshortening led to the adoption of a theory of the succession of the struggles for liberation, in which it was forgotten that GR are always also relations of production, and thus how strong are the relations of reinforcement and support for the reproduction of the current form of relations in their totality. The relations of production cannot, therefore, be revolutionised first and, only later, the GR.

In the last three years of his life (1880–82) **Marx** made copious ethnological excerpts from **Morgan**, John Budd **Phear**, Henry Sumner **Maine**, and John **Lubbock**. Lawrence **Krader** designated them as an ‘empirical ethnology that is simultaneously revolutionary and evolutionary’ (*Introduction*, **Marx** 1972, 12). He

understood their perspective in the following way: 'the originary community, consisting of equals, is the revolutionary *form* of society which will have a new content after the historical transformation which humanity has experienced and after exploitation in the form of slavery, serfdom and capitalism has been overcome' (14 et sq.). He thought he had found in ethnology proofs for the possibility of co-operative institutions and communal, community-oriented labour relations.

The excerpts from **Morgan** constituted the major share of this work. The focal points of the 'family' and kinship make them fruitful for the question of GR. **Marx** mostly followed **Morgan's** views, so that astonishment when GR are not mentioned and when they are treated applies to both authors. The material suggests the view that human development proceeded from an original communist equality to domination and oppression through the emergence of private property, that this process was accompanied by progress and, crossing stages of barbarism, led to civil society. Inventions and discoveries assured not only survival, but also the possibility of surplus and thus the foundations for the emergence of wealth, which became a historical reality to be privately appropriated.

Marx excerpted exactly the kinship lines demonstrated by **Morgan** – from the family related by blood to the punaluan and the syndyasmian or pairing family, to the patriarchal family (which he held, with Morgan, to be an exception) and to monogamy. What interested him in Morgan was the idea, later to be more fully developed by **Bloch**, of a non-contemporaneity. 'The system has out-lived the uses from which it emerged, and survives as if those uses were still valid, even though such a system is in the main unsuited for present conditions' (**Marx** 1972, 135). Which women and which men were allowed to marry each other in group marriage thus became relevant because the tribal lines of the gentes were determined in this way. Everywhere there were female lines of descent, and the children remained with the mother or with the gens of the mother. The father belonged to another gens. At the beginning of humanity's development, inventions aimed at the acquisition of the means of subsistence and were in this way easily conceivable for both sexes. 'Common estates and agriculture in common must have led to communal housing and a communistic household. [...] Women received stability and security, provided with common supplies and households in which their own gens had a numerical predominance' (344). The situation of women deteriorated 'with the rise of the monogamous family, which abolished the communal dwelling, placed the woman and mother in a single family dwelling in the midst of a purely gentile society and separated her from her gentile kin' (ibid.). One gains the impression that regular military campaigns led to the invention of better weapons

and to the formation of military leaders; the bow and arrow, the iron sword (barbarism), and firearms (civilisation) were regarded as important inventions. Inasmuch as chieftains, councils and political assemblies are considered – the selection criteria are noted as personal competence, wisdom, and eloquence (199) – women are represented only enigmatically: the Iroquois ‘women were allowed to express their wishes and opinions through a speaker which they had selected themselves. The council made the decision’ (227). After the forms of marriage, the excerpts are concentrated on the development of the cultivation of grain, domestication of animals, military campaigns and the development of property, and later the development of political society. The activity of women, however, is conspicuous by its absence. For example, the following isolated note from **Morgan’s** presentation of the Moqui-Pueblo Native Americans appears (without commentary): ‘Their women, generally, have control of the granary, and they are more provident than their Spanish neighbours about the future. Ordinarily they try to have a year’s provisions on hand’ (**Morgan** 536; **Marx** 1972, 179). One can implicitly gather that responsibility for children – as presumably also for births; at any rate, humans multiplied rapidly, but even this notice only obtains a reference to increased means of consumption (172) – held women back from the warpath. Such wars, however, when successfully issuing in conquests, lead to an accumulation of wealth. ‘Following upon this, in course of time, was the systematic cultivation of the earth, which tended to identify the family with the soil, and render it a property-making organization’ (**Morgan** 543; **Marx** 1972, 184). This sheds light on the seeming ‘naturalness’ of male property, succession according to patrilineal descent, and corresponding monogamy. Finally, the head of the family (male) became ‘the natural centre of accumulation’ (*ibid.*).

Concentration on the history of men occurred rather implicitly, and was often revealed in the spontaneous choice of words. **Marx** noted: ‘The higher qualities of humanity begin to develop on the basis of the lower stages: personal honour, religious feeling, openness, masculinity and courage now become common character traits, but also cruelty, treachery and fanaticism’ (1972, 176). He did not appear to note the androcentrism. – As long as there was no private property, matrilineal descent was clearly just as little problematic as was the mother’s authority. **Marx** wrote again without further explanation: ‘as soon as more property had been accumulated [...] and an ever greater part was in private possession, the female line of descent (due to inheritance) was ripe for abolition’ (342). Parentage was now defined according to the father (patrilineal). This was possible due to the fact, among other reasons, that the gradually forming ‘political’ positions of power (chieftains, councillor, judge) were occupied by men as well.

In **Morgan's** reading of **Fourier**, **Marx** noted an extension of earlier definitions of the family and of its relations to the broader society: '**Fourier** characterized the epoch of civilisation according to the presence of monogamy and private ownership of land. The modern family contains in essence not only *servitus* (slavery), but also serfdom, since from the beginning it had a relation to services for agriculture. It contains in itself in miniature all of the antagonisms which later were widely developed in society and the state' (**Marx** 1972, 53).

It can be inferred from the study of **Morgan** and **Marx** that war and private property determined GR, undermining the originary community and thus promoting development on the basis of inequality. – Unfortunately, **Marx** abandoned a form of ethnological research which, after the complications of who was allowed to marry whom and how descent in the female line and primitive communism were connected, considered the activity and lives of women.

The re-reading of ethnological studies that broke this silence was the later work of Marxist and feminist ethnology. Claude **Meillassoux** criticised **Marx's** reading (and its continuation by **Engels**) for having stumbled 'into the ideological trap of blood kinship' and claimed that they had failed to apply their own method, namely, that of analysing the 'reproduction of life' and the relations of production as 'social relations of reproduction' (1994, 318). This critique can be extended to the treatment of GR by all of the classics. – A more sophisticated version of GR in the development of humanity remains almost invisible in historiography, if female labour in the context of total social labour and the participation of women in politics and administration are not searched for with the attentive eye of a detective.

The *Ethnological Notebooks* of **Marx** were first published in 1972 by Lawrence **Krader**. **Engels**, however, had already in 1884 summarised **Marx's** excerpts from **Morgan** and the notes from his own reading of **Bachofen** in *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*, thus providing the material and the style in which the oppression of women was thought. Simultaneously, he had thus strengthened a mode of reading that, to a certain extent, comprehended GR as an addition to, and outside of, the relations of production. In his famous passage on monogamy (taking up an insight from *The German Ideology*) he opened up a personal relation into a social one by means of the application of the concept of class to the man-woman relationship: 'The first class conflict [...] coincided with the development of the antagonism between husband and wife in monogamous marriage, and the first instance of class oppression with the oppression of the female sex by the male' (MECW 26/175 [21/68]). Furthermore, with monogamous marriage began an 'epoch in which every step forward was simultaneously a relative back-

ward step, in which the well-being and the development of the one group prevail through the misery and repression of the other. It is the cell form of civilized society in which we can already study the nature of the oppositions and contradictions which fully develop therein' (ibid.). – **Marx** had noted to the contrary, incidentally, that 'the family – even the monogamous family – could not form the natural basis of gentile society, just as little as today in bourgeois society the family is the unity of the political system' (1972, 285).

Engels's stirring rhetoric conceals the fact that the form of monogamous marriage does not imply any specific labour relations. Concepts such as 'antagonism, classes, well-being and misery' allowed GR to be regarded as mere relations of subjugation – as after a war – and not as practices of both sexes. Thus studies on GR did not lead to a comprehension of the connection of relations of production, but rather, on the contrary, to a separation of the terrains of the production of *life* and the production of the *means* of life. That, admittedly, corresponds to the development of capitalism, but nevertheless prevents one from seeing precisely the generalising imposition of obligations as an effect of the relations of production. In the Preface to *Origin*, Engels sketched out what was supposed to be understood by 'production and reproduction of immediate life': 'On the one hand, the production of the means of life, of the objects of food, clothing and shelter and the tools necessary for that production; on the other hand the production of human beings themselves, the propagation of the species' (MECW 26/135 et sq. [21/27 et sq.]). He named both 'production' and thereby established the starting-point for a theory of GR. However, he impeded its further elaboration by definitions which appeared to establish all labour (nutrition, clothing, and housing) on the one side, and, on the other, the family; the latter was distinguished not by specific labour connections, but, rather, through relations of kinship. Consistently, following **Marx's** notebooks of excerpts, he noted in detail, in *Origin*, the variants of organisation of sexual relations and reproduction, but did not note what the relation was between the labour carried out in the family and total social labour and to the reproduction of society. To this extent, his work can be read as a failure to write the history of GR as a dimension of the relations of production. Instead, he treated the levels of sexuality and morality – in which **Engels**, as **Bloch** noted, obeyed 'puritanical motives' when he proclaimed monogamy to be a female victory against 'disorderly sexual dealings' and claimed a 'mysterious seizure of power' of men on the basis of taking up, all too unconsidered, ideas from **Bachofen** (1967). – **Engels** gathered much material in order to prove the humiliation of women. However, it also escaped him in this instance that GR determine the *whole* society and are not restricted to the domestic sphere. His most famous

sentence in this connection presented women as mere victims: ‘the overthrow of patriarchy was the *world-historic defeat of the female sex*’ (MECW 26/168 et sqq. [21/60 et sq.]).

Engels’s perspective for liberated GR was the inclusion of women in industry, a movement which he saw already becoming a reality in capitalistically organised production, because modern industry ‘not only allows female labour on a large scale, but in fact formally demands it, and [...] strives more and more to dissolve private domestic labour into a public industry’ (MECW 26/261 [21/158]). Since this perspective defined the state-socialist project, the problems can be studied in concrete and historical terms.

Critical conceptual summary – The critical survey of Marx and Engels demonstrates the approach to comprehend GR as relations of production just as much as its abandonment. The greatest barrier proves to be the tendency to think of GR as relationships between men and women. It must obviously become a rule to investigate the different modes of production in history as always also GR. Neither can be comprehended without the answer to the question of how the production of life in the totality of the relations of production is regulated and their relation to the production of the means of life, in short, how they determine the reproduction of the whole society. That includes the differential shaping of genders themselves, the particular constructions of femininity and masculinity, just as much as the development of the forces of production, the division of labour, domination, and forms of ideological legitimation.

4. Politics concerning GR emerge in the history of Marxism as a struggle against the ban on abortion, as a demand for gainful employment for women and equal wages for the same work, but also as demands for a better family life (among others, by Clara **Zetkin**), as a promise to raise women up out of the restrictive confinements of the domestic sphere (**Lenin**, alongside many others), and as an attempt to liberate also the feminine psyche from its love-prison (Alexandra **Kollontai**). Finally, in the late 20th cent., there was the demand to create the preconditions that would allow the combination of family work and paid employment. In short, the question of GR always emerged as the ‘women’s question’, which took no account of its connection to the relations of production.

An exemplary exception stands out in Antonio **Gramsci**’s notes on Fordism. His point of departure was the rationalisation of labour on the assembly line (Taylorism), the related creation of “a new type of human” among workers, and the political regulation of structural conditions. Gramsci introduced the concept of *historical bloc* for this process. He understood by this the combin-

ation of groups in the dominant power relation – in this context, the combination of the mode of mass production, private life-styles, and state-sponsored campaigns concerning morality (Puritanism/Prohibition). From this perspective, GR emerged, in the first instance, as a particular subjugation of men under intensified “mechanical” exhausting work conditions for higher pay which allowed the support of a family and recreation, and which, in turn, was necessary for the maintenance of precisely this Fordist labour subject. His exhausting work conditions required specific morals and ways of living, monogamy as a form of sex which did not waste time or indulge in excess, little consumption of alcohol, and the formation of housewives who watched over (and were accordingly actively engaged in promoting) discipline, life-style, health, and nutrition of the family, in short, the mode of consumption. One sees the disposition of the genders and thus essential aspects of their construction, along with political regulations. Among other aspects, it can be seen how this whole structure was transformed with the change of the mode of production, and the essential points of articulation that flexibly hold capitalist society together can be recognised in this process. Related to the transition to the high-technological mode of production, Gramsci’s insights teach us how to investigate the transformation of the relations of manual to mental labour by the new mode of production through an examination of GR: the new mode of production requires less labour-power than other types and its hegemony is correspondingly differently enforced; it needs another type of intervention by the state; it produces another effect on the terrain of civil society, and so on. The question of the new labour subject must include the new determination of GR, precisely because it concerns life-style, maintenance, and development, which, to a certain extent, represent a “marginalised centre” of social relations (cf. F. Haug 1998).

5. The book on the subjugation of women published by John Stuart **Mill** together with his wife, Harriet **Taylor**, and their daughter Helen in 1869 aroused a great sensation and was translated into German in the same year. The goal was a kind of social psychology of GR as a foundation for the political and legal equality of women in order to support the struggles for the right to vote, the right to work, and the education of women. **Mill** and **Taylor** used the concept of GR, even though it became unrecognisable in the German translation [*Beziehungen zwischen den Geschlechtern*, ‘relationships between the sexes’] (**Mill** 1997, 3). The primary terrains upon which existing GR were thought were habits and feelings, opinions on the nature of men and women, and their current positions in society which were derived from such opinions, above all in terms of their legal status. Since ‘the subjection of women by men’ was ‘a universal habit’, every deviation from this appeared as ‘unnatural’ (16). Their research was con-

sequently directed toward the terrains of everyday experience, the morality regulating it, and the law. The assumption of the naturalness of the 'feminine' was criticised, and instead comprehended as a product of an education in dependency, a 'result of forced repression in some directions, unnatural stimulation in others' (28). The main focus of their work was the legal treatment of women: for example, the marriage contract (35 et sqq.), which they portrayed historically from stages of violence to the modern form of 'slavery' in which women, to a large extent without legal status and without property, owed obedience to their husbands, 'in a chronic situation of bribery and intimidation combined' (14), until, finally, a gradual correction in the direction of the right of divorce. Olympe de Gouges remained unnamed, but her ideas are certainly present. 'Marriage', declare Mill and Taylor, 'is the only actual bondage known to our law. There remain no legal slaves, except for the mistress of every house' (102). Humanity would gain infinitely if women were allowed to develop their capabilities and to apply them (105 et sq.). According to the assumption of a masculine arbitrary violence, no attempt was undertaken to establish a connection to the relations of production. Their own field of experience, the fate of women of the bourgeoisie, allowed them also to overlook the formation and education of the female proletariat. – It remains to be recorded that, since the end of the 18th cent., insight into the constructed nature of gender, in particular, the gender of women – first, in de Gouges, now in Mill/Taylor – belonged to the standard stock of knowledge. Two centuries later, this insight emerged again with no sense of its own history, as if it were the most novel of all ideas.

Just seventy years after Mill/Taylor, Virginia Woolf, writing in a context in which bourgeois GR had remained relatively stable, bade farewell to the hope that society would gain when women were placed on an equal footing with men and could take up the careers reserved for and practised by men. In this case, she argued, women would become just as 'possessive, suspicious, and quarrelsome' as men (87). In the GR in which the bourgeoisie reproduced itself, she detected the possibility of the capitalist mode of production, of war, and of its ideological anchoring. These GR produced on the side of the subject 'senselessness, pettiness, malice, tyranny, hypocrisy, immorality in excess' (108). On the basis of the difference between the practices of the genders, she came to the conclusion that the emancipation of women required another society in which, among other things, education and development would not be 'for capitalism, market, war, but for the perfecting of spirit and body, life and society' (ibid.). Although, again, limited to the bourgeois class, knowledge was here developed concerning the structural role of the sexes in the reproduction of the relations of production.

Ten years later, Simone **de Beauvoir** explained that the oppression of women was due to the 'capacity for reproduction' of woman; she saw feminine subalternity maintained by the respective socially specific construction of social gender. 'The balance of the productive and reproductive powers is realised in different way in different economic epochs of humanity's history. These, however, create the pre-conditions for the relationship of the male and female parts to their descendants and thus also to each other' (46). Her conclusion, which was influential for the later women's movement, was aimed at the employment of women in order to make them economically independent from men, the structural integration of technical progress in human reproduction and the transformation of the ideological-psychological construction of the feminine.

6. Important elements for a theory of GR were developed in the discussions concerning a Marxist anthropology in France in the 1960s. Insights into the connection of political and cultural dimensions in the development of modes of production were supposed to be gained from the analysis of pre-capitalist societies. A point of contention, among others, was what 'the economic in the last instance' meant. Maurice **Godelier** grasped the role of relationships of kinship for the regulation of the relations of production as a question of a dominance which then "integrates" all other social relations, 'which not only defines relations of descent and marriage, 'but also regulates the particular laws regarding the disposal of the means of production and products of labour, [...] and when it serves as a code, a symbolic language to express man's relation to man and to Nature' (35). Claude **Meillassoux** responded critically that kinship was, for **Godelier**, the 'Alpha and Omega of all explanation regarding primitive societies; kinship in some way is seen as generating its own determination. It follows from this that the economy is *determined* by social evolution [...] and that historical materialism is left without scientific basis' (1981, 49). The critique is unjust, since **Godelier**'s formulation of the research question posed to the social sciences was: 'Under what circumstances and for what reasons does a certain factor assume the functions of relations of production and does it control the reproduction of these relations and, as a result, social relations in their entirety?' (36). He understood this as a specification of **Marx**'s formulation of the ultimate determination of the social and intellectual life process by the mode of production.

Meillassoux's suspicion that, in this articulation, kinship was given 'a double role of both infra- and superstructure' (1981, 49) and was even regarded as a key for anthropology is, however, not to be rejected out of hand. Of course, the seesaw of instances and dominances vanishes as soon as kinship relations

are grasped as relations of production. Meillassoux opened the way for this by defining as the central point of departure the concept of *relations of reproduction*. With this, he concluded that a society for its continuation must establish a 'satisfactory balance in the community between the number of productive and non-productive members and among these [...] enough people of appropriate age of each sex' (42). Since this is not given in itself in small cells of production, the elders, who enjoy a higher standing due to work done in the past, develop a system of exchange of women (43 et sq.); their power shifts 'from control over subsistence to control over women – from the management of material goods to political control over people' (45). In the proto-agrarian mode of production (which was based in addition upon hunting), this authority of the elders did not exist; there was kidnapping of women and thus the necessity to protect women, which excluded them from hunting and war. At the same time, war became more important for the foundation of masculine domination.

Meillassoux agreed with the view of Marx and Engels that 'women probably constituted the first exploited class' (78), but added that they were subjected to different relations of exploitation and subjugation according to sexual maturity. He agreed with Engels that one could speak of an 'historic defeat of the female sex', but objected that this is not to be linked to the emergence of private property. Rather, it was founded in the relations of reproduction, in which, on closer inspection, a multiplicity of relationships of dependence are also to be detected among men, differing according to the mode of production. He connected the necessity of marriage with farming, in which the wife became an instrument of reproduction.

Meillassoux showed as an example of the agricultural household how the 'relations of reproduction' became 'relations of production', since 'filiation relations have to correspond to the relations of dependence and anteriority established in production' (47). In this case, the relations in reproduction are politically formed, subjugated, however, to the determining constraints of production. In the central themes of the studies on primitive societies – forms of the family, female lines of descent, their dissolution by patriarchal lines of descent, authority of elders, fertility cults, compulsion to endogamy, incest taboo – he highlighted the achievement of relative independence of the organisation of reproduction. 'The domestic community's social reproduction is not a natural process, nor is it [...] the result of war, abduction and kidnapping. It is a political enterprise' (46). Meillassoux held, with Marx, to the primacy of the relations of production and explained that 'the place occupied by the relations of reproduction in social organisation and management' establishes the meaning 'which the juridico-ideological representation, i.e., kinship has', so that relations of

reproduction 'tend to become accepted in a non-egalitarian class society as fundamental "values"' (48).

The domestic mode of production, the economic centre of primitive societies, continued, according to **Meillassoux**, until the late phases of imperial capitalism and was assimilated to the laws of capitalist class society as a meagre basis of production of life and labour-power, preserved there and, at the same time, destroyed. Accordingly, Meillassoux opposed **Marx's** view (*C I*, MECW 35/565 [591]) that there was no longer any inflow of elements originating outside of the capitalist mode of production into developed capitalism after the phase of primitive accumulation, overlooking, of course, Marx's comment to the contrary (*C II*, MECW 36/105 et sqq. [114]).

Following **Meillassoux**, studies became possible that allowed the structural role of the sexes in the regulation of total reproduction (determined by the state of material production) and, in this, the role of politics, ideology, morality, and their relative independence to be analysed. Nevertheless, he did not keep completely to his intention to think the relations of production on the basis of the relations of reproduction, so that, for example, the power of the elders appeared to him as masculine, conditioned by production. Here, the comprehension of GR still needs to be adequately integrated into the analysis.

7. Feminist ethnology concentrated on the treatment of GR. Thus, Olivia **Harris** and Kate **Young** gave as a reason for their turn from women's studies to research on GR the fact that the relationships between different actors only becomes understandable in connection to the relations of production (1981, 111). As a terrain of analysis, they suggested changing from the general terrain of the mode of production to the more concrete one of the 'conditions of reproduction of historically-located productive systems' (117).

Engels's *Origin* has regularly been a starting-point or critical point of departure for feminist ethnologists. One of the first, Eleanor **Leacock**, following Engels's proposal to connect the oppression of women to the emergence of private property, worked from the 1950s on research into non-class societies in order to grasp in a new way the position of women in relations of production, distribution, and consumption. Her fields of research were, among others, organised hunter-gatherer societies before the emergence of the state. In her re-reading of the studies of **Morgan**, **Wright**, and **Lafiteau**, but also later authors such as **Landes** (1938), **Leacock** criticised both their inadequate research of the self-transformative socio-economic conditions and their ethnocentric points of view (147 et sqq.). Instead of equality, she spoke of an autonomy of the sexes (134). She criticised the generalisation of the division,

common in class societies, between the public and private, doubted the universal representation of the family, and noted the absence of leaders, markets, and private land ownership as essential dimension of hunter-gatherer societies (140). The division of labour between the sexes was accompanied by a high reputation for women because of their ability to give birth to children. To be noted, according to Leacock, is the fact that women in every society make an important economic contribution, but their status is dependent upon 'whether they control the conditions of their work and the dispensation of the goods they produce' (152 et sq.). Her conclusion is that, in societies in which the domestic economy makes up the whole economy, GR were not determined by relations of domination (144) and that 'household management' was decisive in council assemblies which decided on war and peace.

Inside feminist ethnology there consequently developed three tendencies in opposition to the thesis of the binary division of the history of humanity into a matriarchy and – after a break – a patriarchy as precondition of progress. The idea of women as victims was positively taken up, or rather, updated in a slightly modified form, by a first tendency. Thus, the view of Claude Lévi-Strauss (e.g. 1968, 1979), among others, that men everywhere behaved toward women just as culture to nature and that women represented the non-cultural wild element, also enjoyed feminist recognition (cf. e.g. Ortner 1974; Rosaldo 1974; Benard/Schlaffer 1984). Sherry B. Ortner, for example, inspired in an equal measure by both Simone de Beauvoir and Lévi-Strauss, claimed that universal oppression of women stems from the fact that 'woman's body seems to doom her to mere reproduction of life; the male, in contrast, lacking natural creative functions, must [...] assert his creativity externally, "artificially", through the medium of technology and symbols'; the male creates in this way 'relatively lasting, eternal, transcendent objects, while the woman creates only perishables – human beings' (1974, 75).

A second group regarded the victim discourse as a result of a masculine mode of research which did not notice (or, due to the separateness of women's culture, could not even raise) the activities of women. Carol P. MacCormack criticised the constructed nature of such a model as a product of the late 18th cent. and demonstrated at the same time the dominatory uses of this mode of thought: 'When women are defined as "natural", a high prestige or even moral "goodness" is attached to men's domination over women, analogous to the "goodness" of human domination of natural energy sources or the libidinal energy of individuals' (1980, 6). The perception of non-European women and their symbolical appropriation by means of Western ethnology was treated in a similar way. 'The conscious and unconscious symbolic reification of the

“primitive” woman in the everyday life, art and science of the metropolises has legitimated her actual subordination and encouraged an activity which continues it’ (*Arbeitsgruppe Wien* 1989, 9).

A third tendency of critical-feminist research was directed toward the search for gender-egalitarian societies. Equality was here understood as equal value, because the division of functions is not necessarily accompanied by hierarchy. Ilse Lenz (1995), who spoke of ‘gender-symmetrical societies’, criticised the conclusion suggested by Engels’s binary division of history into a matriarchal phase of reproduction and a patriarchal epoch determined by production, namely, that women could only liberate themselves through participation in the latter (38 et sq.). ‘Gender and domination are simply seen in relation to each other in this binary division of epochs, and the necessary mediating steps of the economy, society and thought are missing’ (44). The question for ethnological research, on the other hand, had to be ‘in which form women and men are active in these socio-political processes and what power they derive from them’ (45). Research questions were directed toward production, reproduction and sexuality, knowledge of the body, political authority, and symbolic order. Lenz rejected the usual concept of power (for example, that of Max Weber) as masculine, since it one-sidedly referred to the opportunity to enforce one’s will over and against others and was thus limited from the outset to the victor. She comprehended power as determination over processes and resources. Only this allowed the multiplicity of GR to be comprehended, to discover, for example, women’s power also in patriarchal societies on the ‘underside’ of official power (55), and thus to think in terms of a ‘power balance’, rather than having to think a complete subjugation of one gender by the other (64).

The thesis ‘that forms of marriage give an excellent insight into the organisation of relations of production specifically relevant to gender in all classless societies’ (*Collier/Rosaldo* 1981, 278), was contested by Ute Luig (1995) who pushed rites of sexual maturity and of access to economic, political, and religious resources back onto centre stage. Her main conclusion: a gender-specific division of labour does not have to be accompanied by hierarchy, dependence, and exploitation. ‘Egalitarian relationships do not correspond to any natural, originary situation, but are perpetuated by conscious, social strategies and control mechanisms and are continually formed anew’ (95). As preconditions of equality, she named the absence of accumulation, that is, the immediate consumption of foodstuffs, and, accompanying this, autonomy as a capacity to provide for one’s self. For the most part, Luig used the concept of GR in the singular. This mode of formulating the question produced the effect that the different practices into which the sexes enter were not seen in connection to the reproduction of society, but, rather, on the contrary, social production,

hunting and gathering, were comprehended as moments of determination of the interaction of the sexes – as if the genders as such were antecedent and as if society was additionally produced as a particular (e.g. egalitarian) relation of both to each other.

The study of distant cultures and their GR led at times to a kind of sophisticated tolerance for which all material evidence appeared to be unimportant. Thus Ina Rösing (1999) reported from an investigation of an Andean village in which she claimed to have discovered ten instead of the normal two genders. She demonstrated this in the multiple and changing ‘gender’ allocations of space, time, field and public offices, and so forth – thus, for example, the sun is masculine in the morning, but feminine in the evening. Research into GR was here dissolved into a multiplicity of discourses. Nonetheless, even in this many-stranded fabric, there is a central thread to be discovered: ‘The fundamental, everyday division of labour, family life and sexuality are not affected by symbolic genderness’ (56). She explained the conspicuous gender symbolism materialistically as a recharging of the sexual, in the sense of entreaties for fertility made necessary by the hard conditions of survival in the Andes.

Maxine Molyneux, in her re-reading of studies on Gouro-formation (which had been studied by Emmanuel Terray (1974) and Georges Dupré and Pierre-Philippe Rey (1978)), demonstrated that leaving the status of women out of an account led to more general conceptual and epistemological problems. The point of contention was the question of whether or not this was already a class society. The focus of the analysis was the relation of elders to the younger men who found themselves in an ambivalent exploitative relation. Molyneux showed that opponents and supporters of the thesis of a class society departed from a vision of a purely male society (1977, 61). Central for the analysis of any mode of production, however, according to Molyneux, was the comprehension of the gender-specific division of labour (62). Among the Gouros, women’s surplus-production was appropriated by the eldest, so that they would have represented a class for Terray, whose point of departure was observed exploitation rather than property. Attention to women, however, could also have corrected Terray’s concept of class: in the separation of women from the land and from the product of their work one could have seen ‘the dissolution of collective ownership of land and of the emergence of private property relations’ (Molyneux 1977, 71) and, consequently, the transition from primitive communism to a class society (cf. 70 et sq.). In opposition to Engels, Molyneux did not see the subordination of women as founded in their marginalisation by the development of social production. Rather, she argued that it consisted precisely in the fact that they were supposed to ‘*remain central to it* [i.e. production]’ (76), because they brought prosperity. Women and their labour were,

thus, essential for the dissolution of community. – Molyneux used the concept of ‘relations between the sexes’ (78), but this was made unrecognisable by the German translator as ‘Beziehungen zwischen den Geschlechtern [*relationships between the sexes*]’ (1989, 132).

The study of feminist ethnology demonstrates, among other elements: an historical materialism which is attentive to real history demands that GR be comprehended as relations of production, that is, demands research into the participation of the genders in different modes of production and thus the investigation of the many and diverse practices and their symbolic expression, and their reinforcement in determinant customs, traditions, and value systems. If the standpoint of the reproduction of society is abandoned, the phenomena appear as arbitrary. In the re-reading of existing research it becomes apparent that, due to the ethnocentrism and/or androcentrism of language and concepts, it is appropriate to proceed with caution and scepticism; this is also the case for feminist research.

8. The perception that there lay a further system of domination beyond that of capitalism, namely, patriarchy, raised the question for the feminism of the second wave of the women’s movement of how the interaction of the two types of domination was to be thought. The discussions about chief and secondary contradictions, influenced by Maoism, sought to affirm an integral totality. Its analysis, however, was simultaneously blocked by this same conceptual paradigm. The discussion struggled against Marxism, by which **Marx** was understood as standing for the centrality of class relations. After the struggles of the 1970s concerning the recognition of housework, the question was further developed into a problematic of the total social economy. The debate was conducted under the name of ‘dual economy’.

Linda **Phelps** was one of the first who sought to comprehend capitalism and patriarchy as different relations of production: ‘If sexism is a social relationship in which males have authority over females, *patriarchy* is a term which describes the whole system of interaction arising from that basic relationship, just as capitalism is a system built on the relationship between capitalist and worker. Patriarchal and capitalist social relationships are two markedly different ways human beings have interacted with each other and have built social, political and economic institutions’ (1975, 39). Zillah **Eisenstein** proposed speaking of two different modes of production mutually supporting one another (1979, 27); Sheila **Rowbotham** (1973) regarded such a coexistence as merely specific to capitalism; Ann **Ferguson** (1979) coined the term ‘sex/affective production’ in relations of reproduction as a term for the mode of production occupied dominantly by women. The most well-known was Heidi **Hart-**

mann's attempt of 1981, in connection to the theses of **Marx** and **Engels** that the seed of the patriarchy is the power to dispose of female labour-power (*GI*, MECW 5/37 [3/32]), to establish a materialist theory of GR. This was aimed against the view proposed by, for example, Juliet **Mitchell**, that there were 'two autonomous areas, the economic mode of capitalism and the ideological of patriarchy' (1974, 409). – **Roisin McDonough** and **Rachel Harrison** (1978) insisted that patriarchy could only be comprehended if it was defined historically and concretely in the interaction of 'relations of human reproduction' and the relations of production (26). This meant, for capitalism, the introduction of class relations into the analysis of GR. – **Gabriele Dietrich** questioned the priority of commodity production, since 'the production of life is an indispensable condition for every further production process'; in a socialist perspective, this involved 'not only the problem of how we want to get to the association of free producers, but also of how we want to shape that which was called "reproduction" for the society of free humans' (1984, 38). **Iris Marion Young** proposed to overcome the 'dual system' approaches in the direction of a single theory 'that can articulate and appreciate the vast differences in the situation, structure, and experience of gender relations in different times and places' (1997, 105). **Michèle Barrett** (1980) summarised the debate for her foundation of a Marxist feminism.

9. The analysis of GR presupposes the category of gender. The possibility available in English of distinguishing between biological *sex* and social *gender* was the basis for a conjuncture which lasted more than twenty years in which gender was comprehended as socially constructed, to the extent that the concept of "gender" was also adopted in other languages. However, the analysis of gender which – not least of all due to the decline of the women's movement – had dissolved the apparent naturalness of previous thematics of questions concerning women, had also dispensed with the connection to relations of production which had still been dominant in the debate concerning housework; thus, the discussion centred upon the concept of gender, but not GR.

The fall of state socialism made it absolutely necessary for Marxist feminists to think the relation of GR and modes of production in a new way, not least of all because the now obvious demolition of women's rights in the former state-socialist lands caused by bringing them into line with those offered by capitalism was accompanied by the claim that state socialism had oppressed women just as much as capitalism, and, at the same time, the claim that the collapsed state socialism's mode of production was entirely different from the capitalist mode of production, with which it had not been able to compete. This manner of posing the problem assumed that GR and a mode of produc-

tion do not have any internal connection. It was not the time for social theory, and thus thinking GR as relations of production could be made out to be a relic of thought from days gone by.

The following thesis led to intense controversy: 'The dominant economy of exchange, the market, profit and growth is setting out upon an extensive exploitation, not only of employed labour-power, but just as much other (third) worlds which do not produce according to the same principles. It is neglecting care for life and its commitment to the people who do these things out of love, out of a feeling of "humanity" and who therefore cannot be treated as the same. The symbolic order, the fields of art and science, and the entire model of civilisation are all equally imbued and legitimated by such GR as relations of production. That is also the case for subjects themselves as personalities' (F. Haug 1993/1996, 151). Hildegard Heise saw in this a modern maceration of the concept of relations of production (1993, 3), while Ursula Beer detected the reduction of 'Marxist conceptual paradigms' to 'a purely illustrative character' (1993, 6). Such conception of GR as relations of production would result in 'one of the most essential concepts of Marxism being comprehended in an *anti-* or *un-*Marxist way' and 'the *necessary*, in Marxist terms, transformation of capitalist relations of production' would be seen as 'a contradiction between male production and female appropriation' (Rech 1993). Beer regarded it as arbitrary whether the concept of GR was used in the singular or the plural; in order to avoid an 'unnecessary addition' 'of GR' 'to the capital relation' (3), she spoke of 'moments of sexual inequality which are spread across the whole system [...] e.g. the exclusion of women from positions of influence and power, the gender-specific division of labour in the family and at work, cultural production as, to a large extent, men's business' (1993, 8). Such definitions overlook both that, in the lands of state socialism, women were almost fully integrated into working life, and that the multitude of female writers can be taken as an indicator that cultural production was also women's business.

The following concepts were suggested in the place of GR: 'gender inequality to the disadvantage of women' and 'gender domination', analogous to class domination (Beer 1993, 10). Classes, however, can be abolished, they are not a "natural" phenomenon; genders, on the other hand are (although socially formed) also a "natural" phenomenon; the existence of genders is thus not simply an element of 'gender domination' as the existence of classes is an element of class domination. – The concept of 'gender inequality' is dubious, because 'gender equality' would be understandable, at best, as an expression of political slang. To speak of genders is to speak of the differences between genders. Or, even further: difference is too weak a term for thinking the complementarity conditioned by the naturally unequal contribution of the two

genders to procreation. Equal rights before the law for women and men places them on the same level as legal subjects, abstracted, that is, from gender. Where equal rights are not really realised and compensatory measures such as quota regulations are resorted to, the members of the individual genders are in fact treated in individual cases, departing from inequality, as 'unequal', in order to arrive at an average equal treatment in a determinate respect. To speak of 'asymmetrical power relations' (Bader 1993, 6) or 'masculine supremacy' (Becker-Schmidt (in Beer 1993, 5)) is too weak, because power relationships could only have any effect at all as asymmetrical, and supremacy is a shifting phenomenon, while domination is something structural. 'Gender antagonism' (Heise 1993, 1), formulated following the class antagonism, is similarly not fully conceptualised. Sexual complementarity is the natural form of mammals, but the development of domination in relations between complementary genders is a historically variable form of human society. Heise feared that thinking of GR as relations of production instigated 'the substitution of genders for classes' (3). Her general concept was the concept of a 'combinatory of genders', which, however, would only make sense if one sought to model the reality and the mode in which GR find their field-specific forms in all social fields. To think all of these forms as a 'combinatory' (to be comprehended as a *strategic encoding*), however, assumes the concept of GR.

GR and the category of gender. – Already in 1987, Donna Haraway registered a fundamental critique of the explanation of women's oppression by the 'sex-gender-system'. Her critique of the biological essentialism of this distinction prepared the way also for the surrender of thinking in terms of gender. This terrain was further explored primarily by Judith Butler, who rejected 'gender' as an 'identificatory site of political mobilization at the expense of race or sexuality or class or geopolitical positioning/displacement' (1993, 116). She radicalised the representation of the socially constructed nature of gender also regarding the part which was taken for granted as biologically given and in this way transposed the *Kampfplatz* to the process of the formation of identity. 'There is no "I" prior to its assumption of sex [...] to identify with a sex is to stand in some relation to an imaginary and forceful [...] threat' (99 et sq.). In the symbolic, the 'sexualised' subject is formed normatively by language (107). – The displacement of power struggles in the assignment of gender allows exclusions, bans, and stabilisations to be deciphered as elements of GR. The dispute about the respective priority of race, class, and gender, which resulted in the corresponding movements falling out with each other in a depoliticising way, can also be productively turned around by the question of the articulation of the one with – and at the cost or rather to the benefit of – the other (116). Butler extended this approach into a basic principle of productive conflicts 'for a Left

which is “universal”, not in the sense of being unitary or uniform, but rather in the sense of having a universalist perspective’ (1998, 36 et sq.). This is the liberating side of Butler’s intervention. She pleaded for a type of democratic coherence (following Gramsci) worked on by individuals for themselves and for their identities, without always repeating exclusions through unreflective unification. Against the plundering of ‘the Third World’ by feminists in search of examples of ‘universal patriarchal subordination of woman’ (1993, 117), Butler proposed ‘to trace the ways in which identification is implicated in what it excludes, and to follow the lines of that implication for the map of future community that it might yield’ (119). The dilution of categories is easily comprehensible; however, the avoidance of any functionalism for the question of GR has the disadvantage of losing sight of how it really also concerns the reproduction of humanity. It is from the support, enabling, and contemporaneous marginalisation of the necessity of the reproduction of the species that the actions decoded by Butler gain their virulence in the symbolic sphere, in language, and in the imaginary.

Nancy Fraser attacked Jürgen Habermas’s analysis of modern society as a paradigm of androcentric social theory. Here, the capitalist economic system was comprehended as ‘systematically integrated’, while the small family, on the other hand, was understood as ‘socially integrated’ (1981/1984, 341, 357 et sqq.; 1981/1987, 234, 243). She demonstrated the wasted opportunity in Habermas’s model of different fields of material and symbolic reproduction to understand in a genuinely new way the public and the private realms in their interpenetrating relation. Habermas’s model made it difficult to analyse families as ‘sites of labour, exchange, calculation, distribution and exploitation’ – in short, as economic systems (Fraser 1989, 120). That Habermas comprehended the raising of children as symbolic, but wage-labour, on the other hand, as material, while each of them are both, made the fact that he took up at all the former in his model at once problematic and a supporting argument for the private raising of children as a form of female subordination. Fraser understood the weakness of this concept as its inability to thematise the ‘gender subtext’ (Dorothy Smith 1984) of the described relationships and arrangements. All mediating personifications are however determined by gender: ‘There was a struggle for a wage, [...] as a payment to a man for the support of his economically dependent wife and children’ (Fraser 1994, 124). With Carol Pateman (1985), Fraser demonstrated that women are not absent from paid employment, but, rather, are present in a different way: for example, reduced to femininity, often to sexualised servants (secretaries, domestic servants, saleswomen, prostitutes, stewardesses); as members of the caring professions with maternal capacities (such as nurses, social workers, primary school

teachers); as lowly qualified workers in segregated work places; as part-time workers under the double burden of unpaid housework and paid employment; as supplementary wage-earners. Thus, the official economy is not merely bound to the family by means of money for commodities, but also by the masculinity of 'normal' wage-labour. Conversely, the consumer 'is the worker's companion and helpmeet in classical capitalism' and advertising 'has elaborated an entire phantasmatics of desire premised on the femininity of the subject of consumption' (125). This is, of course, dependent upon the product, and changes in this branch of industry which also appeal to men come into conflict not only with the attributes of the feminine, as Barbara Ehrenreich (1984) demonstrated in an analysis of *Playboy*. Habermas's *dramatis personae* lacked the child-minder, Fraser's critique continued, which he nevertheless needed to cast in a central role in his definition of functions of the family. A consideration of them could have shown the central meaning of GR for the 'institutional structure of classical capitalism' (126). The 'citizen's role', this connecting position between the private and the public, is self-evidently masculine – it relates to the participant in political discourse and naturally to the soldier as defender of the community and protector of women, children, and the old. It escaped Habermas how the protection/reliance structure runs through all institutions and how, finally, 'the construction of masculine and feminine gendered subjects is necessary in order to fill every role in classical capitalism' (127).

Fraser used the concept of GR only marginally, though in the German translation it becomes completely casually 'the gender relation [*das Geschlechterverhältnis*]' (cf. 137). Her central concepts were gender identity and gender; she thus falls behind her own analysis with her demand for 'gender-sensitive categories' (128). Finally, she highlights practices into which humans enter for the reproduction of their life. She proposes to understand 'worker', 'consumer', and 'wages' as gender-economic concepts, and citizen as a gender-political concept. But, in this way, only the gender-typical effects of the social relations of production are noticed. Thus the open questions which Fraser gains from this extensive engagement appear to be comparatively harmless: should a future society which is not founded upon the subjugation of women (and which therefore needs no firm attribution in the construction of masculinity and femininity) conceive all labour under the form of wage-labour, or should the political part of society (Habermas's citizen's role) be expanded through making the raising of children obligatory for all? – Fraser's critique was at the same time her answer to the 'dual economy debate', whose supposition of a 'fundamental distinctness of capitalism and patriarchy, class and gender' had left unclear 'how to put them back together again' (8).

Feminist sociology – Attempts to undertake feminist research in the terms of social theory operate with the concept of GR. For Ursula Beer (1990), ‘the gender relation’ was limited without exception to ‘generative maintenance of survival’ or ‘generative reproduction’. She claimed to inscribe it in Marxist social theory as such a ‘structural element’, which she accordingly renovated when necessary. She understood Marx’s work as fundamentally a structural theory, whose central concept was ‘totality’ (70 et sq.). She screened off ‘the production of life’ conceptually against empirical practices. Nor was she concerned with praxis-relations, but rather with the status that, for example, women’s ability to give birth has in a structural theory of society. The view comes from above, from the perspective of a theoretical organisation of categories in which individuals are allocated a ‘categorical’ place. That individuals in reality shape their lives either in forms of resistance or those of obedience is not taken into account. The *concepts* which were suggested for ‘empirical’ purposes allow a sociological investigation only at the cost of marginalising the contradictions in which actual human beings realise themselves: ‘differentiation of fields of labour’ (52) remains vague; ‘forms of labour/ production not mediated by the market’ (73, 76 et sq.) resolves only seemingly the problem of the housework debate, as these activities include not merely reproduction, but also, for example, left-wing theory, gardening, bowling, and voluntary work of all types.

Regina Becker-Schmidt and Gudrun-Axeli Knapp (1995) wanted critically to overcome the limitedness of feminist research, which they thought had been bogged down in the analysis of the construction of gender. Moving ‘the gender relation’ into the centre of feminist sociology was supposed to do this. The research question was how man-woman relationships ‘are organised in particular historical conjunctures’ (7), ‘to what extent predominant connections and conditions influence the relation of the genders’ (8), and, conversely, how ‘gender relationships’ react upon society. The way of formulating the question remained structural-theoretical, organised according to the logic of cause and effect. In this way, genders themselves appeared to be fixed and society was grasped as a type of space in which human relationships merely occur. They talked of ‘arrangement of the genders’ (following Goffman 1994), of ‘composition of GR’ or, five years later, evading the difficulty by changing terminology, ‘gender-relations [*Gender-Relationen*]’ (2000, 45). In order to overcome the merely psychologising research of ‘gender relationships’ Becker-Schmidt und Knapp comprehend these as ‘cultural, political, and economic’ (1995, 18) and related them to ‘exchange’ in ‘labour, performances, and satisfaction of needs’ (17 et sq.) or to ‘exclusion’ from ‘spaces, terrains of praxis, resources, and rituals’. In distinction, they here regarded GR as ‘contexts of domination and power in which the social position of gender groups is institutionally anchored and

prolonged' (18). Thus, GR were articulated to social reproduction like a type of administrative machine; they are to be studied additionally and appear to function according to their own rules, which can simply be modified by the total social reproduction.

In the foreword to **Becker-Schmidt/Knapp** (2000), the use of the singular and the plural of GR is described in this way: 'If we want to express the mutual social relatedness of gender groups [...] epistemologically only the concept of "gender relation" makes sense. If we come across empirical situations of disparity on all social levels of a society, if all social orders turn out to be based upon similar determinations of relation, the singular is advisable. [...] The plural is called for when we [...] consider international variability' (154). The linking of the concept of GR to international usage was justified by 'ethnographical diversity'; meant by 'the gender relation' was a cultural order as an expression of structure (social fabric, symbols). In this way, society can hardly be thought practically, even though it strives to somehow bring together structure and activity by means of the concept of 'connections [*Konnexionen*]' (40). Following **Beer** (1990), they sought to comprehend the equality of determinant mechanisms in different fields (here, families and servant and service rights) 'as an expression of the structure of the relations of production' (165). Alternatively, a patriarchal population politics, a gendered division of labour, and a masculine politics were supposed to sustain the complementary idea of thinking gender as a structural category. The investigation of diversity, discrepancy, and even the contrariness of human practices, however, is blocked by such an expressivist theory. – In the end, **Becker-Schmidt** summarised their argument as follows: 'Feminist research has not yet succeeded in sketching out a theory of GR which would be capable of itemising all of the complexes of causation and motivation contexts which traverse the relations between gender groups' (61). But the approach of 'itemising all of the motivations and causes' persisted, itself trapped in the irredeemable idea that it is possible to sketch such a model theoretically, instead of researching the practices of humans in the organisation of their life and their reproduction in their interconnections.

Masculinity research – **Robert Connell** gave the concept of GR a fundamental status in this field: 'Knowledge of masculinity arises within the project of knowing gender relations' (1995, 44). He recognised that it is not meaningful to speak of genders without relating their foundation historically to the question of the reproduction of the species, upon which 'one of the major structures of all documented societies' (72) was formed. Connell argued that 'definitions of masculinity are profoundly interwoven with economic structures and the history of institutions' (48), and assumed that, in capitalist relations of production, the

field of human reproduction is subordinated to that of the production of the means of life (understood in the broadest sense).

10. GR, as 'relations into which humans enter in the production of their lives', are always relations of production, just as, vice versa, relations of production are always also GR. The duplication of 'production' into the production of life (in the broadest sense, including rearing and care) and the production of the means of life (again, in the broadest sense, including the means of production) was the point of departure for the historical autonomisation of the latter into the system of the economy and – in capitalism – its dominance over the production of life. The state stabilised this dominance, inasmuch as it ensured that the economy did not destroy its own foundations. For the analysis of relations of production, the codification of the whole with overdeterminations, relations of articulation, and dependencies must be treated. To research GR as relations of production requires a differential combination of historically comparative studies, attentive to moments of transition, with social-theoretical and subject-scientific analysis. All of these aspects require clarification.

The development and capitalist utilisation of gene technology, intervening in human reproduction, has now moved the boundaries between the production of life and goods so decisively, however, that the connection of GR as relations of production must be thought in a new way. If it could previously be assumed that capitalism allowed, for the purposes of its diffusion, the continuation of the 'domestic mode of production' of the family – or rather, thrived from it – capitalist industry is now pushing its borders further, into the terrain of the sexual body and its propagation. An antecedent was medical transplants, which turned the body into a usable resource of organs and opened up a new field of activity for business just as for crime. Reproductive medicine has moved the borders further. Sperm, eggs, and embryos have become commodities; fertilisation, training, and implantation have become services for sale. The ability to give birth can be bought like labour-power or like the right to use a body for sexual gratification. So long as the creation of children was not organised in a capitalist form, the protection of women and control of the woman's body appeared as a dimension of the second order of the relations of production. Now, however, her organs themselves – just as previously male sperm – are becoming raw material or means of production of a mode of production which has added a further form, that of the 'surrogate mother', to the former forms of individuality – such as housewife, business woman, wage-worker, and prostitute – according to which sexual bodies were active and positioned in relation to each other. This is the beginning of a devel-

opment whose effect upon GR constitutes the task of future analysis and a politics of emancipation. Within GR in which social interference in the lives of women with the ability to be mothers and the corresponding protective and blocking strategies was mostly haggled over and diminished, the penetration of the forms of capital into the sphere of procreation can bring all borders into flux.

At the beginning of the second wave of the women's movement great hopes of liberation were placed in reproductive technology. Shulamith Firestone (1970) regarded test-tube babies to be an indispensable revolution, because she thought the oppression of women as biologically determined. Donna Haraway proposed, in a fiercely contested manifesto, to infiltrate gene technology with socialist-feminist principles, and argued for '*pleasure* in the confusion of boundaries and for *responsibility* in their construction' (1984/2004, 8). Haraway comprehended the 'translation of the world into an encoding-problem, into a pursuit of [...] a universal key which subjugates everything to an instrumental control' as an approaching 'info-tech of domination' (11). Since women have lost more than they have won from previous boundary consolidations, they should not withdraw to motherhood, human dignity, and similar 'innocent' positions, but, instead, answer offensively the dimensions produced by the capitalist commissioning of this 'info-tech of domination', and the violence against women within it, with their 'own biotechnological politics' (13). Further, they should negotiate openly the problems of gene technology, taking into account gender, race, and class as well as labour, poverty, health, and economic power. Feminist science-fiction novels were an important medium for such negotiation (Joanna Russ, Ursula K. LeGuin, Marge Piercy). A sociological fantasy was developed regarding what a transformation of GR by technological and economic development would look like, in the best as well as the worst of cases, if motherhood's attachment to the female body was dissolved, if dreams of an end to all natural lack were satisfied by capitalism in the form of 'flawless' children like commodities for exchange, or the human-machine-boundary became permeable. Here, the threatening destruction of the earth by the neoliberal unleashing of a savage capitalism was anticipatorily explored. A world in which everything is subjugated to the profit principle cannot maintain itself without increasing self-destruction.

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→ anthropology, body, classes, community, domestic labour debate, domestic mode of production, domination, equal opportunities politics, equality, exchange, family work/domestic labour, forces of production, free love, gender contract, gender, gender democracy, gender egalitarian societies, gender mainstreaming, gene technology, healthy/sick, history, housewife, kinship, labour, matriarchy, mode of production, mother, non-contemporaneity, originary community, patriarchy, periodisation of history, precapitalist modes of production, private/public, relations of production, relations of reproduction, reproductive labour, reproductive rights, revolution, rights, sexuality, spirit, subsistence, suffragettes, theory of social development, total labour, women's labour, women's movement, women's question

→ Anthropologie, Arbeit, Familienarbeit/Hausarbeit, Frauenarbeit, Frauenbewegung, Frauenfrage, freie Liebe, Geist, Gemeinwesen, Gender Mainstreaming, Gentechnologie, Gesamtarbeit, Geschichte, Geschlecht, Geschlechtervertrag, Geschlechterdemokratie, geschlechtsegalitäre Gesellschaften, gesund/krank, Gleichheit, Gleichstellungspolitik, häusliche Produktionsweise, Hausarbeitsdebatte, Hausfrau, Herrschaft, Klassen, Körper, Matriarchat/Mutterrecht, Mütter, Patriarchat, Periodisierung der Geschichte, privat/öffentlich, Produktionsverhältnisse, Produktionsweise, Produktivkräfte, Rechte, Reproduktionsarbeit, Reproduktionsverhältnisse, reproductive Rechte, Revolution, Sexualität, Subsistenz, Sufragetten, Tausch, Theorie der gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung, Ungleichzeitigkeit, ursprüngliches Gemeinwesen, Verwandtschaft, vorkapitalistische Produktionsweisen

Hacker

A: qurşān aš-sifra. – F: hacker. – G: Hacker. – R: chaker. – S: hacker. – C: hēikè
 黑客

The rise of the computer leads to the emergence in capitalism of a novel formation of high-tech actors who ironically understate their virtuosity as simply ‘hacks’ (Levy 2010, 10). – They appropriate the new forces of production through their further development and oppositional refunctioning, combining work, mode of living, ethics, and sports into countercultures rebelling against corporate and state bureaucracies. The rule-breaking and border-crossing constitutive of hacking operate on the fringes of criminality and can in some instances cross this threshold as well. In turn, private and public security agencies can recruit H competency.

Hack – this denotes, among other things, ‘a waged scribbler, who hammers down line of text after line of text on his typewriter’ (Freyeremuth 1998, 30) – by the 1960s, it stood for a solution to problems facing electronics hobbyists and programmers at US universities, exhibiting three main characteristics: ‘1 Simplicity: the act has to be simple but impressive. 2 Mastery: the act involves sophisticated technical knowledge. 3 Illicitness: the act is “against the rules”’ (Taylor 2005, 16; cf. Turkle 1984/2005). By linking together technical virtuosity and rule breaking (up to and including social rebellion), Hs of the 1960s and 1970s made a decisive contribution to the development of new programming languages, the PC, and the Internet (Raymond 1999, 231 et sq.; Gröndahl 2000, 52 et sq.). Distinctive, mutually delimiting H cultures subsequently emerged, active in different fields and seeking to draw on the work culture of H pioneers.

1. *Digital Transgression.* – As computer networks are spanning across enterprises, the contradiction further sharpens whereby the same technology in which top secret, complex knowledge for the sake of domination as well as sensitive medical data are locally concentrated also contains an inbuilt possibility to inspect – and alter – this information from various points outside of a given enterprise. Here, the H emerges as ‘one of neoliberalism’s new forms of individuality’ (Haug 1999, 185) – the digital border crosser, transforming himself from the subaltern trespasser into the digital doppelgänger of a “legal” system user (such as by acquiring such a user’s password). The H can appropriate the digital identities of many users of different systems through network

exploration, his power of anonymous border crossing increases steadily. Roland Eckert et al. (1991) demonstrate to what extent Hs are fascinated by worldwide 'data journeys' in which data are only inspected. There are also Hs who successfully look for the password of the "superuser" or "sysadmin" (the system administrator with access to highly sensitive files who decides who can access them, etc.). Insofar as Hs possess the necessary technical qualifications, they can manage to lock the legal sysadmin out of the system: 'The pinnacle for every hacker is to achieve total control over the other network' (169). As the H may have acquired several important passwords, the sysadmin will potentially neglect to eliminate his access immediately, finding it more important to trace the different digital trails of the H in order to identify the person itself. These dog fights can extend over months, and have spawned an entire literary genre (Stoll 1989).

The individuality form of the H as a 'system intruder' reproduces itself in transnational high-tech capitalism on an ever-expanding technical scale due to the dynamic equilibrium of mutually constitutive learning between Hs and software industry programmers. New programs manage to plug previous security leaks, yet also facilitate new ones – not least because it is more profitable for the industry to sell a new product quickly, even with security flaws if necessary. When hacking activity turns these flaws into public scandals, new programs are issued to resolve them, but are (for example) often installed in enterprises at a delayed pace (Taylor 2005, 67 et sq.). Accordingly, less qualified Hs also manage to achieve spectacular successes, while qualified Hs analyse complicated systemic weaknesses. Furthermore, some computer scientists believe Hs to be particularly well-suited due to their practical-experimental approach (77).

Some Hs switch over to corporate security departments, found their own companies, or become "samurai" Hs with specific professional ethics, renting out their services to illegal but legitimate aims (Raymond 1998, 396). Criminal organisations also seek to recruit Hs. The individuality form of the H which cultivates itself through the dedicated exploration of foreign systems can be incorporated into diverse political projects.

2. *Software-/Datapiracy.* – Prior to the internet age, 'a "cracker" and "demo" scene developed around groups which made a sport out of "cracking" the copy protection of new computer games and programs, inserting "Intros" with sophisticated graphics and sound effects' (Eckert et al. 1991, 263) in front of them, and distributing them at no cost. The Internet provided this scene with newfound significance, as sales totalling in the billions hung in the balance. Electronic commerce means transforming products like music, books, movies, programs, etc. into digital products for the sake of digital distribution. They are expensive to produce, yet cost almost nothing to copy. For this reason, they

along with the devices used to play them are reconfigured into digital commodities (such as through encryption), which only those who purchase them can access. 180 music and technology companies banded together in 1998 to form the “Secure Digital Music Initiative” (SDMI), yet its technology was already cracked by Hs in its planning phase. Some forms of particularly sophisticated copy protection (such as “dongles”) can only be cracked by ‘three or four crackers in the world’ (McCandles 1997). The results of their labour and the code name of the successful H and their group spread throughout the Internet.

Restoring general usability of digital commodities is the goal of the H as “cracker”, but Hs also ran ahead of capital and consolidated a new form of mass digital product distribution on the Internet (such as “Napster”); in some cases, they laid the groundwork for later profitable pathways, encouraging individual Hs to commercialise their capabilities. The “cracker” formation, however, continually reproduces itself through the general labour of unlocking products of general labour “protected” from general use, or utilising as yet unlocked products before the chains of the commodity form are laid upon them (Ohm 2000, 731 et sq.).

The state intervenes in the wake of hacking’s success. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) passed in the USA in 1998 made the modification of ‘technological measures designed to protect copyrighted works’ a punishable offense (with up to five years of imprisonment). European law pursued a similar orientation. – New contradictions emerge, as not only hacking but also computer science research into certain encryption technologies face the threat of repression.

3. *“Virus” Production.* – Computer viruses were initially developed by young people in the USA in the early 1980s; the first global virus outbreak occurred in 1986; by 1987, a scene of virus programmers began to emerge (the so-called “Vx scene”); by the late 1980s, companies began producing anti-virus programs. Although most viruses circulated ‘only within the scene’ and ‘only a marginal portion ever [infected] uninvolved computers’ (Röttgers 2001, 63), the transition from sport to criminality is particularly evident in virus production. According to Sarah Gordon’s estimates, roughly 100 people in about 20 active groups regularly produced new viruses in 1994. Competition among and between groups is a central motivator behind virus programmers, although some – anonymously – “release” viruses. This brutality is potentiated by the Internet, as a successfully circulated virus can irrevocably destroy millions of users’ data.

The Internet is also the medium by which a technically unqualified H today can download entire virus assembly kits; it thereby functions as a multiplier of

the lethal capabilities of a small number of virus programmers. That youthful Hs who themselves use computers acquire destructive viruses and allow them to circulate may be related to formation-specific moments of the process by which Hs work themselves into the hacking 'subject form'. Appropriation of technical capability often occurs as "dismantling" (Zerspielung) (Wulff 1987) of reality: on one hand, Hs in the making appropriate through PC and Internet usage enormous technical and cooperative know-how at a young age; on the other, the world of computer games – thematically and dramaturgically constructed by the gaming industry as a substitute for reality – alters perception of reality. The sneaking into foreign computer networks, the battle with the sysadmin, destroying data he administrates, is a kind of continuation of computer battle games in the style of "reality TV". In children's and young adult literature there is a common recourse – not necessarily illusionary – to the actions of young Hs combining the hunt and battle against destruction: seven 10–16-year-old cyberkids cooperate via Internet across continents against a virus producer (Balan 1999). – State actors seeking to combat hacking activity with the legal system face the dilemma that many Hs are children and young people and thus not liable to punishment.

4. *Software Development*. – Hs who consciously identify as such and thus draw on the traditions of the technologically ground-breaking Hs of the 1960s and 1970s join together into a globally networked collective worker in a core area of transnational high-tech capitalism on the basis of unpaid labour, encompassing more people than the largest software company, Microsoft, and develop the open-source software operating system Linux. Many reasons are given for the prospective superiority of these H collections of the Linux type (Raymond 1999). – It is possible that this form of non-capitalist software development will assert itself worldwide, as software development has developed into a form of general labour which requires forms of self-socialisation incompatible with – even radically modernised – capitalist production regimes. For Linux Hs, only their new mode of production is compatible with their sense of producer pride, making them productive as producers, as the programs (and the names of their authors) are published on the Internet and made available for further critical development. – That said, transnationally operating high-tech capitalism is not threatened in its existence if the development of forces of production in important sectors occurs in a non-capitalist fashion.

5. *'Hacktivism'*. – The concept is formed through the contraction of the words "hack" and (political) "activism", that is, the use of Hs' technical capabilit-

ies for political projects. One of the goals is to utilise the medium of the Internet as public space against privatisation and other strategies of enclosure, that is to transpose the freedom of assembly and demonstration once asserted for public spaces prior to the Internet's emergence as electronic public space, by construing structural analogies to sit-ins and blockades. Here, network-technical competence is needed alongside political networking capacity. According to Stefan **Wray** (1998), enthusiasm for political projects increasingly emanates from technically-oriented Hs. One such group, the Electronic Disturbance Theater (**EDT**), organised virtual sit-ins against Mexican government websites in support of the Zapatistas: those involved used a program to leave a critical message at the target server every several seconds. Should enough internet surfers participate, the server can no longer be accessed from outside. A group in Britain inspired by **EDT** are the Electro-Hippies, who reject clandestine actions and work on further developing protest forms and are less interested in disabling a target server than in activating as many people as possible to engage in spontaneous participation. – To what extent the disturbance of communication flows on the Internet is politically wise, given that the opposing side can also utilise this weapon, is highly controversial among hacktivists.

Unlike hacktivism, the goal of cyberterrorism (Dorothy **Denning** 2001) is to cause catastrophes and kill people through network attacks. To the extent it can, the US military has been working on a concept for Cyberwarfare for ten years, while a plethora of further states have begun working on this model of warfare in the period since.

6. *Hacking-Ethic(s)*. – Processes of self-socialisation, that is, the diversion of young Hs' aggressive labour energies towards projects of recognisable civil-social value, are initiated by H associations such as the Chaos Computer Club (**CCC**). The **CCC**'s hacking conferences, for example, always feature "sessions" in which Hs who are respected in the hacking world urge 'script kiddies' to become "real hackers" – such as by not attacking dissenters' institutions. (Relevant literature for young people such as Bruce **Balan**'s **Cyber.KDZ** series follows a similar perspective.) – The **CCC** was founded in West Germany in the early 1980s and operates today as an umbrella association in which many Hs across Germany have convened. The group developed a widely accepted H code of ethics, the first imperative of which stipulates: 'Access to computers – and anything which might teach you something about the way the world really works – should be unlimited and total'. In light of prevailing social relations, this ethics is simultaneously a manifesto for breaking through the secrecy of the capitalist state.

A central topic of CCC congresses is uncovering the technical weak points of computer networks, which is only possible through practical-experimental approaches, and presenting their findings to the public. These also reveal possible points of entry for computer criminality, which exploits such weak points and can always rely on the discretion of affected companies and authorities. In this sense, the investigative work of the CCC and the Hs organised under its umbrella is socially indispensable. – The terror attacks of 11 September 2001 served as the pretext for introducing new forms of electronic citizen surveillance, which in turn has created a new civil-socially relevant sphere of activity for the CCC and the Hs gathered in it.

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→ appropriation, collective worker, counter-power, counter-public, destructive forces, development, general labour, high-technology mode of production, immaterial labour, individuality form, internet, neoliberalism, play, power, private property, Productive Forces/Relations of Production, security, self-determination, subject, subversive, technical development/technical revolutions, Zapatismo

→ Allgemeine Arbeit, Aneignung, Destruktivkräfte, Entwicklung, Gegenmacht, Gegenöffentlichkeit, Gesamtarbeiter, hochtechnologische Produktionsweise, immaterielle Arbeit, Individualitätsform, Internet, Macht, Neoliberalismus, Privateigentum, Produktivkräfte/Produktionsverhältnisse, Selbstbestimmung, Sicherheit, Spiel, Subjekt, subversiv, Technikentwicklung/technische Revolutionen, Zapatismus

Hegemony

A: al-haimana. – F: hégémonie. – G: Hegemonie. – R: gegemonija. – S: hegemonía. – C: bàquán, lǐngdǎoquán 霸权, 领导力

1. In trying to determine the form of motion for strategies to achieve political unity, it is through his conceptual working out of the ‘enormously productive metaphor of H’ (Hall 1992, 280) that Antonio Gramsci arrives at a Marxist theory of politics and power that ‘perspectivises all other topics’ (Haug 1996, 9) and is free of all economic reductionism. In the course of his research on H he examines ancient, ecclesiastical-feudal, bourgeois, and fascist forms of domination and acquiring power – both ‘hegemonic systems within the State’ and ‘combinations of States in hegemonic systems’ (SPN, Nb 13, § 2, 176). But he consistently does so with a view to a social-emancipatory capacity to act, that is from the standpoint of those who are kept in a subaltern state, which is to say from a position of relative weakness. For socialist, communist, or generally left-wing political and party theory, this research is of fundamental significance. It ‘substitutes the idea of the leading role with that of the leading influence, the idea of an institution of compulsion and repression with that of an expanding power, of a “pedagogical relation”, and aims at consensus, not at falling into line’ (Sève 1980, 583). In class antagonism or class alliances, indeed also in the international formation of blocs, and not just during the Cold War, “H” describes the power of attraction of a political formation developed on a class basis, of its “philosophy” and its project, exercised first of all vis-à-vis the intellectuals of the classes or groups appropriate as allies, and possibly even vis-à-vis those of the opposing formations. The substance of what H can mean from the standpoint of the classes kept subaltern was put in a nutshell by Bertolt Brecht: ‘Just as the oppressed can succumb to the ideas of their oppressors, so members of the oppressor class can fall victim to those of the oppressed. In certain periods when the classes are fighting for the leadership of mankind any man who is not hopelessly corrupt may feel a strong urge to be counted among its pioneers and to press ahead’ (BTheat, 258). As Gramsci emphasises, the concept of the ‘struggle between two hegemonic principles’ (FSPN, Nb 10.1, § 13, 359) – which of course do not exist in a vacuum but must articulate a feasible response to the objective conditions and problems they inter-subjectively convey – takes precedence over the principle of H. In the case of stable rule the intellectuals of the social movements can wear down (“disarticulate”) the “ideological

cement” of that rule, thus pursuing the (long-term) goal of bringing about a dys-H of the rulers. Within the framework of the support bases of counter-vailing power and alternative public media, they must endeavour to develop a counter-H (however limited its scope may be).

Since the 1970s, **Gramsci's** concept of H has become enormously influential. While up to then it had been ‘almost unknown’ outside Italy or, at the most, France, Günther **Trautmann** could observe by 1987 that **Gramsci's** ‘theory of H was familiar to almost all European intellectuals’, indeed even penetrating ‘the language of leading politicians’ (133) and had the potential to become ‘the point of departure for a modern theory of political action’ (147). At the historic moment of the self-abandonment of the GDR, Detlef **Hensche** attempted to bring **Gramsci's** insights into the trade-union movement: ‘Proletkult and reservations about intellectuals have a long tradition, even with us. And yet we have known, since Gramsci at the latest, that one’s self-assertion depends not on the strong arm of the worker alone, but equally on public opinion, on cultural H’ (1990, 410). Peter **Glottz** identified in the *Prison Notebooks* ‘six or seven figures of thought the parties of the European left could still work with today, if only they wanted to. The most important of these figures can be characterised in terms of three concepts: cultural H, historical bloc, folksiness’ (1991). The situatedness within the class structure of society, without which **Gramsci's** concept loses all substance, here admittedly fades to the point of becoming indiscernible.

Amongst the communist parties that had arisen from the Third International outside the SU, the topic of H in **Gramsci's** sense only became virulent when the antagonistic H of the bloc dominated by the SU and led by it through “command administration” had eroded internally and externally. The attempt to gain “cultural H” began to shape politics during the eurocommunist phase. This meant ‘an orientation towards a mode of handling antagonisms that aimed at “general” assent’ (**Haug** 1996, 9).

Its reception was propelled by the desire for the signified thing: for a power that is rooted in people’s conviction and does not just abstractly legitimate domination, but is based on the consent of the ruled. That H theory assigns a key role to political intellectuals may have contributed to the inflationary use of the concept. Like the related concept of civil society, which **Gramsci** defines as the sphere in which H is formed, this inflationary use has often enough rendered the concept of H trivial. It has been translated ‘into the dull language of German politics [...] as “opinion leadership”’ (**Glottz** 1991), ‘thematic leadership’ (**Razumovsky** 1993) or ‘argumentative dominance’ (**Fuhr** 1997), eclipsing the deeper social dimension of H in favour of the desired surface effect.

Traditionally, “H” was used to mean domination. Thus, the ‘struggle [...] for European H’ (Simmel 1900, 212) turned modern European history into the history of warfare, until, as a result of the Second World War, this history of warfare gave rise to the binary world order of system competition, whose parade order on either side of the “Iron Curtain”, “hegemonically” dominated by the superpowers USA and SU, excluded nation-state wars conducted for the sake of H. In a world shaped by neoliberalism, a world whose “global cities” stand in the shadow of the ‘bullet-proof glass towers of the H of money’ (Marcos 2000), the USA – the only superpower left standing after the demise of the SU – have struck out on the violent path of imperial domination. The USA operate “hegemonically”, without international H, albeit with an ongoing partial H in the field of culture. The medium and smaller powers thereby see themselves compelled to respond by developing international political structures capable of H (see Haug 2003, 251 and elsewhere), to the extent that they do not content themselves with ‘a kind of sub-H within the continuing structure of US supremacy’ (Fülberth 2001, 24).

The antithesis of imperial society and civil society has been considered to define the epoch (Fleischer 1992, 97), but civil society is consumeristically eroded under the influence of diversion as mediated by TV. In addition, in the USA debates touching on the issue of H only reach a minority, while the majority is neutralised, in terms of the politics of H, as “non-voters”.

1. The expression H derives from the Greek ἡγέομαι, which primarily means ‘to be at the head, to lead, to precede’ but can also mean ‘to think, believe, appraise’. A ἡγεμών is 1. ‘one who shows the way to others, a leader’ (in this sense ἡγεμόνιος is the epithet applied to the god Hermes, who leads the souls of the dead to the underworld); 2. a ‘commander’; 3. a ‘prince, lord’. In ancient Greek politics as it played out between the “cities”, the role of H was key. The flowering of Athens was due to the combination of military supremacy as a naval power and a political prestige and trust that Athens acquired amongst many of the militarily and economically weaker city states, especially in the war of liberation against Persian despotism. The Athenians squandered this consensus when they stopped being ‘coequal leaders’ and practised the ‘subjugation of the allies’ (Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, 5.5). Its H in the sense of its military leadership functioned as long as it was based on the ‘free will’ of the allies (5.6). – Prefigured in Plato’s ἡγεμονοῦν (*Tim* 41c; see *Men* 88c; *Leg* 963a) and Aristotle’s ἡγούμενον, the concept of ἡγεμονικόν (‘that which leads’), as the ‘genuinely Stoic designation for the central organ of the soul’ (Kobusch 1974, 1030), assumes the function of expressing the rationally and responsibly subjective aspect of the subject.

Presumably it was its primarily military meaning that impeded H from becoming a fundamental term of bourgeois political theory. However, the term's referent has been omnipresent under other names since the founding period of European philosophy. When **Plato** positions the concept of justice at the centre of his state theory, this is always also matter of stable rule based on consent. It is no different when **Aristotle** treats ethics as a part of politics, even if his aristocratic-pluralist constitutional ideal is opposed to the Platonic model of the philosopher king. Being just is being capable of consensus. All governance seeks to represent itself in this way. The mirrors for princes impress this positively on aspirants to power; the doctrine of the natural right of tyrannicide frames it negatively.

Even where bourgeois modernity announces itself with an undisguised propensity towards violence, in **Machiavelli** – whom **Gramsci** understood as a kind of **Marx** of the early bourgeois 'revolutionary class of the time, the Italian "people" or "nation"' (*SPN*, Nb 13, § 20, 135) – with *The Prince* declaring violence, in the first instance, the decisive factor in the conquest or defence of state power, because 'all armed Prophets have been victorious, and all the unarmed Prophets have been destroyed' (VI, 21), this is violence only because it is exercised by people with specific motives; it is nothing ultimate. Thus **Machiavelli** vehemently opposes mercenary armies (XI). In spite of all the armed force that is decisive in the first instance, the 'armed prophet' (Isaac **Deutscher** chose this phrase from **Machiavelli** as the title of the first volume of his trilogy on **Trotsky**) must ultimately prove his mettle as a prophet. Success resulting from weapons tends to be due mainly to *fortuna*, that resulting from sustainable politics mainly to *virtù*. They who 'come to the Princedom [...] by virtuous paths acquire with difficulty, but keep with ease' (ibid.). Rule has to be "in touch with the people": 'it is essential for a Prince to be on a friendly footing with his people, since, otherwise, he will have no resource in adversity' (IX, 35). It is necessary to connect the government's view of the people with the people's view of the government because in the long run it is only the interconnection of governors with the governed that is decisive with regard to the maintenance of power: In order to know or understand the nature of the people, one has to be a prince; in order to understand the nature of the prince one has to be the people ('bisogna essere popolare'; *Dedication*, 5). Linguistic usage, customs and regulations matter ('forme di lingua, costume e di ordini'; III, 9 et sq.). Popular consent is fickle, such that 'while it is easy to persuade them [the multitude] of a thing it is hard to fix them in that persuasion' (VI, 21). The ultima ratio is force, which itself can be "persuasive": 'Wherefore, matters should be so ordered that when men no longer believe of their own accord they may be compelled to believe by force' (VI, 21). **Machiavelli** resolves the mutually exclusive antagonism between

force and free persuasion into a reciprocally conditioned relationship. '[...] the main foundations of all States, whether new, old, or mixed, are good laws and good arms' (XII, 40).

As fickle as the "soft element of opinion" may be, it nevertheless has taken on decisive importance. 'L'opinion dispose sur tout' – 'Opinion decides everything', **Pascal** notes, adding that the mere title *Della opinione regina del mondo* – 'On Opinion, Queen of the World', an Italian book of which he only knew the title – is worth many books (*Pensées*, No. 82, 37). – While the Civil War unleashed by the English Revolution leads in **Hobbes** to the hypothesis of an absolutely coercive state, the almost nonviolent sealing of its results provides epochal evidence for the liberal civil-society paradigm. With this the concept of opinion launches its second, quintessentially bourgeois career. In his *Essay Concerning the True Original Extent and End of Civil Government*, **Locke** articulates the political *hegemonikon* as 'the law of reason' (§ 57) and on the basis of the law of reason defines the rationality of the law as 'not so much the limitation as the direction of a free and intelligent agent to his proper interest' (*ibid.*). The purpose of the state is built on an interest in the 'mutual preservation of their lives, liberties, and estates' (§ 123). Thus people are 'quickly driven into society' (§ 127). **Locke's** pupil **Shaftesbury** further reinforces the counterposition to **Machiavelli** and **Hobbes** by reducing the importance of force in the name of 'liberal education and a liberal service': A chained tiger or a monkey disciplined by a whip, meaning 'slaves and paid servants who are restrained and made orderly by punishment and the severity of their master are not made good or honest by this' (*An Inquiry Concerning Virtue, or Merit*, I.3.3). That justified consensus is able, within the structural compromise of law, to transform domination into 'moral freedom' has been put concisely by **Rousseau**: 'l'obéissance à la loi qu'on s'est prescrite est liberté' – 'obedience to a law which we prescribe to ourselves is freedom' (*Contrat social*, I, ch. VIII).

To be sure, this "self-prescription" of right and law is – in the absence of concrete practices of democratic self-socialisation – a H-suffused fiction whose connections to reality are largely symbolic. Thus **Hume** can begin his treatise on the *First Principles of Government* by marvelling at the 'easiness with which the many are governed by the few; and the implicit submission, with which men resign their own sentiments and passions to those of their rulers' (I.IV). He calls this a 'wonder' but explains it on the basis of a basic principle of the foundation of political power: 'As FORCE is always on the side of the governed, the governors have nothing to support them but opinion'. Government, even the most despotic, is founded on opinion, since its agents of force must also be governed through opinion, so that they may govern the rest with force. – It is as if **Ferguson**, a protégé of **Hume** and **Adam Smith's** direct 'teacher', accord-

ing to **Marx** (II.3.1/251), picked up on this notion without further mediation: 'Arms are of consequence only in the hands of the brave' (*Essay on the History of Civil Society*, I, 9). And directed against the economism of the 18th cent.: 'The strength of a nation is derived from the character, not from the wealth, nor from the multitude of its people' (ibid.). In arguing this he draws a sharp distinction between economic and civil society and its respective actors. As a *merchant* one does not belong in civil society if a 'period of vision and chimera' is not to break out and ruin 'the solid basis of commerce' (III, 4). **Ferguson's** civil society is a counterfactually idealising organisation of *moral sentiment* on the basis of *bourgeois* society, whose prosaic commerce it negates as it is itself negated by commerce and simultaneously propagated as its "beautified shadow".

The bourgeois post-revolutionary "British line" always hovers on the edge of cynicism because it (quite realistically) subordinates the question of justice to the question of the mere *abstract opinion* as to whether things are occurring in a just way, thereby elevating the shaping of opinion to the status of the key to power. The bourgeois pre-revolutionary "continental line" still focuses on the opined thing itself. **Rousseau's** *general will*, together with the proclamation of human equality, shifts the focus from consent to an act already performed back to the source of action itself. The enormous hegemonic potential of this orientation, which becomes manifest in the French Revolution, will propagate itself in the sense that, as **Engels** goes on record saying a century later, it 'even today still plays an important agitational role in the socialist movement of almost every country' (AD, 25/95). – In **Kant**, the status of 'good will' and the derivation of the 'categorical imperative' from the generalisation of principles of conduct as a formal vehicle for all ethics channels **Rousseau's** impulse in the direction of a liberal state under the rule of law 'precisely because it is the *a priori* given general will (in one people or in terms of different peoples amongst themselves) that is the sole determinant of what is right among men' (**Kant**, *Vom ewigen Frieden*, Anhang [Appendix], A 85). For Hegel, too, the 'universal will' is equivalent to 'right in itself' (*PhRight*, § 82, Addition).

In his use of the H concept, **Hegel** draws on the ancient Greek sense of military supremacy and its prestige but then shifts the sense to the politico-ethical. As he emphasises, the ancient H concept encompasses free will *and* coercion. At one end of the spectrum is the prehistoric model of the campaign against Troy as narrated by **Homer**: 'The relation of Agamemnon and the princes who accompanied him was not that of feudal suit and service: it was a free association merely for a *particular purpose* – a H' (*PhilHist*, 370). In historical time, H fell to Sparta because, as **Hegel** says, it 'enslaved the free nation of the Messenians, partly because it had assisted many Greek states to expel their Tyrants' (275). However, H was not only a consequence but also a cause of war. In turn,

the consequence of H was, particularly in the case of Athens, also a relatively stable alliance, aided by coercion, whose members had to pay the hegemonic city a kind of H-tax. The ‘contest for the H set the States at variance with each other’ – this is Hegel’s explanation for the Peloponnesian War (284). Notwithstanding the element of coercion, an element of consensus adheres to H here as well; to eliminate the basis of this consensus was to necessarily endanger H. ‘After the fall of Athens, Sparta took upon herself the H; but misused it [...] so selfishly, that she was universally hated’ (290). – To designate a ‘third epoch’ of world history that emphasises the subject and its freedom, Hegel detaches the concept of H from its predominantly military basis. To be sure, the Roman Empire had already arrived at the ‘unity of a universal principle’; however, the “modern era” realises unity not, as with the Roman Empire, ‘as the unity of abstract universal sovereignty, but as the H of self-cognizant Thought’ (363).

2. In his letter to Annenkov of 28 December 1846 **Marx**, against **Ferguson’s** idealisation of civil society, ridicules all who appeal ‘to official society from the official epitome of society’ (cf. 38/96). But in this context he compresses the relation between bourgeois and civil society, or bourgeois and citizen, into a simple relation of expressions: ‘Posez telle société civile et vous aurez tel état politique, qui n’est que l’expression officielle de la société civile’ (III.2/71; the German MEW edition correctly translates ‘société civile’ as ‘bürgerliche Gesellschaft’ here; see MEW 4/548). Through this short-circuiting, Marx misconstrues the terrain, deployment, and forms of political struggles (or of those that precede formal politics). He is right to oppose idealisation, but he overlooks the fact that battles are waged with such postulates.

‘German ideologues’ who derive their special national position and mission in the world from the idea of a ‘H of self-cognizant Thought’ are objects of ridicule to **Marx** and **Engels**. They let Heinrich **Heine** speak for them (5/470): ‘The land belongs to the Russians and French. / The English own the sea. / But we in the airy realm of dreams / Hold sovereign mastery. / Our unity is perfect here, / Our power [Hegemonie] beyond dispute; / The other folk in solid earth / Have meanwhile taken root’ (*Deutschland, ein Wintermärchen*, Caput VII). At the same time, they both use the term H for political analysis. To elucidate the H of the Prussian state amongst the German bourgeoisie, **Engels** credits it to the power of attraction the Prussian bourgeoisie exercised over the non-Prussian bourgeoisie (26/469 et sq.). The old ideological powers of Prussia endangered this H through their influence: ‘The more the post-March government strove to re-establish the old management of priests and Jesuits, the more impossible became its H over a country which was one to two-thirds Protestant’ (466).

Marx analysed the constellation of interests underlying the US Civil War with the help of the concept of H: Partly through conquest (Texas), partly through winning more US states for slavery (Missouri), the South sought 'to assert its influence in the Senate and, through the Senate, its H over the United States' (MECW 19/40 [MEW 15/336]). This was simultaneously a matter of containing the internal danger – in the form of the large number of poor whites facing a small number of landowners – by holding out to these poor whites 'the prospect of one day becoming slaveholders themselves' (41 [337]). In return, in order to crush the South's H, the Republicans were at pains to prohibit by law 'any further extension of slave Territories' (ibid.). – Here the term H is used rather formally, to refer to the majority in the Senate, where each federal state was entitled to two votes regardless of the size of its population. But in substance **Marx** has a fine grasp of the "inside" of H, which **Hegel** saw as defining the 'third epoch'. When "his" newspaper was decried as 'communist' by its conservative competitors, the young **Marx** wrote: 'practical attempts, even mass attempts, can be answered by cannon as soon as they become dangerous, whereas ideas, which have conquered our intellect and taken possession of our minds, ideas to which reason has fettered our conscience, are chains from which one cannot free oneself without a broken heart; they are demons which human beings can vanquish only by submitting to them' (MECW 1/220 et sq. [MEGA 1.1/240]). Later, having become the leading theoretician of the ascendant labour movement, he vehemently opposes attempts by the socialist party leadership to turn institutional dependence into censorship, to subject the press to 'nationalisation' rather than restricting itself to 'moral sway' (**Engels** to **Bebel**, MECW 50/33 [MEW 38/517]). Thus the poles of the political concept of H are indicated.

In many of his writings, **Marx** touches on aspects of the H problematic, as he does here even though he does not use the word. In *CHPL*, with a view to the French Revolution, he sketches the interrelationship of the H of a revolutionary class with the dys-H of the ruling class, such that a part of society 'fraternises and merges with society in general, becomes confused with it and is perceived and acknowledged as its *general representative*', while, conversely, 'all the defects of society must [...] be concentrated in another class' (MECW 3/184 et sq. [MEW 1/388]).

3. The concept of H became a catchword of the left for the first time in Russia where it was, from the 1890s to 1917, 'one of the most central political slogans in the Russian Social-Democratic movement' (**Anderson** 2017 [1976], 44). In terms of the 'idea', it was prepared by **Plekhanov's** writings of the 1880s (ibid.). What was episodically worked on and finally articulated as 'gegemoniya' was the

belief in the ‘necessity of a specific, autonomous struggle of the working class for the leadership of the revolutionary process in Russia’ (**Buci-Glucksmann** 1982, 534). In the end, as **Axelrod** wrote to **Struve** in 1901, ‘by virtue of the historical position of our proletariat, Russian Social-Democracy can acquire H (gegemoniya) in the struggle against absolutism’ (*Perepiska G.V. Plekhanova i P.B. Axelroda*, Moscow 1925, II, 142; cited in **Anderson** 2017 [1976], 45). In the 1905 Russian Revolution the concept of H then acquired crucial practical-political importance within the discourse of left parties and groups contending for leadership of the popular movement. The basic democratic orientation of the movement against Tsarist autocracy reinforced the aspect of consensus as against that of leadership. The orientation to H was disputed amongst the Bolshevik leadership because it came down to accepting support from liberal democrats when confronting autocracy. **Lenin** opposed those who would ‘scrap the idea of H’; in his view, the proletarian movement’s opportunity for success lay precisely in supporting the democratic movement – though in such a way as to push for a radicalisation of the democratic movement’s platform (*Working Class and Bourgeois Democracy*, 1905, CW 8, 78). This was to ‘[make] the idea of H a reality. Only a petty-bourgeois huckster’s idea of H can conceive it as a compromise, mutual recognition, a matter of worded terms. From the proletarian point of view H in a war goes to him who fights most energetically, [...] who criticises half-way policies of every kind’ (79).

Six years later, under conditions of re-stabilised Tsarist repression, **Lenin** again defended the orientation toward H. This time he turned against those who believed that once the proletarian-communist movement ‘has suffered reverses, has been hard-pressed and driven underground’, the question of H has no more meaning for them (CW 17, 80). Against this **Lenin** reformulates H’s orienting significance: ‘The H of the working class is the political influence which that class (and its representatives) exercises upon other sections of the population by helping them to purge their democracy (where there is democracy) of undemocratic admixtures, by criticising the narrowness and short-sightedness of all bourgeois democracy’ (79). Constant critique is needed of the ‘corrupting demoralizing content’ of liberal discourse. The struggle against nationalism is especially important: ‘If certain sections of the population combine hostility to privilege with nationalist sentiments, surely it is the duty of the leader to explain to them that such a combination hinders the abolition of privilege’ (ibid.). Here, the aspect of ‘purification’ comes into play, which **Gramsci** would later develop as the necessary ‘catharsis’ needed to achieve H. As long as capitalist class society exists, it is ‘the duty of the “leader” to explain the source of these privileges and this oppression [...] in the camp, not only of the proletarians, but also of the semi-proletarian and petty-bourgeois masses’ (80).

In a not too different way, although without the word H, and following the historic failure of the labour movement to prevent the unleashing of the First World War, Rosa **Luxemburg**, in the draft of her 1916 Junius Theses, written at the height of the War, sketches the main tasks of the International that needs now to be founded anew: Because what is chiefly at issue is 'to educate the broad masses to be capable of political action' it follows that the 'second urgent task of socialism' is to bring about the 'intellectual liberation of the proletariat from the custodianship of the bourgeoisie, which expresses itself in the influence of nationalist ideology' (GW 4, 47).

During the 'entire period of the October Revolution', and under the sign of war communism, 'the idea of H as leadership' disappears from **Lenin's** terminology, remaining in the shadow of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat', though it turns up again in Lenin's 'last struggles' and the debate on the role of trade unions (**Buci-Glucksmann** 1985, 534; see **Lenin** CW 32/1 et sq.).

4. After the second historic defeat of the labour movement in the face of fascism, **Gramsci**, who at first uses the H concept prevalent in the Third International, launches a 'radically new interpretation' in his *Prison Notebooks* (**Buci-Glucksmann** 1985, 476); integrating the concept of 'prestige' used by linguists of the time (**Lo Piparo** 1979, 104 et sq.), **Gramsci** makes H the basic concept of a theory of politics and the state that closes a fateful gap in **Marx** and earlier Marxism. Posed in a new way, the question of the 'common accord between the various wills' (*SPN*, Nb. 13, § 1, 127) calls for an investigation of the historical operation of social classes in connection with the development of their political culture and a rethinking of class struggles in their multi-dimensionality, beyond economistic simplification. It leads to a new conception of party theory, placing the emphasis on the word "democratic" in "democratic centralism", and thereby providing an alternative to emergent Stalinism. It brings civil society (as the sphere in which the struggle for H takes place), the hegemonic apparatuses (as the bases in this struggle) and intellectuals (as the agents of H) into focus, extends the conception of the state to the concept of the 'integral state' and leads to a supplementation of the concept of revolution with that of 'passive revolution'. The bearers of a determinate government policy appear as a 'historical bloc', which achieves its historical capacity for action by dint 'of H and consensus' (*FS*, Nb. 10.I, § 12, 357). Much as the ancient philosophers did with their political model, Gramsci applies the concept of the 'historical bloc' to the individual's self-relation and the conditions and forms of its ethical and cognitive coherence; to him, H becomes a 'philosophical fact' by virtue of individuals orienting the conduct of their lives within it (*SPN*, Nb. 10.II, § 48) With an eye to orienting revolutionary politics in the West, H theory offers a concep-

tual toolbox by which to set this politics apart from revolution in the East: while the latter follows the model of a ‘war of movement’, the former has to unfold as a ‘war of position’. – Gramsci takes these military metaphors from the experience of the First World War, but he warns ‘that comparisons between military art and politics should always be made with a grain of salt, that is, only as stimuli for thought’ (*PN* 1, Nb. 1, § 133, 217). – In sum, the many branches of a new Marxist science of politics spring from the hub of the H question.

4.1 *H in the ‘Southern Question’*. – In the political analyses written before 1924, ‘H’ still means “superior power” and “supremacy”, while the expression ‘prestige’ occupies essential aspects of what would be called ‘H’ in the *Prison Notebooks* (Lo Piparo 1979, 105). As in all previous Marxist usage, Gramsci speaks, in *The Southern Question* (1926), of H as something aspired to by the working class. His background experience here is the early 1920s movement of factory councils, which, as he retrospectively notes, had ‘concretely posed themselves the question of “proletarian H”, in other words of the social base of the proletarian dictatorship and of the workers’ state’ (1995, 31). The latter is founded on H in the form of a ‘system of class alliances’ by virtue of which the proletariat can, through the mobilisation of the ‘majority of the working population against capitalism and the bourgeois state’, succeed in becoming ‘the leading and ruling class’ (31 et sq.) The twofold character of leadership and domination is what leads, through its examination, to the first elaboration of the concept of H, which is ‘significantly more comprehensive and theoretically grounded’ (Kramer 1975, 88).

4.2 *Emergence of the “new” concept of H*. – The H question – which is still not listed among the main topics in the study plan of the *Prison Notebooks* (*PN* 1, 100) – first appears, in substance, that is, without the word being used, in § 43 of the first notebook; the word itself appears in § 44, one of the most extensive entries (*PN* 136–51). Beginning with the investigation of the relationship between leadership and domination in the Risorgimento (the struggle for the Italian nation-state, “belated” like that for the German nation-state) the question of H now informs topic after topic. The Risorgimento, one of the main topics of the *Prison Notebooks*, is also absent from the study plan. In outlining the ‘critical-historical’ type of periodical (point 14 of the study plan and addressed in § 43), Gramsci appears to “slip into” this theme. The following entry (§ 44) is dedicated to ‘political class leadership before and after assuming government power’ and turns the “slip” into the main path of inquiry. After a page of preliminary clarifications, the phrase ‘political H’ turns up (137), initially in quotation marks: ‘There can and there must be a “political H” even before assuming gov-

ernment power, and in order to exercise political leadership or H one must not count solely on the power and material force that is given by government'.

The backdrop of Gramsci's critical-historical analyses of the ascent of the bourgeoisie to the status of ruling and leading class is provided, in spite of all differences, by the question concerning an analogous ascent on the part of the modern wage-worker class. With this in view, Gramsci compares Italy's path to the nation-state with the revolutionary path of France, driven in its decisive phase by Jacobinism. The capacity of the democratic-revolutionary forces to develop and pursue an autonomous politics presupposes that – unlike the Action Party in the Risorgimento – they free themselves from the magnetic field of 'foreign H' (this term first appears explicitly in Nb. 6, § 38, 30), which is centred in the upper classes. In keeping with this approach, the study of the hegemonic subalternity of progressive movements occupies an important position, with certain phases of the labour movement being alluded to. Viewed from the perspective of its results, subaltern-passive H proves a condition of possibility of a 'revolution without revolution', or, as Gramsci later adds in the margin, 'a passive revolution' (137). The dominant class succeeds in carrying out this kind of modernisation process when it maintains its leadership ability on the basis of a complex H. 'It leads the allied classes, it dominates the opposing classes' (136).

In order to apprehend H and leadership ability, Gramsci extends the concept of intellectuals beyond 'those ranks commonly referred to by this term' to include 'the whole social mass that exercises an organizational function in the broad sense, whether it be in the field of production, or culture, or political administration' (Nb. 1, § 43, 133). Hence the guiding premise of research: 'there does not exist an independent class of intellectuals, but every class has its intellectuals' (§ 44, 137). With this the question of the relations of forces amongst the class-specific intellectual groupings comes into view. True, each class forms its own intellectuals; 'however, the intellectuals of the historically progressive class exercise such a power of attraction that, in the final analysis, they end up by subordinating the intellectuals of the other classes' (137 et sq.). In this case, 'so-called "transformism" occurs' (§ 43, 133): The intellectuals of a social movement are 'incorporated molecularly' by the hegemonic formation, and the societal groups from which they originate are 'decapitated' (§ 43, 133) and rendered 'impotent' (§ 44, 137) by means of this, as it were, surreptitious 'absorption of the elites', which operates through informal forces of attraction and involves the 'absorption of the active elements that arose from the allied as well as from the enemy classes' (ibid.).

A class formation is 'historically progressive' (137) by virtue of its historical "productivity", that is, the expansiveness of the concrete politico-economic

regime of which it is the bearer. Thanks to its historical productivity, the class formation ‘pushes the whole society ahead, not only satisfying its existential needs but continuously enlarging its compass through the continual appropriation of new spheres of industrial-productive activity’ (138), thereby promoting the credible expectation of individual “life prospects” (in Nb. 4, § 49 **Gramsci** specifies that ‘the consent that comes from the prestige attached to the function in the world of production’ may be the substance of H; 201). However, a historical actor of this sort jeopardises the hegemonic ‘power of attraction’ rooted in such a situation if it displays an interest only in ‘its actual physical members, its immediate “corporate” interests (corporate in the special sense of the immediate and egotistic interests of a particular restricted social group)’ (§ 44, 147). The capacity for H thus presupposes the overcoming of the corporative stage of a “historically productive” social group or class; its intellectuals are the actors of such a – real or at least partially illusory – universalisation, which requires the group or class make a ‘sacrifice’ in order to be able to “take along with it” other classes, strata, and groups by providing them with possibilities for their own development. Full H is therefore not mere persuasion, and ‘cultural H’ is also not merely cultural but must have some factual or at least objectively possible basis in the sphere of production (see Nb. 13, § 13). ‘Once the dominant class has exhausted its function, the ideological bloc tends to disintegrate, and then “spontaneity” is followed by “constraint” in forms which are less and less disguised and indirect, ending up in downright police measures and coups d’etat’ (Nb. 1, § 44, 138).

4.3 *The beginning of the implementation and unfolding of the concept of H.* – In the notes following the two “emergence paragraphs” in the first notebook, **Gramsci** amplifies the conceptual-historical phenography of H and its crises. Of ‘scholastic activity’ in the broad sense comprising institutions of higher learning, he emphasises not only its influence on the cognitive and politico-ethical formation of individuals but also its ‘enormous importance even economically for intellectuals of all grades’, in terms of their professional prospects; journalism, party movements, etc. have ‘greatly expanded’ the intellectual leadership stratum since the 19th cent. (§ 46, 152 et sq.). – Gramsci sees a second ‘strategic line’ of the ‘H of a central leadership over the intellectuals’ in ‘a general conception of life’, a philosophy (Gioberti), which gives its adherents a “dignity” to set against the dominant ideologies as a principle of struggle’ (153). – In § 47 he interprets **Hegel’s** theory of corporatism (see *PhRight*, §§ 250–56) as a conception of the “private” fabric of the state’ (ibid.). This conception was informed by the experiences of the French Revolution, according to **Gramsci**: ‘government by consent of the governed, but an organized consent, not the

vague and generic kind which is declared at the time of elections' (*ibid.*), while the associations, through which 'the state' teaches consent, again according to Gramsci, 'are private organisms, left to the private initiative of the ruling class' (*ibid.*). To Gramsci, this contradictory unity of public and private anticipates the theory of 'the parliamentary state with its regime of parties' (*ibid.*). Gramsci uses the example of the French Revolution to reflect upon the group structure of power, the "grouping of groups" organised as a club 'centered around single political personalities', along with a newspaper 'through which it keeps alive the attention and interest of a particular, though loosely defined, clientele' (154).

§ 48 deals above all with crises of H – in which we see a recurrence within each party of 'the same thing that occurs in parliament: difficulties of government' (156) – as well as with the variety of forms in which groups and individuals confront such crises and position themselves. "The "normal" exercise of H on the now classic terrain of the parliamentary regime is characterized by a combination of force and consent which balance each other so that force does not overwhelm consent but rather appears to be backed by the consent of the majority, expressed by the so-called organs of public opinion' (155 et sq.). 'Between consent and force stands corruption-fraud', typical of situations 'in which it is difficult to exercise the hegemonic function while the use of force presents too many dangers'; the enemy groups are then to be debilitated 'by buying – covertly under normal circumstances, openly in the case of anticipated danger – their leaders' (156).

Gramsci establishes the connection of current questions of H to the economy by means of the US example. This leads to Fordism coming into focus as a 'new type of society in which the "structure" dominates the superstructures more directly and the superstructures are rationalized (simplified and reduced in number)' (Nb. 1, § 61, 169). The 'viscous sedimentations from past historical phases' characteristic of Europe, sedimentations that are economically inactive and rely on inherited property titles, are lacking in the 'young' USA. "This preliminary "rationalization" of the general conditions of production which was already in place or was facilitated by history, permitted the rationalization of production, combining force (destruction of trade-unionism) with persuasion (wages and other benefits), so as to base the whole life of the nation on industry' (*ibid.*). To indicate the specifics of the USA of his time Gramsci uses the formula (often wrongly torn from its context and generalised): 'H is born in the factory and does not need so many political and ideological intermediaries'. (*ibid.*) He (at the beginning of 1930) still sees the 'new type of society' in the '(apparently) idyllic' initial phase of the 'forced development of a new human type' in the sense of a 'psycho-physical adaptation to the new industrial struc-

ture' (ibid.). This is followed by the enigmatic phrases: 'there has not yet been (except sporadically, perhaps) any "superstructural" blossoming; therefore, the fundamental question of H has not yet been posed' (ibid.).

Four years later, when integrating this note into the notebook on the theme *Americanism and Fordism*, Gramsci adds 'high wages' as a means by which to drive this process forward and dates his note to before the 1929 crisis (*SPN*, Nb. 22, §2, 286). The superstructures are until then still 'anachronistic compared with the development of "things"' (ibid.); specifically, 'American workers unions are, more than anything else, the corporate expression of the rights of qualified crafts and therefore the industrialists' attempts to curb them have a certain "progressive" aspect' (ibid.). Thus the *fundamental question of H* is that of whether a 'historical bloc' is formed which penetrates all "levels" of society, from production to the superstructures, in harmony with the developed state of the forces of production and relations of production, allowing the class that dominates production to become the leading class, that is, win H.

After the first Fordism paragraphs of the first notebook (§ 61), Gramsci turns to conflicts of H that flare up with the 'regulation of the sexual instinct', without which 'there cannot be intense productive labor' and which causes 'the sexual question [to] [...] be full of morbid characteristics', 'until woman has truly attained independence in relation to man' (§ 62, 171). But since all sorts of 'sectarians' and 'oddballs' pounce on social emancipation movements like the women's movement with their little treatises – all the more so during H crises –, Gramsci conceptualises the type of the 'Lorian' intellectual in order to create among the addressees of a potentially hegemonic project from below 'an aversion to intellectual disorder (and a sense of the ridiculous)' (§ 63, 172). The paragraph closes with the now famous maxim: 'It is necessary to create sober, patient people who do not despair in the face of the worst horrors and who do not become exuberant with every silliness. Pessimism of the intelligence, optimism of the will' (ibid.).

In the subsequent paragraphs Gramsci considers the 'ability to command' as a hegemonic function (Nb. 1, § 79, 183); he also considers the 'separation between modern culture and popular culture or folklore', whose transcendence could be compared with the Reformation (§ 89, 187); the relation of political to military leadership, which is decisive for mobilising capacity and the "morale" of the troops (§ 114, 198 et sq.); the collapse of the morale of the Piedmontese troops in the 1848 war, because 'the rightists believed that this fighting spirit was an expression of a pure, abstract "military spirit" and they resorted to intrigues to restrict popular freedoms' (§ 117, 207); the necessary primacy of politics as well as the 'fundamental difference' in political structure according to 'class character', which leads to a maxim coined with an eye to emancipatory move-

ments: 'in political struggle one should not ape the methods of struggle of the ruling classes, and avoid falling into easy ambushes' (§133, 217); the consolidation of the underdevelopment of the South by the H of the North (§149, 228); the role (and overconfidence) of intellectuals within the state, understood as the 'concrete framework of a productive world' (§150, 229); the development of Puritan ideology in the USA 'in order to achieve a new adaptation to the new mode of work [...] which gives to the intrinsic brutal coercion the external form of persuasion and consent' (§158, 235); the 'authoritative' ending of the crisis of H by external force 'if self-discipline is not established' (236). In short, once the political question of H appears it pervades, with all of its aspects, the otherwise thematically very varied notes of the first notebook and demonstrates its fecundity for Gramsci's research. Quite a few of its aspects, which Gramsci works out in an increasingly systematic way in the subsequent notebooks, provide the titles of HCDM articles. – As many notes from Notebook 2 show, Gramsci continues to use the primarily "political-military" concept of H (following ancient Greek usage) (see for example §§16, 40, 97, and 125), alongside the dominant "civil-society-cultural" one (see especially §138, where he says of the American industrialists following in the footsteps of Henry Ford: 'in addition to the economic effect of high wages, they also tried to obtain certain social effects of spiritual H, and this is normal' (358)), though it is the latter that will go on to link the thematically highly diverse entries of the *Prison Notebooks* like a red thread.

4.4 *Dialectic of the concept of H.* In accordance with his distinction between the H function from the function of 'direct domination', Gramsci distinguishes civil society and state (in the narrow sense) as 'two major superstructural "levels"' (SPN, Nb. 12, §1, 12). Developed societies of the Western type are penetrated, divided, and held together by a highly differentiated civil-society web of associations and organisations. This sphere of civil society is 'commonly called "private"' (ibid.), but in reality it is situated beyond the private sphere, transcending the confines of personal private property (though by no means its domination). The crises of state and economy after the First World War have shown that state authority can begin to totter without this seriously endangering bourgeois domination as long as its basis of H remains stable. In the case of 'an inaccurate understanding of the nature of the state (in the full sense: dictatorship + H)', revolutionary politics will fail (Nb. 6, §155, 117). Gramsci compares the indicated political structure to a 'war of position', which 'in politics [...] is represented by the concept of H' that can only come into existence with the 'large popular organizations of the modern type that represent, as it were, the "trenches" and the permanent fortifications of the war of position' (Nb. 8,

§ 52, 267). In the course of their development, the ‘internal and international organizational relations of the state’ become, on the whole, ‘more complex and massive’ the less bourgeois societies are in that ‘state of fluidity’ which made possible the ‘Jacobin experience from 1789 to Thermidor’, to which **Marx** and **Engels** gave expression, in the wake of 1848, by coining the slogan ‘revolution in permanence’ (10/287). **Gramsci** can therefore say that the ‘formula of the “Permanent Revolution” is expanded and transcended in political science by the formula of “civil H”’ because, due to the unfolding of bourgeois society and the organisations of the labour movement, in it ‘the war of movement increasingly becomes war of position’ (*SPN*, Nb. 13, § 7, 243).

In the spontaneous ‘identification of state and government’ **Gramsci** sees the re-emergence of the ‘economic-corporative form’ and the ‘confusion between civil society and political society. For it should be noted that certain elements that fall under the general notion of the state must be restored to the notion of civil society (in the sense, one might say, that state = political society + civil society, that is H protected by the armor of coercion)’ (Nb. 6, § 88, 75). Accordingly, an ‘intellectual and moral reform has to be linked with a programme of economic reform’, the condition, in terms of H, for a social emancipation movement (*SPN*, Nb. 13, § 1, 133).

Fundamental to the theoretical “grammar” of the concept of H is the “dual perspective” in political action and in national life’ (§ 14, 169), as seen for example in the indissoluble interrelationship between the ‘two factors of authority and universality’ (§ 5, 1543), which must not be separated from each other. Just as civil society is not a positive empirical sphere but the dimension of all social domains in which H is contested, so, also, H is not an independent entity in relation to domination, not merely one of ‘two forms of “immediacy”’ (*SPN*, § 14, 170), but rather a *relation to* domination and government power and at the same time a *factor within* that relation. It is methodologically important, on the one hand, to observe the ‘various levels’ on which ‘the dual perspective can present itself’, ‘from the most elementary to the most complex’, while recognising, on the other hand, that they ‘can all theoretically be reduced to two fundamental levels’, corresponding to the dual nature of **Machiavelli’s** Centaur – half-animal and half-human. They are the levels of ‘force and of consent, authority and H, violence and civilisation, of the individual moment and of the universal moment (“Church” and “State”), of agitation and of propaganda, of tactics and of strategy, etc’ (169 et sq.). The two factors must be posited neither as spatially separate nor as temporally consecutive, ‘but as a dialectical relation’; nevertheless, it can happen ‘that the more the first “perspective” is elementary, the more the second has to be “distant” [...]. In other words, it may happen as in human life, that the more an individual is compelled to defend

his own immediate physical existence, the more will he uphold and identify with the highest values of civilisation and of humanity, in all their complexity' (170). The fact that H is a form of struggle, thus an antagonistic form, also prohibits it from being conceived (as is often done in the regulation school) "one-sidedly from above", as the form of domination or of state power, while civil society is seen not as the sphere where H is struggled over, but simply as 'the H apparatus of the ruling class' (Sablowski 1994, 152). Social antagonisms always underlie H, as it is itself interminably contested. Even if the relations of H express supremacy, there are always forms of countervailing power and counter-public, in short, "non-hegemonic H".

A part of the "logic" of H consists, finally, in 'catharsis', the overcoming of the collective self-interest of the rulers and the 'sacrifice' they have to make in order to strike a 'compromise' and arrive at a relative 'equilibrium'. 'Undoubtedly the fact of H presupposes that account be taken of the interests and the tendencies of the groups over which H is to be exercised, and that a certain compromise equilibrium should be formed'; therefore it is 'incongruous' but also understandable that 'the concrete posing of the problem of H should be interpreted as a fact subordinating the group seeking H' (*SPN*, Nb. 13, §18, 161). 'But there is also no doubt that such sacrifices and such a compromise cannot touch the essential; for though H is ethical-political, it must also be economic, must necessarily be based on the decisive function exercised by the leading group in the decisive nucleus of economic activity' (*ibid.*).

4.5 *H as a philosophical and, in its tendency, democratic fact.* – Gramsci appears to have been conscious of developing 'a theory and technique of politics which [...] might be useful to both sides in the struggle' (Nb. 13, §20, 136). Although it is to begin with a "value-free" politological analysis, the concept of H tends towards democracy, among whose 'many meanings' 'the most realistic and concrete one', in his view, 'is that which can [be] brought into relief through the connection between democracy and the concept of H': 'In the hegemonic system, there is democracy between the leading group and the groups that are led to the extent that [the development of the economy and thus] the legislation [which is an expression of that development] favors the [molecular] transition from the groups that are led to the leading group' (Nb. 8, §191, 345). In this sense, even in the Roman Empire there was 'an imperial-territorial democracy [...] in the form of the granting of citizenship to conquered peoples' (*ibid.*).

In Gramsci's writings, the concept of H acquires its full significance not only in the politico-legal, but also in the socio-emancipatory context, such that Christine Buci-Glucksmann was able to say that it aims, in 'actual meaning', at an "anti-passive revolution", thus opening up a 'new field of analysis: the his-

tory of the subaltern classes and their “hegemonic” development’ (1985, 480). However, every emergence from subalternity presupposes a break with foreign H, an emancipatory *differentiation* from dominant relations, and thus ‘cannot be equated only with agreement and “consent”’ (479); rather, it is based on the opposite of these and reserves a function for intellectuals: ‘a human mass does not “distinguish” itself, does not become independent in its own right without, in the widest sense, organising itself; and there is no organisation without intellectuals, that is without organisers and leaders’ (*SPN*, Nb. 11, §12, 334).

Leadership is conceived of by Gramsci as a pedagogical relation – but with the twofold aspect (inspired by the third *ThF* and progressive education) ‘according to which the relationship between teacher and pupil is active and reciprocal so that every teacher is always a pupil and every pupil a teacher’ (Nb. 10, § 44, 350). Relations of H can thus be understood ‘as reciprocal relations of praxis [...] instead of as dichotomous relations of domination’ (Merkens 2004, 32). What is at stake in the formation process of potential H (or counter-H) as it results from struggle is the historical capacity to act or the social capacity to shape reality; this capacity thus ‘presupposes the attainment of a “cultural-social” unity through which a multiplicity of dispersed wills, with heterogeneous aims, are welded together with a single aim, on the basis of an equal and common conception of the world [...] where the intellectual base is so well rooted, assimilated and experienced that it becomes passion’ (*SPN*, Nb. 10.11, § 44, 349). In order to grasp this process conceptually, Gramsci dissolves the borders of the pedagogical; he disconnects it from the ‘strictly “scholastic” relationships by means of which the new generation comes into contact with the old and absorbs its experiences and its historically necessary values and “matures” and develops a personality of its own which is historically and culturally superior’ (350). In the broader sense, ‘this form of relationship exists throughout society as a whole and for every individual relative to other individuals. It exists between intellectual and non-intellectual sections of the population, between the rulers and the ruled, elites and their followers, leaders [*dirigenti*] and led, the vanguard and the body of the army. Every relationship of “H” is necessarily an educational relationship and occurs not only within a nation, between the various forces of which the nation is composed, but in the international and world-wide field, between complexes of national and continental civilizations’ (ibid.). For Gramsci the figure of the philosopher is therefore ‘also given by the active relationship which exists between him and the cultural environment he is proposing to modify. The environment reacts back on the philosopher and imposes on him a continual process of self-criticism’ (ibid.).

Thus the concept of H ties together social and individual emancipation. Gramsci describes the socialisation of individuals occurring behind their backs

as the initial 'situation in which the contradictory state of consciousness does not permit of any action, any decision or any choice, and produces a condition of moral and political passivity' (Nb. 11, §12, 333). If things are left to run their course, one is therefore initially a member of disparate collectives that one has never chosen (323): 'Critical understanding of self takes place therefore through a struggle of political "Hs" and of opposing directions, first in the ethical field and then in that of politics proper, in order to arrive at the working out at a higher level of one's own conception of reality. Consciousness of being part of a particular hegemonic force (that is to say, political consciousness) is the first stage towards a further progressive self-consciousness in which theory and practice will finally be one' (333). This, however, is one of the two foundational questions of European philosophy, alongside the basic politico-philosophical question of ἕν ἐκ πολλῶν or *unum ex pluribus*, that is of the production of Unity out of the Many, or of the formation of an aggregate capacity for action whose reach extends to all of society. Hence Gramsci's conclusion that 'the political development of the concept of H represents a great philosophical advance as well as a politico-practical one. For it necessarily supposes an intellectual unity and an ethic in conformity with a conception of reality that has gone beyond common sense and has become, if only within narrow limits, a critical conception' (333 et sq.). Thus for Gramsci the formation of mass/individual 'coherence' in the medium of emancipatory H is an eminently "philosophical" event' (Note IV, 325). H in Gramsci's sense has at least one foot outside of mere domination and is not simply more refined, 'harder to get rid of than domination alone'; it is not a unilateral 'capacity through which an actor [...] can lead others, without coercion, to pursue their own goals only within a framework that is determined by his interests, without them being able to behave in an equivalent way towards him' (Fülberth 2001, 24) – a definition that does however get to the heart of what a purely instrumental relation to H aims at.

5. The crisis and decline of Fordism have caused everything connected with this phase of capitalist development to become obsolete. But the analysis of the succeeding formation based on automated labour and computerised activities can draw inspiration from Gramsci's method of investigating relations of H during the ascendant phase of Fordism. Moreover, there is no doubt that everything in Gramsci's analysis that is associated with the "Bolshevised" CP of the Third International as "the (one, the exclusive) party of the working class" is outdated, even if Gramsci did, in his day, oppose domination-driven inversions that ultimately took the absurd form of inscribing H into constitutions in the name of the 'leading role of the party of the working class', that is, repla-

cing the moment of freedom with coercion, which is the surest way of losing H. Ultimately, it was under these auspices that a more or less completely negative H or dys-H of the single party was created in most state-socialist European countries, a 'dictatorship without H' (*SPN*, Nb. 15, §59, 106). H cannot simply be claimed but must be earned. 'Strategies of unity associated with a direct claim to control will lead to division' (**Haug** 1985, 113). A force that seriously wishes to become and remain capable of leadership needs to struggle for this, and it can only do so if it recognises that the position of the "hegemon" is continuously contested. In this sense it may be said that **Gramsci's** concept of H rests 'on a "pluralism" peculiar to Western societies' (**Buci-Glucksmann** 1985, 481), while the assertion that **Gramsci** broke with the concept of 'class-specific' ideologies (**Mouffe** 1979, quoted in **Buci-Glucksmann** 1985, 481) is misleading insofar as it is only true in the sense that the class character of 'ideological elements' does not pertain to those elements by necessity, as a result of their essence, but rather is determined by the way they are articulated (**Mouffe** 1979, 171 et sq.). What is indispensable in the struggle of antagonistic 'hegemonic principles' is **Gramsci's** expanded concept of intellectuals – even if "telecracy" and the Internet give rise to new kinds of H actors and forms of action, as well as his insights into the relevance of H to the 'intellectual/people axis' and his associated critique of intellectual 'abstractism' and 'Lorianism'.

The decentred and "field-theory" concept of 'H without hegemon' or 'structural H' attempted to respond to an "aggregate condition" of the working class and of social movements characterised, in the context of the crisis of Fordism, by diversification (**Haug** 1981/1985, 158 et sq.), while neoliberalism's epochal H determines, under conditions of hegemonic consumerism allied with a televisual culture of distraction, the practico-theoretical tasks of a new type of globalisation-critical "movement of movements" that is gradually reconstituting itself. Neoliberal H under high-tech capitalism, with its phenomena of the fragmentation of the social, of exclusion, indeed of decivilisation, encompasses strategies both of normalisation and of conformism, although of a different sort than that associated with Fordist H. **Gramsci's** H research provides indispensable means of reflection and methodological stimuli by which to tackle the questions of H and counter-H under conditions of transnational capitalism, questions that increasingly pose themselves in international terms.

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→ action potency/agency, americanism, antagonism, automation, bolshevisation, bonapartism, bourgeois society/civil society, campaign, catharsis, civil society, class struggle, coercion, coherence, common sense, conduct of life, conformism, consciousness, consent, consumptionism/consumerism, council communism, counterpower, counterpublic/oppositional space, Cold War, crisis, critique, critique of globalisation, culture, democracy/dictatorship of the proletariat, democratic centralism, discipline, domination/rule, dominating class/ruling class, economic-corporative, economism, education, emancipation, empire, ethico-political, eurocommunism, factory councils, fordism, French Revolution, global city, Gramscianism, hegemonic apparatus, hegemonism, historic compromise, historical bloc, historico-critical, ideological class struggle, ideologue, integral state, intellectuals, international relations, internet, Jacobinism, leadership, Leninism, Lorianism, myth, nationalism, neo-liberalism, New Left, oppression, order, organic intellectuals, parties, passive revolution, permanent revolution, pluralism, policy of alliances, politics, popular national, power, Prison Notebooks, regulation school, relation of forces, Risorgimento, state theory, structural hegemony, subalternity, superstructure, system competition, Taylorism, television, unity, violence/power, war, war communism, war of position/war of manoeuvre

→ Alltagsverstand, Amerikanismus, Antagonismus, Automation, Bewusstsein, Bolschewisierung, Bonapartismus, Bündnispolitik, bürgerliche Gesellschaft/Zivilgesellschaft, Demokratie/Diktatur des Proletariats, demokratischer Zentralismus, Disziplin, Einheit, Emanzipation, Erziehung, ethisch-politisch, Eurokommunismus, Fabrikräte, Fernsehen, Fordismus, Französische Revolution, Führung, Gefängnishefte, Gegenmacht, Gegenöffentlichkeit, geschichtlicher Block, Gewalt, globale Stadt, Globalisierungskritik, Gramscismus, Handlungs-

fähigkeit, Hegemonialapparat, Hegemonismus, Herrschaft, herrschende Klasse, historischer Kompromiss, historisch-kritisch, Ideologe, ideologischer Klassenkampf, Imperium, integraler Staat, Intellektuelle, internationale Beziehungen, Internet, Jakobinismus, Kalter Krieg, Kampagne, Katharsis, Klassenkampf, Kohärenz, Konformismus, Konsens, Konsumismus, Kräfteverhältnis, Krieg, Kriegskommunismus, Krise, Kritik, Kultur, Lebensführung, Leninismus, Lorianismus, Macht, Mythos, Nationalismus, Neoliberalismus, Neue Linke, ökonomisch-korporativ, Ökonomismus, Ordnung, organische Intellektuelle, Parteien, passive Revolution, permanente Revolution, Pluralismus, Politik, popular-national, Rätekommunismus, Regulationstheorie, Risorgimento, Staatstheorie, Stellungskrieg/Bewegungskrieg, strukturelle Hegemonie, Subalternität, Superstruktur, Systemkonkurrenz, Taylorismus, Unterdrückung, Zivilgesellschaft, Zwang

Historicism, Absolute

A: at-tārīḥīya al-muṭṭlaqa. – F: historicisme absolu. – G: Historizismus, absoluter.
 – R: absoljutnyi istorizm. – S: historicismo absoluto. – C: juéduì lǐshǐzhūyì 绝对历史主义

The expression “AH” – ‘storicismo assoluto’ – appears only three times in the *Prison Notebooks* of Antonio Gramsci. It appears for the first time as a subject for further investigation, in the first note that Gramsci writes with the title ‘An Introduction to the Study of Philosophy’ (Q 8, § 204). Its second appearance (perhaps the most well known quotation) is in ‘Concept of “Orthodoxy”’, as a concluding formulation to the important additional passage (note 1) which argues that ‘it has been forgotten that in the case of a very common expression [i.e. historical materialism] one should put the accent on the first term – “historical” – and not on the second, which is of metaphysical origin. The philosophy of praxis is the A“H”’, the absolute secularisation and earthliness of thought, an absolute humanism of history. It is along this line that one must trace the thread of the new conception of the world’ (Q 11, § 27; *SPN* 465). Its third and final appearance is in ‘Introduction to the Study of Philosophy’ (Q 15, § 61; *SPN* 417), in the middle of series of notes dedicated to considering the nature of the Italian Risorgimento and its relationship to the French Revolution. As in Q 11, § 27, the expression “AH” is used as a description of one of the elements of the philosophy of praxis. Although its importance is emphasised, the expression itself is not subject to further explicit analysis or development. It appears like the tip of an iceberg, beneath which lies a conceptual structure and series of analyses and researches that remain largely implicit.

1. ‘Theory of History and of Historiography’ constitutes the first subject of the proposed study plan that Gramsci writes on the first page of his first notebook on 8 February 1929. In the first notebook with a section dedicated to philosophical questions, entitled ‘Notes on Philosophy. Materialism and Idealism’ (Notebook 4), he begins to consider Marxism’s relation to historicism, considered as both a political-ideological formation and philosophical doctrine – a dual-sided exploration that Gramsci relates to Hegel’s and Marx’s comments on the relations of translation which obtained between the political practice of the French Revolution and the theoretical developments of German

idealism (cf. Q 8, § 208). In 'Two Aspects of Marxism', he argues that historical materialism can be considered, insofar as it is still undergoing a period of popularisation in the form of a materialism closely connected to the traditional world-views of the subaltern classes, as 'the popular side of modern historicism' (Q 4, § 3; *SPN* 396). In 'The Restoration and Historicism', he specifies this formulation, arguing that the confrontation of the different "historicisms" that emerged from the experience of the French Revolution and the period of the Restoration produced their *Aufhebung* in the form of a "popular" historicism which criticised the petty bourgeois ideology and the "aristocratic" ideology, explaining both and explaining "itself", which represented the greatest form of "historicism", the total liberation from any form of abstract "ideologism", the real conquest of the historical world, the beginnings of a new, original civilisation. It is necessary', Gramsci declares, 'to study all of these currents of thought in their concrete manifestations: 1) as a philosophical current; 2) as a historiographical current; 3) as a political current' (Q 4, § 24; cf. Q 16, § 9; *SPN* 399).

The systematic pursuit of this study plan occurs immediately, particularly in the two great philosophical (and at the same time, directly political) confrontations which will occupy Gramsci throughout his incarceration: the critiques of the attempted "liquidation" of Marxism by Benedetto Croce and the "dilution" of Marxism which Gramsci argues is represented in the (emerging diamat orthodoxy) of the *Theory of Historical Materialism: A Popular Manual of Marxist Sociology* by Bukharin. "AH" functions as a 'critical concept' in both directions (Roth 1972, 66). These two distinct critiques are unified not only by their common motivation to defend and develop Labriola's 'thesis that Marxism is an independent and original philosophy', against the 'double revision' to which Marxism had been subjected (Q 4, § 3; *SPN* 390). They are also unified by the dialectical rhythm with which Gramsci develops themes in his engagement with one thinker which are then transferred, or "translated", into the terms of his critique of the other, and vice versa. Thus, although these critiques are developed in tandem, it is nevertheless still possible to detect distinct moments of critical attention in relation to each thinker. Thus, in Notebook 4, Gramsci's comments on the theme of historicism are particularly directed against Bukharin. In his reduction of the philosophy of Marxism to a version of traditional, 18th-cent. vulgar materialism (which 'can be nothing other than eternal and absolute' (Q 4, § 40; *SPN* 407; cf. Q 4, § 25; Q 7, § 47)), Bukharin does not comprehend, Gramsci argues, that 'the essential part of Marxism consists in its sublation [*superamento*] of the old philosophies and also in the way of conceiving philosophy; it is this which must be demonstrated and systematically developed [...] in the expression "historical materialism" the accent has

been placed on the second member, whereas it should be given to the first: **Marx** is essentially an “historicist” (*Q* 4, § 11; cf. *Q* 11, § 27; *SPN* 465). The new way of practising philosophy consists not only in the historicist critique of the metaphysical tradition and the “theoretical” explanation ‘that every “truth” believed to be eternal and absolute has practical origins and has represented or represents a provisional value’. It also consists, equally if not more importantly, in the much more difficult task of making ‘this interpretation “practically” comprehensible in relation to historical materialism itself’ (*Q* 4, § 40; *SPN* 406).

The critique of **Croce’s** relation to historicism, on the other hand, intensifies in Notebook 8, both in the notes written before the third series of ‘Notes on Philosophy’, in this section itself, and above all, in the “special” Notebook 10, which constitutes, in part, the “Anti-Croce” which **Gramsci** intended to write following the example of **Engels’s** “Anti-Dühring” (*Q* 8, § 235; *SPN* 371). **Gramsci** criticises **Croce’s** claims of ‘a disinterested contemplation of the eternal becoming of human history’ (*Q* 8, § 39) and highlights the similarity between the nature of his (historiographical) historicism and those of the traditions of (political-ideological) historicism which emerged during the experience of the Italian Risorgimento, which **Gramsci** suggests can be understood with the concept of ‘passive revolution’ (*Q* 8, § 39; cf. *Q* 10.1, § 6). Both were committed to an abstract and symmetrical view in which history progresses according to a ‘dialectic of preservation and innovation’ (*Q* 8, § 27). Doctrines such as those of the Jacobin moment of modern culture, which proposed not the preservation of elements of the past according to a progressively unfolding preordained plan, but the introduction of new elements and the dislocation of certainties under the pressure of actual historical practice, were declared to be ‘irrational’. **Croce’s** historicism is argued to be, in a repetition of the historicisms of the Italian Risorgimento, ‘not so much scientific theory as practical-political tendency or ideology’ (*Q* 8, § 27): a ‘speculative, “liberal”’ Utopia whose fear of mass movements (*Q* 10.1, § 6) banishes revolutionary politics to the irrational and anti-historical, and makes fascist reaction incomprehensible as anything but a temporary aberration in an otherwise pacific evolutionary development. Rather than ‘an ethical-political history’, **Gramsci** claims that **Croce** has produced ‘a speculative history’ (*Q* 8, § 240).

At the same time, **Gramsci** pursues his critique of **Croce** on the specifically philosophical terrain, discovering the same contradictions at work in **Croce’s** speculative historicism as those that dominated his historiography. Significantly, this engagement occurs after **Gramsci** has translated the ‘Theses on Feuerbach’ in the pages reserved for translations at the beginning of Notebook 7 (according to **Francioni** (1984, 38) most probably undertaken at the same

time as **Gramsci** writes the first 'Notes on Philosophy' in Notebook 4, between May and November 1930) and has begun to develop the notion of the distinctive features of a philosophy of praxis (the term itself appears for the first time in relation to historical materialism and, in particular, the theory and practice of hegemony, in 'Materialism and Historical Materialism' (Q 7, § 35; cf. **Haug** 1994, 1195 et sq.)). Against **Croce's** claim to have 'attempted "to expel" from the field of philosophy every residue of theology and metaphysics to the point of negating any philosophical "system"', **Gramsci** argues that his thought remains essentially speculative and within the problematic of theology and metaphysics: 'every claim of "historicism" is empty, because it is a case of speculative "historicism", of the "concept" of history and not of history' (Q 8, § 224; cf. Q 10.I, § 8). Although **Croce** had indeed argued that philosophy progresses by solving problems presented to it by historical development, and not in terms of a closed sphere of thought (Q 10.I, § 4), he still wished to maintain a qualitative distinction between philosophy, understood as a disinterested search for truth, and ideologies, which he reduced to mere instruments of political action (Q 10.II, § 2). Certainly, for **Croce** also, historical thought is the 'only and integral form of knowledge' (1938, 56), which constitutes an AH in the sense of a unity of philosophy and history. However, he only went 'half way', because he 'takes the categories of Spirit out of this historicity' (**Roth** 1972, 68).

Gramsci, on the other hand, in one of the richest passages of the *Prison Notebooks*, describes the distinction between philosophy and ideology as a quantitative one, related to the level of social, political and historical coherence (in the specific sense this word has for Gramsci; cf. **Haug** 1996, 21 et sqq., 61) of conceptions of the world. 'Ideology is any particular conception of groups internal to the class' which are directed to the resolution of immediate problems. Philosophy, on the other hand, in the positive sense with which **Gramsci** uses the term in this passage, is a conception of the world which tends to raise the level of awareness of historical determination and increase the capacity to act of an entire social class, 'not only in its current and immediate interests [...] but also in its future and mediated [interests]' (Q 10.I, § 10; cf. Q 10.II, § 31). The introduction of the third term of "politics" to the equation "history = philosophy" thus allows Gramsci to think both the extent to which the present is not identical with itself, but rather is fractured by residual formations of the past and emergent formations directed towards new social practices, and also the means by which the philosophy of praxis' acknowledgement of its own determination increases its ability to contribute to social transformation.

It is in the context of these developing critiques that the expression "AH" appears for the first time in the first note entitled 'An Introduction to the Study

of Philosophy': 'Transcendence, immanence, AH. Meaning and importance of the history of philosophy' (Q 8, § 204). It emerges as a 'sublation [*superamento*] of a prior mode of thinking' (Q 8, § 220), produced by appropriating an expression used by Croce and, in an act of immanent critique, attempting to give it a level of conceptual consistency which Croce had failed to achieve. The essentially critical nature of the term, and critical value of the adjective "absolute" in particular, is underlined by the two alternative lines of affiliation sketched out in 'Introduction to the Study of Philosophy' (Q 8, § 235) ('Beyond the series "transcendence, theology, speculation – speculative philosophy", the other series "transcendence, immanence, speculative historicism – philosophy of praxis"') and the reformulation of AH as 'realistic historicism', in opposition to "speculative historicism" (Q 10.I, 'Introduction'; cf. Q 10.I, § 11; Q 10.II, § 6ii) and to 'abstract or speculative "absolute philosophy"' (Q 10.II, § 31). The critique of the failings and contradictions of Croce's version of AH continues throughout Notebooks 8 and 10, particularly in terms of the critique of speculation, and the suggestion that the philosophy of praxis contains a new notion of immanence – touchstones to which Gramsci constantly returns, and which are central to the development of the status of 'theory' within the philosophy of praxis (Q 4, § 17; Q 8, § 238; Q 11, § 63), in which the critique of speculation is linked to the question of hegemony (Q 10.I, § 8; Q 10.II, § 9; Q 11, § 24; Q 11, § 28; cf. Boothman 1991, 62–4; Frosini 2003, 143–49).

The most significant conceptual development, however, consists in Gramsci's synthesis of the terms of his critique of Croce with his renewed attempt in Q 11 to refute the tradition of metaphysical materialism within Marxism. The expression "AH", one of the spoils of victory of Gramsci's clash with Croce, is now reforged into a genuinely new concept in Gramsci's dialectical workshop, coordinating and summarising his many sided attack upon Bukharin's 'upside-down idealism' (Q 11, § 14; *SPN* 437). Although Bukharin's seems to be a perspective diametrically opposed to Croce's, Gramsci discovers the same lack of a critique of metaphysics and speculative philosophy at work in Bukharin's search for a first philosophy to underwrite an historical-materialist sociology (Q 11, § 14) as he did in Croce's 'capably disguised form of history according to a plan' (Q 10.II, § 41.xvi): 'speculative categories are replaced by empirical concepts and classifications which are not less abstract and anti-historical' (Q 11, § 14; *SPN* 437). Lacking a critique (and in particular, a political critique) of the failings of the speculative mode of practising philosophy (Q 11, § 14), an understanding of the new dialectic (Q 11, § 22) or the new meaning of immanence introduced by Marx (Q 11, § 24; Q 11, § 27), Bukharin had attempted to posit the speculative concept of matter of metaphysical materialism as a guarantee

for Marxism's (transhistorical) validity (intimately related to his dismissal of all previous philosophies as mere 'delirium and folly' (*Q 11*, §18; *SPN* 449)). For **Gramsci**, it is essential to comprehend the concept of matter in a realistic and historical sense – that is, not as an a-historical metaphysical category, but as 'socially and historically organised for production; consequently, natural science should be seen as essentially an historical category, a human relation' (*Q 11*, §30; *SPN* 465 et sq.). Gramsci's declaration that 'it has been forgotten that in the case of a very common expression one should put the accent on the first term – "historical" – and not on the second, which is of metaphysical origin' should thus be understood strictly and literally: as an 'A"H"', an 'absolute secularisation and earthliness of thought, an absolute humanism of history' (*Q 11*, §27; *SPN* 465), the philosophy of praxis can explain, overcome and incorporate, rather than merely dismiss, the contradictions of metaphysical materialism, just as it resolves the aporiai of speculative, idealist forms of historicism. It is able to "translate" them into a realistic and historical register – and this 'translation' between 'different philosophical and scientific languages' and 'different phases of civilisation' is 'organic and profound' 'only in the philosophy of praxis' (*Q 11*, §47). As the philosophy of praxis possesses a concept of theory (*Q 11*, §45) which acknowledges that thought, and the systems of thought known as philosophy, are practices directed to the resolution of determinant problems in determinant historical conjunctures or 'historical blocs', it is able to provide an account of the emergence, consolidation, political efficacy, and decomposition of these doctrines.

Gramsci acknowledges that the alternative to the metaphysical guarantee offered by **Bukharin**, namely, 'to think of a philosophical affirmation as true in a particular historical period (that is, as the necessary and inseparable expression of a particular historical action, of a particular praxis) but as superseded and rendered "vain" in a succeeding period, without however falling into scepticism and moral and ideological relativism, in other words to see philosophy as historicity, is quite an arduous and difficult mental operation' (*Q 11*, §14; *SPN* 436). He nevertheless insists that such an understanding is implicit in the philosophy of praxis, and, crucially, politically enabling.

In distinction to all previous historicisms, the philosophy of praxis' equation of history, philosophy, and politics enables it to comprehend not only the historicity of other thought forms, but also, 'to explain and justify historically itself as well' (*Q 16*, §9; *SPN* 399) 'as the result and crowning point' (*Q 15*, §61; *SPN* 417), or 'the maximum historicism' (*Q 16*, §9), of the entire historical-philosophical-political sequence which descends from the nexus of the French Revolution and German idealism. Thus, although the philosophy of praxis, like all thought forms, must 'hold itself to be "exact" and "true" and

struggle against other forms of thought', it alone is able to do this 'critically' (Q 11, § 45). It does this by acknowledging itself as an historical product of the dynamic of class society which, as an integral element of these contradictions, seeks to resolve them immanently, positing itself 'as an element of the contradiction' and elevating 'this element to a principle of knowledge and therefore of action' (Q 11, § 62; *SPN* 405). The fully developed concept of AH thus enacts both a definitive refutation of **Bukharin's** 'return to metaphysics' and provides the philosophy of praxis with a positive programme with which to comprehend and to elaborate philosophy as a practice within history.

2. The concept of AH did not play a prominent role in the initial reception of the *Prison Notebooks* following the Second World War. **Gramsci's** *historicism*, his relations to **Croce** and to the tradition of Italian historicism were acknowledged. The thematic organisation of the first edition of the *Prison Notebooks*, however, did not allow an analysis of the critical development and specificity of the concept of AH, resulting in a perception that the adjective played a merely emphatic role ('very, very historicist') in **Gramsci's** argument against **Bukharin**, and was not also, at the same time, an act of immanent critique and transformation of **Croce's** position (a position which continues in post-critical edition Gramscian scholarship, cf. **Morera** 1990). Further, the "allegorical" reading of the *Prison Notebooks* promoted by **Togliatti**, legitimately fearing censorship by the diamat orthodoxy which then reigned in the Soviet Union and international communist movement, tended to obscure the full dimensions of **Gramsci's** critique of **Bukharin's** position which had become, precisely, one of the central professions of faith of this new orthodoxy. A combination of national and international conjunctures – a widespread questioning of Crocean historicism in the context of post-Fascist reconstruction of the Italian state and a partial opening of the space available for theoretical debate in the international Communist movement following the events of 1956 – led to a discussion of the validity of **Gramsci's** historicism in comparison with new theoretical initiatives, above all, in Italy, the Della Volpean school's emphasis upon Marxism as a *science* (particularly during the debate of 1962 following the publication of Nicola **Badaloni's** *Marxismo come storicismo*; cf. **Liguori** 1996, 132–52).

The most significant and influential interpretation of **Gramsci's** notion of AH, however, was that proposed by Louis **Althusser** in 1965 in one of the central chapters of *Reading 'Capital'*, 'Marxism is not an historicism' (*RC*, 119). This critique, produced in a complex theoretical and political conjuncture (an attempted critique from the Left of the failings of the "official" critique

of Stalinism), was one of the central moments in which many of the features which later came to be known as “Althusserianism” (anti-historicism, anti-humanism, the critique of an expressivist notion of the social totality) were first fully elaborated. Althusser credited Gramsci with providing one of the most coherent formulations of a tradition of ‘revolutionary humanism and historicism’ (120) which emerged from the experience of the First World War and the Russian revolution, and which included Luxemburg, Mehring, Korsch, and Lukács (and whose problematic Althusser also detected in Sartre, Della Volpe, and Colletti, among others); he acknowledged that this tradition ‘was born out of a vital reaction against the mechanism and economism of the Second International’ (RC, 119); he praised the ‘enormously delicate and subtle work of genius’ of Gramsci, and in particular, his ‘fruitful discoveries in the field of *historical materialism*’ (as opposed to what Althusser described as Gramsci’s ‘interpretation of *dialectical materialism*’ (126)). Nevertheless, he argued that a close analysis of not merely Gramsci’s ‘words’ but his “*organic concepts*” (126) revealed the ‘latent logic’ (131) of a problematic which threatened Marxism’s theoretical and political coherence. Arguing that Gramsci had remained ‘constantly haunted by Croce’s theory of religion’, Althusser accused him of flattening out the distinction between Marxism, and Marxist philosophy in particular, and other ‘conceptions of the world’ (130). For the Althusser of *Reading ‘Capital’*, on the other hand, Marxist philosophy is not merely one ‘conception of the world’ ranged alongside others: ‘what distinguishes Marxism from these ideological “conceptions of the world” is less the (important) formal difference that Marxism puts an end to any supraterritorial “beyond”, than the distinctive form of this absolute immanence (its “earthliness”): *the form of scientificity*’ (131), a form of scientificity constituted by an epistemological rupture with a previous ideological problematic. As such, ‘philosophy [...] remains a systematically ahistorical discipline insofar as it eternally retraces the frontier of the “ideological” and the “scientific”’ (Tosel 1995, 10 et sq.). Gramsci, having failed to acknowledge this distinction, thought the ‘relationship between Marxist scientific theory and real history according to the model of a relationship of *direct expression*’ (RC, 131) of a fundamentally Hegelian pedigree, in which Marxist philosophy was unable to be distinguished from the history from which it organically emerged (132). Indeed, this was the central contention of Althusser’s critique: that which made Gramsci’s ‘historicism *absolute*’, according to Althusser, was the fact that the Absolute Knowledge of the Hegelian system was ‘itself historicized’, and that the privileged moment of transparency reserved by Hegel for an indeterminant future moment of Absolute Knowledge was thus surreptitiously transferred to all possible presents, each of which possessed the “essential section” of

contemporaneity' (ibid.). In **Althusser's** view, absolute historicisation 'swallows knowledge, as it were, just as historical materialism swallows dialectical materialism' (**Haug** 1996, 58). Much more dangerously, 'the project of thinking Marxism as an (A)H automatically unleashes a logically necessary chain reaction which tends to reduce and flatten out the Marxist totality into a variation of the Hegelian totality' (*RC*, 132) – as if **Gramsci's** rejection of **Bukharin's** metaphysical materialism unintentionally itself resulted in a 'return to metaphysics'.

Despite his numerous prefatory precautions and commendations, **Althusser's** critique was not without serious limitations and misunderstandings of **Gramsci's** concept of AH. Some of these limitations were unavoidable, given the lack of a critical edition of the *Prison Notebooks* that allows an analysis of the dialectical emergence and specificity of the concept. Thus **Althusser** regarded the arguments developed in the *Prison Notebooks* as a continuation of the positions which **Gramsci** had adopted as a political organiser and agitator, rather than a searching critique and reconsideration of their pedigrees in the light of the defeat of the workers' movement in the West and the victory of the passive revolution of fascism; he was unable to note the extent of **Gramsci's** critique of **Croce**, and asserted a fundamental continuity between the two thinkers; he could not note the specificity of the adjective "absolute", as it was appropriated by **Gramsci** from **Croce** and deployed in the senses of "realistic" and "maximum", and thus ascribed to it an Hegelian – and metaphysical – meaning fundamentally foreign to the problematic of the *Prison Notebooks*. Other misunderstandings, however, were consequences of **Althusser's** attempted strategy of immanent critique of Stalinist orthodoxy. The early **Althusser** attempted to preserve 'the formal structure of Marxism-Leninism' (**Tosel** 1995, 9), particularly the division of Marxism into an historical materialism and a dialectical materialism. **Althusser** aimed to develop a *theoretical* reformulation of Marxism, which, he hoped, would act as an implicit critique of the *political* degeneration of Marxism into Stalinist domination. He did not note that one of the consequences of this strategy, in relation to his critique of **Gramsci**, was that it led him to assert a variant of precisely that philosophical position (a speculative notion of science as an a-historical guarantee for Marxism's validity) which **Gramsci** had already refuted in his engagement with **Bukharin**. Thus **Althusser** regarded **Gramsci's** notion of the philosophy of praxis as an 'interpretation of dialectical materialism' (*RC*, 126), rather than a refutation and historical explanation of it; he sophistically asserted that **Gramsci's** emphasis upon 'the "historicism" of Marxism [...] is *in reality* an allusion to the resolutely *materialist* character of **Marx's** conception (both in historical and dialectical materialism)' (129;

cf. Haug 1996, 58). More seriously, and as a consequence of both the lack of a critical edition and Althusser's philosophical presuppositions, was Althusser's assertion that Gramsci thought the philosophy of praxis' relation to the history in which it emerged as a direct and organic expression of an 'essence' (RC, 122) of the present. Althusser could not see that Gramsci's notion of the status of "theory" within the philosophy of praxis (existing in determinant historical conjunctures) provided an historicist and realistic translation of his own notion of "Science", and that Gramsci had explicitly rejected an 'organicism', 'emanationist' relation between history and the philosophy of praxis in his critique of nominalism (Q 11, § 24 et sq.). Further, Althusser failed to note the extent to which Gramsci had already thought the present's non-identity with itself – i.e. its penetration by residual and emergent social formations – and thus its lack of any unifying essence, as precisely the contradictory terrain on which the philosophy of praxis strives to contribute to the coherence of the working-class movement and its attempt to build social and political hegemony.

Althusser's critique nevertheless exerted, and continues to exert, a large influence on the general Marxist intellectual culture. The appearance of Valentino Gerratana's critical edition of the *Prison Notebooks* in 1975 contributed to the process of the reassessment of the presuppositions of this critique and the development of more nuanced interpretations. Nicola Badaloni emphasised the importance of the moment of politics and Gramsci's theory of the relation between structures and superstructures in an historical bloc, arguing that 'the AH for Gramsci is the theory that carries to its most extreme consequences the politicisation of class division, solidifying the aggregations of new social forces around the divided class, and at the same time providing it with the intellectual instruments for expanding its own division into a hegemonic condition' (Badaloni 1975, 140). In a similar vein, Hermes Spiegel stressed that Gramsci's AH is 'not an historicist relativism': 'By emphasising the historical limits of Marxism, Gramsci at the same time acknowledges the legitimacy of Marxist science within these limits' (Spiegel 1983, 83; cf. Q 10.1, § 8; Sablowski 1994, 148). – While Wolfgang Fritz Haug rejected the 'logical [*logizistisch*]' presuppositions of Althusser's critique (1996, 40), André Tosel argued that Althusser's critique was more appropriately applied to 'soft forms of historicism' such as that of Sartre, whereas Gramsci aimed 'to change the very terrain of the question, beyond the distinction science-ideology' in order 'to determine every thought by means of the immanent recognition of its historical conditions of realisation, of its political constitution; in this, he follows Marx, who had thought in this way the relationship between political economy and its critique' (Tosel 1995, 11). – The exploration of the full potentials of an "absolutely historicist" philo-

sophical and political practice is one of the most pressing challenges, and one of the most fruitful opportunities, for the development and revitalisation of contemporary Marxism.

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→ Althusserianism, coherence, conjuncture, dialectics, de-Stalinisation, dialectical materialism, economism, French Revolution, Gramscianism, history, historical bloc, hegemony, historiography, historical materialism, historicism, humanism, humanism controversy, idealism/materialism, ideology theory, immanent critique, immanence/transcendence, Jacobinism, Marxism-Leninism, matter, metaphysical materialism, metaphysics, philosophy of praxis, popularisation, *Prison Notebooks*, relativism, Risorgimento, speculation, totality, truth, vulgar materialism

→ Althusser-Schule, Dialektik, dialektischer Materialismus, Entstalinisierung, Französische Revolution, Ganzes, *Gefängnishefte*, Geschichte, geschichtlicher Block, Gramscismus, Hegemonie, Historiographie, historischer Materialismus, Historismus, Humanismus, Humanismusstreit, Idealismus/Materialismus, Ideologietheorie, immanente Kritik, Immanenz/Transzendenz, Jakobinismus, Kohärenz, Konjunktur, Marxismus-Leninismus, Materie, Metaphysik, metaphysischer Materialismus, Ökonomismus, Philosophie der Praxis, Popularisierung, Relativismus, Risorgimento, Spekulation, Vulgärmaterialismus, Wahrheit

Historical-Critical

A: tānḥī naqdī. – F: historique et critique. – G: historisch-kritisch. – R: istoričesko-kritičeskij. – S: histórico-crítico. – C: lìshǐ kǎozhèng de 历史考证的

As attested by the works of **Thucydides** and **Aristotle**, the articulation of history and critique began to develop from the “Greek enlightenment” onwards, receiving impetus from both the story-telling traditions of the popular classes and celebratory poetry in the service of the rulers. Greek and Roman philology and the practice of critical editions of the Renaissance humanists provided formative elements. However, approaching tradition as such in an HC way is an achievement of intellectuals from the early bourgeois period, developed in permanent confrontation with censorship and persecution mainly from the religious apparatuses. This connection appears systematically for the first time in Pierre **Bayle**'s *Dictionnaire historique et critique* (1696), which opened the age of Enlightenment as ‘the actual age of critique’ (**Kant**). History was still understood by **Bayle** as histories in the sense of oral or written narratives; critique, as its examination in the “natural light of reason”. This rationalism prepared the terrain for historicism and “scientific” historiography (i.e. founded upon the critical use of sources). Marxian, and later Marxist historical materialism, attempts to explain history through reference to the mode of production and reproduction of social life.

Just as once Christianity in the course of becoming a state religion (“the Constantinian turn”) passed into an ideological state apparatus, giving ‘the authoritarian relations iron structures and a centre in their handling of ideas and the transmission of traditions’ (**Haug** 1983, 6), so Communist Marxism in power underwent a similar transformation. Its ideological apparatuses, in their ‘authoritarian controlled arrangement and concealment’ (ibid.) like a ‘Central Administration of eternal truths’ (**Havemann** 1971), operated at the apex of the “command-administrative” régime created by **Stalin**. Once more, the self-evident right, indeed duty of Marxists to have a critical relation to their own history and an historical relation to their own theories, had to be bitterly fought for. Under European state socialism of the 20th cent. it was finally during the five years of *perestroika*, the attempt at democratisation under **Gorbachev**, that individuals were liberated from formal constraints. The collapse of European state socialism ‘promoted an “epistemological break” and a stimulus towards historicisation’. This stamped the HC method with ‘an emphatic actuality’ for

Marxists. 'Here it is a case of, on the one hand, the critical (and self-critical) evaluation of historical experiences and, on the other, the analytical survey, development, and critical working through of an enormous mass of intellectual material' (HKWM 1, *Preface*).

1. After 'the remarkable rudiments of an HC treatment of the Bible' in Thomas Hobbes's *Leviathan* (Lange, I, III.2, 285), whose fourth book on the intrigues of religious institutions is entitled 'Of The Kingdom of Darkness', the ground for Pierre Bayle's HC dictionary was prepared by, more than any other work, Baruch Spinoza's critique of the Bible, the *Tractatus theologico-politicus*, published anonymously in 1670 – a genuinely 'revolutionary text' (Giancotti Boscherini 1985, 23), an 'organ of political struggle' (Gadamer 1976, 19). According to the subtitle, it claims to show that 'the Freedom of Philosophising cannot only be allowed safe to Piety and a Republic's Peace: but it cannot be taken away except at the same time with the Republic's Peace and Piety'.

"Erreurs" and "fautes" (mistakes) are key categories in Bayle's HC dictionary. He had originally planned 'un Dictionnaire de Fautes'. However, the surfeit of uninteresting mistakes would have made the work 'pedantic', a consideration which led him to a 'nouvelle Oeconomie': beginning with what can be historically reported, he added to this (in the form of footnotes, clearly set in smaller type) commentaries, corrections, critiques of inherited judgements and occasionally philosophical reflections. Exemplary is the nineteen-page article on Spinoza, at the time slandered and deeply hated by clerical ideologists of all confessions. In terms of *form*: the historical part of the article comprises often not more than two or three lines to a page; the rest is taken up, in *petit*, by the "critical" comments. In terms of *content*, Bayle indeed names Spinoza's *Tractatus*, using the official obligatory terminology, 'calamitous' ('un livre pernicieux et détestable, où il fit glisser toutes les sémences de l'Athéisme'); nevertheless, he presents Spinoza's personal irreproachability in a thus even better light: 'c'étoit un homme qui n'aimoit pas la contrainte de la conscience, & grand ennemi de la dissimulation'. He concludes from Spinoza's ethically exemplary conduct the possibility of a community of atheists living together more peacefully than a community of Christians. 'Cela est étrange; mais au fond il ne s'en faut pas plus étonner, que de voir des gens qui vivent très-mal, quoiqu'ils aient une pleine persuasion de l'Évangile'.

Leibniz enters into combat against this emancipation of moral criteria from religious conviction in his *Theodicy*. He criticises Bayle's HC dictionary 'where religion and reason appear to be in conflict with each other [*en combattantes*] and where Mr. Bayle made it known that it was his intention to make reason be quiet after he had made it speak for only too long' ('Preface', 35; transl.

modified). In the second edition of the HC dictionary, Bayle added an essay to his presentation of the Manichean and sceptical positions (which had been reproved 'by some religious bigots'), which, according to **Leibniz**, 'was supposed to present the innocence and utility of his method by means of examples, authorities and reasons' (*Theodicy*, 'Introduction', § 39; transl. modified). Leibniz sees in such a claimed autonomy of reason the beginning of the end of faith. No opposition between the two orientations should be allowed to come about: reason is 'just as much a gift of God as belief'; their struggle would therefore be 'a struggle of God against God' (ibid.). He appears to sense that the apology for religion was entering dangerous terrain. In no way should it be claimed 'that that which one believes is *untenable*: for that means allowing reason for its part to triumph in a way that would destroy belief' (§ 41; transl. modified).

While **Descartes** had tried to demonstrate the compatibility of science and especially his own philosophy with religion, **Bayle**, in fact, 'as **Voltaire** remarks, didn't openly attack Christianity in a single line, but he also didn't write a single line which was not intended to awaken doubt' (**Lange**, I, IV.1, 11; transl. modified). He indeed maintains the appearance that the contradiction between reason and revelation would be decided in favour of the latter. 'However, the effect was calculated to produce a decision of the reader in the opposed sense' (398 et sq.; transl. modified). The effect 'was one of the greatest which a book can have', both upon the republic of letters as upon the educated in general (399). 'His style', **Hettner** says, 'is of the most dramatic vivacity, and fresh, direct, bold, provoking, and yet ever clear and rapid in the attainment of its aim; while he seems only to be skilfully playing with the subject, he probes and dissects it to its inmost depths' (1894, 48). From here comes 'the mode of combat of **Voltaire** and the French Encyclopaedists' and it still continued to have effects on **Lessing's** mode of thinking and writing (ibid.; cit. in **Lange**, I, IV.1, 11). A trace can be found in **Lessing's** judgement of **Alexander Pope**: 'He has read over before the material of this and that writer, and, without investigating them according to their own founding principles, kept from each one whatever he believed would allow itself to be best rhymed together in well-sounding verse. I believe even, in considering his sources, to have uncovered his operations, that I have made some other HC notes' (*Pope, A Metaphysician!*, *Werke* 3, 663).

Bayle's HC dictionary opened an epoch in the sense of an irreversible epistemological break. **Kant**, for example, wished in a review of a work of **Herder** that 'an HC mind [...] had done some work in advance'. A criterion of HC competence here was that such a person 'would have, from the immense mass of [...] notices, drawn out primarily those which contradict each other and presented them next to each other (with additional recollections due to the believability of any reporter)' and thus would have avoided 'basing [him-

self] upon one-sided reports without having previously weighed carefully the reports of others' (WA 10, 801). This describes the impact of the HC method in the epoch of the Enlightenment. If one abstracts from its objective content, knowledge is, according to Kant, 'subjectively regarded, either historical [*historisch*] or rational'. Here, 'historical' is still not understood in the sense of real history [*Geschichte*], but rather, as the reckoning of dates which 'are given' to the knowing subject 'from outside; whether through immediate experience or narration, or (as in the case of general knowledge) through instruction' (CPR, B863 et sq.). The Archimedean counterpoint on which this determination turns is the *cognitio ex principiis*, according to which the reception of such facts by the cognising subject is not only reasonable, but is drawn from this subject's own reason. Whoever relies upon the 'historical [*das Historische*]' (here Kant includes also the case of studying already given philosophies rather than philosophising on the basis of principles found in oneself), 'has formed his mind on another's reason, [...] and although, objectively considered, it is indeed knowledge due to reason, it is yet, in its subjective character, merely historical [*historisch*]'. Whoever has 'grasped and learnt well' such knowledge is, nevertheless, merely 'a plaster-cast of a living man' (B864). Subjectively rational is (objectively rational) knowledge only 'when it has been drawn from universal sources of reason, [...] from which there can also arise critique, nay, even the rejection of what has been learnt' (B864 et sq.; transl. modified). The problem with the historical [*das Historische*] is that it, like everything 'else which we can only learn from the testimony of the experience of others', must in the first instance be 'believed'. Notwithstanding that, it is 'not in itself a matter of belief', since for some it was once 'personal experience and fact, or is presupposed as such'. Thus 'it must be possible by this path (that of historical belief) to arrive at knowledge; and the objects of history and geography, just as everything which it is possible to know [...] belong [...] to the realm of facts' (CPR, § 91). In this sense of a critical survey of historically passed down facts, Kant's *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* is therefore an HC work.

2. After his first two sensational publications on the censor and the freedom of the press, the twenty-four year old Marx attacks the conservative and even reactionary deployment of the HC method in the 'historical school of law', which has carried 'its love for sources to such an extreme that it calls on the boatman to row not on the river's current, but on its source' (MECW 1/203; transl. modified). Gustav Hugo, who founded the school, twisted Kant's relativisation of "historical" knowledge into its opposite since he opined, as Marx notices, 'that because we cannot know what is *true*, we consequently allow the *untrue*, if it

exists at all, to pass as *fully valid*' (204). That the existing state of affairs is irrational – and in so far as it was irrational, bad – hitherto had been the argument for its very transformation. After the Counter-Enlightenment had failed with its attempt to present the *ancien régime* as rational, it now totalised the verdict of the irrational. If Hegel had posited that rational [*vernünftig*] = real [*wirklich*], Hugo posited that the positively real = irrational, and thus, that reason = unreal. 'With self-satisfied zeal he adduces arguments from every region of the world to provide additional evidence that no rational necessity is inherent in the positive institutions, e.g., property, the state constitution, marriage, etc., that they even *contradict* reason' (ibid.; transl. modified). In order to wrest the argument of reason from the Left, Hugo *profanes* all that the just, moral, political man regards as holy, but he smashes these holy things only to be able to worship them as *historical relics*' (ibid.). His critique 'levels down': '*Everything existing* serves him as an *authority*, every authority serves him as an *argument*' (ibid.). A radical relativism neutralises all differences of civilisational development. 'With him, *eighteenth-century scepticism* in regard to the *rationality of what exists* appears as *scepticism* in regard to the *existence of reason*. He adopts the *Enlightenment* [...]; he thinks the *false flowers* have been plucked from the chains in order to wear *real chains* without any flowers' (205; transl. modified). With that, the HC delegitimation of any régime of violence has become the apology for the '*right of arbitrary violence*' (210; transl. modified). Marx then applies the HC method to the less outspoken 'juridical and historical theories' subsequent to Hugo, which 'after some operations of the *critical art of separating* allow the *old original text* to be made legible again' (ibid.; transl. modified).

Subsequently, Marx and Engels transfer the HC claim to the terrain of history, which they survey in a new way in terms of social theory and with a focus upon class struggles. In the meantime, Feuerbach had sublated [*aufgehoben*] the critique of the Bible into the "atheistic" critique of religion. To transform the critique of Heaven into the critique of the Earth and to broaden the critique of religion into general ideology-critique will be the sense of the practical-materialist conception of history that seeks the ultimate driving forces and "elements" [*Einsätze*] of the historical process in the production and reproduction of social life. Marx's critique of political economy will allow the historical dimension of the capitalist value-forms to step forward from under the appearance of the natural, an appearance that enshrouds them in the consciousness of everyday life just as in economic theory. The thus uncovered historical-transitory nature of the capitalist relations of production is supposed to nurture the history-making force of the proletariat. The 'Historical [*das Historische*]' is indeed – according to Gramsci's insight, sharpened through

his grappling with Benedetto Croce – not necessarily part of ongoing history [*geschichtlich*] (cf. Haug 1994, 1214); instead, ‘the tradition of all the dead generations’ can weigh ‘like a nightmare on the brain of the living’ (18.B, MECW 11/103). This practical-theoretical impulse, to go to the social roots of that which has become historically congealed in order to help another world become reality, lies at the foundation of Marx’s opening of the ‘continent of history’ (Althusser 1969, 7; *LeninPh*, 72), even if this emancipatory sense has often been obscured by discourses invoking objective laws.

3. Henceforth, already in reaction to the socialist labour movement, Friedrich Nietzsche declares ‘history and critique’ to be the epitome of the decadent (*The Birth of Tragedy*, 23; transl. modified). When a people begins ‘to comprehend itself historically and to smash the mythical bulwarks that surround it’, there occurs a ‘secularisation’ in the sense of a ‘break with the unconscious metaphysics’ (ibid.) which constitute the “value” of a people, thanks to which ‘it is able to press upon its experiences the stamp of the eternal’ (ibid.). This is that which Nietzsche sees ‘corroded by the HC spirit of our culture [*Bildung*]’ (ibid.). In *Beyond Good and Evil* (209), he praises, against HC scepticism, ‘the scepticism of daring masculinity, which is closely related to the genius for war and conquest’, and which he sees embodied in Frederick the Great. He praises its paradoxical master-race mindset: It ‘despises and nonetheless seizes to itself; [...] It gives the spirit a dangerous freedom, but keeps the heart severe. It is the German form of scepticism, which [...] has brought Europe for some time under the dominion of the German spirit and its critical and historical mistrust’ (ibid.; transl. modified).

The ‘HC spirit of our culture’ castigated by Nietzsche finds its anti-positivist formulation in the *Geistesgeschichte* coined fundamentally by Wilhelm Dilthey. It demands that we ‘analyze historically and critically the value of the individual procedures which thinking uses in solving its problems in this area; it demands further that we clarify, through observation of that great development whose subject is humanity itself, what the nature of knowledge and understanding is in this field’ (*Introduction to the Human Sciences*, 1922/1988, 78). Dilthey explains the medieval ‘dominance of superstition’ as ‘an abbreviated and falsified passing down of the old world as an authority’ (thus, essentially, following in Bayle’s footsteps). Against the ‘uncritical’ connection of the ‘epistemological-theoretical presupposition of the historical school and of idealism’ in Humboldt, Dilthey founds the ‘construction of a historical world in the social sciences’ on a ‘critique of historical reason’ (136). He begins from the supposition that psychologically describable inner-structures are expressed in world-views etc. Also here, ‘politics was continued [...] on the scientific fronts’

(**Krauss** 1950/1984, 30), for **Dilthey** expected a ‘consolidation of the upper classes’ due to the increase in the ‘independent power of the social sciences’ (*Briefwechsel*, 29.2.1892).

4. After preparing the way for it, **Bayle’s** ‘HC Dictionary’ was eclipsed by the success of the *Encyclopaedia* edited by **Diderot** and **d’Alembert**. It is only in editorial practice that the concept of the HC has been firmly established. **Erich Auerbach’s** description of the ‘critical edition’ is particularly valid for the ‘HC edition of texts’: it is regarded among the works of philology in the republic of letters as ‘la plus noble et la plus authentique’ (1965, 9). It ‘investigates primarily the age, the originality and the authenticity of the written works, and evaluates their original accuracy or their occasionally accidental, occasionally deliberate corruption, often up until the point of verifiably re-establishing what an author had really written, or the convincing ascertainment of that which the supposed author did not write’ (**Wolf** 1807, 39 et sq.). In order to achieve this in a transparent (verifiable) way, both history and bearers of the tradition (‘textual witnesses’) as well as textual variants should be accounted for, preferably embedded in the history of the conditions of their production and contextual references; insofar as effect and tradition interact, the history of reception is to be included (cf. *Grundzüge*, 1996, 179 et sqq.). **Karl Lachmann** developed the paradigm of the critical edition for the editing of collected works of the “old” authors (whose aim was the reconstruction of the often only fragmentary or corrupted text passed down by tradition) and later carried it over to the edition of collected works of a modern author such as **Lessing** (1838–40). ‘The HC edition of **Schiller’s** works (1867) according to this model’, edited by **Karl Goedecke**, ‘became authoritative for the subsequent editions’ (*Reallexikon*, 1958, 318). Of course, HC reconstruction aiming at the authenticity of the text is not to be separated from the mediation of meaning: ‘To live classically and to realise antiquity practically in oneself’ was for **Friedrich Schlegel** the ‘goal of philology’, even if he was uncertain whether this was possible ‘without any cynicism’ (*Athenäumsfragmente*, no. 147).

Regarding authors ostracised for their critique of domination and ideology, or those persecuted due to their fundamentally democratic orientation or their commitment to the cause of the exploited and the oppressed, or those who were censored and whose books were burnt – in other words, precisely those authors which are particularly interesting for an HC dictionary of Marxism – the concept of the HC refers to the unfinished-historical dimension of social movements and their struggles. More comprehensively than its predecessors in the early bourgeois epoch, the HC method really does live up to its name and thus, from having a merely formal existence, comes into its own in terms of

content. For example, in the search for traces of that “other history” of women, which had been effaced or written over in masculine terms in the course of patriarchal oppression, the HC method assumes the additional meaning of brushing history against the grain from the standpoint of the oppressed. This is often the case when it is applied to colonised people or to all those held in subaltern positions. The “HC” censorship of the tradition from the standpoint of the rulers themselves must also be subjected to this procedure. This is what Karl Barth had in his sights when he remarked that ‘the HC [authors] needed to be more critical for me’ (1922/1999, xviii). What he meant was the then dominant HC interpretation of the Bible, which reduced the subject-matter that is treated in the Bible – liberation from enslaving relations – to the question of “how it really was”. Against this reductive method, which made the Messiah out to be a ‘historical Jesus’ tailored to fit the bourgeois idea of a good person, Barth wrote: ‘*krínein* means for me in relation to an historical document: the measuring of all words and word groups contained in it against the cause of which they clearly speak, if appearances are not deceptive’ (xviii et sq.).

In the history of philosophy and theory, the HC method is fuelled up when it deals with witnesses of radical critique of domination and ideology, to begin with **Democritus**, the materialist and indeed the only democrat among the classical philosophers (cf. fragment 241, attributed by the tradition, significantly, to a ‘Demokrates’), whose works, according to **Aristoxenos**, were bought up by the anti-democrat and anti-materialist **Plato**, in order ‘to burn all of **Democritus**’s writings which he could find’ (**Diogenes Laertius**, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, 9.40). The tradition was continued by **Epicurus**, who was slandered for centuries as the ‘swine’ (cf. *ibid.*, 10.3 et sqq.; **Kimmich** 1993), because he declared fear of death and above all, the notion of a punishing or rewarding “Beyond” (introduced into philosophy by **Plato** and strengthened by **Cicero**) as groundless (‘For that which has been dissolved into its elements experiences no sensations, and that which has no sensation is nothing to us’ (§2, *Principal Doctrines/Vatican Sayings*)); by **Spinoza**, who as an author was cursed by the Jewish Rabbis and forbidden by the Christian institutions; and by the radical-democratic and Marxist authors caught between the millstones of Stalinism and fascism. In all such cases, where access of the transmission of tradition has been blocked, hushed up, demolished, or slandered by censors imbued with the standpoint of the rulers, the HC fuses with the cause itself. Such an expansion of the HC method, when it comes into its own not merely formally but also at the level of its content, is demonstrated by Peter **Weiss** in a scene of *The Aesthetics of Resistance*. Here, the Pergamon altar is viewed in the early years of Nazism through the eyes of young anti-fascists, who see it in the light of thousands of years of the history of class oppression and – not only eco-

conomic but also corporeal-aesthetic – exploitation. Thereby is reclaimed, for the cause of the oppressed, the very power which has been taken from them and instrumentalised for the symbolic reproduction of the ruling order.

5. The concept of philology makes an astonishing appearance in **Gramsci's** *Prison Notebooks*, where 'the theory and practice of philological critique found in the notebooks constitute in themselves a most important contribution to the elaboration of an anti-dogmatic philosophy of praxis' (**Buttigieg** 1991, 64). **Gramsci** spoke of philology not only in the technical sense of work with texts but, rather, uses it to describe any method which deals with the concrete individual, including, ultimately, the methodology of a mass party. He may well have been inspired by Giambattista **Vico**. While **Vico** assigned to philosophy the ascertainment of the true [*verum*] founded upon reason, he entrusted philology, as a 'new critical art', with the ascertainment of those things which are certain (*certum*), because 'they depend upon human will' (*The New Science*, Element X, § 138, 63).

First, philology for **Gramsci** has 'a simply instrumental value, together with erudition' (Q 11, § 42). In order to study **Marx's** 'conception of the world', which was 'never set forth by its founder systematically (and whose essential coherence is to be sought not in each single text or series of texts but in the whole development of his multiform intellectual labour [...]), it is necessary first to do meticulous philological work conducted with maximum scrupulousness with regard to exactitude, scientific honesty, and intellectual loyalty, and without any preconception and apriorism or preconceived idea' (Q 16, § 2). **Gramsci** then outlines fundamental principles of an HC engagement with **Marx** and a correspondingly HC edition of his works that offers 'a text based on a critical use of sources' (*ibid.*). At the same time, 'the question of the relations of homogeneity between the two founders of the philosophy of praxis must be posed'; one should neither 'identify' them with each other 'nor is it necessary to think that everything which the second attributed to the first is absolutely authentic and without infiltration' (*ibid.*). Such philology acquired immediately explosive political force in the face of the dogmatic tendencies in the Communist International.

Second, against the tendency of making historical materialism into a "science of laws" about (and above) society and history, **Gramsci** elevates philology to an organon for the logic of the historical, which he saw as being distinguished by the fact that it allowed individual elements to come into their own, all the more so when the subject is an almost integral part of the object, namely insofar as we are dealing with human activity. 'The experience upon which the philosophy of praxis is founded cannot be schematised; it is history itself in

its infinite variety and multiplicity' (Q 11, § 25). Regarding the study of history, however, he says that it 'can give place to the birth of "philology" as a method of erudition in the assessment of particular facts', which made it necessary to enlarge 'the sphere of philology as it has been traditionally understood' (ibid.). In these conditions, regular contexts can be reformulated as 'tendential laws', 'which correspond in politics to the statistical laws or the law of great numbers' (ibid.). The paradigm of an expanded philology aimed not only against scientific objectivism but also against the speculative interpretation of history, in order to free itself from 'every residue of transcendence and of theology also in their last speculative incarnation' (Q 10.1, § 8): 'If the concept of structure is conceived speculatively, it certainly becomes a "hidden God"; but it doesn't need to be conceived speculatively, but rather, historically, as the ensemble of social relations in which real men move and operate, as an ensemble of objective conditions that can and must be studied with the methods of "philology"' (ibid.). – 'The fragmentary character of the notebooks is due', according to Joseph A. Buttigieg's insight, 'at least in part, to the "philological" method governing their composition' (1991, 63).

Third, Gramsci carries over – and here the practical-political quintessence of his intervention can be glimpsed – the concept of philology to the practice of 'mass parties and their organic adherence to the innermost (productive-economic) life of the masses'; here it is not only a case of 'knowledge and judgement of the importance' of the feelings experienced intensely by the masses, but also of an acting upon these 'by the collective organism through "active and conscious collective participation", through "compassionateness" [*con-passionalità*]', through experience of immediate particulars, through a system that could be called that of a "living philology". Thus a close tie is formed between the great masses, party, and leading group and the entire well articulated whole can move as a "collective-human"' (Q 11, § 25).

6. Regarding the publication of Marx's work, technical-philological problems are compounded by those connected with the HC reception of these texts. Indeed, thanks to the administrative virtues of those involved and their followers, if we leave aside the final version of *The German Ideology*, almost everything is preserved here, and nothing – except for Marx's handwriting, which only experts are able to decipher – would have stood in the way of publication, were it not for their unparalleled world-historical effects and repercussions. The problem was not simply in the camp of the enemies, the most horrific of whom appeared in the form of Nazi 'counter-Bolshevism' (Haug 1980, 59–63). Rather, it was also in the camp of the friends and followers who, whenever they made available to the public something from the mountain

of manuscripts, almost always made merely tactical use of it. Indisputably, Friedrich Engels delivered such a great service in bringing Volumes II and III of *Capital* into print that he could be named the “father of Marxism”, and Marxism itself as ‘Engelsism’ (Künzli, cited in Hirsch 1968, 95); nonetheless, he published the *Theses on Feuerbach* in 1888 with serious changes, which partly create misunderstandings, sometimes coming close to falsification of the text and furnishing material for a vulgarised reception. The form of “Works” into which he brought Marx’s manuscripts of *Capital* Volumes II and III was driven by political objectives, not those of HC transparency (cf. MEF 2001). Karl Kautsky edited the *Theories of Surplus Value* with significant interventions, transpositions, and smoothing over, in contempt of all the rules of a critical edition. The underlying manuscripts represent of course, to a large extent, more or less very rough drafts. ‘Beside extensive analysis are short, abrupt sentences, often only references for later elaboration. Marx also regularly changes between three languages [...] – German, French, and English. This and other difficulties allow in individual cases several possible readings [...]. It is therefore inappropriate to polish the text here, and completely impossible to fabricate a “fluent” text, if we don’t want something completely different from the work of Marx to be the result’ (MEW 26.1, *Vorwort*, XIV et sq.; cf. Sander 1983).

A further hindrance is the claim, absolutising a legitimate position, that any text exists ‘as an intellectual production [...] only in its interpretations’ (Heinrich 1991, 22). The perceptions that often overlay the originals like group prejudices led Brecht to say that Marxism has become so unknown ‘chiefly through the many writings about it’ (letter to Korsch, 1939, GA 29, 131). Faced with this situation, the decision of the CPSU to publish “the whole Marx and Engels” in an HC form, instead of a merely selected edition, had great significance. The merits of the editor of the first MEGA, David Riazanov, are immeasurable (cf. Vollgraf et al. 1997). The cunning way in which he got copies of Marx’s manuscripts out of social-democratic custody is a story in and of itself – as is their later rescue from the grasp of the Nazis. But then Stalin had Riazanov murdered. After the German offensive against the Soviet Union the MEGA project was abandoned. This decision may have been made even easier for the Stalinist leadership by the fact that the complete and authentic Marx who had begun to come to light could not be made to accord with the methods of domination it practised, or with the Marxism-Leninism which it had codified for its own legitimation.

In the 1970s, the second MEGA began as an international project under the auspices of the Moscow and Berlin Institutes for Marxism-Leninism (IML). It is one of the contradictions of the post-Stalinist political structures that, alongside the enormous costs, they also took the “ideological” risk upon them-

selves of publishing material that, in the last instance, was not compatible with their still powerful forms of command-administrative state domination. While the versions of the texts together with the critical apparatus satisfied the highest “technical” exigencies and represented an enormous achievement, the introductions, not infrequently, locked **Marx** up unhistorically and uncritically with Byzantine praise in a mausoleum (cf. **Haug** 1985). This ceremonial and celebratory prison conceded to **Marx** no problems, no crisis-ridden learning process, no obscurity, no textual ambiguities. However, the mass of manuscripts that were published in the **MEGA** according to the rules of the **HC** art speaks another language. It is as if **Marx**, like a sculptor, had continually relocated his workshop, leaving behind extensive excerpts, sketches, and work torsos in the former premises. Even the single volume of *Capital* published by **Marx** himself contains so many layers of revision in which an undeclared paradigm change occurs that it could be compared with a ‘palimpsest’, an incessantly repainted, layer after layer, time and again newly inscribed parchment (**Scaron** 1975, VIII; **Lefebvre** 1983, XXX et sqq.). An **HC** edition, beginning from the version of the last authorised version (in this case, edited by **Engels**), would have to make clear the different layers of revisions and, if possible, to historicise them. The Latin American edition of **Pedro Scaron** for the publishing house Siglo XXI is structured as ‘una primera aproximación a una edición crítica’ of this type (1975, XI). It documents all of the versions published in **Marx**’s lifetime as well as giving **Engels**’s changes to the fourth German edition ‘en conjunto’, albeit not completely. It has the extraordinary advantage of showing **Marx**’s learning process, whose direction and rationality has been little investigated and even less comprehended and consulted as important for interpretation; indeed, for the Hegelian-Marxist perspective of many interpreters (for example, **Fetscher**, **Reichelt**, **Backhaus**, **Heinrich**) it has even appeared as a history of degeneration. Since, however, the critique of political economy only makes sense so long as it allows us to think simultaneously a reality subjected to constant transformation since the time of **Marx**, the development of **Marx**’s concepts is to be noted with particular care. The editors of the **MEGA**, confronted by the extremely complex textual status, decided to publish the different versions not ‘en conjunto’, but each on its own. Not only different German versions of *Capital* were to be considered, but also, among others, the French translation modified by **Marx**. Even (be it as a contrast in order to document **Marx**’s and **Engels**’s divergent understanding of method) the English translation was consulted, ‘for whose text’, **Engels** said, ‘I am responsible in the last instance’ (**MECW** 37/5). Of course, any judgement of changes or translations would have required competence in terms of content and any evaluation would have needed to skate on the dan-

gerous slippery ice of censorship, freezing into the text unclarified differences of school and tendency, instead of offering them up to the process of open discussion.

The editors of *CI* in MEW, in turn, followed the – according to Engels's statement – 'most possibly, definitive establishment of the text' in the fourth edition and abstained, with some exceptions, from making known the layers of the text. Engels's alleged adoption of all essential Marxian changes of the French edition was not completely checked and supplemented. Thus, the standard German edition lacks changes which give decisive clues for the further development of Marx's version of the dialectic, whose 'limits' were so important for Marx that he referred Russian readers of *Capital* to the French translation, even though there had long been a Russian edition (cf. MECW 24/200). Instead, the text was all the more pedantically guarded to the extent that even an obvious printer's error which had escaped Marx in his corrections of the second edition was still hauled out, against all common sense, until the twelfth edition of MEW 23 (1977) (Skambraks 1979). Another that had crept into the third posthumous edition curated by Engels (53, fifth line from the top: 'commodity' instead of 'commodities') was still faithfully and blindly reproduced in the thirty-third edition (1989). It legitimated Hegelian-dialectical interpretations, even though Marx had angrily thundered against such interpretations in the *Marginal Notes on Wagner* and had referred to the (still) correct version in the second edition (cf. Haug 1992).

That interpretation and HC editorial technique limited to formal issues cannot be neatly separated is also shown by the MEGA index, not very different from that of the MEW. Under the direction of the IML until 1989, many of Marx's concepts that had become important outside the narrow spell of Marxism-Leninism were absent, while concepts were registered which not only were absent from Marx's text ('law of surplus-value') but which also directly contradict Marx's thought in part: thus, in the index to Volume 11.5, the critique of political economy becomes 'Marxist political economy', and Marx's key concept of 'critique' is entirely absent (Haug 1985, 216).

The HC character of the MEGA is concentrated in the imperative for transparency of the editorial dossier, under an array of "diacritical" symbols and a "critical apparatus" that provides evidence of corrections and itemises variants. The introduction gives an account, as attested to by the 1993 rules, reformulated for the post-Communist situation, about 'the constitution of the volume, its demarcation from or rather its relation to other volumes, and its inner articulation; – the reasons for the incorporation or exclusion of documents; – the composition of materials, the textual-critical analysis corresponding to their specific character; – the editorial decisions reached as a result of tex-

tual critique (e.g. attribution of authorship, dating, reproduction of the text, presentation of variants, and other editorial particularities)' (*Editionsrichtlinien*, 30).

7. The collapse of European state socialism ejected **Marx** and the Marxist universe out of the "eternity" of an ideology orbiting around state rule and its legitimation and has thrown them into the open air of history, as free floating "property without a master". The task of the *Historical-Critical Dictionary of Marxism* has been derived from this world-historical caesura. Its claim can be best expressed by Walter **Benjamin's** concept of 'rescuing critique [*rettende Kritik*]', together with the image of a 'Noah's ark' of critical knowledge (HKWM 1, *Preface*, 111). In terms of content, the HC method here responds to 'a constellation of dangers, which threatens both the tradition and those who receive it' (*ArcadesPrj*, 475; transl. modified). The intention of rescuing does not disarm the 'destructive or critical momentum of materialist historiography' about which Benjamin speaks (*ibid.*). It is not to be confused with apology.

In dealing with **Marx**, the first word has a type of analytical philology that expands the "love of the word" to "love of the concept". It is not **Plato's** doctrine of ideas and all of its later disguises that should orient this reading. It is, rather, in the first instance, Ludwig **Wittgenstein's** fundamental sentence: 'the meaning of a word is its use in the language' (*Philosophical Investigations*, § 43). Before a **Marxian** concept can be followed in historical struggles and in contemporary embroilments, its use by Marx must be secured in philological textual work. In this process we normally see ambiguities that make it impossible to remain stuck to the text. Whoever accepts 'that it is not a case of the preservation of a monument but rather of a "work in progress", and that progress consists precisely in continuing the work in an HC manner' (**Knepler** 1996, 53), will ask the question about which of the "spectral shades" (to extend **Derrida's** metaphor of 'spectral analysis') of **Marx** are to be taken up and which are not. For the *Historical-Critical Dictionary of Marxism*, despite the importance which it attributes to the works of the founders of Marxism, the principle of conservative hermeneutics cannot be valid: the latter finds its authoritative essence in the past and sets itself the task of the 'rehabilitation of authority and tradition', because its paradigm is formed by the interpretation of juridical laws, holy writings, and canonical art works (cf. **Gadamer** 1989, 277 et sqq.). More than ever is forbidden the pseudo-historical construction of legends aptly formulated by **Werner Krauss**: 'History is made by heroes and it can therefore only be interpreted by prophets who resemble such heroes' (1950/1984, 42). For Marxists, leaning uncritically on the thought of **Marx** should be excluded. Among the

'intellectual restraints' that the HKWM must always seek to remove (Knepler 1996, 54), not the least are the dogmatic ones. 'Every term', Georges Labica wrote in his preface to the *Dictionnaire critique du marxisme*, 'was treated like a defendant who couldn't be believed simply on the basis of what he said about himself. [...] Whenever it was necessary, [the investigation] called upon different witnesses, close and distant relations, and resorted to the means of cross-examination and searching' (vii).

Whenever the *Historical-Critical Dictionary of Marxism* subjects the classical texts as well as the most important witnesses of their history of reception and efficacy to an historically informed critical re-reading, it will provide the best weapon against the unhistorical and uncritical Marxisms that will always reappear. It cannot know the historical struggles of the future – but it can prepare the way for them. 'Which individuals or groups, which organisation or institution could come to an overall view of the research and discourses of the past and the present, even only in their rudiments, paying attention to them and making them useful', Peter von Oertzen wrote regarding the HKWM, 'if there were no place where at least a part of them were summarised and made accessible?' (1996, 68).

The young Hans Magnus Enzensberger declared that it was the 'task of historical critique not to mummify the past but rather to expose it to the grasp of those who come later on' (1963, 9). But a mere museum of things from the past, mummified or not, would not be sufficient for the coming generations. Marx's theories are 'at the same time a part of the historical process, thus also themselves a process' (Luxemburg, GW 1/2, 377). As Rudi Dutschke urged the student movement to HC continuity with the socialism of the workers' movement, he knew that, as indispensable as it was, the matter was not resolved with historical knowledge alone. 'The old concepts of socialism must be critically sublated [*aufgehoben*], not destroyed and not artificially conserved. A new concept cannot yet be at hand, it can only be worked out in practical struggle, in the regular mediation of reflection and action, of praxis and theory' (1968, 90 et sq.). The never finishing mediation of reflection and action in struggles gives the HC method its non-doctrinal meaning. It is precisely herein that the HC method finds its particular task in a dictionary of Marxism. As a 'compendium of critical memory and open thought-workshop' (Behrend 1996), it does not historicise, but rather, philosophises with the hammer and scrutinises the historical [*das Historische*] with a view to its ongoing historical [*geschichtlich*] potentialities. This is the difference between an HC dictionary and an Encyclopaedia that claims to reveal a closed circle of circles of knowledge. At the same time, the 'uncanny dimension' of work on the HKWM presupposes that it does not 'stand *over* its object, but *in* it. It doesn't simply represent that which exists

ted outside of and without it, but relates to its object in the present or even in certain respects calls it into existence or exerts an influence on its formation' (Haug 1999, 95).

The HC question regarding Marxism, with which this dictionary approaches history, is productive not only in relation to its own narrow object. It makes it necessary and possible to read "intellectual history" – first and foremost, the European intellectual history that has become hegemonic on a worldwide scale – against the grain. Thus, it is not only the masses of knowledge of the emancipatory social movements that are taken up here; there are also aspects of another world on originally "bourgeois" terrain if one approaches them with the "Marxprobe". For the *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, model of exemplary scholarship in form but, on the other hand, largely uncritical in terms of content, 'everything existing [still appears] as an authority, every authority [...] as an argument' (MECW 1/204). On the other hand, the historically-materialist grounded HC method, where it is successful, can lead to an 'increasing condensation (integration) of reality' as Benjamin had in mind, 'in which everything past (in its time) can acquire a higher grade of actuality than it had in its moment of existing' (*ArcadesPrj* 392). What appears in the *Eighteenth Brumaire* of Marx as anti-historical, the shaking off of the 'tradition of all the dead generations' (MECW 11/103), obtains here, as in Gramsci, the meaning of unleashing the formative momentum of history.

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→ absolute historicism, authority, censor, command-administrative system, critique, critique of religion, death, dialectics, dogmatism, encyclopedia, Engelsism, Enlightenment, epistemology, error, eternity, forgetting/remembering, *Geistesgeschichte*, the hereafter/this world, hermeneutics, history, historical/logical, historical school of law, historicisation, historicism, historicism (absolute), human sciences, ideology critique, ideology theory, interpretation, irrationality, limits of dialectics, Marxism-Leninism, materialist reading of the Bible, MEGA, mistake, rationalism, reading, reason, reconstruction, rescuing critique, Stalinism, text, *Theses on Feuerbach*, tradition

→ Aufklärung, Autorität, befehlsadministratives System, Dialektik, Dogmatismus, Engelsismus, Enzyklopädie, Epistemologie, Ewigkeit, Fehler, Feuerbach – Thesen, Geistesgeschichte, Geisteswissenschaft, Geschichte, Grenzen der Dialektik, Hermeneutik, Historische Rechtsschule, Historisches/Logisches, Historisierung, Historismus, Historizismus (absoluter), Ideologiekritik, Ideologie-

theorie, Interpretation, Irrationalität, Irrtum, Jenseits/Diesseits, Kritik, Lesen, Marxismus-Leninismus, materialistische Bibellektüre, MEGA, Rationalismus, Rekonstruktion, Religionskritik, rettende Kritik, Stalinismus, Text, Tod, Tradition, Vergessen/Erinnern, Vernunft, Zensur

Hope

A: al-‘amal. – F: espoir. – G: Hoffnung. – R: nadežda. – S: esperanza. – C: xīwàng
希望

The Romance appellations are derived from the Latin *spes/sperare*, from which one can still read the double meaning of a positive, joyful expectation and a neutral reference to the future. **Virgil** still uses *sperare* for the expectation of pain (*sperare dolorem*; *Aeneid* IV, 419). The Greek equivalents ἐλπίς/ἐλπίζειν originally mean ‘generally and formally a reference to the future’ (**Link** 1974, 1157), to which the neutral terms of expecting or assuming correspond. Traces of it are still found in modern linguistic usage, e.g. in the Spanish *esperar* (to wait). The **Grimm** dictionary was still reporting in 1877 a general meaning of ‘to expect something, to wait’ – e.g. in the language of hunters (‘nach dem Fuchs hoffen’, ‘hoping for the fox’) (IV, 1669).

The discrepancy between antique and modern usage is important for an understanding of the philosophical controversies surrounding H. In linguistic history two other strands of meaning – lost meanwhile – also resonate, namely the aspect of waiting contained in expecting, which appears passive from the standpoint of an actively intervening praxis, and on the other hand the usage especially in antiquity of the paramount sense of considering something as probable. So H could be associated with inactivity as well as with the δόξα (the mere opinion) and *illusio*.

The terminological inconsistencies seem to be based on an ambiguity in the very nature of H itself. According to Ernst **Bloch** it is ‘*the most human of all mental feelings*’ (1959, *PH*, 75), which however for the want of possibilities for realisation can easily become ‘empty H’, the drive to self-deception. ‘One hopes, as long as one lives’, is a common saying, but also: ‘Hoffen und Harren macht manchen zum Narren’ (‘Hoping and waiting make fools of some people’). What keeps humans alive and future-oriented is at the same time an anthropological characteristic within which the turnaround into fear, doubt, and hopelessness might take place. H, deprived of a realistic basis, prepares the soil both for nihilism and resentment, as well as for various forms of eschatological displacement and religious exaltation. In societies in which emancipation and self-realisation take place primarily at the expense of others, who are excluded from them, H itself is permeated by social contradictions: What for some is the H of victory or social ascent, is for others the prospect of ruin or

misery. Thinking about H in this antagonistic field of meaning has also taken the most diverse positions.

1. In the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* the Elpis connections can express both the open meaning of assuming (e.g. *Il* 16.278 et sqq.; *Od* 6.297), as well as the positive meaning of hoping (e.g. that of Penelope for Odysseus; *Od* 16.101; 20.328), that are, to be sure, deceived several times and proven illusory (e.g. *Il* 21.600 et sqq.), and finally also those meanings of fear and anxiety contrary to H (e.g. *Il* 15.110 et sq. and 16.28 *Od* 3.228). The Homeric warrior aristocracy does not “hope” for a religious hereafter, but for posthumous fame (see Woschitz 1979, 78; van Menxel 1983, 45).

On the other hand Hesiod criticised the pacifying and at the same time illusory aspects of Elpis from the point of view of a peasant’s work ethic: ‘The unworking man, who stays on empty anticipation, needing substance, arranges in his mind many bad thoughts, and that is not a good kind of hopefulness which is company for a man who sits, and gossips, and has not enough to live on’. (1959/1998, 498 et sqq.) The terms contrary to ‘empty H’ are work, intelligent precaution, and foresighted diligence (295 et sq., 384 et sq., 474 et sqq.). Hesiod’s version of the Pandora story shows Elpis in a sinister form: Zeus punishes humans for the theft of fire by Prometheus (the foresighted one), by giving his brother Epimetheus (the hindsighted one who loses out because of his failure to look ahead) the beautiful Pandora, the female ‘evil, [which they hold] close to their hearts and take delight in it’ (59). The woman lifted the cover of the great jar and let the evils out, which since that time have been plaguing humans silently; ‘H was the only spirit that stayed there in the unbreakable closure of the jar, under its rim, and could not fly forth abroad’ (95 et sqq.). According to Karl Matthäus Woschitz here Elpis, imprisoned ‘according to the will of the cloud-bearing Zeus’ (98 et sq.), signifies ‘the illusionary which lacks the possibility of becoming real’ (1979, 83). On the other hand François van Menxel translates ἐπίς as the foreknowledge of a (bad) fate and interprets it as an evil, which humans were spared (1983, 50).

Relevant for the influence of the Pandora legend are the versions reported by Theognis and Barrios, according to which Elpis is represented as a good goddess who is the only one that remained with humans, while the other gods abandoned them. Humans pray to these, but they count on H, and therefore she receives the first and the last sacrifice, as Theognis has it (1135 et sqq.). In the account of Barrios furthermore, it is not Pandora who opens the jar, but “the human being” in the shape of the curious Epimetheus. The myth is scarcely taken up by the Roman classical authors, but the church fathers use the Pandora figure as a confirmation of female original sin, by setting her opening the

jar parallel with the enjoyment of the forbidden apple (see **Panofsky/Panofsky** 1956, 9 et sqq.). The fact that in the fine arts and literature since the Renaissance the topos of a 'box' brought from the sky along with Pandora was established can be traced back to a translation error made by **Erasmus**, who confounded the stationary supply jar (πίθος) with the mobile box (πυξίς) (ibid., 15 et sq.).

The positive interpretation of *Elpis*, which is commonly thought to have set in with the 5th cent. B.C., and here above all with **Euripides** (Dihle et al. 1991, 1162; van Menxel 1983, 86 et sq. and 94), is accompanied frequently by a religious connotation. With **Plato** a positive H appears where the Platonic **Socrates** is dealing with immediately approaching death: 'good reason there is to hope' that dying is something good, is declared in the *Apology* of Socrates, because it is either a kind of non-being, which the dead one does not feel, or a relocation of the soul, thus in both cases a 'wonderful gain' (40c–41d). In the *Politeia* he has Cephalos say that in old age the just are accompanied by the H of a happy life after death (1.331a). Philosophy is treated in the *Phaedo* as a learning to die (*ars moriendi*), whereby the H is directed toward the release of the soul from the body, its return to the 'true heaven' and its convergence with God (64–68, 80–84, 110 et sq.). Here especially the philosopher practised in abstinence has the privilege of being released forever from his body (114c).

On the other hand, the orientation of H on an afterlife of this kind is questioned by an approach that is critical of religion. **Democritus** explains the faith in an afterlife with the ignorance of the dissolution of human nature (DK, Frg 297), and differentiates between the reasonable foresight of the thoughtful person and the impossible expectations of those lacking in understanding (Frg 58 and 292). In order to force back the power of chance (τύχη), behind which humans deceive themselves about their helplessness (Frg 119), it is necessary to establish H on reason, wisdom, and deliberation. **Epicurus** states that the fear of death is groundless because with death the soul disintegrates into atoms again: 'what has disintegrated lacks awareness; and what lacks awareness is nothing to us' (Proposition 11; see *to Menoikeus*, 124 et sq.). Instead H is regarded from the viewpoint of the human capacity for happiness and its dialectical relationship to the future. On the one hand the joys of the soul are also caused by hoped for future pleasures, on the other hand it is stupid to neglect the present and to set everything on the future, because 'the future is neither wholly ours nor wholly not ours' (127). The art of living that is sought for is that of meeting the future with H without making it into an absolute. Here the *Elpis* has a positive place in a 'coherent and emancipatory system' (van Menxel 1983, 138), certainly without being concerned with politics and 'withdrawn from the multitude' (*to Pythokles*, Diog. Laert., x.119, and Theorem XIV).

2. Before the translation into Greek (Septuaginta) in the 3rd cent. B.C., which will determine the language of the New Testament (NT), there is no uniform word for H in the Hebrew bible. Nonetheless right here an intensive linkage is developed between divine 'promise' and human H, which differs significantly from the philosophical articulations of Greek and Roman antiquity: in the centre is located a monotheistic god, who has made a 'covenant' (*berith*) with his chosen people; his promises are primarily worldly, the emancipation from slavery, a country full of 'milk and honey' (Ex 3.17), and numerous descendants; and finally H is seen as demanding obligatory loyalty, so that doubting its realisation and 'grumbling' become a transgression.

2.1 In terms of social history the belief in Yahweh is primarily about the Hs of a people threatened or directly subjugated by one of the great powers of antiquity (Egypt, Assyria, Babylon, Persia), a people whose social ethics were long shaped by the pre-state social structures of a 'segmentary society' (Crüsemann 1978, 203 et sqq., Sigrist 1994).

According to the biblical narrative the history of Israel begins with the exodus of the aged Abraham from Ur, one of the earliest class societies organised as states, and with the promise to make his name great through a large number of descendants with their own country (*Gen* 12.1 et sqq.; see 15.7 et sqq., 17.2 et sqq.). The exodus from the state of an "advanced culture", re-actualised in the exodus from Egypt and from Babylon, is connected with a completely improbable future promise (in view of the advanced age of Sarah) and becomes precisely through that a constant point of reference for the demanded attitude of faith and H against all "common sense" (see *Rom* 4.3 and 9.22; *Gal* 3.6). In the first commandment the imageless God is defined as he 'who brought you out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of slavery' (*Ex* 20.2; see *Lev* 26.13; *Hos* 13.4; *Ez* 34.27). 'Exodus [...]' gives the Bible, from here on, a basic resonance which it has never lost' (Bloch 1959, *PH*, 496). The exodus is regularly recalled to memory by ritual and liturgical repetition (e.g. in the Jewish Seder) and thus becomes part of the 'cultural memory' (Assmann 2011, 6 et sqq.) for the articulation of popular Hs, which contributes to the ideological attractiveness of US-American and Israeli exceptionalism (see Bové 2003).

The prophetic judgement sermon brands the violation of the regulations for social protection of the Torah by the dominant elite as a falling away from Yahweh, and makes it responsible for the breakup of the Israeli kingdom into two partial states, as well as for the loss of autonomy and exile in Babylon (approx. 587–539 B.C.). In a second liberation a just distribution of land is promised, as well as the H-image of a small peasant 'association' without exploitation (Veerkamp 1993, 301) is painted: 'They will not build for others to live in, or plant so that others can eat. [...] and my chosen ones wear out what their hands

have made' (*Isaiah* 65.22; see 23 and 25). The social pauperisation in the 5th and 4th cent.s gave rise to an eschatologisation, which moves the overthrow caused by Yahweh to the end of history. The reversal can take place with the assistance of a Davidic messiah who, contrary to the real kings, rides humbly on a donkey (*Zechariah* 9.9). The promises exceed those of the exodus, but 'they do not invite anything like the ongoing human effort required in the Exodus story' (Walzer 1985, 122). The stone, which in the Apocalypse of Daniel destroys the previous world empires, broke away completely on its own, 'untouched by any hand' (*Dan* 2.34).

2.2 The central NT usages update and modify the eschatological and apocalyptic Hs for reversal of the Hebrew Bible in the context of the Roman Empire. In the confrontation with the ideology of the Pax Romana, which propagates the Roman Empire as the fulfilment of humanity's Hs ('golden age'), the New Testament H articulates itself in the context of a worldwide counter-empire: It is founded on the hopeless absurdity of a crucified messiah. Those excluded from the hoped for goods of the Roman Empire become the yardstick and crystallisation point of the 'Kingdom (*imperium*) of God'. Whereas the lowly are raised up and the hungry are satisfied, the wealthy and the elite lose their power and receive nothing (*Lk* 1.46–55). Many H-stories are structured according to this reversal logic. The specific characteristic of the New Testament lies in the peculiar tension between an already-there and a not-yet: on the one hand H is directed toward an imminent return (Parousia) of the resurrected one, which Paul still hopes to experience (*1Kor* 15.52), and on the other hand the "last things" of the eschatology are brought back into the present: through Jesus Christ the time is already 'close at hand' (*Mk* 1.15) and the kingdom of God 'is among you' (*Lk* 17.20 et sq.).

With Paul H stands together with 'faith' against a 'law', which produces nothing but anger and transgressions (*Rom* 4.15). It arises from crushing hopelessness: the creation was subjected to nullity, so that it 'from the beginning until now has been groaning in one great act of giving birth, and we too groan inwardly and wait for [...] our bodies to be set free' (8.20 and 22 et sq.). This is the language which, by way of the mystic Sebastian Franck, reached Ludwig Feuerbach – God as 'an unutterable sigh, lying in the depths of the heart' (cited in Feuerbach 2012, 82) – and from there was adopted by the young Marx: Religion as the 'sigh of the oppressed creature' (MECW 3, 175 [1/378]). The subjection of creation to nullity occurred, according to Paul, precisely with creation having 'the H of being freed like us, from its slavery to decadence, to enjoy the same freedom and glory as the children of God' (*Rom* 8.21). This H is invisible, he insists, and therefore 'it is something we must wait for with patience' (8.25). In turn, longer suffering is bearable through this, 'as we know that these sufferings

bring patience, and patience brings perseverance, and perseverance brings H' (5.2–4). 'Patience' becomes the hardened state of H in times of hopelessness, and with the deferral of the Parousia of Jesus it will remain as the primary Christian virtue of the subaltern.

In connection with the faith in Christ, H functions as a constituting concept for the new communities, which elevates these from those who 'have no H' (1 *Thess* 4.13; *Eph* 2.12). At the same time, profound tensions between a religious settling in the present and a "rapturous" expectation articulate themselves within the already-and-not-yet-structure, which threaten to destroy the cohesion of the communities. Confronting the social and religious polarisations in the Corinthian congregation, **Paul** arranges the three qualities 'that last', 'faith, H, and love', which he brings into a hierarchy, saying that love (*Agape*) is greatest among them (1 *Cor* 13.13). This gradation probably demonstrates the fear of a fixation on H and faith driven by an egoistic striving for salvation, which is to be prevented with the connection back to love as a praxis of compassion and solidarity towards fellow humans.

2.3 The triad is worked out by **Augustine** as a threefold Christian cardinal virtue. The **Pauline** immanent expectation is replaced by the Catholic Church, whereas the link to the future is redirected into a neo-Platonic other-world. Whereas faith can refer to past, present, and future, H is aimed only toward good and future things, *spes bonarum rerum futurum*, which **Augustine** conceptualises from the point of view of the individual hoping person (*Enchiridion* 11.8). This definition is assumed and supplemented by **Thomas Aquinas**: In contrast to cupidity and longing, the future good is difficult to attain, yet it is in principle attainable (*Summa Theologiae*, 1a 11ae, 40.1). In order to prevent H from tipping over into the "sins" of arrogance and despair, Thomas must balance them by fear, which above all as childlike and chaste is indispensable for the fulfilment of the law, as well as to the welfare of the soul, and keeps H on track and at the same time in check (11a 11ae, 19 and 22). Also for **Luther**, H is not conceivable without the counterpart of fear. Between both 'as between the upper and nether millstone, we must always be ground and kept that we never turn either to the right hand nor to the left' (1519/1903, 225). When in the course of the convergence with the princely state the seigniorial elements won out against the 'communalistic' tendencies in Lutheran theology (see **Blickle** 1992; **Brady** 1985), H was also affected: as in the open confrontation against "enthusiasts", faith was increasingly bent into obedience, H was brought down to the passive meaning of 'patience' and defined from there (see **Luther** 1522/1959, 71).

3. **Spinoza** sees in H primarily the uncertain, which he depicts as a deficiency in the context of his emphatic concept of the reason-led capacity to act (*potentia agendi*). The emotions, loaded with doubt, 'are not so constant', until humans have attained certainty over the outcome of the thing (1677/1996, 81; III.18, note 1), and these include both H and 'inconstant joy' (*inconstans laetitia*) as well as fear as 'inconstant sadness' (note 2). 'Therefore, these affects [of H and fear] cannot be good of themselves' (IV.47). There is no H without fear, fear is aversion and thus directly bad, unless it contributes to restraining an excess of desire (IV.41 and 43). Both emotions indicate an insufficiency of the spirit (*impotentia mentis*): 'Therefore, the more we strive to live according to the guidance of reason, the more we strive to depend less on H, to free ourselves from fear, to conquer fortune' (IV.47, note).

According to David **Hume**, H as well as fear is determined by uncertainty: If one is certain of the pleasure, one feels joy, is one certain of the pain, sadness. The uncertainty 'gives rise to FEAR or H, according to the degrees of uncertainty on the one side or the other [of good and bad]' (*Treatise*, 1739, II.III.IX; 1874/1898, 215). The mixing proportion is determined according to an internal probability calculation. The impressions oscillate between the poles of joy and pain. But the passions on which they are laid are slower, like stringed instruments, which resound after each note. This asynchronicity produces an uncertain mixture of opposite passions (216 et sqq.; 179 et sqq.).

From here **Hume** criticises in the *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* (1779) that religion affects the mixing proportion of the passions unfavourably: Although both H and fear enter into religion, nevertheless the fright dominates the pleasure, and furthermore this is lived as 'fits of excessive joy' which fatigue the spirit and quickly turns again into superstitious fright. Clamped between an eternity of happiness and an eternity of misery, a balanced condition of mind is not to be reached (XII; 1874/1898, 466). With **Kant**, on the contrary, H is the crucial instance in the 'moral proof of God', and thus the pivot point at which his 'transcendental idealism' without God tips over into one with God. In the context of the epistemological question 'What can I know?' he had refuted the previous proofs of God and identified them as 'transcendental Ideas', which may be understood only as 'regulative', in the mode 'as if', and not 'constitutive', as referring to the real existence of God, (1781/1984, 345 et sqq. and 388 et sqq.). The moral question 'What ought I to do?' (457) he answered likewise without resort to a divine transcendence through the practical-reasonable construction of a 'categorical Imperative', which as 'pure moral law' he distanced from any self-interest or striving for happiness (458). With the third question 'What may I hope?' he encounters the problem that his apriori deontology becomes an 'empty pipe dream', because it only makes a moral agent 'worthy' of happiness

without being able to give him the H of also really participating in it. Because the 'Ideal of the Supreme Good' requires a linkage of morality and proportional happiness (459 et sq.). From the realistic observation that the 'world of sense' in this life does not offer us this connection, it follows for Kant that we must accept a life after death and a God who creates this connection (1781/1984, 460 et sq.; 1788/1997, 117). The introduction of H, which was excluded previously, into the connection between morality and happiness, forces the emphasis onto the afterlife, which is now itself given as the basis of H: 'Only if religion is added to it does there also enter the H of some day participating in happiness to the degree that we have been intent upon not being unworthy of it' (1788/1997, 108). With this reversal Kant's critique of religion flows back into the courses of a conservative view of religion, which makes H for happiness a religious monopoly and puts it off for eternity.

In the same motion in which with **Hegel** the moral problem dissolves into the self-movement of the spirit, H also disappears as an independent topic. Where the term is used, it remains in the hands of the religious. The young Hegel argues along the same lines as **Hume** that the alternative between eternal bliss and eternal damnation leaves mankind 'endlessly vacillating between terror before the universal Judge and H in a merciful and forgiving Father' (**Hegel** 1793–94/1984, 87; W 1, 81). He reproduces the anti-Judaistic opposition between a Christian moral H and a 'Jewish H', of the re-establishment of the Israeli state: the attempts of Jesus to kindle 'higher Hs' in Judaism fail because of its 'hypocrisy and sanctimoniousness' (Hegel 1795–96/1948, 180; W 1, 107). Also in the *Phenomenology of the Spirit* there is only concern about the 'H of becoming one with it [the beyond]', and this must simply remain 'H, i.e. without fulfilment and present fruition' (1807/1977, 129). Hegel is not interested in a philosophical elaboration of the concept: Whereas he concerns himself intensively with the mediation between faith and reason, H is left behind with the religious faith in the hereafter.

4. The lack of interest in the H-dimension shown by post-Kantian idealism is probably the reason for the fact that the term is used only rarely by **Marx** and **Engels**, and then mostly with the negative connotation of the illusionary. Apart from isolated expressions in the style of the common rhetoric of the workers' movement, for example the 'proud H of future victories' (**Engels**, MECW 26/439 [21/341]), H usually appears as a synonym for 'pious wishes' and contrary to '*better realization*' (**Marx**, MECW 1/124 [1/18]). 'Not a single hope had become reality', was said of the 'cherished Illusions' of the petty bourgeois in the revolution of 1848/49 (MECW 11/254 et sq. [8/262]), and it is not only the H for the return of prosperity which proves to be 'chimerical' and must be given

up (MECW 15/568 [12/505]). If Marx states that the 'European peace is relegated to the domain of H and faith' (MECW 19/167 [15/468]), this means nothing else but that a war is presumably approaching.

More fruitful are passages in the text in which H and hopelessness are set in relationship. 'No people wholly despairs, and even if for a long time it goes on hoping merely out of stupidity, yet one day, after many years, it will suddenly become wise and fulfil all its pious wishes', writes Marx in 1843 in a letter to Arnold Ruge (MECW 3/134 [1/338]). The sentence is directed against Ruge's preceding 'funeral song', which is not 'political' because it deplors only the rule of the 'philistine' and overlooks the precariousness of this rule, and here especially the possibility of the "stupidity" of the people's illusionary H suddenly turning into its "wise" fulfilment (ibid.). Does Marx hold 'too high' an opinion of the present with this analysis of contradiction (141 [342])? In answer to this self-posed question he writes: If he were not to despair over the present, 'it is precisely the desperate situation which fills me with H' (ibid.). H is placed in a 'rupture within present-day society, a rupture which the old system is not able to heal' (ibid. [343]). A half century after this, Engels in old age welcomes the strike of the London dock workers in 1889 as the 'movement of the greatest promise' for years, especially because it was organised by the most "hopeless" part of the working class: of these, the 'odds and ends of all trades', one could say with Dante, 'lasciate ogni speranza', abandon all H 'for want of self-confidence and of organization', and if 'they can combine, and terrify by their resolution the mighty Dock Companies, truly then we need not despair of any section of the working class' (MECW 26/545 [21/382]).

'Arise, ye starvelings from your slumbers', is the first line of the "Internationale", which then continues: 'We have been nought, We shall be all!' That Marxism in the 19th and 20th cent.s in an historically very short time could become a far-reaching movement of worldwide proportions is connected to a liberation of H-potentials which can be compared to early Christianity with regard to its dynamics and intensity. The ethical core of this release is 'the categorical imperative to overthrow all relations, in which man is a debased, enslaved, forsaken, despicable being' (MECW 3/182 [1/385]). The liberating intention, which Bloch calls the 'warm stream' of Marxism (PH, 209), is oriented toward the perspective of an 'association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all' (*Communist Manifesto*, 1848/2002, 244 [4/482]). For the description of such a goal Marx resorts to the term used by Luther, 'Realm of Freedom' (e.g. 1521, W 8, 326), in order to designate the sphere of human self-determination [Selbstzwecksetzung], which begins 'beyond the sphere of actual material production' in the strict meaning of the term (MECW 37/807 [25/828]). Certainly H here has not been moved

into an otherworldly or eschatological perspective, but refers to the shortening of the working day and the collective regulation of the “necessary” metabolism with nature (*ibid.*).

In substance the merit of **Marx** and **Engels** lies above all in the development of a set of analytic tools which are relevant for the distinction between illusionary and realistic H. What the late Engels brought into the formula ‘from the utopian to the scientific’ (MECW 24/281 [19/177]), is directed against political concepts which exploit human H-capabilities for unrealistic goals, and burn them up. **Marx**, in the context of his criticism of **Bakunin**, criticises a utopian socialism which tries to ‘foist new illusions onto the people’, instead of finding its support in the social movement made by the people themselves (MECW 24/520 [18/636]). Utopian thinking can recognise no ‘historical initiative’ on the side of the proletariat (*Communist Manifesto*, 1848/2002, 254 [4/490]). Already in 1843 **Marx** describes the advantage of the new direction, stressing ‘that we do not dogmatically anticipate the world, but only want to find the new world through criticism of the old world’ (MECW 3/142 [1/344]). This includes the critical analysis of the religious or political self-consciousness, which brings to light ‘that the world has long dreamed of possessing something of which it has only to be conscious in order to possess it in reality’ (144 [346]).

The proposed examination of the dreams of the people can be described as the translation of illusionary H.s into grounded ones. For this **Marx**, following **Hegel**, developed a peculiar type of critique called “determinate negation”, whose “no” does not come from outside, but has its standpoint in the negated (see **W.F. Haug** 1973, 179; 1995, 177 et sqq.). It is oriented toward the discovery of developed ‘elements of the new society’ in the womb of bourgeois society, and ‘setting them free’ (MECW 22/335 [17/343]). Without such ‘latent’ seeds of the new ‘all attempts to explode it would be quixotic’ (MECW 28/97 [42/93]). Limits to revolutionary expectation are set, since humankind ‘inevitably sets itself only such tasks as it is able to solve’ (MECW 29/263 [13/9]). According to the meaning of the Greek word for discerning (*κρίνειν*), a critique of this kind enables one to distinguish between what shall be kept and what is to be negated, between attainable and unattainable moments; thereby it can become an orientating activity which affects the horizon of expectation of H.

5. Opposing a Christian understanding of H as a virtue, Friedrich **Nietzsche** reverts to its antique definition by **Hesiod**. Confusing it with happiness is part of the illusionary features of human nature. ‘Zeus did not want man to throw his life away, no matter how much the other evil might torment him, but rather to go on letting himself be tormented anew. To that end, he gives man H. In truth, it is the most evil of evils because it prolongs man’s torment’ (**Nietz-**

sche 1878/2004, 58 [KSA 2, 82]). The triad Faith/H/Love of the New Testament describes not real virtues but ‘three Christian *ingenuities*’ (1895/1924, 76 [KSA 6, 191]), i.e. those of human seduction: ‘H, in its stronger forms is a great deal more powerful stimulans to life than any sort of realized joy can ever be. Man must be sustained in suffering by a H so high that no conflict with actuality can dash it – so high, indeed, that no fulfilment can *satisfy* it: a H reaching out beyond this world’ (1895/1924, 76 [KSA 6, 190]).

Nietzsche conceived his theory of the ‘eternal recurrence’ not least as an alternative to the teleological seduction by H. The Christian teachings, which divert eternal value away from life into an otherworld, are to become in such a way ‘inverted’ that metaphysics ‘emphasises precisely *this* life with the *heaviest* accent’ (KSA 9, 515). We should live in such a way ‘that we want to live again and live that way for eternity’ (494 et sqq.; see KSA 3, 570). The separation of the important from the unimportant according to the criterion of the desired eternal recurrence promises to make, through a ‘religion of religion’, better use of the eternity-effect than past religions, and above all better use than the Christian one, which is filled with the Hs for salvation of those at the bottom: ‘Let us press the image of eternity onto our life!’ (KSA 9, 503; see 505, 513, 515; KSA 11, 488). Günther **Anders** criticises the doctrine of the eternal recurrence as a compulsory obligation to repetition transposed into philosophy, ‘only that in this case the compulsion is not “to act”, but, an “*event compulsion*” projected into the universe (as its mode of being) (1982, 100). The called for new ‘heavy accent’ on one’s own life is to accompany a ‘philosophy of indifference’ toward ‘humanity’s’ problems (KSA 9, 494 et sq.). Then again this is supposed to engender a charging of the moment, since according to **Nietzsche** life shall be eternally repeated only for the sake of certain orgiastic ‘supreme moments’: ‘the value of the shortest and most fleeting one, the seductive gold flashing on the belly of the serpent of life’ (KSA 12, 348). This is most notably what postmodern attempts to oppose the enjoyable lightness of the present moment to H will recur to.

6. Ernst **Bloch** reconnected Marxism with H-traditions, from which it had been separated due to Hegelianism as well as through its own anti-utopian determinism. The fact that **Hesiod** reckons Elpis among the evils can only have the sense that he refers ‘to its deceptive aspect, even to the powerless aspect which it still represents for itself alone’; not meant is the ‘founded, [...] mediated with the real Possible’ H; the later version of the Pandora story, in which H as a positive good remains in the box, is for **Bloch** ‘in the long run [...] surely the only true one; H is the good thing that remains for men [...], in which man can become man for man and the world homeland [Heimat] for man’ (1959, *PH*, 334 et sq.).

Bloch's terminology is laid out so that the seductiveness of H confirms its fundamental anthropological relevance: That it 'is preached from every pulpit' and 'deception [...] must work with flatteringly and corruptly aroused H' does not speak against H, but shows that the reference to the future represents the central field of the ideological arguments. 'Hopelessness is [...] downright intolerable to human needs', which indicates that, 'man is essentially determined by the future' (4 et sq.).

Accordingly **Bloch** attempts to anchor H as an emotional substructure for the specifically human 'anticipation' in a theory of the affects. For this he differentiates the emotions first into 'filled' and 'expectant emotions': with the first the intention-contents are in a 'set horizon' (**Husserl**), i.e. that of the memory conception, while to the latter he reckons anxiety, fear, H, faith; they are 'long-term', and their specifics lie in the 'incomparably greater anticipatory character' (74 and 108). In a second step, taking a front position against **Heidegger's** "ontology of anxiety", he contrasts the 'positive', expectant emotions of H and confidence with the 'negatives' of anxiety and fear: only the latter are 'suffering, oppressed, unfree', of 'passive passion', **Bloch** argues in implicit dialogue with **Spinoza's** theory of the affects, but the former are much more actively reaching out and linked with the human ability for anticipation (110 and 75). 'The emotion of H goes out of itself, makes people broad instead of confining them [...]. The work of this emotion requires people who throw themselves actively into what is becoming, to which they themselves belong' (1).

For **Bloch** it is a matter of taking the H out of the 'rationalistic' critique of affects. To be sure, it still has in common with anxiety 'a mood-based element', but it stands at the same time as one of the 'most exact emotions', above every mood, 'capable of logical and concrete correction and sharpening' (111 et sq.). Through its connection with anticipation it is at the same time a '*directing act of a cognitive kind*' and thus a counterpart not only to *anxiety*, but also to memory (12 and 112). **Bloch's** concept of H is connected with the project of a 'psychology of the unconscious of the other side, of forward dawning', the Not-Yet-Conscious (116), which can be connected with the 'objectively Possible' (122). In this sense, H is also an unexplored 'place in the world' [Weltstelle], a 'basic determination within objective reality' (6 et sq.). If this becomes conscious, then H arises no longer merely as a 'self-based mental feeling', but becomes an '*utopian function*' (144). 'Reason cannot blossom without H, H cannot speak without reason, both in Marxist unity – no other science has any future, no other future any science' (1367).

The language oriented on the pathos of the young **Marx** makes it easy to overlook the fact that **Bloch** conceives of the relationship between H and its realisation as a contradictory tension which he describes as a '*melancholy of*

fulfilment' (299): If the hoped for is there and if everything is good, then nevertheless 'the hoping itself is no longer there', and it 'carried something with it which does not make itself known in the existing pleasure' (178 et sq.). Bloch explains this discrepancy in the context of his theorem of 'the darkness of the lived moment' [Dunkel des gelebten Augenblicks], the blind mark in the soul (313) that means that 'you can never experience beautiful days as beautifully as they later shine in memory or previously shine in H' (Jean Paul, quoted in 313). 'No earthly paradise remains on entry without the shadow which the entry still casts over it' (299). This tear in the actualisation can lead to a 'reification' of H, which eternalises utopia and thwarts the pleasure of the here and now (299 and 314). The example of disenchanting infatuation shows the extent to which this tension can arise as a destructive opposition: 'Experience was not forbearing with H, but this H was not forbearing with experience either; and the latter became exaggeratedly disappointing'. (180) The reduction or abolition of this 'incognito', the 'remaining minus' of the 'homo absconditus', is the topic of all humanistic dreams: 'to educate the educator, [...] to Realize the Realizer himself' (300).

Anders ascribes to Bloch an 'incapability not to hope', which bends the world and even God as 'works in progress' into shape – 'putting all past philosophers of progress in the shade' (Anders 1982, 138 and 159). The criticism of such 'naivety' (138) can rely on passages in which H appears as a *given*, together with a utopian 'tendency-latency' as 'a basic determination within objective reality' (Bloch 1959, *PH*, 7). However, Bloch conceives of H primarily as something that is *assigned* to us: 'It is a question of learning to hope', making it to 'docta spes, comprehended H' (3 and 7). The 'objective', 'hoped' H – *spes, quae speratur* – which Bloch distinguishes from the 'subjective', 'hoping' H – *spes, qua speratur* – can also never be fully confident; otherwise it would not be H any longer. It remains 'open history', so that optimism is only conceivable as 'militant optimism, never as certain' (1372). In contrast to the different narrations of an 'end of history' Bloch's concept of H holds firmly to the 'openness of the historical process which is continuing and has by no means been defeated up to now: it is not yet the evening to end all days, every night still has a morning' (305).

7. The *Principle of Hope* caused an upswing of H-theologies, which – partly supplementary to Bloch, partly competing with its 'atheistic' interpretation – tried to define the Christian faith as essentially eschatological. The most well-known example is Jürgen Moltmann's *Theology of Hope* from 1964, which attempts to demonstrate 'H as the foundation and the mainspring of theological thinking as such' (1967, 19). His argument has two prongs: On the one hand he questions

the religious bending of an eschatological H into a belief in the hereafter, which took place in the course of the hellenisation of Christianity, on the other hand he tries, in the confrontation with Marxism, to direct the H-intentions which **Bloch** had detached from religion back into a religious form. The 'homeland' [Heimat], toward which Bloch's *Principle of H* points (PH, 1376), must not be identified with a Marxist 'Realm of Freedom', but can only be grasped through faith in a divine counterpart (**Moltmann** 1966, 322 et sqq.).

It is primarily this argument which was introduced into the Christian-Marxist dialogues in 1965. Thus for example, William **Dantine** is of the opinion that in contrast to traditional individualistic eschatology a 'Theology of H' will 'force new questions on obstinate atheism' (quoted from Kellner 1966, 74). 'How can there be H without promise?', asks Johann Baptist **Metz** in his answer to Roger **Garaudy** (ibid, 109). **Metz**, who welcomes the common Christian-Marxist 'rejection of the veiled *cult of the absurd* in our historical thinking', sees the 'apportionment of the beyond into the later', claimed by **Bloch**, to be rooted in the Biblical message (221). Christians must take H out of the 'bracket' of their theology, take it 'out of the subordinate clause in which they transmit it, and involve it in the main clause of their confession, thus revealing it as the sought for essence of Christian existence' (222). From this perspective Christians are 'quite simply those "who have H"' and convert the orthodoxy of faith into an '*orthopraxis* of changing this world' (223).

Hans **Jonas** attempts to unhinge the 'Principle of H' by means of an 'Imperative of Responsibility'. However, he obscures the destructive tendencies of the capitalistic domination of nature as 'quasi-utopian dynamics' of technology as such, and simply attributes it to the 'utopian' itself, which he claims violates the present in favour of an engineered future (1984, 201). The H for improvements must be unhooked 'from the bait of utopia', and must subordinate itself to a 'non-utopian ethics of responsibility' (201 and 386), which Jonas, referring to **Heidegger**, conceives of as '*concern* for another being, recognised as obligation' (391). Again the hoped for humanising of humanity is replaced by the eternally 'ambiguous' human being, the 'preappearance' of a liberated and reconciled society in the work of art by its 'timeless appearance in itself' (381 et sq.). Finally, ethics is about learning reverence and fear again, which reveal to us a (not further determined) 'holy' (392 et sq.). This conservative farewell to H is not conducive to Jonas' own claim of an ecological conversion of technology.

8. Walter **Benjamin** treated the topic of H and hopelessness in the context of the fatal love between the figures Eduard and Otilie in his study of **Goethe's** *Elective Affinities*. The starting point is a sentence which he considers the watershed of the piece, and in which the entangled ones seal their fate without being

aware of it. 'H shot across the sky above their heads like a falling star'. This means according to **Benjamin** 'that the last H is never such to him who cherishes it but is the last only to those for whom it is cherished' (1922, *SelWr* 1, 354): 'Only for the sake of the hopeless ones have we been given H' (356). The sentence becomes clearer if one reads it with another: "'Elpis" remains the last of the primal words: the certainty of blessing that [...] corresponds to the H of redemption that we nourish for all the dead. This H is the sole justification of the faith in immortality, which must never be kindled from one's own existence' (355). 'Only for the sake of the hopeless ones' is a statement against the private-egoistic temptations of H, and not least against the salvation-egoistic temptations of religious H for immortality, which have determined the belief in the hereafter since the adaptation of Christianity to neo-Platonism. What is required is to conceive of H from the standpoint of those who have nothing to lose 'but their chains' (*Communist Manifesto* 1848/2002, 258; [4/493]).

The idea that the only legitimate H is one directed toward the salvation of the dead is pursued by **Benjamin** in his theses *On the Concept of History*. He turns it here against the conception of progress held by a social-democratic labour movement which considers itself to be the 'redeemer of future generations' (1940, *SelWr* 4, 394): it should orient itself not toward the 'ideal of the liberated grandchild' but to the image of the 'enslaved ancestors' (*ibid.*). Taken by itself this opposition is not convincing. To the extent that it – going beyond the criticism of the linearity of the concept of progress – attempts to drive any orientation toward the future out of H, it neglects the importance of the anticipatory for human behaviour, indeed, even for animal activity (see **Holzcamp** 1983, 142 et sqq., 261 et sqq., 340 et sqq.). Nevertheless, it contains a dimension which is neglected in a one-sided future-fixation of H: the task of 'fanning the spark of H in the past'. Every age must strive 'anew to wrest [tradition away] from conformism' thereby 'appropriating a memory as it flashes up in a moment of danger' (**Benjamin** 1940, *SelWr* 4, 391). Benjamin's reflections coincide with **Bloch's** concept of a past which is 'undisposed of' [unerledigt], 'not yet wholly discharged' [nicht ganz abgegolten] (1935, *HOT*, 55, 110, 112), with the difference that the image of the salvation of the dead already formulated in judgement prophecy takes the place of a future embedded in the past which is still to be realised.

In another way, shortly before his execution, Dietrich **Bonhoeffer** attempted to formulate the paradoxical possibility of H under conditions of hopelessness in his *Letters from Prison*. 'For most people the forced renunciation of future planning means that they have succumbed to living only for the moment at hand, irresponsibly, frivolously, or resignedly; some still dream longingly of a more beautiful future and try thereby to forget the present', but for us there

remains only 'the very narrow path, sometimes barely discernible, of taking each day as if it were the last and yet living it faithfully and responsibly as if there were yet to be a great future. [...] To think and to act with an eye on the coming generation and to be ready to move on without fear and worry' (1951, 17 et sq.). If the illusion is already so great a power, then the 'grounded H' is even much more (474). Optimism is not an opinion about the present situation, but 'a power of hope [...] that never abandons the future to the opponent but lays claim to it'. This 'will for the future' should never be despised, even if it is proved wrong a hundred times (18).

9. 'Contradictions are our H!', is the slogan of Bertolt **Brecht's** *Dreigroschenprozess*. Yet H itself is pervaded with contradictions. The fact that **Bloch's** title, *The Principle of Hope*, has become the usual formula for conjuring up a rise of the stock exchange, or that in the USA proclaiming America a 'beacon of H' forms a core component of ideological interpellations, are indications of the extent to which the anthropological characteristic of expecting the future can be instrumentalised by dominant ideologies. The daydreams which Bloch in his criticism of **Freud** emphatically defined as advanced 'anticipations of a better world' (*PH*, 581) are often shaped by the illusion industry in such a way that the dreamers, usually 'filled with H, reinforce their oppression rather than change it' (F. **Haug** 1984, 693). Conversely, equating H with illusionary self-deception disregards the experience that the disappointing release from illusions does not by any means necessarily lead to hopelessness, but can also bring about a strengthening of the capacity to act and anticipate. The expectation that an 'other world is possible' (World Social Forum) can be abused and alienated in various ways, but without it nothing moves.

In view of this ambivalence it would be one-sided to idealise H as a "good" essence of human nature. The reverse one-sidedness consists in the abstract negation of H. What matters is the analytic and practical ability to differentiate again and again concretely between 'empty' and 'well-founded' H. This requires the realistic estimation of both the social balances of power and the potential for development, as well as the individual possibilities for action and motivations. The critical elaboration of the art of distinction-making is not only an intellectual exercise, but itself a practical activity which contributes to structuring the contents and horizons of H. A dialectic approach can learn both from the philosophical criticism of H as well as from its mass mobilisation in popular movements, be it in religious or secular contexts. It will be oriented towards deciphering the illusory desire-projections of H and criticising their private-egoistic narrowness by defining them from the point of view of the sur-

vival interests of the hopeless ones, thus working constructively to transform the hopelessness of the subaltern into 'concrete anticipation' (Bloch 1959, *PH*, 723).

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→ anticipation, anxiety, fear, charisma, christianity and marxism, christian-marxist dialogue, congregation, parish, critique, critique of religion, death, des-

pair, determinate negation, disillusionment, dream, elements of the new society, emancipation, end of history, enthusiasm, eternity, faith, fatalism, forgetting/remembering, God, happiness, hereafter, hopelessness, illusion, imaginary, indifference, Jewish Question, joy, knowledge, liberation, love, materialist Bible reading, messianism, optimism/pessimism, phantasy, possibility, project, prophecy, reason, redemption, religion, rescuing critique, responsibility, sense, utopia

→ Angst/Furcht, Antizipation, Befreiung, bestimmte Negation, Charisma, Christentum und Marxismus, christlich-marxistischer Dialog, Elemente der neuen Gesellschaft, Emanzipation, Ende der Geschichte, Enthusiasmus, Enttäuschung, Entwurf, Erkenntnis, Erlösung, Ewigkeit, Fatalismus, Freude, Gemeinde (christliche), Glauben, Gleichgültigkeit, Glück, Gott, Hoffnungslosigkeit, Illusion, Imaginäres, Jenseits, Juden, Kritik, Liebe, materialistische Bibellektüre, Messianismus, Möglichkeit, Optimismus/Pessimismus, Phantasie, Prophetie, Religion, Religionskritik, rettende Kritik, Sinn, Tod, Traum, Utopie, Verantwortung, Vergessen/Erinnern, Vernunft, Verzweiflung

Imperialism

A: al-'imbiyāliya. – F: impérialisme. – G: Imperialismus. – R: imperialism.
S: imperialismo. – C: dìguózhǔyì 帝国主义

The term I stems from the Latin *imperium*, whose change of meaning from “command”, “rule”, or “order” to “force” or “domination” resulted in referring to territories subordinated to the “imperative” of a universal power. Following the example from antiquity (*Imperium Romanum*), Czarist Russia, Great Britain, or France under **Napoleon III** understood themselves as being “empires”. Towards the end of the 19th cent., the word “I” was coined in the context of the global expansion of capitalism. Although not used by **Marx** with this intention, there is hardly any other term more closely interconnected with the development of Marxism in the 20th cent. – for one thing because of the close interrelationship between the unlimited accumulation of capital and modern I, and for another because of the influence of **Lenin** and Leninism. A first wave of Marxist theorising concerning the emergence, essence, and future of I occurred during the period of the First World War. The term was primarily conceived to explain the drive to colonial expansion and the rivalry between the great powers, but starting in the 1930s it was used to explain the relationship between I and fascism as well. After 1945, with the beginning of the Cold War, the reference to inter-capitalist relations retreated to the background vis-à-vis the confrontation between systems; “I” became a term for a system and camp in opposition to state socialism. The Vietnam War brought about a second wave of theorising, in which the domination and exploitation of the peripheries (“Third World”) by the USA and its allies, the “First World”, was discussed as an antagonism between rich and poor countries. At the beginning of the 21st cent., a third wave of Marxist theories of I developed which dealt with a globally operative capitalism and its “imperium” in the classical sense of the word.

In various ways, non-Marxist studies sought to reject Marxist explanations rooted in theories of capitalism, preferring to treat I as a purely political phenomenon or as a relapse into pre-capitalist forms of expansion. Thus for example **Hans J. Morgenthau** defines I as ‘a policy devised to overthrow the status quo’ (1948, 34) – thus making it possible to disparage national liberation movements as “imperialist” and attest that the protection of American predominance is “anti-imperialist”. **Joseph A. Schumpeter** regards I as an irrational, atavistic relapse into pre-capitalist behavioural patterns: ‘capitalism is by nature

anti-imperialist' (1919/1951, 73). For Max **Weber**, in contrast, 'imperialist capitalism' '[...] has always been the normal form in which capitalist interests have influenced politics'; 'For the predictable future, the prognosis will have to be made in its favor' (*E&S*, 919). This is because it 'has offered by far the greatest opportunities for profit. They have been greater by far than those normally open to industrial enterprises which worked for exports and which oriented themselves to peaceful trade with members of other polities' (918).

1. There exist considerable differences between theorists with a Marxist orientation concerning the definition of I and the evaluation of its relation to capitalism. Five positions can be distinguished: 1. The designation of I as 'the domination of one country by another in order to economically exploit the dominated' (**Szymanski** 1981, 5) distinguishes clearly between I and capitalism and leaves the relation between them open. A "deficient capitalism", so to speak, or certain capitalist interests could consequently lead to imperialist actions. 2. I as the gradual expansion of capitalist relations in stages to pre-capitalist or non-capitalist parts of the world: thus the emergence of national economies is followed by the colonialist stage and the creation of spheres of influence, which is followed by the international capitalist integration towards the end of the 20th cent. referred to as 'globalisation' (**MacEwan** 1972). 3. A conception originating with **Lenin** regards I as the "final" or "highest" stage of capitalism, without distinguishing between modern I and monopoly or late capitalism. 4. The dependency theory which became prominent in the 1970s and the world systems approach designate I as a (capitalist) system characterised by a spatial dichotomy between centre and periphery. Capitalism tends intrinsically toward I, since a few metropolitan states have always dominated and exploited weaker, peripheral countries; the forms of I have merely changed over time. This concept is found more pointedly in the work of **Herb Addo** (1986), who designates I to be a permanent condition of capitalism. 5. Finally, analogous to **Marx's** elaboration of the external factors of the genesis and spread of capitalism and the emergence of the world market in the *Critique of Political Economy*: I as the pioneer or "midwife" of capitalism (**Warren** 1980).

2. Although the term is only used by **Marx** in the phrase "concealed I", which he uses to characterise the aspirations of the 'official republican opposition' of large parts of the bourgeoisie and petite bourgeoisie under **Louis-Philippe**, characterised by 'French nationalism' (*MECW* 11/112 et sq. [8/124]), the theories of I that emerged after his death were able to refer back to his work. The primary reference points were **Marx's** emphasis upon the expansive force of

capital which subjugates all other social relations, and his analysis of primitive accumulation. ‘The sudden expansion of the world market, the multiplication of commodities in circulation, the competition among the European nations for the seizure of Asiatic products and American treasures, the colonial system, all made a fundamental contribution towards shattering the feudal barriers to production’ (Marx 1981, 450 [25/345]). Thus for Marx, the expansion of the market into a world market and unequal development at a global scale were inextricable – as both cause and effect – from the emergence of capitalism.

Marx was primarily interested in the transformation of merchant capital into industrial capital. Using the example of India (MECW 12/125–33 [9/127–33]), he demonstrated that the advance of merchant capital alone not only exploited the country, but also destroyed traditional modes of production without bringing about higher socioeconomic development, whereas elsewhere, the destruction wrought by no less exploitative industrial capital at least created space for new relations (see Brewer 1980, 59). Geoffrey Kay (1975) developed this thought further within the framework of a theory of (under)development. It also forms the point of departure of Bill Warren’s understanding of I as the “pioneer of capitalism”. According to Warren, Marx’s “progressive” interpretation of I was later ‘sacrificed to the requirements of bourgeois anti-imperialist propaganda and, indirectly, to what were thought to be the security requirements of the encircled Soviet state’ (1980, 8). The progressive character of capitalism, as Marx understood it, should according to Warren also serve as a model for determining the progressive function of I; he regards it as erroneous to draw a conclusion about the reactionary character of capitalism from the character of I.

In a late work, Engels describes imperialist expansions as attempts to solve the escalating contradiction between production and consumption in European industrial states through the conquest of new overseas markets. But this would merely delay the crisis, causing it to break out at a later date with even more intensity: ‘Here we have another splendid quirk of history – China is all that is left for capitalist production to conquer, yet the latter, by the very fact of having finally conquered her, will itself be hopelessly compromised in its place of origin’ (Letter to Kautsky, September 23, 1894, MECW 50/350 [39/301]).

3. The first wave of theories of I was based upon the works of Hilferding, Kautsky, Bukharin, and Lenin, as well as the important contribution of Rosa Luxemburg, who analysed I within the framework of Marx’s theory of accumulation. The replacement of the capitalism of free competition by monopoly

capitalism is at the centre of “Leninist” conceptions; I is understood as its ideology and praxis as well as a necessary stage of capitalist development.

The most important precursor of these approaches was the British radical democrat John A. **Hobson**. As a reaction to the Boer war, which he abhorred, he sketched an antagonism between liberal and imperialist capitalism. He determined the latter to be an attempt to use the expansion of markets and the export of capital to overcome tendencies toward underconsumption, which he traced back to the increasing monopoly power of large firms. Following this, I refers to a policy of aggressive nationalism, colonialism, and militarism promoted by large companies. ‘It is not industrial progress that demands the opening up of new markets and areas of investment, but mal-distribution of consuming power which prevents the absorption of commodities and capital within the country. The over-saving which is the economic root of Imperialism is found by analysis to consist of rents, monopoly profits, and other unearned or excessive elements of income’ (1902, 85). Hobson assumed that underconsumption could be overcome if monopoly profits were redistributed as wages and social welfare benefits. A “democratic and social” capitalism would not waste its resources on armaments and colonialism. ‘I is a depraved choice of national life, imposed by self-seeking interests which appeal to the lusts of quantitative acquisitiveness and of forceful domination surviving in a nation from early centuries of animal struggle for existence’ (1902, 368).

The first genuinely Marxist theory of I is found in Rudolf **Hilferding**’s work *Finance Capital* (1910/1981). For the first time, I was understood as a necessary corollary of the stage of capitalist development in which the formation of cartels displaces free trade and finance capital succeeds industrial capital as the hitherto dominant form. Hilferding sees the ideology and praxis of finance capital as ‘opposed’ to liberalism, since ‘finance capital does not want freedom, but domination; it has no regard for the independence of the individual capitalist, but demands his allegiance. It detests the anarchy of competition and wants organisation, though of course only in order to resume competition on a still higher level’ (1910/1981, 334). For that reason, it requires ‘a strong state which will ensure respect for the interests of finance capital abroad, and use its political power to extort advantageous supply contracts and trade agreements from smaller states’, which must be capable and prepared ‘to transform the whole world into a sphere of investment for its own finance capital’ and ‘is strong enough to pursue an expansionist policy and the annexation of new colonies’ (ibid.).

Bukharin’s *Imperialism and World Economy* was written in 1915, but was first published after the October Revolution. **Lenin** published an introduction praising it and analysed the material for his own theory. **Bukharin** examines

the contradictory tendencies of the international and national expansion of capital, which together make up the new stage of I. Concentration and centralisation have progressed to the point where each national economy has become 'one gigantic combined enterprise under the tutelage of the financial kings and the capitalist state' (1915/1929, 73). At the same time, the rivalry between capitalist states has replaced the competition between capitalist enterprises. The national chauvinism arising from this has an effect upon the working classes of the imperialist countries. In the long term, however, internationalised forces of production would enable the proletariat to overcome national boundaries (144–68).

Although **Lenin's** text is also based upon a comprehensive study of the materials (CW 39), it is distinguished from **Hilferding's** and **Bukharin's** analyses by the fact that its primary aim is to "educate" the labour movement and convey to it an awareness of the specific character of the epoch and the causes of what **Lenin** views as the treacherous behaviour of most social democratic leaders during the outbreak of the First World War. The text had 'the character of a revelation' within Marxism-Leninism and the anti-colonial liberation movements. In the countries of the Third World, it attained a theoretical significance comparable to that of the Manifesto in the developed countries (**Kemp** 1967, 67).

For **Lenin**, capitalism had reached a new stage with I, marked by five distinct characteristics: 1. The concentration of production and capital brings about the formation of monopolies, which achieve a determining role in economic life through their sheer size ("economies of scale") and technological and organisational superiority (CW 22, 210 et sqq.). 2. The fusing of bank capital and industrial capital into 'finance capital' leads to the emergence of a financial oligarchy (226). 3. The significance of the export of capital trumps that of the export of commodities. Within the advanced countries, there is a 'lack of a field for "profitable" investment'; an increase of profits is therefore only possible through exporting capital to underdeveloped countries (242). 4. International monopolies divide the world among themselves. 5. This is accompanied by a complete territorial 'division of the world' between the capitalist great powers (254).

In contrast to **Hobson**, I for **Lenin** does not concern political decisions, but rather an irreversible stage in the development of capitalism (288). Any kind of "redistribution of monopoly profits" is precluded, since these profits are the necessary result of the development of the forces of production and the pressure on the general rate of profit. However, parts of the monopoly profits flow to select groups of workers in the form of higher wages, which **Lenin** considers to be a 'bribe' (301) aimed at bringing about a national-chauvinist 'labour aris-

tocracy' and splitting the labour movement. The 'social I' that set in with **Bismarck** and which attained its classical expression in the 'Tariff Reform League' led by Joseph **Chamberlain** constitutes an attempt to indoctrinate the workers with patriotism in order to destroy proletarian internationalism (285). In the 1930s, this concept was used to analyse European fascism; in the 1960s, it was deployed in the **Maoist** critique of the Soviet Union.

One of those attacked by **Lenin** (288 et sqq.) was Karl **Kautsky**, who interpreted I as the annexation of agrarian territories by advanced capitalist countries – and thus as a political strategy that could also be given up again. Kautsky regarded the formation of an 'Ultra-Imperialism' as a possibility, in which militaristic imperialist policy 'is displaced by a new, ultra-imperialist' one, which posits 'in place of the struggle between national finance capitals among each other the common exploitation of the world by an internationally united financial capital' (1915, 144). For **Lenin**, such a claim was a 'lifeless abstraction' (CW 22, 272) only suitable for diverting attention away from the antagonistic contradictions of the capitalist mode of production and between capitalist states. However, he acknowledges that in history there have been examples of such "ultra-I", for example in the common exploitation of China (295). But due to capitalist competition, such alliances are not permanent; since the world is already divided up, there can only be a 'redistribution', the expansion of one's own territory at the expense of others (254). This leads to continuous 'alternating forms of peaceful and non-peaceful struggle on one and the same basis of imperialist connections and relations within world economics and world politics' (295). Competition brings about 'unequal' development – the centre of economic development shifts from England and France to Germany and Japan, respectively, and ultimately to the USA.

In contrast to **Lenin**, Rosa **Luxemburg** conceives of I as a permanent component of capitalism, the reproduction of which is dependent from the very beginning on the exploitation of non-capitalist modes of production. In order to examine the conditions necessary for the realisation of surplus value and the accumulation of capital, she draws upon **Marx's** schemata of simple and expanded reproduction. She sees a flaw in their neglect of 'the deep and fundamental antagonism between the capacity to consume and the capacity to produce in a capitalist society, a conflict resulting from the very accumulation of capital which periodically bursts out in crises and spurs capital on to a continual extension of the market' (1913/2003, 327). Capitalist growth is ultimately only possible if an increasing mass of surplus value is realised through the expansion of demand outside of the system. 'Capitalism is the first mode of economy with the weapon of propaganda, a mode which tends to engulf the entire globe and to stamp out all other economies, tolerating no rival at

its side. Yet at the same time it is also the first mode of economy which is unable to exist by itself, which needs other economic systems as a medium and soil. Although it strives to become universal, and, indeed, on account of this its tendency, it must break down – because it is immanently incapable of becoming a universal form of production’ (447). **Luxemburg** substantiates her central thesis, that capitalism is kept running by the subjugation of primitive non-capitalist economies, by pointing to the historical replacement of old, artisan forms of production of village communities by cheap mass-consumer goods and the violent appropriation of land and natural resources in many parts of the world. In analysing the subjugation of non-capitalist modes of production as a form of destruction and impoverishment, she anticipates essential elements of the second wave of Marxist theories of I in the 1960s and 1970s.

Luxemburg’s derivation of the concept of I from **Marx’s** reproduction schemata was frequently criticised. **Bukharin** writes that she provides ‘a brilliant and masterful description of colonial exploitation’, but misses ‘the theoretical nucleus of the matter’, because ‘she reduces everything to the bare formula of the possibility of realization’ of the surplus value already produced, and separates this problem from that of ‘larger profits’, ‘thus from the question of the exploitation of non-capitalist economic forms’ (1926/1972, 246; see Howard/King 1989, 114). In 1913, **Otto Bauer** observed that countries with ‘continuous underaccumulation attract capital from abroad and send labour overseas’, whereas ‘continuous overaccumulation’ requires foreign investment, which in the long term leads to a corresponding ‘adjustment [...]’ by means of ‘great crises, with unemployment, wage reductions, and increasing exploitation on the one hand, and unemployment of capital, destruction of values, and a declining rate of profit on the other’ (1913/1986, 106 et sq.). **Luxemburg** is also alleged to have underestimated the possibilities for the domestic market to expand (which would in the later period of Fordism become the fundamental basis for a class compromise between capital and labour). Yet according to **Bauer**, **Luxemburg** correctly saw that accumulation ‘in an isolated capitalist society’ is ‘confined within limits. I does in fact serve to widen these limits’ (108). According to **Sweezy**, ‘the distinction between “capitalist” and “non-capitalist” consumers’ is ‘quite irrelevant’: ‘if the dilemma were a real one [...] it would demonstrate not the approaching breakdown of capitalism, but the impossibility of capitalism’ (1942, 205). **Joan Robinson** conversely defends **Luxemburg’s** proposition with the argument that ‘investment can take place in an ever-accumulating stock of capital only if the capitalists are assured of an ever-expanding market for the goods which the capital will produce’ (1951, 21). To the extent that **Luxemburg** concentrated upon the exploitation of non-capitalist

modes of production and a continuous “primitive accumulation” as factors counteracting the tendency for the rate of profit to fall, from the standpoint of dependency theory and feminist positions her theory of I was superior to Lenin’s.

4. The October Revolution, the socioeconomic and political turbulence of the 1920s and 1930s and the rise of fascism required theories of I to be developed further. This was accomplished above all by Eugen Varga’s conception of a ‘persistent crisis of capitalism’ (1922, 8) combined with the prognosis of the “end of I”, caused by its internal contradictions as well as by the increasing strength of anti-imperialist forces. According to Varga, I transforms itself in order to delay its final crisis; it promotes fascism and state monopoly capitalism, both characterised by an increase in state interventionist activity. I and fascism are interconnected in two respects: the latter serves in the first instance to break the resistance of the working class and nationalise its independent organisations in the interests of the monopolies. Secondly, it organises ‘the nation both spiritually by intensive propaganda and practically by military preparations and authoritarian centralization for an ambitious campaign of territorial expansion’ (Dobb 1937, 259).

After the Second World War, Varga assumed that deliberate planning would replace the anarchy of the market and that the state would thereby acquire autonomy from the economic base. He was criticised for considering state capitalist tendencies to be a new, crisis-free stage of capitalism (Howard/King 1992, 77). He retracted his position and developed a concept of the three stages of a general crisis of capitalism, which later on significantly influenced the view of I held by communist parties. However, despite the collapse of the colonial system, his theory lost its cogency once capitalist accumulation gained new momentum in the 1950s and 1960s.

John Strachey’s “new revisionism” was an attempt to overcome old theories of I: in light of the substantial growth of real wages in the imperialist metropolises, the ‘Hobson-Lenin’ line had supposedly become irrelevant. The old imperial powers no longer drew their profits from colonies. West Germany of all countries, which had no overseas colonies to fall back on, made the quickest recovery from the war. Contrary to popular prejudices, the strengths and weaknesses of a nation were inversely proportional to its imperial possessions (1959, 194). Strachey defines I as an ‘imposition of the power of one nation on another, with the intention of ruling the subjected nation for an indefinite period’ (292) and proceeding from this examined the possibilities of an American or Russian I. The first is prevented by the SU’s and China’s positions as world powers, and furthermore by the anti-imperialist tradition of the USA and the ‘relat-

ive immaturity of the American economy for empire' (291). In contrast, the SU had clearly become an imperial power oppressing and exploiting the peoples of Eastern Europe, but was not suited to an imperial role due to its low level of economic development (304). For that reason, the 'end of the imperialist epoch' is 'a precondition of our survival' (309).

5. At the high point of the second wave of theories of I, *The Geometry of Imperialism* (1978) by Giovanni Arrighi was published. Whereas Hobson and Lenin conceived I in terms of the convergence of nationalism, inter-state anarchy, and the reign of finance capital, the I of the post-war period should be conceived as a combination of internationalism and a hierarchical order of states and transnational corporations. It is characterised by an informal empire of free trade and free enterprise, embedded in a "Pax Americana" through the hegemony of the USA.

The new theories were linked to the rise of the so-called "New Left" in the 1960s and 1970s. One of the predecessors was Paul Baran's *Political Economy of Growth* (1957). According to him, the current division into centres and peripheries can be traced back to the European campaigns of conquest of the past few centuries. The different forms which the integration of Japan and India into the world market took demonstrate that underdevelopment is not the result of backwardness or a lack of capitalist production, but rather of a world economy structured by imperialist power as such, which cements the dependency of less developed countries. Development could only be set into motion by socialist-oriented revolutions which could bring about a relative decoupling of the peripheral countries from the world market. Baran's analysis inspired revolutionary movements of the "Third World", beginning with the Cuban Revolution of 1959. For the second wave of theories of I, his book played a role similar to that of Hobson's for the first. However, he did not formulate a specific theory of I. It became implicitly clear that I is an element inherent to capitalism that alters with the changing forms of capitalist development.

The work that Baran wrote together with Paul Sweezy, *Monopoly Capital* (1966), placed the emphasis upon American militarism and I. For the American oligarchy, a large and growing military machinery is existentially necessary in order to contain, force back, and ultimately destroy the rival socialist world system, as well as propping up "allies" and other clients that are willing to adjust their laws and policies to the needs of American "big business" (1966, 191, 201). Military build-up absorbs a growing share of surplus value produced, but whereas massive state expenditures for education and welfare threaten to weaken the position of the oligarchy, military expenditures do the opposite: 'militarization fosters all the reactionary and irrational forces in society [...]

Blind respect is engendered for authority; attitudes of docility and conformity are taught and enforced; dissent is treated as unpatriotic or even treasonable. In such an atmosphere, the oligarchy feels that its moral authority and material position are secure' (209).

In 1968, Harry **Magdoff** published an economic analysis of the 'new I' using the USA as his primary example. 'I is not a matter of choice for a capitalist society; it is the way of life for such a society' (1969, 26). Its fundamental need is to gain control of as many sources of raw materials as possible, 'wherever these raw materials may be' (35). As a result, the USA develop a strong dependency upon raw material imports, in particular of strategic industrial materials, increase their direct investment in foreign countries, and place great importance on military expenditures for leading enterprises.

In a series of articles from the 1970s, Stephen **Hymer** (1979) examined the rise of transnational corporations and the internationalisation of capital, which led to a modification of the hierarchical structure and control over the world economy. According to Hymer, if either an increase in competition or the working class became a threat, transnational corporations were in a position to retreat to other markets and unify their interests. The increase of their power and their dominance within the newly emerging global economic order created centralised decision-making processes and effected a division of labour between nations that corresponded to the division of labour within the hierarchy of an enterprise. Parallel to this, Christian **Palliox** (1975) developed a formal model of accumulation on the world market. He relied empirically upon a comparative study of various strategies used by European countries to promote the growth of select branches of industry in order to be able to react to the new global constellation. The concept of a "new international division of labour" and its repercussions for the working class in the industrialised and tricontinental countries was further developed by Folker **Fröbel**, Jürgen **Heinrichs**, and Otto **Kreye** (1977). From the viewpoint of the "tricont", the "new Is" were aggregated under the term "neo-colonialism" – Kwame **Nkrumah's** *Neo-Colonialism – the Last Stage of Imperialism* (1965) being exemplary. The then-dominant euphoric mood was expressed by Jack **Woddis**, for whom neo-colonialism was a reaction to the liberation movements of the tricont: 'This phase is one in which I is faced with the emergence of a powerful socialist camp, an unprecedentedly powerful national liberation movement [...] and a strong working class and democratic movement in the industrialised capitalist countries' (1967, 50).

Building upon **Lenin's** configuration of the characteristics of I, James **O'Connor** provided an updated list: 1. integration of the capitalist world economy by transnational corporations dominated by the US, under whose auspices technical revolutions are accelerated; 2. A turn away from the "free" international

market, which is replaced by price regulation; 3. The participation of state capital in international investments; 4. the replacement of national rivalries by the consolidation of an international ruling class; 5. the intensification of all of these tendencies due to the threat posed by socialism to the capitalist world system (121).

Dependency theory and the world systems approach were the most politically influential variants of the second wave of theories of I; both were closely interconnected to examinations of unequal exchange (Emmanuel 1969). Central to these theories and predictions, however, was the capitalist world system, described as a relatively stable system of domination and exploitation sustained by a contradictory centre-periphery relation. 'The connection between I and world capitalism is so close, I is so much an intimate part of world capitalism that capitalism cannot exist without I. We may in fact see the two phenomena as synonyms' (Addo 1986, 14).

André Gunder Frank would later claim that the tendency to reduce global capitalism to a structurally fixed system with a spatial dichotomy and to equate this with I was part of the problem: central concepts of dependency theory such as 'over/underdevelopment', 'capitalism', or 'dependency' were 'all derived only from European/Western ethnocentrism, which was propagated around the world [...] as part and parcel of Western colonialism and cultural I' (1998, 336).

6. The looming end of the competition between social systems, the neoliberal reordering of global capitalism and the decline of the "Third World movement" mandated a rethinking of I. On the basis of a comparison between American I and the earlier empires of the Dutch and the English, Giovanni Arrighi (1994) depicts the history of world capitalism in long, secular cycles: the phase of expansion with its diverse possibilities for investing money profitably is gradually replaced by a phase of stagnation in which capitalists attempt to transfer their fixed capital into more liquid forms of property, which leads to financial speculation at the global level. What distinguishes the individual 'systemic cycles of accumulation' is the character of the driving investments and the hegemonic centres. The territorial basis of the dominant factions of capital has gradually expanded: from an almost non-territorial "network" of capital, hegemony passed to the Netherlands, then Great Britain, and finally to the continental power of the USA. In this manner, it is possible to compare the different capitalist regimes of accumulation with each other and reconstruct the formation of American hegemony around the turn of the millennium.

Alfred W. Crosby's study of *Ecological Imperialism* (1987) sheds light upon an aspect that was hardly considered in earlier examinations of European expan-

sion: the colonising Europeans, with the plants and animals they brought with them, triggered an ecological shock in local cultures which made them more susceptible to epidemics and famine. Mike Davis demonstrates how cyclical climatic phenomena like *El Niño*, came to be “natural” catastrophes through the advancement of the capitalist mode of production and the destruction of old, relatively acclimatised ways of life in India, China, Brazil, and Ethiopia. Thus underdevelopment had already been produced in the late 18th cent., and a ‘Third World’ was ‘made’. ‘Millions died, not outside the modern “world system”, but in the very process of being forcibly incorporated into its economic and political structures. They died in the golden age of Liberal Capitalism; indeed, many were murdered [...] by the theological application of the sacred principles of **Smith, Bentham, and Mill**’ (2001, 9).

Prabath Patnaik’s study *Accumulation and Stability under Capitalism* (1997) connects post-Keynesian theories of growth and distribution with theories of unequal development, in order to better grasp the functioning and elasticity of the capitalist system. The periphery provides a buffer that allows growth in the capitalist centre to proceed relatively free from crisis and inflation. Capitalism can stabilise itself because the wages of an outsourced part of the labour force, above all producers in the primary sector, are ‘compressible’ due to the reserve army in surrounding areas (1997, 9). According to Patnaik, it is precisely this complex system with a spatial dichotomy and a functional economic unit that constitutes contemporary I. This allows for I to almost self-legitimize. Because the system ‘functions well’ at the centre, this appears as an inherent quality of the system itself, and poverty, unemployment, and social unrest “outside” appear to be attributable to the fact that capitalism has not yet developed far enough there: ‘its ideological triumph consists in the illusion that it creates, including among its victims, that its success at the core is replicable everywhere’ (1997, 182).

The centres are not only interested in non-renewable resources from the peripheries, but are also always reliant upon the import of agricultural products. Charles A.S. Hall et al. (2000) use the example of Costa Rica to demonstrate how the intensive industrialised cultivation of monocultures for export leads to soil erosion, the loss of biodiversity, higher susceptibility to illness, as well as a declining ability on the part of many countries to feed their own populations. Ecological I refers to the state of affairs in which the environmental costs of the “Northern” standard of living is imposed mainly upon the export countries of the South. Despite the disproportionate share in the use of natural resources worldwide, the centres are able to preserve their own “ecological capital” at the expense of others. They maintain the illusion that further growth is the solution to ecological problems, and accuse poor countries of not ensur-

ing the preservation of their natural resources (for example, the Brazilian rain forests) (**Muradian/Martínez-Alier** 2001; **Andersson/Lindroth** 2001). Bilateral and multilateral agreements and patent regulations are attempts by agribusiness and the pharmaceuticals industry to politically and institutionally secure the private appropriation and valorisation of genetic resources (see **Brand/Görg** 2001).

Multiple Marxist investigations concentrate upon the establishment of a neoliberal global order dominated by the USA. **Walden Bello** (1994) demonstrates how primarily the USA has pushed through a series of measures to dismantle trade barriers, open borders to investments, extensively privatise state sectors, dismantle welfare state rights, reduce wages, and devalue currencies, which has led to disastrous consequences for the global poor. **Peter Gowan** (1999) examines in detail how the USA instituted the “Dollar-Wall Street Regime” and used it, via the collaboration of private international financial actors with the dollar policies of the US government, to impose their national interests on the world market. Beginning with the unilateral termination of the Bretton Woods Agreement in 1971, increasingly differentiated strategies were developed in order to force internal economic and political reforms upon countries that did not follow the Anglo-American model of liberal capitalism. In this respect, **Stephen Gill** speaks of a ‘new constitutionalism’ of ‘disciplinary neoliberalism’ that helps to anchor the power of capital within the state and civil society by means of macro- and micro-economic discipline (2000, 4). **Kees Van der Pijl** (1997) examines the formation of a transnational ‘Atlantic ruling class’. As **Leo Panitch** notes, as early as 1973, **Nicos Poulantzas** had described a new era of I by specifying three imperialist phases: a transitional phase from competitive capitalism to I, a phase of consolidation and finally, after the Second World War, ‘a new epoch of American global dominance, entailing a new type of non-territorial I, implanted and maintained not through direct rule by the metropolis, nor even through political subordination of a neo-colonial type, but rather through the induced reproduction of the form of the dominant imperialist power within each national formation and its state’ (**Panitch** 2000, 9; see **Poulantzas** 1973, 25 et sqq.).

Susan Strange also points out that a ‘structural power’ (1988, 24) has formed which in some regards is more reminiscent of the Roman Empire than of powerful nation states. With regard to the USA, she writes of a ‘nonterritorial empire with its imperial capital in Washington, D.C.’ (1989, 167). **Michael Hardt** and **Antonio Negri** claim to transcend the term I with their concept of empire. They determine I to be a relic of a bygone world divided into nation-states. ‘I is over. No nation will be world leader in the way modern European nations were’ (2001, xiv). Empire rules the entire “civilised” world, without ter-

ritorial limits. Whether an all-encompassing empire will mark the new epoch, or whether imperialist rivalries will assert themselves again, is a question that is both decisive for the future of humanity as well as open. Many aspects of the situation at the beginning of the 21st cent. display parallels to the dynamics of the international system at the end of the 19th cent. According to Peter Gowan, the key elements of analysis in both cases are the same, namely the dominant states (USA/Great Britain), their main competitors (EU/Germany and Japan), the new centres of growth (East Asia), and dependent regions; labour organisations in both epochs were weak. There are admittedly great differences. Thus, for example, internationalisation in the 19th cent. took place within the context of the extraordinary stability of the international gold and financial system, instead of the 'chaos of the Dollar-Wall Street Regime' (1999, 72).

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→ accumulation, capitalism, casino-capitalism, colonialism, cultural imperialism, dependency theory, domination/rule, ecological colonialism, ecological imperialism, empire, fascism, finance capital, Fourth World, globalisation, hegemony, Indian question, international division of labour, international mobility of capital, international political economy, late capitalism, media imperialism, monopoly, monopoly capital, multinational corporations, nation state, nationalism, neocolonialism, periphery/centre, social imperialism, state monopoly capitalism, Third World, three worlds theory, transnational capitalism, transnational corporations, tricontinent, ultra-imperialism, unequal exchange, underconsumption, underdevelopment, wild capitalism, world economy, world market, worldsystem

→ Akkumulation, Dependenztheorie, Drei-Welten-Theorie, Dritte Welt, Faschismus, Finanzkapital, Globalisierung, Hegemonie, Herrschaft, Imperium, Indische Frage, internationale Arbeitsteilung, internationale politische Ökonomie, Kapitalismus, Kapitalmobilität (internationale), Kasino-Kapitalismus, Kolonialismus, Kulturimperialismus, Medienimperialismus, Monopol, Monopolkapital, multinationale Konzerne, Nationalismus, Nationalstaat, Neokolonialismus, Ökokolonialismus, ökologischer Imperialismus, Peripherie/Zentrum, Sozialimperialismus, Spätkapitalismus, staatsmonopolistischer Kapitalismus, transnationale Konzerne, transnationaler Kapitalismus, Trikontinent, Ultraimperialismus, ungleicher Tausch, Unterentwicklung, Unterkonsumtion, Vierte Welt, Weltmarkt, Weltsystem, Weltwirtschaft, wilder Kapitalismus

Intellectuals

A: al-mutaqaffūn. – F: intellectuals. – G: Intellektuelle. – R: intelligenty. – S: intelectuales. – C: zhīshi fēnzǐ 知识分子

Prior to all reduction of intellectual praxis to the activity of “scribes” as the chosen representatives of the “intellectualitas”, the latter term generally means “the ability to grasp something” (Georges). It denotes the ability to orient oneself in the world generally, to develop a concept of the social and natural world together with all other members of society, to make use of this as knowledge and to pass it on to subsequent generations. This general function of orientation through understanding and knowing can be acquired and monopolised as a symbolic monopoly of interpretation, a “clerus” which presides over special cultural techniques – the written word, a canon of texts, an institutionalised hierarchy of knowledge and rituals which regulate belonging and upward mobility. Mastering these bodies of transmitted knowledge and controlling access to them are linked to the function of the ideological reproduction of the symbolic order (or symbolic order of values) and justifies the exclusion of the “simple” as the “uneducated” from the organisation of ideal socialisation. Vis-à-vis the “naturalness” of this secular order of things, Antonio Gramsci emphasises: ‘All men are I [...], but not all men in society have the function of I’ (PN, Notebook 12, §1, 1500). One goal of emancipation consists in achieving a new balance between physical and intellectual labour that would overcome one of the social divisions of labour embedded most deeply in the layers of social organisation, such that all can enjoy their full intellectual competence and participate in a shared understanding of the world.

1. Analysing the concept historically, a group can be singled out as ‘I among the Middle Age clerics, ‘who think and teach their thoughts as an occupation’ (Le Goff 1993, 7), characterised by scholars who possessed a level of ability to manoeuvre vis-à-vis the revealed truth administered by the church apparatus or even, as in the case of the Averroists, who separated truth and philosophy in order to philosophise, no longer ‘secundum veritatem’, but rather ‘secundum philosophum’, consequently securing an independent space for philosophical truth to manoeuvre (see Müller 1947, 6). Where feudal society fixes groups in the social hierarchy, a certain independence is lent to those who, as protagonists of modernity, are convinced they are dwarves sitting on the

shoulders of giants, as the famous formulation of **Bernhard v. Chartres** states, with which they measure cultural progress in relation to antiquity (see **Le Goff** 1993, 20).

In the 19th cent., various expressions are used side by side: the educated, the spiritual, literati, ideologues, intellectual labourers, intelligentsia. The first explicit usage of the expression I is found in Claude-Henri de **Saint-Simon** (see **Julliard/Winock** 1996; **Rademacher** 1993, 129). He underscored the productive function of I by categorising them as ‘industrialists of theory’ (145 et sq.) alongside wage-earners, manufacturers, and bankers in the ‘industrial class’.

The modern term – “les intellectuels” – emerges towards the end of the 19th cent. in the Dreyfus affair, itself a lesson in cultural hegemony. The initially individual concern of several literati, seeking to express their indignation at a judicial error whose victim is the French-Jewish officer **Alfred Dreyfus**, takes on the dimensions of a social movement. Where the traditional institutions fail – politics, the judiciary, the army and the church – a movement crystallises, presenting itself in the name of “justice” and “truth” and antagonistically occupying the field of exposition of the highest ideological values. **Emile Zola**, a leading representative of the naturalist novel, hurls his ‘J’accuse’ against the nationalists and militarists on his own behalf. “Les intellectuels”, initially deployed by the opponents of the “dreyfusards” as an insult, is fashioned into an honorary title by all those who raise their voices against injustice of every kind. That the “I” to be understood under this label cannot be ascribed to a specific occupational group can be deduced from the *Manifesto of the I* circulated in 1898, which demanded an appeal to the trial. Here, cooks, printers, business travellers and skilled labourers appear alongside literati and professors (**Bering** 1978, 38). They are bound together as organisers of an alternative collective will which challenges the dominant power bloc. The hopelessness of the discussions in the labour movement concerning the “class character” of I is the symptom of a reductionist conception of the social totality and its ideological reproduction, which knows only “capitalists” and “workers”. Although **Marx** and **Engels** had delineated a non-reductionist understanding in the *German Ideology*, it was only **Gramsci** who would achieve a paradigm shift in the conception of I. He understood them not primarily as an occupational group in terms of the circulation of capital or according to their self-understanding as great intellectual heroes, but rather under the aspect of their organising function in the ensemble of social relations and the division of labour. There is no ‘organisation without I’ (*PN*, Notebook 11, §12, 1385) – as true for the Catholic Church as it is for the Communist Party or an entrepreneurs’ association.

2. **Marx and Engels** generally use the term ‘ideologue’ or ‘ideological castes’, thereby illustrating that the function and significance of the corresponding activities emerge out of the structure of the mode of production. From the producing segments of the bourgeoisie ideologues receive the means for and tasks of intellectual production. The ideologues conceptualise the bourgeois worldview and organise an active consensus in the form of a multiplicity of novel superstructures. This forms the terrain upon which class struggles are conducted.

The term ideologue casts a critical light on the bourgeoisie and the religious-illusionary character of its convictions, yet also tends to give the impression that it is analytically sufficient merely to make a denunciation of intellectual praxis while being critical towards ideology. Nonetheless, a moment of I’s social-organisational productivity becomes evident in the ability of the bourgeoisie to assimilate ‘the old ideological castes’ (*Theories of Surplus Value*, MECW 30/197) and transform them ‘into its functionaries’ (197), which will also inform the **Gramscian** conception of I. The expansive force of the bourgeoisie is explained by its ability to ‘profane’ the intellectual functions tied to the feudal world and to relate in a ‘severely critical’ manner towards the old state machinery (30) – aspects which are relevant to a class which seeks to become hegemonically dominant. It is not only a matter of conceptualising new thoughts, but rather of their “socialisation” and assertion, up to and including the ability to influence a new common sense. **Marx and Engels’s** critical perspective on ideology, revoking the credibility of the biased notion that ideas were motivating people, reveals its limitation where its fruitful insights can no longer be pursued and the concrete “how” of the organisation of ideological domination is not attended to.

Alongside the critical perspective on ideology, the question of the class-theoretical determination of I emerges in the writings of **Marx** closely connected to his assessment of revolutionary theory. To integrate I into the bourgeoisie dominates largely because the activity proclaimed to be human “nature” requires social relations in which it is above all the “bourgeois” who expands his horizons of possibility and action potency. Following the criterion of ownership over the means of production, the I belong more to the petit bourgeoisie or the working class. In terms of the process of production in its totality, I can also be viewed as an organ of the collective labourer. Even if their labour power directly serves the valorisation of capital and they produce surplus value, this does not necessarily say anything about whether they will “betray” the bourgeoisie and become critics of bourgeois society. Where the question of the I’s class belonging sets the agenda, the problem of the bourgeois I switching classes becomes central in the revolutionary perspective. Changing classes initially

occurs as a polarisation of the ruling class, which seeks to pursue its politics further by means of the classes of the people through its I. The I are thus not only passive and fickle defectors, but rather organisers of a social bloc. **Marx** preferred a political-cultural explanation for those 'who have raised themselves to the level of comprehending theoretically the historical movement as a whole', citing the fact that, due to intensifying class struggles, a process of dissolution emerges within the ruling class (*Manifesto*, MECW 6/494). The behaviour of the bourgeois I plays a significant role because with their loss, the bourgeoisie's capability to decapitate the subaltern classes is also weakened. 'The more a dominant class is able to absorb the best people from the dominated classes, the more solid and dangerous its rule' (*C III*, 736).

2.1 With the rise of the German working class beginning in the 1880s, **Engels's** thought is dominated by a critical perspective on the people 'who consider their modicum of education absolutely essential if the worker is not to emancipate himself but rather be liberated by them. In their eyes, the emancipation of the working class is attainable only through your eddicated mediocrity; how could the poor, helpless, uneddicated workers hope to achieve it on their own account?' (to **Bernstein**, 13 September 1882, MECW 46/325 [MEW 35/360 et sq.]). The ironic view towards the 'eddicated mediocrity [jebildeten Spießbürger]', who brings the workers their knowledge, correctly shines a critical light on the educationism of the teacher who neglects his self-education; this experience gives expression to the fact that the liberation of the worker can only be the work of the workers themselves, but also becomes a point of departure for an attitude which is directed head-on against "the I" and the "Spießbürger" under them as the dominant figure. This attitude can be found both "below" and "above", as much among the "left communist" groups of 1920s Germany (cf. **Bering** 1978, 155 et sq.) as in the executive staff of the Communist state party, which took up the emancipation of the workers as its sole responsibility.

Karl Kautsky's formulation of the problem draws on a thread of **Marx's** theory to specify a class-theoretical perspective. **Kautsky's** analysis becomes reductionist at the point where a certain individual behaviour is "derived" from or even predicted by an economic category – class. Since under the explosive development of the forces of production, "education", according to **Kautsky**, is becoming 'a special trade' conducted by a 'special class' (1892/1910, 36 et sq.), the growing demand for technicians, doctors, teachers, etc. devalues the monopoly of the "educated": 'They have ceased to be the leaders of the capitalist class and have become their bailiffs instead. Place-hunting takes more and more of their energies. Their first care is not the development of their intellect, but the sale of it' (40). To the extent that the 'condition of the proletariat' becomes

‘more and more that of the whole population’ (35), the “educated” increasingly become ‘educated workers’; they constitute an “intellectual” or “educated” proletariat’ (40) and in this way demonstrate to the wage-labourers that there is no individual way out of their class condition. “To the individual proletarian the prospect has vanished of ever being able, by his own efforts, to pull himself out of the quagmire into which the present system of production has pushed him. The individual proletarian can accomplish his own redemption only with the redemption of his whole class’ (42). When Kautsky draws the conclusion of an inevitable proletarianisation of the “educated” from the enormous expansion of the higher education system that forms the basis for meeting the rising demand for technical intelligentsia, his manner of speaking takes for granted that which first of all should have been a topic of a politics that would not have merely been fixed in the ‘party form’ (Vacca 1985, 105): That the ‘conquest’ of the I by social democracy seems to be already secured by the fact that the latter understood itself as the ‘empirical site of consciousness of the historical necessity of socialism’ (ibid.). With his gaze fixed on the inherent necessity of class position, from which he hopes for revolutionary effects, **Kautsky** has no sense at all for new types of intellectuality that arise with the growing scientification of production. It is as if the admiration for an old variety of I is still hidden in the analysis of education as a trade, one which encourages a subaltern form of zeal for education within social democracy.

2.2 With **Lenin**, in the context of the split of the Russian social democrats into a ‘majority’ and a ‘minority’, into a ‘revolutionary’ wing and an ‘opportunist’ wing (1904, CW 7/204), the term I takes on a polemical edge. For example, he states that the Mensheviks have a ‘leaning towards the mentality of the bourgeois intellectual, who is only prepared to “accept organisational relations platonically”’ and exhibits a ‘tendency towards autonomism as against centralism’ (205). **Martov**, a leading representative of the “minority”, is said to exhibit ‘the instability and wishy-washiness of the intellectual’, and ‘feeble whining of I who happened to find themselves in the minority’ (324), designations with which **Lenin** relates to ‘the brilliant social and psychological characterisation’ of the I by **Kautsky** (322). In doing so, **Lenin** specifies that he uses ‘the words intellectual and intelligentsia to translate the German *Literat* and *Literatentum*, which include not only writers but in general all educated people, the members of the liberal professions, the brain workers [...] as distinct from manual workers’ (322, fn.). Where the usual “*Literat*” is characterised by the inability to accept ‘being a part subordinate to a whole’ (**Kautsky**, cit. in **Lenin**, 323), **Wilhelm Liebknecht** and **Marx** are put forward as ‘an ideal example of the kind of intellectual the socialist movement needs’, whose chief characteristic is that their ‘party dis-

cipline [...] was exemplary' (**Kautsky**, cit. in **Lenin**, 323 et sq.). With this rather moralising critique, **Lenin** is not able to arrive at a theoretical insight into the activities and contradictions of the I in movements of emancipation. A lack of respect is a vital quality of the I and this is especially true for the scientists and scholars among them. It was precisely the disciplining of the I in the organisations of the workers' movement and the practice of accrediting platitudes that produced the paradoxical figure of the "independent Marxist", who steps in to counter the 'administrative intervention into scientific processes' for the ruthless development of critical scholarship (**Haug** 1977/1985, 64).

Even though polemical verbiage dominates in this constellation of infighting over the correct party line, it would be false to pin **Lenin** down to that, as Dietz **Bering** does, prefacing his study with the following sentence characterising that dispute: 'A tight hold must always be kept on the intelligentsia' (CW 8/415). **Lenin** also sees that the I, tied as they are to the bourgeoisie, can become a force in the struggle against Tsarist autocracy or – as in the case of the Dreyfus affair – 'against clerical and military reactionaries' (1919, CW 30/219). This is because they express 'the essential interests of the bourgeois class as a whole' and provide the petit bourgeoisie and the peasants with 'knowledge, programme, guidance, and organisation' (1905, CW 9/215). **Lenin's** apprehension – that the I who are involved in workers' organisations were likely to hinder a decisive revolutionary politics – is influenced by his experience in exile: isolated from the concrete struggles, they lack a realistic assessment of the relations of power, something that can lead to 'instinctive anarchism' (CW 7/454). Thus critique and education within the party becomes necessary.

The successful revolution of 1917 allows **Lenin** to fully understand that a moralising evaluation of the I leads to nothing. He emphasises that the label of the I as bourgeois or petit bourgeois should not at all be understood as a term of abuse, but should rather be seen as a 'class characterisation' (CW 29/230). He explicitly rejects the use of 'incitement' against the I. This is particularly clear in the question of the 'bourgeois experts' who must be won over to the cause of the workers. 'As they see the working class promoting organised and advanced sections, which not only value culture but also help to convey it to the people, they are changing their attitude towards us' (180). The experts are not 'the servitors of the exploiters', but 'cultural workers' who 'in a proletarian society [...] would serve us' (180 et sq.). **Lenin's** argument that the I should only be characterised as petit bourgeoisie analytically, without discrediting them as such, does not prevail in the context of the need, which asserted itself again and again, within the socialist movement for polemical terminology. By underscoring the aspect of conviction, **Lenin** relativised resentment against 'the' I, already undergirded

with class-reductive assumptions, and thus created a point of departure which tends to treat the problem as a question of alliances and in this way to overcome mistrust toward the “wishy-washy” and trouble-stirring I.

3. The ‘Formation of Italian I groups’ is in the list of **Gramsci’s** ‘Main topics’ which opens the first of his *Prison Notebooks* from 1929 (*Prison Notebooks*, 99). On 19 March 1927, Gramsci named four subjects in a letter to Tanja **Schucht**, firstly an examination of the ‘formation of the public spirit in Italy during the past century’, and thus a study of “Italian I” (*Letters from Prison* I, 83) that paradigmatically represent an aberration: They are ‘a caste and not a part of the people equipped with organic functions’ (*Prison Notebooks*, *PN*. 21, § 5, 2044). The subject becomes significant in his reformulation of the concept of hegemony, where the rhetoric of the ‘leading role of the working class’ is held up to the mirror of the influence that it has actually had upon society.

3.1 **Gramsci** no longer conceives of the I in relation to class theory and the logic of the circulation of capital. He focuses on the activity of the I in the organisation of the dominant culture and their work in opposing to the emancipatory movements of the classes and groups held in a “subaltern” position. To this end, he draws on the concrete relationship between “manual” and “mental” work to provide him with analytical instruments. These, however, signify biases rather than essences, assigned according to class limitations. As manual labour contains moments of intellectuality, so intellectual work contains moments of physicality. Those who work also think and have a conception of the world; but at the same time they are also dispossessed and dominated culturally. The ‘trained gorilla’, as Frederick W. **Taylor** describes the worker under Fordism, is a ‘metaphor’ used ‘to display a boundary in a particular direction’ (*Prison Notebooks*, *PN* 12, § 1, 1499 et sq.). **Gramsci** shifts his attention away from activity towards the socially formative function. The I take over certain functions of the bourgeoisie, comparable to the clergymen tasked, as the I-category ‘organically’ tied to the landed aristocracy, with integrating the subaltern groups into the feudal regime and organising their consent. The capitalist entrepreneur must have specific intellectual abilities, he must be an ‘organiser of human masses [...], an organiser of the “trust” of those who invest in his business, of those who buy his goods’ (1497). In order to carry out this work, the bourgeoisie ensures the formation of a corresponding category of I. Like other groups determined by material production, ‘one or more strata of I are created organically’, and appointed to produce ‘the most advantageous conditions for the expansion of their own class’ (ibid.). As it is not enough just ‘to make individually “original” discoveries’, but rather ‘to spread truths critically’ (*PN* 11, § 12, 1377), the I only

prove themselves in their organisational function when they act not merely as specialists in a particular branch of knowledge, but as the ‘organiser[s] of a new culture’ (PN 12, § 1, 1497), of a new ‘intellectual and moral order’ (PN 11, § 12, 1377).

The relationship between the I and the world of production is “mediated” through the entire social fabric, through the complex of superstructures in which they serve as “functionaries” (PN 12, § 1, 1501 et sq.). It is characteristic of his position that Gramsci uses this to expand the concept of the I. The I have an organisational function not only in culture, but in both sectors of the ruling class, civil society and the political class. In civil society the I of the dominant groups contribute to the universalisation of their corporate interests, thus furthering their hegemony by attempting to win over the subaltern groups consensually. The I who work within the anti-hegemonic organisations of emancipation movements of the “subaltern” have a correspondingly inverse effect. Among the political class (that is, the parties, parliament, government, police, courts – the state itself) the I have an organising and unifying role. When the traditional ‘caste prejudices’ (1502) are removed from the I as the “bourgeois” intellectual heroes, their intellectual activities and functions open up as a complex social field: now the ‘most modest “administrators” and popularisers of the already available [...] intellectual wealth’ move into the picture alongside the ‘founders of the various sciences, philosophy, art, etc.’ that stand on the ‘highest rank’. If Gramsci here uses military metaphors to describe this field – ‘subaltern officers, higher officers, general staff’ (1503), it is because the I retain an essential function in the ‘trench warfare’ of both civil society and the political class. There is an analogue in this to Walter Benjamin, who, in opposition to a cultish worship of the work of art in literary history, insisted the discipline study the ‘geological structure of the book-alps, rather than confining itself to a view of the peaks’ (*SelWr*, 225). Similarly, ‘troop service ranks’ first appear in Gramsci below those I ‘whose real significance is greater than is normally thought’ (PN 12, § 1, 1503). It is, however, not “very respectable” to seek out one’s opponents among the dumbest and the most mediocre’ (PN 11, § 15, 1402), as in Nikolai Bukharin’s instruction book on historical materialism, which treats the ‘greatest I exceedingly briefly’ (§ 22, 1417). Hence the eminent significance of an ‘*Anti-Croce*, which in the modern cultural climate could be as significant as *Anti-Dühring* had been for the pre-World War I generation’ (PN 10.1, § 11, 1248).

3.2 With this new way of looking at the problem, the distinction between “traditional” and “organic” I, which Marx had already indicated, becomes central. The ‘assimilation and “ideological” conquest of the traditional I’ becomes all the more successful for the ascendant group ‘the more it trains its own organic

I simultaneously' (N. 12, § 1, 1500). If the Church was able to exercise its 'monopoly in cultural leadership' over the course of centuries (1507), it was because, on the one hand, the 'clergy' acted as the I category 'organically bound to the landowning aristocracy' and at once on equal legal footing with them (1498). On the other hand, it was due to the fact that, with the Church, they commanded a 'transnationally' organised apparatus and, with Latin, a linguistic medium that ensured a space in which their own action could resonate. To the extent that the Church-maintained 'hierarchy of the I' served to perpetuate the 'community of believers', they also possess an organic character: thus the relationship of the I/laymen comes into view as the strategic point of deployment of every hegemonic construction. Such a construction will be all the more fragile in efforts to spread a new kind of common sense, to lift ever wider layers of society intellectually, that is, to give personality to the 'amorphous masses', by forming 'I elites of a new type' 'who emerge directly from the masses and nevertheless remain in contact with them and become their "supporting pillars"' (N. 11, § 12, 1390). The I's "organic" character consequently determines whether the 'transition from knowledge to understanding, to feeling, and vice versa' is functional, or whether it will be cut short by either "pedantry" and "philistinism" [Spießbürgertum] or by 'blind passion' and 'sectarianism' (§ 67, 1490). From this point of view a relation between I and laymen appears as 'traditional', one which strives to leave to 'the "laymen" in their primitive philosophy of common sense' instead of erecting a 'moral-intellectual bloc which makes massive intellectual progress possible and not only one of sparse intellectual groups' (§ 12, 1383 et sq.). The difficulty of remaining in contact with the "laymen" or coming into contact with them at all leads Gramsci to his thesis on the cosmopolitan character of the Italian I who hindered a popular-national unity movement in Italy. Against this backdrop, Julien Benda's well-known pamphlet against the 'treason' of the I reveals itself to be an apology for the traditional I who devotes themselves to the 'pursuit of eternal things and values' (1927/2006, 30). Although Jacques Julliard and Michel Winock identify 'commitment' as the criterion which qualifies scholars, writers and artists as I (1996, 12), they nevertheless follow Benda in this question when they adhere to his demarcation between 'service to ideas' and service to 'parties': The 'sad 20th century, accompanied by the double adventure of fascism and above all Communism, is a long bracket within a historical tradition the unworthy son of which [...] is Sartre' (13).

3.3 Gramsci rightly suspects that Paul Nizan's polemic against 'modern philosophy' (*The Watchdogs*, 1932), which appeared as he was working on his notebook on I and which he only knew from indirect sources, was written 'in support of a philosophy of praxis' (PN 10.11, § 50, 1343). Nizan calls

for philosophers to be ranked 'differently than according to the rank of their intelligence', in order to emphasise that philosophies can serve 'liberation and oppression' (1932/1969). 'It is not "thought" but what people really think that unites humans or makes them different' (*PN* 7, § 35, 186). If Nizan, who joined the CP in 1927 and left it in 1939 in protest against the Hitler-Stalin Pact, takes up an 'open party', it is no longer as the 'voice of the intellect', but as 'one voice among many', and as a 'philosopher', who links his work 'the trivial demands of the concrete people', and therefore acts as a 'technician of these demands' by expressing the 'gradually awakening revolt of the people' (1932/1971, 198 et sq.). He not only supplies his friend **Sartre** with the keyword for the latter's concept of commitment, but also directs our attention to the axis of the I as a people, no longer to the 'people' designated as such by 'our fathers with a mixture of confidentiality, arrogance and hope', but rather to the 'proletariat'. However, it remains unclear what exactly the 'annexation' between 'the philosophy of **Marx** and **Lenin**' Nizan calls for actually looks like (194). The 'philosophy of the deed (praxis, development), but not the "pure" deed, but rather precisely the "impure" deed' (*PN* 11, § 64, 1479), which **Gramsci** develops with the question of the socially formative function of the I and their translation into the hegemony-theoretical problematic and the creation of a new stratum of I, remains unelaborated in Nizan. Even though he seeks to begin by dispelling the identification of the I with the conventional image of the scholar, the philosopher or the artist, he does not bring this problematic onto the terrain of the 'modern world', a world that requires a technical education closely connected to industrial work, and thus fails to turn it into something that can become a 'basis of the new type of I' (*PN* 12, § 3, 1531). **Gramsci** attributes the success of the journal *Ordine Nuovo* (1919–1920) to precisely this merit: that he no longer appeared as a 'mere orator' but as a 'constructor, organiser, "long-term persuader" who educates the specialists into "leaders" (specialists + politicians)' (1532).

4. Bertolt **Brecht's** *Galileo* despises people 'whose brains aren't capable of filling their stomachs' (*GA* 5, 213; *GW*, 1259). Indeed, the wise minds can be 'utilised very foolishly, both by the powerful and by their owners themselves'. In antagonistic societies, in which the 'good life of the few [...] is produced from the bad life of the many', the 'wise minds' must be deployed in order 'to overturn the most foolish of institutions' – something which only works as long as they take 'filling their stomachs', which they expect from the currently dominant class, to be their main occupation (18, 70; 12, 436). The notes toward the novel *Tui per-vade* Brecht's work as those on Lorianism run through **Gramsci's**: the Brechtian 'Tellekt-uell-in' (17, 68; 12, 598) – the 'I of this time of markets and commodities', who rents out his intellect (153; 611) – is no more an isolated case than **Gram-**

sci's Lorian, who is characterised by 'ethical weakness and permissiveness in the area of scientific-cultural activity' (PN 28, 2223). If the main doctrine at the Tui-school is summarised in the line 'consciousness determines being' (Brecht, GA 17, 27; GW 12, 611), then the breadbasket in this school, being pulled higher in the case of answers deemed wrong as they legitimate the dominant relations poorly because transparently, illustrates that there is not much to the notion of a determining role of consciousness. In his American exile, Brecht notes: 'the great comedy of them believing to direct and being directed, the quixotism of consciousness, which alleges to determine social being – that was presumably only valid for Europe'. The 'sale of opinions' does not need to be revealed when it occurs 'naked' (AJ, 18.4.1942).

Brecht sees the expression of a 'strong fighting instinct' in the 'utter distrust' with which the proletariat views the I, whose 'historical usefulness' is especially of interest to him (1929/30, GA 21, 339; GW 20, 52). The proletariat needs the I '1. To undermine bourgeois ideology. [...] 2. To study the forces which "move the world". [...] 3. To develop pure theory'. The second answer is made more precise: 'Primarily in non-revolutionary situations, a revolutionary intelligentsia can preserve the revolution' (1935; 22, 150; 20, 54). The function the I were to fulfil was 'leadership' – an 'essential function', in which one can hardly decide 'whether these individuals such as **Marx, Lenin** etc. had their function ascribed to them by the proletariat or themselves assigned to the proletariat a function' (21, 338 et sq.; 20, 52). It can only be exercised, of course, when this dialectic is not immobilised through conditions of dominance and subordination. Even the I's 'commonly emerging view' 'that it is necessary to disappear into the proletariat is counter-revolutionary', for only 'evolutionists believe in an overthrow of the social order through "participation"' (339; 53). The question of which class the I belong to is not a question of sociological categorisation for Brecht. Rather, it is translated in terms of praxis and philosophy: The role of the I in the revolution can only be an 'intellectual role' in the activation of a 'dynamic, politically speaking, liquidating intellect' (340; 53).

Gramsci's shifting of the I concept to the aspect of its social function is also crucial in Brecht's understanding of the matter. The Tui, the knowledge worker, the intervening thinker, the "philosopher" – all these terms describe "thinking". Not, however, as a function tied to specific occupations, but as a 'behaviour' (GW 20, 166), a socialising act that can be aimed towards the reproduction of the dominant conditions, but can also aim towards intervention from an emancipatory perspective. There is 'nothing blameworthy' in the fact that fascism treats thinking as a behaviour, similar to a 'criminal act', that can be punished accordingly (167). Brecht emphasises the 'practical side' of the concept of philosophy; even 'specific modes of action and ways of behaving'

were always popularly called 'philosophical' (127). According to Brecht, professional philosophers must be observed in handfuls, when they criticise other philosophers: 'One watches artisans at work. **Hegel** describes **Kant** thusly, and **Schopenhauer** describes **Hegel** purely as one who assumes a behaviour, operates, acts. [...] In this way the interests become clear, and with the interests the philosophies' (142). "Truth" is something produced, and accordingly there is a 'mode of production of truth' (GA 22, 96). Whoever fights for the truth 'not only fights against untruth but also against certain human beings who spread it' (81).

The 'commodity character of knowledge itself' is certainly a subject that occupied **Brecht**. Beyond that, however, his underlying interest in class plays a role (**Ruoff** 1980, 76). This is not simply attributed to an already constituted and fixed interest beyond concrete action. It is formulated as the result of a process. As one of the aims of **Gramsci's** critique of objectivism is to develop a consciousness for the active side of thinking, **Brecht** also urges: 'When you conclude the necessity of a series of facts, do not forget that you yourself are one of these facts, and determine the necessity as exactly as possible, as in order to be a necessity it requires very specific action'. (GW 20, 69; cf. **Haug** 1996, 52 et sq.) Thought is an act, capable of dissolving the cement of the dominant relations just as much as it can fortify them. The 'idle ingenuity' (**Horkheimer** 1937/2002, 206) that behaves as if occupied while idling at work also has a social function.

5. For **Karl Mannheim**, who, in opposition to the illusion of "thought-in-itself", seeks to bring the 'wealth of forms in which men really think' into view (1929/1969, 4), the situation of the modern I is symbolised by the fact that they are no longer 'a member of a caste or rank', no longer a 'clergy' (11). What matters is to recognise the 'framework which, in a real division of labour' integrates 'the character of the work of every individual' (27), such as the 'social character of knowing and experiencing' which define a 'social nexus' and produce a 'consensus' in an internally divided society (20), something which in **Mannheim**, of course, hardly goes beyond particular groups. **Gramsci** develops a position from the standpoint of the "organicity" of the I and their connection to a class or group with a view to broadening not least the subaltern groups' ability to act. In **Mannheim** this appears as a deficient form which, particularly in the form of 'party functionaries', lacks 'receptivity and elasticity' (34), a form characterising an "intelligence" that just wants to escape the dead ends of 'situationally-bound thinking' (44). It is obvious that this conception was compatible with the fiction of an "unbound", autonomous thought that hardly reflected its social determinants, and that "autonomy" nevertheless belonged to the contextual preconditions of scientific action even at the point where it was 'brought into line' (cf **Haug et al.** 1989).

Against **Mannheim**, Max **Horkheimer** emphasises that critical theory is ‘neither “deeply rooted” like totalitarian propaganda nor “detached” like the liberalist intelligentsia’ (1937/2002; 223 et sq.). Only critical thinking, he claims, can become a progressive element and qualify the I as an “organ” of those whose emancipation is the I’s responsibility. His critique is ‘aggressive [...] not only against the conscious defenders of the status quo but also against distracting, conformist, or utopian tendencies within his own household’ (216). Under the conditions of fascism and exile, ‘truth has sought refuge among small groups of admirable men. But these have been decimated by terrorism and have little time for refining theory’ (237 et sq.), so that the ‘transmission of the critical theory in its strictest possible form’ appears more urgent than the ‘idea of a transformed society’, in order to work towards ‘a state of affairs in which there will be no exploitation or oppression’ (241). Accordingly, when Horkheimer and **Adorno** returned to Germany and resumed teaching in Frankfurt, it was with the goal of being able to contribute to the development of a new type of critical I under the conditions of the Fordist welfare compromise. In this new type of I, the philosophical tradition, with its claim to reason and cognition of the whole, was to be linked with knowledge of the advanced methods of social science. These I would be disposed toward non-conformism in their attitude, they would not make themselves into instruments of recognised social legitimacy and would position themselves in critical opposition to the generally dominant spirit of administration and control; they would be in their own way bound to the concepts of truth and rationality, in order to pursue analysis and critique, without censoring thought, up to the point of a radical critique of society (cf. **Demirović** 1999).

6. It is no coincidence that Jean-Paul **Sartre**, who shaped the figure of the engaged I more than any other writer after 1945, garnered Theodor W. **Adorno**’s critique (cf. **Jehle** 2004). If ‘the possibility of what is better’ can only be maintained in ‘unalleviated consciousness of negativity’, then ‘inviolable isolation’ is now ‘the only way of showing some measure of solidarity’ (*Minima Moralia*, aph. 5, 25). This distanced attitude probably leads him to suspect committed literature of ‘intellectual regression’ (*Commitment*, 1974, 84). The motive was scepticism toward a praxis proclaimed by I that would use the relationship between the I and the people as an excuse to censor thought and theory. Even in Adorno the I must desire something, because otherwise there will be nothing for them to recognise; but the task of the I is the recognition and the maintenance of the claim to reason: tasks which push one toward reality and not toward the hasty partisanship of individual interests. – But even for **Sartre** the I’s characteristic conflict between ‘particularising ideology and universalizing

knowledge' is not annulled by 'joining a mass party' (1965/1976, 258); he can only 'serve the people' as a '*singular universal*' (259) who makes efforts toward 'universalization', without ever being able to overcome his 'situation' as a 'member of the middle class' (260).

6.1 The Germans in Paris – this is the defining experience to which Sartre attempts to answer. 'Each of those authors [...] took stock of his responsibility as a writer. The Occupation taught us ours' (1945/1988, 252). That writers, like scholars and scientists, have 'no way of escaping' is not a tragedy but an opportunity: to overcome 'sterile impartiality', in which 'pure science' and 'l'art pour l'art' meet and convince themselves that they remain outside of time (249). By developing a category of 'specialists in practical knowledge' out of the modern bourgeoisie – 'scientists, engineers, doctors, lawyers, jurists, academics and so on' (1965/1995, 233). – They give the latter 'the means to self-reproduction and expansion' (234). The 'philosophers' in the 18th cent. sense of the term, who are inextricably tied to those specialists, 'can thus be seen as *organic* I, in the sense that Gramsci gave to the word. They were born into the bourgeois class, and they took upon themselves the task of expressing the *objective spirit* of this class' (236) – specifically, a rational view of the world in which the individual, free from the pressures of feudal society, 'a solid and indivisible particle, the vehicle of human nature, resides like a pea in a can of peas' (1945/1988, 256). This 'golden age' is gone (1965/1976, 236 et sq.). The I, as they have emerged since the Dreyfus affair, result from the contradiction of being both specialists in practical knowledge and a 'servitors of hegemony' at the same time, 'agents of ideological *particularism*' (238) who stand in opposition to the bourgeois claim to be the 'universal class'. Should the I refuse to be a 'subaltern agent for bourgeois hegemony', he will become a 'monster, that is to say an intellectual; *someone who attends to what concerns him* [...] and whom others refer to as a man *who interferes in what does not concern him*' (244). He will be turned into a 'technician of the universal who realizes that in his own field, universality does not exist ready-made; but perpetually remains to be achieved' (249).

6.2 Sartre distinguishes between the 'true' I and the 'false' I (252), who defend particularist ideology. The latter's reformism cause the former to 'become revolutionary' (257); as a result he cannot conceive of I who are not 'left-wing' (1968/1973, 157). Thus the category takes on a normative emphasis which it does not have in Gramsci: The true I are those who, 'uneasily aware of their essentially monstrous character' (253), are torn between the universality of their essence and the particularity of their class affiliation. The 'nature of his contradiction [...] obliges him to *commit himself*' (254). What causes them to flout the bourgeois security of the 'false' I remains unclear. In contrast to Gramsci,

who sees the I through the lens of their organising function rather than their class affiliation, Sartre argues that an 'organic I of the proletariat will remain a contradiction in terms' '[u]ntil the day of the revolution' (257). 'Both in his capacity as one who can never be assimilated, and remains excluded even during violent action, and as a divided consciousness, that can never be healed' (262). This contradictory situation is itself a condition of their action: without a 'mandate' the I is 'suspect to the working class, a traitor to the dominant class, a fugitive from his own class who can yet never wholly escape it' (264).

6.3 Michel Foucault took a path diametrically opposed to that of Sartre. Science and scientific truth represent specific forms of exclusion resulting from knowledge and power that have contributed to the formation and development of capitalism. The appeal to the universal as such is therefore no more emancipatory than the appeal to a universal I. In Foucault's view, the historical character of the struggle has changed. The I no longer find their work in 'the unitary theoretical instance that claims to be able to filter them, organize them into a hierarchy, organize them in the name of a true body of knowledge', but in concrete conditions of work and living: in sexuality, in the place of residence, in the mental asylum, in prison. Thus the question is one of a 'local critique' that participates peripherally in the 'insurrection of subjugated knowledges' (*insurrection des 'savoirs assujétis'*) (1976/2003, 7–10). The I might acquire knowledge about specific problems that are often different from those of the proletariat and the masses. And even this new category of the 'specific I' (*Dits et Ecrits*, vol. 3, 205) would still encounter the same opponents as the proletariat: multinational corporations, the apparatus of the courts and the police, real estate speculation. The specific I would be distinguished from the universal I, who set the justice and equality of an ideal law against a juridical understanding of power which corresponds to the abuses of power and the arrogance of wealth. In contrast, the specific I would no longer be determined by their relation to the sacralising effect of the written word. Instead, they would be determined by their genealogical task to connect learned knowledge with local memories (1976/2003, 8). Foucault, however, does not want to renounce the universalising moment of struggle. For he sees the possibility that the I created a network between themselves and various sites, became mutually politicised and succeeded in creating a new, globalised strategy. According to Foucault the question is one of changing the political, economic and institutional system of truth production, of unshackling the truth from previous forms of hegemony and thereby fighting against the forms of power that close off knowledge from below, the subjugated knowledge of the masses (*Dits et Ecrits*, vol. 3, 216–18). He repeatedly emphasises that it is not a matter of raising consciousness, because

the masses and workers have long possessed consciousness and knowledge; rather it is a question of giving their consciousness and their knowledge the opportunity to spread.

6.4 **Foucault** criticised the project of the universal I through that of the specific I from an anti-authoritarian standpoint, although without having joined in the postmodern claims about the death of the I more generally. He critically includes in his analysis various occupations in the humanities such as economy, psychiatry and medicine, along with the technicians of engineering and leadership. He does not expand on the dialectic of the specific and universal I, of local critique and universal demands, although the distinction between him and **Sartre** lies less in the critique of universality, which he in the final count adheres to, than in his reservations toward isolated position of the I as a 'singular universal' and the plea for cooperative networks of local critique.

Bourdieu likewise critiques the existentialist aspect of **Sartre's** view that the I express themselves in relation to all problems of their time solely by virtue of their intellect. He also has reservations, however, about **Foucault's** notion that the I should limit their intervention to specialised knowledge. **Bourdieu** fears that this will stimulate resentment toward the social sciences under the guise of a 'critique of the texts' of old and pure philosophy and encourage an irrational nihilism (1989, 68 et sq.). Like **Foucault**, **Bourdieu** orients himself in opposition to the prophetic I who treat their own experiences and interests as universal and act as guardians over others. He explains this process of intellectual generalisation thusly: the I tend to falsely imagine themselves in solidarity with those who are dominated as they misjudge their own class position as that of a dominated faction of the dominating class, simulating themselves into a false class affiliation (1991, 63). In this regard he rejects **Gramsci's** concept of the organic I as a mythic concept, as the I thereby make themselves into fellow travellers of lower I categories who anoint themselves spokesmen for the proletariat. That being said, his own excellent engagement in the globalisation critique of the "movement of movements" can be perfectly described with this concept.

For **Bourdieu**, it is decisive that the I understand themselves as a universal body that has an overriding interest beyond all national differences. That interest being to fight for their autonomy, their power, to evaluate their production in accordance with their own criteria. The defence of the universal, in his view, is only possible through a defence of the defenders of the universal, and, accordingly, of the economic and social conditions of their autonomy.

Bourdieu's considerations lean toward sociologism: they waver between the assignment of the I to the dominant class, without understanding their organicity, and the claim that a pure social alliance of the I, bound to the

universality of reason, would be thinkable or desirable – this while the I for him consist quite conventionally of scholars and scientists, artists and writers. What is desirable, however, and what, despite many differences, the various efforts toward a critical-material theory of the I centre on, is the demand for the social conditions which make rational thought possible (51; 2002, 33). This is only possible if the conditions of the production of the universal are no longer a privilege but a universal quality themselves: the universal, not as an idea and a norm, but as humanity made concrete and objectively realised – as Gramsci expressed it (*PN* 11, §17, 1412) – a culturally unified species.

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→ anti-intellectualism, being/consciousness, *Berufsverbot*, church, classes and social strata, class position, class reductionism, collective labourer, commitment, common sense, competence/incompetence, conformism, confucianism, consensus, Critical theory, culture, culture industry, dogmatism, education, educationism, elite, enlightenment, existentialism, functionary, German misery, head/hand, hegemony, hermeneutics, historical bloc, idea, ideologue, ideology critique, ideology theory, intellect, intellectual history, intellectual and physical labour, intelligentsia, interest, internality, interpretation, interventionist thinking, irrationalism, ivory tower, labour movement, leadership, literature, Lorianism, mass intellectuality, organisation, organic intellectual, partisanship, petit bourgeoisie, philosophy, popular-national, Prison Notebooks, production

intellectual, specialists, subalternity, technical intelligentsia, thinking, tradition, truth, Tuism, universalism, values, working class, world view

→ Alltagsverstand, Arbeiterbewegung, Arbeiterklasse, Aufklärung, Berufsverbot, Bildung, Denken, deutsche Misere, Dogmatismus, Edukationismus, eingreifendes Denken, Elfenbeinturm, Elite, Engagement, Existenzialismus, Führung, Funktionär, Gefängnishefte, Geist, Geistesgeschichte, geistige und körperliche Arbeit, Gesamtarbeiter, geschichtlicher Block, Hegemonie, Hermeneutik, Idee, Ideologe, Ideologiekritik, Ideologietheorie, Innerlichkeit, Intellektuellenfeindschaft, Intelligenz, Interesse, Interpretation, Irrationalismus, Kirche, Klassenanalyse, Klassenlage, Kleinbürger, Kompetenz/Inkompetenz, Konformismus/Nonkonformismus, Konfuzianismus, Konsens, Kopf und Hand, Kritische Theorie, Kultur, Kulturindustrie, Literaturkritik, Lorianismus, Organisation, organische Intellektuelle, Parteilichkeit, Philosophie, popular-national, Produktionsintellektuelle, Sein/Bewusstsein, Spezialisten, Subalternität, technische Intelligenz, Tradition, Tuismus, Universalismus, Wahrheit, Weltanschauung, Werte

International Division of Labour

A: at-taq̄sīm ad-daulī li-l-‘amal. – F: division internationale du travail. – G: internationale Arbeitsteilung – R: meždunarodnoe razdelenie truda. – S: divisi3n internacional del trabajo. – C: gu3jì fēngōng 国际分工

The IDL brings different modes of production together under the domination of the capitalist world market. Upon the basis of the division of labour within society, it realises itself in part through the power relations in the world market, and partly through the centre’s imperialist domination over the periphery or direct violence, which furthers an ‘uneven and combined development’ (**Mandel** 1976, 70) of the productive forces and wealth. Conditioned by crises of capital accumulation, class struggles and wars, impelled by colonialism, imperialism, trans-nationalisation, and globalisation, the expansion of the capitalist mode of production through consolidation and differentiation of the IDL is a medium of transformation that is fought over with respect to traditional social conditions and the ensuring of capital’s profitability. At least three historical forms can be differentiated: colonial, Fordist, and the so-called “new IDL”.

The IDL played a significant role under state socialism, too. Until 1990 ‘socialist economic integration of the member countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance’ was sought after (Komplexprogramm 1971, 3). Even though it failed because of the contradictions of the Stalinist bureaucratic command economies, national overheads as well as pressure from the arms race, the orientation of organising the IDL in such a way as to avoid unilateral advantages (4) remains essential to the quest for a more just economic order.

1. For **Adam Smith**, expressing one of the central demands of the rising bourgeoisie, free trade provided for a productivity-enhancing division of labour, because ‘[b]y means of it the narrowness of the home market does not hinder the division of labour in any particular branch of art or manufacture from being carried to the highest perfection’ (*Wealth*, 178). The market is understood as the world market, regulated by the IDL on the basis of the ‘natural or acquired’ advantages which one country has over another (204). Building on this, **David Ricardo** developed the so-called theory of comparative advantage: even if a nation is capable of producing all of its internationally marketable commodities more cheaply than other nations, seen comparatively – i.e. by comparing

the cost of goods for export – it is advantageous for it to specialise in the most cost-effective products. Ricardo's example is the division of labour between England and Portugal. Although Portugal could produce not only wine, but also cloth more cheaply than England (*Principles*, 159) it imports cloth in order to produce wine with the freed up capital, 'for which she would obtain more cloth from England, than she could produce by diverting a portion of her capital from the cultivation of vines to the manufacture of cloth' (*ibid.*). The wealth of both countries increases (provided an even balance of trade), because labour can be allocated more profitably. In general, no extension of foreign trade will 'increase the amount of value in a country, although it will very powerfully contribute to increase the mass of commodities, and therefore the sum of enjoyments' (146).

Classical political economy was largely able to abstract from labour migration and capital flows. **Ricardo** drew upon experience to show that the 'insecurity of capital, when not under the immediate control of its owner, together with the natural disinclination which every man has to quit the country of his birth [...] [can] check the emigration of capital' (161), even if only 'a low rate of profits' (162) is to be expected. The nascent character of international capital flows made it impossible to develop a general rate of profit. Ricardo modified the law of value accordingly: 'The same rule which regulates the relative value of commodities in one country, does not regulate the relative value of the commodities exchanged between two or more countries' (156).

2. As early as his "Speech on the Question of Free Trade", **Marx** expected that free trade and the IDL 'carries the antagonism of proletariat and bourgeoisie to the uttermost point' and so 'hastens the Social Revolution' (MECW 6/465 [4/458]). The "Manifesto" notes, without sorrow, the destruction of the 'old-established national industries' by the 'new industries', whose raw materials are drawn from 'the remotest zones' and 'whose products are consumed, not only at home, but in every quarter of the globe'. 'In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal inter-dependence of nations' (MECW 6/488 [4/466]).

The British world market hegemonised the IDL between the metropolises and the colonies in the 19th cent. It was this hegemony, and not a 'natural destiny' of the colonies, as the proponents of free trade contended, restricted the production of the colonies to raw materials or more specifically to semi-luxury items such as coffee and sugar. Marx then wrote in *Capital*: 'By constantly making a part of the hands "supernumerary", modern industry, in all countries where it has taken root, gives a spur to emigration and to the colonisation of foreign lands, which are thereby converted into settlements for growing the raw

material of the mother country' (MECW 35/454 [23/475]). Through this a 'new and IDL, a division suited to the requirements of the chief centres of modern industry springs up, and converts one part of the globe into a chiefly agricultural field of production, for supplying the other part which remains a chiefly industrial field' (ibid.).

With this argument it became possible to answer the unsolvable question, raised by partisans of free trade, 'how one nation can grow rich at the expense of another' (MECW 6/464 [4/457]). **Ricardo**, for example, conceives of 'foreign trade [...] as simple circulation' (MECW 28/242 [42/236]) or 'simple exchange' (276 [268]). Instead of developing the contradictions of the 'IDL' out of an analysis of the process of the creation of surplus value, Ricardo 'rather shifts them off by considering the value in exchange as indifferent for the formation of wealth' (277 [269, fn. 19]). This is why there could, theoretically, be neither over-production nor crises for Ricardo (and his epigones); actual economic crises were accounted for on extra-economic grounds.

In *C I*, **Marx** addresses the question how commodities that rely on different conditions of production and are therefore incomparable in terms of labour output can nevertheless be compared on the world market. The 'contemporaneous difference of national wages' leads Marx to take into consideration 'the price and the extent of the prime necessities of life as naturally and historically developed, the cost of training the labourers, the part played by the labour of women and children, the productiveness of labour, its extensive and intensive magnitude' (MECW 35/558 [23/583]). These are so different that to assume equalised labour and socially average conditions at the level of the world market is unrealistic. As a 'unit of measure' of the national averages of labour with their 'scale' of uneven intensities and productivities, the 'average unit of universal labour' emerges on the world market (559 [584]). 'The more intense national labour, therefore, as compared with the less intense, produces in the same time more value, which expresses itself in more money. But the law of value in its international application is yet more modified by this, that on the world market the more productive national labour reckons also as the more intense, so long as the more productive nation is not compelled by competition to lower the selling price of its commodities to the level of their value' (ibid.). The quantities of commodities produced during the same working time but on different levels of development have 'unequal international values, which are expressed in different prices', and the relative value of money will be higher in lesser developed economies (ibid.). Nonetheless Marx sees 'the entanglement of all peoples in the net of the world market, and with this, the international character of the capitalistic régime' (750 [790]) as a precondition for a future supersession of capitalism.

3. Rosa **Luxemburg** shows, against Rudolf **Hilferding** and Otto **Bauer** (see *Anti-Critique*), and in an original perspective often simplistically criticised as ‘under-consumptionist’, that capital accumulation cannot proceed in such an ‘unlimited’ way as they had seen it in the Marxian schema of enlarged reproduction, because the ‘conditions of direct exploitation and those of the realisation of surplus-value are not identical. They are separated logically as well as by time and space’ (*Accu*, 324). **Marx** does not account for this contradiction in *C II*. Counterfactually, he assumes a society consisting of wage labourers and capitalists only. Against this, **Luxemburg** maintains: ‘Since the accumulation of capital becomes impossible in all points without non-capitalist surroundings, we cannot gain a true picture of it by assuming the exclusive and absolute domination of the capitalist mode of production’ (*Accu*, 345). From this point of view, she redefines how internal and external sales markets are to be understood, in economic and no longer merely in politico-geographic terms, as ‘strict and precise’ concepts in the sense of the reproductive schemes: ‘[T]he internal market is the capitalist market [...] The external market is the non-capitalist social environment [...] Thus, from the point of view of economics, Germany and England traffic in commodities chiefly on an internal, capitalist market, whilst the give and take between German industry and German peasants is transacted on an external market as far as German capital is concerned’ (347). This leads her to analyse a contradiction that results from this and is important for the theory of imperialism, namely ‘that the old capitalist countries provide ever larger markets for, and become increasingly dependent upon, one another, yet on the other hand compete ever more ruthlessly for trade relations with non-capitalist countries’ (*ibid.*). From the fact that on the one hand, capitalism is on a mission to reshape the entire world in its image, while on the other, it cannot subsist without its Other, **Luxemburg** deduces the prospect that capitalism will shatter by virtue of its being ‘immanently incapable of becoming a universal form of production’ (447). She makes clear, in opposition to the claims of the Ricardian School, that the IDL based upon ‘an international system of Free Trade’ was nothing more than a ‘passing phase in the history of capitalist accumulation’ (430). This is precisely because it ‘never expressed the interests of capitalist accumulation as a whole’ (427).

For Karl **Kautsky**, imperialism is the ‘annexation of agrarian regions by industrial nation-states’, and the colonial form of the IDL is by no means ‘an economic condition’ of capitalist accumulation (1929, IV, 554). By contrast, Nikolai **Bukharin** defines the IDL as a ‘system of relations of production with corresponding exchange relations on an international scale’, pertaining to pre-capitalist, semi-capitalist, and late capitalist formations, bound together by the world market and dominated by the imperialist states (1929, 25). Pursuant to

this, **Lenin** considers the notion that the imperialist 'division of the world' consists in the appropriation of purely agrarian regions to have been practically refuted (*Imp*, CW 22/258). Lenin characterises finance capital as the driving force (226 et sq.), just as **Hilferding** had done (1910, 223). **Lenin** argues that the commodity exports that dominate the period of free trade are replaced, under imperialism, by capital exports (CW 22/241). Capital is seen as lacking 'a field for "profitable" investment' (242) within the developed countries, and the progressive exploitation of foreign territories and labour power as going hand in hand both with a capitalist development of these countries that 'greatly accelerates' (243) and with increased commodity exports (244). Unequal development is seen as acquiring the status of a necessity (248 et sq.). Beside the 'two main groups of countries' – colonial powers and colonies – there emerge, according to this account, 'the diverse forms of dependent countries which, politically, are formally independent, but in fact, are enmeshed in the net of financial and diplomatic dependence, typical of this epoch' (263).

'In the newly-opened countries themselves,' according to **Hilferding**, 'the introduction of capitalism intensifies contradictions and arouses growing resistance to the invaders among the people, whose national consciousness has been awakened' (1910/1981, 322). Integrated into the IDL, the 'old social relations are completely revolutionized, the age-old bondage to the soil of the "nations without a history" is disrupted and they are swept into the capitalist maelstrom. Capitalism itself gradually provides the subjected people with the ways and means for their own liberation. They adopt as their own the ideal that was once the highest aspiration of the European nations; namely, the formation of a unified national state as an instrument of economic and cultural freedom'. (Ibid.) This prognosis was verified by the national liberation movements active from the 1940s until the 1970s.

4. **Lenin's** theory of imperialism became the basis for the 'Tricontinental' critique of the world market. Following Raúl **Prebisch** (1950) and Paul A. **Baran** (1957), dependency theory traces the impoverishment of the 'three continents' back to the unfavourable structural integration of peripheral countries into the IDL. Fernando H. **Cardoso** and Enzo **Faletto** (1977) emphasise the aspect of indirect exploitation through the transfer of real incomes, a phenomenon that becomes evident as the "terms of trade" (the exchange relations within international trade) worsen. The Group of 77's demand for a new international economic order (UN 1974) was an expression of this position.

Arghiri **Emmanuel** developed the model of 'unequal exchange' and denounces 'trade imperialism' (1972). He proceeds from **Ricardo's** approach but believes he has found, in **Ricardo's** exclusive attention to commodity as op-

posed to capital flows, the reason for the theoretical failure to account for the impoverishment of trading partners (40 et sq.). The income gap between the centres and peripheries is far greater than the difference of productivity levels (290). Dieter **Senghaas** also sees the IDL as an 'exchange of less for more labour and consequently a transfer of value from the peripheries to the metropolises' (1974, 31). Immanuel **Wallerstein** similarly diagnoses the 'centre countries' appropriation of the economic surplus of the whole world economy' (1979, 47).

André Gunder **Frank** (1969) describes a politico-economic cycle of sorts. The IDL initially takes the form of a division between industries according to the principle of absolute cost advantages. The industrial export of finished products from the centres (especially production goods and consumables for the higher income classes) goes hand in hand with the export of raw materials and unprocessed agrarian products from the periphery, where only export-oriented sectors record significant productivity growth. Whatever opposes itself to this arrangement is repressed through direct violence. Crises and wars cause world trade to collapse, and sources of direct investment and credit in the periphery dry up. The turmoil of the world wars leads the imperialist countries to concentrate on themselves. The national liberation struggles (which only begin after the Second World War in Asia, Africa, and Latin America) are associated with a new relationship between the former colonial peripheries and the centres. It is in this situation, when attachment to the metropolitan states is weakest, that the peripheral countries succeed in boosting development more strongly (*ibid.*; **Emmanuel** 1972, 246 et sq.). Attempts at import substitution are made with simple consumer goods. And yet the longer this strategy of self-industrialisation is pursued, the more foreign capital and technology are required, and so reintegration into the now regenerated and structurally renewed world market becomes necessary again.

This goes hand in hand with a second form of the IDL, predominantly based on specialisation within industrial production, preferably using unskilled and cheap labour. Low incomes prevent a rise in demand for mass consumer goods, which would allow for a transition to intense accumulation. This leads to growing impoverishment, while a small part of the population is able to afford a certain degree of luxury consumption owing to its export earnings. The open rule of the centres over the periphery is transformed into indirect forms of neo-colonialism, and direct violence is replaced by 'structural violence' (**Galtung** 1969, 170). Whatever form of specialisation the peripheries opt for within the IDL, it is not freely chosen, but determined by the needs of the metropolises.

Building on dependency theory, Dieter **Senghaas** (1974) developed the concept of 'peripheral capitalism' (see also **Córdova** 1973; **Prebisch** 1981). On this account, integration into the IDL leads to the formation of 'export enclaves'

that are fully integrated into the metropolitan economies 'and are dependent upon their dynamics of reproduction, be they positive (growth during the boom phase) or negative (phases of stagnation)' (1977, 38). 'The sector of the periphery that isn't an enclave is degraded, becoming a supplier of cheap labour and its subsistence needs, dependent on the business cycle [...] so it is in no way isolated from the export activities of the enclave. Instead it is symbiotically aligned to the production needs of the enclave' (ibid.). Underdevelopment is therefore an expression of this structurally induced heterogeneity of the IDL, which bars a self-sufficient development of the productive forces (1974, 24). Representatives of dependency theory or peripheral capitalism accordingly advocate 'dissociation' or 'de-linking' from the metropolises (1977, 261; Amin 1977, 1). The rise of the East Asian "Tigers" shows the limits to such an approach.

5. Christian **Palloix** explains that 'there is no transfer' of values through the IDL (1969, 114). Ernest **Mandel** qualifies this by adding that in any case, no transfer of values is based on 'unequal exchange', this being a matter of the equivalent exchange of 'equal international values' that 'represent unequal quantities of labour' (1976, 359). He refers to **Marx**: in foreign trade 'the more advanced country sells its commodities above their value even though cheaper than the competing countries. In so far as the labour of the more advanced country is here realised as labour of a higher specific weight, the rate of profit rises, because labour which has not been paid as being of a higher quality is sold as such' (MECW 37/236 [25/247 et sq.]). The capital of this country 'secures a surplus profit' and the less advanced country 'may offer more objectified labour *in natura* than it receives, and yet thereby receive commodities cheaper than it could produce them' (ibid.). It can gain 'absolutely' in the IDL, but 'it will nonetheless suffer relative impoverishment' (**Mandel** 1976, 73). Because 'of these differences in the value of commodities and the productivity of labour [...] the law of value inexorably compels the backward countries with a low level of labour productivity to specialize on the world market in a manner disadvantageous to themselves' within the IDL (74). The modest 'extension of the market is kept within extremely narrow confines by the low level of real wages' and 'acts as a limit on the further accumulation of capital' (68).

Until the late 1940s, the IDL was shaped by the monopolistic-colonial exploitation of raw materials, bound up with a direct transfer of products and profits to the metropolitan countries. The low composition of capital, by comparison to industrialised countries, within colonial forms of production (with stagnant labour productivity) led to a rise in the price of raw materials, thus becoming 'an obstacle to the further expansion of capital' in the metropolitan countries (62). This led to a 'massive penetration of capital into the sphere

of raw materials' (*ibid.*) while simultaneously causing the centres to focus on the 'export of elements of fixed capital' (65). Both factors explain the relative interest in a (partial) industrialisation of the developing countries (*ibid.*). 'Thus the reproduction of the division of labour created in the 19th century is slowly but surely collapsing in face of the sudden extension of the production of raw materials and an alteration in the differential rates of profit from the production of raw materials and the production of finished goods' (64 et sq.).

As **Marx** has elaborated, the deterioration of the 'terms of Trade' for the developing countries rests upon the 'proportionate decrease in the value of the raw material arising from the growing productivity of the labour employed in its own production' (MECW 37/109 [25/119]). Instead of the direct appropriation of 'colonial surplus profits', the 'chief form of the metropolitan exploitation of the Third World at that time' (**Mandel** 1976, 345), an indirect transfer of value on the basis of divergent productivity levels becomes the more important form. It is precisely the higher profitability in the metropolitan centres that leads to capital exports being redirected, such that they are now effected 'between the metropolitan states themselves' (346).

6. In contrast to dependency theory, **Folker Fröbel**, **Jürgen Heinrichs**, and **Otto Kreye** stress the dynamics of the 'radical change in the world economy' (1986), which leads to the 'industrialisation of the developing countries'. A 'new IDL' becomes discernible. It is marked by the 'breaking down of the production process into different partial operations in different sites worldwide' (1977, 62). This is quite different from the former partial industrialisation of 'import substitution in protected markets' (1986, 105). In the 1960s, a liberal system of world trade leads to the progressive 'internationalisation of capital and labour' (1973, 429). The crisis of Fordism brings about a 'valorisation-optimal' redistribution and recombination of 'production sites *and* forms of organisation [...], with an eye to increasing flexibility and reducing production costs' (1986, 37 et sq.) through 'worldwide sourcing' (101 et sqq.). What proves decisive for the restoration of profitability is expanded access to a 'reservoir of potential cheap labour comprising hundreds of millions of workers' (46), though the need for a basic minimum of skills acts as a limiting factor. In any case, labour is cheaper in the developing countries because workers' individual reproduction is 'subsidised' by extensive subsistence production in the informal sector (*ibid.*; see **Meillasoux** 1975). The value of labour power is further depressed by the integration of women as 'domestic workers' within the framework of 'international subcontracting' (464 et sq.; see **Mies** 1991).

On the 'world market for labour power' with low skills, workers in the centres find themselves competing with workers from other world regions; this

leads to a deterioration in working conditions and structural unemployment (**Fröbel/Heinrichs/Kreye** 1986, 47). The 'crisis of the centre' is not however 'synonymous with an equally profound crisis of capital operating on a global scale' (1977, 64). A 'massive growth of the developing countries' share of world exports of processed products' (1986, 54) takes place. The competition on the 'world market for production sites' compels the state to provide 'the best possible conditions for accumulation' leading to the dismantling of 'the guarantees provided by the welfare state and labour protection' in the centres and to the 'constitution of free production zones' (48) and 'world market factories' in the periphery (101). This does not occur automatically, but rather as a process that needed first to be made 'politico-institutionally and technologically possible' (102), including through the use of force (475 et sq.).

John Walton proposes that it is better to speak of a 'third IDL' (1985, 3). This proposal is taken up by Danièle Leborgne and Alain Lipietz (1996, 704 et sq.). To Lipietz, the 'new IDL' portrayed by Fröbel et al. is merely the Fordist form of the integration of newly industrialised countries into the world market (1997, 15). It is based on the price differentials of labour inputs in various segments of the production process. The specific form of the Fordist division of labour – the separation of conceptual work, planning and the organisation of work, of skilled manufacturing and routine, unskilled activities – 'allows for a geographical separation'. Unskilled activities are accordingly moved to countries with a great supply of cheap labour – a form of 'primitive Taylorisation' associated with high rates of exploitation with respect to wages, working hours, and working intensity, as well as with rigid discipline. Skilled manufacturing is relegated to countries with enough skilled workers, but comparatively low wages, whereas the first type of tasks (conceptual work and planning) remains in high-wage countries disposing of the requisite technical and organisational know-how. This is a division of labour between various segments of the production process within the same sector (*ibid.*).

Both of the (still existing) former forms of the IDL are eclipsed by a third one (18). It is made up neither (as in the first form) of the 'production of very different products in different ways', nor of the specialisation (the second form) of 'different tasks' within the Fordist production process, but of 'the production of similar products in different ways' (**Leborgne/Lipietz** 1996, 705). Here, Ricardo's theorem of comparative cost advantages is at work in a modified form: specialisation does not take place according to the availability of capital and labour (these are more or less mobile), but according to the way they are combined, hence according to the form of the relation between capital and labour, which develops via corresponding state regimes (*ibid.*). Every country will specialise in sectors, production segments, and forms of organisation in

which it 'can most intensively use the "factor"' that 'it has the best supply of, i.e. either flexible and Taylorised work or the skilled work with negotiated integration' (Lipietz 1997, 26). 'Thus the observable centre-periphery patterns' arise 'because the industrial working class and reserve army are exploited by capital [...], but in different ways' (Ferrão/Jensen-Butler 1984, 399).

Lipietz calculates the ability of a country to sell its products of labour to other countries above their actual value through an 'index of international value' (the relation of per capita GDP to current exchange rates by GDP per capita in purchasing power parity) – which yields markedly higher coefficients for the centres (1997, 22). A 'new hierarchy' of space becomes discernible (21), based on different forms of labour relations and business relations, a specific combination of the production of absolute and relative surplus-value, and particular state forms within regime competition and specific capacities to control capital flows (Candeias 1999, 80 et sq.). Lipietz only refers to forms of the IDL between national economies, without taking into consideration the structures of transnational production rendered possible by the development of the productive forces. Elmar Altvater relates old and new IDLs to various forms of 'environmental plundering' (1992, 142 et sq.): the overexploitation of natural resources is complemented by a market-friendly environmental policy that itself becomes a site of capital accumulation (such as emissions trading), such that the destruction of the Earth's atmosphere perpetrated by the industrialised countries becomes institutionalised through the buying up of rights to pollute in less developed states.

7. At the beginning of the 21st cent., the IDL is increasingly characterised by flexibly integrated transnational production networks that combine the advantages of a differentiation of forms of production and labour that is based both on competition and on complementarity. At the same time, the tight interlocking of single, fragmented stages of production according to the just-in-time principle raises the risk of breakdown and opens the potential for the organisation of a counter-power (Candeias 2000, 712). Information technology and the computer industries are pioneers of local-global networking (Lüthje 1998, 561 et sq.). Silicon Valley is an example of this: as a prototype of intra-regional networking and clustering, it is also at the centre of a global system of production, in which leading businesses set technological standards. They thus exert a strict control over the fragmented processes of production (with the relative autonomy of respective sites). Processes of this kind are similarly underway in the automobile industry (Revelli 1999, 62 et sq.). One thus has here a contradictory process, in which the centralism of production planning 'counteracts the often proclaimed autonomy of labour organisation on

site' (Candeias 2000, 711). The factory, once a place where the working class was physically present, is now experiencing its fragmented globalisation – from the maquiladoras to the glass factory, from informal putting out workers to modern teleworkers – based upon the high-technology mode of production. Gramsci formulated the concept of the 'dispersed factory' (*Gef* 7, 925) even without being able to know the extent to which this fragmentation would take place. The disintegration and globally fragmented restructuring of socially collective labour results in the shift of social power relations to the disadvantage of wage labourers (Candeias 2003, 77 et sq.). Their organisational forms, based on the old-fashioned nation state, come under pressure. The perpetual restructuring of employment structures through the interplay of in/outsourcing and restructuring ensures far greater control over the workforce and potential countermovements. The result is a state-backed precarisation of labour and the formation of extensive low-wage segments, while the labour aristocracy experiences high income growth; women's entry into the labour market destabilises traditional male worker identities. Middle-class women in affluent countries are able to take up gainful employment and free themselves from the restrictive nuclear family by resorting to the cheap labour of (often illegalised) migrants for domestic reproductive labour. In this way, 'global care chains' are formed (Hochschild 2001). In the peripheries, the hyper-exploitation mainly of female labour power is accompanied by rising capital intensity within highly skilled production and service tasks and associated with the emergence of new middle classes. The result is a complex overlap of national divisions of labour transformed by the scientification and flexibilisation of labour, a radical transformation of the gender division of labour and the recombination of the global societal collective worker within the framework of the IDL.

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→ classical political economy, collective labourer, colonial mode of production, crisis, crisis of Fordism, decolonisation, delinking, dependency theory, developing countries, development, division of labour, exploitation, export processing free zones/industrial free zones, Fordism, free trade, globalisation, high-tech industry, housewifisation (of labour), imperialism, industrialisation, informal economy, international political economy, migration, neocolonialism, North-South conflict, organisation of work, overaccumulation, peripheral capitalism, periphery/center, productivity, proletarianisation, putting-out/home-work/outwork/telework, relations of production, structural violence, subsistence production, Third world, trade, transnational capitalism, transnational corporations, tricontinent, underconsumption, underdevelopment, unequal development, universal labour, world economy, world market, world system

→ Abkopplung, Arbeitsorganisation, Arbeitsteilung, Ausbeutung, Dependenztheorie, Dritte Welt, Entkolonialisierung, Entwicklung, Entwicklungsländer, Fordismus, Freie Produktionszonen, Freihandel, Gesamtarbeiter, Globalisierung, Handel, Hausfrauisierung, Heimarbeit, High-Tech-Industrie, Imperialismus, Industrialisierung, informelle Wirtschaft, Internationale Politische Ökonomie, klassische politische Ökonomie, koloniale Produktionsweise, Krise, Krise des Fordismus, Migration, Neokolonialismus, Nord-Süd-Konflikt, peripherer Kapitalismus, Produktionsverhältnisse, Produktivität, Proletarisierung, strukturelle Gewalt, Subsistenzproduktion, transnationale Konzerne, transnationaler Kapitalismus, Trikontinent, Überakkumulation, ungleiche Entwicklung, ungleicher Tausch, universelle Arbeit, Unterentwicklung, Unterkonsumtion, Weltmarkt, Weltsystem, Weltwirtschaft, Zentrum/Peripherie

Kronstadt Rebellion

A: tamarrud kronštadt. – F: révolte de Kronstadt. – G: Kronstädter Aufstand. – R: Kronštadtskoe vosstanie. – S: levantamiento de Kronstadt. – C: Kālángshītǎde pànluàn 喀琅施塔得叛乱

‘Third revolution’ or ‘counterrevolutionary mutiny’ – these are the two extremes between which verdicts on the KR, which shook Soviet Russia from 1 to 18 March 1921, are situated. The symptom of a comprehensive crisis whose causes lay in the disruption Russia had suffered during seven years of war and civil war, as well as in the system of war communism practised by the Soviet government, the KR posed an acute threat to the power of the RCP(b), being led by the sailors of Kronstadt, the ‘pride and glory of the Russian Revolution’ (Trotsky), who had once contributed decisively to the revolution’s success, defending the Soviet government on numerous fronts. The country was destabilised not only by several peasant uprisings and the anarchist Makhno movement, but also, and for the first time since the revolution, by worker unrest in Petrograd and Moscow, while the question of trade unions sparked a crisis within the RCP(b); the opposition that emerged within the party in the course of this crisis could only be suppressed by abandoning intra-party democracy. Within this situation, the KR erupted ‘like a flash of lightning which threw more of a glare upon reality than anything else’ (Lenin 1921, CW 32/272–84).

1. *The Program of the Rebels.* – The core demand was for the creation of a “genuine” council democracy, different from the one that had been created with the Bolshevik-led soviets. While the Kronstadt rebels considered the freely elected soviets that had emerged in their city in 1905 to have been organs of grassroots democracy, of great value to the organisation of post-revolutionary society, Lenin and his followers were always concerned with the ‘composition’ (Stalin, Wks 6, 209) of the councils, which they felt ought to serve the purpose of winning and maintaining power for the RCP(b). This already emerged in 1917, when the slogan ‘All power to the soviets’ was handled in a purely tactical way, with the soviets of worker, soldier and peasant delegates being created or dissolved depending on how “appropriate” their composition was considered.

1.1. In a resolution passed by 16,000 sailors, soldiers, and workers during a general assembly on 1 March, the rebels noted that ‘the existing soviets do not

express the will of the workers and peasants' and demanded that 'new soviets be elected immediately, by ballot and following free electoral agitation open to all workers and peasants' (qtd. in Kool/Oberländer 1967, *Dokumente*, 343). This corresponded to the original idea of the soviets and the constitution of the RSFSR, which had envisioned the dismissal of delegates who no longer acted in accordance with the wishes of the electorate. Additional political demands included: freedom of speech and of the press for workers, peasants, anarchists, and left-socialist parties; freedom of assembly; freedom of trade unions and peasant associations; the holding of a non-party conference of workers, members of the Red Army, and sailors from Petrograd, Kronstadt, and the Petrograd garrison; release of all political prisoners who were members of socialist parties or had been arrested in connection with worker and peasant movements; the election of a 'commission for the review of the trial records of all those held in prisons and concentration camps' (ibid.).

What was not envisioned was freedom to engage in counterrevolutionary activities or freedom for right-wing parties. The convening of the constituent assembly that right-wing parties strove for was rejected by the majority of Kronstadt's Provisional Revolutionary Committee (PRC); the Kronstadt sailors had after all actively contributed to the dissolution of the constituent assembly. An article stating the basic principles of the KR included this statement: 'The workers and peasants are marching forward inexorably, leaving behind both the constituent assembly with its bourgeois order and the dictatorship of the communist party with its Cheka and its state capitalism' (*Dok.*, 388).

In order to break with the CP's claim to be sole representative and leader of the Russian working class, the resolution called for the dissolution of the communist combat groups within the military and the communist control units at the workplace, arguing that 'no single party may claim privileges in the propagation of its ideas and receive state funds for this purpose' (*Dok.*, 343). On 6 March, the slogan 'All power to the soviets, and not to the parties' (365, 368) was issued. It was not directed against ordinary communists, whose exclusion from soviet elections was not envisioned and who participated in assemblies, at least initially. The slogan 'For soviets without communists' was never formulated in Kronstadt; growing anti-communist agitation and measures taken against communists who remained loyal to the party leadership could however be interpreted in this sense.

Economic demands – equal food rations for all working people; abolition of the blockades preventing the exchange of commodities between the countryside and the city; full peasant control over land and livestock, to the extent that peasants were able to maintain both without engaging in wage labour; permission to engage in free artisanal production based on one's own independent

labour – corresponded to the immediate interests of peasants and artisans, and to a lesser extent of workers, and they reflected widespread egalitarian tendencies and outrage over the privileges enjoyed by the emerging soviet and party bureaucracy. Yet these demands were by no means oriented towards a restoration of capitalist relations. Contrary to what **Lenin** claimed (CW 32/358), there was no call for free trade.

This first catalogue of demands was expanded upon during the days that followed. Thus, a call was formulated for transforming the ‘state-directed trade unions into free associations of workers, peasants, and the toiling intelligentsia’ (*Dok.*, 388). The ‘state socialism’ in which the worker had turned from a ‘slave to the capitalist’ into a ‘slave to the state enterprise’ was to be replaced by a ‘different kind of socialism’, a ‘soviet republic of workers in which the producer will control and manage the products of his labour himself, without restrictions’. The system of worker control introduced in late 1917 and early 1918 was rejected, as it was claimed to have led to a deterioration of production (501 et sq.).

1.2. Following the wholesale rejection of their demands by the Chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, Mikhail **Kalinin**, on 1 March, the rebels made the resignation of the communist government their main goal. The more the Soviet government took steps to contain and quell the rebellion (by declaring the state of siege in Petrograd and environs, issuing leaflets with ‘final warnings’ and calls to surrender, taking hostages, arresting some persons, shooting others, subjecting the rebels to artillery fire and aerial bombardment, as well as to infantry attacks), the more virulent became the propagandistic attacks on the ‘communist reign of terror’ and the ‘rule of the commissars’. Three centuries under the yoke of monarchism paled by comparison to as many years of Cheka-assisted communist tyranny, it was claimed (*Dok.*, 387).

Particularly furious criticism was directed at the Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the RSFSR, Leo **Trotsky**, a proponent of the ‘militarisation’ of Soviet society and the person responsible for the deployment of the Red Army against Kronstadt, and Grigory **Zinoviev**, the Chairman of the Petrograd Defense Committee. Anti-Semitic sentiment played a certain role in this; many sailors from Ukraine and Russia’s western borderlands were traditionally prone to anti-Semitism (**Avrich** 1970, 155, 178 et sqq.). Calls for the expulsion of Jews and their resettlement in Palestine were formulated, although they lacked majority appeal (cf. *Kronštadtskaya* 1999, 1, 119, 145). Faith in **Lenin** ‘had not yet been lost’ until his speech at the X Party Congress. He was considered a ‘prisoner’ of his communist associates, forced to ‘slander’ the rebels ‘as much as they’ did (*Dok.*, 471 et sq.). This was a variant, according to Paul **Avrich**,

of the traditional belief in the 'good tsar' who is deceived by his clerks (1970, 177). When **Lenin** declared the principles of the NEP, which accorded with the demands of the Kronstadt rebels on many points, government troops had already begun their siege of Kronstadt, and Lenin's speech was rejected as offering only 'minor concessions', with the sole purpose of 'further tightening the vise of the party dictatorship' (*Dok.*, 487).

The rebels considered their activities the beginning of a 'third revolution' (after the February and October revolutions) that would 'free the working masses of the last of their chains' and 'break a new, broad path towards creative activity in the spirit of socialism' while 'stirring up the working masses of the East and the West' (*Dok.*, 387 et sq., 414). In a statement to the women workers of the world issued on the occasion of International Women's Day (8 March), the rebels invoked 'social world revolution' (385). The international press was called upon to support the rebels and inspect the situation in situ, which some foreign correspondents went on to do (cf. *Kronštadtskaya* 1999, 1, 448). Citing the revolutionary traditions of Kronstadt, the 'vigilant custodian of the achievements of social revolution', the rebels presented themselves as a vanguard fighting for the implementation of the Russian revolution's genuine goals (*Dok.*, 442). They were aware of the fact that their rebellion was welcomed by counterrevolutionary forces. Yet those forces were hoping to 'renew the tsarist whip and the privileges of the generals', which meant they could be 'no allies' (360).

There is no evidence that the KR was organised by any single party, nor can the program be attributed to any one party. Some demands of the Left and Right Social Revolutionaries, the Mensheviks and the anarchists can be found in the programme, but others are missing. In **Avrich's** view, the programme is a variant of the anarcho-populist current of the social revolutionary Maximalists, whose positions fell somewhere between those of the Left Social Revolutionaries and those of the anarchists. Hostility towards the central state and the ruling class, widespread since the peasant uprisings of the 17th and 18th cent.s, also found its way into the programme, according to **Avrich** (cf. 1970, 170 et sqq.). Naturally, the programme could not be developed further, much less implemented, during the two weeks that the PRC held power in Kronstadt. The vagueness of some elements of the programme is due to the differences of opinion among the various forces represented within the PRC, and to the fact that views were sometimes not openly expressed, when the general sentiment among the sailors made this seem inadvisable.

2. *The PRC as an Organ of Power.* – The KR began spontaneously and developed extremely rapidly. It was probably directed, from the outset, by a small illegal

group associated with the chairman of the PRC, Stepan **Petrichenko**, chief quartermaster on the battleship *Petropavlosk* (cf. **Avrich** 1970, 110). Delegates had been dispatched to Petrograd in order to obtain information about the worker unrest there. The reports sent by these delegates boosted the morale of the sailors. **Petrichenko** directed the first, decisive assemblies of ship crews and proposed the programmatic resolution during the plenary assembly on the anchoring berth on 1 March. He also chaired the assembly of delegates on 2 March, where the PRC, constituted by Petrichenko's supporters on the *Petropavlosk* the evening before, was elected the KR's supreme organ of power. On 4 March, the number of PRC members was increased from five to 15. The PRC consisted of sailors, workers, an engineer, a switchboard operator, a transport director, and a medical assistant (cf. *Dok.*, 445 et sq.). The PRC took over the administration of the city and the fortress of Kronstadt, removing the communists from all positions of authority and prohibiting them from leaving Kotlin Island. It also maintained order in the city and organised Kronstadt's defence. Revolutionary triumvirates were set up in government agencies, social organisations, and military units, charged with implementing the decisions of the PRC. The communists in the city were called upon to hand over their weapons. Arrests of communists began as early as the delegate assembly on 2 March and were justified by claiming those arrested had resisted PRC measures, engaged in sabotage, or attempted to flee. Those arrested included the Commissar of the Baltic Fleet, N.N. **Kuzmin**, the deposed chairman of the Kronstadt soviet P.D. **Vasiliev**, the chairman of the Kronstadt party committee L.A. **Bregman**, and the head of the Baltic Fleet's political administration, E.I. **Batis**. None of the 320 persons arrested were executed (cf. **Ščetinov** 1999, 15).

With an eye to securing closer ties with workers, a decision was taken to hold new elections, within three days, for the leadership of all trade unions, as well as of the Council of Trade Unions, which was to work closely with the PRC (*Dok.*, 354). The garrison's political department was dissolved, as was the Worker's and Peasant's Inspection, which consisted mainly of communists; the supervisory function of the Inspection was assigned to the Soviet of Trade Unions (cf. 506). Workers sympathetic to the PRC were provided with arms and charged with securing order within the city. The planned new election of soviets could not be held, due to the beginning of military hostilities.

3. *Social and Political Composition of the Rebels.* – The number of active rebels is estimated to have been between 9,000 and 10,000, no higher than 12,000. This means that a considerable share of the 18,000 soldiers and 8,000 to 9,000 adult men in the city did not participate in the armed struggle (cf. **Ščetinov** 1999, 23).

The social base of the KR was constituted by the sailors and Red Army soldiers of the garrison, in particular by the crews of the battleships *Petropavlosk* and *Sevastopol*. Eighty percent of the sailors had a peasant background and maintained close ties with their regions of origin, mainly Ukraine and South Russia. Visits home and letters from relatives ensured they were well informed about the peasants' disaffection with war communism, as well as with the peasant uprisings in many areas of Soviet Russia, and in particular with the Makhno movement. The sailors also had close ties to the workers of Petrograd. The majority of Kronstadt's civilian population viewed the rebels with indifference. Some workers, including women, expressed their sympathy by donating food, clothing, and shoes to the defenders of the fortress, whom they did not consider White Guards.

From the start, assessments of the Kronstadt sailors' social background have seen two views pitted against each other. RCP(b) and Soviet historians claimed the Kronstadt sailors of 1921 had nothing in common with the participants in the October Revolution. Those opposing this view emphasised the continuities with 1917. The truth lies somewhere in between. The social composition of the sailors had indeed changed. In 1917, most of the sailors had come from Petrograd and other cities; now, most of them were peasants. In Trotsky's pointed assessment: 'If in 1917–18 the Kronstadt sailor stood considerably higher than the average level of the Red Army and formed the framework [...] of the Soviet regime in many districts, those sailors who remained in "peaceful" Kronstadt until the beginning of 1921 [...] stood by this time on a level considerably lower, in general, than the average level of the Red Army, and included a great percentage of completely demoralized elements' (104). In fact, Kronstadt sailors had been deployed on numerous fronts during the civil war, or they had been given responsibilities within the party; the ensuing gaps had been stopped with young recruits. Nevertheless, a core group of experienced sailors remained in place. In late 1920, the difficult political and ideological situation in the Baltic Fleet had even led to the reactivation of more than 700 veteran communist sailors (cf. Elizarov 2004, 167).

The revolutionary traditions of Kronstadt, which were passed on to the new arrivals in spite of all the changes undergone by the ships and the garrison, played a role in prompting the rebellion, as did the traditional inclination of sailors towards insurrection and insurgency. Yet it was not the young, but rather the more experienced sailors who organised the rebellion. 30-year-old **Petrichenko** had served in the fleet since 1912, and on board the battleship *Petropavlosk* since 1918. His deputy Vasilii **Yakovenko** had fought on the barricades in 1917 (cf. Avrich 1970, 91). The share of sailors who had experience of battle and had fought on the side of the Soviet government during the civil war was far

larger than Soviet party historians were willing to concede, making up as many as four-fifths of the crew on both battleships (cf. **Elizarov** 2004, 168). Of the 1,300 men on board the *Petropavlosk*, one sixth were communists (cf. **Semanov** 1971, 28).

The political composition of the rebels comprised forces left of the RCP(b) (Maximalists, Left Social Revolutionaries) as well as disenchanting communists and members of parties situated further to the right, such as the Popular Socialists and the Mensheviks. The popularity of the anarchists is evident in the fact that they are explicitly mentioned in the resolution passed on 1 March. The PRC was however wary of rash action and wished to save the rebels' strength 'until we can deal the final, decisive blow to the enemy' (*Dok.*, 412).

The PRC made successful efforts to win the support of as many ordinary communists as possible. A provisional office of the Kronstadt RCP(b) organisation urged that 'the measures of the Provisional Revolutionary Committee be in no way obstructed' (*Dok.*, 348). 845 of the 2,093 persons organised within the RCP(b) announced their resignation from the party during the rebellion (cf. *Kronštadtskaya* 1999, 11, 160 et sq.). Those resigning were mainly party members and candidates who had joined the party in 1919/20. About 40 percent of the communists took a neutral stance (cf. **Avrich** 1970, 183). Some of the communists who remained loyal to the Soviet government left the island in an orderly fashion, and bearing arms, on 2 March. Others managed to escape during the first days of the rebellion, while still others remained and sought to support the government troops during the attack on Kronstadt.

General A.N. **Kozlovsky**, in command of the fortress's artillery since December 1920, was one of several former officers of the tsarist army who had served in the Soviet army in Kronstadt. These officers were not among the organisers of the KR, but immediately sided with the rebels, providing advice and coordinating the city's military defense from 3 March onward, at the request of the PRC (cf. **Ščetinov** 1999, 13). Communist commentators exaggerated the role played by former tsarist generals and officers, whereas the rebels denied there had been any. The name of the head of defense, the former chief of staff of the fortress, Lieutenant Colonel E.N. **Solovyanov**, was not made public until 12 March (cf. *Dok.*, 440). If military staff had indeed coordinated the movement, they would not have limited themselves to defending the city and the fortress, but would have proceeded immediately to launch an attack on the mainland. The PRC rejected such acts of aggression, as it felt they would not be condoned by the sailors.

4. *The Role of Anti-Soviet Émigrés.* – There is no evidence that the KR was directly organised from abroad, as claimed by the RCP(b) and the Soviet government.

The French press had however reported on plans for a rebellion in Kronstadt in great detail on 12 February 1921. A memorandum discovered by **Avrich** (1970, 235–40) in the Russian Archive of Columbia University, New York, deals with the question of how to organise a rebellion in Kronstadt. The memorandum, written by an agent of the National Centre in Vyborg in early 1921, shows that serious thought was given to the organisation of an insurrection in Kronstadt among émigrés. The author of the memorandum expected the rebellion to begin following the thaw, and proposed that émigrés and foreign powers, such as France, support it in a coordinated manner.

Anti-Soviet émigrés followed the development of the KR with great interest. The slogan ‘All power to the soviets and not to the parties’ was received sceptically, but farsighted émigrés such as the leader of the Constitutional Democratic Party, **Pavel Milyukov**, considered it a transitional demand. The formulation proposed by him – ‘For the soviets, but without communists’ – which had circulated in Siberia during the civil war and was seen on leaflets in Petrograd on the eve of the KR, was intended to promote the goal of re-instituting a bourgeois government.

Émigrés analysed all statements by the rebels in light of their own goals. A declaration issued by the PRC on 15 March included the statement: ‘We are now fighting to topple the yoke of the party, for genuine soviet power, and then the free will of the people shall decide how the people are to be governed’ (*Kronštadtskaya* 1999, I, 447). This led the president of the dissolved constituent assembly and leader of the Social Revolutionaries, **Viktor Chernov**, to hope for a reconvening of the constituent assembly. His offer to visit Kronstadt was rejected as premature even by those members of the PRC who were in favour of the constituent assembly being reconvened (cf. **Ščetinov** 1999, II, 17).

All émigré currents with the exception of the Mensheviks expressed their willingness to support the rebellion by providing food, medicine, or money. Many also began to organise military support. Initially, the PRC rejected offers of support from abroad. On 8 March, it declared: ‘If however our struggle should continue longer than expected, we may be constrained, out of consideration for our wounded heroes, and for children and civilians, to request food aid from abroad’ (*Dok.*, 414). Negotiations on food aid were held with a delegation of the Russian Red Cross (abroad); this food aid did not, however, reach Kronstadt. One member of the delegation, the monarchist and former commander of the *Sevastopol*, **Baron P.W. Wilken**, remained in Kronstadt. His call for military support by the White Guard was rejected by majority vote within the PRC (cf. **Ščetinov** 1999, 21). A statement issued by the PRC on 15 March pointed out, however, that ‘military aid’ might prove ‘necessary’. A PRC delegation was dispatched to Finland in order to conduct negotiations (cf. 25).

Following the suppression of the rebellion, the leaders who had emigrated to Finland entered into secret agreements with White Guard émigrés, preparing for common armed struggle against the communists (cf. **Avrich** 1970, 127 et sqq.).

5. *The Question of a Peaceful Solution.* – A peaceful solution was not seriously attempted, since the RCP(b) completely misjudged the situation. **Kalinin** had been successful in his dealings with Petrograd workers only a short time earlier, but in the Kronstadt assemblies, he, **Kuzmin**, and **Vasiliev** only heightened tensions by their unwillingness to compromise. They did not even hint at the possibility of rescinding war communist measures, something that was envisaged within the framework of NEP. The attempt to arrange negotiations between the Petrograd soviet and the Kronstadt PRC failed due to the unfulfillable demands both sides formulated with regard to the composition of the delegations. The RCP(b) failed to play upon the sympathies for **Lenin** that were initially still in evidence among the sailors. The issuing of ultimatums merely reinforced the stance of the rebels. A mediation offer by the anarchists **Alexander Berkman** and **Emma Goldman** was rejected (cf. **Berkman** 1922, 23 et sq.).

From the outset, the Soviet government and the RCP(b) leadership considered the KR a White Guard mutiny of generals and Social Revolutionaries, coordinated from abroad and led by **Kozlovsky**. The Kronstadt party committee and **Kalinin** were caught in the logic of the civil war, which had recently ended, and the first measures that occurred to them were military. On 2 March, the rebels were declared counterrevolutionaries ‘outside the law’; the goal of the KR was interpreted, from the outset, as that of ‘Soviets without the Bolsheviks’ (**Lenin**, CW 32/358). Negotiations on the rebellion’s political goals were never considered. As far as the RCP(b) was concerned, there were only two possibilities: unconditional surrender of the Kronstadt rebels or suppression of the KR by force of arms, as had already been the practice in the case of the peasant uprisings. The RCP(b) therefore bears the main responsibility for the KR’s bloody conclusion. At the party congress on 9 March, **Lenin** declared: ‘We have spent quite a lot of time in discussion, and I must say that the point is now being driven farther home with “rifles” than with the opposition’s theses’ (200).

The rebels began to prepare for armed struggle on 4 March; their slogan was ‘Victory or death’ (*Dok.*, 353). They too rejected all compromises, ‘given the firm intention of the working people of Kronstadt to liberate Russia from communist rule forever’ (474).

6. *The Suppression of the Rebellion.* – Militarily, the KR did not represent a serious threat to the Soviet government (cf. **Avrich** 1970, 218). The RCP(b) never-

theless wished to suppress it as swiftly as possible. The slogans of the Kronstadt rebels evoked the power of the soviets, making them far more accessible and convincing to the masses than those of the White Guard, and so circulation of these slogans had to cease. According to **Lenin**, 'petty-bourgeois anarchism' had come to the fore within the KR, and it had begun to influence the proletariat. In his view, this 'petty-bourgeois counter-revolution' was 'undoubtedly more dangerous than **Denikin**, **Yudenich** and **Kolchak** put together, because ours is a country where the proletariat is in a minority, where peasant property has gone to ruin and where, in addition, the demobilisation has set loose vast numbers of potentially mutinous elements' (CW 32/184). The problem needed to be solved prior to the X Party Congress of the RCP(b). The Soviet government was negotiating the possibility of trade relations with the USA and England, and a continuation of the rebellion would have put these negotiations at risk. If the Kronstadt rebels had sustained their rebellion for an extended period of time, this would have increased the danger of the uprising spreading to other regions and receiving support from Russian émigrés and foreign powers. Another consideration was that it was easier to attack the well-secured fortress as long as the Gulf of Finland was still frozen. Following the thaw, Kronstadt's military defences would have benefited from greater mobility, and foreign ships could have come to their aid. A rekindling of the civil war that had just ended did not seem out of the question.

The attack on heavily fortified Kronstadt turned out to be more difficult than expected. The first offensive was conducted on 8 March, the opening day of the X Party Congress. It failed due to the unreliability of the troops deployed, who were unwilling to take action against the rebels. There were hundreds of defectors (cf. *Dok.*, 405, 446, 510). Punitive measures ranged from disarming soldiers and resettling them to having them executed by court martial. Having obtained new troops and the propagandistic support of 300 Party Congress delegates, of which 15 were killed in battle, the second offensive was initiated on the night of 16 March. Kronstadt's defenders were not able to ward off this offensive, given the sheer number of 50,000 attackers. 8,000 rebels, including almost all members of the PRC and the defence staff, retreated to Finland across the frozen sea. This played into the hands of Bolshevik propaganda, which had predicted just such an outcome.

The exact number of victims on both sides has never been ascertained. The wounded and the dead on the government side are estimated to have numbered about 10,000. There were about 600 dead and more than 1,000 injured on the side of the Kronstadt rebels (cf. **Avrich** 1970, 211). Following the seizure of Kronstadt on 18 March, there ensued a bloody settling of accounts with the city's sailors, soldiers, and workers. Persons not directly involved in

the rebellion were arrested along with active fighters. At least 2,103 of them were sentenced to death, while 6,459 received lengthy prison sentences (cf. **Naumov/Kosakovsky** 1997, 15). In 1922, more than 2,500 residents of Kronstadt were resettled; 1,963 of them were described as ‘Kronstadt mutineers and their relatives’ (367). In the course of a purge, 212 communists were excluded from the Kronstadt organisation (*Kronštadtskaya* 1999, II, 163). 15,000 sailors considered unreliable were removed from the navy (cf. **Avrich** 1970, 213 et sq.). The names of the battleships *Petropavlosk* and *Sevastopol* were changed to *Marat* and *Parizskhaya Kommuna*.

The KR remained isolated. The expectation that the workers of Petrograd would follow its example was disappointed. While some of these workers sympathised with the KR, the majority remained indifferent. This was due to the propaganda of the government, whose claims about a White Guard conspiracy played on the fact that the masses were not in favour of a restoration of the monarchy; it was also due to the general war-weariness and the Soviet government’s economic concessions.

7. *Consequences of the Suppression.* – In the view of the CPSU and other communist parties in power during the 20th cent., the main lesson to be learned from the KR was that all attacks on their monopolisation of power needed to be nipped in the bud. With reference to Kronstadt, **Lenin** declared: ‘The proletarian revolution in Russia again and again confirms this lesson of 1789–94 and 1848–49, and also what Frederick **Engels** said in his letter to **Bebel** of December 11, 1884. [...] “Pure democracy [...] when the moment of revolution comes, acquires a temporary importance [...] as the final sheet-anchor of the whole bourgeois and even feudal economy. [...]” In any case our sole adversary on the day of the crisis and on the day after the crisis will be the whole of the reaction which will group around pure democracy, and this, I think, should not be lost sight of’ (CW 32/461).

Kronstadt confirmed **Lenin** in his ‘[u]ncompromising struggle against Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries, anarchists’, which is what the ‘[e]xperience and lessons of Kronstadt’ consisted of to him (324). This approach entailed the elimination of the last remaining representatives of non-Bolshevik left-wing parties within the soviets, and hence the consolidation of the one-party state. It was on the X Party Congress, and with reference to the KR, that the ban on factionalism was issued, which was used for decades to crush all opposition within the party (cf. 249). While Party Congress delegates from the opposition held views that were in many ways similar to those of the Kronstadt rebels, they too supported the suppression of the KR, as they did not want to challenge the party’s authority. The decisions taken with regard to the NEP, which had not

been prompted by the KR, but which were no doubt spurred by it, were not combined with corresponding steps towards a broadening of democracy within the state, the party, and the economy, as had been demanded by the oppositional groups within the party. Even the proposed formation of a Soviet Peasant Association under the leadership of the RCP(b), discussed in May/June of 1921, was rejected for fear of a 'large-scale' Kronstadt (**Wehner** 1999, 255).

Thus the Leninist model of socialism was consolidated. While invoking a new form of democracy, this model in fact amounted to absolute power for the communist party, without any democratic participation on the part of the masses. Until the reforms introduced during the perestroika period, the soviets remained toothless, mere appendages of the party. The party's monopolisation of power and its associated contempt for democracy entailed the failure of the various attempts at reform undertaken throughout the history of the USSR.

The relentless and unrestrained suppression of the KR provoked disillusionment among communists abroad and non-communist sympathisers. The fact that Red Army soldiers had opened fire on their own people was a tragedy even Nikolai **Bukharin** was moved by: 'Who says the Kronstadt rising was White? No. For the sake of the idea, for the sake of our task, we were forced to suppress the revolt of our erring brothers. We cannot look upon the Kronstadt sailors as our enemies. We love them as our true brothers, our own flesh and blood' (qtd. in **Avrich** 1970, 134). Rudiments of a similar sentiment can even be found in **Lenin** when he speaks of the 'mistakes of the hapless Kronstadt mutineers of the spring of 1921' (CW 33/27). In this passage, Lenin hints at what he was not willing to admit openly: that part of the October revolution's social base had risen up against communist party rule.

8. *The Debate on the KR*. – Against his better knowledge, **Lenin** attempted, in a conversation with a correspondent of the *New York Herald*, to play down the KR as a 'very petty incident' that 'no more threatens to break up the Soviet state than the Irish disorders are threatening to break up the British Empire' (CW 36/538). Nevertheless, an international debate on the events developed immediately after the suppression of the KR. As **Frits Kool** and **Erwin Oberländer** demonstrate in the introduction to their collection of source materials (1967, 283–96), there were already a large number of reactions in the social democrat, left socialist, and communist press as early as March of 1921. Russian anarchists were the first to defend the hypothesis of a third revolution abroad (**Berkman**, **Jartschuk**, **Volin**). In 1921, the Prague newspaper *Volia Rossii* published a report titled *Pravda o Kronshadtte* (The Truth About Kronstadt), fully documenting all issues of the *Izvestiia* (Notifications) the Provisional Revolu-

tionary Committee of the Sailors, Red Army Soldiers, and Workers of the City of Kronstadt had published from 3 to 16 March (a German translation can be found in *Dok.*, 297–515). The authors of the report felt the significance of the KR lay in the fact that it had ‘forced the Communists to renounce their own economic policy, that is, the very Communism for which they supposedly carried out the October Revolution, spilled seas of blood, and destroyed Russia’ (*Dok.*, 338). However, the authors continue, the communists ‘would not agree to allow discussion of the question of power’, preferring instead to ‘eliminate food requisitioning, to restore trade, to make concessions to foreigners and to concede Russian land and Russian population to Poland, [rather] than to give, if even just to socialist parties, the right of free speech, press, assembly’ (339). The rebellion had shown, in the authors’ verdict, that ‘in the people, and only in the people, there is a huge life-force, and that it and it alone may, in the centre, shake loose and overturn the Bolsheviks’ (*ibid.*).

In 1922, Alexander **Berkman** took the view that the KR had been the first step towards an ‘inevitable’ third revolution. It had ‘proved that the Communist Party dictatorship and the Russian Revolution are opposites [...] and mutually exclusive’. **Berkman** describes the communist state as ‘itself the most potent and dangerous counter-revolution’ (1922, 17, 26). Klaus **Gietinger** built on this assessment in 2011: Upon ‘the civil war having been concluded successfully’, the ‘revolution had been defeated as well’, as the Bolsheviks had ‘definitively transformed themselves into counterrevolutionaries’ by virtue of ‘failing to reverse the disempowerment of the soviets in the army, at the workplace, and in politics’ (30).

Berkman believed the Kronstadt rebels had made a fatal mistake by not conducting an offensive on the mainland: ‘Rebellion should be vigorous, striking unexpectedly and determinedly. [...] A rebellion that localizes itself, plays the waiting policy, or puts itself on the defensive, is inevitably doomed to defeat’. According to this argument, the KR ‘repeated the fatal strategic errors of the Paris Communards’ (1922, 25). In drawing these conclusions, **Berkman** was more or less in agreement with reflections **Lenin** had formulated on the eve of the October Revolution, in *Marxism and Insurrection* and *Advice of an Onlooker* (CW 26/22–27, 179–81).

In *The Unknown Revolution*, published posthumously in 1948, **Volin** (i.e. Vsevolod Eikhenbaum) took the view that the KR had been ‘the first entirely independent attempt of the people to liberate itself from all yokes and achieve the Social Revolution, an attempt made directly, resolutely, and boldly by the working masses themselves without political shepherds, without leaders or tutors’. In **Volin**’s view, ‘[i]t matters little’ that the rebels ‘still spoke of power (the power of the soviets) instead of getting rid of the word and the idea altogether and

speaking instead of co-ordination, organisation, administration'. The 'triumph' of 'State Socialism' over the KR 'bore within itself the seed of its final destruction'. The communists, 'caught by the logic of events', had shown 'that they were prepared to sacrifice the goal, to renounce all their principles, to deal with anyone, so as to preserve their domination and their privileges' (1954, 223). **Volin** considered the NEP a betrayal of socialism, a counterrevolution: **Lenin** had 'applied exactly the programme' he had 'attributed falsely to the men of Kronstadt', and for which he and his associates 'claimed to have fought them'. In this way, 'the true meaning of the "freedom" demanded by the Kronstadt rebels was completely distorted. Instead of the free creative and constructive activity of the labouring masses, an activity which would have allowed the march towards their complete emancipation to continue and accelerate, which was what Kronstadt demanded, [the New Economic Policy] was "freedom" for certain individuals to trade and do business, to get rich' (222).

Following **Efim Yartchuk**, who had spoken, in 1923, of the third revolution as the 'true proletarian revolution' (3), **Ida Mett** 1938, **Johannes Agnoli** and **Cajo Brendel** 1971, and **Gietinger** 2011 described the KR as a 'proletarian offshoot' of the Russian revolution, this last being defined by them as bourgeois; they also described the KR as a 'second Paris Commune'. On **Brendel's** view, Kronstadt saw 'a modest beginning being made with the realisation of a genuine worker's democracy'. Kronstadt had involved a 'resolute rejection not only of Bolshevik claims to power, but also of traditional Bolshevik conceptions of the party, challenging the party as such' (1974, xx). Much as the insurrection of the Paris proletariat in June of 1848 had marked 'the moment of truth for the radical French republic', the sailors and workers of Kronstadt had forced the Bolshevik party to 'show its true face: as an institution that is openly hostile to workers and whose only purpose was the creation of state capitalism' (xxviii). On this view, the KR marks 'the moment at which the pendulum swings farthest to the left' (xxvi) and is comparable to **Babeuf's** conspiracy in France (1796) or the developments in Catalonia in May of 1937, all of them having ended in defeat due to the absence of the preconditions for proletarian victory (xxi).

In making these claims, **Brendel** was also positioning himself in the debate, still ongoing today, over whether the program of the KR had any chance of being implemented given the international balance of power and the situation in Soviet Russia. Like most other authors, **Brendel** believes the answer is no: 'What was described as the "third revolution" was nothing but an illusion in the agrarian Russia of the time with its comparatively small population of workers and its primitive economy'. The significance of the KR lay in the notions of the 'commune' and the 'freely elected Soviet', which had provided the 'model for a proletarian revolution and worker power' (xxix).

Avrich is also unwilling to entertain the possibility of 'a rebel victory'. Its discontent notwithstanding, the people, exhausted by war, feared 'a White restoration more than they hated the Communists' (1970, 218). **Kool** and **Oberländer** hold that the KR's program was 'no doubt utopian under the circumstances'; the rebels had proclaimed the 'watchwords of October', but these had proven 'impossible to implement in practice'. 'Development of a modern industrial sector' had proven incompatible with a 'combination of barter and local autonomy' (1967, 289). The statements of the Kronstadt rebels revealed an 'irrational faith in the soviet idea, which was to renew Russia' (**Anweiler** 1974, 252). **Karl-Heinz Gräfe** takes a different view. To him, the question of whether the 'outlines of an alternative to Soviet Russia's social conditions might have been realised' remains 'open' (2011, 22).

The left Menshevik **Julius Martov** held that the KR's broad range of supporters presented the 'possibility of a proletarian unity front' that could have advanced the revolution, as well as the possibility of struggling for such revolutionary progress without playing into the hands of the counterrevolution (**Ščetinov** 1999, 25). **Lenin** responded to this by reminding **Martov** of **Milyukov's** tactic: 'It does not matter whom we support, be they anarchists or any sort of Soviet government, as long as the Bolsheviks are overthrown, as long as there is a shift in power; it does not matter whether to the right or to the left, to the Mensheviks or to the anarchists, as long as it is away from the Bolsheviks. As for the rest – "we", the Milyukovs, "we", the capitalists and landowners, will do the rest "ourselves"; we shall slap down the anarchist pygmies, the Chernovs and the Martovs' (CW 32/359 et sq.). **Viktor Serge** shared this view. In 1937, he wrote, in *Proletarian Revolution*: 'Rebellious Kronstadt was not counterrevolutionary, but its victory would inevitably have entailed counterrevolution' (qtd. in **Mett** 1938/1974, 84).

Trotsky, who was criticised especially fiercely by the anarchists for his role in the suppression of the KR, continued to defend his assessment of the insurrection as late as 1938; this assessment corresponded to that of CPSU(b). **Trotsky** described the KR as 'only an *episode* in the history of the relations between the proletarian city and the petty-bourgeois village', one that differed from other petty-bourgeois movements and uprisings in Russia 'only by its greater external effect' (103). On **Trotsky's** view, the KR was 'an armed reaction of the petty bourgeoisie against the hardships of social revolution and the severity of the proletarian dictatorship' (105), as well as a 'mortal danger' to said dictatorship, notwithstanding the participation of skilled workers and engineers, which had represented only a 'negative selection' of sorts. **Trotsky** asked: 'Simply because it had been guilty of a political error, should the proletarian revolution really have committed suicide to punish itself?' (ibid.).

In 1970, **Avrich** situated the KR not only within the context of the larger crisis of 1921, but also within the tradition of spontaneous insurrections Russia has experienced throughout its history: 'Yet Kronstadt presents a situation in which the historian can sympathize with the rebels and still concede that the Bolsheviks were justified in subduing them'. Nevertheless, no actions taken by émigré Whites could 'excuse any atrocities which the Bolsheviks committed against the sailors' (5 et sq.).

In Western studies, parallels were often drawn to crises in other state socialist countries: from the KR in March 1921 'through June 17, 1953, in East Germany, and on through October 1956 in Hungary and Poland, the revolutionary rebirth of the councils in a struggle against Bolshevik dictatorship runs its course' (**Anweiler** 1974, xvi). In a discussion of the emergence of *Solidarność* in Poland, **Iring Fetscher** drew attention to the anarcho-syndicalist views of the Kronstadt rebels and the worker opposition within the RCP(b), seeing in them the beginnings of a genuine worker democracy within "actually existing socialism". He commented: 'If the reform is successful, the Polish party leadership could become the most firmly established within the entire "socialist camp"' (1980, 33). What was received in a fundamentally sceptical way was the fact that in their resolution, the Kronstadt rebels had demanded liberties only for socialist parties, just as they had only demanded the release of left-wing prisoners: 'The resolution was not, however, democratic in our sense' (**Gosztony** 1982, 25).

In the Soviet Union, and following **Lenin**, the KR was long perceived as a counterrevolutionary undertaking, and its significance downplayed. 'Anti-Soviet Kronstadt mutiny' (*Sovietskaya Istoritseskaya Enziklopediya*, vol. 8, 1965, 178) and 'counterrevolutionary action of part of the Kronstadt garrison and Baltic Fleet crews, organised by Social Revolutionaries, Mensheviks, anarchists, and White Guards, with the support of foreign imperialists' (*Sovietskaya Woennaya Enziklopediya*, vol. 4, 1977, 479) – such were the basic patterns of interpretation. The very title of one of the few longer studies, *Liquidation of the Anti-Soviet Mutiny in Kronstadt* (**Semanov** 1973), underscores its fundamentally derogatory portrayal of the KR. During the period of Stalinist terror, the discontent of the Kronstadt rebels, which had led to the outbreak of the rebellion, and the failure of the first attack on Kronstadt were linked to Bolsheviks who had fallen from favour, such as **Trotsky**, **Zinoviev**, **F.F. Raskolnikov**, and **M.N. Tukhachevsky** (cf. **Žakovščikov** 1941).

Tentative departures from this line of interpretation repeatedly met with immediate criticism. This was the case, for example, with **Semanov's** statements on the composition of the two battleship crews (cf. **Ščetinov** 1973, 110 et sq.). As late as 1984, careful attempts at a more nuanced assessment

– namely that the KR had represented a crisis of power brought about by the Bolsheviks' own failings, a position defended by E.A. **Ambarzumov** in an essay on **Lenin's** analysis of the crisis of 1921 – were sharply rejected (**Bugayev** 1985).

It was only in the course of perestroika and glasnost that a new interpretation was able to assert itself. In January of 1994, this led to the rehabilitation of the Kronstadt rebels by Boris **Yeltsin**. The repression the rebels had been subjected to was declared unlawful, and it was decided to raise a monument in their honour in the fortress city (cf. **Naumov/Kosakovsky** 1997, 6). Source editions (*Kronštadtskaya tragediya 1921 goda* and **Naumov/Kosakovsky**) made new materials available to scholars and allowed for a more nuanced view. Yet scholarly studies in the strict sense (e.g. **Elizarov** 2004) remained few and far between, as the Kronstadt rebels' goal of establishing a council democracy met with incomprehension or utter disapproval in post-1991 Russia: 'If the dictatorship of the white generals had been successfully imposed in the country, it would, on balance, have caused far less harm, for the simple reason that the white generals did not proclaim the goal of realising a "grand utopia" that revolutionises Russia's traditional economic, social, political, and cultural foundations in their entirety' (**Ščetinov** 1999, 27).

9. The KR and its bloody suppression were, so to speak, the 'original sin of the Bolshevik revolution' (**Bock** 2011, 6). The RCP(b)-led Soviet government fought part of its original social base with brutal violence, without considering the possibility of peaceful negotiations. Most of the rebels were not opposed to Soviet power and the prospect of Russia developing in a socialist direction. They thought of themselves as carrying forward the revolutionary intentions of 1917, as protagonists of the third revolution – a revolution within socialism and for socialism.

Had they been successful, the Kronstadt rebels would have had to wage a two-front war: against the Bolsheviks, who were not willing to relinquish their unlimited power, and against the counterrevolutionary forces that sought to restore the power of the bourgeoisie and the landowners. Had the Bolsheviks been toppled, the divergent views within the PRC, which had remained under the surface during the common struggle against the communists, would have become apparent, and existing divisions would have been deliberately aggravated by party leaders in Russia and abroad. The renewed Soviets would hardly have been able to stand up to the counterrevolution, which would have enjoyed international military, financial, and propagandistic support. This is what **Lenin** had in mind when he commented, in 1921: 'I believe that there are only two kinds of government possible in Russia – a Government by the

Soviets or a Government headed by a tsar' (CW 36/538). By the former, he meant a government led by the RCP(b).

The KR became a 'menacing portent' (Bock 2011, 5) of the failure of the state-socialist system introduced in the Soviet Union. The necessary lesson was not learned and suppression (tacitly) became the response of choice whenever this system faced opposition movements (East Germany in 1953, Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, China in 1989).

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→ anarchism, anarcho-syndicalism, Bolshevisation, civil war, class rule, coercion, commune, communism, council communism, councils/council system, counterrevolution, crisis, criticism of Soviet Union, democracy/dictatorship of the proletariat, glasnost, hegemony, insurrection, intra-party democracy, New Economic Policy, new type of party, October Revolution, Paris Commune, parties, perestroika, persecution of communists, power, relation of forces, revolution, socialism, socialist state of law, soviet, Soviet society, state, state monopoly capitalism, violence, war, war communism, worker control, worker state/worker and peasant state, working class

→ Anarchismus, Anarchosyndialismus, Arbeiterklasse, Arbeiterselbstverwaltung, Arbeiterstaat/Arbeiter- und Bauernstaat, Aufstand, Bolschewisierung, Bürgerkrieg, Demokratie/Diktatur des Proletariats, Gewalt, Glasnost, Hegemonie, innerparteiliche Demokratie, Klassenherrschaft, Kommune, Kommunismus, Kommunistenverfolgung, Konterrevolution, Kräfteverhältnis, Krieg, Kriegskommunismus, Krise, Macht, Neue Ökonomische Politik, Oktoberrevolution, Pariser Kommune, Parteien, Partei neuen Typs, Perestrojka, Räte/Rätesystem, Rätekommunismus, Revolution, Sowjet, Sowjetische Gesellschaft, Sowjetkritik, Sozialismus, sozialistischer Rechtsstaat, Staat, staatsmonopolistischer Sozialismus, Zwang

Land Seizure, Land Grab

A: ‘istilā’. – F: accaparement des terres. – G: Landnahme. – R: priobretenie zemli. – S: acaparamiento de tierras. – C: yòng zhímín fāngshì, zhànlǐng tǔdì
用殖民方式, 占领土地

Landnahme, inadequately translated into English as “land seizure” or “land grabbing”, is a metaphor for capitalism’s expansive dynamic. As a social science term, the L theorem states that capitalist societies cannot reproduce themselves endogenously, which is why they depend on the persistent occupation of a non-capitalist Other. Each growth spurt can be described as a phase of specific L on the part of the expanding industrial and market-based section of the national and world economy (Lutz 1984, 62). The L theorem is related to concepts such as *valorisation*, *real subsumption*, *colonisation*, and *imperialism*; it always addresses the non-linearity and finiteness of capitalist development. Ultimately, the dynamisation and self-stabilisation of capitalism is impossible without the appropriation and possibly ‘active creation’ (Harvey 2003, 141) of a non-capitalist Other.

The history of the L metaphor can be traced back as far as the *Old Testament*. As a Biblical motif, the concept thematises the departure of the tribes of Israel from Egypt and the L in Canaan. Archaeologists and historians have interpreted this journey through the desert and subsequent settlement in terms of conquest or revolt, or they have read it as a case of migration-driven penetration. As used by historians, the term L refers to the appropriation or settlement of a territory by peoples or social groups. More specific, currently common variants of the category (*land grabbing*) refer to practices associated with global agribusiness. Corporations and states purchase agricultural land on a large scale, sometimes in cooperation with private investment funds, in order to produce food or bio fuels. One consequence of this is that peasant forms of land usage are displaced in favour of industrial monocultures. This polyvalence of the term is indicative of a basic motif common to different concepts of L. L always concerns expansion, as well as the occupation and appropriation of ‘land’, though ‘land’ must not necessarily be understood in the literal sense. Another current within the discussion on L makes reference to **Lenin’s** conception of capitalist development within agriculture and his distinction between the Prussian and American developmental paths, both of which are associated with forms of L (CW 13/esp. 238 et sqq.).

L is to be distinguished from *land grabbing* in the narrow sense and from the discourse on the genesis and development of agrarian capitalism. In Marxism and the social sciences, L is used in a wider sense to analyse capitalist modes of development. Within this context, the L theorem provides a specific analytic perspective that addresses the exchange relations between capitalist and non-capitalist territories, modes of production, ways of life, classes and social strata. Apart from **Marx**, thinkers as diverse as Rosa **Luxemburg** and Hannah **Arendt**, the industrial sociologist Burkart **Lutz**, and the Marxist geographer David **Harvey** have worked on the L theorem. More recently, political scientists (**Streeck** 2009), heterodox economists (**Bellofiore** 2009, 666; **Special Section** 2010), sociologists (**Dörre/Lessenich/Rosa** 2009) and exponents of feminist political economy (**Madörin** 2007, i.a.) have adopted the concept within the context of a diagnosis of the times, as a way of capturing the crisis-driven metamorphoses capitalism has undergone since the 1970s. All of the writers mentioned focus on and interpret specific developmental stages of capitalism.

1. *Primitive accumulation*. – While **Marx** does not himself use the expression L, he did pen an early analysis of the basic structure of capitalist L (*C I*, 873–942 [23/741–802]). He ironically compares ‘so-called primitive accumulation’ with ‘original sin’ in the garden of Eden (873 [741]). Capitalism does not come into the world by itself and it is by no means the result of a particular way of life or some pronounced drive toward thriftiness on the part of asset owners. The midwives of capitalism include the state and political coercion, as well as accumulation through violent expropriation (peasant clearance), the spoliation of church property, the abolition of collective ownership of communal land, colonisation, and slavery. The separation of the producers from the means of production is a precondition for the emergence of doubly free wage labour, and thereby of capitalism; it is ‘written in the annals of mankind in letters of blood and fire’ (875 [743]).

Marx describes the transition from feudalism to capitalism as a violent process. He does so in order to be able to address the prospect of a ‘negation of the negation’, or of the restoration of individual property on a different, non-capitalist basis (929 [791]). Notwithstanding the discrepancy between it and our present historical knowledge, the construct of ‘primitive accumulation’ can be used as a heuristic device by which to reconstruct the dimensions and core structure of capitalist L: first, the historical parallelism of capitalist and non-capitalist modes of production; second, the imposition of new property and class relations as a prerequisite for and condition of capitalist accumulation; third, the deployment of extra-economic force (the use of feudal ‘blood laws’ against the expropriated rural population); fourth, laws by which wages are

lowered and the workforce is disciplined in the interest of the new capitalist mode of production; fifth, the outward expansion of capitalism as driven by finance, credit, and force (colonisation, the international system of slavery).

L in the Marxian sense denotes the expansion of the capitalist mode of production within a non-capitalist environment that remained dominant for centuries. A distinctive feature of primitive accumulation that Marx emphasises is that it is, from the outset, a political process. Neither the transformation of property relations nor the expropriation of the rural population or the disciplining of the “liberated” workforce in the interest of the new mode of production would have been possible without state intervention. Thus laws originating in feudal times were repeatedly used in order to impose a general compulsion to work and so as to politically regulate wages. The ‘agricultural people [...] turned into vagabonds’ were ‘whipped, branded, tortured by laws grotesquely terrible, into the discipline necessary for the wage system’ (899 [765]). Capitalism was never a pure market economy, not even when it first developed. The disciplining deployment of political power helped ensure that not only the emergence of the market, but also that of the new mode of production occurred in the context of structurally asymmetrical power relations.

Marx assumed that the use of political coercion, to the point of open violence, would remain an episode of capitalism’s early history. In the course of history, he argued, there develops a workforce ‘which by education, tradition, habit, looks upon the requirements of that mode of production as self-evident natural laws’ (899 [765]). Extra-economic violence is then only resorted to in exceptional cases; in the normal case, workers can be left to the ‘natural laws of production’. The ‘silent compulsion of economic relations sets the seal on the domination of the capitalist over the worker’ (899 [765]). However, Marx qualifies this claim in *C III*, identifying the causes of processes that counteract the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, such as the intensification of exploitation through the lowering of wages below the value of labour power, the resistance against the more or less comprehensive subordination of labour under capital and machine work that results from the existence of a ‘relative surplus population’, and the possibility of surplus profits that foreign trade provides advanced countries with (*C III*, 342–46 [25/245–49]). However, Marx considers these counteracting factors to be no more than temporary obstacles to capitalism’s full self-assertion: ‘All fixed, fast-frozen relations [...] are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air’ (MECW 6/487 [4/465]). There is no systematic discussion of the significance of non-capitalist modes of production, classes, social strata, and ways of life for the developmental dynamic of capitalism in Marx’s work.

2. *Imperialism*. – This is the starting point for Rosa **Luxemburg's** main work *The Accumulation of Capital*, published on the eve of the First World War (1913/2003 [GW 5, 5–412]). While Luxemburg does not speak of L either, but rather of colonisation, she does astutely develop the core idea of the L theorem. Capitalist development, she claims, is identical with the crisis-wracked implementation of a systemic compulsion to grow. This compulsion results from the basic demands of capitalist reproduction. Luxemburg begins by posing herself the question of how a chaotic multiplicity of unrelated microeconomic operations can ultimately lead to the dynamic self-stabilisation of capitalist systems. Her answer: 'It is the production of surplus value which turns reproduction of social necessities into a *perpetuum mobile*' (2003, 11 [GW 5, 16]). Since it is the individual capitalist who determines the scale of reproduction, and since he does so under conditions of competition, there is a powerful motive for constantly expanding reproduction: 'Capitalist methods of production do more than awaken in the capitalist this thirst for surplus value whereby he is impelled to ceaseless expansion of reproduction. Expansion becomes in truth a coercive law, an economic condition of existence for the individual capitalist' (12 [18]). This compulsion to grow cannot be abrogated by individual capitalists – not only because of competition, but also because of the complex metamorphoses that capital needs to undergo within each reproductive cycle. This complexity emerges clearly, according to Luxemburg, when one breaks the formula for accumulation: $(c+v)+m/x+m'$ down into individual operations. It then becomes apparent that as soon as capital has transformed from the commodity form into money, it requires a further metamorphosis, since money cannot be used to produce surplus value. In order to genuinely produce surplus value, the capital that has been advanced must assume the concrete form of machines, raw materials, labour power, means of reproduction, etc. that allow capital to operate as productive capital in the first place. Subsequently, the capital advanced sheds the commodity form again. Anarchically produced goods must be marketable: failing this, the capital invested is lost. From this complex metamorphosis, a structural compulsion to grow results. Since no capitalist can be certain that the multi-stage transformation process of the capital he has advanced will genuinely succeed, there is a constant need for measures that ultimately result in expanded reproduction. The systemic compulsion to grow renders the dependence of individual capitalists on society apparent, since an expanded sales market is not something any individual capitalist can create; he has 'no control' over this requirement (17 [23]).

It is in this dependence of the capitalist on society that **Luxemburg** identifies the germ of imperialist expansionism. She assumed (accurately, for her time) that the expansion of the mass of produced goods that comes with the

compulsion to expand reproduction meets with an effective demand that is limited not only structurally, but also politically. In fact, during the Weimar Republic, the mechanism that Burkart Lutz has described as the ‘capitalist law of wages’ was still operative. What is meant is that ‘wages in the modern sector of the national economy cannot rise significantly and permanently above the subsistence level that is proper to the poorer parts of the traditional sector, a subsistence level that is primarily defined in terms of barter’ (1984, 210). **Luxemburg** concludes that capitalist reproduction is structurally dependent on the occupation of a non-capitalist Other. She breaks with the two-class-model of the pure capitalism assumed in **Marx’s** reproductive schemes and emphasises that surplus value realisation is a problem in its own right. In the last instance, **Luxemburg** argues, expanded reproduction encounters boundaries that result from the limited capacity for consumption associated with antagonistic relations of distribution: ‘The market must, therefore, be continually extended, so that its interrelations and the conditions regulating them assume more and more the form of a natural law independent of the producers and become ever more uncontrollable. This eternal contradiction seeks to balance itself by an expansion of the outlying fields of production. But to the extent that the productive power develops, it finds itself at variance with the narrow basis on which the conditions of consumption rest’ (2003, 324 [GW 5, 294]). **Luxemburg** points out critically that in order to overcome this limitation, **Marx** resorted to a ‘theoretical contrivance’. For in fact, ‘real life has never known a self-sufficient capitalist society under the exclusive domination of the capitalist mode of production’ (328 [297]). The component of surplus value that is to be capitalised cannot possibly be realised by workers and capitalists; in fact, ‘a closer study of the diagram of enlarged reproduction will reveal that it points to some sort of organisation more advanced than purely capitalist production and accumulation’ (331 [299]). It is only by incorporating into itself non-capitalised labour power and land that capital ‘acquires a power of expansion that permits it to augment the elements of its accumulation beyond the limits apparently fixed by its own magnitude’ (337 [305]); thus capital retains ‘close ties [to] non-capitalist strata’ (ibid. [306]).

According to **Luxemburg**, it is only by virtue of this Other that expanded reproduction over extended historical periods becomes possible. At the same time, ‘continuous improvements in labour productivity’ entail a drive toward and depend upon ‘unrestricted utilisation of all substances and facilities afforded by nature and soil’ (337 et sq. [ibid.]). Capitalism may only extend to a small part of the world, but ‘[f]rom the very beginning, the forms and laws of capitalist production aim to comprise the entire globe as a store of productive forces’ (338). In its systemic compulsion to expand, capital ‘ransacks the

whole world, it procures its means of production from all corners of the earth, seizing them, if necessary by force, from all levels of civilisation and from all forms of society' (ibid. [307]). Until this process is concluded, it plays out in the twofold form mentioned above. One of the two movements imposes itself in the sites of surplus value production, in factories, a thoroughly capitalised agriculture, and on commodity markets. Here, capitalism reproduces itself largely on its own basis, and the principle of the exchange of equivalents holds true, or at least tends to do so. This means that wage-dependent persons are remunerated more or less according to the value of their labour power (though this is of course mediated by social struggle). The other movement asserts itself through relations of exchange between the accumulation of capital on the one hand and non-capitalist modes of production, social strata, and territories on the other (343 [315]). Because only a limited amount of aggregate social value can be realised on the 'internal market', expanding businesses are forced to realise parts of their surplus value 'externally'. In this context, 'external' must not necessarily mean abroad, or beyond the borders of the nation. Luxemburg notes an interweaving of internal capitalist markets across the borders of nation states. Yet it is also true that within national societies, there exist regions, milieus, groups, and activities that have either not been commodified at all, or only partially, and in which the prevalent forms of exchange are not those of capitalist markets. On 'external markets', the principle of the exchange of equivalents, i.e. the principle that the items exchanged are of equal value, only holds true to a very limited extent, if at all: here, arbitrariness and sometimes open violence prevail. The latter is also deployed with the aim of ensuring that social groups, territories, and even entire states remain at a pre-capitalist or less developed stage, at least for a time.

On Luxemburg's analysis, capitalist L relies on contingent processes that see the limits of capitalist accumulation imposed by 'internal' and 'external' markets being shifted and temporarily overcome. This is not, however, simply a linear valorisation of "new land". Rather, L always involves the possibility of regression, even to the point of violence being deployed for disciplinary purposes. The reason for this is that 'the old capitalist countries provide ever larger markets for, and become increasingly dependent upon, one another, yet on the other hand compete ever more ruthlessly for trade relations with non-capitalist countries' (347 [316]).

Luxemburg's theory of accumulation has frequently been criticised for implying a theory of capitalism's collapse, as well as for its logical inconsistencies (Bauer 1912/13, 862–74; Grossmann 1929/1992; Sweezy 1956, 202 et sq.). Thus it has been argued that underconsumption merely represents a special case of the larger capitalist problem of disproportionality, and moreover one

that can be neutralised through a large number of countervailing tendencies (Sweezy 1956, 218–34). Crises resulting from disproportionalities need to be distinguished, according to this criticism of **Luxemburg**, from crises whose ultimate cause is the fall of the rate of profit. Historically, both types of crisis manifest themselves only in hybrid forms, which is to say that empirically, neither one nor the other is ever encountered in a pure form. **Harvey** (2003, 137 et sq.) criticises **Luxemburg** for underestimating the possibilities for politically stimulating reinvestment and thereby generating an internal demand for capital goods and means of production. Moreover, **Harvey** argues, geographical expansion is capable of stabilising capitalist systems for extended periods of time. From the perspective of capital, it is often less a question of permanently keeping peripheral countries at the stage of non-development than of utilising them as stable investment locations, according to Harvey. More recently however, there has been a renewed sympathetic reception of **Luxemburg's** theory of crisis. Authors associated with the current known as the “new reading of **Marx**” (*neue Marx-Lektüre*) speak of a ‘macro-monetary class approach’ (**Bellofiore** 2009, 8; **Schmidt** 2012, 253) that is relevant to the politico-economic analysis of 21st cent. crises and can be interpreted as an innovative anticipation of elements of **Keynes's** *General Theory*.

Luxemburg's contribution to a theory of capitalist L can be summed up in three remarks. First, it draws attention to crises of capitalist reproduction whose deeper cause lies in the antagonism between a systemic compulsion to grow on the one hand and the finitude of social and natural resources on the other. Capital ‘must be able to mobilise world labour power without restriction in order to utilise all productive forces of the globe – up to the limits imposed by a system of producing surplus value’ (2003, 343 [GW 5, 31]). But this general mobilisation abstracts from the finitude of social and natural resources. Second, **Luxemburg** sharpens our awareness of the relations of exchange between capitalist reproduction and non-capitalist milieus. She demonstrates that ‘[h]istorically, the accumulation of capital is a kind of metabolism between capitalist economy and those pre-capitalist methods of production without which it cannot go on’ (397 [315]). Third, she draws attention to the fact that within the relations of exchange between the accumulation of capital and non-capitalist milieus, the very thing that **Marx** declared to be a specific characteristic of primitive accumulation is rendered permanent: ‘Its [sc. the accumulation of capital’s] predominant methods are colonial policy, an international loan system – a policy of spheres of interest – and war. Force, fraud, oppression, looting are openly displayed without any attempt at concealment, and it requires an effort to discover within this tangle of political violence and contests of power the stern laws of the economic process’ (432 [397]).

Excursus: Subsistence and care work as 'colony'. – Within the reception of **Luxemburg's** theory of accumulation, imperialist 'external' L was for a long time at the centre of discussion. The hypothesis that Luxemburg formulates in a more implicit way, namely that 'internal' L can occupy activities beyond remunerated or gainful employment, was explicitly picked up on by feminist social theorists (in particular **Mies** 1980, and 1983, 117 et sqq.; **Bennholdt-Thomsen** 1981; v. **Werlhoff** 1985, 23 et sqq.). It was applied by them to processes associated with the contemporary development of capitalism as based on the oppression of women and their simultaneous integration into the world market. Maria **Mies** assumes that the transformation of working-class women into housewives (in the course of Fordism) should be understood as a form of 'colonisation' or 'domestication' (1983, 120). The transformation of the female proletariat into housewives, and the subsequent deployment of housewives as underpaid single earners, is understood by Mies as a global process that ultimately also aggravates the situation of the male proletariat. She characterises this process as one of 'housewifisation'. Men's relationship to women is comparable, she argues, to the relationship between metropole and colony. 'Thus the colonies are the external global "housewife" and housewives here are the internal colony of capital and men' (117). Veronika **Bennholdt-Thomsen** emphasises the violent character of the underlying processes (1983, 207 et sqq.). Claudia **von Werlhof** speaks of a general historical tendency: the spread of capitalism aims not at proletarianisation, but at 'reducing wage labour overall and replacing it through labour relations that have been subjected to "housewifisation"' (1982, 92). The concept of housewifisation is intended to capture the global process by which the undervaluation of domestic work is made to serve as the structural and ideological basis for a general policy by which capital strives to generate greater profits.

Since the 1990s, and beginning in the Anglophone world, feminists have replaced the term *reproduction* with that of *care*, in order thereby to emphasise the emotional aspects of domestic work (for a critique, see *Argument* 292, 2011, *Care – eine feministische Kritik der politischen Ökonomie?*). Mascha **Madörin** (2007) relates this approach back to economic relations, arguing that in the case of care work, the value produced does not enter into the capitalist production of exchange value except via numerous intermediate stages.

These intermediate stages provide leverage points for a power-based hierarchisation of remunerated and unremunerated activities. The separation of public and private allows dominant capitalist actors to deploy economic, cultural-symbolic, or state-political power resources in order to valorise gainful employment vis-à-vis other activities while simultaneously creating a hierarchy within gainful employment. The examples of subsistence or care work

allow one to show that even under capitalist conditions, exploitation within surplus production is only one of several, and often not even the dominant mode in which social wealth is privately appropriated. It is combined with another variant, to which a definition of exploitation that emphasises the violent character of appropriation can be accurately applied: 'To exploit [*Ausbeutung*] is to gather booty [*Beute machen*], i.e. to appropriate something that is not the product of one's own labour through violence, to take something without returning anything of equal value' (Mies 1983, 120). Such (secondary) mechanisms of exploitation are at work whenever it is not just economic, but also symbolic or state-political disciplinary mechanisms that are deployed in order to preserve distinctions between the internal and external, with the goal of forcing the labour power of certain social groups significantly below the general level of wages and reproduction, e.g. through racist or sexist devaluation, or of turning activities within and without the sphere of gainful employment into resources that can be used free of charge. Thus it is argued that when society's dependence on human services and care work that is difficult or impossible to rationalise within the process of reproduction increases, extra-economic disciplinary mechanisms may be resorted to in order to artificially depress the cost of these activities, or so as to continue to be able to use them for free. The social significance of such mechanisms of exploitation becomes apparent when the scale of care work is assessed by means of expanded calculations of the gross national product (GNP). According to such calculations, unremunerated labour accounts for about 41 percent of gross value production. In terms of working hours, the preparation of meals is actually the largest economic sector. If women were to curtail their unremunerated care work by only ten percent, this would be the equivalent of all institutions within the field of remunerated healthcare and social services being shut down (Madörin 2007, 143–45; the figures are based on the case of Switzerland). In sum, while these activities can only be commodified to a limited extent, they represent an 'external market' that can become the object of 'internal' L.

3. *Accumulation of political power.* – The extra-economic motives for L have been analysed by Hannah Arendt (1951). Unlike Luxemburg, Arendt witnessed the October Revolution, the fall of the Weimar Republic, the ensuing 'global civil war', fascism, and Stalinism. In her efforts to reveal the causes of totalitarian forms of rule, she makes use of the L theorem in an original way. Alluding to Marx's analysis of primitive accumulation and explicitly referencing Luxemburg, she claims the process of capitalist accumulation requires that the 'original sin of simple robbery' (Arendt 1951/1979, 148) be periodically repeated: 'When capitalism had pervaded the entire economic structure and all social

strata had come into the orbit of its production and consumption system, capitalists clearly had to decide either to see the whole system collapse or to find new markets, that is, to penetrate new countries which were not yet subject to capitalism and therefore could provide a new noncapitalistic supply and demand' (ibid.). In complex, internally differentiated societies, Arendt argues, the need for expanded reproduction has to be recurrently written into the action strategies of capitalist actors. However, ideological and political legitimisations tend to hive off from the socio-economic causes of expansionism and take on a life of their own. They can also anticipate the dynamic of expansionism. Arendt's account resembles Marxist analyses in that it identifies an overproduction and financial crisis as the original driver of capital's compulsion to expand. It was only 'exported money' that 'succeeded in stimulating the export of power' (137). The 'bourgeoisie's empty desire to have money beget money' could only be satisfied because in the occupied territories, 'power, with complete disregard for all laws – economic as well as ethical – could appropriate wealth' (ibid.). Only the 'unlimited accumulation of power could bring about the unlimited accumulation of capital' (ibid.). Thus the putatively unlimited accumulation of capital is preceded, on Arendt's account, by an accumulation of power that is also unlimited, at least according to its ideological self-legitimation. Yet Arendt insists that an ideological expansionism that legitimises imperialist policies should not be reduced to its economic functions. Thus military and political elites may push for aggressive colonial policies even when this is economically dysfunctional. In such cases, ideological expansionism serves to consolidate social alliances between 'superfluous wealth and superfluous men' (200). This fictional union of a people divided into classes, which is based on the ideology of the mob, exceeds the interpretive capacities of Marxism, according to Arendt. It is the popularity of an aggressive nationalism and the appeal of racist and anti-Semitic resentment that account for the absence of popular opposition to imperialist policies in the capitalist centres. Through the postulate of national interests, which sought to legitimise expansionism as an end in itself, imperialist policy was able to provide the 'superfluous' persons of Central and Eastern Europe with a common ideological reference point within their nation states. In this way, the despotism of the people's community (*Volksgemeinschaft*) was made possible and the demands of the 'superfluous' were aggressively directed at an 'outside', a target beyond the nation's borders.

Even if one does not subscribe to Arendt's interpretation of Luxemburg's theory of imperialism (for a critique, see F. Haug 2007, 181–97), there remains a fruitful core to Arendt's reflections: the ideologically legitimated accumulation of political power can, as evidenced by the example of state socialism, serve as

a social orientation system even in the absence of a private capitalist base. The welfare-state project that asserted itself in capitalism's core regions after 1945 was also based on expansion. It generated an expansive L dynamic, as did the failed attempt to catch up with and overtake developed capitalism that was undertaken by state-socialist societies.

4. *Fordist L*. – Burkart Lutz has described 'internal' Fordist L as a 'short-lived dream of perennial prosperity' (1984). The Fordist L cycle was primarily shaped by policies aimed at curbing the power of the market. Much as suggested by the notion of 'original sin' that Marx and Arendt make reference to, it was extra-economic forces, according to Lutz, that allowed a new *modus operandi* of capitalist L to assert itself: the significance of demand-oriented state intervention, which had already become evident during the Second World War; the North American model of a New Deal based on mass production, mass consumption, and an individualised lifestyle; the elite consensus, prompted by the rivalry between capitalist and state-socialist countries, on the need to allow persons in dependent employment to partake of the benefits of increased productivity. This political interventionism created the possibility, in capitalism's core regions, to abrogate the 'law of wages'. Subsequently, real wages tripled within twenty years (1950–1970): an improvement in the standard of living of wage-dependent persons and their families that is unparalleled both in quantitative and in qualitative terms, and which rendered obsolete, at least temporarily, the oscillation of wages around a historico-moral subsistence minimum.

However, this Fordist growth spurt relied on conditions that could not be reproduced once they had exhausted themselves. The overcoming of the dualism between the traditional and the industrial sector led, within welfare-state capitalism, to a 'destruction of the structures, modes of production, forms of life and behavioural orientations that had until then been constitutive of the small-business and artisanal sector' (228). The progressive exploitation of natural resources was associated with rising costs for the community and constituted an ecological front line within developed societies. Moreover, low growth rates meant that struggles over distribution increasingly concerned the very substance of societal wealth (228–35). In this sense, what occurred was an 'internal' L that 'can very much be seen as analogous to the "external L" of imperialism' (213). The successful expansion of the welfare state that characterised the external relations of capitalism's core regions went hand in hand with an accentuation of the North/South divide – an additional barrier to the unbroken continuation of the Fordist accumulation regime.

With hindsight, Lutz's statements concerning the significance of labour-market dualism – this dualism is identified by him as the decisive field of Ford-

ist L – need to be qualified somewhat. Nor has it in any way been demonstrated that the small-business and artisanal sector is doomed to disappear forever. Lutz does however implicitly make clear that L is always associated with the surrender of territory. Given the relations of forces of the time, the process of making labour power available for ‘internal’ capitalist markets only became possible, within capitalism’s core regions, thanks to policies of decommodification, that is, thanks to the expansion of the welfare state and non-commodified public sectors. When the driving forces of the Fordist accumulation regime began to lose steam, the ‘outside’ created in this way became the object of a new L, driven this time by finance capitalism.

5. *Global expropriative capitalism.* – David **Harvey** has analysed this process from a Marxist perspective. In a number of works (2006 and 2010b), he has brought the L theorem up to date and made it a useful tool by which to analyse the expansion of finance capital since the mid-1970s. His contribution to the debate can be summed up in five key ideas. Harvey is in favour of an updated interpretation of ‘accumulation through dispossession’; he emphasises that the process of primitive accumulation has not been concluded to this day; he sees a continuity between the violent expropriation of assets and their integration into the circulation of capital; he cites numerous examples, including the catch-up processes of L in China and other emerging economies and the expropriation of home owners during the 2007/09 subprime crisis in the USA. Harvey concludes that in each of its stages of development, capitalism rests on two fundamentally different systems of exploitation and accumulation, and that therefore ‘there is much to suggest that **Luxemburg** was right in principle, even if one does not have to follow her all the way to her specific conclusions’ (2010a, 306).

Harvey situates the relations of exchange between two systems of exploitation within a dynamic interpretation of capitalism, which he argues ‘is nothing if it is not on the move’ (12). Following **Marx**, **Harvey** explains the dynamism of capitalist societies in terms of their ability not so much to eliminate their contradictions as to find forms in which they ‘have room to move’ (C I, 198 [23/118]). **Marx** considers this to be ‘in general, the way in which real contradictions are resolved’ (ibid.). Consequently, for **Harvey**, the dominant social actors can at least temporarily circumvent or overcome the immanent barriers to capitalist accumulation, though ‘barriers overcome or circumvented at one point result in new barriers appearing at other points’ (2010a, 339). In this context, **Harvey** makes a case for shelving all older Marxist controversies on the nature of capitalist crisis (theories of overaccumulation, underconsumption, or the profit squeeze). Major crises of capitalist accumulation, those that

extend to the entire ensemble of modes of regulation, are to him mainly the spatio-temporal manifestation of barriers that continuously reappear within the process of capitalist accumulation and reproduction. Harvey identifies eight possible barriers, 'each of which can slow down or disrupt the continuity of capital flow and thereby create a crisis of devaluation' (337): (1) the inability to amass enough original capital; (2) scarcities of labour; (3) disproportionalities between sectors; (4) resource depletion and ecological crises; (5) imbalances resulting from rapid technological change; (6) worker recalcitrance within production processes; (7) underconsumption; (8) monetary and financial crises (316–37). According to Harvey, the means and methods employed to overcome such barriers, without any master plan and in a manner mediated by millions of microsocial activities, result in a specific *modus operandi* for each L cycle. In other words, the relevance of specific barriers to capitalist accumulation at a given time, and the particular attempts made to overcome those barriers, generate driving forces of L processes that are always specific to their particular context and need to be analysed empirically.

Harvey also considers the production of space and time a key aspect of capitalism's dynamic self-stabilisation – this is in fact his most important contribution. In a sense, Harvey argues, L corresponds to the dynamic of creative destruction outlined by Joseph Schumpeter (1934). Differently from what classical theories on the relevance of location to economic development suggest, this dynamic never results in conditions of harmonious equilibrium. Instead, it tends to compress space and time. It obeys the capitalist motive of minimising spatial barriers and accelerating the circulation of capital, i.e. reducing costs and the time needed for moving capital through space (Harvey 2003, 98). Corporations and states can respond to valorisation problems by breaking up existing spatio-temporal consolidations of capital, as well as by moving capital through space and time with an eye to overcoming barriers to accumulation; however, this always comes at the cost of new consolidations with their own potential for crisis. This dynamic view implies that an 'outside' of capitalist accumulation can be actively created again and again. On Harvey's view, there are no absolute barriers to capitalist accumulation. For example, a non-capitalist Other can be created via the mechanism of the reserve army of labour. In a sense, this mechanism is a way of actively creating an 'outside' in a manner that runs contrary to state-driven decommodification (*C I*, 781 et sq. [23/657 et sqq.]). During periods of economic upturn, the various forms of this industrial reserve army of labour can be used to mobilise additional labour power. In times of crisis, those excluded from capitalist production are especially useful as a means of exerting downward pressure on wages.

Capitalism ‘actually throws workers out of the system at one point in time in order to have them to hand for purposes of accumulation at a later point in time’ (Harvey 2003, 141). Yet when the workers are employed again, this occurs under conditions that are more favourable from the perspective of valorisation.

According to Harvey, this manner of actively producing an ‘Other’ or ‘outside’ that is temporarily exempt from exploitation as it occurs within the framework of surplus value production is characteristic of contemporary forms of finance-capitalist L. Much like Marx, Luxemburg, and Arendt before him, Harvey attributes special significance to the finance sector when it comes to the dissolution of modes of production and forms of life associated with earlier capitalist epochs. Finance capital’s ‘fix’ – the original sense of this term is that ‘a certain portion of the total capital is literally fixed in and on the land’, but there is also the metaphorical sense of ‘a particular kind of solution to capitalist crises through temporal deferral and geographical expansion’ (115) – is considered by Harvey to represent a particular system of power that is essentially based on ‘accumulation through dispossession’ (for a critique of this hypothesis as overly general, see W.F. Haug 2012, 143, fn. 129). Not only is this system especially prone to crisis, but it can also be stabilised only temporarily, by constantly introducing new assets, territories, social groups, etc. into the circuit of capital. This is the reason why the engine of ‘accumulation through dispossession’ needs to be kept running by means of ever new rounds of privatisation, deregulation, and precarisation (Dörre 2011, 63). It is also the key cause of neoliberalism’s capacity to survive, neoliberalism being an aggressive ideology that legitimises finance capitalism’s expansion and has proven highly flexible in spite of all the crises it has suffered.

6. Engaging with Harvey in the spirit of *Aufhebung*, we can consider the L theorem a concept that is essential to the renewal of Marxian theory in the 21st cent. In conclusion seven considerations are to be outlined as a way of suggesting how a theory of capitalist L might be developed further.

6.1 *Types of L.* – Harvey tends to use the expression ‘accumulation through dispossession’ as a catch-all phrase encompassing highly diverse phenomena such as the valorisation of rural regions in emerging economies and the “cold” expropriation of homeowners in the USA. It would be more analytically precise to distinguish between *first-* and *second-order* forms of L. Forms of first-order L correspond to the pattern of primitive accumulation, disciplinary commodification, and violent expropriation outlined by Marx and Luxemburg. By contrast, second-order L refers to the occupation of territories, institutions, milieus, and social groups that have already become the object of first-order L,

or result from it, and are now used to actively produce a non-capitalist Other. Finance capitalist L corresponds to this model, because it dissolves the power of wage-dependent persons and expropriates citizens. On the global scale, forms of first- and second-order L interact by means of diverse relations of exchange (Dörre 2011, 67 et sq.). However, a society that strives to totalise creative destruction in the course of forms of second-order L will ultimately destroy itself.

Finance capitalist expansion is increasingly mutating into a seizure of and assault on society and nature. This is why such a programme inevitably mobilises counterforces that seek to protect themselves from market competition. Yet while these counterforces help to ensure that the entrepreneurial “spirit of capitalism” never fully asserts itself, the vast number of its microsocial realisation efforts shifts the boundaries between the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’ of (finance) capitalist accumulation. In the course of second-order finance capitalist L, the decommodified sectors of the Fordist cycle become the object of policies of commodification, which is to say a structure that has already undergone L is subjected to it a second time. One of the paradoxes of this process is that the dominant *modus operandi*’s capacity for survival rests on an instrumentalisation of institutions, forms of production, labour systems, and schemes of thought and action whose origins lie, in some cases, in earlier historical phases, in “social” capitalism or state-bureaucratic socialism. These elements of older social formations do not vanish from one day to the next. On the contrary, they need to be understood as ‘long-term [...] structures’ (Braudel 1982, 225), which however are combined with the finance-capitalist regime of competition and thereby transformed, such that in spite of the persistence of older elements, society transitions to a new aggregate state.

6.2 *Forms of exploitation.* – It seems appropriate to expand the **Marxian** concept of exploitation, but also **Harvey**’s reflections, by distinguishing between forms of primary and ‘secondary exploitation’ (*C III*, 745 [25/623]); the forms of primary exploitation are determined by capitalism, whereas secondary exploitation is not specific to the capitalist formation. Primary relations of exploitation are embedded in contractual relations intended to guarantee the exchange of equivalents (labour power in return for adequate compensation) – a principle that can only assert itself through complex notions of justice and conflicts over distribution. Secondary forms of exploitation institute a different type of relation of equivalence. In this context, “secondary” does not mean less painful, brutal, or significant. Rather, the characteristic feature of secondary relations of exploitation is that the rationality of the exchange of equivalents and of exploitation within surplus value production does not apply. The func-

tionalisation of women's unremunerated reproductive labour or the institution of a disenfranchised, transitory status for immigrants are classic instances of mechanisms of secondary exploitation at work. In the first of these two cases, symbolic-habitual and politico-institutional mechanisms are deployed in order to establish a hierarchy of activities by means of gender-specific constructs. It is here that the devaluation of reproductive work and the relatively far-reaching exclusion of women from gainful employment that would allow them to earn a living originate historically. In the second case, the special status of immigrants, which is transitory and based on relative disenfranchisement and deracination, stabilises a specific distinction between the internal and the external whose purpose is to ensure the availability of cheap labour power that can be mobilised for use in the more unattractive segments of the labour market with their low-skilled, strenuous, and poorly paid work. When social groups participate in a hegemonic way of life, consuming natural resources on a scale that is detrimental to the quality of life of other groups and populations, this is also a case of secondary exploitation (Dörre 2012, 108 et sq.). Today, a group of people making up one-fourth of the world's population, and residing mainly in the global North, consumes three-quarters of the world's resources and is responsible for three-quarters of waste and emissions (König 2008, 277). This is also an exploitative relation of equivalence outside of surplus value production, and one that cannot be reduced to the capitalist determinacy of its form. Thus the concept of secondary exploitation must go beyond its Marxian usage.

6.3 *Actors.* – From the perspective of the dominant capitalist actors, the dialectic of the internal and the external that is characteristic of capitalist L presents itself as a space of possibility by virtue of which corporations and states, and/or their leading representatives (proprietors, managers, financiers, governments, etc.), are able to integrate mechanisms of both primary and secondary exploitation into their micropolitical and strategic calculi, in addition to reconfiguring those mechanisms. This is the reason why developments that appear regressive when held to the standard of social welfare can go from being no more than a possibility to becoming the prevailing reality at any stage of capitalist development. What appears rational on the macroeconomic level and on that of society as a whole must by no means prove practically relevant to the microeconomic and microsocial calculi of capitalist actors. From the microsocial perspective, it can appear sensible to resort to strategies that aim at an intensification of primary or secondary exploitation even when this appears unreasonable from a macroeconomic and macrosocial perspective. Dominant capitalist actors will sometimes seek to circumvent social rules in order to use

the disparity between the general validity of these rules and their limited local efficacy as a way of generating additional profit (Streeck 2009, 241); this is one way in which secondary forms of exploitation can be made use of. Bearing this in mind, one can analyse the dialectic of the internal and the external proper to capitalist L without resorting to functionalist simplifications. From the perspective of the actors, the question is no longer whether or not expanded capitalist reproduction systemically requires a non-capitalist Other, but rather how this Other is produced and put to use within concrete practices and action strategies.

6.4 *Antagonisms*. – Processes of L are always to do with new sales markets, though this is never the only thing they are about. Regardless of the question of market expansion, L always bears on the interconnection of different productive and reproductive activities. Here, points of contact become visible between a theory of capitalist L and research on the overlap between different relations of domination that is today being conducted under the heading of ‘intersectionality’ (Andersen/Collins 1998). The interconnection between primary and secondary relations of exploitation (where the former are specific to the capitalist formation and the latter are not) implies a plurality of social antagonisms (though not an unlimited one). Capital and labour, gender, ethnicity, nationality, and relations between humans and nature all institute specific contradictions and relations of exploitation that are always present within the social relations between rulers and ruled, though one can never determine a priori which antagonism will prove decisive in social struggles and political conflict. Moreover, the welfare state creates additional possibilities of politically influencing, and perhaps ameliorating or aggravating, the social inequalities associated with one or the other form of exploitation. In other words, there is a structural ‘politicisation’ of relations of exploitation (Lessenich 2009, 156). In any case, it needs to be emphasised that all forms of exploitation and all antagonisms remain present throughout. Social actors establish a hierarchy of the various antagonisms, but this does not mean that one form of exploitation can be traced back or even reduced to another. None of the ‘axes of inequality’ constituted in this way can be ‘adequately grasped’ by ‘considering it in isolation’ (Becker-Schmidt 2007, 56). Thus the new forms of servitude evident in the field of care work bring about a hierarchy and synthesis of various relations of exploitation: low valuation, and consequently discrimination, of female-dominated reproductive activities; overexploitation and informalisation of immigrant labour power; deficits associated with a model of welfare that privatises a large share of care work; but also class-specific forms of super- and subordination that are not even regulated by

means of formal employment contracts, as in the case of the illegal employment of immigrants (Lutz 2007; Becker-Schmidt 2007, 68).

6.5 *Reproduction.* – As flexible modes of production assert themselves, society becomes increasingly dependent on care work and other reproductive activities (job training, further education, etc.), a development that Harvey underestimates. It is a property of such activities that they are not easily rationalised. This is due to three features. Human services are geared toward the production of use values, and the processes of production and consumption are inseparable here. Labour time is part of the service rendered in an immediate sense; if labour time is reduced, this has an effect on the service rendered, because there results at the same time a curtailment of the effort invested into the cultivation of relationships and the affective labour involved in such processes. Finally, care work establishes a power imbalance between service worker and client, the client's strong dependence on the worker notwithstanding (Madörin 2007, 142). These features of care work and other remunerated human services lead to a steady increase in the volume of such activities by comparison to more easily rationalised productive activities. While meal preparation can to a certain extent be replaced by the serial production of oven-ready meals and fast food, the same does not apply to activities such as childrearing or caring for family members. In theory, the flexibilisation of gainful employment and work activities ought to increase not only the client's, but the entire productive sector's dependence on care work. The value attributed to care work by society ought to increase; where it is a matter of professional services, wages ought to rise. And yet the empirical reality more closely resembles the opposite scenario. What is becoming apparent is a social devaluation and precarisation of these activities that cannot be understood purely in terms of economic coercion, but needs also to be traced back to disciplinary measures that are of a political nature, and to mechanisms of secondary exploitation. The relevant activities are occupied, but they are also appropriated, as poorly paid or free-of-charge resources, through politico-cultural disciplinary measures and extra-economic force.

6.6 *Transfer.* – With processes of finance-capitalist L, market-dominating corporations need to be seen as playing a role comparable to the one held only by states in earlier epochs (Crouch 2011, 71 et sqq.). The accumulation of economic, ideological, and bureaucratic power by corporations has become almost symbiotic and can be used as a lever for policies that generalise not market exchange as such, but rather competition. It is in this sense that 'market power is constitutive of competition'; 'competition proceeds in the mode of market power' (Thielemann 2010, 382). The intensification of competition,

both between market-dominating corporations and within them, distinguishes 'second-order' L from the financial capitalism of the early 20th cent. Financial market actors are the driving force behind this development, and they 'are themselves intensely competing with one another' (Windolf 2005, 25). This 'competitionalisation' can assert itself by means of shareholder value qua tool for steering the behaviour of corporations, or by means of the market for corporate control; it can also assert itself by means of management models that lead to the creation of spin-off companies, or to strategies of outsourcing and contracting out. Such strategies aggravate the secondary power imbalance on the labour market. What is no less significant is that this rationality of competition is also extended to areas of society beyond the export-oriented economy (finance-capitalist penetration, economisation). Bureaucratic instruments such as budget planning, rankings, ratings, and target agreements are deployed on infra-organisational quasi-markets, with an eye to generalising competition. There is a logic of augmentation inherent in this generalisation of competition, and with it comes an aggressive effort to access hitherto untapped labour power and reserves of activity. 'Whoever does not adapt his manner of life to the conditions of capitalistic success must go under, or at least cannot rise' (Weber 1904/05/2001, 34). The radicalisation of this logic of competition forces wage-dependent individuals to work longer hours and more flexibly; it constrains them to pursue activities unrelated to their profession, to abandon any clear distinction between private and public and consequently to mutate into not just labour-power entrepreneurs but 'life entrepreneurs' (Dörre/Haubner 2012, 80).

6.7 *Crises*. – The L theorem can help account for the global crisis taking place from 2007 onwards as a spatio-temporal condensation of finance-capitalist accumulation and reproduction's self-created boundaries. In the 21st cent., the feedback effect by which socio-economic and ecological crises mutually aggravate one another becomes a fundamental problem for the dynamic self-stabilisation of developed capitalist society. Ever since the industrial revolution, growth (or the augmentation, both in terms of value and in material terms, of the aggregate amount of assets and services) has been considered the royal road to the temporary overcoming of capitalist dysfunctions. Yet to the extent that it rests on the extensive consumption of natural resources, depletes a finite supply of fossil fuels, and produces emissions that are harmful to the climate, this approach can be retained only at the cost of escalating ecological crises. On the other hand, if economic growth comes to a standstill or collapses altogether, the results are unemployment, poverty, and precarity in the form of growing inequality. Thus the capitalist system is not particularly able

to withstand stress during periods of stagnation and weak growth. As soon as the engines of growth come to a halt, the feedback effects of expanded reproduction stop contributing to the integration of contrary interests and begin to produce the opposite effect, i.e., they begin to trigger or aggravate crises. This is why the different variants of capitalism, including those associated with developed welfare states, cannot transform themselves, of their own accord, into steady state systems or post-growth societies that exist in a state of equilibrium and are no longer characterised by the compulsion to continuously engage in L. The dynamic inherent in all variants of capitalism can only ever push the system towards ‘one of two extremes: expansion or collapse’ (Jackson 2011, 80).

It remains an open question whether the principle of dynamic self-stabilisation will soon encounter not just relative socioeconomic barriers, but also the absolute barriers associated with the humanity/nature antagonism. Harvey mentions that ‘there may be an imminent crisis in our relation to nature that will require widespread adaptations (such as the development of new environmental technologies and the expansion of industries producing these goods)’ (2010a, 323), but he also believes it ‘would be false to argue that there are absolute limits in our metabolic relation to nature that cannot be transcended or bypassed in some way’ (322). Other Marxist authors (Sarkar 2012, 295 et sq.) believe that this kind of ‘Pincer-Grip Crisis’ is already upon us and call for efforts to realise a ‘socialism of the 21st cent.’ (Altvater 2010, 238 et sqq.) that operates without the compulsion to growth. There is a consensus that the – limited – plurality of property forms and social antagonisms should also highlight the diversity and range of anticapitalist movements and political forces, of which labour movements are only one among many.

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→ accumulation, agribusiness, appropriation, capitalism, capitalist mode of production, class analysis, climate politics, coercion, colonialism, commodification, competition, crisis, crisis of Fordism, crisis theories, critique of political economy, culture, cultural imperialism, discipline, domestic mode of production, domination, Earth, ecology, ecologisation of production, ecosocialism, environment, exploitation, expropriation, exteriority, fascism, female labour, feminisation of work, feudalism, feudalism debate, forces of production, Fordism, formal/real subsumption, gender relations, globalisation, growth, high-technological mode of production, housewifisation, housework debate, ideology critique, imperialism, justice, labour market, labour movement, labour power, legality/legitimacy, legitimisation crisis, Luxemburgism, market, market economy, mode/conditions of life, mode of production, nationalism, nature, October Revolution, overaccumulation, peasants, possession/property, power, poverty/wealth, pre-capitalist modes of production, precariat, primary valorisation, primitive accumulation, Prussian road, racism, relations of production, relations of reproduction, reproduction, reserve army of labour, secondary

exploitation, sexism, social formation, socialism, Stalinism, subsistence production, surplus value, tendency, tendency law, tendential fall of the profitrate, totalitarianism, unemployment, wage-labour, war, world war

→ Agrobusiness, Akkumulation, Aneignung, Arbeiterbewegung, Arbeitskraft, Arbeitslosigkeit, Arbeitsmarkt, Armut/Reichtum, Ausbeutung, Besitz/Eigentum, Disziplin, Enteignung, Erde, Exteriorität, Faschismus, Feminisierung der Arbeit, Feudalismus, Feudalismus-Debatte, Fordismus, formelle/reelle Subsumtion, Frauenarbeit, Gerechtigkeit, Geschlechterverhältnisse, Gesellschaftsformation, Gewalt, Globalisierung, Hausarbeitsdebatte, Hausfrauisierung, häusliche Produktionsweise, Herrschaft, hochtechnologische Produktionsweise, Ideologiekritik, Imperialismus, industrielle Reservearmee, Inwertsetzung, Kapitalismus, kapitalistische Produktionsweise, Klassenanalyse, Kleinbauern, Klimapolitik, Kolonialismus, Kommodifizierung, Konkurrenz, Krieg, Krise, Krise des Fordismus, Krisentheorien, Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, Kultur, Kulturimperialismus, Lebensweise/Lebensbedingungen, Legalität/Legitimität, Legitimationskrise, Lohnarbeit, Luxemburgismus, Macht, Markt, Marktwirtschaft, Mehrwert, Nationalismus, Natur, Ökologie, Ökologisierung der Produktion, Ökosozialismus, Oktoberrevolution, Prekariat, Preußischer Weg, Produktionsverhältnisse, Produktionsweise, Produktivkräfte, Rassismus, Reproduktion, Reproduktionsverhältnisse, sekundäre Ausbeutung, Sexismus, Sozialismus, Stalinismus, Subsistenzproduktion, Tendenz/Tendenzgesetz, tendenzieller Fall der Profitrate, Totalitarismus, Umwelt, Überakkumulation, ursprüngliche Akkumulation, vorkapitalistische Produktionsweisen, Wachstum, Weltkrieg, Wettbewerb, Zwang

Lenin's Marxism

A: mārksiya līnīn. – F: marxisme de Lénine. – G: Marxismus Lenins. – R: mark-sizm Lenina. – S: marxismo de Lenin. – C: Lièníng de Mǎkèsī zhǔyì 列宁的马克思主义

The life and work of **Lenin** were central to the development of Marxism in the 20th cent. According to Eric **Hobsbawm**, the fact that ‘one third of humanity found itself living under regimes directly derived’ from this revolution ‘and Lenin’s organizational model, the Communist Party’ three or four decades after **Lenin**’s April 1917 arrival in Petrograd evidences that the transformation initiated in 1917 was ‘by far the most formidable organized revolutionary movement in modern history’ (1995, 55). However, the Russian revolutionary’s world-historical role, as well as the 20th cent. state-socialist alternative to capitalism founded upon his legacy, appear deeply contradictory when measured against the core of **Marx**’s emancipatory vision. His record stands for Marxism’s ambivalent dual function in this epoch, one in which it reached the peak of its influence and later underwent its deepest crisis – both as a revolutionary orientation in the struggle against oppression and exploitation, as well as the ruling ideology of states in which Marxism as Leninism, or rather Marxism-Leninism (ML), took power. This dichotomy brought to Marxism the potential for extensive global influence as well as severe negative developments, usually inseparably intertwined with one another. In order to win renewed strength and political authority, the Marxism that developed after the 1989 collapse of the Soviet-style states in Europe first had to be liberated ‘from public identification with Leninism in theory and with the Leninist regimes in practice’ (**Hobsbawm** 2011, 5).

Beginning in the early 1980s, Georges **Labica** worked towards a ‘renewal of Leninism’ *against* the dogma of Leninism that ruled in state socialism (1986, 123). He emphasised a strand of thought in the **Leninian** tradition that avoids claims to a model character seeking to raise ‘the empirical evidence of an exceptional historical situation to that of a generality’, but instead seeks to serve as the foundation ‘of a political praxis’, which works towards the realisation of a ‘communist revolution [...] in conjunctures of a necessarily extraordinary nature’ (ibid.). He calls this type of renewing critique, which works towards a constructive turn in the engagement with Lenin’s legacy, the ‘work of the particular’ (116). It requires historical concretisation as

well as critical evaluation of Lenin's 'interventions' and their consequences for the further development of Marxism (117).

The 'warm stream, hopeful for change' (Mayer 1995, 300) that managed to survive, against all odds, from Lenin to Gorbachev can nevertheless hardly conceal the fact that Marxism 'was in rapid retreat' (Hobsbawm 2011, 385) long before the emergence of the 'post-communist', or rather 'post-Soviet' situation (Haug 1993). This retreat could also be observed in how 'Soviet orthodoxy precluded any real Marxist analysis of what had happened and was happening in Soviet society' (Hobsbawm 2011, 386). While Marx's analysis and critique of capitalism has retained its validity, reception of Lenin has become even more overshadowed by Stalinism and its victims since 1989/91. Wolfgang Ruge understands the tragedy of Lenin in that 'he achieved a great amount, but what he achieved did not correspond to that which he intended whatsoever', and that his goal, ultimately 'overrun' by history, cost 'millions of human lives' (2010, 398). Nevertheless, the more Lenin is evaluated in light of the failure of Soviet state socialism since 1989/91, including by Marxists and leftists, the more urgent a historical-critical reconstruction of his views becomes.

This contribution first addresses the meaning of Lenin in terms of difference and continuity with Marx on one hand, and in terms of the official Marxism-Leninism (ML) canonised by Stalin on the other. Proceeding from the end of this epoch, the further question of the general tendencies of development constituting the context in which Lenin's work and historical impact stand at the beginning of the 21st cent., an epoch characterised by conditions of global capitalism resting on the foundation of high-tech forces of production, will also be addressed.

1. *Revolutionary Marxism in the Periphery: The Russian Context of its Emergence.*

– 1.1 Discrepancies between developments in Marxist theory and the possibilities of practical movement were already visible in the political and social conditions of backwards Russia. The intellectual atmosphere was as heterogeneous as the country was backwards; political opinions among the Russian "Intelligentsija" ranged from Slavophilic conceptions of national self-reliance and the agrarian-socialist utopias of the populist movement to anarchist terrorism, liberal receptions of Marx, and the beginnings of a Marxist movement.

In spite of these difficult conditions, connections between Marx and Russia and the Russian reception of Marx had already enjoyed a quarter century-long history in the late 1880s, when Lenin's revolutionary activities began. Russia had long appeared as a bulwark of the feudal-absolutist counter-revolution from the standpoint of advanced capitalism, far removed from conditions that could support a revolutionary movement. Only after Russia's defeat in the

Crimean War and the 'movement for the emancipation of the serfs' emerging thereafter did **Marx** see the possibility 'of an internal development' in the country 'that might run counter' to Tsarism's traditionally reactionary foreign policy (to **Engels**, 29 April 1858, MECW 40/310 [29/324]).

The emancipation of the serfs in 1861 and the Narodnik movement brought the question of Russia's potentially revolutionary future onto the horizon, and renewed importance to the question **Marx** had already raised in 1853 with regard to British colonial rule in India of the connection between revolutions on the edges of modern capitalism and the 'great social revolution' (MECW 12/222 [9/226]) of the working class. Russia exemplified this predicament, torn between hopeful expectations placed in the emerging working class on one hand, and concerns that the country's backward condition meant 'fearful social revolution is at the door' (to **Engels**, 12 February 1870, MECW 12/430 [32/443 et sq.]) on the other. **Marx** and **Engels** studied conditions in Russia intensively and maintained close contact with Russian oppositionists. **Marx's** works in turn had a significant impact in Russia itself: *C I* appeared in Russian as early as 1872, along with *Poverty of Philosophy* and *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*. The Marxist theory of history was the subject of controversial discussions with respect to the potential paths of Russia's future development (cf. **Küttler** 1978a, 26 et sqq. and 42 et sqq.).

The emerging Russian Marxist movement in exile was primarily concerned with the question of how the struggle for democracy and socialism could and should be led, and which lessons could be drawn from the **Marxian** critique of capitalism and conception of revolution for this struggle. When asked about prospects for revolution in Russia by Russian Marxist Vera **Zasulich** in 1881, **Marx** entertains the possibility, predicated upon the victory of the proletarian revolution in the West, of a peasant revolution based on the village commune that could facilitate a Russian path to socialism bypassing protracted capitalist development (MECW 24/346–71 [19/242 et sq. and 384 et sqq.]).

Both preconditions for this unique constellation would remain unfulfilled. As **Engels** concluded in 1895, the labour movement in the West was in need of an extended, renewed approach to revolution following the disappointed expectations of 1848 and the defeat of the Paris Commune in 1871 (MECW 27/510 et sq. [22/514 et sq.]). The revolution had failed to materialise in Russia as well, while advancing capitalist development meant that 'the axe had also been taken to the root of the Russian peasant commune' (1894, MECW 27/431 [22/433]). Russia was now irrevocably part of 'the general movement' determined in all European countries by the rapid growth of the labour movement, and the situation of the country thus initially corresponded to 'the form [...] of an assault aimed to bring about the fall of tsarist despotism' (ibid.).

Lenin belonged to the section of the Russian intelligentsia determined to hazard this attempt. The son of German mother Maria **Blank** and father Ilya **Ul'yanov, Lenin** (born Vladimir Ulyanov) was familiar with European education from birth, and the fundamentals of his thought shared an orientation towards capitalist progress in the West, although he cultivated a decisively revolutionary standpoint from the very outset. The seventeen-year-old was confronted with the mistakes and tribulations of the Russian opposition against the Tsarist regime when his brother Alexander **Ulyanov** was executed for participating in the attempted assassination of Tsar **Alexander III** in 1887, and he joined the illegal struggle of the Marxist circles during his studies. Fundamentally, he oriented himself towards Georgi **Plekhanov** and his 'Emancipation of Labour' group, who had come to the conclusion that perspectives for the revolutionary movement in Russia were determined by the ongoing development of capitalism and thus primarily by the struggle of the working class during his exile in Geneva in the 1880s.

1.2 Lenin's critique of petty bourgeois anti-capitalism and the agrarian-socialist concepts of the Narodniks were by no means on the side of the 'legal Marxists', who accepted capitalism as a model for Russia, but were rather part of his strategy to catch up to and overtake the bourgeois revolution with the goal of realising a socialist-communist transformation. 'Marxism' proceeds from neither the negation nor the acceptance of capitalism, but rather 'sees its criterion in the formulation and theoretical explanation of the struggle between social classes and economic interests that is going on before our eyes' (*Economic Content of Narodism*, 1895, CW 1/394). The Russian Marxists had to 'present an integral picture of our realities as a definite system of production relations' and thereby 'show that the exploitation and expropriation of the working people are essential under this system, and show the way out of this system that is indicated by economic development' (*Friends of the People*, CW 1/296, emphasis removed). To the extent that Marxist theory 'satisfies the requirements of science' and is capable of providing answers to the proletariat's questions, then 'every awakening of the protesting thought of the proletariat will inevitably guide this thought' into the channels of revolutionary Social Democracy (297). Should this unity of theory and practical movement be achieved, then Russian workers would 'overthrow absolutism' and lead the open struggle for communist revolution on behalf of the proletariat worldwide (300). These key points represent the essentials of Lenin's views on the application of Marxist theory and praxis under particular Russian conditions.

Lenin first sought to substantiate his practical strategy with recourse to comprehensive empirical findings, and began by concentrating on agriculture

as the sphere that caused the Narodniks to doubt the potential of country-wide capitalist development. His initial research therefore did not focus on the 'heights' of modern capitalism in the few urban centres of industry (*Economic Content of Narodnism*, CW 1/495) but rather on the emergence of the 'home market' (*Capitalism in Russia*, 1899, CW 3/25) caused by the transformation of agriculture, largely dominated by semi-feudal manorial economies and "archaic" village institutions at the time, which he investigated by studying statistics collected by local government bodies (*zemstvo*). He based himself theoretically on the Marxian analysis of the mode of production of developed capitalism (cf. *Capitalism in Russia*, Chapter 1 as well as the concluding section, *The 'Mission' of Capitalism*). Lenin would later utilise Karl Kautsky's research on the *Agrarian Question* (1899) in ensuing debates around capitalism in agriculture (Lenin 1902, CW 5/103–222).

Next, Lenin pointed to the existence of 'antagonistic classes' among the traditional peasant communities, that is, among the majority of the population, 'characteristic only of capitalist organisation of the social economy' (to P.P. Maslow, 30 May 1894, CW 43/40), and thereby ascertained the natural ally of the working class, still in the minority at the time: the rural proletariat.

The third qualification, namely the ideational and organisational mobilisation of the potentially revolutionary classes, would become the main sphere of activity for the Russian socialists during the founding phase of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party, around 1898–1903. Lenin develops his renowned concept of a party structure adapted to the conditions of illegal struggle in this context. Cohesion and centralised organisation are for him necessary preconditions for building a party not 'of social reforms' but rather 'of social revolution', in which the 'fundamental ideas of Marxism' and the 'theory of the class struggle' in particular are adhered to (CW 5/353). Debates on this project increasingly revealed the antagonism between the party's radical wing, led by Lenin and commanding a majority at that time (Bolsheviki, from *bolshinstvo*, majority), and the reformists and centrists (Mensheviki, from *men-shinstvo*, minority).

1.3 These differences grew into a deeper division during the first Russian Revolution, lasting from 1905 to 1907. Lenin was primarily concerned with forcing the process of revolution beyond its bourgeois limits, against the supporters of a moderate opposition within the bourgeois-democratic movement. After being forced into temporary emigration, he deepened his understanding of Marx to the extent possible at the time. In order to refine his understanding of revolution, he studied Marx's concept of the 'permanent revolution' (MECW 10/287 [7/254]) and his later critique thereof. Lenin differentiated

between the 1789 type of revolution and its central image of the Jacobin dictatorship and that of 1848 and the victory of the feudal counter-revolution (CW 8/257–59). In doing so, he understood democratic revolutions in the periphery, such as the one in 1905, as already belonging to a new epoch of socialist transition – in declared opposition to **Plekhanov**, who, in light of Russia's backwardness, viewed only radical opposition within the bourgeois camp as realistic. **Lenin**, by contrast, insisted upon the possibility of a direct transition to proletarian-socialist revolution: 'The proletariat must carry the democratic revolution to completion, allying to itself the mass of the peasantry in order to crush the autocracy's resistance by force and paralyse the bourgeoisie's instability'. The goal as well as lines of conflict of the actually intended objective of the upheaval is established directly after: 'The proletariat must accomplish the socialist revolution, allying to itself the mass of the semi-proletarian elements of the population, so as to crush the bourgeoisie's resistance by force and paralyse the instability of the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie' (*Tactics*, 1905, CW 9/100, emphasis removed). He does not understand the hegemonic bloc necessary for different phases of the revolution as securing a majoritarian social basis as such, but rather bases himself on the social forces ready and willing to undertake a violent break with the past, which in turn is to be realised by the dictatorship of a revolutionary state, based on a movement from below.

1.4 Following the defeat of the revolution in **Stolypin's** 1907 coup, agrarian relations as well as the relationship between revolution and reform remain central topics of **Lenin's** analyses; as in the 1890s, problems concerning capitalism as a social formation also surface (cf. **Küttler** 1978b, 450 et sqq. and 462 et sqq.). **Lenin** deals primarily with the alternatives of bourgeois upheaval in Russia during this phase, that is, the democratic revolution from below in the French style and the feudal-bourgeois revolution from above of the Prussian-German type. He expands this differentiation between developmental paths with an analysis of different forms of capital and types of capitalists on the one hand (to I.I. **Skvortsov-Stepanov**, 16 December 1909, CW 16/117–22), and by contrasting two basic types of capitalist development in agriculture, analogous to the two political paths, on the other: the US-American type of unrestricted establishment of fully capitalist relations, and the Prussian model of reform through compromise with the existing feudal nobility (cf. CW 13, esp. 240 et sqq.).

In contrast to the USA and Germany, he regards an at least relatively progressive conclusion of capitalist formation in Russia to be impossible along either developmental path. The reforms conceded by Tsarism were inadequate to facilitate even a minimal degree of bourgeois social progress, particularly in the countryside. This means that, firstly, the 'autocracy has entered a *new*

historical period. It is taking a step towards its transformation into a bourgeois monarchy' (CW 16/199), while revolutionary democracy is at the same time weakened, though not defeated. In this regard, post-1905 Russia is similar to Germany between 1848–71, 'the epoch of the revolutionary and counter-revolutionary struggle' between these two paths of the bourgeois revolution, from both above and below (121).

Accordingly, Lenin also stands by his revolutionary strategy during this phase. The Labour Party must prepare itself for an additional, deeper transformation. He thus opposes tendencies towards integrating Russian Social Democracy into reformism, as well as those seeking to limit the party to the illegal struggle by boycotting parliament (cf. CW 13/94–113). Lenin's political fight against revisionism corresponds to a sharp polemic on philosophical, primarily epistemological, terrain (*Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, 1909), for which he was 'poorly equipped' in light of 'his philosophical knowledge at the time' (Wittich 1999, 82).

1.5 The outbreak of the First World War and the Social Democratic leaderships' alliances with the ruling classes of their respective countries represented a caesura for Lenin. In *The Collapse of the Second International* – the title of his 1915 polemic – he describes the alliance as 'the disgraceful treachery to their convictions [...] by most of the official Social-Democratic parties', having 'taken sides with their General Staffs, their governments, and their bourgeoisie, against the proletariat' (CW 21/205 et sq.). It was an existential crisis of Marxism in the sense of a principled choice between revolutionary and reformist orientations, which he considered to have been overdue for quite some time.

On the eve of the war, Lenin had already sought to direct the strategic deliberations of the socialist parties in the metropolises towards the social movements outside of the core. He refers primarily to the Chinese revolution of 1911–12, in which 'one quarter of the world's population has passed' over to 'movement and struggle' (CW 18/400). Lenin situates 'the place of imperialism in history' (*Imperialism*, 1917, CW 22/298) as the stage of capitalism's final crisis, out of which the socialist transformation as world-historical epoch emerges.

This epochal understanding of history serves as the frame for a novel world-revolutionary strategy and explains the abrupt change in Lenin's own perspective towards a direct transition to proletarian-peasant revolution after the fall of Tsarism in 1917. An initial formulation of this turn can be found in his *Letters From Afar* (CW 23/295–342) drafted during his Swiss exile, and is further elaborated as Bolshevik strategy following his return to Petrograd in the so-called *April Theses* (CW 24/21–26), against the protests of many of his own comrades.

Plekhanov describes **Lenin's** conception as 'ravings [...] abstracted [...] from the conditions of time and place' (1917/2013, 92 et sq.) and points to the underdeveloped state of Russian capitalism.

Lenin argues that deteriorating social conditions brought on by the war, affecting not only the proletariat and peasantry but also wide swathes of the intelligentsia, the petty bourgeoisie, and the oppressed non-Russian populations, offer the chance to form a broad hegemonic alliance to transition the hitherto bourgeois revolution 'to its *second* stage, which must place power in the hands of the proletariat and the poorest sections of the peasants' (CW 24/22). Although he acknowledges the possibility of a peaceful transition under the condition that the Soviets, under Bolshevik leadership, are granted 'all power', the notion that a violent break is inevitable predominates, and would be confirmed by the actions of the counter-revolution. In this context, the exclusive condition of 'all power to the Soviets' represents a narrowing of the hegemonic block. In early October 1917, Lenin, in light of the majority in the Soviets for the 'democracy of Russia' (CW 26/67), still argues that convening the Constituent Assembly could 'ensure the peaceful development of the revolution, [...] and power could pass peacefully from one party to another'; otherwise, 'there is bound to be the bitterest civil war between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat' (ibid.). Shortly thereafter, as the situation continues to escalate, Lenin begins to argue for the forceful taking of power against reservations from his own ranks (cf. *The Crisis Has Matured*, CW 26/74–86; *Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?*, ibid., 87–136). Following the victory of the insurrection and the formation of the Soviet government, the Constituent Assembly, 'summoned on the basis of the election lists of the parties existing prior to the proletarian-peasant revolution under the rule of the bourgeoisie, must inevitably clash with the will and interests of the working and exploited classes' (CW 26/382). According to his view, its dissolution in January 1918 ultimately became necessary, as the Assembly 'refused to recognise the power of the people' (441).

The contradictions inherent in **Lenin's** understanding of the state in relation to the labour movement and participation of the masses as such can be observed throughout all phases of the revolutionary struggle and counter-revolutionary violence, from the failed December uprising of 1905 to the successful revolution of 1917. In *State and Revolution*, a programmatic text written shortly before the October Revolution in 1917, his arguments are both anti-state and strictly council-socialist, referring to **Marx's** assertion that 'the working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made State machinery, and wield it for its own purposes' (*Civil War in France*, MECW 22/328 [17/336]; *State and Revolution*, CW 25/419). This constituted 'the principal lesson of Marxism regarding the tasks of the proletariat during a revolution in relation to the state' (420).

Confronted with the pressures of civil war and material necessity after the victory of the revolution, he pursued a political centralisation that ultimately smothered the councils. 'The title of "Soviet" remained, while the thing itself vanished' (Haug 2005, 269).

1.6 The concrete form of the new era is characterised by this internal contradiction found in **Lenin's** Marxism in power. At the same time, the frequency of his abrupt strategic turns, often difficult to understand even for his own comrades, demonstrates an uncanny ability to recognise and make use of opportunities. He undertakes drastic strategic shifts and systemic changes such as the implementation of dictatorial measures during the civil war, followed later by the transition to the New Economic Policy (NEP), which he justifies by arguing that if 'the transition to peace takes place in a period of economic crisis' and the Soviet government fails to introduce the necessary 'system of complex, transitional measures', it will 'surely lead to the collapse of the Soviet power and the dictatorship of the proletariat' (CW 32/189 et sq.).

At the same time, **Lenin** vigorously rejects any possible compromise with the insurgents of the Kronstadt uprising, although they originally came from the revolutionary ranks themselves. On the one hand, he acknowledges the source of the current phenomena of crisis in his own mistakes: 'one crucial event, one critical lesson of the past few weeks – the Kronstadt events – was like a flash of lightning which threw more of a glare upon reality than anything else' (CW 32/279). Nevertheless, in order to justify the violent suppression of the uprising, he blames the motivations of participants on their backwardness, the petty bourgeois interests and behaviours of the peasantry, and the interventions of White Guards, foreign enemies, and 'petty-bourgeois anarchist elements' (184). During the 10th Party Congress, while the uprising still raged, he cites the necessity of 'a thorough appraisal of the political and economic lessons of this event' (184) as one of the most important reasons for the transition to the NEP. He corrects War Communism with a policy that again allows for nuanced relations with the peasantry and petty bourgeoisie, and even invites foreign capital into the country to this end (329–65). Contradictions develop relating to the antagonism between an openness towards flexible economic and social changes and rigorous observance of the principles of dictatorship in the political structure, which will become characteristic of the state socialist developmental model emerging from the Russian Revolution as such.

2. *Lenin's 'Interventions'*. – Antonio **Gramsci** identifies **Lenin's** contributions as the 'theorization and realization of hegemony' of revolutionary forces (PN, Notebook 7, §35, 187) and compares him, in terms of the popularisation of Marxism, to early Christianity's **Paulus** (§33; 183 et sq.). **Labica** makes positive

reference to this observation, while also emphasising the other side of **Gramsci's** position, namely his warning against an uncritical generalisation of the Russian example and Lenin's interpretation thereof (1986, 118). What is at stake is not only **Lenin's** method of changing strategies and solutions based on the situation at hand, but in fact the entire concept of this Marxist-oriented movement, constituted as a "work in progress", as it were, and later established as the epochal model of the Communist workers' movement as such.

2.1 Initial focus is devoted to the character, method, and intention of **Lenin's** reception of **Marx**. Illegality and internal banishment restricted his access to Marx's work for some time, and it was only later, in exile, that **Lenin** was able to read the entirety of known literature by and about **Marx**, as is noted in the commented bibliography of the essay *Karl Marx*, originally written for a lexicon marking the 30th anniversary of his death in 1913 (CW 21/80–91). Citations of various receptions of Marx and individual references made to Marx, **Engels**, and Marxism fill 12 double-columned pages in the index of the Collected Works (CW, Reference Index 2, 335–47). **Lenin's** explicit comments on the Marxism of the Second International, which in turn outline his understanding of 'orthodox Marxism' as such, always occur within the context of debates with other political currents. The objects of analysis and the consequences to be drawn from them in terms of practical strategy vary according to the situation in the country and internationally.

Lenin repeatedly emphasises the coherence and systematics of **Marx's** doctrine: *Marxism* is the system of Marx's views and teachings. Marx was the genius who continued and consummated the three main ideological currents of the nineteenth century, as represented by the three most advanced countries of mankind: classical German philosophy, classical English political economy, and French socialism' (CW 21/40). 'Acknowledged even by his opponents, the remarkable consistency and integrity of Marx's views' drove **Lenin** to begin his essay with a 'brief outline of his world-conception in general' (*ibid.*), before summarising dialectics, the materialist conception of history, class struggle, economic doctrine, and **Marx's** conception of socialism in textbook-like fashion.

Lenin regularly draws attention to the conflict between **Marx** and **Engels** and their opponents of all stripes, such as in a review of their correspondence edited by August **Bebel** and Eduard **Bernstein**. Here, he criticises Bernstein's forewords to the individual volumes as well as his participation as an editor as such, arguing that Bernstein, given 'his notorious "evolution" to extreme opportunist views', could not do justice to the letters, 'impregnated through and through with the revolutionary spirit' (CW 19/552) as they were. Beyond

the *Manifesto*, the 1859 preface to *Contribution*, and the first volume of *Capital*, Lenin pays particular attention to Marx's contemporary historical writings (*Class Struggles*, *18th Brumaire*, *Civil War*), and from Engels primarily *Peasant War*, *Anti-Dühring*, *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*, and *The Housing Question*. The notion of a seamless continuation, later cultivated by ML, in which Lenin understands the "new" as merely the "application" of the original theoretical corpus to contemporary developments, can be found here for the most part. Yet differences arise in the approach, practical implementation, and justification of each step, which transform his 'interventions' into weighty developments with major implications for the future of Marxism.

2.2 This pertains, firstly, to the conception of the relationship between scientific analysis and practical strategy. On the one hand, Lenin emphasises that a realistic candour or openness is necessarily both the prerequisite as well as result of scientific thoroughness. In this regard, he bases himself primarily on Engels, who in 1888, when discussing the 'exposition of the materialist conception of history' developed in 1845–46 – i.e., *The German Ideology*, first published in 1932 – states that it only proves 'how incomplete our knowledge of economic history still was at that time' (*Ludwig Feuerbach*, MECW 26/520 [21/264]; *Friends of the People*, CW 1/147). On the other hand, this open analysis of new developments ought to yield 'an integral picture of our realities' (CW 1/296); contrary to the careful estimates attributed largely to Plekhanov, Lenin's method of anticipatory tendency analysis assumes the theory of a developed mode of production from the first volume of *Capital*, about which Marx says in the preface (1867) that the 'country that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future' (*C 1*, MECW 35/9 [23/12]) (although he would later restrict this prognosis to 'the genesis of capitalism in Western Europe' in 1887; MECW 24/200 [19/ 111]). As early as 1895, in the context of an argument over socialist perspectives in Russia, Lenin calls for 'the Marxist' to view the capital relation in its 'most developed form', that which is the 'quintessence of all the other forms, and shows the producer that the aim and object to follow is the abolition of this relation and its replacement by another' (*Economic Content of Narodism*, CW 1/381, fn.). In a fragment on *Statistics and Sociology* written in 1917, he emphasises – this time in a debate on the national question – the need to 'build a reliable foundation of precise and indisputable facts' in order to avoid one-sided conclusions; for a theoretical foundation to become 'a real foundation', it 'must take not individual facts, but the *sum total* of facts, without a single exception' (CW 23/272).

The basis of the certain result is thus the analysis of facts out of which the practical political programme directly emerges, although **Lenin** nevertheless regards **Marxian** theory to be an adequate template under Russian conditions as well. It becomes clear in his first summaries of **Marxian** theory, such as **Lenin's** interpretation of the *Preface* 59, that he one-sidedly assumes the inevitable conquest of all existing forms by the capitalist social formation. He grasps concrete processes of transformation from the perspective of a theoretically fixed conclusion. Where **Marx** writes of 'the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science', differentiating them from 'ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out' (MECW 29/263 [13/9]), **Lenin** separates 'ideological social relations' from 'material social relations [...] that take shape without passing through man's consciousness' (*Friends of the People*, CW 1/140). He misses the fact that the 'material [...] economic conditions of production' (MECW 29/263 [13/9]) cannot emerge without being mediated by the consciousness of actors.

This interpretation of the base and superstructure conception also has implications for **Lenin's** understanding of the relationship between party and masses and between leadership and class. He views the **Marxian** theory of social formation and theory of class struggle as mutually interdependent foundations of a materialist theory of history and society, as a synonym for social science. Accordingly, his concepts of the individual and of the group are derived from socio-economic relations. As early as 1895, long before the oft-cited passage in *A Great Beginning* (CW 29/421), **Lenin** defines 'classes' as groups 'within the bounds of each such social-economic formation, [...] differing from each other in the part they played in the system of production relations, in the conditions of production, and [...] in the interests determined by these conditions' (*Economic Content*, CW 1/412). Marxist-influenced sociology and historiography oriented itself around a conception of the relationship between the theory of formation, class, and class struggle (cf. **Steiner** 2008, esp. 238 et sqq.) as developed here for far too long, neglecting differentiations with view to both cultural relations as well as **Marx's** concrete class analysis (cf. **Vester** 2008).

Although **Lenin** denies its presence in his own Marxism, the trend towards objectivism inherent in this understanding, intended to provide 'a firm basis for the conception that the development of formations of society is a process of natural history' (*Friends of the People*, CW 1/140 et sq.), also abets the 'degenerate tendency', as **Gramsci** states with reference to Nikolai **Bukharin's** *Theory of Historical Materialism*, 'which consists in reducing a conception of the world to a mechanical formula which gives the impression of holding the whole of history

in the palm of its hand' (*SPN*, Notebook 11, § 25, 427 et sq.). As a politician, **Lenin** knows that no one can hold history in his pocket, but nonetheless requires this understanding of formation for political-ideological reasons, namely, to justify the possible hegemony of the proletariat in a coming revolution that is initially of a bourgeois nature – and after 1917, to situate the post-revolutionary transitional society as a precursor to fully-developed socialism.

2.3 This approach defines **Lenin's** conception of an "epoch" as well as his view of the relationship between capitalism and socialism in times of war and revolution. It also serves to refute social democratic claims to **Marx** that understand the relationship between revolution and war according to the model of the bourgeois revolutionary wars of the 19th cent. (cf. *CW* 21, esp. 145 et sqq.). For **Lenin**, by contrast, the crisis of the capitalist system in the imperialist war means that a decision between catastrophe and barbarism on the one hand, and progress towards socialism on the other becomes inevitable. The war had 'speeded up developments fantastically, aggravated the crisis of capitalism to the utmost, and confronted the peoples with making an immediate choice between destruction and immediate determined strides towards socialism' (September 1917, *CW* 25/282). He repeats in October: 'humanity must now choose between perishing or entrusting its fate to the most revolutionary class' (367 et sq.), and argues that his followers 'cannot be revolutionary democrats in the twentieth century and in a capitalist country *if we fear* to advance towards socialism' (360).

Lenin views the synthesis between industrial and finance capital as a 'special stage of capitalism' (*Imperialism*, *CW* 22/265) – not in the sense of a finished condition, but rather according to the 'tendency of capitalist accumulation' (*MECW* 35/748 [23/789]) originally identified by **Marx** – and, with reference to Rudolf **Hilferding's** *Finance Capital* (1910), as *monopoly* capitalism. On the one hand, this 'newest stage' is 'progressive' (*CW* 23/63) in that it intensifies the contradiction between capital and labour, but on the other hand is plagued by 'parasitism and decay' (*CW* 22/276). As a 'moribund capitalism' (302), it objectively paves the way for the passage 'to a higher socio-economic order' (298).

In the revolutionary year of 1917, **Lenin** establishes a direct relation between the monopoly stage of capitalism and Soviet power and the beginnings of socialist economic organisation, arguing that 'socialism is merely the next step forward from state-capitalist monopoly' (*CW* 25/362). For the **NEP**, **Lenin** suggests connecting elements of this most modern capitalism with revolutionary control of the 'commanding heights' of the economy as a necessary transitional form. Because history '*has given birth* in 1918 to two unconnected halves of socialism existing side by side like two future chickens in the single shell of

international imperialism. In 1918 Germany and Russia have become the most striking embodiment of the material realisation of the economic [...] conditions for socialism, on the one hand, and the political conditions, on the other' (CW 27/340). Absent a victorious revolution in Germany, however, the task of revolutionaries 'is to study the state capitalism of the Germans, to spare *no effort* in copying it and not shrink from adopting *dictatorial* methods to hasten the copying of it. Our task is to hasten this copying even more than Peter hastened the copying of Western culture [...], and we must not hesitate to use barbarous methods in fighting barbarism' (ibid.).

2.4 The *political* organisation of the transitional society was to correspond to this dualism of still-capitalist structures and the party's monopoly on political power. Its repressive structure was significantly bolstered by War Communism, before external victory and internal crisis forced a return to the conceptions of 1918, although it remains unclear whether Lenin understood this radical turn in merely tactical terms or was in fact pursuing more principled aims (Behrendt 2010, 2046 et sqq.).

The immense difficulties encountered while developing the new society appear largely as obstacles which can be overcome as long as the revolutionary government 'has the backing of the majority of the population' (1917, CW 24/418). In situations in which 'we are faced with either destruction or self-discipline, organisation and the possibility to defend ourselves', the 'politically conscious worker will understand what the main task of the socialist is, and then we shall win' (May 1918, CW 27/403). The title of his last *Pravda* article published in March 1923, 'Better Fewer, But Better', evidences his concerns about the quality of the transition. Here, Lenin cites the fact that 'development proceeded at such breakneck speed', taking Russia 'from tsarism to the Soviet system' in the course of a few years, as the primary cause for difficulties in constructing the new state (CW 33/488).

Lenin nevertheless maintains the possibility of catching up to bourgeois development as a way of opening up the path to socialism: 'What if the complete hopelessness of the situation, by stimulating the efforts of the workers and peasants tenfold, offered us the opportunity to create the fundamental requisites of civilisation in a different way from that of the West-European countries?' (1923, CW 33/478).

Despite this orientation towards the participation of the mass of workers and other layers of the working population, the dictatorial system remains. For Lenin, post-revolutionary democracy is always the new form of socialist democracy which emerges along the path of revolutionary dictatorship, in explicit reference to Engels (cf. *State and Revolution*, CW 25/459 et sqq.). The state is

either an instrument of the ruling class dictatorship (390 et sqq.) or of the revolutionary-democratic, that is, proletarian dictatorship. Here, **Lenin** bases himself on the writings of **Marx** and **Engels** concerning the 1848 revolution and the ensuing class struggles (406 et sqq.), **Marx's** evaluation of the Paris Commune (418 et sqq.), and the notion of the withering-away of the state developed by **Marx** in *Gotha* and **Engels** in *Anti-Dühring* (461 et sqq.). Marxists are only those who have grasped 'the essence of Marx's theory' of class struggle and adhere to the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat without question: 'The transition from capitalism to communism is certainly bound to yield a tremendous abundance and variety of political forms, but the essence will inevitably be the same: *the dictatorship of the proletariat*' (418).

According to this view, the transition requires the dictatorship of the proletariat to suppress the counter-revolution and, as developments even after victory in the civil war demonstrate, opposition within the revolutionary ranks as well (cf. CW 32/196–203). True emancipation is linked to the communist future: 'So long as the state exists there is no freedom. When there is freedom, there will be no state' (*State and Revolution*, CW 25/473). The proletarian revolution is tasked with undertaking concrete steps towards liberation from oppressive state structures, as expressed immediately after the revolution in the *Declaration of Rights of the Working and Exploited People* (CW 26/423–25). However, measures to ensure individual freedoms were lacking. Instead, the declaration was followed by repressive decisions such as the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and the removal of remaining coalition partners from the revolutionary government.

The country's desperate situation, in which the extreme Right once again dominated on the side of the counter-revolution, was supposed to legitimise the use of extreme measures modelled upon the Jacobin dictatorship: 'Our Red terror is a defence of the working class against the exploiters' (CW 31/142). The suppression of the Kronstadt rebellion served as a particularly drastic demonstration of the consequences of this radically single-handed approach: as **Rosa Luxemburg** had warned, the dictatorship of the proletariat became a dictatorship of the party and, even more restrictive, the party leadership.

Similarly, the state of exception had fateful consequences on the terrain of legality. The new legality was to be strictly observed and guaranteed, as **Lenin** repeatedly emphasises, while exclusively serving the aims of the revolution at the same time. Lenin calls for the ruthless application of terror in this regard on multiple occasions. As he explains in 1922 while justifying a law concerning the death penalty, the legal system 'must not ban terror [...] but must formulate the motives underlying it, legalise it as a principle, plainly, without any make-believe or embellishment'. Thus, laws 'must be formulated in the broad-

est possible manner, for only revolutionary law and revolutionary conscience can more or less widely determine the limits within which it should be applied' (to D.I. Kursky, CW 33/358).

Lenin's willingness to accept realistic corrections to his political course did not extend to even contemplating modifications to the dictatorial form of party rule. Laws and legislation were radically emptied of their indispensable formal validity and subjected to the requirements of revolutionary power. Nearing death and isolated from political life, Lenin warns in his last letters, constituting a kind of testament, against arbitrariness, recklessness, and exorbitance among the leading revolutionaries, from whom he demands 'not so much the qualities of an administrator as [...] the ability to enlist the services of other men' (CW 36/599). In doing so, he does not touch upon the structures he built in the revolutionary struggle. Stalin's later escalation of this arbitrariness beyond all measure despite the stabilisation of the new order and the devastating consequences thereof 'cannot be retrospectively justified' (Klenner 2012, 833) by the rampaging of the counter-revolution and the fascists.

3. An attempt at an historical-critical summary must primarily address the novel quality of the problems emerging from the imperialist war, the revolution, and the conditions of development in Soviet Russia. Lenin's Marxism broke new ground in this regard. The construction of a new social order in an underdeveloped country, at least initially as a transitional society, while nevertheless pursuing socialism as a formational perspective was without precedent in both theory as well as actual history.

3.1 Following the immense losses of both human life as well as means of production, the fundamental preconditions from which Marxian socialism proceeds, i.e., the existence of capitalists and workers, first had to be re-created in the peasant-petty bourgeois-shaped transitional society – in the contradictory form of a state capitalism that does not serve the interests of capital, necessary 'to lay the economic foundation for socialist economy', as the revolutionaries 'hold all the key positions. We hold the land; it belongs to the state' (1922, CW 33/427).

Here, sober evaluation stands side-by-side with exaggerated faith in one's own strength, hopes for the participation of the masses alongside dictatorial acceleration of the transformation from above. 'Our opponents told us repeatedly that we were rash in undertaking to implant socialism in an insufficiently cultured country. But they were misled [...] because in our country the political and social revolution preceded the cultural revolution [...]. This cultural revolution would now suffice to make our country a completely social-

ist country' – a task which 'presents immense difficulties'; 'for to be cultured we must achieve a certain development of the material means of production, must have a certain material base' (6 January 1923, CW 33/474 et sq.). Ten days later, he asks 'why cannot we begin by first achieving the prerequisites for that definite level of culture' necessary for the 'building of socialism' by revolutionary means, 'and then, with the aid of the workers' and peasants' government and the Soviet system, proceed to overtake the other nations' (478 et sq.)?

3.2 This raised the precarious problem of the relationship between Russian reality and the **Marxian** project as such. On one hand, **Lenin** did not deviate from **Marx's** fundamental assertion that only highly-developed capitalism provided the necessary preconditions for the socialist-communist society. On the other, and in line with his concept of the "epoch", **Lenin** related the revolutionary movements in the periphery of the capitalist world to the world-revolutionary context as a whole, and thus, like **Marx** and **Engels** in the 1880s and 1890s before him, considered it plausible that these could play an instigating role. This explains the asynchronicity in forms of the transformational process: 'The social revolution cannot be the united action of the proletarians of *all* countries', he writes in the summer of 1916, because 'most of the countries [...] have not even reached, or have only just reached, the capitalist stage of development' (CW 23/58 et sq.).

As demonstrated in his January 1917 speech marking the anniversary of Bloody Sunday, the beginning of the first Russian revolution in 1905, **Lenin** did not assume from the outset that Russia would be the first country in which the imperialist war would become a revolutionary civil war. Although he predicts the coming revolutionary upheaval, which 'cannot end otherwise than with the expropriation of the bourgeoisie, with the victory of socialism', he suggests that he and the 'older generation' of the revolutionary movement 'may not live to see the decisive battles of this coming revolution' (CW 23/253). **Lenin** neither assumes the victory of the socialist revolution in an *underdeveloped* capitalist country as an historical law, nor does he insist that this must occur in the weakest link in the geopolitical chain. As Isaac **Deutscher** has correctly pointed out, it was only with the doctrine of 'Socialism in one country' that **Stalin** 'established himself as an ideologue in his own right' (1949/1962, 290).

Also after the victory of the Russian revolution, **Lenin** was aware that its historical importance was only relative. In this regard, he stressed the need to differentiate between the current influence that events in Russia have on the labour movements of other countries, and the more general significance of the 'historical inevitability of a repetition, on an international scale' of 'certain fundamental features of our revolution', meaning that 'at the present moment

in history [...] it is the Russian model that reveals to *all* countries something [...] of their near and inevitable future' (*Left-Wing Communism*, CW 31/5 et sq.). Lenin nevertheless warns against exaggerating the degree of this vanguard role, for 'soon after the victory of the proletarian revolution in at least one of the advanced countries, a sharp change will probably come about: Russia will cease to be the model and will once again become a backward country (in the "Soviet" and the socialist sense)' (ibid.).

The contradiction, both in terms of the **Marxian** programme as well as within his own political and theoretical conceptions, lies not in this question, but rather in the ambivalent treatment of the problem of the transition, primarily in terms of the relationships between state, party, and society, that is, the relationship between leadership and "masses". This relationship oscillates from the very outset, from the struggle over the party programme during its foundation to **Lenin's** writing and decrees while in power, torn between forced educationism from above and calls for active participation and continuous democratic control from below.

In *What is to Be Done?* (1902), **Lenin** not only underscores the importance of revolutionary theory, without which there can be 'no revolutionary movement' (CW 5/369), but also connects this, basing himself on **Kautsky's** assertion that socialist consciousness is always 'something introduced into the proletarian class struggle from without' (384), to a more fundamental assertion on the relationship between theory and ideology: 'Since there can be no talk of an independent ideology formulated by the working masses themselves in the process of their movement, the *only* choice is – either bourgeois or socialist ideology' (ibid.). This statement is relativised in a footnote: 'This does not mean, of course, that the workers have no part in creating such an ideology. They take part, however, not as workers, but as socialist theoreticians' (ibid.). Here, the emphasis of the external relationship between Marxism understood as a revolutionary 'ideology' and the working class is not the only matter of note. Even more important – because of its later binding character within ML – is the turn away from the exclusively critical conception of ideology as derived from **Marx** towards ideology as a neutral definition of all forms of social consciousness, and from this, an exclusively positive relationship to proletarian, or rather socialist theory and worldview.

3.3 This blending of theory and ideology also strains **Lenin's** relationship to philosophy and science, and not only because his later statements would become an integral component of ML. These statements can be found primarily in *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* and in the conspectuses and margin notes of the *Philosophical Notebooks*. Lenin seeks, as he emphasises in a letter

to Maxim Gorky, to be 'just an ordinary Marxist in philosophy' (25 February 1908, CW 13/449). But this hesitation, with which he, for example, allows artists full freedom of political orientation outside of party work (*ibid.*), is coupled with an uncompromising rejection of deviations from 'dialectical and historical materialism' as he understands it, which threaten to damage the theoretical-political unity of the party. Freedom of criticism, as he explains in *What Is To Be Done?*, is not that of creative scientific debate, but rather the *ideological* 'freedom to convert Social-Democracy into a democratic party of reform' (CW 5/355), and *scientifically* the 'freedom from all integral and pondered theory', that is, a turn towards 'eclecticism and lack of principle' (369). On one hand, Lenin pursued a legitimate clarification vis-à-vis the Neo-Kantian critique of Marx with view to establishing a productive connection between materialism, which – through 'further experimental investigation' – 'stimulates' attempts to solve other unsolved questions (CW 14, 46) and contemporary scientific developments. On the other hand, Lenin also demands strict "orthodoxy" in philosophical questions, as is evidenced in a list of questions formulated in 1908 obliging lecturers at the party school on the island of Capri to adhere to the principles elaborated by Engels in *Anti-Dühring*. They were to 'acknowledge that the philosophy of Marxism is *dialectical materialism*' and 'that Machism has nothing in common with Bolshevism' (CW 14/15 et sq.).

Later preoccupation with questions of the dialectic in Greek philosophy and primarily Hegel in 1916 pertain to the ongoing conflict with reformism, yet Lenin adopts the Marxian dialectic not only as methodological foundation of scientific analysis, but elevates it to the level of a comprehensive object theory as well. Here we can again observe the oscillation between an open and fixed worldview as an essential feature of the Leninian understanding of Marxism.

Lenin could certainly draw on Marx, and even more so Engels, as far as the materialist foundation of scientific thought was concerned. Nor did he view the oft-emphasised claim to the validity of the 'doctrine' as a monopoly on scientificity or as a free pass for ignorance vis-à-vis non-Marxist philosophy and science. That said, they should, similar to the 'problems raised by the recent revolution in natural science', be integrated into 'militant materialism', particularly since this revolution, especially like the theory of Albert Einstein, who 'is himself not making any active attack on the foundations of materialism', would be thoroughly gutted by the bourgeois intelligentsia. In order to 'hold its own in the struggle against the onslaught of bourgeois ideas [...] and carry it to a victorious finish, the natural scientist must be a modern materialist, a conscious adherent of the materialism represented by Marx, i.e., he must be a dialectical materialist' (CW 33/233).

Lenin's fight for the superiority of 'militant materialism' over the allegedly contrary bourgeois science tended towards ideologisation and dogmatisation, which later helped to facilitate its transformation into a catechism securing the power of a new ruling elite. Here we ultimately find the contradiction between Lenin's 'implicit' philosophy, which, as Gramsci writes, lies in 'the practical work of creating history', and his 'explicit' philosophy, which seeks to elaborate this 'coherently' (*FS*, Notebook 10.11, § 31, 387).

4. *The ambivalent result: Lenin's Marxism in his epoch.* – 4.1 The question of how Lenin would have ultimately resolved the nascent dualism emerging with the onset of the NEP between a dictatorship conceived as socialist and a renewed capitalism ventures into the realm of speculation. His warnings concerning the role of Stalin during the 'long agony' lasting from late 1922 to his death on 21 January 1924 (*Hedeler* 2013, 45 et sqq.) were ignored largely because the leadership group, meticulously dissected and evaluated in his last writings, agreed that a public debate on the distribution and control of power risked splitting the party and endangering the entire system – a judgement in line with the uncompromising path to and in power that Lenin himself had pursued.

Among the contenders for his succession, Bukharin (1926/1976, 598 and 1929/2013) supported the cautious line of the alliance with the peasantry, while Trotsky as well as his supporter, the economist Yevgeni Preobrazhensky, tended towards a dictatorship of the working class – including support for industrialisation via primitive accumulation at the expense of the peasantry. Trotsky did not, as Stalin later claimed following the party's break with "Trotskyism", see himself as principally opposed to Lenin. There had of course been 'moments when we disagreed', but these had never amounted to a 'struggle between two "principles"' as depicted by Stalin (*Trotsky* 1929/1970, 461). The 'fight against Trotskyism' initiated in 1923 had actually been 'a fight against the ideological legacy of Lenin' (488).

The latter was effectively claimed by Stalin, who would ultimately emerge from the power struggle victorious, to legitimise his system of political rule. In this regard, he defined Leninism as early as 1924 as the 'Marxism of the era of imperialism and the proletarian revolution', the 'theory and tactics of the proletarian revolution in general' and 'the dictatorship of the proletariat in particular' (*Foundations of Leninism*, Wks 6, 73); although 'proletarian' actually signifies the inverse of the established relations of power in both cases.

This version of Leninism, officially designated the 'Marxism of the 20th Century' (*Fedoseyev* 1973, 181 et sqq.) by the CPSU, has since been widely considered a legitimate further development of Marxism in the Soviet Union and later the "socialist camp", as well as by many outside of this sphere in the context

of the Cold War. The close connection between **Marx** and **Lenin** in ML was by no means exclusively **Stalin's** invention, nor was it merely a result of the problematic form taken on by the relationship between theory and praxis. **Lenin's** ideas continued to be perceived as representative of a revolutionary Marxism despite, or perhaps because of, their integration into ML. That said, even upon critical examination, his political importance exceeds that of other theoreticians and party leaders of both the Second International and the Comintern.

This was made historically possible by the extreme answers demanded by extreme conditions in a catastrophic period, characterised by **Hobsbawm** as an 'age of total war' (1994/1995, 21) and 'world revolution'. The latter emerged and unfolded as 'the child of twentieth-century war': while the First World War had triggered the Russian Revolution, the Soviet Union resulting from it became a 'superpower' after the Second. The revolution initiated in 1917 thus became 'a global constant in the century's history' (54), one pole in the barbarically waged conflicts of the 'age of extremes'.

4.2 Writing while still under the impression of the 'Great War', Ernst **Bloch** expresses the hopes attached to the revolution successfully realised in Russia with the Biblical reference 'ubi Lenin, ibi Jerusalem' (*PH*, vol. 2, 610). Bertolt **Brecht** writes in memory of **Lenin** in a similar vein, in a time marked by extreme disappointments due to Stalinist terror and the defeats at the hands of fascism: 'When **Lenin** died and was absent / The victory had been won, but the country lay in ruins. / The masses had decamped, but / The path was obscured. / [...] Fifteen years have passed since then. / One-sixth of the Earth / Is liberated from exploitation. / [...] And where it persists] / The masses continue to rise again / Prepared to struggle. / Lenin [...] was our teacher. / He struggled with us. / He is enshrined / In the great heart of the working class' (*Kantate zu Lenins Todestag*, 1939). For **Brecht**, however, this pathos does not pertain to the ruling symbolism found in statues and monuments, nor does 'enshrined' mean the ideological consolidation of a singularly valid canon or cult-like deification of an authority above any and all critique. Rather, honouring **Lenin** should be realised through the practical resolution of concrete life questions. **Brecht** incorporates this into his image of the carpet weavers of Kutan-Bulak, who spent the money collected for busts of **Lenin** to combat an outbreak of fever threatening their village: 'So they were useful to each other by honouring Lenin, and / Honoured him by being useful to each other, and thus / Had understood him well' (1929/1977, *GW* 9, 666 et sq.). This image of Lenin as enlightening and clarifying figure stands in direct contrast to the mummification of his body (even lying at **Stalin's** side for several years) in the mausoleum in front of the Moscow Kremlin, reminiscent of the ancient Pharaohs – a revealing and

incriminating example of tendencies towards an oriental-despotic form of rule. Accordingly, **Brecht** defines the relation to **Stalin** in terms of difference: 'Mi-en-leh's orders were tersely formulated convictions. Mi-en-leh could not say the superior power of his opponents forced him to give orders. It forced him to convince. Ni-en had fewer opponents and gave orders' (*Me-ti*, 2016, 144).

4.3 **Brecht's** cautious voice of protest and the haughty insistence on an all-powerful Leninism as expressed by **Fedoseyev** in the early 1970s (1973, 184) represent the opposing sides found in the reception of **Lenin** in the decades following the Second World War. More so than during the struggle against fascism, the contradictions inherent in this reception grew increasingly visible in the context of global systems rivalry, which also witnessed the greatest spread and influence of Leninian Marxism. We find historical examples thereof in revolutionary movements and upheavals on all continents on one hand, and convulsions within state socialism's sphere of influence on the other: 1953 in the GDR, 1968 in Czechoslovakia, 1970 and 1980 in Poland.

Following **Stalin's** death and the 20th Congress of the CPSU, a brief period of openness towards internal reform set in, during which (and similar to the final crisis after 1985) proponents spoke out in favour of restoring Leninian conceptions of socialism – with the unintended consequence of revealing the system's blatant unreformability. Subsequent engagements with Lenin's work were accordingly broad and diverse, ranging from those within the ML framework 'of the sort seeking to renew dialectical materialism' while abandoning the canonised 'pedagogical corpse' (**Labica** 1986, 123) on one side, to endeavours towards fundamental renewal based on a deconstruction of said materialism on the other.

The dilemma of the former method, widespread and internally differentiated across the established social sciences of state socialism, is described aptly by **Labica**: they demonstrated that attempts at renewal could 'never be entirely covered up' by the authority of dogma and in fact repeatedly 'haunted' official ML (124). This took place via dissidents and oppositionists, who in the role of 'moles of re-emerging Leninism' never 'grew tired of invoking its legacy' (123). At the same time, however, the 'struggle over words' in ML 'expressed a lot about what it had to say: the convoluted stringing together of complex interventions, with the ultimate effect of allowing time itself to come apart' (124). This pertains to sociological, historical, legal, and political scientific references to **Lenin** in the context of the internal requirements of state socialist societies in competition with the West as well as the growing international integration of academia operating under the Marxist-Leninist label (**Küttler** 1999). In the Soviet Union itself, a reception of **Lenin** directly conceived as revision served to

expand historical and sociological research on the conditions and novelties of the Russian Revolution, as well as analogies to the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America (Hösler 1995) – endeavours corresponding to similar projects in GDR scholarship, such as the projects on developing countries and revolutionary historical research initiated and conducted by Walter Markov (2009, 337 et sqq. and 370 et sqq.).

Meanwhile, the image of Lenin in bourgeois scholarship differentiated as well, particularly with view to the concept of 1917 as a developmental revolution (cf. Geyer 1968/1987). Doubts and criticisms grew among Marxists outside of the Soviet sphere of influence concerning the foundations of ML: the dictatorship of the proletariat, the fighting revolutionary party of a new type, the worldwide transition to socialism as initiated in 1917, as well as the dominant understandings of science and philosophy. In light of obvious manifestations of crisis within state socialism, foundations for a renewal of Marxism were drafted via a critical evaluation of Leninian Marxism. In this regard, the development of the reception of Lenin is inextricably linked to the wider history of Marxism 'in rapid retreat' (Hobsbawm 2011, 385).

5. *Prospects: Lenin and Marxism in the 21st Cent.* – With the ruptures of 1989, the global situation as it was discussed in the 1970s and 80s has again changed dramatically. For Marxism, liberation from the chains of dogmatic ossification means, on the one hand, that it can engage with the new constellation of social development without reservations. On the other hand, the epochal shift of 1989/91 also meant losing the support of a real-historical alternative. History, which in ML was fixed as the "historical law" of the transition from capitalism to socialism, proved to be open in this regard once again.

Accordingly, Lenin is no longer viewed exclusively through the lens of a progressive revolutionary epoch, but increasingly in terms of negative developments and malformations – to some extent as the inverse of the positive super-elevation once common in state socialism. Overall, a depreciating distance is predominant, at least in the industrialised countries of the West. In Russia itself, he appears more as destroyer of the great national power than as the initiator of a new upward trajectory, so much so that in the context of a new Great Power political nationalism, even Stalin is viewed more positively (cf. Schützler 2014, 16). In Left discourse at the outset of the 21st cent., concepts of transformation realised step-by-step through broad alliances of civil society dominate (cf. Reißig 2009, 15 et sqq.), in which Lenin no longer plays a role. In contrast to this is the attempt to invoke a new 'hour of Lenin' and identify analogies to 'Leninian moments', particularly with view to his revolutionary politics, in the construction of a corresponding organisation and party

form (Porcaro 2012, 86). Slavoj Žižek responds to the undeniable insight that a return to Lenin is impossible, ‘that his particular solution [...] even failed monstrously’, by asserting that repetition does not entail repeating his concepts and deeds, but rather returning to unsolved problems, to thereby better see ‘that there is something wrong with *our* epoch’, because ‘a certain historical dimension is disappearing from it’ (2002, 310 et sq.).

Even if one does not agree with these lines of argument, the questions they pose are important for a situation in which the point is no longer to argue whether Lenin’s revolution was directed against Marx’s *Capital*, as Gramsci (1917) saw it, to thereby identify the discrepancy between intentions and results of Lenin’s Marxism. Rather, we must ask ourselves to what historical generality the ‘work of the particular’ (Labica 1986, 116 et sqq.) should refer, if the transition to socialism can no longer be conceived within the framework established by the October Revolution. ‘We cannot foresee the solutions of the problems facing the world in the twenty-first century’, writes Hobsbawm (2011, 15). But in order to find plausible solutions, ‘they must ask Marx’s questions, even if they do not wish to accept his various disciples’ answers’ (ibid.). That Marxian questions have again become prominent in a new way is rooted in ‘plenty of good reasons’, namely the real experience that ‘the globalised capitalist world [...] was in crucial ways uncannily like the world anticipated by Marx in the *Communist Manifesto*’ (5). Precisely because of this, Hobsbawm relates this historical relativisation of the aforementioned answers not only to those of the ‘disciples’, but also to the concrete answers that Marx provided and which in some respects are ‘not or no longer acceptable’ (12) over one and one half cent.s later. Decisive is if and how the world of globalised capitalism will make Lenin’s questions relevant once again, even if the answers are no longer appropriate in their specifics or require a thoroughgoing critique in light of their previous consequences.

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→ abstract/concrete, anarchism, basic question of philosophy, being a Marxist, Bukharinism, cadre party, capitalism, colonialism, commanding heights, concentration and centralisation of capital, councils/council system, counter-revolution, critique (V), critique of the soviets, dialectics, dialectical materialism, dictatorship of the proletariat, dismantling of the state, dual power, electrification, epistemology, figure of thought, finance capital, Gramscism, Hegelianism, historical materialism, idealism/materialism, idol, imperialism, Kautskyism, *K-Gruppen*, Kronstadt rebellion, legal Marxism, Luxemburg-Gramsci Line, Luxemburgism, Mao-Zedong-thought, Marxism, Marxism-Leninism, materialism, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, monopoly capital, New Economic Policy, October revolution, Paris commune, Party of a New Type, power, primary contradiction (primary/secondary contradiction), professional revolutionary, reflection, reformism, revisionism debate, revolution, revolutionary *Realpolitik*, Russian revolution, Second International, soviet, soviet society, state, Stalinism, textbook Marxism, Theses on Feuerbach, theories of crisis, theory of revolution, totality, transitional society, Trotskyism, ultra-leftism, vanguard, war communism, withering away of the state, Zimmerwald

→ Abbau des Staates, Abbild, Absterben des Staates, abstrakt/konkret, Anarchismus, Avantgarde, Berufsrevolutionär, Bucharinismus, Denkform, Dialektik, dialektischer Materialismus, Diktatur des Proletariats, Doppelherrschaft, Elektrifizierung, Erkenntnistheorie, Feuerbach-Thesen, Finanzkapital, Gramscismus, Grundfrage der Philosophie, Grundwiderspruch (Haupt-/Nebenwiderspruch), Hegelianismus, historischer Materialismus, Idealismus/ Materialismus, Imperialismus, Kaderpartei, Kapitalismus, Kautskyanismus, K-Gruppen, Kolonialismus, Kommandohöhen, Konterrevolution, Konzentration und Zentralisation des Kapitals, Kriegskommunismus, Krisentheorien, Kritik (V), Kronstädter Aufstand, Legaler Marxismus, Lehrbuchmarxismus, Linie Luxemburg-Gramsci, Linksradikalismus, Luxemburgismus, Macht, Mao-Zedong-Ideen, Marxismus, Marxismus-Leninismus, Marxistsein/Marxistinsein, Materialis-

mus, Materialismus und Empiriokritizismus, Monopolkapital, Neue Ökonomische Politik, Oktoberrevolution, Pariser Kommune, Partei neuen Typs, Räte/Rätesystem, Reformismus, Revisionismusstreit, Revolution, revolutionäre Realpolitik, Revolutionstheorie, Russische Revolution, Sowjet, Sowjetische Gesellschaft, Sowjetkritik, Staat, Stalinismus, Totalität, Trotzismus, Übergangsgesellschaft, Widerspiegelung, Zimmerwalder, Zweite Internationale

Limits to Growth

A: ḥudūd an-numūw. – F: limites de la croissance. – G: Grenzen des Wachstums. – R: predely rosta. – S: límites del crecimiento. – C: zēngzhǎng de jíxiàn 增长的极限

1. In 1972 ‘A Report for the Club of Rome’s Project on the Predicament of Mankind’ was published by **Meadows** et al. (*The Limits to Growth*), followed by the German edition in 1973. The ninth edition (1975) of *Gablers Wirtschaftslexikon* did not recognise the term yet. Under ‘Growth Process’ the following definition can be found: ‘concept of modern economic theory for the continuous expansion of production yields in goods and services over a specific period of time, brought about by the continual formation of additional real capital’ (2122). At the UN Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm 1972, Rio 1992) as well as in the reports compiled for the conference (Hammarskjöld Report 1975, Bariloche Report 1976, Brandt Report 1980, Brundtland Report 1987) the question of the LG was central from the very beginning.

In the field of political economy since Adam **Smith** and since Karl **Marx**’s critique of it, the conditions of and limits to economic growth have been pivotal to micro- and macroeconomic theory. The limitations set by nature have been incorporated in various ways. Later, on account of the tumultuous development of industrial capitalism in the 19th cent., this engagement with the natural conditions of production took a backseat. The neo-classical marginal utility theory (**Marshall, Walras, Menger**) no longer investigated macroeconomically how value is generated through the application of nature, labour, and capital, but rather how subjective utility can be optimised through microeconomic expansion (cf. **Hirsch** 1974).

Subsequently, perspectives were determined in particular by mass consumption based on mechanised and rationalised mass production, for which the concept “Fordism” became formative. After the Second World War, the Fordist manifestation of capitalism prevailed completely in the industrial societies of Western Europe – mediated to some extent by capital exports from the USA. Keynesianism drafted government economic stimulus programs for the purpose of stabilising economic growth. This could only work because of the worldwide access to natural resources and the radical exploitation of the environment. The first worldwide crises of Fordism can be summarised in the

keywords: decolonisation, the end of the Bretton Woods system of currency controls, the energy crisis, and noticeable air and water pollution.

1. With their report, which responded to these developments, **Meadows** et al. once again seized on an elementary concept of capitalist economic theory: that of *scarcity*. However, contrary to the traditional conception, they did not relate 'scarcity' to the discrepancy between unlimited human needs and limited production capacities, the expansion of which is deemed necessary to achieve the optimal satisfaction of need. They established instead that the finitude of natural resources on the planet sets objective limits to the growth of the world economy, for energy and raw material supplies are not simply substitutable at will. Population growth and the inability of nature to cope with the exposure to contamination lead in the same direction (cf. **Commoner** 1971).

And with this, the substitution paradigm of Nobel Prize Winner Robert M. **Solow** – a pillar-saint of the neoclassical theory of limited resources – was scrapped. He had incorporated the reflections of **Hotelling** on the 'Economics of Exhaustible Resources' from the 1930s and – in an implicit recourse to **Ricardo's** rent theory – derived the conditions for the exploitation of depletable resources 'from two aspects of technology': 'first, the likelihood of technical progress [...] and, second, the ease with which other factors of production, especially labour and reproducible capital, can be substituted for exhaustible resources in production' (**Solow** 1979, 329). Ulrich **Hampicke** objected that this assumes 'a world of the mobility of resources also in a physical respect': 'Everything that is relevant must in principle be replaceable (substitutable) [...]. We can say with certainty that with today's level of ecological knowledge, as incomplete as it still may be, this economic illusory world is *not* the real world. The concepts of the complementarity of systematic cohesiveness and of the complementarity of indispensability have no place in neoclassical practice' (1992, 107). Wherever this tendency makes light of ecological dangers, 'this can ultimately be attributed to "substitution worship"' (ibid.; cf. **Hampicke** 1995). – The global debate that **Meadows** et al. provoked (cf. **Immler** 1973, 1975; **Czeskleba-Dupont** 1979; **Mehte** 1981) admittedly did not bring about radical reforms, but it did raise general awareness of the LG.

2. **Marx** understood production as the 'appropriation of natural substances to human requirements; it is the necessary condition for effecting exchange of matter between man and Nature; it is the everlasting Nature-imposed condition of human existence, and therefore is independent of every social phase of that existence, or rather, is common to every such phase' (MECW 35/194 [23/198]). The process of accumulation of capital is also a process of the self-

accelerating valorisation of nature, for 'this movement is not only a replacement of value, but also a replacement in material and is therefore as much bound up with the relative proportions of the value components of the total social product as with their use value, their material shape' (MECW 36/393 [24/393]).

Against the **Kautskyian** mainstream in post-Marxian theory formation, Rosa **Luxemburg** assigned central significance to these material conditions of accumulation: 'On the other hand, the constant increase in the productivity of labour, which is the most important method for raising the rate of surplus value, *implies the unconfined exploitation of all the resources, all the materials and conditions provided by nature and by the Earth, and it is thus bound up with these*. In this respect, it is in keeping with the essence and mode of existence of capital that it will tolerate no restrictions. [...] for the productive employment of realized surplus value, it is necessary for capital to dispose ever more fully over the whole globe in order to have available to it a quantitatively and qualitatively unrestricted range of means of production' (CW 2/780–82 [5/306 et sq.]; emphasis added). In her study on *The Accumulation of Capital* (1913), Luxemburg considered what internal laws drive capital around the entire earth. In doing so, she identified the unbridled subjugation of nature as a fundamental condition of the production of surplus value and realisation of capital. Beyond this insight she suggested yet another insight that she also shared with **Marx** (cf. MECW 35/591 [23/621]): while the global exploitation of capital finds its limits in the objective material elements of this process, it will be limited by the barriers that are imposed upon it by the natural conditions for the reproduction of humanity. The striving of capital to expand or lift these barriers, in other words, to make nature artificially and technically reproducible, is itself inherent to the very meaning of exploitation that makes accumulation and, with it, growth, the ultimate objective as an end in itself.

The productive metabolism therefore runs into a crucial limitation: even if energy or material substance (according to **Georgescu-Roegen** 1971) cannot be lost in a physical sense when undergoing transformation through processes of work (1st Fundamental Rule of Thermodynamics), this does occur in an economic sense, in the form of no longer usable energy or substance. The transformation of nature is fundamentally, i.e. independent of the relations of production, an irreversible process of appropriation and alteration of nature by humans. This irreversibility can be prolonged or moderated – this is a question of social organisation and the development of technical capacities. Being prepared to see that an economy based on the complete closed-loop use of natural resources is fundamentally impossible could slow down the steady increase in entropy production.

3. Irreversibility often becomes visible and palpable only once it is too late. The overuse of reproducible nature, the exploitation of unrennewable resources, the contamination of air, water, and soil have for millenia been the repercussions of human activity that overstepped these limits (cf. Lipietz 2000, 46 et sqq.). This was often devastating for entire regions, leaving them beyond repair for centuries, however so far not for the entire planet. And yet just such a global crisis has been developing since the 1950s into a real problem, for which a solution has yet to be found.

Today's civil society is not completely blind with respect to its effects on nature. Since 1984 the Worldwatch Institute has published the yearly report *State of the World*, in which the disastrous effects on nature and the human environment are described. Also, the 2001 Environmental Outlook from the OECD addressed in detail the destructive sides of growth. While it may appear as if the prognoses of an impending scarcity of raw materials may in fact be nullified by increases in efficiency, alternative energy production, and exploration of new repositories, awareness is being raised about the negative effects of growth on the natural environment (cf. Meadows et al. 1992).

The dramatic decline of fish stocks or biodiversity in the world's oceans, the acceleration of the logging of the tropical rainforests, the excessive growth of mountains of garbage, the regional contamination of air, water, and soil through toxic immissions and emissions are "minor" concerns in comparison to the no longer disputed change in the earth's climate. The limits to what is physically tolerable and financially feasible – only the latter being alarming within the capitalist economic system – are step by step becoming more disastrously tangible. There are hardly any more insurance policies for damage suffered due to natural catastrophes, because reinsurance industry analysts consider further 'El Niño' effects unpayable.

Despite the political declarations of intent from Rio 1992 and Kyoto 1997, the CO₂-equivalents of recorded emissions of greenhouse gases have increased worldwide. According to the OECD, they will once again have increased by 33 percent by 2020. Due to the increase in mobility, automobile traffic will have doubled by 2020, while air traffic will have tripled. The growth of the world's population from 2.5 billion people in 1950 to over 6 billion at the turn of the millennium requires deeper and deeper encroachment into the ecosystem – the soil, water, and air. In the coming decades the increase in the average annual global temperature due to greenhouse gas emissions will, according to all reputable calculations, amount to as much as 5 degrees Celsius. This will bring about an increase in extreme weather, such as droughts and flooding, as well as a rise in sea levels, and all the catastrophic ramifications this holds for human societies.

'Earth Politics' (Weizsäcker 1989) reforms designed to counter this fall short (cf. Mármora 1990), or they take the initiation of necessary changes no further than the model of a new 'Marshall Plan' (Gore 1994). Held captive to the Solowian paradigm, overstepping the LG is only meant to be counteracted by investments in technologies that increase efficiency in the consumption of resources as well as through the reduction of emissions (cf. Weizsäcker et al. 1995). In fact, the actual efficiency gains have been effectively offset by economic growth through price dumping (cf. Massarat 1993, 159 et sqq.).

With the entry into high-tech capitalism fuelled by information technologies, the illusion is fostered that capitalist growth could go hand in hand with a sustainable consumption of resources. But when the electricity must be shut down for hours in the area of Silicon Valley because the virtual surfing of the IT-community overloads the power supplies, it becomes obvious that electricity does not come out of the computer, but rather that computers only function when they receive electricity, which is generated through the consumption of natural resources.

The driving force behind capitalist forms of growth is the valorisation of value in the competition between capitals. Share prices, speculation, and derivative trading remain a zero-sum game if they do not accrue intrinsic value on the basis of growth, which can solely be created through the energetic and substantial exploitation of nature in human labour. At least since the imperialist era at the end of 19th cent., capitalism has globalised its regime of accumulation. The worldwide expansion of the capitalist mode of production through the conquest of other cultures and the destruction of pre-capitalist relations of production, as Luxemburg precisely analysed, are accompanied by the valorisation of nature and the environment. The sustained destruction or harm to sensitive ecosystems such as in semi-arid and arid regions of the earth (for instance, in Egypt in the 19th cent., cf. Schyga 1994) had already demonstrated the LG for capitalism much earlier. In moderate climatic zones the harm done by the overexploitation of natural resources has been thus far less devastating. This is not only because of these zones' superior ability to regenerate, but above all because political barriers have been set up against their pillaging. The drastic logging of forests for mining has been curbed since the modern era in favour of the long-term profit calculations of landowners. What is more, resources could continuously be allocated from a public accumulation trust in order to mitigate the most brutal negative repercussions that the exploitation of natural resources has had on humans, or at least to help them vanish from public perception. Through billions of investments in the municipal supply of water and sanitation, water, once a free good, became a commodity and was given a price. The immediate availability of fresh water at any time and the

effortless disposal of both human faeces and industrial wastewater mean that the metabolic process of human reproduction is no longer made manifest as such. It disappears in commodification, while its naturalness and the limitations that naturalness entails are abstracted. Only through water shortages do many people become aware again that this naturally occurring resource can be treated but not produced – an experience that people in semi-arid and arid regions of the planet have every day, while alone in the desert regions of the USA, in Texas or Arizona, the daily use of water per person amounts to 250 litres.

According to dominant economic theory and politics, the ecological crisis, arising out of the limitless accumulation of capital within a limited nature, can be overcome by means of substituting production processes that are directly environmentally harmful with others and, above all, through the ‘internalization’ of ecological ‘ensuing costs’ (cf. **Kapp** 1950) into the price as part of circulation: ‘The key to the ecological problem’ lies, according to Niklas **Luhmann**, ‘in the language of price. Thus this structural restriction to price is not only a disadvantage, not only a rejection of other possibilities; it guarantees that the problem [...] *must be processed* within the system’ (1989, 62). Thus, like the harm inflicted upon it, nature only appears according to the logic of property or the market. According to this view, even the last bits of nature not yet forced into the market ought to have their price.

As alternatives to this vision, suggestions of thrift and sacrifice never end (in the most advanced form as ‘sufficiency debate’), usually wrapped in advice for a modified lifestyle so as not to raise fears of asceticism (cf. for example **Bund, Misereor** 1996; **Weizsäcker** et al. 1995). The problem with such proposed solutions is that, in light of limited resources, they merely call upon politics to tame the destructive dynamic of accumulation in the capitalist economy. However, capital’s need for valorisation is limitless. The barriers nature sets to this valorisation are increasingly coming into focus, and yet this quite simple and yet so complicated dilemma can hardly be solved: the capitalist regime of accumulation requires, for reasons immanent to the way it functions as a system, the expansion of quantitative growth, and yet quantitative growth is limited by nature, its capacity for regeneration and its ability to manage our waste (cf. **O’Connor** 1988: ‘The Second Contradiction of Capitalism’). A political advisor to US president **Bush** made this state of affairs eminently clear when, prior to the climate conference in Bonn in 2001, he pronounced that, despite climate change and the consequential rise in sea levels, it is economically more reasonable, i.e. cheaper, to build dams and relocate people when necessary, than it is to forego economic growth or even to interfere politically in the advancement of particular industries.

4. The fact that on the brink of the 21st cent. there still does not appear to be, not even in broad outlines, any foreseeable alternative society to aim at except one defined by the dynamic of capitalist accumulation, is also due to a lack of progress in the *CPE* since **Marx**. The established opinion since **Kautsky** was that capitalist growth should develop the forces of production until it encountered the limitations of capitalist relations of production. In the countries of state socialism with an authoritarian character – after the revolutionary efforts at the centre of capitalism had failed and the realisation of socialism was undertaken in poor, peripheral countries – the fundamental economic-political solution in place was ‘to catch up and overtake’ capitalism. The occasional formulation of ‘overtaking without catching up’ (**Ulbricht**) remained a powerless reformulation of an unresolved problem.

Marx had still emphasised that the expansion of the forces of production ‘can only consist in socialised man, the associated producers, rationally regulating their interchange with Nature, bringing it under their common control’ (*MECW* 37/807 [25/828]). Faced with a nature that is setting barriers to its own limitless exploitation, it is imperative to further pursue these thoughts in theory and practice.

Peter Schyga

II. The division of the debate into a diagnostic question – what the conditions for economic growth are, or whether such conditions are still given – and a prescriptive question – whether such growth should continue to be the goal of economic policy – points to the contradictions of capitalist accumulation. What is commonly understood as economic growth under capitalist relations, an increase in the “gross national product”, is analysed by **Marx** under the headings ‘accumulation’ and ‘expanded reproduction’ (*MECW* 35/part VII; 36/ch. XXI [23/Abschn. VII/24/Kap. 21]). Within the capitalist mode of production these constitute the immanent goal of all economic processes (cf. *MECW* 35/591 [23/621]), whereas in a communist society the satisfaction of human needs, as they develop without coercion, would be the sole standard of economic activity.

Among the first reactions to the debate initiated by **Meadows et al.** (1972) (from **Enzensberger** 1973 to the **Brundtland Report** 1987), the reactions of Marxist authors ranged from simple denial of the problem (**Kruschwitz/Kade** 1974; **Massarat** 1979) to its detailed reception (**Maier** 1977; **Roos/Streibel** 1979; **Graf** 1984). After Wolfgang **Harich** (1975), responding to Freimut **Duve’s** urgings, had promptly formulated a programme to handle the looming ecological

crises, further attempts to provide a Marxist reformulation of this complex of problems were gradually being developed (Gorz 1977; Tjaden 1977; Commoner 1977; Methe 1981; Sacristán 1983). Various other attempts at an elaboration of ecosocialist objectives have followed since the beginning of the 1980s (Bahro 1980; Leff 1986; Ryle 1988; Antunes et al. 1990, Fernandez Buey/Riechmann 1996; Wallis 2001). The 1990s saw new theoretical approaches that made recourse to Marxian theory a basis for the thorough theoretical understanding of the LG (O'Connor 1988; Altvater 1991; Hampicke 1992; Deléage 1992; Massarat 1993; Lipietz 2000; Beckenbach 2001), most notably different elaborations and reformulations of analytic instruments, stretching from Kapp's (1950) institutionalist elaboration of neoclassical economics to Georgescu-Roegen's (1971) inclusion of the entropy problem. At the same time Marx's own contributions to this question were worked out and acknowledged (cf. Soper 1995; Burkett 1999; Foster 2000).

According to Marxist analyses, the capitalist mode of production – despite all political demands to curtail and regulate the dynamic of accumulation – is fundamentally incapable of conforming to the prescriptive demands of the LG debate for zero growth, i.e., for the 'Steady-State-Economy' that has been extolled by thinkers from John Stuart Mill to Hermann E. Daly. But this does not mean the capitalist mode of production can evade the analytical dimension of these demands: so long as restrictions to capitalist accumulation do not arise from the deliberate creation of a socialist sector of the economy, the only objective factors that could directly restrict capitalist accumulation are the saturation of the market or the exhaustion of resources. Indirect restrictions, based on the regulation of emissions (greenhouse gases, ozone hole) or on the overload of "carbon sinks", can only be brought into effect by political intervention into economic processes.

The saturation of markets usually appears as a component of the cyclical crises of capitalism. At this level, growth has for many generations already found its limits in the course of those 'commercial crises' that the *Manifesto* addressed, 'that by their periodical return put on trial, each time more threateningly, the existence of the entire bourgeois society' (MECW 6/489 [4/467 et sq.]) – only to subsequently see the preconditions of further growth, and thus its new limits, restored through the actions of businesses and the state. This kind of restoration of the conditions for growth, which as a rule is tied to different ways of relocating production geographically, runs into objective limits. For any given commodity, there is a limit to the total quantity that can be sold. Whether the limiting factor is *need* or whether it is *demand* (which reflects purchasing power), the effect is the same. The capitalist economy con-

sequently enters a phase of *stagnation*, which it seeks to offset by means of continuous, desperate improvisations, including incessant innovation, technical ‘improvements’, and omnipresent advertising.

The depletion of resources does not enter into the normal capitalist cycle, but rather asserts itself only in the long term. Its impacts on the capitalist accumulation process resemble those of market saturation. Many different resources are today no longer available in large enough quantities to allow for consumption to continue at present levels. Capital’s response to this difficulty is ambiguous: on the one hand, it cannot avoid contemplating conservation measures, thereby, in a sense, recognising the LG after all; on the other hand, it attempts to evade precisely this consequence by trying to find technological and synthetic substitutes (some of which may be dangerous), while implementing reactionary economic policies to ensure that the suffering associated with the inevitable limitations will target those who, on account of their class position, race, national or regional background, are defined as inferior or simply do not have the power to defend themselves. Even if capital resists LG, it cannot escape their reality. Its response is therefore incoherent, chaotic, and, at worst, repressive.

Marx was aware of the specific conditions that in the long term would set objective limits to capitalist development. In this sense, his anticipation of communism as a society which, among other things, can meet the prescriptive standards of the LG debate very much points us back to his analysis of the capitalist mode of production. The theoretical foundations for Marx’s explicit acknowledgement of the LG are to be found in his discussion of nature. In *Capital* he developed relevant thoughts using the example of agriculture: ‘Moreover, all progress in capitalistic agriculture is a progress in the art, not only of robbing the labourer, but of robbing the soil; all progress in increasing the fertility of the soil [...] is a progress towards ruining the lasting sources of that fertility’ (MECW 35/507 [23/529]). In this context, the incompatibility of capitalism’s overexploitation of the soil with a good life for future generations represents a central issue (cf. Foster 2000). In this sense, soil depletion constitutes one of the objective LG; in light of the tendency of capitalist production to overstep such limits, consciously opting for a political break with this tendency eventually becomes a matter of survival.

Like many other aspects of **Marx’s** thought, his implicit conception of the LG could not be integrated into the programmes of the first generation of Marxist efforts to realise socialism. The urgent need to overcome poverty and build a sufficient industrial base, in order to resist capital’s military attacks, led to a growth orientation that, in practice, left no space for establishing a connection between socialism and the critique of growth. Socialism was

instead understood simply as a 'growth machine' superior to capitalism. In the words of **Bukharin** and **Preobrazhenskii**: 'The communist method of production will signify an enormous development of productive forces, [...] Concurrently with the disappearance of man's tyranny over man, the tyranny of nature over man will likewise vanish' (*The ABC of Communism*, 1919/1921, 77).

In the 1920s conservation areas were still being established in the Soviet Union; this practice was abandoned in the course of **Stalin's** industrialisation policy. The Soviet orientation towards growth resulted not from the communist perspective but rather from the simple fact that the Soviet Union had a relatively poor national economy within a capitalist world. Accordingly, the governments of underdeveloped countries defined economic growth as the goal of their politics, regardless of whether they defined themselves as socialist: in the dominant discourse, overcoming poverty appears bound up with an increase in the aggregate production of goods and services, i.e. the capitalist notion of "growth" as it has been elaborated statistically since the 1930s (cf. **Rostow** 1960; **Galbraith** 1987).

Under what historical and social conditions can the notion of LG, which is suppressed by capitalism and not taken into consideration by poorer countries, ever become the object of an actual politics with its corresponding social proponents? This question points to the processes by which people become more aware of the "objective LG" that are approaching. In this regard, progress will be measured by the degree of convergence between awareness of the ecological problem and anti-capitalist political forces. Synthesising the various tendencies that lead in this direction constitutes an intellectual challenge for our time (cf. **Wallis** 2001). In the meantime, Marxists from different parts of the world have rediscovered **Marx's** own contribution to the initiation of ecological thought, including in terms of the problematic of the LG (for instance **Sacristán** 1983, 41 et sq.; **Foster** 2000).

Within the scope of socialist politics, it is in any case possible to implement an option that consciously bears in mind the LG, as the example of organic agriculture in Cuba shows (**Rosset** 1998). It is also by now beyond dispute that the problems that arise from overstepping the LG can be seized upon by mass movements with concrete anti-capitalist ambitions (cf. **Antunes et al.** 1990). Whether or not respect for the LG becomes a broadly accepted political demand in the centres of capitalist accumulation will depend upon it being demonstrated clearly that there is no longer any intrinsic connection between an increase in overall productivity and the enhancement of human wellbeing in those countries, whereas at the periphery the main concern is still to steer global economic growth into ecological, sustainable channels (cf. **Commoner**

1990). In order to attain this, it will be necessary to criticise the material content of capitalist production in terms of its qualitative relation to the human needs it purports to serve.

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Both parts of the article translated by Robert Ogman

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→ Agrarfrage, Agrobusiness, Akkumulation, Destruktivkräfte, Elektrifizierung, Exkremente der Produktion, Gattungsfragen, grüner New Deal, grüne Revolution, Keynesianismus, Landwirtschaft, Mensch-Natur-Verhältnis, nachhaltige Entwicklung, Natur, Naturbeherrschung, Nord-Süd-Konflikt, Ökologie, ökologische Modernisierung, Ökosozialismus, Produktion des Lebens, Produktivismus, Tonnenideologie, Umwelt, Unterentwicklung, zweiter Widerspruch des Kapitalismus

Luxemburg-Gramsci Line

A: tayyār lüksimburg-ġramšī. – F: ligne Luxemburg-Gramsci. – G: Linie Luxemburg-Gramsci – R: linija Ljuksemburg-Gramši. – S: linea Luxemburgo-Gramsci. – C: Lúsēnbǎo-Gělánxī lùxiàn 卢森堡-葛兰西路线

The term LGL was coined by Peter Weiss. He included it in a July 1977 outline indicating how he planned to structure the final section of his *Ästhetik des Widerstands* (*Äw*)/*The Aesthetics of Resistance* (*AR*). There this term stands for nothing less than the perspective of Weiss's work as a whole. In part directly inspired by it, in part detached and based on knowledge and experience gained in particular, if related contexts, the LGL became a metaphor for the quest for a renewal of Marxism and the socialist movement. To grasp how, one needs to reconstruct Weiss's approach, sketch his reception on the Left, and, finally, bring out Rosa Luxemburg's connection to Antonio Gramsci in a new way, interpreting the LGL as a line of development in which Luxemburg's role in renewing the Social-Democracy's theory and practice is clarified from a Gramscian standpoint, while Gramsci appears as a thinker whose critical elaboration can also be read as a response to unresolved questions in Luxemburg.

1. *Peter Weiss*. – With *AR*, Weiss has bequeathed the workers' movement a magnificent historical account in novel form that goes far beyond the framework of traditional historiography. He lends cultural expression to the workers' movement, transforms knowledge into actively intervening thought, and tells this story of struggles and failure from the standpoint of a possible Marxism initiated, in his view, in the figures of Luxemburg and Gramsci. In his *Notizbücher* [Notebooks], accordingly, Weiss notes, as a guideline 'for the final section': 'membership in the party – that it was a small party is of no importance. Membership a declaration of principle – ideological affiliation – absence of constraint and dogmatism – Luxemburg Gramsci line – precondition: clarification of historical mistakes – living critical science, rejection of any and all forms of idealism, mystifications, or the cultivation of illusions' (608). Three dimensions are prominent here: affiliation with the party as a self-imposed obligation excluding dogmatism, criticism of mistakes as the precondition for a living Marxism, and *Ideologiekritik*. These three proposals are responses to the wrenching contradictions in which Weiss develops the LGL. At stake are appropriation of the past, concepts, and culture from one's own (class) stand-

point. Weiss writes the story as self-education in the movement: 'One cannot work these questions out by oneself, there are many of us, and we arguably also speak for many – for this reason I have joined a party, the CP [...] a community in which it is important that everyone express his opinion in various ways, in contradiction with others in the democratic sense' (December 1977, on the democratised Left Party-Communists in Sweden; 650).

The sentence of **Luxemburg's** that is the most widely quoted on the Left, but also far beyond it – 'freedom is always freedom for those who think differently' (*RLR*, 305, transl. corr., FH), which has been brought down to the level of a simple appeal for liberal tolerance – figures as a guiding principle in Weiss's *Notizbücher* (663, 692, 699, 823, 837). It is, so to speak, re-appropriated and politicised. Initially, the issue is exclusion and employment bans in the West. Later, it is state censorship in the GDR, where Weiss's historiography was not tolerated. Conflating the two, Weiss writes, on receiving a prize in the West: 'We who write find ourselves, and no mistake, in an unremitting struggle against restriction of the freedom of speech, against state authorities' discrimination against, and expulsion of, those who think differently' (692). The principle strikes out the hardest against Stalinism: 'massacre [...] is of the essence [...] of a centralism taken to its furthest extreme [...]. Equally to blame are those who blindly obey, who bow down before the figure of the Forefather, who quell every impulse to rebelliousness in themselves, who call their monstrous broken-spiritedness discipline. No less responsible, however, are [...] the victims, who went the furthest in their servility [...] to the point of self-extinction [...]. They were perhaps the greatest traitors of all, for they had once been the most eminent thinkers of the materialist science of society' (607). In the debate over the new Vietnam, Weiss recalls, in July 1979: 'True freedom is the freedom which is also that of those who think differently' (823). Here it becomes unmistakably clear that this principle is not intended as an appeal for peaceful tolerance, but that what is at stake is the very essence of socialism.

Luxemburg had appended this principle originally as a marginal note to her criticism of the Bolsheviks after the October Revolution. The context should be recalled. It was, she says, 'the immortal historical merit' of the Russian Revolution to have put itself 'at the head of the international proletariat with the conquest of political power and the practical placing of the problem of the realisation of socialism' (*RLR*, 310, transl. corr., FH); but, at the same time, errors were made in setting the course of the construction of socialism, which was taking place 'under the frightful compulsion of the world war, the German occupation' (308). Taking issue with a formula of **Lenin's** which had it that the socialist state was merely the capitalist state stood on its head – rather than the working class now the bourgeoisie was being repressed – she writes: 'This sim-

plified view misses the most essential thing: bourgeois class rule has no need of the political training and education of the entire mass of the people, at least not beyond certain narrow limits. But for the proletarian dictatorship that is the life element, the very air without which it is not able to exist' (304 et sq.). Because the masses had not been involved deeply enough in the construction of socialism, it could not become any kind of socialism at all for them. Taking issue with **Trotsky's** view that it was only a question of an 'open and direct struggle for power' (1919, 80), **Luxemburg** enumerates how the Bolsheviks have promoted the 'suppression of public life' and, by doing that, have 'blocked up the fountain of political experience and this source of this rising development', thereby making 'the practical realisation of socialism' impossible (*RLR*, 305). It is here that the well-known passage occurs in the form of a marginal comment: 'Freedom only for the supporters of the government, only for the members of one party – however numerous they may be – is no freedom at all. Freedom is always freedom for the one who thinks differently. Not because of a fanatical concept of "justice" but because all that is invigorating, wholesome and purifying in political freedom depends on this essential characteristic, and its effectiveness vanishes when "freedom" becomes a special privilege' (305, transl. corr., FH).

Weiss – implicitly criticising **Luxemburg's** critique of **Lenin** even as he confirms it – asks about the conditions under which 'true freedom [...] which is also freedom for those who think differently' (*N*, 1979, 823), can exist at all: 'But it is no more possible in VN [Vietnam], they say, than it was after the October Revolution / reality no more allows of it in VN than in Cuba, although, here as well as there, the preconditions for it seem to exist / here as well as there, a humanistic basis / but also, here as well as there, an external foe constantly striving to bring the Revolution to its downfall [...]. It's the old problem: socialism has never yet been able to develop freely; the imperialist enemy was always standing in its way' (*ibid.*).

Thinking differently becomes, for **Weiss**, a keyword for Marxism, which he characterises as humanistic, critical, self-critical, unwilling to settle for ready-made formulas, and in search of new strategies (13 May 1977). In a critical backward glance, he presents the 'shattering of the Second International, the successive splits in the Third International, the wasteland after the disastrous errors in the assessment of fascism', the mistaken Popular Front policies, the political devastation associated with the Second World War, the icy Cold War crisis (*N*, 633) – and goes on to call for risking something new. 'Our experiences of the past half century have taught us that suppression of criticism, of the will for independent investigation of social processes, necessarily brings on cultural death' (712). Those are **Luxemburg's** words in a different context: 'Without gen-

eral elections, without unrestricted freedom of press and assembly, without a free struggle of opinion, life dies out in every public institution, becomes a mere semblance of life, in which only the bureaucracy remains as the active element' (*RLR*, 307). One theme spills over into the next: criticism of mistakes and self-criticism, critical science, culture, learning from experience – and they are, at the same time, the foundations of Luxemburg's thought. After the failure that saw the Social-Democracy vote war credits in 1914, she issued a call to found a new party in 1917: 'now, however, it is clear to every thinking worker that a rebirth of the workers' movement out of its present collapse and present ignominy is impossible without a clear grasp [...] of the causes'. What must be understood, according to Luxemburg, is 'bust up of 4 August 1914 for sure already had roots in the very core of the workers' movement *before* 4 August 1914' (*GW* 4, 270 et sq.). Only if one knows the roots of the problem, she says, can one extirpate them and gain the 'firm ground' needed to build a new organisation. Hence 'the starting point [...] for the creation of a new socialist movement in Germany' must be a 'thoroughgoing *evaluation of the past* [...]. Clear guidelines for the future can only be drawn from the well of self-criticism, from an excruciatingly thorough examination of our own mistakes in programme, tactics, and organisation [...]. The task was to undertake a *political* examination of the practice of the German Social-Democracy and the labour unions in its main features, to expose their main defects in the past [...] something we must also do in our propaganda before each individual worker when we try to rally him to the opposition's banner' (271).

Luxemburg calls for 'exposing the *political* roots of bureaucracy and the degeneration of democracy in the old party, and chopping them off with an axe' (272 et sq.). **Weiss** holds this critique up to illustrate the contrast between revolutionary and bureaucratic thinking: 'what a gulf between those who think like revolutionaries, who are, that is, uncompromising and intent on throwing off all forms of oppression, and the functionaries and bureaucrats nested in their apparatuses' (*N*, 633). **Luxemburg** and **Weiss** alike repeatedly emphasise that one must learn from experience to find a pathway to the future, and declare that the form of such learning is experiment. **Weiss** (612) approvingly quotes a sentence by the social-democratic theorist Ernst **Wigforss** from 1938: 'Socialism can assume dogmatic, dictatorial forms, but it can also be *critical*, experimental, ready and willing to learn from experience'. **Luxemburg** writes: 'Only experience is capable of correcting and opening up new ways. Only unobstructed, effervescent life falls into a thousand new forms and improvisations, brings to light creative force, itself corrects all mistaken attempts [...]. Otherwise, socialism will be decreed from behind a few official desks by a dozen intellectuals'

(*RLR*, 306; see 302 et sq. for a similar passage). A new society, Luxemburg insists – and Weiss repeats – cannot be built by following old recipes. It requires experiment. It *is* experiment.

Weiss constantly integrates (as did Brecht before him) sentences, words, and images of Luxemburg's into *AR*, and even takes elements of his critique of traditional historiography as well as suggestions for revamping it (*N*, 782) from them. Luxemburg calls for writing history as the work of ordinary men and women. '*The whole of human history is a work created by the social cooperation of many people, is a work by the masses [... Human] history abounds in sagas about heroes and individuals' mighty deeds; it echoes with the fame of wise kings, bold military commanders, daring explorers, heroic liberators, inventors of genius [...]. At first sight all good and evil, the happiness and the misery of the peoples is the work of individual rulers or great men. In reality, the peoples, the nameless masses themselves, forge their own destiny, their happiness and woe' (GW 4, 206 et sq.). Weiss takes up Luxemburg's invitation to decode a certain type of historiography as obfuscation of people's liberation struggles and makes it *AR's* opening scene and finale ('the last scene must evoke the Pergamon frieze', *N*, 897), sometimes using her language almost verbatim, and at other times adopting her characteristic style. As in Brecht, so too in Weiss, it is 'reading workers' whose thoughts and insights as they look at the Pergamon altar help to decrypt historical testimonies in a new way. 'It was no doubt high-bred figures who trod barbaric mongrels underfoot here, and the sculptors did not immortalize the people who were down in the streets, running the mills, smithies, and manufactories, or who were employed in the markets, the workshops, the harbor shipyards [...] no doubt, only the names of some of the master artists were handed down [...] and not the names of those who had transferred the drawings to the ashlar [...] and nothing recalled the peons who fetched the marble and dragged the huge blocks to the ox carts, and yet, said Hellmann, the frieze brought fame not only for those who were close to the gods but also for those whose strength was still concealed, for they too were not ignorant, they did not want to be enslaved forever [...] they rebelled at the end of the construction' (*AR*, I, 8). In this way, Weiss invokes the history, carved in stone, of those silenced by a historiography that only has eyes for the victors; he invokes it as awakening, as future, and thus simultaneously writes a new history.*

The traces of Luxemburg in *AR* (where she herself appears as an actor) and in the *Notizbücher* are impressive, but the second segment of the *LGL* is not directly to be found. Gramsci appears only once in the *Notizbücher*, albeit in a crucial passage: 'It's right for us to jettison the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat. In our countries, the particular class that could be called the proletariat no longer exists; here there are only big blocks of people united by

the same interests, the same desires, the same aversion (as defined by Gramsci), as they clearly appear in the communist movement of Italy, Spain, and France. When these blocks gain a majority, for long not any more by way of revolution, but by a democratic vote, the discredited concept of dictatorship will have been replaced by a concept that could perhaps be called 'resoluteness' (October 1978, 749). In the passage that bids farewell to the dictatorship of the proletariat, **Luxemburg** too is abandoned, and **Gramsci**, with his concept of the bloc, is taken up. The **Luxemburg** line is pursued via **Gramsci**, and intervenes in the politics of the workers' movement. The adversaries are the 'hardened, unmoving and unmovable trustees of an ideology'; they 'are always on the reactionaries' side, no matter which bloc they consider theirs, and their apparently rigorous, militant attitude serves only to preserve a stockpile of outdated ideas' (631). Conversely, Marxism is for **Weiss** the science of criticism. As a Marxist, he says, one finds oneself at all times in a dialectical process, can never consider anything finished, must call everything into question (630). Thus **Gramsci** is summoned to bear witness to a now indispensable, new historical-critical mode of thought and is, at the same time, one of the two figures who, as Marxists, are still alive, meaning that the coming generation can refer to them and turn to them for support in order to discover what remains true in Marxism, amidst all its failures.

To comprehend the split in the workers' movement, the tragedy of self-laceration, the mistaken Popular Front politics and their destruction in fascism, and yet not simply despair: for that one needs **Gramsci**, with his concepts, his proposals, his philosophy of praxis that pursues contradictions from the global level all the way down to the individual subject – Gramsci with his attitude of 'pessimism of the intelligence' and, despite all, 'optimism of the will' (*PN* 1, N. 1, § 63, 172). Thus the whole of *AR* can also be read as a Gramscian novel, in which theory, practice, resistance, revolution, art, and criticism are united. For the third volume of *AR*, **Weiss** comes to the conclusion that 'it is no longer a question of depicting the path to an aesthetics of resistance; rather, this aesthetics forms the basis of the whole view. The gaze turns from this aesthetic towards the occurrences. The motif of resistance is in art, as described here, of particular importance (in first place), since the problems weighing people down have become so onerous that they seem unbearable to them' (*N*, 782). The speeches and articles that **Luxemburg** produced in the context of the crushed November 1918 uprising speak essentially of courage and the need for struggle, of indignation over the adversary, despair over bloody defeats, and, ultimately, the certainty that one can learn from defeats. The 'I was, I am, I shall be!' (*RLR*, 378) at the close of **Luxemburg's** last article, written in a context in which, once again, *Order reigns in Berlin*, refers not to **Luxemburg** herself, but to the revolu-

tion. **Weiss** appropriates this sentence as follows: 'Again and again, it was to be as if all earlier hopes had been dashed by later lost intentions [...]. The hopes would remain. Utopia would be necessary. Later too, the hopes would flare up again, countless times, quelled by the superior enemy and re-awakened. And the realm of those hopes would grow bigger than it was in our day, spreading to every continent. The urge to contradict, to fight back, would not wane' (*ÄW*, III, 265).

2. *Reception.* – In 1985, in the framework of a German-Italian cultural festival, a conference was held under the title 'The Luxemburg-Gramsci Line'. The idea, born in 1983 at the Hamburg Volksuniversität, was to combine **Luxemburg's** idea of exemplary mass learning with **Gramsci's** concept of hegemony and to call on Peter **Weiss** as the main witness (cf. *Kunstreich/Holler* 1986). Of the forty papers given at the conference, only few actually referred to both **Weiss** and **Luxemburg**, let alone to a LGL. Ten were published in a 1989 collection bearing the same title as the conference; anyone who looks for LGL on the internet will be referred to this collection. The two editors, Ulrich **Mehlem** and Thomas **Weber**, draw a connection in the book's preface between this project and Perestroika, then in its beginnings: 'Over against what separates **Luxemburg** and **Gramsci**, the common and the complementary take centre stage: the project of both thinkers is to overcome subalternity and develop the capacity for social agency of those at the bottom [...]. Rosa **Luxemburg's** emphasis on self-initiative and autonomy [...] and **Gramsci's** concept of the hegemonic "war of position" [come together to constitute] a programme for reorganisation' (*Die Linie Luxemburg-Gramsci*, 5).

Wolfgang Fritz **Haug** long ago pointed out that **Weiss's** concern is 'to further develop a Marxism in the line that runs from Rosa **Luxemburg** to **Gramsci** by way of a newly re-discovered **Lenin**' (1981, 34). He went on to recall the contrasting judgements of the early **Gramsci** (the **Gramsci** of 1920), who called the murdered Rosa **Luxemburg** and Karl **Liebknecht** 'greater than the greatest of Christ's saints' (O 9, 157) because of their practice of struggle for the workers movement, and the **Gramsci** of the *Prison Notebooks*, who criticised **Luxemburg's** contribution to the mass-strike debate at the theoretical level for the 'iron economic determinism' it displayed (cf. *SPN*, N. 7, § 10, 233), for her expectation that capitalism would break down, and for her neglect of the laws of the 'war of position' between classes in favour of a rapid 'war of movement', treated as absolute and held up as a 'model for revolution' (**Haug** 1989, 6). **Haug** stresses the LGL's significance in the context of the urgency of a renewal of Marxism and passes on Lisa and Wolfgang **Abendroth's** judgement ascribing pre-eminent historical authority to **Weiss's** novel, marked by 'an intensity', according to the

Abendroths, ‘which no history of the workers’ movement and the resistance [...] has ever matched’ (**Haug** 1981, 23 and 20; 1989, 7).

Frank **Deppe** considers the question of the LGL at the higher level of the significance that both authors have for ‘revolutionary Marxism [...]’; Rosa **Luxemburg** in the context of German Social-Democracy’s left wing, which, in the debate with the reformism and centrism, ultimately opted for independence as the “Spartacus League” and then as the KPD; **Gramsci** as the head – as **Togliatti** put it in 1962 – of the Italian CP’s “leading group” (1989, 15). **Deppe** warns against ‘making amalgams that can hardly be theoretically justified’, identifying what the two authors have in common as ‘the socialist revolution’ (16) and the ‘renewal and further development of Marxism’, including a ‘preoccupation with the crisis of Marxism’ (17). The difference between them, he insists, is that **Luxemburg** was the theorist of the war of movement, **Gramsci** that of the war of position, leading **Gramsci**, in ‘the perspective of the working class’s struggle for hegemony’, to ‘a reflection on “a fundamental intellectual and moral reform”’ (18). This helps explain the non-contemporaneous reception of the two theorists, according to **Deppe**: **Luxemburg**’s came in the wake of the student movement (owing to her conception of spontaneity), while the reception ‘with international resonance’ of **Gramsci** came only with the conception of Eurocommunism (18). **Luxemburg**’s contribution to the renewal of Marxism consists, in **Deppe**’s view, in her critique of reformism and of ‘divorcing the economic from the political struggle’, ‘the labour unionists’ fetishism of organisation on the one hand and the “parliamentarisation” of social-democratic politics on the other’ (21). **Deppe** characterises her ‘conception of the breakdown of capitalism’ as problematic, although it does, he concedes, aptly bring out the significance of the “underdeveloped” countries and of military expenditures as a sphere for capital investment’ (22). He does not, however, notice that what he considers the positive aspects of **Luxemburg**’s thought show her to be in a war of *position*. A positive Gramscian reference to **Luxemburg** may be discerned, he believes, in the need for a ‘philosophy of praxis’ that ‘historicises the theory-practice relationship’ (25). Yet **Gramsci** is said to have reflected upon the ‘perspective of a new revolutionary strategy in the West’ after the defeat at the hands of fascism, unlike **Luxemburg** (*ibid.*), and, precisely in this connection, to have criticised her position in the mass-strike debate as ‘economistic’. **Deppe** calls **Gramsci**’s ‘attitude to **Luxemburg**’ ‘distanced’ and, further, historically determined by the ‘prejudices against her that gained ground in the Communist International after **Lenin**’s death’ (26). In distinction to **Luxemburg**, he affirms, **Gramsci** strove ‘to set a new path for proletarian revolution’ (27). However, **Deppe** overlooks the fact that, after the ‘scandal of 4 August 1914’ (**Luxemburg**, GW 4, 271), she too aspired to do just that.

Generally speaking, the question of a LGL seems to have been posed too early for the left theorists of 1985. They were familiar either with **Gramsci** – thanks above all to the important texts translated and edited by Christian **Riechers** in 1967 (the complete German-language edition of the *Prison Notebooks* began to see the light only in 1991) – or with **Luxemburg**, but not with both, although that was indispensable here. As a rule, it was **Luxemburg** who was neglected. That cannot be chalked up to the inaccessibility of her writings, for the edition of her works launched by Clara **Zetkin** and Adolf **Warski** in 1923, although it was not pursued in the GDR until the 1970s, was in fact accessible. The dilemma finds expression in, say, Vittantonio **Gioia's** claim, made after he read **Luxemburg's** shrewd reflection on the reception of **Marx's** work in the workers' movement (GW 1/2, 368), that she considered scientific theoretical studies to be unnecessary for politics, with the result that **Gramsci's** analysis in its entirety could be 'deemed a sharp reaction to **Luxemburg**' (1989, 43). Domenico **Losurdo** (1997) discusses **Luxemburg** only marginally and negatively in his book on **Gramsci**, because, in her critique of the construction of socialism, she 'accused the Bolsheviks of once again striking down the path of "Jacobin rule"' (162).

Jörg **Wollenberg** offers a different appreciation in 2005, that is, twenty years after the first attempts, taking the LGL to be 'a different history of workers' education from below' (22). 'When Peter **Weiss** is read properly, it appears that this "LGL" should be extended to include critics of an "atavistic patronisation" [Weiss]. We might here mention figures such as August **Thalheimer**, Walter **Benjamin**, Ernst **Bloch**, Karl **Korsch**, Bertolt **Brecht**, or Paulo **Freire**, on whose works **Weiss** also relies' (22). **Wollenberg** deciphers the LGL as a 'critique of the main features of the education reserved for workers, from Wilhelm **Liebknecht** to the present day, a critique which sets its hopes on workers' capacities for self-development and "socialism through enlightenment" and takes its inception in a radical questioning and self-examination of the workers' movement inspired by Rosa **Luxemburg's** categorical imperative: "the emancipation of the working class can only be the work of the working class itself, says the Communist Manifesto, taking working class to mean not a party executive committee seven or even twelve individuals strong, but the enlightened mass of the proletariat in person"' (2; cf. GW 3, 38). In this line, **Wollenberg** founded, together with veterans of the anti-fascist struggle, Peter **Weiss** reading groups in Bremen, the city in which **Weiss** began his work. This new educational activity was supposed to take up the tradition of the "Red Academy", the old 'party school of the workers' movement before it split, council education, and even aspects of [...] labour-union educational activity and socialist (Heim-)Volkshochschulen' (5). 'With the "defeat of a basic scientific Marxist position" (Otto **Brenner**) in

the SPD and labour unions after 1945, 'these traditions were lost', according to **Wollenberg**, and 'repressed or even deliberately suppressed – despite attempts by Oskar **Negt** and others to link up with and renew them in the 1960s and 1970s' (ibid.). Thus **Wollenberg** draws a connection between **Weiss's** work and **Luxemburg's** critique of the kind of educational work that neglects the subjects. To 'drumming in a sum of positive knowledge', Luxemburg opposes the 'exchange of ideas' as a form of 'training in systematic, independent thinking' (24; *GW* 2, 551), while settling scores across the board with the kind of labour-union education in which 'teachers [are] condemned to recite' one and the same thing 'four times in a row in a seven-month period' (*GW* 2, 552 et sq.). 'Every teacher who does not want to become a soulless machine' must rather, she says, 'constantly develop his subject, constantly gather new material for it and re-organise his exposition of it. This becomes especially necessary for teachers in our workers' schools, who are at the same time, after all, only comrades in the struggle sitting behind a lectern, and thus learners themselves, not professional educators' (552). **Wollenberg** refers to **Gramsci** as someone who was for the council movement and against 'authoritarian learning' (23). Like **Luxemburg** (among others), he is said to have stood for 'moments of possibility of the realisation of a concrete utopia' (27), in a now obliterated tradition 'of historical, scientific, and cultural education' (22). **Wollenberg** cites a passage in which **Weiss** expresses his despair over the terrible dialectic of the antifascist resistance: 'That was the dreadful horror: the fact that the party, whose task should have been to work for the liberation of culture, wiped out its creative thinkers and treated only the clichés as valid. All those who had gathered around **Luxemburg** had been advocates of a revolution that was supposed to promote the development of people's positive faculties; and just as fascism had taken a hammer to the refined achievements of art and literature, so the orders for the destruction of the intellectuals had come from the centre of communism' (33 et sq.; *ÄW*, III, 151). **Wollenberg** pursued the LGL in **Weiss** reading courses in Bremen in opposition to a labour-union educational system that no longer wanted to hear anything about the LGL. 'In the failure of the organised workers' movement', in **Wollenberg's** view, **Weiss** saw 'the history of subjugated people's untapped capacity for education. *The Aesthetics of Resistance* can accordingly become the point of crystallisation for a new formation of emancipatory forces after the collapse of actually existing socialism [**Bernhard** 1992, 191]' (21).

Bernd **Röttger** (2011) grasps the LGL differently, a quarter of a century after its initial reception: in Peter **Weiss**, the LGL is not just an empty formula that left-wing intellectuals quickly assimilated, but a "fundamental position" that had already been developed in outline. According to **Röttger**, this position

can be discerned time and again in the history of the workers' movement, hence (and especially) in **Luxemburg** and **Gramsci**, but also before and after them. It is characterised, he says, by three essential moments: an orientation to the practice of people's self-enablement, which only creates the initial condition for revolutionary upheaval; an orientation to the defeats of the organised workers' movement as historic opportunities for advancing the organisation's self-transformation and renewal; and – with an eye to **Marx's** affirmation that 'men make their own history, but under already existing circumstances' that again and again restrict action – an elaboration of the dialectic of structure and action.

3.1 *War of position / war of movement and revolutionary Realpolitik*. – After reading Rosa **Luxemburg's** *The Mass Strike: The Political Party and the Trade Unions* (1906) (Cesare **Alessandri** translated the text to Italian in 1919–20), **Gramsci** expressed the judgement that 'this little book, in my view, constitutes the most significant theory of the war of manoeuvre applied to the study of history and to the art of politics. The immediate economic factor (crises, etc.) is seen as the field artillery employed in war to open a breach in the enemy's defences' (*PN* III, N. 7, § 10, 161). But the historical experiences of 1905 were, Gramsci thought, generalised 'somewhat hastily and superficially too', while, 'thanks to a certain "economistic" and spontaneist prejudice', 'the "voluntary" and organisational elements which were far more extensive and important in those events' were neglected (*SPN*, N. 13, § 24, 233). For Gramsci, **Luxemburg** counted too heavily on the self-destructive tendencies of the capitalist mode of production and, as a result, overlooked the structure in which the system could regenerate itself in diverse rescue stations and thus not 'lose faith in [it]self, [its] forces, and its future' (*ibid.*). **Gramsci's** critique points to **Luxemburg's** insufficient analysis of the reproduction of the power of domination because of 'the awaiting of a sort of miraculous lightningstrike' (*ibid.*, transl. corr., FH). At the same time, it fails to consider her actual political activity. **Gramsci** was obviously unaware of **Luxemburg's** day-to-day politics, which she herself has called 'revolutionary *Realpolitik*'. In many respects, her model of politics corresponded to his conception of politics in the 'war of position' in which the struggle for hegemony must be pursued in non-revolutionary times. **Luxemburg** makes it clear that '[i]t is absurd to think of the mass strike as one act, one isolated action. The mass strike is rather the indication, the rallying idea, of a whole period of the class struggle lasting for years, perhaps for decades' (*RLR*, 192). **Gramsci**, for his part, recalls that '[i]n the period after 1870, with the colonial expansion of Europe', all the 'organisational relations of the State' altered, while 'the Forty-Eightist formula of the "Permanent Revolution" [was] expanded and transcended in political

science by the formula of “civil hegemony” (*SPN*, N. 13, §7, 243). He therefore suggests ‘studying “in depth” which elements of civil society correspond to the defensive systems in a war of position’ (235).

Luxemburg had lived through the First World War and witnessed the politics of the Social-Democracy and the activity of the working masses during it; this impelled her to criticise and renew the politics of the workers’ movement, her own included. **Gramsci** had experienced, in addition, the laborious construction of socialism in Russia and the defeat of the workers’ movement at the hands of Italian fascism, which threw him into prison. This configuration compelled him to think about renewing the politics of the workers’ movement.

The key to **Luxemburg**’s conceptions of the war of position – and thus of civil society – is her revolutionary *Realpolitik*, which is underpinned by highly controversial statements about parliamentarianism, revolution, democracy, the dictatorship of the proletariat, freedom, the cultural, bourgeois rights, and the state. In all these domains, Luxemburg had the merit of posing a series of questions and displacing existing problematics that **Gramsci** further elaborated by means of the concepts of hegemony, civil society, the integral state, the historical bloc, and organic intellectuals. One of the problems in any approach to **Luxemburg**, however, is that her work has been practically buried by biased receptions, through which one must therefore dig one’s way. It is possible to draw from it sharply conflicting claims about each of the aforementioned domains and elevate them to the rank of “valid definitions” – but to do so is to miss, from the start, Luxemburg’s way of thinking and working. For she neither thinks in terms of definitions nor paints things black and white. Her theoretical strategy aims, precisely, to dissolve conventional oppositions and displace questions. Thus even the usual stock question as to whether Luxemburg was for or against parliamentarianism misses her working method. In the debate about parliament, she lays the groundwork for a politics in contradictions which **Gramsci** later aptly conceptualises as the struggle for hegemony in civil society.

3.2 *Parliament.* – **Luxemburg** understands parliament to be a historical form of the bourgeoisie’s class domination that must be used by the working class’s representatives to improve working people’s social conditions and, at the same time and even more importantly, must be defended against constant threat from the bourgeoisie. The aim of every intervention and the aim overall should be to show that a different social order is necessary. Thus, like **Gramsci** after her, **Luxemburg** takes politics to be, among other things, a learning process that should qualify people to participate in governance. In 1918, she wages a polemic against a proposed election boycott: ‘Elections represent a new instru-

ment of revolutionary struggle'. A 'crude either-or [...] is a simplification that does not serve to instruct and educate the masses' (GW 4, 483). She fights for a politics that will show the masses 'the inadequacy of reformist patchwork and the necessity of socialist revolution' (GW 1/2, 125). Thus the 'Social-Democracy' arrives at the contradiction, which it must also assume, that 'socialist activity' can be only be directed to preparing the introduction of socialism, yet 'must capture all attainable positions in the existing state, must advance everywhere' (ibid.). 'The Social-Democrats' role in the bourgeois legislative body is, from the start [...] caught up in inner contradictions. To participate in positive law-making in a way that can have practical consequences while simultaneously bringing to the fore the standpoint of fundamental opposition to the capitalist state every step of the way: that is, in broad outline, our parliamentary representatives' difficult task' (GW 1/1, 251). Luxemburg does not analyse this problematic – for example, the question of leftists' participation in government – in any greater depth (cf. Brie 2011). On specific points, however, she does discuss how politics in contradictions is to be pursued as 'a particular way of shaping our representatives' *parliamentary* activity' (GW 1/2, 453). This includes acknowledging actions by capital and the state that are of public benefit, while at the same time constantly exposing those of their features imposed by 'present-day legislation and the present-day legal system and administration, dominated by the spirit of private property' (123). Thus she considers it necessary to fight 'for the development of transport, but not for the capitalist state's policies on the rail-roads [...] for raising the level of the school system, but not for its present-day forms' (122). Luxemburg also sees the coalitions in the capitalist camp which demand the ruling bloc to do their dirty work for them: 'Here want-lists addressed to the state are drawn up, concerning economic legislation, means of transport, rail-road rates, public services – all for capital's greater good. When capital requires it, rivers are polluted by industrial waste and neighbourhoods are transformed into stinking sites of contagion. But when the organised power of capital gives the nod, canals are dug, railways are built, and exclusive residential neighbourhoods spring up, awash in air, sunlight, and glistening greenery' (GW 3, 431).

In parliamentary work, the individual steps that can be taken on the thin line between 'sectarian nay-saying and bourgeois parliamentarianism' (GW 1/1, 252) may seem quite small and almost over-subtle. Luxemburg, however, provides a further guideline for such work, while simultaneously proposing a further shift for, this time, parliamentary representatives' edification: 'Only the cooperation of various forms of struggle' constitutes socialist politics. She mentions mobilisations 'in the streets', general strike and, especially, press work, 'in the sense that the working masses are increasingly invited to consider their own power

and their own actions, and do not regard parliamentary struggles as the central axis of political life' (GW 1/2, 454). Thus Luxemburgian politics also requires a critical perspective, a critical standpoint, that go beyond the bounds of existing society (454 et sq.). Even if parliamentarianism, democracy, and freedom of the press are not specifically socialist goals, but bourgeois rights, they remain necessary conditions for struggle within bourgeois society. However, as soon as the Social-Democracy declares these conditions themselves to be goals, it is locked into rigid bureaucratic forms and becomes one bourgeois party among others. The alternative, according to Luxemburg, is to show at every moment that the world's destinies are not ruled by parliament, but dominated by capital that is in the process of becoming transnational, and that this brings war, destruction, and mass misery in its wake.

3.3 *Revolution and hegemony.* – Luxemburg's concern, therefore – to put it in Gramscian terms now – is to forge a politics for socialist hegemony. The traditional question as to whether reform or revolution constitutes this politics proves, once again, to be incorrectly posed. Both are means of struggle. One is required, within the bourgeois state, in order to improve the condition of the working class, and for its education, while the other is required to overcome this state, since political power cannot be attained without overthrowing it. Luxemburg's conception of revolution and violence, which at the same time says something about the relationship between *war of position* and *war of movement* – Gramscian concepts again – runs: 'not, to be sure, out of a predilection for acts of violence or revolutionary romanticism, but out of bitter historical necessity, the socialist parties must sooner or later, in cases in which our efforts are directed against multiple interests of the ruling classes, also be prepared for violent clashes with bourgeois society' (GW 1/2, 247). In clear terms, she situates the two standpoints in the historical process, describing, at the same time, the interrelationship between the different political means: 'The idea that parliamentarianism is, for the working class, the sole political means capable of ensuring its salvation is as far-fetched and, in the end, as reactionary as the idea that the general strike or the barricade is the sole such means [...]. However, a clear understanding of the need to use force both in individual episodes of the class struggle and for the final conquest of state power is indispensable from the start; it is this understanding that can lend even our peaceful, legal activity real emphasis and effectiveness' (ibid.). Luxemburg's orientation is towards linking the various means, that is, struggling in parliament, the factory, the street, and the press. It is precisely this multiplicity that constitutes socialist politics. Every form of struggle practised in exclusion eventually turns reactionary. The result, she says, is idealist sacrifice, a bureaucracy that encourages passivity, and

paralysing fatalism. If any one of the individual forms becomes independent of the others, it will eventually lose the vitality that results from integrating the greatest possible multiplicity of forms and makes up the substance of socialism for Luxemburg. 'There is nothing more improbable, impossible, or fantastic than a revolution even an hour before it breaks out, and nothing simpler, more natural, or more self-evident than a revolution after it has fought its first battle and gained its first victory' (GW 4, 255).

In her critique of Bolshevik policy after the beginning of the revolution, Luxemburg raises the question of 'dictatorship or democracy'. Proletarian dictatorship, she says, cannot be merely a bourgeois dictatorship with proletarians at its head; it must be *democratic as dictatorship* in the form of majority rule. In the revolution, the goal is no longer to protect 'bourgeois democracy', but it is 'to create a socialist democracy to replace bourgeois democracy – not to eliminate democracy altogether' (RLR, 308). The decisive difference resides 'in the *manner of applying democracy*, not in its *elimination*, in energetic, resolute attacks upon the well-entrenched rights and economic relationships of bourgeois society'. It 'must be the work of the *class* and not of a little leading minority in the name of the class – that is, it must at every turn proceed from the active participation of the masses; it must be under their direct influence, subjected to the control of complete public activity; it must arise out of the growing political training of the mass of the people' (ibid., transl. corr., FH). Here dictatorship may be understood as forced development or a permanent categorical imperative. All must learn to rule by taking responsibility for social self-rule.

This is where Gramsci puts an analysis of the development of *civil society*, whose underdevelopment in Czarist Russia leads him to a different assessment of Lenin's policies. The necessary step from a war of movement to a war of position, that is, to consolidating 'trenches', had to be taken under great time pressure, requiring, to begin with, 'identification of the elements of trench and fortress', since 'the state was everything, civil society [...] primordial [and gelatinous; FH]' (PN III, N. 7, §16, 168 et sq.).

3.4 *Dialectical thinking: the mole.* – Luxemburg's comments on the revolution testify to 'an implicit passionate dialectic [...] which finds itself put to the question of its conduct amidst conflicting necessities' (W.F. Haug 2005, 236). A 'real revolution, a great outpouring of the masses', can, in her view, '*never become* an artificial product of conscious planning, leadership, and propaganda' (Luxemburg, *The Revolution in Russia* 1905; 2018a). This explains her interest in the 'non-linear and sudden, the unforeseen' that realises a 'leap in time' (Haug 2005, 237). Conversely, Luxemburg conceives of the "appropriation" of state power as endless small-scale work 'in every province, in every city, in every

village, in every municipality in order to take and transfer all the powers of the state bit by bit from the bourgeoisie [...]' (*RLR*, 372, transl. corr., FH). Her approach to revolution flows from her assessment – with **Marx** – of the capitalist mode of production as itself revolutionary, until the point is reached at which the destructive forces inherent in it are directed against society. The laws of development of capitalism itself ceaselessly sap the very foundations on which they are effected; they give birth to the proletariat as a force in its own right, thus operating to subvert all old forms.

By means of the mole metaphor, **Luxemburg** presents the dialectic of history as an incessant burrowing through society's inner depths which, in spatially and temporally discontinuous fashion, shatters the crust of existing circumstances and breaks through to the surface. Thus capitalism can appear in 1896 as 'the young mole' which, in an ossified Russia, 'undermines the foundations, and this guarantees the overthrow of absolutism from within' (*GW* 1/1, 42). 'How merrily it works first right under the feet of Western European bourgeois society!' she writes in view of the 1905 Russian Revolution (2018b). Taken from **Shakespeare's** *Hamlet*, the mole metaphor had already served **Marx** as a means of expressing the non-linear aspect of development, as a code for movement in the foundations of society. In **Luxemburg**, it is also a way of expressing the idea that, ultimately, there is in fact a 'great historical law', as she writes in May 1917 at the moment of the Russian Revolution, which has put an end to the hopelessness of the First World War and shown that there can be no bringing class struggles to a halt – that they operate like a natural force, like 'a mountain water, whose brook bed has been clogged and which, plunged into the depths, suddenly springs up again in an unexpected place, sparkling in bright colors' (*The Old Mole*, *RW*, 243, transl. corr., FH). The association of subterranean and subversive 'burrowing labor' with iron laws is characteristic of **Luxemburg's** dialectic. It is the *form* in which unexpected movement and purposeful development are expressed simultaneously, so that constant agitation remains a necessity even while no calculation can be made as to when a revolution will break out; indeed, it cannot even be said *whether* it will.

Gramsci too asks these questions, but differently. Although, in November 1917, he had hailed the October Revolution as a 'revolution against *Capital*' (*SPW* I, 34–7) – read, as a revolution contradicting the assumptions of Marxist theory – later, in prison, after the next disastrous defeat of the workers' movement at the hands of fascism, he analyses revolutions on a comparative historical basis, rather than expressing himself about revolution as such. But he thinks through what is revolutionary about Marxian theory, and this also shifts **Luxemburg's** question from a day-to-day parliamentary experience to the cognitive process that sustains it. 'A theory is "revolutionary" precisely to the extent

that it is an element of total separation into two camps, to the extent that it is a peak inaccessible to the enemies. To maintain that historical materialism is not a completely autonomous structure of thought really means that the ties to the old world have not been completely severed' (*PN* 11, N. 4, § 14, 156).

3.5 *Party and intellectuals.* – The basis for politics is constant study by the party's intellectuals. Like Gramsci after her, Luxemburg in 1904 imagines a growing group of trained scholars in the world's proletariat's service showing that its cause is a generalisable standpoint. If party intellectuals are to be effective, they must be represented in parliament, among other places, and use parliament as a platform that allows to speak to the people (*GW* 1/2, 450). 'The war of words as a parliamentary means of action is meaningful only for a party of struggle that seeks support of the people' (*ibid.*). Luxemburg also sometimes calls the party intellectuals' task 'mole's work' (*RLR*, 2018c). However, a political standpoint, she argues, should not be drawn from what the relation of forces makes possible, but must be based on 'tendencies of social development' (*GW* 2, 495). By way of example, she explains that 'a sharp wind is blowing against the Social-Democracy in the ruling circles' (1910, *GW* 2, 484), that militarism and the arms race are increasing the danger of world war, but that the demand for the 'legal eight-hour working-day', 'which has no hope of success in today's parliaments', should nevertheless be put on the agenda by left-wing parliamentary representatives, because it 'is in line with the progressive development of the forces of production, technology, and international capitalist competition' (1911, *GW* 2, 495). The politics of the working-day thus takes, for her, the form of a paradox: it is both a fight for the further development of capitalism and 'a giant revolutionising step toward the enlightenment and organisation of the working class' (*ibid.*).

The art of politics is practised in the public sphere. Publicly stating the facts as they are paves the way for enabling the proletariat to take the structuring of society into its own hands. Luxemburg does not conceive of 'enlightenment', 'enablement', and 'agitation' as the acts of a leadership that teaches the workers, the 'mass', what is at issue and what is to be done. The party is not sacrosanct for her, leadership is not synonymous with the power of command, and the masses' role is not confined to carrying out orders. She thinks socialist politics as a process that enables the 'mass' to act purposefully on its own, to exercise power as the power to structure society. Even the concept of 'enablement', however, has too "top-down" a ring to it if one considers the role she ascribes to socialist organisation as a whole. What Gramsci calls the struggle for hegemony comes closest to her conception: an attempt to win the people's consensus for the project of an alternative organisation of society and the economy.

Any attempt to grasp such politics conceptually must wrestle with the problem that nearly all words are invested in such a way that all those who are at the bottom of the social scale also appear as stupid and incapable, while those who are at the top and call the tune do so in their own interests. In this spontaneous top-and-bottom logic, two organs of socialist politics are revealed to be ambiguous: the party and the intellectuals, whose 'duty' it is, according to **Luxemburg**, to participate actively in the mass movement in a 'leading' role. She describes both organs in various ways; they 'serve', forge 'slogans', spell out the 'orientation', and so on. Yet, however clear the spirit of the enterprise may seem, the exact characterisation of those who are supposed to carry things out remains ambivalent. The party is not a party in the bourgeois sense; it is, rather, untiringly active throughout society. When Luxemburg directly addresses the party leadership, it is at the points where it fails and deserves the sharpest criticism (see especially *The Crisis of the Social-Democracy*). Between the outbreak of the World War and the Spartacus uprising, party – as opposed to the formal party, the SPD – appears to be that which carries the spirit of the revolution forward, the spirit Luxemburg sums up, at the KPD's 1918/1919 founding conference, in the phrase 'I was, I am, I shall be!' (*RLR*, 378). For that contradictory form (or phenomenon) of history, a socialist party that simultaneously questions its own form, a fundamentally different concept is required. Luxemburg does not, however, work it out.

We can pursue matters further by observing **Gramsci** working on this problematic in the same spirit a scant ten years later, after the experience of fascism. He broaches the question from another angle, that of the party's effectiveness, examining its 'force, positive and negative, in having contributed to bringing certain events about and in having prevented other events from taking place' (*SPN*, N. 13, § 33, 151). This also means that a party is of no interest from the standpoint, so to speak, of the sociology of institutions; the focus is, rather, on 'the history [...] of a particular mass of people who have followed the line of the party, sustained them with their trust, loyalty and discipline, or criticised them "realistically" by dispersing or remaining passive in the face of certain initiatives' (150 et sq., transl. corr., FH). From the masses' standpoint, Gramsci defines the party with regard to its function of training 'qualified political intellectuals, leaders and organisers of all the activities and functions inherent in the organic development of an integral society, both civil and political' (N. 12, § 1, 16). So conceived, 'socialist party' becomes a process for winning hegemony for an alternative society. The understanding of intellectuals becomes fundamental.

In **Luxemburg**, vagueness in defining the party has its pendant in a similar uncertainty about intellectuals. There can be little doubt that, in all her appeals

about what is to be done now, she counts on the intellectuals in the workers' movement. She describes their function the most clearly in her analysis of the situation in Russia in 1904. What was lacking in Russia was the petty bourgeoisie that functioned elsewhere as 'a revolutionary connecting link', a 'radical and democratic' force and 'necessary material mechanism', 'living cement' with the 'necessary fiction of a united folk ("the people")', a 'political, spiritual, and intellectual *educator*'. The 'intelligentsia [and] liberal professions [...] with points of social contact with the [...] proletariat', were able to play an active part in this situation. They 'functioned as the ideological representatives of *the working class*', carrying out 'the "mole's work" of socialist [...], social-democratic agitation' (*RLR*, 2018c). Within the German Social-Democracy, Luxemburg mentions members of parliament and other representative bodies, journalists, literati; one can always recognise her too among them, a tireless scientific mole of movement politics in the party. But she heaps merciless scorn on the hirelings, the intellectuals bought off by the bourgeoisie (*GW* 1/2, 382 et seq.). She presents the *Verein für Sozialpolitik*, with its denial of 'Marxian crisis theory' (383), as a ridiculous accomplice of capital. She caricatures the methods that bourgeois science uses in denouncing prevailing conditions, making its results in this domain useless: 'The bureaucrat is joined by his natural extension [...] the German professor at his lectern, the theorising bureaucrat who picks apart the living stuff of social reality, reducing it to its finest threads and tiniest particles, classifies and reorders it in line with bureaucratic principles, and submits it as scientific material, all the life thus taken out of it, to the administrative and legislative activity of the councilmen. This diligent labour of atomisation [...] is [...] the surest means of theoretically dissolving all major social relationships and making the capitalist forest 'scientifically' disappear behind an unending multitude of trees' (388). Bertolt Brecht, who included a great deal of Luxemburg in his plays and other writings (for example, passages from the Spartacus Programme in his *Refugee Dialogues*), would later integrate these images and this conception in his unfinished play *Turandot or the White-washers' Congress*.

In everyday politics, insights can be used like snowballs, as Brecht has his Me-Ti say (2016, 101): they melt away and new ones are formed. However, when it comes to handing down the tradition – in other words, the political training of the coming generation – the shifting content of a concept such as 'intellectuals' becomes a problem. One could adduce very different definitions when trying to pin Luxemburg down on the question of intellectuals' function in the workers' movement. Sometimes all practice takes precedence over theory, sometimes intellectuals as such are the henchmen of the dominant, sometimes they are narrow-minded, sometimes they are conceited, sometimes they stand

over against the common people, sometimes they are part of it, sometimes they are indispensable to socialist working-class politics. In sum, it may be said that Luxemburg approaches socialist intellectuals as a function or personification of a critique of bourgeois society from the working class's or "people's" standpoint – from the standpoint, in a word, of the general in the process of emerging. Thus the critique of theory too, as well as the analysis of the international situation and the nation-state and its politics, become tasks for intellectuals.

Elaborating the problematic in which Luxemburg worked, Gramsci produces a theory of intellectuals useful for thinking her contradictory definitions more clearly. He does not set out from the idea that intellectuals are a distinct professional group but considers intellectuality as a political and social function. Anyone can assume this function, and each class will have its own intellectuals (*SPN*, N. 12, §1, 5 et sq.), who fight for its interests, produce the appropriate concept for this or that particular concern, condense it in slogans, broadcast it in publicly effective form, and write on behalf of their class. Gramsci forges the concept of 'organic intellectuals' for this context. 'There is no organisation without intellectuals [...] without the theoretical aspect of the theory-praxis nexus being distinguished concretely by the existence of a group of people "specialised" in conceptual and philosophical elaboration of ideas' (N. 11, §12, 334). The dominant classes' intellectuals put forward particular interests as universal, thus working towards their hegemony by striving to win the subaltern groups' consent. Conversely, the intellectuals of emancipatory movements work to counter the prevailing hegemony. Their activity is educational, is directed against domination, and facilitates organising at different levels of society; as teachers, 'administrators' and divulgators of pre-existing, traditional, accumulated intellectual wealth', movement intellectuals (N. 12, §1, 13). Socialist politics will also strive to win over as many intellectuals in the service of the dominant class as it can. That is possible, because the aim here is not to disguise particular interests as general, but to come forward as 'organisers of a new culture' (5), a new 'intellectual and moral order' (N. 11, §12, 325).

Equipped with definitions like these, we can describe Luxemburg's position more exactly. She herself spoke and acted as an organic intellectual of the workers' movement and sought to win others over to being precisely that – in the end, also to founding a new party (as Gramsci did a little later) in opposition to the old Social-Democracy.

3.6 *State and hegemony.* – However clearly and precisely Luxemburg announces the 'conquest of political power' as the political goal, what she understands by the state and, with it, governmental authority remains imprecise. A

note of hers justifies the conclusion that she knows that the state also makes use of the people by turning one segment of it into soldiers, bureaucrats, etc., and thus knows that the state too is made up of 'the people'. She has, however, no theory of the state and its instances or of the relationship between the army and state authority. Rather, she takes it for granted that the state in the form of the army has already put the people in a position which it can also exploit in order to appropriate power: 'We know, and rely on the fact, that the German worker's brothers, who were once filled with the [...] exalting feeling of love for mankind and the international solidarity of the peoples, will not betray the precept of humanity even with the king's uniform on their backs. Put your trust in the historical dialectic [... in the fact] that the great mass of people in our real fatherland will sooner or later rise up and say: Enough of these criminal policies!' (March 1914, GW 3, 423). With the outbreak of the World War shortly thereafter, this proved illusory.

Luxemburg explains in many different passages that society is, from within, becoming ever more socialistic under the impulsion of the development of the productive forces, even as the state and law erect ever higher protective walls against this, thus making socialism increasingly unlikely. She assumes that state authority is conservative or reactionary in comparison with the advanced segment of capital that drives development to the point of crisis; that it is, in other words, an obstacle to human progress. Thus (with **Marx**) she conceives of the development of the productive forces driven by the advanced segment of capital as a dynamics increasingly at odds with the relations of production. She does not, however, say which incompatibilities arise as a result of this development and, above all, she gives no thought to the transformation of work and the demands it puts on working people. Although, like Marx, she identifies polytechnic training as the future form of education of the masses, she pays no attention, unlike Marx, to the shift in working people's position with respect to machines and industrial plant – in other words, to the mode of work. In the *Grundrisse*, Marx had theorised the way living labour is gradually excluded from the productive cycle by the development of technology, becoming, tendentially, a supervisor and regulator of machinery (MECW 29/91). The demands for the qualification and expenditure of labour power are transformed as radically as the number of workers is reduced. Structural unemployment and the training of the labour force become the contradictory dimensions accompanying development of the productive forces. Marx elaborates the socialist perspective on the basis of his analysis of them. **Gramsci** follows him here, bequeathing us an analysis of the development of labour, mode of life, entrepreneurial strategies, and state interventions (in Fordism) that provides useful tools for grasping social relationships even in 'transnational

high-tech capitalism' (cf. W.F. Haug 2012). In this context, he also clears a path to a historical-critical understanding of gender relations.

In **Luxemburg**, the socialist point of view results from the working class's confrontation with capital, and must become conscious. It does so thanks not only to agitation and enlightenment, but also to the experience of oppression and the lesson of class struggles, hence from a confrontation that she calls 'political', distinguishing it from merely economic struggle. At issue here is an alternative mode of running the economy, in which the working class comes up against the state as guarantor of the bourgeois form. In this way, Luxemburg justifies her politics in the state against the state. But where a struggle for hegemony is waged, as is in all her speeches, articles, texts, and declarations, it is quite obvious that the people, addressed 'through the window', must be under the hegemony of the bourgeoisie. The bourgeois state would accordingly have to be conceived of as a state that is also sustained by the people, including the workers. What is required is a set of analytical tools that can grasp the state inside individuals and, accordingly, grasp individuals in their subalternity. Without the consent of the many, the ruling state will be difficult to maintain or will resort to dictatorial forms, and no revolutionary transformation is possible.

In **Gramsci**, this means that 'there can and there must be a 'political hegemony' even before assuming government power, and in order to exercise political leadership or hegemony one must not count solely on the power and material force that is given by government' (*PN* I, N. 1, § 44, 137). **Luxemburg** assumes that the bourgeois state is willing to relinquish bourgeois achievements because they were above all forms for its class struggle with feudal powers and lost their function after its victory; and, further, that increasingly transnational capital freely avails itself of the powers of the state, bending them to its will. Even in these clear-sighted prognoses, however, there is no definition of what the state is and how it works – and therefore also no explanation of what it means to seize state power. The effect of the dialectical process of proletarian class struggle, says **Luxemburg**, is that in the struggle for democratic relations in the state, the struggle itself is organised; class consciousness develops; and 'the proletariat, as it thus attains consciousness in the political struggle and organises itself, simultaneously democratises the bourgeois state, making it ripe for socialist revolution to the extent that it itself matures' (*GW* 1/2, 318).

From **Marx's** thesis that what is real about the talk of human essence is 'the ensemble of social relations', **Gramsci** concludes that 'man', as a social being, can appropriate this essence, his own, only by endlessly pursuing his self-transformation. This is not just a psychological task, but, above all a political one, because it necessarily involves taking part in structuring social relations.

‘So one could say that each one of us changes himself, modifies himself to the extent that he changes and modifies the complex relations of which he is the hub’ (*SPN*, N. 10, § 54, 352).

Gramsci overcomes the lack of a theory of the state in **Luxemburg** with his concept of the ‘integral state’. It bears, above all, on the contested relations between society and the state, the economy and politics. Yet **Luxemburg** does not think that the state is merely an instrument of the bourgeois classes, that it merely regulates society from above and outside it. Rather, her conceptions oscillate, as it were, between such disambiguations, including elements of both conceptions and repeatedly encountering additional problematics. **Gramsci** brings them together in the concept of the integral state: ‘state = political society + civil society, that is, hegemony protected by the armor of coercion’ (*PN* III, N. 6, § 88, 75). Politics, the economy, and ideology are thus grasped as internally related. **Gramsci** develops this theorem in a debate with economism. The integral state integrates the members of society and transforms them. Thus the state can be apprehended in individuals just as the reproduction of the dominant class can be analysed in them. This makes it clearer what the tasks that devolve upon a class in the struggle for hegemony are. Above all, **Gramsci**’s concept makes it possible to grasp changes in the relationship between politics and the economy; thus politics is understood as ‘the art of governing men, of securing their permanent consent’ (*PN* II, N. 5, § 127, 378), while the integral state itself is always also understood to be an “educator” who tends precisely to create a new type or level of civilisation’ (*SPN*, N. 13, § 11, 247). All these determinations are of central importance to a theory and strategy of revolutionary politics. What is more, they clear up inconsistencies in **Luxemburg**’s texts in such a way as to bring out the sharp turn charted by her thinking, making it possible to make use of her ideas as a new departure for political thought. As for the question of what the ‘seizure of political power’ means in **Luxemburg**, as it comes into view in her analysis of parliament, **Gramsci** notes: ‘A class that posits itself as apt to assimilate the whole of society – and, at the same time, is truly capable of embodying this process – would take this notion of the state and of the law to such a level of perfection as to conceive of the end of the state and the law, for the state and the law would serve no purpose once they had accomplished their task and been absorbed by civil society’ (*PN* III, N. 8, § 2, 234).

3.7 *The politics of the cultural.* – Study of **Gramsci**’s *Prison Notebooks* reveals the yawning gap left in **Luxemburg**’s analyses and politics as a result of the fact that, in her work for the masses and with the ‘people’, she neglects the ‘cultural’. To grasp it and provide a guide for struggles, **Gramsci** reworks the concept of ‘civil society’, incorporating it in the materialist conception of history. Politics

is thus brought to bear in a different way on subjects who act in contradictions and are, consequently, contradictory in themselves. Gramsci takes action in civil society to be all the practices in which individuals construct a world view for themselves and make sense of society; this determines their political opinion and, ultimately, their actions – at the pub, in associations, in their families, at school, at the workplace, etc. In this way, individuals are woven into the woof of existing society by countless threads. A study of the way they are thus integrated as well as emancipatory suggestions about alternative practices is required in order to work with them against the ruling hegemony. Setting out from Gramsci, Wolfgang Fritz **Haug** has conceptualised this interweaving of individual and society, as well as the attempt to build a counterhegemony, as a ‘politics of the cultural’ (1988/2011, 137 et sqq., 145 et sqq. and elsewhere). In many different forms and groupings and in various cultures, people are held fast in habit; they must work through this themselves in order to forge a consciousness of their being and possible goals. ‘Should this will [a rational will corresponding to objective historical necessities] be represented at the beginning by a single individual’, **Gramsci** writes, ‘its rationality will be documented by the fact that it comes to be accepted by the many, and accepted permanently; that is, by becoming a culture, a form of “good sense”, a conception of the world with an ethic that conforms to its structure’ (*SPN*, N. 11, § 59, 345 et sq.).

At certain points, **Luxemburg** comes close to similar ideas – for example, when she discusses the thinking of workers intent on protecting their vested rights, or the ‘immaturity’ that saw them marching off to fight in an ostensibly patriotic war in order to murder their ‘socialist brothers’; or again, when she assumes that politics must be pursued not with the *victorious*, but with the dominated proletariat; finally, when, in her detailed day-to-day activity, she strives to work against the predominant consensus. She abandons such approaches again, however, for the hope that a direct solution can be found by way of what is basically the already existing consciousness of the situation. The women’s question is exemplary in this regard: here she dismisses out of hand the advantages and constraints of the protection that family and home offer in order to turn to the class question. Thus she also fails to see the power of the cultural milieu in which individuals, workers included, swim like fish in water, as well as the fact that, in the cultural sphere as well, the struggle must always be fought out with contradictory subjects.

This problematic is nevertheless not entirely foreign to her. On the one hand, she sharply criticises pseudo-intellectual exchanges of hot air – what **Gramsci** calls ‘Lorianism’ (*Prison Notebooks*, N. 28) – and, on the other, excoriates the claustrophobic stuffy family milieu in the working class and, above all, in the party. It is indeed the case that ‘the military and police state’ survived ‘well into

the 20th cent.; it had its correlatives in an authoritarian society and a subservient mentality [...]. The Social-Democracy too remained permanently attached to this historical and social milieu [...]. For a long time it proudly referred, to be sure, not just to **Lassalle**, but also to **Marx** and **Engels**. Yet neither the attitude of the majority of its supporters nor the politics it actually practised, even before 1914, were those of a Marxist workers' party' (**Flechtheim** 1985, 10).

In addition to her political work, **Luxemburg** also produced literary criticism (in prison). She writes of **Franz Mehring's** biography of **Schiller** (*Die Neue Zeit*, 1904/1905) that it plays its part in the 'work of emancipation of the working class', and recommends that **Schiller's** significance be judged on the basis not of what he contributed to the working class but, on the contrary, of what the working class 'imported into **Schiller's** poems in the way of aspirations and sensibilities [...] unconsciously recasting [them] in the world of its own revolutionary thoughts and sensibilities' (GW 1/2, 534). In prison in Wrocław/Breslau in 1918, she translated **Vladimir Korolenko's** *The History of my Contemporary*, showing in an introductory essay how Russian literature 'attacked the deepest psychological roots of absolutism in Russian society', engaging in social criticism and demonstrating a sense of social responsibility (*RLS* 1970, 344). She affirms that literature should not be read as social theory or be judged according to its intentions or the recipes it propagates, but on the basis of the human meaning that constitutes its source and captivates the masses – what she calls 'its animating spirit' (345). Thus she also reconstructs the way that the 'decadent', 'reactionary' authors **Tolstoy** and **Dostoevsky** produce a particular effect on people, 'inspiring, arousing, and liberating' them (*ibid.*). Like **Brecht** after her, **Luxemburg** discerns the fascination that crime holds for the literary world, in that murder becomes not just an accusation levelled against prevailing social conditions, but, above all, 'a crime committed against the murderer as a human being, a crime for which we are all responsible' (347). Unusual in her treatment of literature is the fact that she reads novels from the standpoint of their reception by the people, with an eye, that is, to the way people can draw connections between fictional characters and their own lives. Thus literature becomes a medium through which the people can educate itself (GW 1/2, 536).

Gramsci too translated literature in prison – including texts by **Marx** and **Grimm's** fairy tales – and he too wrote literary criticism. Much like **Luxemburg**, he characterises 'the type of literary criticism suitable to historical materialism [as] a struggle for culture, that is, for a new humanism, a criticism of customs and sentiments, impassioned fervor, even in the form of sarcasm' (*PN* II, N. 4, § 5, 145). In prison, he too evaluated novels of particular interest for people's everyday reading. Like **Luxemburg** analysing **Mehring's** reading of **Schiller**, he attempts to decipher the meaning that people seek in these novels. **Luxem-**

burg, however, obviously has in mind a working class that, generally speaking, reads bourgeois literature, even if it confines itself to reading selections from it. **Gramsci** has in mind workers who are, expressly, caught up in another culture created specifically for them – mass-market popular literature – and thus in illusions. He therefore looks for literature written in such a way as to be understood and enjoyed by the people without being ideological or illusory, that is, without locking people into their subaltern status. Unlike mass-market literature, produced for those at the bottom, but not from their point of view, such literature may be described as ‘popular and democratic’ (terms found in the translation of *PN I, N. 1, § 44, 138* and *passim*). Gramsci wants to induce literati on the left to write better popular literature, thus assuming their task as ‘educators’. **Luxemburg** wants to bring the people closer to the great works of bourgeois literature in such a way that it can appropriate them for its own purposes. She has a higher opinion of the people than **Gramsci** does; hence the more durable appeal of his work to a people that does not have a very high opinion of itself. Both Gramsci and **Luxemburg**, however, take ‘the people’ to mean the mass of those subjected to the bloc of power and domination.

4. *Conclusion.* – One can, setting out from Antonio **Gramsci**, read Rosa **Luxemburg** as an organic working-class intellectual who endeavoured to renew politics under dramatically shifting historical conditions, coming up, in the process, against the limits and deficiencies of socialist politics as previously practised. It then becomes clear where her work remained in its beginnings: in the politics of the cultural, the theoretical-political definition of intellectuals, hegemony, civil society, the state, and, in connection with it, the development of the forces of production and analysis of the subject, which, embedded in bourgeois conditions, had, if it was to rise up in revolt, to cast off bonds that enlightenment and consciousness alone would not be sufficient to break.

Gramsci, with one more experience of catastrophe behind him, worked on all these points in a way that may be understood as a historical-critical appropriation of **Luxemburg**’s thought and her art of politics. He develops and forms the analytical concepts for what she attempted in the political sphere – hegemony, civil society, the integral state, the historical bloc and historical milieu, the politics of the cultural – as well as an appeal to political subjects mired in clashing, contradictory traditions, customs, and cultures to strive for coherence by participating in the endeavour of structuring politics and society, a movement that **Luxemburg** too regarded as fundamental. Thus **Gramsci** can also be read as a ‘**Luxemburgist**’. Reading Gramsci with **Luxemburg**’s political aspirations and practice in mind teaches us to understand him better; reading **Luxemburg** with **Gramsci** in mind not only brings out her inadequacies,

but also reveals traces and suggestions whose significance and possibilities we would have missed without him. To study both of them in their reciprocal interactions has a synergic effect that reinforces political hope and, with it, the capacity for action.

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→ art, automation, cadre party, civil society, class struggle, Comintern, concept, contradiction, critique, culture, democracy, development, dialectics, dictatorship of the proletariat, discipline, dogmatism, domination, rule, economism, enlightenment, eurocommunism, form, freedom, liberty, functionary, gender relations, guiding thread, hegemony, historical bloc, integral state, intervening thought, knowledge, labour movement, leadership, learning, liberation, literature relations, Luxemburgism, marxism, mass strike debate, masses, mistake, error, mole, organic intellectuals, parties, people's universities, perestroika, persecution of communists, philosophy of practice, politics of the cultural, prohib-

ition of profession, proletariat, reading workers, reform, reformism, resistance, revolution, revolutionary realpolitik, rights, social democracy, socialism, state, subalternity, tendency, theory of ideology, vanguard, war of position

→ Arbeiterbewegung, Aufklärung, Automation, Avantgarde, Befreiung, Begriff, Berufsverbot, Demokratie, Dialektik, Diktatur des Proletariats, Disziplin, Dogmatismus, eingreifendes Denken, Erkenntnis, Entwicklung, Eurokommunismus, Fehler, Form/Formbestimmtheit, Freiheit, Führung, Funktionär, geschichtlicher Block, Geschlechterverhältnisse, Hegemonie, Herrschaft, Ideologietheorie, integraler Staat, Kaderpartei, Klassenkampf, Komintern, Kommunistenverfolgung, Kritik, Kultur, Kunst, Leitfaden, Lernen, lesende Arbeiter, Literaturverhältnisse, Luxemburgismus, Marxismus, Masse, Massenstreik, Maulwurf, Ökonomismus, Opposition, organische Intellektuelle, Partei, Perestrojka, Philosophie der Praxis, Politik des Kulturellen, Proletariat, Recht, Reform, Reformismus, Revolution, revolutionäre Realpolitik, Sozialismus, sozialistische Demokratie, Staat, Stellungskrieg, Subalternität, Tendenz, Volksuniversitäten, Widerspruch, Widerstand, Widerstandsästhetik, Zivilgesellschaft

Mariáteguism

A: madhab māriyātīgī. – F: mariateguisme. – G: Mariateguismus. – R: mariategizm. – S: mariateguismo. – C: Mǎllyàtèjí zhǔyì 马利亚特吉主义

José Carlos **Mariátegui** (1894–1930), a ‘Peruvian Marxist, journalist and intellectual influentially engaged in the labour movement of his time’ (Füssel 1986, 7), presented a comprehensive analysis of his country’s specific economic, political, and cultural relations in his main work, *Seven Interpretative Essays on Peruvian Reality*. By using the conceptual means of Marxism developed in Europe to ‘understand Peruvian reality’, he committed a ‘history-shaping heresy’ (Haug 1986, 308) in much the same way as **Lenin** had done when staging the October revolution against the economic dogma of the Second International, thereby practising Marxism as the ‘concrete analysis of a concrete situation’ (CW 31/166). **Mariátegui**’s heresy, which brought him into conflict with post-**Lenin** Leninism and saw him baptised with the damning name of ‘M’ within the Third International, which had sworn loyalty to **Stalin**, consisted in his wish to bring ‘socialism in Latin America’ to life as ‘Indo-American socialism [*socialismo indo-americano*]’ (**Mariátegui**, OC 13, 249).

One generation later, this analysis and the stance underpinning it exerted a decisive ‘influence on liberation theology, and in particular on its “founder”, the Peruvian Gustavo **Gutiérrez**, to whom **Mariátegui**’s view that ‘to think history is to make history’ became decisive (Füssel 1986, 11). Yet only since the 1980s it has become common, in Latin America, to speak positively of ‘M’. In 2006, under the presidency of Evo **Morales**, Bolivia reconstituted itself as an ‘*estado plurinacional*’ in which indigenous peoples are represented and heard for the first time; there, **Mariátegui** is a vital reference point. When Bolivia’s vice president Álvaro **García Linera** received an honorary doctorate from Chile’s *Universidad de Arte y Ciencias Sociales*, in recognition of his ‘tireless social and political struggle for indigenous people, linked to academic work’, reference was made to his ‘intellectual and moral stance, comparable only [...] to **Mariátegui**’ (25 March 2014, www). Similarly, in Venezuela, the backing the Bolivarian movement has been able to provide common people with is associated with **Mariátegui**’s concept of Indo-American socialism. On the occasion of a tribute to Luis **Villafañá** (‘El Negro’), who died in 2009, Roland **Denis**, the former minister of planning under Hugo **Chávez**, stated: ‘When “El Negro” meets **Mariátegui**, a little light is kindled, and a debate gets underway; it fun-

damentally changes the premises of the subject – the people, with its origins and its memories, replaces an abstract conception of the working class. In the concrete case of Mariátegui, we speak of an Indo-American socialism; from the standpoint of Marxist thought, the *indígena* becomes the main bearer of this socialism' (qtd. in Bolívar 2011).

EDS.

1. The theoretical foundations of Mariátegui's social analyses and his political action are not comprehensively explicated anywhere in his writings. His *Siete ensayos de interpretación de la realidad peruana* (1928, English 1971), an examination of Peru's economic, social, political, and cultural development, also contain no 'political theory or strategy', as he once said (Mariátegui, letter dated 20 July 1929; 1984, 610). In making this statement, Mariátegui was overly modest. By placing the 'Indian problem' centre stage and tracing it back to its '[roots] in the land tenure system' (*Seven Essays*, 22), he avoids the pitfall of indigenism, which is incapable of an historical materialist analysis of the concrete situation and replaces it with the cult of the Indian. While a projected book, to be titled *Ideología y política en el Perú* and conceived of as a complement to *Seven Essays*, was never published – the manuscript is considered lost (cf. OC 13, 7 et sq.) – the works that we do possess provide sufficient material for understanding how 'Indo-American socialism', as developed by Mariátegui with reference to rural relations of production and the related problem of racial domination, was able to exert an influence well beyond the author's brief life.

As with many socialists, journalistic work played a major role in Mariátegui's life. Many short articles, talks, essays, and introductions provide hints that allow us to reconstruct his theoretical positions. The journals *Amauta* (1926–30) and *Labor* (1928–29), which both became discussion forums with continental reach, were founded on his initiative. *Amauta* exemplifies the combination of thorough research into the Indian legacy (as indicated by the title, which means 'wise man' or 'teacher' in the Quechua language) with lively engagement with political and cultural developments throughout the world (it was in *Amauta* that the first Spanish translation of an article by Sigmund Freud was published, among other translations).

2. Following his return from a more than three-year sojourn in Europe (1919–23), described by him as his 'best apprenticeship' (*Seven Essays*, xxxvi), Mariátegui described himself as a 'convicted and confessing Marxist' (letter dated 10 June 1927; 1984, 289). Italy, where he spent most of his time, provided a young revolu-

tionary with ample material for study. He witnessed the movement of factory councils in Turin, read the journal *Ordine Nuovo* (published by Gramsci and others), and attended the 1921 party congress in Livorno, where the minority faction split from the Socialist Party and reconstituted itself as the Communist Party. He probably met Gramsci in person.

From then on, analysis of Peruvian society, and of the possibilities for socialist revolution in Latin American countries, took centre stage in his reflections and activities. What separated him from APRA (the *Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana*) and its leader Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre from at least 1928 onward were their divergent views on the role of national bourgeoisies in underdeveloped societies. Mariátegui rejected interpretations of the colonial past as 'feudal' (on this point, his position is comparable to that of the later dependency theory), although he was very much aware of the existence of pre-capitalist forms of exploitation, particularly in rural areas. Mariátegui considered Peruvian society 'semi-feudal' and saw it as part of a global capitalist system that prevents underdeveloped countries from following the developmental trajectory of industrialised countries. 'The countries of Latin America have been late to join capitalist competition. The best seats have long been taken. The lot of these countries within the capitalist order is that of simple colonies' (OC 13, 248). The national bourgeoisie and the major land owners were allied with imperialist capital. Thus the prospects for socialist revolution rested on urban workers and Indian peasants. 'In Peru, four fifths of the masses – the working class – are Indian. Our socialism would therefore not be Peruvian – it would not even be socialist – if it did not begin by expressing its solidarity with Indian demands' (217).

Mariátegui viewed the communitarian traditions of Indian communes as presenting the possibility for a direct transition to socialism, without any need to undergo the full development of capitalist relations first. 'A new agrarian policy must devote itself, first and foremost, to promoting and protecting the Indian village commune. The "*ayllu*", the smallest unit of the Inca state, has survived the attacks of feudalism and large-scale landholding until today, and it remains sufficiently vigorous to be able to gradually develop into the germ cell of a modern socialist state' (OC 11, 109 et sq.). On this point, Mariátegui reached conclusions similar to those formulated by Marx in his assessment of the Russian peasant commune's developmental prospects, which saw Marx explicitly restricting his analysis of the 'genesis of capitalist production' to the 'countries of Western Europe' (letter to Vera Zasluch, third draft, in: Shanin 1983, 117 [19/401]). 'Communal land ownership offers it [the peasant commune] the natural basis for collective appropriation, and its historical context – the contemporaneity of capitalist production – provides it with the ready-made

material conditions for large-scale co-operative labour organised on a large scale. It may therefore incorporate the positive achievements developed by the capitalist system, without having to pass under its harsh tribute' (121 [405]).

3. While emphasising the autonomy of 'Indo-American socialism', which he argued ought to be 'neither a replica nor a copy' (OC 13, 249), **Mariátegui** could conceive of revolution only on a global scale. 'The Latin American revolution will be neither more nor less than a stage, a phase of the world revolution' (248). Yet one of the tasks the revolution needed to accomplish in underdeveloped countries was that of constituting and internally consolidating nations that imperialist domination had until then held in a state of self-fragmentation. This entailed, particularly with respect to Peru, integrating into national history the experiences and achievements that had characterised Indian societies prior to the Spanish conquest; it also entailed the participation of Indians in national life on the basis of equal rights. This was not simply a matter of equal economic and legal rights, but of a lived integration of Indian social, cultural, and religious traditions. 'The Indian is the basis of our emerging nationality' (OC 11, 32).

Mariátegui was a contemporary of the indigenists and respected their philanthropic work, but diverged from their demands by giving pride of place to the problem of land and emphasising the active role of the Indians. 'The solution to the Indian problem has to be a social solution, and it has to be implemented by the Indians themselves' (33). Nevertheless, **Mariátegui** was far from propagating a return to the Indian past as a political program. 'Over the course of four centuries [the period since the Spanish conquest], a new reality has emerged. [...] It may be a weak one, but it is in any case a reality. To want to ignore it would amount to Romantic exaggeration' (66).

This emphasis on regional specificities, combined with an attempt to link the labour movement both to peasant liberation and to critical intellectuals, led to conflicts between the Peruvian Socialist Party, co-founded by **Mariátegui** in 1928, and the Comintern. **Mariátegui's** refusal to treat the Indian problem as a question of nationality and his insistence on the need for a single party of workers and peasants (as opposed to a purely proletarian class party) led to him being accused of being 'petty bourgeois' and 'populist'. Shortly before his death, the Comintern's position prevailed within the Socialist Party (SP), which subsequently renamed itself the Communist Party. During the period that followed, the rift between APRA and the CP widened; assessments of **Mariátegui** formulated by authors associated with the two parties ranged from seamless cooptation (Cox 1934) to subtle defamation (Vargas 1934). An open debate about the significance of the 'first Latin American Marxist' (Melis 1967/1999,

11) did not begin until the 1970s, first in Peru and then in others countries on the continent. With the exception of a Cuban edition (1963), the *Seven Essays* were not published outside of Peru until this period.

Mariátegui's attempts to understand Peruvian reality set themselves an 'ambitiously pursued goal: to contribute to the development of a Peruvian socialism' (Preface, 16). José Aricó reads this effort, which distinguishes Mariátegui from other Latin American Marxists, as one of "translating" the Marxism learned in Europe into the terms of a "Peruvianisation", adding that it is precisely because of this effort that the *Seven Essays* 'remain the sole genuinely significant theoretical work of Latin American Marxism, even fifty years after their publication' (1978, xix). Atilio Borón arrived at the same conclusion in 2009. As far as the history of Marxism is concerned, the significance of the *Seven Essays* extends beyond Latin America. They consistently demonstrate their 'usefulness' anew, 'whenever one allows oneself to be inspired by them to do something comparable for one's own time and place: to undertake concrete efforts at comprehension with an eye to Marxism's ever new arrival in one's specific reality' (Haug 1986, 311).

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→ agrarian question, anticolonialism, colonial mode of production, Comintern, decolonisation, dependency theory, Gramscianism, Guevarism, ideas of Mao Zedong, imperialism, Indio question, Indo-American socialism, internal colonialism, land reform, liberation theology, Luxemburgism, Maoism, Martianism, Marxism, myth, nation, national bourgeoisie, national liberation, national road to socialism, peasant movement, populism, Pre-Columbian mode of production, Sorelism, Third World, Trotskyism, underdevelopment, vanguard, village community, Zasluch letters

→ Agrarfrage, altamerikanische Produktionsweise, Antikolonialismus, Avantgarde, Bauernbewegung, Bodenreform, Dependenztheorie, Dorfgemeinschaft, Dritte Welt, Entkolonisierung, Gramscismus, Guevarismus, Imperialismus, Indiofrage, indoamerikanischer Sozialismus, innerer Kolonialismus, koloniale Produktionsweise, Komintern, Luxemburgismus, Maoismus, Mao-Zedong–

Ideen, Martianismus, Marxismus, Mythos, Nation, nationale Befreiung, nationale Bourgeoisie, nationaler Weg zum Sozialismus, Populismus, Sassulitsch-Briefe, Sorelismus, Theologie der Befreiung, Trotzismus, Unterentwicklung

Marxism-Feminism

A: mārksīya nisā'īya. – F: marxisme-féminisme. – G: Marxismus-Feminismus.
 – R: marksizm-feminizm. – S: marxismo-feminismo. – C: Mǎkèsī zhǔyì-nǚxìng
 zhǔyì 马克思主义-女性主义

M-F is characterised by its effort to fight and work for an integration of the feminist revolution into Marxism. The resistance it encounters means that feminism has been forced to take on an initially oppositional and polemical form. The aim of the feminist revolution is the liberation of women from male domination as a precondition for the transformation of our society into one based on solidarity. This perspective seeks the eradication of patriarchal gender relations as an integral aspect of the socialist transformation of the relations of production. This means revolutionising the revolution, setting out to alter every dimension, every aspect of the social.

For theoretical consistency, this requires M-F to think of gender relations as relations of production. This position is founded on **Marx** and **Engels's** thesis that male domination over the female gender constitutes the first instance of historical class relations, at the heart of which is the ability to dispose of others' labour-power (*GI*, 3/32); slavery can be seen as an extension of this form (**Marx**, *Ethnological Notebooks*, 160).

One of the problems for Marxist Feminism is the question of its theoretical and practical approach to the 'intersection' of gender relations with relations of class and race. Another central problem is the challenge of conceptualising the persistence of sexual violence against women without constructing naturalised and essentialised dichotomies of masculinity versus femininity.

Feminist Marxism has deliberately taken up the 'one-sided' feminist challenge and started to transform theory and praxis. Historically and conceptually this transformation also coincides with the strategic integration of ecology.

Insofar as the goals of feminist Marxism and Marxist Feminism draw closer together, and thereby enhance Marxism itself, so their contrasting differences begin to disappear. From both a programmatic and a practical-utopian perspective, they can therefore be seen as historical and transitory formations. However, even if they are bound to disappear as distinct formations in the wake of their successes, the work that they have started will continue for generations.

1. *Origins.* – The expression ‘M-F’ first appeared as a term designed for international struggle at the beginning of the 1970s. Its exact meaning was gradually developed through a learning-process that took place in a conflictual field of multiple meanings, promoted by a minority among the feminist voices that was also marginalised among the Marxists. It originated in the context of a students’ movement that had started to read **Marx**, and a women’s movement that attempted to change traditional Marxism by inserting within it the standpoint of women and a programme for their liberation. The overlap between elements of both movements created an environment in which such struggles for change could be waged. This resulted not only in conflict between feminists, but above all in conflict between feminists and those who advocated an orthodox Marxism that was both factional and dogmatic. In Germany, this was, in part, thanks to groups of students (*K-Gruppen*) who attempted to protect the ‘one true’ Marxism from feminist infiltration.

Mariarosa **Dalla Costa** and others called a conference in Italy (Padua) to discuss the ‘overthrow of society’. Participants included about 20 feminists from the US, Italy, France, and the UK, who united around a campaign for ‘Wages for Housework’. This was extremely successfully launched under the leadership of Dalla Costa and Selma **James** with a call for a strike on housework (Sylvia **Federici** renewed this call in 2012). In 1972 **Dalla Costa** and **James** published their manifesto for the ‘overthrow of society’ simultaneously in Italian and English; the following year it was translated and published in German, and later in Spanish and French. It entails a feminist reading of **Marx** that launched the ‘domestic-labour debate’. Here, the unwaged labour of women in the household is considered as producing surplus-value, since women also work longer hours than are needed for their individual reproduction. Female unwaged labour is discussed in relation to the reproduction of capital, and the refusal of housework is proposed as a subversive and revolutionary strategy.

These arguments caused sharp public debate, published mainly in the *New Left Review* between 1974 and 1977. Wally **Seccombe**’s contribution, ‘The Housewife and her Labour under Capitalism’ (1974), opened the debate to underline the role for a critique of political economy of work in the household. While the position of **Dalla Costa**, developed within the framework of autonomist Marxism (*Operaismo*), found supporters worldwide, it also provoked strong feminist critiques of its conceptualisation of housewives as waged labourers who would be enabled, through wage-payment, to collectively organise childcare, meal preparation, and so forth. Heidi **Hartmann** summarises the consciousness-raising potential of the Wages for Housework position in this way: ‘By demanding wages for housework and by refusing to participate in the labour market, women can lead the struggle against capital. Women’s community organisa-

tions can be subversive to capital and lay the basis not only for resistance to the encroachment of capital but also for the formation of a new society' (1979, 6). However, Hartmann makes the criticism that, while this strategy makes women part of the anti-capitalist struggle, it does not evince feminist thinking in terms of the actual content of the gendered division of work, thus it remains fundamentally economic and does not aim for a more human society.

In 1979, the influential book by Sheila **Rowbotham** et al. on the relationship between the women's movement and socialist organisation was published in the UK. It problematised conceptualisations of consciousness and the avant-garde. It argued that the women's movement had 'cut through circular avant-gardist thinking'; questioned the criteria by which avant-gardism defined 'progressiveness' and 'backwardness'; and pointed instead to a praxis based on 'lived experience' (1979, 102–11). Opposition to feminism in groups that regarded themselves as Trotskyist and Leninist often resulted in women quitting those socialist and communist organisations. Carla **Ravaoli** notes in the case of Italy that the failure of feminist women to change socialist politics then led to a strategy of 'double militancy', in that they had to fight on two fronts: one directly against capital, the other against patriarchal cultures and their consequences, which in turn have been employed and cynically exploited by capital (1977, 163 et sq.).

A fierce debate resulted from the publication of Heidi **Hartmann's** essay 'The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism', first published in the US in 1975, re-worked in cooperation with Amy B. **Bridges** and republished in 1977, re-printed in *Capital & Class* in 1979, and finally appearing in 1981 together with twelve contributions to the debate published in the volume *Women and Revolution*, edited by Lydia **Sargent**. In the Introduction to the volume Sargent formulated a theoretical challenge: 'How can women understand their particular oppression in a way that can confront the narrowness of Marxist terminology (as used by the men in the movement) which focuses on work and economic relations as the primary (sometimes only) area of importance; and how can they develop a new theory which understands the importance of reproduction, family, and sexuality as central to current analyses and future visions?' (1981, xviii).

In its composition **Sargent's** edited volume is a classic of productive engagement in debate. It showcases work in progress: different positions are introduced as first steps, prerequisites are formulated, and perspectives on what still has to be developed are sketched out. The following terms are shown to be contested: production, patriarchy, sex/gender system, the personal and the private as political – within a Marxism in motion of which M-F is one expression, alongside the 'everyday-life school' (for example, Eli **Zaretsky**, 1973) and

the 'Radical Feminists' (for example, Shulamith Firestone 1971, and Kate Millett 1969). Right from the beginning these individual positions establish themselves on a dividing-line, where the centre of analysis switches between either the position of women in the economic system or the relations of domination between men and women.

Hartmann argues initially that the specific focus of feminist Marxism is a departure from 'the women question'. 'The women question has never been the "feminist question"' (1975/1981, 3). The latter is much more concerned with the development of a theory of female oppression, of its integration into capitalism, and with a basis for reconstructing Marxism. 'Radical Feminists' include psychoanalysis in their analysis. 'The personal is political' means here that the 'original and basic class division is between the sexes, and that the motive force in history is the striving of men for power and domination over women, the dialectic of sex' (1979, 10).

Zaretsky aims to widen our understanding of production and work by integrating housework, and thereby to update Marxism by integrating feminist questions. 'The housewife emerged, alongside the proletariat [as] the two characteristic laborers of developed capitalist society' (1973, 114). The feminist Marxism suggested by **Hartmann** formulates its challenge as the attempt 'to use [...] Marxism to consider patriarchy as a system of social relations based on men's control of women's labor power, both in the home and in the wider economy' (1975/1981, 371). In this way, it avoids economism, which suggests one unitary system in which everyone labours for capitalism, and also the psychologism of theories of patriarchy, which develop another unitary theory that assumes an essentialist male drive for power.

There was no such systematic debate in Germany, but M-F can be traced in various accounts, bearing witness to the existence of such discussions. The Frauenzentrum Berlin [Berlin Women's Centre] discussed a 'Marxism/Feminism working group' that aimed to clarify the theoretical significance of feminism, as well as a working group on 'the workers' and women's movement' (see Jutta **Menschik** 1977, 96). Herbert **Marcuse** was one of the supporters of an interconnection of Marxism and feminism. He gave a series of lectures on the topic during 1974 in Germany and the US. Sieglinde **Tömmel** argued that, as part of the 'recent opening-up of intensive debate on the relationship between Marxism and Feminism and also on the theory of women's liberation [*Frauenemanzipationstheorie*] in Germany [...] judgements about the priority of "class" or "gender" in the struggle for women's liberation caused disagreement within the women's movement itself' (1975, 835). Initially the female Marxists within the movement gave predominantly defensive responses. The seminar programme of the Otto-Suhr-Institut at the Free University of Ber-

lin lists for the semester of Summer 1975 a seminar on M-F offered by Ingrid Schmidt-Harzbach, in which more than one hundred students participated (Lenz 2010, 212).

In protest against the orthodox women's policy of their party, feminists in the French Communist Party in Paris founded the journal *Elles voient rouge* [*Women See Red*], and in 1980 they organised an international symposium entitled *Féminisme et Marxisme*. Here, representatives of 'autonomous' women's groups as well as feminists within parties and trade unions discussed politically and strategically how the women's movement could constitute itself as a force without having to rely on traditional structures, debating, for example, whether they should form their own women's party. Central topics included: patriarchy and women as a class; housework as productive or unproductive work; wages for housework; the right to paid employment; part-time work and the family; the women's movement and self-awareness groups; movement and party; the state and the personal as political; complicity; and homosexuality (the discussion was published in 1981 under the title of the symposium; see a review in *Das Argument*, Beiheft 1983, 11 et sqq.). Nicole Edith Thévenin (1982) announced programmatically: 'It seems to me that, from a Marxist perspective, feminism is equally fruitful in theory and in praxis'. From the beginning of the 1980s, publications that highlighted the tensions between Marxism and feminism started to accumulate in Western-European and Anglophone countries (USA, Canada, Australia).

In the first place, M-F is a concept of a movement [*Bewegungsbegriff*]. It polemicalises, on the one hand, against a form of Marxism that does not include feminism, and, on the other hand, against a feminism that does not view Marxism as its guiding principle. 'The women's question should be dealt with from a Marxist perspective, and to this end traditional Marxism needs to be reconstructed, extended, and critically used' (Haug/Hauser 1984, 17). The history of the term M-F – that is, when the term first appeared – can only be vaguely delineated. A survey in 2014 asked 30 international Marxist Feminists already active in the 1970s about who coined the term M-F. Their responses generated only hesitant references to one another, but no clear results suitable for a historical account (Haug 2014).

Internationally the term was used to describe a current in contrast to "materialist feminists" or "socialist feminists". Differences were soon debated on internet discussion forums. Retrospectively, Martha E. Gimenez characterises these in this way: 'In the exciting times of the women's liberation movement, four main traditions of feminist thought can be identified: the liberal tradition (concerned with the realisation of political equality within capitalism), the radical tradition (concentrating on men and patriarchy as the main sources of female

suppression), the socialist tradition (a critique of capitalism and Marxism, aimed at avoiding reductionism in Marxism that results in a two-system theory, where an interaction of capitalism and patriarchy is assumed), and Marxist Feminists (a theoretical position represented by relatively few feminists in the US – including myself – that aimed to develop the potential of Marxist theory, to grasp the capitalist sources of female oppression)' (2000, 18). In the aftermath of the world financial crisis of 2008 and beyond, the collection and classification of texts from these international currents has gained renewed topicality in journals, workshops, and educational programmes of the Left, or, for example, at the annual conference of the journal *Historical Materialism*.

2. *Representation*. – To enable a better overview, we can distinguish between different historical-thematic stages within M-F. Initially, we see a separation from traditional forms of Marxism, which took place partly as a split from these approaches, and partly as a forthright critique of them. Struggles existed around the question of a Marxist approach to questions of women's oppression, as well as around questions of research design and of new methods of scientific inquiry. Overall, M-F can only be depicted as a project in development. We can discern moments of intervention, where either Marxist renewal has been advanced by feminist insights or, where feminist work was criticised by Marxist inquiry and thereby re-conceptualised.

2.1. *Separation*. – In Germany, where the women's movement predominantly emerged from within the students' movement, feminist critique initially targeted the theoretical foundations of Marxism. This stood in contrast to the UK, Italy, and France, where feminism focused on criticising the politics of the workers' movement. Early publications expressed dissatisfactions, arising from a sense of exclusion from the version of Marxism taken up by the students' movement, with the classic authors of Marxism themselves. A book like *Die Märchenonkel der Frauenfrage: Friedrich Engels und August Bebel* [*The Peddlers of Fairy Tales about the Women Question: Friedrich Engels and August Bebel*] (Roswitha Burgard and Gaby Karsten, 1975) notes the patriarchal style of these leaders' way of life, collects their scattered comments on women, and exposes them to female laughter. Indeed, once on this trail, we quickly find that women are excluded as a matter of course. For example, we read in such an important text as the *Communist Manifesto* that 'not only has the bourgeoisie forged the weapons that bring death to itself, it has also called into existence the men [*Männer*] who are to wield those weapons – the modern working class – the proletarians' (*Manifesto*, 1969, 18). Here it goes without saying that women have disappeared from sight and their claim to be autonomous agents has been dis-

missed, as it becomes simply a question of 'do[ing] away with the status of women as mere instruments of production' (25). Yet whilst such feminist acts of deconstruction and desecration can be emancipating, they are also limited in the longer term.

2.2. *Conceptual Work.* – As M-F developed, it spread across countries and continents, enabling people to discuss it widely, with a desire to grasp female oppression by its roots and bring it into the political spotlight. In a continuous process of discussion, voices chimed in from everywhere, only some of which can be illustrated here.

Fundamental tenets and concepts of Marxism were challenged. First of all, the concept of *class* was challenged, and thereby also the corresponding theory of domination based on one single source, whose comprehensive abolition therefore "only" requires this one class-struggle. French feminists were among the first to extend the concept of class in order to make it fruitful for feminist work. 'The distinction between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat is as simple as the division between genders' (Thévenin 1982, 12). But since women have no common space (such as the factory), nor a shared economy, and so are defined more 'by their class membership via their husband rather than via the class of woman' (11), an overarching form of female solidarity and a shared understanding of oppression is required. Christine Delphy (1980) identifies this as a reciprocal constitution of men and women in a relation of exploitation. This allows for an analogy with the relations of waged labour. The location of women's oppression is within marriage, endowed by a work contract. We can state 'the existence of two modes of production in our society: (1) most goods are produced in the industrial mode; (2) domestic services, child-rearing, and a certain number of goods are produced in the family mode. The first mode of production gives rise to capitalist exploitation. The second gives rise to familial, or more precisely, patriarchal exploitation' (33). According to Delphy, in both cases the enemy is the man who appropriates female labour-power.

These arguments stimulated international discussion. From the UK, Michèle Barrett and Mary McIntosh (1979) accused Delphy's argumentation of being both anti-Marxist and anti-feminist. With regard to women, they argued that her work fails to differentiate between married women and women in general, and lacks any reference to the ideological construction of femininity. The assumption of two distinct modes of production – capitalist and patriarchal – ignored the Marxian concept of the mode of production. 'What is needed is a more complex analysis of the way in which the historically constructed category of women has been harnessed into various divisions of labour at different periods and how this category has itself altered in the process' (104).

What became obvious during these intense debates was that every attempt to focus the entire movement on only *one* phenomenon resulted in energy-sapping divisions that did not do justice to the problem of women's exploitation and oppression. The assumption that domination could be reduced to one source, rather than being a polymorphic praxis based on various interrelated conditions – as, for example, Marx and Engels outline in *GI* – gives rise both to feminist conceptions of patriarchy and to a conceptualisation of capitalism as a singular totality. What is needed is a combined theory of domination that allows for an understanding of the societal system as two-sided, as capitalist and patriarchal at one and the same time. In this way the concept of *gender* is placed alongside that of *class*. Since male domination of women cannot be simply tacked on to other forms of domination, we have to understand them as distinct but nonetheless thoroughly imbricated. The works of Louis Althusser and of Karl Polanyi were particularly influential in developing such a perspective on domination, which proved particularly influential for Anglo-Saxon feminism.

New concepts were developed: *Sexism* – analogous with racism – was intended to denote general relations between men and women, insofar as they were to be understood as relations of domination and exploitation. The reification of women as objects of male desire, evident in the aesthetic treatment of the female body, was exposed as offensive. This demonstrated the comprehensive oppression of women, their subjugation mediated through the body, and their resulting exclusion from positions of power in politics, economics, and science.

The concept of *women* as a theoretical-political problem in particular concerned feminist Marxists in the US and France: What is common to all women, such that it could be seen as the starting point of a shared project of liberation? After the fight against abortion laws was stifled by compromise, Simone de Beauvoir (1981) suggested that, in order to revive the women's movement, women should concentrate on *housework* as a shared focus for struggle, since all women are ultimately home-makers, regardless of class, social stratum, status, and so forth. Controversy was also caused by the question of whether to call women 'sisters', since this could be seen as similar to 'that obscure notion of brotherhood, a moralistic and illusory [...] universality' (Suzanne Blaise 1982, 32). The hope of uniting on the basis of a non-authoritarian commitment between female beings in shared powerlessness is criticised by Elisabeth Fox-Genovese (1979/80) as a conservative amalgam of femininity. In contrast she suggests 'that we must adopt gender system as a fundamental category of historical analysis', which enables an 'understanding that such systems are historically, not biologically determined' (1982, 6 et sq.), and 'to grasp the equal

participation of women in the human struggle for survival and domination of nature with the aim of a humanistic world' (1983, 688).

It remains in dispute whether it is housework and family, men in general, or capital that create and perpetuate women's oppression. Ultimately, the question of *oppression* itself is still contested: does it arise out of wage discrimination, sexual exploitation, the appropriation of others' labour-power by men and by capital? During the 1970s and early 1980s, as women in the French Communist Party were involved in such debates, and their arguments were generating controversy in England and the US, silence on the women's question still prevailed in parallel organisations in Germany. Until the late 1980s, capital was considered the number-one oppressor of women. The phrase 'patriarchal capitalism' had simply appeared, albeit without any clear idea of what this might actually be.

2.3. *Building on Marx*. – In various countries, feminists who view themselves also as Marxists differ on the question of how to build on **Marx**. Some concentrate on Marx's early work (Danièle Léger in France, Rada Iveković in Yugoslavia, Gabriele Dietrich in India) and suggest innovative studies of anthropology and history; Raya Dunayevskaya recommends *GI* and calls for new studies of gender relations, and their mediation via forms of families and marriage, as an aspect of relations of production; and for that purpose she recommends the reading of the *Ethnological Notebooks*, where **Marx** shows that 'the elements of oppression in general, and of woman in particular, arose from *within* primitive communism, and were not only related to [the] change from "matriarchy", but began with the establishment of ranks – relationship of chief to mass – and the economic interests that accompanied it' (1981, 180). At the beginning of the 1980s the notion that Marx needed to be re-read in a feminist way had become accepted among Marxist Feminists internationally. For such an endeavour Barrett compiled a report on the discussions around Marxist-Feminist concepts, *Women's Oppression Today* (1980), which became a standard work worldwide. The 24 women of the women's editorial board [*Frauenredaktion*] of the journal *Das Argument* and the *Sozialistischer Frauenbund Westberlin* [Socialist Women's Alliance of West Berlin], who translated the report into German, altered the subtitle to *Outlines of a Materialist Feminism*, in order to give the book a better launch. In this way, they made it unrecognisable as a Marxist-Feminist book.

Barrett considers it the duty of M-F to 'investigate the relations between on the one hand the organisation of sexuality, domestic production, the household etc. and on the other hand the historical changes in the mode of production and in the forms of appropriation and exploitation' (1980, 18). She presents

debates around three main concepts: *patriarchy*, mainly with reference to 'radical feminism', a view which implies that capitalism and patriarchy cannot be successfully linked; *reproduction*, where the functionalism and reductionism of Marxist analysis are problems to overcome, in order to link societal reproduction with individual and biological reproduction so that they no longer serve as a 'divisive political force' (34); and finally *ideology*, following Rosalind Coward (1977), who shifts the relationship for feminists between ideology and the economic towards an equivalence of the three forms of practices (political, ideological, and economic) (Barrett 1980, 32). 'There is no general and essential economic existence of the relations of production, there is only the particularity in which they are secured, a particularity in which the conditions of existence are all-important' (Coward 1977, 34). In every theoretical complexity with which she engages, Barrett works through the deficiencies with respect to Marxist-Feminist claims, and shows which questions remain unexplored, finally concluding that 'although driven by crucially important political motivations, Marxist-Feminist theory is still at a relatively early stage in formulating a perspective which challenges, but benefits from, the more developed science of Marxism' (38). As a way forward she suggests focusing on specific linkages. 'Of these perhaps the most crucial are the economic organization of households and its accompanying familial ideology, the division of labour and relations of production, the educational system and operations of the state' (40). Further topics to research, according to Barrett, are the production of gendered subjectivities, sexuality and 'biological reproduction' (41), and 'sexuality and domination' (42).

Eight years later, Carole Pateman drafted a coherent analysis of patriarchy, drawing on Sigmund Freud. It is understood as a 'fraternal patriarchy' following the 'ousting' of the fathers, sexual oppression of women, colonialism, and bourgeois thinking in social contracts. The original social contract concerns 'white men', whose fraternal contract legitimises 'the social contract, the gender and the slave contract' (1988, 221; cf. HKWM 8/1, 87 et sq.).

2.4. *Experiences, Everyday Life*. – According to US author Barbara Ehrenreich, disappointment over the unsuccessful struggles of the 19th cent. for equal rights (property ownership, divorce, suffrage) gave impetus to the women's movement of the 20th cent. to express the slogan 'the personal is political' as a universal claim, initially located in a socialist context. 'Without the binding understanding that in the sense of the feminist principle, the personal (the way we act and treat others on the individual level) is political, there is little hope of building a socialist movement that entails diverging and often antagonistic social groups' (1978, 17). The accentuation of the 'personal' is not only

a challenge to the conventional division of labour, and the starting point for many consciousness-raising groups on which the new women's movement was built; it is also a theoretical attempt to shift the problematic search for the link between capitalism and patriarchy towards consideration of the practices of everyday life, rather than deducing one from the other. The experiences and everyday life of women become the object of feminist research, which integrates theories of culture and ideology as sub-disciplines.

New *methodologies* had to be found to enable such an endeavour. By the end of the 1970s, these methodologies posited the question of research subjects and objects in a different way. Consciousness-raising group meetings resulted in 'collective memory work', developed and applied by Frigga Haug et al. (1983), a method of collective reflexive research with transformative goals, which was taken up as a movement by many groups in a number of countries. This method starts from the insight that women are not simply the victims of their own conditions, nor are they solely the victims of men, but that they unknowingly participate in their own oppression. This argument stays true to the Marxist insight into the 'coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity of self-change' (MECW 5/3). The victim-actor thesis (Haug 1980, translated into many languages) and the subsequent research on the *Sexualisation of the Body* (1983; 1984 in English) became a "classic" of Marxist-Feminist research on women. It elaborates a socio-historical construction of what became a purely discursive constructivism in academic discussions (cf. Chantal Mouffe 1983).

Among Italy's feminist Marxists, the shifting of focus to the personal was discussed under the headings of 'immanence' and 'transcendence'. To bring the personal to the forefront meant that transformation was required here and now (immanence), not in a distant future in a different societal formation (transcendence). The issue now is to create something like a permanent revolution in the personal sphere (for a summary, see Carla Pasquinelli 1982).

2.5. *Feminist Critique of Feminism Building on Marx.* – At the beginning of the 1970s, Donna Haraway challenged every form of essentialism within feminism, and conceptualised gender as a construct. She also questioned the cult of motherhood as a retreat into biology, which she considered an ideologically interested construct. In her *Cyborg Manifesto* (1984), controversially received among feminists, she suggests a 'socialist-feminist subversion of genetic engineering' where she combines the anti-capitalist struggle with a critique of feminist renunciation of technology. Haraway fights not so much for a feminist Marxism as for a more Marxist feminism. Her concerns were influentially taken

forward by Judith **Butler** (1990). This shift of emphasis, denying substantial meaning to gender in liberation theory, has resulted in various superficialities, and strengthened a post-feminism that wants nothing to do with Marxism.

Doubts about whether gender would constitute significant grounds for knowledge at all were strengthened by the appearance of Cultural Studies (especially in the US). Luce **Irigaray** objected to this erasure (1974). She argued that the entirety of Western culture and its symbolic order would become unintelligible without thinking about binary constructions of gender and/or sexual difference. Drawing on **Marx's** analysis of the double character of the commodity, **Irigaray** deciphers why women are overlooked in silence, and why they themselves do not desire to attain the status of subjects. According to their social nature, women appear as use-value and exchange-value in one – as a mother and thus as a “natural” reproducer; and as virgin, where they become *‘pure exchange value’*, nothing but ‘possibility’ (1977/1985, 186). ‘Participation in society requires that the body submit itself to a specularization, a speculation, that transforms it into a value-bearing object [...]. *A commodity – a woman – is divided into two irreconcilable “bodies”*: her “natural” body and her socially valued, exchangeable body’ (179 et sq.). ‘This transformation of women’s bodies into use values and exchange values inaugurates the symbolic order. [...] Women, animals endowed with speech like men, ensure the possibility of the use and circulation of the symbolic without being recipients of it. Their nonaccess to the symbolic is what has established the social order’ (189). According to this, a critique of capitalism would have to start much earlier, in a critique of the very practice of exchange and the way its role is conceptualised in our understanding of and thinking about society. Tove **Soiland** criticised attempts in the 21st cent. to assume the ‘maintenance of multiple subject positions’ as a means of overcoming the ‘heteronormativity’ of male/female categorisations as ‘too affirmative’ (2014, 116). ‘Only under the presupposition that genders are coherent identities’ does the idea of deconstruction to overcome gender borders make sense. ‘But how to deconstruct what appears in the theory of sexual difference as the non-articulation of the female position?’ (ibid.).

Rossana **Rossanda** suggests employing the ‘female experience of life’ in the ‘intolerability of its alienation’ for the purpose of emancipation (1981/1994, 79 et sq.). ‘In this transition, which will not be easy and for which the high level of pain and conflict in today’s relations between the genders may be characteristic – [...] the experience of women, by becoming totality, also becomes culture in an encompassing sense’ (80). The question of binary constructions of gender is taken up in debates about gender relations.

2.6. *Labour and Value-Theory, Debate on Housework*. – Since the beginning of the campaign for wages for housework, feminist critique has targeted the foundations of the critique of political economy in its theories of labour and value. In his writings, **Marx** built on the notion that labour and land were the sources of all social wealth. He worked out that capitalist exploitation was based on the commodity of labour-power, which, in a unique way, was able to create more value than it required for its reproduction. Women's work, which – according to feminist critique – certainly exists in the area broadly referred to as the 'reproduction of labour-power', is not only largely invisible in society as a whole, but is also systematically rendered invisible in Marxist theory. To begin with, the international debate was essentially aimed at proving that 'housework not only produced use-values but was essential for the production of the surplus-value' (**Dalla Costa/James** 1973, 39; 62, footnote 12 added: 'housework is productive labour in the **Marxian** sense'). Later on, the debate focused on doubts about the **Marxian** concept of labour and attempts to expand it into a political subject of liberation, and reckoned accounts with the critique of political economy as a whole. During the course of these debates, pivotal authors such as **Claudia von Werlhoff** (1978), **Veronika Bennholdt-Thomsen** (1981), and **Maria Mies** (1981) distanced themselves from Marxism. So too did **Christel Neusüß**, whose influential book (1985) comprehensively documents the ignorance of the labour movement concerning the production of life and housework. Opposing **Marx**, she claims that the commodity of labour-power cannot be easily integrated into an analysis of commodity production and value-form, since the work of those who produce life, of mothers, would thereby become invisible (25). She suggests that **Marx** had forgotten that 'it is not just work that produces things, but also work that produces humans' (34).

The debate around housework, which became ever more academic over the years, was ingloriously sidelined by a struggle around authorship between the first authors **Dalla Costa** and **James**, after the latter simply deleted the former as a co-author from the revised edition of the important book of 1972. **Dalla Costa** used this event to make some amendments public. According to her, the campaign for wages for housework basically had no particular authors, but arose from the feminist and workerist Marxist movements. But it had incorporated earlier demands, such as those of **Chrystal Eastman** in the early 20th cent., **Wilhelm Reich** in the 1930s, **Simone de Beauvoir** in the 1940s, and so on. Basic income and a minimum wage had already been central demands in Italian workerism, with which the Wages for Housework campaign could connect (**Dalla Costa** 2012). **Lise Vogel** points to other forerunners of these demands in the US (2001, 1188).

Next to this are attempts to link women working in the home in the “industrialised world” of the North with the subsistence economies in the South. In the words of Maria Mies, ‘The “colonies” are therefore the external world’s “housewives” – and the housewives over here are the internal colony of capital and of men’ (1983, 117). In this perspective, the relationship of every man to his wife in the “industrialised North” would be just as exploitative as the relationship of the imperialist countries to the countries in the “Third World”. Or, as was claimed in the article ‘Women and Ecology’ by Mies and Bennholdt-Thomsen about a conference of the Green Party: one would have to finally grasp that women, nature, and the “Third World” stood on the side of the exploited while all men stood on the side of the exploiters.

Like the housework/domestic-labour debate, the debate about a ‘dual economic system’ (dual-system approach) also shows an anchoring in Marxism as well as venturing beyond its borders. This second debate is concerned with the relationship of the capitalist and patriarchal modes of production, their internal connection or their external combination. The concepts of gender relations, imperialism, and domestic mode of production are examined and developed in new directions.

What remains to be recorded is that the tension between the two poles of the term M-F became stronger in the ongoing process of debate, since discussions had to take place across the entire length of their borders. It quickly became apparent that, as feminists developed their self-confidence, the presumably solid foundations of Marxism had to be investigated anew.

2.7. *Gender Relations as Relations of Production.* – In the shadow of the surrender of European state-socialism, it became unfashionable to think about **Marx**, as he seemed to have lost his historical relevance. Internationally, post-modernism and post-feminism had dismissed the “grand narratives” to which the theories of M-F also seemed to belong. Self-confident women had emerged from the experiment in state-socialism, yet they did not see any use in M-F and hardly developed an effective resistance to capitalist incorporation; this forced the relationship between capitalism and patriarchy back onto the agenda. Frigga Haug intervened several times with the demand to understand gender relations as relations of production. Thereby one is no longer concerned with adding the women’s question, but rather with reconstructing the concept of the relations of production itself, to include the production of life as well as the production of the means of life. As **Marx** and **Engels** set out in *GI*, this enables us to grasp the relationship between capitalism and patriarchy at its roots and to study the ‘fixation of gender in the totality of societal relations’ (Haug 2008/2011, 310). With the societal character of genders in mind, in the

sense of historically discoverable men and women, one has to ask how their initially natural complementarity in regard to reproduction has become culturally and ideologically overdetermined and naturalised in the historical process. Gender relations thereby become comprehensible as 'fundamental relations of ruling in all societal formations': 'They span (and in turn are central to) questions of divisions of labour, domination, exploitation, ideology, politics, law, religion, morality, sexuality, body and senses, language; indeed, essentially no area can be meaningfully researched without paying consideration to how gender relations form and are formed' (ibid.; see also HKWM 5, 493).

After the formation of the party *Die Linke* [The Left Party] in Germany in 2007, **Haug** picked up the discussions where they had left off, and brought together in practice the areas that had been separated by demarcations, with the project of the *Four-in-One Perspective* (2008). This is concerned with the task of emancipating the areas of both producing the means for life through waged labour, and privately/publicly organised social reproduction, from their hierarchical positions within capitalism. It also aims to include the neglected areas of self-realisation and political action to which each individual is likewise and equally entitled. The integration of the four areas is vital to avoid reactionary solutions for any one particular area, and to work on resolving the patriarchal-capitalist nexus of domination. In this way, the struggle of women to enter into history and thereby gain subject status becomes crucial for the struggle for socialist democracy, and for capability and participation for all.

In the second decade of the 21st cent., calls grew for M-F to remember its own history and renew itself. As an essential area for further research, Meg **Luxton** (2013) identified an expanded 'politics of language' which overcomes the 'predominance of the English language' (512) and is directed towards a socialist long-term goal that is not from the outset subordinated to a US-imperialist primacy. Ideological class struggle here is just as relevant as the recognition that effective resistance against change is anchored in the very personality of individuals (514). The link between individual change and changing the conditions remains current. As the inheritor of feminism in Marxism, a newly rising M-F aims for a good life in a world characterised by solidarity, where 'the *needs* of humans have become a *human need*' and thus the individual 'in its individual existence has become a community at the same time' (MEW 40/535), as **Marx** anticipated it, and as it must be related to the totality of gender relations through feminist consciousness.

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→ Being a Marxist, birth control, body, caste, child abuse, child labour, children/childhood, child's play-group, cloning, commune, competence, competence/incompetence, complementarity, concrete useful labour, cook, collective/total labour, conduct of life, counter public/oppositional space, courtesan, crisis, Critical Theory (II), critique (IV), Cultural Studies, cybertariat, experience, detective novel, dialectics, disposable time, division of labour, domestic-labour debate, domestic mode of production, domination/rule, double burden, double militancy, dual economy, equal-rights policy, exchange-value, family, family work/domestic labour/housework, female labour/women's labour, feminisation of labour, feminisation of poverty, feminism, feminist discussion of ethics, feminist legal critique, feminist theology, four-in-one perspective, free love, gender, gender contract, gender democracy, gender-egalitarian societies, gender mainstreaming, gender relations, goddess, headscarf debate, heteronormativity, hierarchy/antihierarchy, historical forms of individuality, homeworking, homosexuality, housewife, housewifisation (of labour), identity politics, immaterial labour/work, individual reproduction, individual work, International Women's Day, intervening social research, justice, kibbutz, labour movement, Lacanianism, land seizure/land grab, laughter, learning, lesbian movement, living labour, love, machismo, maid/maid-servant, market-women, marriage, Marxism, masculinity, memory work, mind and hand, mode/conditions of life, mode of production, orthodoxy, outwork/telework, patriarchy, performance/achievement, power, putting-out, relations of production, research of everyday life, sexuality, sexual liberation, short-time work, socialism, socially necessary labour/labour time, subjective factor, surplus-value, reproduction, revolutionary realpolitik, Third World, value, volunteer-work, witch, witch-

hunt, woman-question, women's emancipation, women's forms, women's labour politics, women's language, women's movement, women's shelter, women's studies, work/labour

→ Alltagsforschung, Arbeit, Arbeiterbewegung, Arbeitsteilung, Dialektik, disponible Zeit, Doppelbelastung, doppelte Militanz, Dritte Welt, Dual-wirtschaft, Ehe, ehrenamtliche Arbeit, Eigenarbeit, Erfahrung, Erinnerungsarbeit, eingreifende Sozialforschung, Familie, Familienarbeit/Hausarbeit, Feminisierung der Arbeit, Feminisierung der Armut, Feminismus, feministische Ethikdiskussion, feministische Rechtskritik, feministische Theologie, Frauenarbeit, Frauenarbeitspolitik, Frauenbewegung, Frauenemanzipation, Frauenformen, Frauenfrage, Frauenhäuser, Frauensprache, Frauenstudien, freie Liebe, Geburtenkontrolle, Gegenöffentlichkeit, Gender Mainstreaming, Gerechtigkeit, Gesamtarbeit, Geschlecht, Geschlechterdemokratie, Geschlechterverhältnisse, Geschlechtervertrag, geschlechtsequalitäre Gesellschaften, gesellschaftlich notwendige Arbeit/Arbeitszeit, Gleichstellungspolitik, Göttin, Hausarbeitsdebatte, Hausfrau, Hausfrauisierung, häusliche Produktionsweise, Heimarbeit/Telearbeit, Herrschaft, Heteronormativität, Hexe, Hexenverfolgung, Hierarchie/Antihierarchie, historische Individualitätsformen, Homosexualität, Identitätspolitik, immaterielle Arbeit, individuelle Reproduktion, Internationaler Frauentag, Kaste, Kibbuz, Kinder/Kindheit, Kinderarbeit, Kinderladen, Kindesmissbrauch, Klonen, Köchin, Kommune, Kompetenz, Kompetenz/Inkompetenz, Komplementarität, konkrete nützliche Arbeit, Kopftuchstreit, Kopf und Hand, Körper, Kriminalroman, Krise, Kritik (IV), Kritische Theorie (II), Kulturstudien (Cultural Studies), Kurtisane, Kurzarbeit, Kybertariat, Lacanismus, Lachen, Landnahme, lebendige Arbeit, Lebensführung, Lebensweise/Lebensbedingungen, Leistung, Lernen, Lesbenbewegung, Liebe, Machismus (machismo), Macht, Magd, Männlichkeit, Marktfrauen, Marxismus, Marxistsein/Marxistinsein, Mehrwert, Orthodoxie, Patriarchat, Produktionsverhältnisse, Produktionsweise, Reproduktion, revolutionäre Realpolitik, Sexualität, sexuelle Befreiung, Sozialismus, subjektiver Faktor, Tauschwert, Vier-in-einem-Perspektive, Wert

Theory of Ideology

A: nazariyat al-'idiyulōḡiyā. – G: Ideologietheorie. – F: théorie d'idéologie. – R: teorija ideologii. – S: teoría de ideología. – C: yìshì xíngtài lǐlùn 意识形态理论

The concept of “TI” was coined in the 1970s in order to designate a refoundation of Marxist research into ideology stimulated by Louis **Althusser**. It was distinguished from three other approaches: 1. the reduction of ideologies to epiphenomena of the economic (“economism”); 2. an ideology-critique that focuses on the critique of “false consciousness” from the standpoint of a “correct consciousness”; 3. bourgeois “legitimation theories” from Max **Weber** to Niklas **Luhmann**, which pose the question of the capacity of ideological integration in a “social-technological” way, from the perspective of domination and its self-justification.

The need for TI resulted from the fact that none of these traditions were able to explain the stability of bourgeois society and its state, let alone to develop a strategy of socialist transformation capable of gaining hegemony. The approaches of TI attempted to fulfil this need by inquiring into the social constitution and unconscious modes of functioning and efficacy of the ideological. TI focuses upon ideology’s “materiality”, i.e. its existence as an ensemble of apparatuses, intellectuals, rituals, and forms of praxis.

TI should not be comprehended as a new discovery, but, rather, as a re-articulation and new re-evaluation of questions that had already been worked on by **Marx** and **Engels** and later, in particular, by Antonio **Gramsci**. The distinction from the approaches of “ideology-critique” is not absolute: on the one hand, because these also deal with the social conditions of constitution and efficacy of ideologies; on the other hand, because TI approaches also contain a component of critique, which differs, however, in that the paradigm of the truth-falsity dichotomy is transferred to the analysis of the mode of efficacy and the opposition is transformed into one of the reproduction of domination versus emancipation.

1. The term ideology was introduced in 1796 by **Destutt de Tracy** as a neologism (analogous to ontology) to signal an analytical science that aimed, following the model of the exact natural science (in particular, physiology), to dissect ideas into elementary component parts and – derived from the Greek sense

of eidos as visual image – to investigate the perceptions upon which they were founded (*Mémoire sur la faculté de penser*, 1798, 324). Underlying this, following **Locke**, **Condillac**, and **Cabanis**, is the sensualist conviction that sense perceptions are the only source of our ideas. Based on the principle of movement of **D'Holbach** and **Spinoza's** concept of the capacity to act [*potentia agendi*], it is supposed to overcome the dualism of materialism and idealism. **Destutt de Tracy** also takes over from **Spinoza** the rejection of free will, so that the physiological and social determinants of ideas, feelings, and actions moved into the central focus (cf. **Kennedy** 1994, 29, 31; **Goetz** 1994, 58 et sq., 61 et sq.).

In opposition to metaphysics, and claiming its position, ideology should be exact in the style of the natural sciences and practically useful (*Mémoire*, 318). All other sciences are subordinated to the new “super-science”, which claims to establish their unity (**Kennedy** 1994, 18, 25). ‘This common denominator, this foundation underlying all knowledge, this origin expressed in a continuous discourse is Ideology’ (**Foucault** 1970, 85). It forms the foundation of grammar, logic, education, morality, and, finally, the greatest art: ‘de régler la société’ (*Mémoire*, 287). Rational derivation of meanings and goals of action should balance out the social oppositions of bourgeois society and thus contribute to the overcoming of its class struggles in an enlightened representative democracy (cf. **Goetz** 1994, 71).

Ideology, appearing here as a non-partisan and universalistic foundational science, is nevertheless ‘inseparable from the material practices of the ideological state apparatuses’ (**Eagleton** 1991, 69). **Destutt de Tracy** introduced the concept into the debates of the *Institut national*, which was created in 1795 after Thermidor as a state institution bringing together the leading republican intellectuals for the reorganisation of the system of education. The Enlightenment was thus institutionalised in the state at the very moment when Jacobinism was politically defeated. Ideology conserved the republican achievements while eliminating the plebeian elements; in the brief period of the Directory, it was accredited with the status of a state philosophy (**Deneys** 1994, 109, 117 et sq.).

This “passive revolution” (**Gramsci**) of the mode of science and education could only be unstable and temporary. After General **Bonaparte** had initially supported the “idéologues”, as Emperor Napoleon he accused the “phraseurs idéologues” of undermining the state’s authority with rationalistic and natural right abstractions, of depriving the people of religion and salutary illusions, and flattering it with a sovereignty that it could not exercise (cf. **Kennedy** 1978, 189). In the end, the concept became a ‘weapon in the hand of an Emperor [...], who desperately fought to silence his opponents and to maintain a regime in dissolution’ (**Thompson** 1990, 31). ‘All the unhappiness of our beautiful France must be ascribed to ideology’, he claimed in 1812 after the defeat against Rus-

sia: 'this dark metaphysic, which seeks in an artificial way for the foundations upon which it can then erect the laws of men, instead of adapting these laws to the knowledges of the human heart and the lessons of history' (cited in *Corpus* 26/27, 145).

An echo of this semantic displacement occurs in the doctoral dissertation of the 23-year-old **Marx** in 1840/41, when he ascribes to **Epicurus** the idea that 'Our life does not need ideology and empty hypotheses, but rather, that we live without disturbance' (MECW 1/68; transl. modified). Of course, it is no longer 'the autocratic power' that forms 'the silent centre of the discourse that dismisses every claim against it as "ideology". Rather, power and domination, together with their changing strategies in relation to ideas, come into the picture' (**Haug** 1993, 9).

2. The critical-theoretical ideology concept is a coinage of **Marx** and **Engels**. The fact that they deployed it in different contexts in different ways led to the situation that three chief directions could be derived from their texts: first, a *critical* conception, represented in particular by Georg **Lukács** and the Frankfurt school, which interprets ideology as "inverted" or "reified" consciousness; second, a "neutral" conception, formulated in particular by **Lenin** and dominant in Marxism-Leninism, which comprehends ideology as a class-specific conception of the world; and third, a conception that goes from **Gramsci** to **Althusser** to Wolfgang Fritz **Haug** and the 'Projekt Ideologietheorie' (PIT), which understands the ideological as the ensemble of apparatuses and forms of praxis that organise the relation of individuals to the self and the world. The three interpretations can also overlap and be combined with each other.

2.1 The critique of ideology as necessarily inverted consciousness can appeal to numerous formulations in which **Marx** and **Engels** (for example, in relation to religion) speak of "inverted world-consciousness", "independent kingdom in the clouds", "distorted conception", "standing on its head" and so forth (e.g. MECW 3/175; 5/27 et sq.; 35/19). Ideology is accomplished by the thinker with a "false consciousness" who misses the real motives impelling him; 'otherwise', notes the late **Engels**, 'it would not be an ideological process' (50/164). Ideologists regard 'their ideology both as the creative force and as the aim of all social relations' (5/420). Such an inversion is compared to that of a "*camera obscura*": 'If in all ideology men and their circumstances appear upside-down as in a camera obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life-process as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical life-process' (36).

The context shows that the claim that **Marx** understood ideology as “empty reflex” and as ‘form of consciousness [*forme-conscience*]’ (**Althusser**, *EphP* 1, 496 et sq.; cf. *SLR*, 294 et sq.) cannot be sustained. It leaves out the ‘historical life process’ that is at stake here: the situation of “standing on its head”, a characteristic of ideology, is treated as an effect of the social division of material and intellectual labour. For only by means of this can consciousness really ‘flatter itself that it is something other than consciousness of existing practice, that it *really* represents something without representing something real’; only now is there ‘the formation of “pure” theory, theology, philosophy, morality’ (**MECW** 5/45), which, separated from relations, are practised by specific intellectual groups ‘as a profession, that is, as a *business*’ (379; cf. 62, 92). What makes possible and produces the reversal of consciousness is the real detachment of intellectual activities from social production, their growing independence, and their predominant position in relation to production.

The separation of material and intellectual labour is, in its turn, embedded in the formation of private property, classes, and the state (46 et sqq.), so that the *camera obscura* is to be understood as a metaphor for the “idealistic superstructure” of class society as a privileged sphere reserved for the mental labour of the ideologues (89). In this sense, it has been proposed that the attention of T1 should not remain bound to the inner image of the *camera obscura*, but should come in from the side and investigate the material arrangement and thus the socially unconscious of the discourse of consciousness (**Haug** 1984, 26): ‘The detachment of consciousness is framed and constituted by the material arrangement [*dispositif*, in a Foucauldian sense] of social domination’ (24).

2.2 Another way of developing the “reversals” of consciousness from social structures is proposed by **Marx** with the concept of “fetishism”, which he used from the 1844 *Manuscripts* onwards in order to study economic relations. The term was initially deployed for the characterisation of bourgeois economic thought, until it appeared in the appendix of the first edition of *C I* (1867) for the first time as characteristic of the equivalent-form of the commodity itself (**MEGA** II,5, 637 et sq.). The passage was then enlarged into a whole sub-chapter in the second edition in 1872 (*C I*, 163 et sqq., **MECW** 35/81 et sqq.). Stimulated by the original meaning of “fetish” used by Portuguese missionaries to describe “primitive” African religions (*fetiço*, something made or produced by humans that gains power over its makers), **Marx** deployed the “fetish character of the commodity” in order to characterise the process in which the social connection of the producers is only established in commodity exchange and thus a posteriori and behind their backs as a foreign, reified power, in the same way that the ‘law of gravity asserts itself when a person’s house collapses on top of

him' (*C I*, 168; cf. MECW 35/86) 'Their own movement within society has for them the form of a movement made by things, and these things, far from being under their control, in fact control them' (*C I*, 167 et sq.; cf. MECW 35/85).

As the analysis of the *critique of political economy* ascends from the commodity to money, then to the commodity of labour-power, wages, capital, and rent, the fetish concept also remains a constitutive part, until the "reification" and "mystification" of the capitalist mode of production is finally completed in the "trinitarian formula" of capital, land, and labour as a "religion of everyday life" – a 'bewitched, distorted and upside-down world haunted by Monsieur le Capital and Madame la Terre who are at the same time social characters and mere things' (*C III*, 969; cf. MECW 37/817). The combination of 'reification' and "mystification" shows that Marx's fetishism analysis attempts to comprehend different phenomena in their interconnection: first, the efficacy of a reified modern form of domination in which the capitalist market functions as a higher power; the producers, consumers, and even the capitalists themselves are at its mercy, so that the relation of supply and demand 'hovers over the earth like the fate of the ancients, and with invisible hand allots fortune and misfortune to men, sets up empires and wrecks empires, causes nations to rise and to disappear' (5/48); second, the self-mystifying naturalisation of this reified domination into inherent necessity [*Sachzwang*]: movements of things as 'natural forms' of social life (*C I*, 168; MECW 35, 86); and finally, the production of spontaneous consent so that the producers feel themselves 'completely at home' in these 'estranged and irrational forms' (*C III*, 969; MECW 37, 817). The different meanings – reification, dissimulation, and "voluntary" subordination – are, for Marx, not only related to each other, but are also immediately inscribed in the material arrangement [*dispositif*] of bourgeois domination: as 'socially valid, and therefore [...] objective thought forms' (*C I*, 169; MECW 35/87) which are reproduced directly and spontaneously as 'current and usual thought forms' (*C I*, 682; MECW 35, 542). The sphere of circulation is 'in fact a very Eden of the innate rights of man. It is the exclusive realm of Freedom, Equality, Property and Bentham' (*C I*, 280; MECW 35/186).

How Marx's analyses of fetishism can be used for the analysis of bourgeois ideologies is contested. Unnoted by Kautsky, Plekhanov, and Lenin, they play a central role neither in the tradition of "Marxism-Leninism" nor in Gramsci. For Althusser, they are a relict of a pre-Marxist phase and, furthermore, 'fictitious theory' (*EphP* 1, 487, 497; cf. *FM*, 230). Lukács, on the other hand, makes the commodity fetish into a universal category of bourgeois society. For some, the fetishism chapter of *C I* is the 'exposure of the contents of the foundational structure of bourgeois consciousness in all its manifold forms' (e.g., Sorg 1976, 45). Philologically, it is to be noted that Marx deploys the concept of ideology

in the context of his fetishism analyses at most indirectly: on the one hand, by means of the inversion metaphor, which refers back to the ideology concept of *The German Ideology*; on the other hand, through association with religion as the historically first form of ideology. According to the Projekt Ideologietheorie (PIT), the 'objective thought forms' support the efficacy of bourgeois ideologies in integrating the society, but do not themselves yet constitute an ideology (1979, 186). Also for Sebastian Herkommer, who understands them as real fictitious modes of bourgeois everyday life, they only become ideologies through systematic elaboration and 'translation' by specialised intellectuals (1985, 23 et sq., 44, 130).

Marx treated such ideologisation with the example of the 'vulgar economists' who 'translate' the ideas of economic actors into a doctrinaire language, precisely 'from the standpoint of the ruling section, i.e., the capitalists, and their treatment is therefore not naive and objective, but apologetic' (TSV 3, 453; cf. MEW 26.3/445), according to what is 'useful to capital or harmful, expedient or inexpedient' (C I, 97; MECW 35/15). He sees such reproduction of the 'superficial appearance', determined by interests, in opposition to the 'urge of political economists like the physiocrats, Adam Smith and Ricardo to grasp the inner connection' (TSV 3, 453; MEW 26.3/445). From another perspective, *The German Ideology* had found a division of mental and manual labour even in the midst of the ruling classes: their 'conceptive ideologists' appear as thinkers 'who make the formation of the illusions of the class about itself their chief source of livelihood', while the 'active members' of this class barely have the time 'to make up illusions and ideas about themselves' (MECW 5/60).

2.3 The interpretation of the ideological as a neutral medium of class interests claims to find confirmation in a passage of the *Preface* of 1859, where Marx distinguishes between the 'material [...] transformation in the economic conditions of production' and the 'ideological forms', 'in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out' (MECW 29/263). Following the young Lenin (CW 1/151), this passage was interpreted in Marxism-Leninism to the effect that the social relations could be divided into material and ideological relations (e.g., Bauer 1974, 19). The dichotomy of "material vs. ideological" reduces the ideological to "ideas" and thus overlooks the fact that, according to this passage, conflicts are not only made conscious but also practically 'fought out' (MECW 29/263) in the 'juridical, political, religious, artistic or philosophic [...] forms' that are summarised as "ideological". This suggests that the concept of "ideological form" deployed here should be ascribed a stronger "materiality" and a more independent inner logic than a rhetoric of "expression" allows. In this sense, the late Engels developed the concept of 'interaction [*Wechsel-*

wirkung]' and emphasised that the ideological (and in particular political and juridical) 'forms of the class struggle [...] also have a bearing on the course of the historical struggles of which, in many cases, they largely determine the *form*' (49/34 et sqq.). The argument indicated here can be generalised in the sense of a "strong" concept of form: just as **Marx** deciphered in the critique of political economy the social-historical specificity of the commodity in the commodity-form with the help of a form-analysis (cf. **Haug** 2005/1974, 117 et sqq), so ideological forms are to be analysed as institutionally anchored "forms of individuality" and praxis (cf. **Sève** 1978).

Above all, the "neutral" concept of ideology overlooks that **Marx** and **Engels** continuously deploy the concept of ideology critically. Antagonisms in material production make a 'superstructure of ideological strata' necessary (TSV 1, 287; cf. MEW 26.1/259). It is not a determinate content of consciousness that makes intellectuals ideologues, but a determinate 'positioning in the structure of domination' (**Haug** 1984, 25), which is to be reconstructed socio-analytically, starting from the contradictions in society.

2.4 The foundation of the concept of ideology in a critical theory of the state was further developed by the late **Engels**, taking up the theoretical sketches of *The German Ideology* and calibrating them with new research (above all, that of **Morgan**). The state is now regarded as the 'first ideological power over man' (MECW 26/392), a 'power having arisen out of society but placing above it, and alienating itself more and more from it' (269). Its functionaries are 'organs of society, *above* society' and 'respect for them must be enforced by exceptional laws, by virtue of which they enjoy special sanctity and inviolability' (270). Already in *The German Ideology* there was this notion of a 'series of powers which determine and subordinate the individual, and which, therefore, appear in the imagination as "holy" powers' (5/245).

3. The orientation towards the conquest of state power that was established in the Marxism of the Second and the Third International enhanced a development in which the ideology critique of **Marx** and **Engels** and, in particular, its connection with a foundational critique of the state was repressed by a widely diffused *neutral* concept of ideology. That was promoted by the fact that *The German Ideology* was only published first in 1926 in an abridged form and then integrally in 1932, which thus could not have been read by the first generation of Marxists. While Antonio **Labriola**, close to **Marx**, could say that Marxist theory had once and for all overcome any form of ideology (*EssMCH*), and Franz **Mehring**, for example, spoke critically of the 'Hegelian ideology' (*Karl Marx*, GS 3, 29), the young Russian delegate to the founding conference

of the Second International in 1889, Georgi **Plekhanov**, spoke of 'our revolutionary ideologues' (cited in **Jena** 1989, 67). **Kautsky** tends more and more to a "neutral" concept, e.g. when he uses 'intellectual [*geistig*]' and 'ideological' interchangeably (cf. 1906, 128 et sq.), and a similar tendency can be found in Eduard **Bernstein's** writings, which contrast economic power to ideological power (1993/1899).

3.1 The young **Lenin** drew the conclusion from **Marx's** distinction in the *Preface* of 1859 between the economic basis and ideological forms 'that social relations are to be divided into material and ideological relations', with the latter forming 'merely a superstructure above the former' (CW 1/151; transl. modified). Looked at from an TI approach, the concepts "material" and "ideological" constitute a false opposition, because it overlooks the materiality of the ideological. The definition of ideal forms of expression of class interests as "ideology" furthermore opens the way to the definition of Marxism as the 'ideology of the labouring class' (394). This poses the problem of delimiting Marxism from other ideologies, such as, for example, Catholicism. **Lenin** does this with the concept of 'scientific ideologies', whose specificity is supposed to consist in the fact that 'the objective truth' corresponds to them (CW 14/153). Underlying this is a fundamental dichotomy between subjective and objective, which falls short of the praxis philosophy of **Marx's** *Theses on Feuerbach* and corresponds, instead, to the "contemplative" or "metaphysical" materialism – **Gramsci** will call it "philosophical materialism" – that is criticised in that text. In confrontation with the subjectivist agnosticism of, for example, **Bogdanov**, **Lenin** adopts a fundamental dichotomy of 'doctrine of two kingdoms' and takes up the position opposed to subjectivism, that of 'objective truth, independent from humanity' (PIT 1979, 23).

In *What Is to Be Done?* (1902), **Lenin** takes up from **Kautsky** the idea that the working class can develop spontaneously only a trade-union 'seed form' of class consciousness, which is still subordinate to bourgeois ideology, since this 'is much older than socialist ideology, because it is much more complexly developed, because it has at its disposition *incomparably* more means of diffusion' (CW 5/386 et sq.; cf. 374 et sqq.). Political class consciousness 'can only be brought to the workers *from outside*', from the sphere of the 'interactions between *all* classes', or the relations between '*all* classes and strata to the state and government' (420 et sqq.). The argument contains an anti-economistic insight, which **Gramsci** will extensively elaborate in the sense that the transition of a class from the corporative to the hegemonic phase requires a 'catharsis' of group egoisms (Q 10.11, § 6). However, while **Gramsci** proposes to elaborate critically the 'spontaneous philosophies' of 'bizarrely' composed everyday

common sense [*sensu comune*] (Q 11, § 12), **Lenin's** "from outside" suggests an educationalistic relation between the working class and a separate layer of organisers and ideologues (the later "nomenklatura").

'If we can now not speak of an independent ideology elaborated by the working masses in the course of their movement itself, the question can only be: bourgeois or socialist ideology', **Lenin** concludes: 'There is no middle position here' (CW 5/385 et sq.). The opposition bourgeois/socialist is inaccurate, because one pole lies on the level of the social structure while the other is located on the level of a political project. The dichotomy is linked to the reductionist postulate of 'seeking behind all the possible moralistic, religious, political and social phrases, explanations and promises the *interests* of this or that class' (CW 19/27), and tends towards a theory of manipulation (for example, in relation to the "freedom of the press" of the rich, CW 26/283). Just as religion is interpreted in a pre-**Feuerbachian** way as "deceit of the priests" (opium *for* the people rather than, as in **Marx**, *of* the people), the ideologue appears as a mere deceiver.

3.2 From the combination of class reductionism and educationism, Marxism-Leninism derived legitimation to define the 'proletarian' ideology through the politburo of the 'party of the working class' and to prosecute contradiction as "deviation". It was thus obscured that **Lenin** had implicitly developed an "operative" TI that is oriented to the self-determined activities of the masses and opposed to the re-ideologisation of Marxism (cf. PIT 1979, 24 et sqq.). Paradoxically, this was manifested in the fact that in the phases of upsurge of the revolutionary movements in 1905 and 1917, the concept of ideology receded behind that of hegemony. With the concept of hegemony, **Lenin** oriented towards driving further the movement for democracy (CW 8/72 et sqq.), towards the "purification" of the allied strata from undemocratic and nationalistic admixture (CW 17/60 et sqq.), and towards the democratic functions of the unions (CW 32/19 et sqq.). It was a matter of the 'discipline of conscious and unified workers, who recognise no order higher than themselves and no power outside the power of their own association' (CW 29/423). This perspective breaks with all ideology in the sense of an alienated socialisation from above. Nevertheless, historically, it failed due to low social levels of development and the thus conditioned limited capacity for action of the working class, as well as due to the unfavourable international power relations. All this favoured the tendencies towards the statification and re-ideologisation of Marxism.

3.3 Subsequently, the problem of ideology was subordinated to a "materialist" response to the "fundamental question of philosophy". It opposes an economic

base, which alone was ascribed the status of “matter”, to an ideology, which was defined as a ‘system of social [...] views that express determinant class interests’ (*PhWb*, 504). At the same time, ideology was also identified with the “superstructure”, so that ‘ideological relations’ could include both the ‘forms of consciousness’ as well as ‘social institutions’ (Bauer 1974, 23). As a result, the dualistic method led to depriving of the “base” of its constitutive moments of conscious activity and to the identification of the ideological, sometimes with consciousness, sometimes with the superstructure *in se*. Even when it was recognised that ‘certain appearances cannot be distinguished into the purely material and the purely ideal’ (Rogge 1977, 1373), or that the idea of ideology ‘as product of the reflection of the material’ was not adequate to the complicated mediations (Dold 1979, 746), the debates remained within the prescribed dichotomy of material and ideal and petered out into hair splitting. According to the PIT, this ‘dualistic approach’ missed the constitution of ideological forms and mystified their determinateness, instead of explaining them functionally-historically on the basis of their necessity in terms of life practices (PIT 1979, 87, 91). Despite continuing reference to the ‘ideological class struggle’, therefore, no theory of it could be developed (83).

4. Even though Lukács sometimes used the Leninist rhetoric of a neutral concept of ideology, his chief category is that of the ‘ideological phenomenon of reification’ (*HistClassCon*, 94). He thus sought to explain the defeat of socialist revolution in the West after WWI and to re-define the aim of revolutionary theory as that of ‘destroying the fiction of the immortality of the categories’ (14).

Characteristic of Lukács’s method is an interpretation of the commodity fetish, which makes it – differently from Marx – into the ‘universal category of society as a whole’ (86). With its help, ‘the ideological problems of capitalism and its downfall’ can be deciphered (84). Here, Lukács links Marx’s fetish analysis to Weber’s ‘formal rationalisation’, which is supposed to merge state and society into an ‘iron cage’ of bondage (1930/1922, 181). From the ‘basic phenomenon of reification’ (*HistClassCon*, 94), Lukács derived the ‘ever more reified levels’ of social consciousness. The relationships of these levels are grasped as ‘analogy’ and ‘expression’ (cf. 46 et sqq., 95, 97) and it is supposed that ‘the structure of reification progressively sinks more deeply, more fatefully and more definitively into the consciousness of men’ (93).

Differently from Weber, Lukács reinterpreted the process of rationalisation on the basis of an underlying Taylorism. He opposed the instrumental rationality [*Zweckrationalität*] that rules in singular sections of the system to the irrationality of the entire process based upon the anarchy of the market (102).

From this he derived the ideological effect of a comprehensive passivisation with regard to society as a whole: the attitude becomes ‘contemplative’, that is, it ‘does not go beyond the correct calculation of the possible outcome of the sequence of events (the “laws” of which he finds “ready-made”), [...] without making the attempt to intervene in the process by bringing other “laws” to bear’ (98). From ‘critical philosophy’ since **Kant**, bourgeois thought is marked by the dichotomy of ‘voluntarism’ and ‘fatalism’. Activity is reduced to ‘the evaluation for [the single] (egotistical) interest of the necessary course of certain individual laws’ (135; transl. modified).

Lukács’s ‘model of the diffusion of an ever more reified reification’ (**PIT** 1979, 53 et sq.) discounts not only what Ernst **Bloch** famously described as ‘non-contemporaneities’ of social development (*HOT*, 97 et sqq.), e.g. the co-existence of capitalist and pre-capitalist forms and the multiplicity of systems of domination, but also eclipses the heterogeneity and contradictoriness of everyday consciousness (*sensu comune* in the Gramscian sense). It is economic insofar as it does not ascribe to the ideological its own reality: integration appears to follow from the commodity fetish itself, without requiring ideological powers, hegemonic apparatuses, ideologues etc. The thesis of passivisation undervalues, furthermore, the ability of bourgeois society to set free activities in private-egoistical form, and misses the ‘multi-formed dimensions of the *Do it Yourself* of ideology’ (**Haug** 1993, 227). Confronted with “ordinary” people reduced to reified-passified subjects, critical intellectuals assume the function of clarifying the “truth” of the social context – a concept that will influence several strands of leftist academics enduringly.

5. **Gramsci**, who did not know *The German Ideology*, published in 1932, and was not interested in the fetish analysis of *Capital*, based himself on, among other texts, the passage of the *Preface* of 1859 (also referred to by **Lenin**), which he translated into Italian at the beginning of his time in prison (cf. *Q* 2358 et sqq.). This translation already displays a particular interest for the specific reality of the ideological: where the German text speaks of the ‘ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out’ (*MECW* 29, 263), Gramsci translates ‘in which’ with ‘on which terrain [*nel cui terreno*]’ (*Q* 2359), as if he wanted to prevent the common misunderstanding of mere forms of consciousness from the outset. The ‘ideological terrain’ that from now on will continually accompany the treatment of ideologies shows that these ‘are anything but illusions and appearance’, but rather, an ‘objective and effective reality’, the terrain of the ‘superstructures’ (*Q* 4, §15; cf. *Q* 10.11, §41; *Q* 11, §64; *Q* 13, §18). Thus he developed a **T1** that is diametrically opposed to the dualistic separation of “material” and “ideal” of Marxism-Leninism. With ref-

erence to **Marx's** political texts (e.g. the *18th Brumaire*, *Civil War in France* and *Class Struggles in France*), he wants to show that the 'approach of deducing and presenting every movement of politics and ideology as an immediate expression of the structure [...] must be combated as a primitive infantilism' (Q 13, § 18). Opposition to the treatment of ideology as expression of the economic, as illusion and mere appearance is pervasive. The term itself, however, oscillates between very different meanings.

5.1 A critical concept of ideology is to be found when **Gramsci** uses the term in opposition to the concept of the philosophy of praxis, which attempts to liberate itself from any 'one-sided and fanatical ideological element' (Q 11, § 62; cf. Q 16, § 9). He criticises as "ideological" the tendency emerging in the Comintern of comprehending theoretical debates as a 'law-suit', 'in which there is an accused and a prosecutor, who, on the basis of his official function, must prove that the accused is guilty and deserves to be taken out of circulation' (Q 10.11, § 24). In opposition, he demands a scientific attitude that takes seriously the opponent's standpoint and builds it into one's own construction. It is precisely this that he means when he speaks of having 'freed oneself from the prison of ideologies (in the negative sense of blind ideological fanaticism)' (ibid.). While "economism" overvalues mechanical causes, "ideologism" is fixated on the great individual personalities and absolutises the 'voluntaristic and individual element' (Q 13, § 17; cf. Q 19, § 5). 'Ideological' is also the theoretical disarming of dialectics by **Benedetto Croce** (Q 10.11, § 41.xvi).

Under the title 'Concept of "ideology"', **Gramsci** goes back to the original meaning coined by the "idéologues", for whom ideology signifies the analytical procedure of tracing ideas back to "sensations" (Q 11, § 63). In this sense, he asks if **Bukharin** is not also entrapped in ideology and claims 'that **Freud** is the last of the ideologists' (ibid.). Here he refers to the physiological foundations of the Freudian theory of drives, which were later criticised in **Lacanian**-influenced psychoanalysis as "biologism". Gramsci also explains with the sensualistic meaning of the word why the concept of ideology implicitly has a 'devaluing judgement' in the philosophy of praxis, which 'historically sets itself against ideology' and represents its 'definitive superannuation', because it seeks the origin of ideas not in sensations, but analyses it historically as a superstructure (ibid.).

5.2 At the same time, **Gramsci** turned against the attempt to oppose ideology to the "objective truth" of a science, because fundamentally the idea of an objective reality is also a 'particular conception of the world, an ideology' (Q 11, § 37). Science is also an historical category. If its "truth" were definitive,

science would no longer exist, and an objective reality without humans would be at the most a chaotic void (*ibid.*; cf. *Q 11*, § 17). Nevertheless, science is conceptually distinguished from ideology: as “methodology”, it is not absorbed into ideology, for it is able ‘to separate objective knowledge from the system of hypothesis’ through a process of abstraction, so that the science of a social group can be appropriated while at the same time its ideology is rejected (*Q 11*, § 38). What distinguishes science from the ideology that ‘coats’ it (*ibid.*) and at the same time connects it with good sense (*buon senso*) is a specifically experimental attitude, ‘the theoretical [...] or practical-experimental activity’ (*Q 11*, § 34), unremitting correction and refinement of the experiment (*Q 11*, § 37). Althusser’s critique that Gramsci misconceives the “epistemological break” between ideology and Marxist theory and dissolves science into ideology (*RC*, 134 et sq.), can therefore not be maintained (cf. Spiegel 1983/1997, 61 et sqq.; 137 et sqq.).

5.3 Gramsci uses the concept of ideology positively for when a philosophy goes beyond the bounds of the intellectuals and is diffused in the great masses (*Q 10.11*, § 41.i). In this context, ideology signifies the ‘element of the masses of any philosophical conception’ (*Q 10.11*, § 2), its ‘moral will’ and its norm of behaviour (*Q 10.11*, § 31). The fact that philosophy becomes a ‘cultural movement’ and brings forth a ‘practical activity and a will’, could also be described as “ideology”, if it is ascribed with ‘the higher meaning of a conception of the world which is implicitly manifested in art, in law, in economic activity in all individual and collective expressions of life’ (*Q 11*, § 12). When philosophies become “ideologies”, this means that they assume the ‘granite fanatical compactedness of the “beliefs of the people”, which take on the same energy as the “material forces”’ (*Q 11*, § 62). Gramsci refers here to the passage of the young Marx, that theory becomes a ‘material power as soon as it has gripped the masses’ (*MECW 3/182 et sq.*). Contrary to the reflection theory metaphors of “expression” and “appearance” that were widely diffused in Marxism, he defined ideologies as ‘practical constructions’ which are ‘anything but arbitrary’, but, rather, represent ‘real historical facts’ (*Q 10.11*, § 41).

Gramsci himself refers to a polysemy of the concept of ideology, which is applied both to ‘arbitrary elucubrations of determinate individuals’ as well as to the ‘necessary superstructure of a determinate structure’ (*Q 7*, § 19). Consequently, one must thus distinguish between ‘historically organic ideologies, which [...] are necessary for a determinant structure, and arbitrary, rationalistic “wished” ideologies’. If the latter produce ‘only individual polemical “movements”’, the former ‘organise’ the masses, ‘forming the terrain upon which humans move, conscious of their position, struggle, etc’ (*ibid.*).

5.4 **Gramsci** attempted on numerous occasions to define the ideological as the ‘entire ensemble of superstructures’ (Q 10.II, § 41.1). The “ideological terrain”, which Gramsci had already introduced in his translation of the passage from the *Preface* of 1859, is specified as the ‘objective and effective reality’ of the superstructural (Q 10.II, § 41.XII). **Marx**’s statement that men become conscious of their conflicts on the ‘ideological terrain of the juridical, political, religious, artistic, philosophical forms’, must be developed ‘with the entire ensemble of the philosophical doctrine of the meaning of the superstructures’ (Q 11, § 64).

The terminological ambiguity of the concept of ideology is a symptom of the fact that it represents, for **Gramsci**, a transition to the elaboration of the more specific categories of his theory of hegemony. The identification of ideology and ‘superstructures’ is to be understood as the foreground of his wide concept of the ‘integral state’, with which he brings together the two decisive functions, usually separated, of ‘political society’ and ‘civil society’, violence and hegemony (Q 6, § 88; cf. Q 6, § 155). Just as Gramsci subordinated the question of utopias and (rationalist) ideologies to the problem of the elaboration of an enduring collective will (Q 8, § 195), he wants to treat the ‘meaning of the ideologies’ in the context of the ‘war of position’ and ‘civil hegemony’ (Q 13, § 7; cf. Q 11, § 12). Thus his TI turns into a theory of the intellectuals: the ‘ideological panorama’ of an epoch can then only be transformed if ‘intellectuals of a new type can be brought forward who come directly out of the masses and stay in contact with them, becoming their “corset braces”’ (Q 11, § 12). He characterised the connection between structure and superstructure achieved by ‘historically organic ideologies’ also as an ‘ideological bloc’ (Q 1, § 44), which he then successively substituted with ‘historical bloc’ (Q 10.II, § 41.1). Gramsci also applies this category to individuals and their inner relations of forces (Q 10.II, § 48). This can be fruitfully taken up as a contribution to a theory of the subject in TI (cf. **Hall** 1988, 56).

5.5 **Gramsci** was particularly interested in the positively organising function of the ideological. In this, he neglected the structures of alienated socialisation, which **Marx** and **Engels** proposed as the core of the ideological (cf. **PIT** 1979, 80). This can be seen, for example, in the lack of an analytical distinction between ideology and culture. On the other hand, however, the perspective of ideology critique that is often lost in the application of the term of ideology is fundamentally maintained in the context of the philosophy of praxis: whereas ideologies aim ‘to reconcile contradictory and oppositional interests’, the philosophy of praxis is the ‘theory of these contradictions themselves’ and at the same time the expression of the ‘subaltern class who want to educate themselves in the art of governing’ (Q 10.II, § 41).

Correspondingly, Gramsci provides worthwhile hints as to how ideology-critique can be further developed on the basis of a materialist TI. First, it is an important part of Gramsci's concept of a critique of everyday consciousness (*senso comune*), whose main elements he sees provided, in his Italian context, by the popular religion of Catholicism (cf. Q 11, §13). To work critically on the coherence of people's worldviews implies a continuous critique of the way ideologies exploit the incoherences of "common sense". Second, 'ideology critique, in the philosophy of praxis, invests the entirety of the superstructures' (Q 10.11, §41.XII; cf. Q 13, §18). It attempts to intervene in this structure effectively, in order to induce a 'process of distinction and change in the relative weight': 'what was secondary [...] is assumed as principal, becomes the nucleus of a new ideological and doctrinal complex. The old collective will disaggregates into its contradictory elements' (Q 8, §195). Cultural studies elaborated these thoughts in terms of discourse theory as 'disarticulation' and "re-articulation" of ideological formations (cf. Hall 1988, 56). Ideology-critique becomes effective as an "interruptive discourse" that does not unmask the ideological bloc of the opponent from outside, but intervenes in it, in order to decompose it, to reshape it and build effective elements into a new order (Laclau 1981; evaluated in PIT 1980, 37).

6. The ideology-critique of the "Frankfurt school" sets out in particular from the Lukács of *History and Class Consciousness*, without familiarity with Gramsci's considerations on ideology and hegemony in the *Prison Notebooks*, which were first published in 1948. For Lukács, the proletariat becomes capable, precisely due to the most extreme reification, of recognising in the crisis the totality of society and thus to break through the reification structure. This perspective, however, is lost for Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno under the conditions of Stalinisation of the Soviet Union and the emerging hegemony of American Fordism. What is retained is the concept of ideology developed within the paradigm of the commodity fetish, which is declared, however, to be no longer effective.

6.1 *Dialectic of Enlightenment* is in the first place concerned with the efficacy of a "new" positivistic-technocratic ideology based on the 'omnipresence of the stereotype' enforced by technology (Horkheimer/Adorno 1995/1944, 136). Instead of appealing to "truth", it is pragmatically oriented to the business purpose and 'conceals itself in the calculation of probabilities' (145, 147). It limits itself to elevating 'a disagreeable existence into the world of facts by representing it meticulously' and thus fulfils the positivistic 'duplication' of a consistently closed being (148, 151 et sq.). The fatal context of alienation then becomes clear

when the dominated develop an 'evil love' for that which is done to them: 'Immovably, they insist on the very ideology which enslaves them' (134).

The concept of this new ideology oscillates between positivistic reflection of the given and manipulation (deception and business). Its apparatus is identified as the "culture industry". As **Adorno** (1963) explained, this was supposed to close off the interpretation that it was a case of a 'culture that arises spontaneously from the masses themselves': 'the masses are not primary, but secondary, they are an object of calculation; an appendage of the machinery. The customer is not king, as the culture industry would have us believe, not its subject but its object' (*CultInd*, 85). This approach has been accused of the assumption of a 'perfect' context of manipulation (e.g. **Kausch** 1988, 92) in which active cultural activity and subversive oppositional decoding is excluded (cf. **Hall** 1981, 232; 1993, 516); capitalist society is comprehended as a 'monolith of a dominant ideology' without contradictions in itself (**Eagleton** 1991, 46). One could explain this with the procedure of transferring categories from Taylorist production immediately onto the culture industry: the latter appears to be a mere continuation of 'what happens at work, in the factory, or in the office' into free time, in order '[to occupy] men's senses from the time they leave the factory in the evening to the time they clock in again the next morning' (**Horkheimer/Adorno** 1995/1944, 131, 137). The functional definition can be made fruitful for the investigation of structural analogies. In this generalisation, however, it misses both the contradictions in the hegemonic apparatuses as well as the efficacy of compensatory oppositional worlds: 'under monopoly all mass culture is identical' (121).

6.2 Instead of using the analysis of the "culture industry" for the further development of a TI, **Horkheimer** and **Adorno** draw the conclusion after their return from exile in the USA of declaring socialisation through ideologies to be irrelevant. This appears to be plausible insofar as they have previously limited the concept of ideology to a classically bourgeois-liberal form of ideology: characteristic is a concept of justice developed from commodity exchange as well as an 'objective spirit' reflected in it that has been disconnected from its social basis (**IFS** 1956, 168 et sq., 176). In an implicit opposition to **Gramsci**, they declare: 'Ideology can only be meaningfully discussed in terms of how a spiritual dimension [*ein Geistiges*] emerges from the social process as independent, substantial and with its own claims' (176; cf. **Adorno**, GS 8, 474). The task of ideology-critique is then to confront 'the intellectual dimension with its realisation' (169/466).

This concept of ideology, which is linked to relatively petty-capitalist market relations and the "grand narratives" of idealist philosophy, is indeed hardly

adequate for an analysis of both fascist ideologies and the culture industry in the USA. **Horkheimer** and **Adorno** take this weakness as a reason to dismiss the concept of ideology altogether in the name of ‘simply immediate’, allegedly ‘transparent’ power relations as well as manipulatively thought out mere means of domination (168 et sq., 170; 465, 467). This can be seen as a regression from the material richness of their own investigations of the “culture industry” into a conception of instrumentalist manipulation. A translation of the culture-industry investigations into the terms of a TI still remains to be undertaken.

The dismissal of the concept of ideology is however not definite. **Adorno’s** *Jargon of Authenticity* not only refers with its original German subtitle “Zur deutschen Ideologie” to the classic work of **Marx** and **Engels** but also uses the concept throughout. Focusing on **Heidegger’s** ontological jargon of ‘authenticity [*Eigentlichkeit*]’ and its discursive diffusion in post-fascist Germany, **Adorno’s** critique targets ‘ideology as language, without any consideration of specific content’ (*JargonAuth*, 160). When, in *Prisms*, he explains the differences between a ‘traditional transcendental critique of ideology’ and his concept of immanent critique, he describes the latter according to the dialectical principle ‘that it is not ideology in itself which is untrue but rather its pretension to correspond to reality’ (*Prisms*, 32 et sq.; GS 10.1, 27 et sq.). For *Negative Dialectics*, ideology ‘lies in the implicit identity of concept and thing’ (*NegDia*, 40). Identity is the ‘primal form [*Urform*] of ideology’, and ideology’s power of resistance to enlightenment is due to its complicity with identifying thought, or indeed with thought at large (*JargonAuth*, 148; cf. GS 10.1, 151). Critical theory intersects here with **Althusser’s** concept of “ideology in general”, which approaches the ideological evidence of “identity” by means of **Lacan’s** psychoanalytical theory of the “imaginary”. Both approaches also share the weakness that the concept of ideology, by its identification with human acting, thinking, and feeling in general, risks losing its connection to the specific alienated structures of antagonistic class societies.

6.3 Following **Herbert Marcuse**, according to whom ideology is now incorporated in the process of production itself (1972, 22 et sqq., 188 et sq.), **Jürgen Habermas** displaces ideology into technology (1970). He thus also comes to the diagnosis that the “late-capitalist” societies have lost their possibilities for the formation of ideology and have instead developed a functional equivalent: ‘In place of the positive task of meeting a certain need for interpretation by ideological means, we have the negative requirement of preventing the emergence of efforts at interpretation onto the level of the integration of ideologies. [...] In the place of “false consciousness” we today have a “fragmented conscious-

ness" that blocks enlightenment by the mechanism of reification' (1987, 355). Also here a narrow understanding of the ideological (as totalising and "false" representation of order) leads to the positing of an opposition between it and fragmentation, instead of treating the latter as an integral component part of ideological socialisation.

By erecting his social theory on the opposition of "instrumental" and "communicative" reason, **Habermas** carries out two complementary strategic modifications: on the one hand, following **Weber's** "value rationality", he re-introduces a positive, neo-Kantian reevaluation of morality and religion, which are called upon as component parts of the "life world" against the "system world" (**Habermas** 1984, 345 et sqq.; 1987, 326 et sqq.); on the other hand, "ideology-critique" increasingly becomes a deprecatory term, with which he attributes to **Horkheimer** and **Adorno** together with **Nietzsche** and **Heidegger** an anti-modernist and potentially totalitarian 'rebellion against all normativity' (1987, 106 et sqq.), which places the 'achievements of occidental rationalism' diagnosed by **Weber** in question (131 et sqq.). Even if **Habermas** and **Axel Honneth** in some ways differentiated the analytical instruments of critical theory, this occurs at the price of cancelling its radical potential for critique and carrying it over into a normative discourse.

7. While **Althusser** criticised in **Gramsci's** "historicist" theory a lack of distinction between "ideology" and "science" (*RC*, 134 et sqq.), his own TI is based in essential aspects on **Gramsci's** notes on "civil society" and on "hegemonic apparatuses". As **Althusser** himself admitted (*LeninPh*, 142; *SLR*, 281), his distinction between the repressive state apparatus and the ideological state apparatus is formed following the model of **Gramsci's** differentiation of "political society" and "civil society", coercion and hegemony (*Q* 6, §88; cf. *Q* 6, §155); the ISAs reproduce the relations of production under the 'shield/cover [*bouclier*]' of the RSAs (*LeninPh*, 150; *SLR*, 287); even the treatment of the ideological apparatuses as state apparatuses would not be comprehensible without **Gramsci's** enlargement of the traditional Marxist concept of the state into the concept of the "integral state"; their "plurality" emphasised by **Althusser** presupposes **Gramsci's** pluralisation of the "superstructures" (in opposition to the then usual singular term "superstructure"). **Althusser** refers to **Gramsci** when he declares that the distinction between "public" and "private" institutions is secondary and claims that their ideological 'functioning' is decisive (144/293). The insight that the resistance of the subalterns can gain a hearing in the ideological state apparatuses by using the contradictions that exist there or conquering 'combat positions' (147/284) takes up in its turn implicitly elements from **Gramsci's** considerations on the "war of position".

However, whereas **Gramsci** was primarily interested in the “working upwards” of a subaltern class into the storeys of the superstructures, **Althusser**’s attention is directed to the ideological subjection under the capitalist order accomplished by the ISAs. He justifies this with the primacy of the bourgeois class struggle in relation to that of the workers’ movement and with the asymmetrical relations of force implied by this (185/266). Hegemony unfolds despite its spontaneous origins into forms that are integrated and transformed into ideological forms. New in comparison to **Gramsci** are particularly the concepts of the subject and the voluntary subjection [*assujettissement*] that **Althusser** develops on the basis of the psychoanalysis of Jacques **Lacan**. Psychoanalytical categories enable him to understand the ideological as an unconscious, “lived” relation and to illustrate the dynamic and active character of ideological subjugation. At the same time, the integration of Lacanian psychoanalysis exposes Althusserian TI to the tension between the historically specific ISAs concept and an unhistorically conceived “ideology in general” – a contradiction which led to divided receptions (cf. **Barrett** 1991, 22, 109) and finally contributed to the disintegration of the **Althusser** school.

7.1 The methodological point of departure for the ISA essay, first published in 1970, is the question concerning the “reproduction of the conditions of production” – on the one hand, of the commodity of labour-power, on the other, of the relations of production. **Althusser** is interested in particular in the point at which both of these overlap: the reproduction of labour-power proceeds not only by means of wages, but also by means of “qualification”, which is predominantly produced outside the apparatus of production in the school system and involves ideological subjection [*assujettissement*] (*LeninPh*, 132; *SLR*, 274). On this basis, **Althusser** comprehends the school as the dominating ISA, because like no other it can draw upon an obligatory attendance for so many years (156 et sqq./289 et sqq.). An “empirical list” includes, beyond this, the religious, familial, juridical, political, trade-union, cultural, and information ISAs (143 et sq./282). Even though a RSA also produces ideological effects and repression also plays a role in the ISAs, the specificity of the ISAs is that they ‘predominantly’ aim at the voluntary subjection of those addressed. Unification occurs not, as with the RSAs, by way of centralisation but rather through the ‘dominant ideology’, which establishes the (sometimes) ‘teeth-gritting’ harmony between the RSAs and ISAs and between the ISAs themselves (150/287).

Already in his earlier writings, **Althusser** had opposed determinism with the concept of “overdetermination” and the Hegelian model of expressivist totality with the concept of a heterogeneously composed ‘structured whole’ (*FM*, 193). Against the idea of a linear and homogeneous temporality, he suggests

that every social level has its own relatively autonomous temporality (*RC*, 100 et sqq.). These approaches are also to be found in Althusser's *TI*. The ISAs vary, on the one hand, regarding the different "regional" specificities; on the other hand (apart from the power relations reigning in them), regarding the effectiveness of their ideological integration. Instead of being a mere "expression" of a foundational economy, the ideologies have their own "materiality": individuals are moved by a system that goes from its particular apparatus to material rituals to everyday practices of the subject and produces ideological effects there: 'kneel down, move your lips in prayer and you will believe' (*LeninPh*, 168; *SLR*, 301; taken from Pascal's *Pensées*, Aph. 944). If ideology was originally comprehended by Destutt de Tracy as the analysis of "ideas", these are now re-interpreted as integral elements of ideological practices and rituals (168/302).

7.2 Althusser's 'point of view of reproduction' (128/270) has been criticised as a 'functionalism' that disregards the contradictions and struggles in the ideological in favour of considering the stabilisation of domination (e.g. Hall 1983, 63; Lipietz 1993). Althusser responded to such objections already in the 'Postscript' to the ISA essay, by emphasising the primacy of the 'class struggle' and referring to the emergence of the ideology of the dominated classes outside of the ISAs (*LeninPh*, 185; *SLR*, 313 et sq.). In 'Remarks on the Ideological State Apparatus' (1976), he introduced the concept of 'proletarian ideology', which is formed under the primacy of (and against) the bourgeois class struggle and calls upon individuals as militant subjects (*SLR* 263 et sqq.). This raises, on the one hand, the problem that different contradictions and struggles are subsumed reductively to "class struggle". This prevented Althusserianism from opening itself towards a theoretical elaboration of gender relations. On the other hand, the professed primacy of class struggle remains unproductive because the ideological is primarily thematised as a phenomenon formed from above and organised through apparatuses. It is certainly an advance that Althusser analysed the dimension of socialisation from above that had been neglected by Gramsci. However, on the other hand, this aspect is absolutised, so that the interface between ideology and the contradictorily composed forms of everyday consciousness falls out of view. Non-ideological material and its ideological organisation are not distinguished. Thus Althusser cannot make his reference to the emergence of ideologies outside the ISAs theoretically productive. 'The ISAs produce their rituals and practices almost out of nothing, that is, without recognisable connection with the practices and thought forms of those who are subjected' (*PIT* 1979, 115).

While ideology and hegemony in Gramsci signify a consensus-oriented *dimension* of socialisation that traverses all instances of the "integral state",

Althusser's ISA concept focuses upon determinant state apparatuses. **Stuart Hall** criticises a neglect of “private” institutions, which, for example, played a significant role in the ideological preparation of neoliberalism (1988, 46 et sq.). According to **Pierre Bourdieu**, the ISA concept misses the economy of the culture producing institutions, their character as culture *industry* as well as the material and symbolic interests of the actors (1982, 51, 24). **Nicos Poulantzas** holds the distinction between RSAs and ISAs to be too schematic: it assigns functions in an essentialist way and thus misses that a number of apparatuses ‘can slide from one sphere to the other and assume new functions either as additions to, or in exchange for, old ones’ (1978, 33) – for example, when the military becomes a central ideological-organisational apparatus and functions chiefly as the political party of the bourgeoisie. Stimulated by **Michel Foucault**, he argued that **Althusser's** binary opposition of repression and ideology is one-sidedly fixated on the negative functions of prohibition and deception and misses the state’s ‘peculiar role in the constitution of the relations of production’, thus becoming unable to understand adequately the bases of the dominant power in the dominated classes: the state is effective in the economic itself and produces the ‘material substratum’ of the consensus that binds the subalterns to domination (30 et sq.); additionally, it places techniques and strategies of knowledge at the disposal of the rulers, which are certainly built into ideologies, but at the same time go beyond them (32); finally, the state also works on the ‘spatio-temporal matrices’ according to which social atomisation and fractionalisation occurs (65 et sq.).

7.3 In direct opposition to the reduction of ideology to false consciousness or manipulation, **Althusser** emphasises its meaning as lived and believed reality: it is ‘fundamentally *unconscious*’, its representations are ‘usually images, sometimes concepts, but they impose themselves on the majority of humans above all as *structures*’ (*FM*, 233). Even when people use it, they are entrapped in it, ‘the bourgeoisie must believe in its own myth before it can convince others’ (234). This thought is developed further in the ISA essay in subject-theoretical terms: ideology in general is defined through the function of ‘constituting’ concrete individuals as subjects. Corresponding to the double meaning of the term (subject/subjected), “sub-ject” means the subordinate individual who (mis-)understands him or herself as autonomously self-determined – subjected in the form of autonomy (*LeninPh*, 169, 148; *SLR*, 302 et sq., 310 et sq.). **Althusser** thinks this voluntary subjection with the image of the call (*interpellation*, literally: call and interrogation) by a superior ideological instance, which he names SUBJECT: it interpellates the small subject as an identity of its own, with name and social status (God calls Moses as “Moses”); the small subject confirms with its answer

the interpellated identity (Moses answers: “Yes, Lord, I am here”); and thus recognises itself in the calling SUBJECT (179 et sq./308 et sq.), so that it gains ‘the absolute guarantee that everything really is so, and that on condition that the subjects recognize what they are and behave accordingly, everything will be all right’ (181/310). Subjects constituted in this way now function as a rule “on their own”, except for the ‘bad subjects’ who are given over to the custody of the RSA (181/310 et sq.).

The presentation of a temporal succession (from individual to subject) is chosen for didactic clarity, for in reality ideology has ‘always already [*toujours-déjà*]’ called individuals as subjects (172/306 et sq.). **Althusser** demonstrates this with the ‘ideological rituals’ with whose help the child already before its birth is ‘expected’ by a (familial) order and through which it must become the ‘sexual subject (boy or girl) which it already is in advance’ (176/307). The observation can serve as an indication that ideological subjection does not occur uniformly, but, rather, that it should be investigated as ‘a process split into two genders’ (cf. Frigga **Haug** 1983, 653 et sq.). It serves **Althusser**, however, as proof for the theoretical assumption that ideology is without history and ‘eternal, just as the *unconscious* is eternal’ since both inwardly cohere (*LeninPh*, 161; *SLR*, 295). Here, he refers to Sigmund **Freud**’s description of the unconscious as without contradictions and ‘timeless’ (vol. XIV, 186 et sq.). The concept of an ideology in general, mediated by **Lacan**’s structuralist interpretation of psychoanalysis (cf. *LeninPh*, 189 et sq.), leads to treating the human – following **Aristotle**’s *zoon politikon* (*Politics*, 1253a) – as an ‘ideological animal’ (*LeninPh*, 171; *SLR*, 303). Thus, the ideological, against **Marx**’s location of it in class-antagonistic societies, is once more relocated in the individual and comprehended as an unhistorical-anthropological essence.

In this over-general version, ideology represents ‘the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence’ (162/296). Taken in itself, the formulation could be made fruitful for a determination of the relation between the “imaginary” forms of everyday understanding and their “ideological” processing. However, the concept taken over from **Lacan** of the “imaginary” is oriented not to an investigation of objectively mystified forms of thought and praxis of bourgeois society (cf. **Marx**’s concept of ‘objective thought forms’; *MECW* 35/85), but moves away from them and towards unhistorical level of a narcissistic ‘mirror stage’, in which the small child ‘jubilantly’ recognises itself in the mirror as a unitary image, even though the child’s motor activity still functions to a large extent non-uniformly (**Lacan** 1977, 1 et sq.). ‘Recognition [*reconnaissance*]’ in the mirror is thus from the outset accounted for as a ‘mis-recognition [*méconnaissance*]’, an ‘alienating identity, which will mark with its rigid structure the subject’s entire mental development’ (4). **Althusser**’s ideo-

logy in general extends to ego formation in general and thus coincides with social praxis and the capacity to act as such. Against the omni-historical and omnipresent ideological subject form, only “science” resists, but only at the price of disengagement from the human life process: as a process independent from subjects. ‘The negation of the ideological by science remains abstract: without a standpoint in human praxis itself’ (PIT 1979, 127).

7.4 **Althusser’s** contradictory combination of historical-materialist TI and Lacanian psychoanalysis has been criticised from opposed sides. Michèle **Barrett** accused him of a ‘colonialist’ integration of **Lacan** into Marxism that marginalises the meaning of the unconscious (1991, 104 et sq.). According to Rosalind **Coward** and John **Ellis**, the materiality of ideology does not lie in the ISAs but in the ideological praxis of subject production itself, which can only be analysed by psychoanalysis, not by Marxism (1977, 69). Slavoj **Žižek** identifies ideology with a ‘fantasy’ anchored in the economy of the unconscious, which structures our social reality itself and supports the ideological interpellation as a specific ‘enjoyment-in-sense’, ideological *jouis-sense* (1994, 316, 321 et sqq.). Judith **Butler** also argues along this line, when she comprehends **Althusser’s** model of interpellation on the basis of a preceding psychological ‘founding submission’, which she interprets as ‘a certain desire to be beheld by and perhaps also to behold the face of authority’ (1997, 111 et sq.).

On the other hand, the PIT, following the approach of “Critical Psychology” (Klaus **Holzkamp** and others), argued that **Althusser’s** ideology in general was caught in the problematic psychoanalytical opposition of a ‘needy individual’ and a necessarily ‘repressive society’ – a dichotomy in which the formation of self-determined capacity to act could not be conceptualised (1979, 121 et sqq.). Instead of developing the ‘celestialised forms’ of the ideological out of the ‘actual relations of life’, which **Marx** called the ‘only materialist and therefore scientific method’ (*CI*, 494, fn. 4; MECW 35/374), or instead of developing ‘from the actual, given relations of life the forms in which have been apotheosized’, **Althusser** foists on all human action and thought an ‘unsocial foundational structure’ that replaces concrete analysis of the current conditions of action with a reductionalist procedure: ‘in the night of the subject-effect all practices are grey’ (PIT 1979, 126).

8. After the dissolution of the Althusserian school, TI suffered a deep crisis in the course of which the concept of ideology was successively displaced by that of “discourse” and “power”. According to a division proposed by Jorge **Larrain** (1994, 68 et sqq., 85 et sqq.), Althusserian TI decomposed into three main currents: first, a line around Michel **Pêcheux** developed a materialist discourse

theory in the context of a communist class project; second, a “middle” neo-Gramscian line around the early Ernesto Laclau and Stuart Hall (“Hegemony Research Group”) integrated linguistic and semiotic approaches into a TI in order to be able to analyse neoliberalism, right-wing populism, and popular culture; third, under the influence of Foucault, somewhat later there was constituted a post-structuralist line around Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, who now accused Marxism of “essentialism” and replaced the concepts of ideology, culture, and language with that of discourse as the paradigmatic principle of constitution of the social.

8.1 The discourse concept was initially developed by a group around Paul Henry and Pêcheux in the framework of Althusserian TI. The task was seen as bringing together linguistics and Lacanian psychoanalysis with Althusser’s model of interpellation, in order to be able to explain the production of evidences of meaning (Pêcheux 1975, 137). Identification with a ‘preconstrued’ meaning [*effet de préconstruit*] occurs through language (88 et sq., 243). The ‘discourse formation’ defines in the framework of a dominant ideology what (corresponding to the rules of a speech, a sermon, a programme etc.) ‘can and must be said’ (144 et sq.). The evidence of meaning corresponds to the illusion of an immediate transparency of language (that a word “has” a meaning, directly signifies a thing etc.; 137 et sq., 146). Insofar as individuals are called upon as subjects of “their” discourse, the constitution of the subject and that of meaning coincide in one and the same process (137 et sq., 145).

In order to incorporate Althusser’s remarks on “proletarian resistance” (cf. SRL, 263 et sqq.) more strongly in terms of TI, Pêcheux proposed to enlarge the standpoint of reproduction with the conceptual couple of ‘reproduction/transformation’ (1984a, 61 et sqq.). The modification can be interpreted as an attempt to break out of the “eternity” of the Althusserian “ideology in general” without placing it in question explicitly: if bourgeois ideology called out to an ‘autonomous’ subject, proletarian ideology called out to the “militant” subject (Pêcheux/Fuchs 1975, 164, 207). For this, Pêcheux proposes the concept of ‘de-identification’, that is, a ‘transformation of the subject-form’, in which the evidences imposed by the ISAs are reversed: “The “eternal” ideology doesn’t disappear, but rather, functions to a certain extent *reversed*, that is, *upon and against itself*” [*à l’envers, c’est-à-dire sur et contre elle-même*; 1975, 200 et sq.; cf. 1984, 64]. This does not mean the exit from subjection, but a permanent ‘work in and with the subject-form’, so that within the subject-form this can at the same time be placed in question (1975, 248 et sq.).

This anti-ideological ‘counter-strike [*contre-coup*]’ regards, on the one hand, the appropriation of scientific knowledges (200 et sq, 248), on the other hand,

the political perspective of the ‘non-state’, which is supposed to make it possible to overcome representative politics in the proletarian revolution with a revolutionary mass democracy (1984b, 65).

This means, at the same time, an ‘ideological de-regionalisation’ which drives politics beyond the limits of parliamentarism and creates a politics of the ‘broken line’ which – without the certainties of the master and the knowledge of the pedagogues – consists in endlessly displacing the questions at stake (66). Here **Pêcheux** refers to **Lenin’s** praxis and the Chinese Cultural Revolution in which the ‘multi-formed network of the [...] dominated ideologies immediately begins to work in the direction of the non-state through the de-identification of the juridical ego-subject and the de-regionalisation of ideological functionality’ (ibid.).

8.2 **Laclau** was initially concerned to distinguish the material of ideological struggles from elaborated class ideologies: the single elements have no necessary relation to class, but obtain it only through their articulation in an ideological discourse whose unity is produced by a specific interpellation (1977, 99, 101). We should distinguish between interpellations as class and popular-democratic interpellations in which subjects are called upon as the ‘people’ against the ruling power bloc (107 et sq.). ‘Class struggle at the ideological level consists, to a great extent in the attempt to articulate popular-democratic interpellations in the ideological discourses of antagonistic classes’ (108). The defeat of the workers’ parties by fascism was connected, according to **Laclau**, to their limitation to a large extent to proletarian class discourses, while the Nazis developed a populism that was able to occupy the contradictions between the ruling power bloc and the ‘people’ and to incorporate them into a racist anti-democratic discourse (124 et sqq., 136 et sq., 142).

While **Pêcheux** sought to develop further the dimensions of ideology-critique of Althusserian TI in his concept of “proletarian ideology”, **Laclau** based himself upon a model of interpellation that functioned ‘in the same way’ for ruling ideologies and for the ideologies opposed to these of the oppressed (101, fn. 32). By neutralising ideology as a practice that produces subjects (ibid.), the way was free to replace it with the concept of discourse. This occurred in the post-structuralist turn in which Marxist theory was bade farewell in the name of an in principle indeterminism of the social (**Laclau/Mouffe** 1985, 85 et sqq.). Whereas **Laclau** had earlier emphasised the necessity of linking popular-democratic ideologies with the class discourse of the workers’ movement, in order to avoid the alternative between left radical sectarianism and social-democratic opportunism (1977, 142), the centrality of the working class was now regarded as an ‘ontological’ prejudice (**Laclau/Mouffe** 1985, 87). That

Gramsci and **Althusser** related the materiality of the ideological to the social superstructures was interpreted as an essentialist *a priori* assumption (109). Ideology is replaced by discourse, which is defined as a 'structured totality' of articulation activities that, in turn, are supposed to include both linguistic and non-linguistic elements (105, 109). With this comprehensive definition it is tautologically established that there is no object that is not 'constituted discursively' (107). The concept of discourse has here absorbed into itself so many meanings from the different fields of ideology, culture, and language that it becomes analytically unuseful (cf. **Sawyer** 2003).

8.3 Stimulated by **Laclau's** studies on right-wing populism, **Stuart Hall** investigated how Thatcherism 'set out to and has effectively become a populist political force, enlisting popular consent among significant sections of the dominated classes, successfully presenting itself as a force on the side of the people' (1988, 40). What is to be explained is 'an ideology that has successfully penetrated, fractured and fragmented the territory of the dominated classes, precipitating a rupture in their traditional discourses (labourism, reformism, welfarism, Keynesianism) and actively working on the discursive space' (42).

From this perspective, **Hall** criticised different concepts of ideology: the Leninist equation with the dominant class consciousness misses the 'internal fractioning of the ideological universe of the ruling classes' as well as the specifically new combination of 'iron regime' and populist mobilisation from below (41 et sqq.). Just as language is 'multiply accentuated' (cf. **Volosinov** 1973, 65 et sqq.), so also is the ideological 'always a field of overlapping accents', so that the representation of fixed class ideologies is to be replaced by the concept of 'ideological field of struggle' and the task of 'ideological transformation' (**Hall** 1983, 78 et sq.). The critical conception of ideology as "false consciousness" misunderstands that the ideological 'reversals' analysed by **Marx** in *Capital* are not "false" but rational in the context of real levels of reality that are one-sidedly generalised (72 et sq.). The sphere of circulation with its values of 'Freedom, Equality, Property and **Bentham**' (*C I*, 280; *MECW* 35/186), deduced by **Marx** from the contract relation of exchange, is a reality without which capitalism could not function; the experience of the market, of the wage packet, of the penny in the automat, etc. is for anyone '*the* most immediate, everyday and universal experience of the economic system' (**Hall** 1983, 72, 75). Inasmuch, both reformist and revolutionary ideologies 'are ways of organizing, discursively, not false but real, or (for the epistemologically squeamish) real enough, interests and experiences' (1988, 46). The most important question regarding an "organic" ideology is 'not what is *false* about it but what about it is *true*', i.e. what 'makes good sense', which is usually 'quite enough for ideology' (*ibid.*).

Althusser's theory of the subject cannot, as Hall further shows, analyse how 'already positioned subjects can be effectively detached by their points of application and effectively *repositioned* by a new series of discourses', since the 'transhistorical speculative generalities of Lacanianism' neglect the appropriation of the respective concrete 'languages' through its fixation on the first entrance into language as constitutive for the subject (50). Gramsci's concept of hegemony is best suited to the analysis of neoliberalism, because he deals with the central problem of the consent of the masses without the mistaken path of a false consciousness and mediates ideology with the contradictory composition of everyday understanding (*senso comune*) (53 et sq.).

Hall's criticisms of concepts of "false consciousness", class reductionism, and of "trans-historical" psychoanalytical accounts led him to go back to a "neutral" conception in which ideology signifies the 'mental context' that 'different classes and social groups deploy in order to make sense of, define, figure out and render intelligible the way society works' (1983, 59). Against the critical meaning in Marx and Engels, he wanted to use the concept in a 'more descriptive' sense 'in order to refer to *all* organised forms of social thought' (60). With that, of course, both the ideology-critique aspects in Gramsci and also its foundation in material hegemonic apparatuses are once again excluded from the concept of ideology. That corresponds to a diffuse relation to both "culture" and also to "discourse" (cf. Koivisto/Pietilä 1993, 242 et sq.). A dissolution of the ideological in discourse, as it is practised by Foucault and Laclau/Mouffe, is nevertheless refused by Hall: this would lead to a new 'reductionism' that could not thematise the relationships between the horizontal powers of civil society and the vertical powers in the state (*CritDlgs*, 135 et sq.; cf. 1983, 78; 1988, 51 et sq.).

8.4 The dissolution of the Althusserian school and the "crisis of Marxism" were intimately intertwined with various "superannuations" of TI by theoretical approaches of discourse and power. Most of them referred in particular to Foucault, who had already in 1969 dissolved ideology into the concepts of 'knowledge' and of 'discursive practice' (1972/1969, 185 et sq.). He reacted, as Dominique Lecourt has shown (1972, 114 et sq.), to Althusser's *For Marx* and *Reading 'Capital'*, in which the ideological is not yet comprehended as material instance of ideological apparatuses and practices, but in general terms, as a necessarily "imaginary", "lived" relation to the world. Where Althusser opposes ideology to science, which transformed spontaneous perceptions through 'theoretical practice' into a 'thought-concrete' (*FM*, 186 et sq.), Foucault proposes to place in question both science and knowledge as 'discursive formations' (1972/1969, 186). Where Althusser develops methodological criteria of a text immanent ideology-critique with the concept of a 'symptomatic reading' (*RC*,

28 et sq.), **Foucault** claims to describe discourse formations in their 'positivity' (1972/1969, 186). In the 'happy positivism' (125) he propagated, he abandoned the analytical task of relating the respective formations of knowledge and science to the underlying social perspectives and of identifying the ideological forms and modes of functioning that strengthen the tendency towards subjugation under the relations of domination. **Lecourt** could thus describe the Foucauldian archaeology as a 'theoretical ideology' that is not able to think the connection between ideological subject production and social mode of production (1972, 127, 133).

Following **Nietzsche**, for whom the true world is a 'mere fiction formed from fake things' (*Unpublished Fragments*, Spring 1888, 14 [93]; KSA 13/270), **Foucault** replaces TI with a fictionalism, which totalises the perspective dimensions of social practices by declaring them to be un-truth. (cf. *Dits et Ecrits*, II, 280 et sq., 506; IV, 40, 44). The ideological is dissolved into a negative epistemology of "everything is fake", which, in opposition to the "inverted consciousness" of **Marx** and **Engels**, leaves the underlying social phenomena of "inversion" out of the picture. Instead, it is **Marx's** and **Freud's** ideology-critique itself that is placed under suspicion of being ideological, because, on the basis of their claims to truth and perspectives of liberation, they apparently chased after a hidden essence (1970/1966, 261 et sq., 327, 340 et sqq.).

While **Foucault's** point of departure was an earlier version of "Ideology in general", he then stopped explicitly engaging with **Althusser's** development of the ISA concept. Instead, referring back to **Nietzsche**, he carried over the ideology concept, now dissolved into 'knowledge' via an underlying 'will to knowledge', into a concept of 'power' that levels out the oppositions between a dominating power from above and a collective power to act from below (cf. **Spinoza's** concept of *potentia agendi*). **Foucault** has in fact adopted a neo-Nietzschean metaphysics in which power is brought into position *behind* social relations, instead of being developed out of them. As can be exemplarily observed in Foucault's *Discipline and Punish*, the rhetoric of a pluriform 'micro-physics of power' (1977, 26) is contradictorily combined with a 'monistic' conception (**Honneth** 1991, 176 et sqq.) in which disciplinary power goes through the entire society right into the innermost recesses of the "modern soul", without encountering any contradiction and resistance. As **Poulantzas** observed, the concept of relational power underhandedly becomes an all-powerful 'Power-Master [*maître-pouvoir*] as the prime founder of all struggle-resistance' as well as a 'phagocytic essence [*essence phagocyte*]' that contaminates all resistances (1978, 149, 151; cf. **Rehmann** 2004, 172 et sqq.). **Gramsci's** distinctions between coercion and consent, political society and civil society remains just as unnoted as **Althusser's** modifying distinction between the RSA and ISAs.

Postmodernism inherited **Foucault's** farewell to TI in numerous respects. **Lyotard** (1984) denounced ideology-critique as the 'terror' of truth. His concept of 'master narratives', whose end he announced, is aimed not so much against the metaphysical novels of traditional philosophy as against the 'emancipation of rational and working subjects' (1984), as well as against the progressive 'project' that draws its legitimation not out of an origin but from a 'future that is to be redeemed' (1990, 49 et sq.). The discourse of postmodernism is here blindly entrapped in its opposite: 'it delivers the greatest meta-narrative imaginable, the narrative after every narrative, which is so clever that it always already knows everything to be non-knowledge' (**Haug** 1993, 11). Jean **Baudrillard** expanded the concept of ideology initially to the form of material and symbolic production *par excellence* (1981a, 143 et sqq.), in order finally to replace it with the fictionalist categories of 'hyperreality' and 'simulacrum': the concept of ideology belongs to an outdated concept of the sign which is supposed to conceal something real, but the sign merely conceals that it does not conceal anything because there is nothing behind it. In this sense, Disneyland only 'conceals' that the real America is Disneyland, prisons conceal that the whole society is a prison etc. (1981b, 24 et sqq.). Already in 1935, Ernst **Bloch** had pointedly summarised the corruption of critique implicit in this: 'fictionalism devours [...] knowledge completely', it transforms scientific concepts or ideal convictions most skilfully into 'share certificates which fluctuate according to the given situation' and 'makes doubt about the reality that is comprehensible today into one about anything and everything. It thus runs through large parts of modern thinking, easy, comfortable, faithless' (*HOT*, 257; cf. *GA* 4, 281 et sq.; *GA* 10, 24).

The postmodern farewell to TI has itself been described and criticised as an integral component of neoliberal ideology. Fredric **Jameson** understands postmodernity as a 'force field in which very different kinds of cultural impulses [...] must make their way', however with a 'cultural dominant' defined as an increasing integration of aesthetic productions into the logic of "late capitalism's" commodity production (1992, 4, 6). According to Terry **Eagleton**, postmodernism operates in the functional context of capitalism both iconoclastically and also in an incorporated way, because capitalism itself is divided into an anarchic market logic that permanently decomposes higher values anti-ideologically, and a systemic need for compensatory ideologies: postmodernism 'scoops up something of the material logic of advanced capitalism and turns it aggressively against its spiritual foundations' (1996, 133; cf. 1990, 373 et sq.). 'No other ideological form seems to be better suited than postmodernism to defend the system as a whole, because it makes chaos, bewildering change and endless fragmentation the normal and natural state of society' (**Larrain** 1994, 118).

9. The “Projekt Ideologietheorie” (**PIT**) founded by Wolfgang Fritz **Haug** in 1977 carries on essential aspects of **Gramsci’s** theory of hegemony and **Althusser’s** ISA theory on the basis of a theoretical elaboration of TI approaches in **Marx** and **Engels**. By analysing the ideological powers, apparatuses and forms of praxis from the perspective of an ‘association in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all’ (*Manifesto*, MECW 6/506), the polarisation between a “critical” perspective, fixated however on the critique of consciousness (e.g. **Larrain**), and a concept of ideology that breaks with the critique of consciousness but instead posits a “neutral” concept of ideology (e.g. **Hall**) is overcome with a ‘critical-structural conception of ideology’ (**Koivisto/Pietilä** 1993, 243). Thus an ideology-critique becomes possible which operates with a theory of the ideological as ‘conceptual hinterland’ (**Haug** 1993, 21).

9.1 Following **Engels’s** concept of ‘ideological powers’ (MECW 26/392), the **PIT** distinguishes between the individual ideologies and the “ideological”. It comprehends the latter not primarily as something mental, but as an ‘external arrangement’ in the ‘ensemble of social relations’ and as a specific organisational form of class societies reproduced by the state (**Haug** 1987a, 60 et sq.; **PIT** 1979, 179 et sq.). It constitutes the basic structure of ideological powers ‘above’ society and thus the functioning and efficacy of an ‘alienated socialisation from above’ (**Haug** 1987a, 63, 68; **PIT** 1979, 181; 187 et sq.). Specific ideological “forms” (e.g. politics, the religious, moral, aesthetic) correspond to the ideological powers. In analogy to what **Marx** described as ‘objective thought forms’ (*CI*, 169; cf. MECW 35/87), they are to be investigated as objective formations of praxis and discourse which are pre-given to individuals and in which these must navigate in order to be capable of acting. Against the background of these processes of subjectivisation, the edifices of ideas are secondary and represent the ‘most variable, tactical dimensions’ (**Haug** 1987a, 69; **PIT** 1979, 188).

Foundational for the ideological is the emergence of the state, linked to the elaboration of class domination, and the transfer of initially ‘horizontal’ competencies of socialisation (of labour and other forms of life competences) to superstructural instances and their bureaucratic apparatuses (62; 181). The state constitutes a terrestrial ‘beyond of society’ in the sense of a ‘socially transcendent instance’ that fixes and regulates the antagonistic class interests from above (61; 180 et sq.). The genealogy of the ideological is to be differentiated by the analysis of patriarchal gender relations which were exercised in the pre-statal “gerontocracies” above all via the “matrimonial regime”, that is, the directive of the elders over the exogenous marriage of women (cf. **Meillassoux**

1981/1975, 42 et sqq., 58 et sqq.). According to **Haug** (1993, 197), the ‘pre-statal’ patriarchy is to be considered as a type of ‘state before the state’, which essentially supports the emergence of the state and also later continues to exist as the ‘foundational cell of the state’. The fundamental fact of the patriarchy’s disposing over female labour-power, which **Marx** and **Engels** described as the first form of property (‘latent slavery in the family’) or the ‘first class anti-thesis’ and ‘class oppression’ in monogamous marriage (MECW 5/46; 26/173), also marks the ideological mode of functioning: while the community of genders is actually destroyed in the social reality, it is “illusionarily restored” in the heaven of the ideological; the compensatory compromise character of the ideological is borne by the symbolic representation of gender relations, the familial becomes an emotional and imaginary vehicle of any subordination and supraordination, in which women represent the imaginary community of the family (**Haug** 1993, 197 et sq., 200).

Concretising **Althusser**’s conception of the subject, **Haug** proposes to conceptualise a ‘sexual subject-effect’ in which social gender is imposed on individuals as a preshaped ideological form that ‘they have to be’ without ever fully corresponding to it: the subject ‘takes itself on [*übernimmt sich*]’ in the double sense this term has in German: on the one hand, that of taking up responsibility for oneself and, on the other hand, that of taking on more than one can handle, of making overwhelming demands upon oneself. Gender thus becomes ‘the most intimate form in which the order of domination is opened up to the individual’ (1993, 201). In the puritan formation from circa 1850–1950, which at the same time was the most intense period of modern racism, the ideological values of *health, beauty, and spirit* [*Gesundheit, Schönheit, Geist*] were linked with sexual abstinence, while syphilis functioned as a catalyst for a medicalisation of the public’s body (1986, 126 et sqq.). “Self-control” [...] becomes precisely the individual form of *uncompelled subjection*’ (145).

9.2 In distinction to **Althusser**’s concept of the ISAs, the ideological for the PIT signifies not primarily a social “region”, but rather the *dimension* of a socialisation from above which penetrates through different social levels. In distinction to **Hall**, it is not used as a descriptive but as an abstractive concept designed to lay out analytically different aspects of the activities of socialisation. The counter-concept to the ideological here is the perspective of a ‘self-socialisation [*Selbstvergesellschaftung*]’ of humans in the sense of a common-consensual control of the conditions of social life (**Haug** 1987a, 59; PIT 1979, 178). From here one can identify anti-ideological impulses that de-sacralise and ridicule verticalist interpellations in a plebeian way by unveiling their “naked” class interests – see e.g. the literary figures of “Hans Wurst” (literally “John Saus-

age”, the German brother of the English “Pickle Herring” or the French “Jean Potage”), or Jaroslav **Hašek**’s *The Good Soldier Svejk*. In opposition to the verticalism of the ideological there are “horizontal” forms of socialisation in which individuals regulate their social life without the intervention of superordinate ideological instances and in which they develop corresponding social experiences and competencies. The meaning of the “anti-ideological” can be defined against this foil as the re-appropriation of the “commons”, the “commune”, that has been alienated in the ideological.

To be distinguished from the ideological are also the dimensions of the “cultural”, in which individuals, groups or classes “practise what appears to them to be worthwhile living”. The analytical differentiation is necessary if we want to observe the specificity of ideological transformation: ‘cultural flowers are continually picked by the ideological powers and handed back down from above as “unwithering” artificial flowers, integrated into the vertical structure of the ideological’ (**Haug** 1987a, 65; **PIT** 1979, 184). The concept of the “proto-ideological” signifies in its turn the material that nourishes and supports “from below” the ideologisation “from above”, e.g. in the form of elders that stand out against the community, of ancestor worship, of medicine men, pre-statal sanctuaries etc., which then are reorganised in the emergence of the state in ideological form (62, 64; 180, 183 et sq.). Also under the conditions of ideological socialisation, self-determined “horizontal” forces and forms of social cohesion are continually exposed to the reach of ideological powers, while, at the same time, ideological phenomena can also be profaned and assimilated in popular culture (65; 184).

As Frigga **Haug** (1980) has shown in the example of female self-subjugation, individuals themselves are actively entrapped in their ideological subjection. Everyday life, which in bourgeois society is extensively marked by market competition and ‘possessive individualism’ (**Macpherson** 1962), creates not only the “reified” thought forms highlighted by **Lukács**, but also unleashes multifarious private-egoistical activities and capabilities which are directed against each other. Under these conditions, ‘self-determination’ takes place as ‘social distinction’ (**Bourdieu** 1987/1979) from others. Identity is determined on the basis of antagonism, ‘the frightened mutually accuse each other of being cowards’ (**Haug** 1986, 106, 124 et sq.). The decomposition of communal solidarities functions like a ‘body of resonance’ that provides the elaborate ideologies with the consensual power over human minds and hearts. Institutionalised ideological practices have their informal correspondances in everyday life as a ‘multiformed *Do it Yourself* of ideology’ in which individuals struggle over the constitution of their own ‘normality’ (1993, 172, 227).

9.3 The duality of “above” and “below” turned out to be too abstract in order to comprehend concrete ideological procedures. As can be seen in an exemplary form in the genesis of law, the elaboration of the ideological can also occur under pressure from below, forcing domination into ideological form (Haug 1987a, 69 et sq.; PIT 1979, 188 et sq.). The concept of “compromise-formation” can be made fruitful for the analysis of the inner contradictoriness of ideological socialisation. Freud used this concept to describe the constitution of the neurotic symptom, which is so resistant, because it is ‘supported from both sides’ (vol. XVI, 359), i.e. from the “super-ego” and the “id”. Converted into social-theoretical terms, it signifies ‘a condensation of antagonistic forces [...] in the framework of the structure of domination’. It is a contradictory form ‘in which the dominated forces are compelled [...] and in which the system of domination concedes them an outlet’ (Haug 1987a, 72; PIT 1979, 190 et sq.).

The young Marx in the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844* had already encountered a peculiar mode of efficacy of the ideological that later further escalated during the differentiation of modern societies, namely, ‘that each sphere applies to me a different and opposite yardstick [...], for each is a specific estrangement of man’ (MECW 3/310). In the modern bourgeois state, ‘man – not only in thought, in consciousness, but in reality, in life – leads a twofold life, a heavenly and an earthly life: life in the *political community*, in which he considers himself a *communal being*, and life in *bourgeois society* [*bürgerliche Gesellschaft*], in which he acts as a *private individual*’ (154; transl. modified). This division into opposed ‘value spheres’, as Weber later formulated it (*RS I*, 541 et sq.; *WL*, 605), is comprehended by Haug as the ‘law of complementarity of the ideological’ (1993, 19). Relations of domination are reproduced via imaginary communities that establish a ‘complementary counter-appearance’ to capitalist private property and the state (147, 183, 199). Where in patriarchy and class society the principle of division actually rules over the common, ‘the ideological imaginary compensatorily places the common over the element of division’ (197).

By nourishing themselves permanently from “horizontal” energies, ideologies (insofar as they are effective among the masses) make possible an ‘antagonistic reclamation of community’ (Haug 1987b, 94; 1993, 84) in which the opposed classes and genders claim and interpret the same ideological instances and values (e.g. God, justice, morality) in opposed ways. The point of condensation of antagonistic interpellations is dependent on the relations of power and hegemony of the social forces. ‘In the symbolic form the antagonists are congruous’; the symbolic form is that which is ‘identical in the antagonistic articulations’ (95; 85). But “underneath” the identical interpellative instances, the ideological is multifariously divided. The ideological powers compete with

each other over where to draw the boundaries between their fields of competence, which must be ever newly fortified (cf. **Nemitz** 1979, 67 et sqq). In crisis of hegemony there are regularly divisions between the hallowed values of an ideological power and its necessarily “unholy” apparatus, so that the ideological “above” doubles into a ‘worldly heaven and a heavenly world’ (**Haug** 1987b, 95; 1987a, 75 et sq.). As can be shown, for example, in the Lutheran Reformation’s deployment of the central instances Scripture/Grace/Faith against the “devilish” church apparatus of the Catholic Church, this cleavage can in specific constellations be used by oppositional movements.

The dialectic of the ideological consists in the fact that it can only compensatorily contribute to the reproduction of domination by also ‘meaning’, in however displaced a form, a liberation from domination: ‘Every ideological power articulates a relation to community, which [...] is negated by class society’ (**PIT** 1980, 77). It is this double character that makes possible that ideological subjugation is performed in the form of self-activity, and also, on the other hand, that anti-ideological, plebeian elements can be combined with the claims of the highest ideological values: ‘Self-subordination under the celestialised communitarian powers can become a vital form of the liberation struggles of the oppressed’ (**Haug** 1987b, 96; 1993, 86). Of course, resistance can also be weakened again via the ideological form in which it is articulated and incorporated into the order of domination, so that, for example, the ‘sigh of the oppressed creature’ (**MECW** 3/175) contained in the religious can fuse with the organisation and reproduction of oppression (**Haug** 1987a, 74; **PIT** 1979, 192 et sq.). An ideology critique informed by a TI will therefore seek to decipher the elements of class-less communities re-presented in the ideological, unhinge them and win them back for the development of a capacity to act in solidarity.

9.4 An historical concretisation of TI followed subsequently in a two-volume study on *Fascism and Ideology* (**PIT** 1980). While **Horkheimer** and **Adorno** abandoned the ideology concept for German fascism, because it did not correspond to their definition as a classically bourgeois-liberal form of consciousness, the **PIT** does not look for a specific content of ideas but concentrates from the outset on the Nazis’ practices of ideological transformation (47). The material studies show a continuous primacy of ideological arrangements, practices, and rituals over the edifice of ideas (51). ‘Much more than any fascist orthodoxy, there was an “orthopraxis”, to be understood as a sequence of “performative acts” with ideological subject effects’ (74), e.g. marching, mass assemblies, collecting foodstuff and money for those exposed to the cold [*Winterhilfswerk*], living in camps, company fêtes (83 et sqq., 167 et sqq., 209 et sqq., 238 et sqq.).

The fascist specificity lies in the effort to occupy the entirety of the ideological and to transform, anti-democratically, the bourgeois power bloc via the articulation of struggle-life risk-faith (48 et sq., 53 et sq., 59). With the help of anti-Semitism, the multiplicity of populist [*völkisch*] ideological elements was early on arranged into a strict supra/sub order. The German *VOLK* was constituted discursively through the opposition to the Jewish *GEGENVOLK*, whose places were however open: 'whoever stood against the Nazis fell into this position and that means, finally, in the domain of the ss' (72). 'Fascism understood in an unprecedented manner how to organise self-alienation as enthusiastic self-activity' (77). Framed by unrestrained, legally unbound violence, all types of appealing elements, regardless of their heritage, were integrated. 'Everything that marked everyday life as its disruption' was occupied, 'any interest, any love, any idealism and any capacity for enthusiasm – everything was roped in' (80).

In a further investigation, **Haug** (1986) showed with the example of the annihilation of 'life unworthy of life' that the Nazis' policies of extermination did not break into psychiatry and medicine from the outside but were actively supported by the respective ideological strata. Gassing was organised as a 'medical competence' – the participating doctors were involved at all levels of the killing, even as regards the pushing of the gas lever; they were not forced to do so, but rather, 'authorised' (26 et sqq.). The question of the ideological constellation underlying the complicit perpetration of these deeds leads into an extensive network of 'powers of normalisation' that worked towards the 'fascisation of the bourgeois subject' already a long time before 1933. In the centre of the psychological-apparatuses and of a widely ramified counselling literature is the protection of ideological subjection. This occurred, on the one hand, through the constitution of idealised images of health and beauty, which were increasingly articulated in racist terms; on the other hand, through the constitution of 'a-sociality' and 'degeneration' which were approved for eradication.

In his book on the 'churches in the Nazi state', Jan **Rehmann** investigated how in both the Roman-Catholic and the Protestant Churches' collaboration with the Nazi state and resistance on peculiar partial issues were indivisibly intertwined with each other: 'The same churches that acknowledge the murderous fascist state right up until the very end as divinely established authority have the capacity, like no other ideological power, of defying its attempts at bringing them into line [*Gleichschaltung*] and destroying their zones of influence' (1986, 13). Both churches want to be 'public corporations', *in and next to* the state and are in the majority ready to support the 'authority established by God' as long as they are accepted as relatively autonomous ideological powers. However, as soon as the Nazis violate this hegemonic arrangement, there is on

the side of the Catholic Church in particular a bitter “war of position” (**Gramsci**) over ideological competencies in public education and morality, during which the NS government had to withdraw on numerous occasions, e.g. in the battle over the crucifixes in classrooms [*Kreuzeskampf*] and when the Catholic bishop **Galen** publicly denounced the practice of “euthanasia”. On the Protestant side, the violation of church autonomy had the effect that the traditional unity of inner attachment to state authority and to the church’s creed entered a state of crises and fell apart to a large extent, which was experienced and articulated by pastors and faithful as ‘pang of conscience [*Gewissensnot*]’ (111). The ‘dialectical theology’ of Karl **Barth**, which refused any connection with other ideological values in the name of the reformatory principle of ‘scripture alone’ (*sola scriptura*), mobilised the contradiction between the heaven of values of the ideological and its “unholy” apparatus and showed in an exemplary fashion that resistance can be articulated effectively in the form of ideological subjection, namely, of obedient submission to the *Holy Word*. ‘It is precisely the authoritarian adherence to the exclusive and conditionless submission to “God’s word” that sets free forces that fascism could not integrate anymore in its church politics: the specific capacity of unflinching no-saying in opposition to the hegemonic claims of other powers’ (**Rehmann** 1986, 118).

Another central point of research of the **PIT** (1987) related to the emergence of bourgeois hegemonic apparatuses in the 17th and 18th cents. Peter **Jehle** (1996) investigated the opposition to France that was constitutive for the “German” constellation of the ideological with the example of Romance languages and literature in academia. The studies initiated by **PIT** on ideological powers in the NS were followed by a subsequent project, from which emerged numerous studies on the position of German philosophers under German fascism (cf. **Haug** 1989; **Laugstien** 1990; **Leaman** 1993; **Orozco** 1995; **Zapata Galindo** 1995).

10. In “disciplinary neoliberalism”, as it has developed above all in the USA, the Fordist modes of regulation that were based upon a class compromise with relevant components of the labour movement and oriented toward a consensual inclusion of the subaltern classes, have been displaced by strategies of supremacy that are primarily based upon the depoliticisation and fragmentation of oppositional forces. The “repressive” aspects of panoptic surveillance, incarceration and coercion play a central role (cf. **Gill** 2003). To the ‘atrophy of the social state’ corresponds a ‘hypertrophy of the punitive state’ (**Wacquant** 2002). The prognosis proposed by **Foucault** of an increasing ‘normalisation’ through the social pedagogisation of punishment (1977, 306) overlooked the bifurcation of

social controls between the ‘self-policing’ among the ‘middle classes’, in which the offers of the psycho-market play an important role (cf. **Castel/Lovell** 1982), and an external disciplining of potentially ‘dangerous classes’, which is marked by ostentatious state and police violence as well as a rhetoric of evil and war (cf. **James** 1996, 34; **Parenti** 1999, 135 et sq.).

In order to comprehend the new constellations, the TI approaches developed in the “social-democratic” epoch of the 1970s and 1980s must be modified. **Althusser’s** thesis that the dominating ISA of bourgeois society is the school is to be revised under the conditions of the neoliberal dismantling of the public school system. Also the original approach of the PIT that fixes the ideological above all in the ‘social transcendence’ of the state (1979, 180) is marked by the model of the European social state in the period of system competition and needs to be supplemented by the US-American tradition, already noted by **Marx** (MECW 3/149 et sqq.) and **Weber** (RS I, 215 et sqq.; 2001, 127 et sqq.), of an ideological socialisation by sects and private associations, which – even though also components of the ‘integral state’ (Q 6, § 155) – are immediately linked with bourgeois business interests (cf. **Rehmann** 1998, 28 et sqq.).

To the extent that the “socially transcendent”, that is, the redistributive and compromise-building sectors and functions of the state are rolled back by the instrumental aspects of neoliberal class domination, the inner composition of ideological socialisation is also transformed. This is the case both for the articulation between “repressive” and “ideological” apparatuses as well as, within the latter, the relation between political-ethical consensus formation, on the one hand, and manipulation as well as distraction based on the media and high technologies (cf. **Bourdieu** 1998), on the other. While the deconstruction of the welfare state leads to the rise in crime rates, the police and security apparatus itself becomes an effective centre of articulation of “civil society” (cf. **Klinenberg** 2001), and “internal security” becomes a theme that sets the stage for electoral victories or defeats. The dominating tendencies go towards rolling back the universal ideas of a human community represented in the ideological imaginary and replacing them with obsessions with crime and terrorism. One of the modes of ideological processing is an attitude that **Peter Sloterdijk** has described as a cynically ‘enlightened false consciousness’ (1983, 37 et sq.; cf. **Žižek** 1994, 312 et sqq.).

The new ideological constellation appears at the same time to connect up with some traits of the “ancient” socialisation, glorified by **Nietzsche**, in which the relation of violence between classes is complemented by an élitist ‘pathos of distance’ (*Genealogy of Morals*, 1, No. 2; KSA 5, 259). As the social reproduction of classes occurs increasingly in separated residential locations, there

is a spatial segregation in which ghettoised poverty and gated communities are no longer integrated but held at a distance. If this tendency is combined with the biotechnologies of human breeding, it could be that the class barrier will become at some stage a biological barrier so that the rulers and ruled at the same time directly represent different “races”. In such conditions, the ideological could once again approach the ancient paradigm of the Pergamon Altar analysed by Peter Weiss in which the victory of ‘highbred’ aristocratic forms is exalted over the ‘barbaric mongrels’ (2005, 8), while the aesthetic forms in which the rulers immortalise themselves are gained by imitating the ruled. Similar to the paradigm of the Roman pantheon of gods, a “postmodern” superstructure could rise over the relations of domination regulated by military violence – an ideological constellation in which the particularistic differences and identity politics of the co-opted beneficiaries are celebrated and elevated. An ideology-critique with the “conceptual hinterland” of a TI is well advised to study the transformations in the ensemble of the ideological instances concretely in each case in order to be able to calibrate both the ‘arms of critique’ (MECW 3/184) and the alternative proposals to the current fronts of struggle.

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→ Althusserianism, anti-ideology, appearance, articulation, base, being/consciousness, camera obscura, catharsis, Chinese Cultural Revolution, commodity aesthetics, commodity fetishism, Common sense [senso comune], consciousness, consensus, critique of religion, cultural studies, culture, culture industry, discourse analysis, discourse theory, dispositif, ethics, eternity, false consciousness, fascism, fictionalism, Fordism, forms of individuality, functionalism, gender, gender relations, genesis, good sense [buon senso], Gramscianism, habitus, heaven/hell, hegemonic apparatus, hegemony, ideal, idealisation, identification, ideologue, ideology critique, ideological state apparatuses, illusion, imaginary, indeterminism, inner world/external world, integral state, intellectual, Jacobinism, Lacanianism, legitimation, Leninism, manipulation, mass culture, normalisation, overdetermination, paradigm, passive revolution, philosophy of praxis, postmodernism, power, regulationalism, reification, religion, representative politics, sense, sexuality, social life/common being, spirit, subject, subject-effect, superstructure, thought-form, violence.

→ Alltagsverstand, Althusser-Schule, Antiideologie, Artikulation, Basis, Bewusstsein, Camera obscura, chinesische Kulturrevolution, Denkform, Diskursanalyse, Diskurstheorie, Dispositiv, Ethik, Ewigkeit, falsches Bewusstsein, Faschismus, Fetischcharakter der Ware, Fiktionalismus, Fordismus, Funktionalismus, Geist, Gemeinwesen, Genesis, Geschlecht, Geschlechterverhältnisse, gesunder Menschenverstand, Gewalt, Gramscismus, Habitus, Hegemonialapparate, Hegemonie, Himmel/Hölle, Ideal, Idealisierung, Identifikation, Ideologe, Ideologiekritik, ideologische Staatsapparate, Illusion, Imaginäres, Inde-

terminismus, Individualitätsformen, Innenwelt/Außenwelt, integraler Staat, Intellektuelle, Jakobinismus, Katharsis, Konsens, Kultur, Kulturindustrie, Kulturstudien (Cultural Studies), Lacanismus, Legitimation, Leninismus, Macht, Manipulation, Massenkultur, Normalisierung, passive Revolution, Philosophie der Praxis, Postmodernismus, Regulationismus, Religion, Religionskritik, Schein, Sein/Bewusstsein, Sexualität, Sinn, Stellvertreterpolitik, Subjekt, Subjekt-Effekt, Überbau, Überdeterminierung, Verdinglichung, Vorbild, Warenästhetik

Theses on Feuerbach

A: *naẓarīyāt ḥaul fuirbāḥ*. – F: *Thèses sur Feuerbach*. – G: *Feuerbach-Thesen*. – R: *tezicy o Fejerbache*. – S: *Tesis sobre Feuerbach*. – C: *Fèi'ěr'bāhā lùngāng* 费尔巴哈论纲

The *Theses on Feuerbach* (ThF) (MEGA IV.3/19–21; MECW 5/3–5 (after Marx's 1845 manuscript), 5–8 (after the version published by Engels); Peking 1976, 61–65 [MEW 3/5–7 (Marx's Ms), 533–35 (as published by Engels)]) are not only 'one of the best known, most concise, and most enigmatic of Marx's texts' (Lefebvre 1958, 41) but, apart from the fragments of some pre-Socratics, the 'smallest of the documents of our western philosophical tradition' (Labica 1987, 5) that are repeatedly made into a point of departure for a fresh theoretical beginning. Its pithiness is all the more astounding as the thesis form is as such foreign to Marxian thinking. Marx's 'is a vivid epic way of thinking, not a metaphysical codifying one, and is undertaken as a historical and genetic-dialectical gesture, as in Hegel's approach' (Irrlitz 1995, 193). By contrast, it seems evident in the ThF that Marx was formally reflecting the thetic prose characteristic of Feuerbach's work.

In 1888, Engels characterised this text of emergence as 'notes hurriedly scribbled down for later elaboration, absolutely not intended for publication, but invaluable as the first document in which is deposited the brilliant germ of the new world outlook' (MECW 26/520 [MEW 21/264]). He returns a compliment here which Marx had made in the *Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (1859), where he described Engels's 1844 *Outlines* (MECW 3/418–43 [MEW 1/499–524]) as a 'brilliant essay on the critique of economic categories' (29/264 [13/10]). – In 1922, one generation later, Karl Korsch regarded the ThF even more highly than Engels had: The work 'contains much more than the "brilliant germ of the new world outlook" [...] rather, in [the ThF], the entire basic philosophical outlook of Marxism is expressed with an incredibly bold consequentiality and with luminous clarity. Step by step, all the weight-bearing beams of received bourgeois philosophy give way under the consciously executed hammer blows of these 11 theses' (GA 3, 177 et sq.). A generation later, in 1968, Lucien Goldmann (1968, 42) compares the historical significance of the ThF with Descartes's *Discours de la méthode*, Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, and Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*. These two-and-a-half manuscript pages thus constitute one of those discurs-

ive events ‘that from a greater distance become increasingly more significant’ (Haug 1984, 18). Ernst Bloch sees in them ‘the beginning *philosophy of revolution*’ (1959/1986, 282).

Marx himself, who did not even show Engels the ThF, would have probably viewed them at the same time as a breaking-point text, which ‘settles accounts with our former philosophical conscience’ (*Preface 1859*, 29/264 [13/10]), similar to the *German Ideology* (GI).

1. *Source, manuscript description.* – After Marx’s death, Engels discovered the ThF in one of his notebooks. The relevant notebook, the ‘first of twenty that have survived’ (MEGA IV.3, App., 483), dates from 1844 to 1847. The manuscript pages 53–57, on which – after a short note that corresponds to passages from *The Holy Family*, and between literature lists, book invoices, shopping lists, addresses, and some additional theoretical draft plans and theses – the ThF are found (IV.3/19–21), date from the Brussels period (between February and the beginning of July 1845). The ThF were written ‘probably by April, perhaps later but certainly not later than the beginning of June 1845’, presumably ‘in connection with the then emerging plan for a critique of all post-Hegelian German philosophy’, which was later realised in the form of the GI (IV.3, App., 490 et sq.).

Marx first wrote the text of Thesis 1 and, as the manuscript shows, subsequently placed the number ‘1’ as well as the title ‘1) ad Feuerbach’ over it. He then similarly numbered the following theses. Thesis 11 is separated from the others by a horizontal line. ‘Marx probably added it after the rest. Perhaps he also wanted to highlight the special significance of this conclusion’ (ibid.).

2. *Sequence of argument.* – Theses 1, 3, 4, and 6 are particularly multi-layered and theoretically rich. To speak of them means to interpret them. We can only deal with the most important phrases here:

Thesis 1 confronts ‘all hitherto existing’ materialism and idealism as mutually opposed one-sided conceptions; it does so from the perspective of a third position that takes the active factor seriously, which up until then was only developed by idealism – that is, in the abstract, only as an intellectual exercise. In contrast this thesis translates this one-sided contraposition into the medium of ‘real, sensuous activity’.

Thesis 2 declares that the question of ‘objective [*gegenständliche*] truth’ is a question of practice.

Thesis 3 repudiates the educationism of a materialistically enlightened elite that is ‘superior’ to society in favour of the ‘coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-change’, which ‘can be conceived and rationally understood only as *revolutionary practice*’.

Thesis 4 absorbs and converts **Feuerbach's** reductive analytical approach of 'resolving the religious world into its secular basis' into a genetic-reconstructive programme of explaining the fact that 'the secular foundation detaches itself from itself and establishes itself in the clouds as an independent realm' by the very 'self-fragmentation' ['*Selbstzerrissenheit*'] of this secular basis.

Thesis 5 characterises **Feuerbach's** critique of mere '*abstract thinking*' as limited to intuitive sensuousness; it calls instead for conceiving this sensuousness as '*practical, human-sensuous activity*'.

Thesis 6 proclaims a paradigm change from a species-like conception of the human essence (based on the abstract individual and his 'religious sentiment') to its historical-materialist understanding based on the 'ensemble of the social relations'.

Thesis 7 calls for understanding the 'abstract individual' and his 'religious sentiment' as having been produced by a 'particular form of society'.

Thesis 8 is oriented to 'human practice' and the 'comprehension of this practice'.

Thesis 9 sees 'intuiting materialism' as being enclosed in the private form of 'single individuals and of civil [*bürgerliche*] society'.

Thesis 10 ascribes the 'old materialism' to 'civil' (bourgeois) society, and the 'new' materialism to (general) human society, which constitutes itself as such as 'social humanity'.

Thesis 11 defines changing the world as the application of interpreting the world.

3. *Publication history.* – In their original **Marxian** wording, albeit in modernised form ('tätig' instead of 'thätig', 'revolutionär' instead of 'revolutionair', 'Feuerbachschen' instead of 'Feuerbach'schen', etc.), spelling out abbreviated words ('und' instead of 'u', 'oder' instead of 'od.', etc.), and modifying punctuation, the ThF were published for the first time in 1925 in the *Marx-Engels-Archiv* (I, 227–30), where David **Riazanov** had published the *GI*. In 1932, the MEGA published the text in this form in Volume I.5, 533 et sqq. (Berlin: Marx-Engels-Verlag). On this basis, it was included in 1959 in MEW 3 (published in MECW 5/3–5; 'printed according to the manuscript'). In 1998, it was published in MEGA IV.3, 19–21 for the first time in a version faithful to the original (correcting slips of the pen and mistakes in punctuation, which are indicated in the critical apparatus), and it is this version (aside from changed case endings required by context) that is cited here.

In 1888, **Engels** had published the ThF in the appendix to *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy* in an altered version. This version is also published in MEW 3/533–35 (MECW 5/5–8). However, it is further

editorially altered by sometimes omitting **Engels's** emphases and quotation marks and sometimes adding new ones – ‘on the basis of **Marx's** manuscript’ (MEW 3/547, note 1), which is quite curious since the point here is precisely **Engels's** alterations.

The ThF were received throughout the world in **Engels's** version, which therefore had, and still has, an immeasurably great impact. This text, rather than **Marx's** original, is cited in the inscription of the Eleventh Thesis in the staircase of Berlin's Humboldt University. To understand the different historical interpretations, the substantively relevant alterations in this version must be considered. They have long been partly ignored, partly swept under the rug. Ernst **Bloch** let his enthusiasm get the best of him when he asserted (1959/1986, 250) that **Engels** had published the ThF ‘naturally without the slightest change of content’. The 1959 MEW commentary sees in **Engels's** alterations ‘a few editorial changes [...] for the purpose of making these notes [...] more comprehensible to the reader’ (547, note 1). The justification behind this assertion is **Engels's** 1888 commentary that the ThF were ‘hurriedly scribbled down for later elaboration, absolutely not intended for publication’ (MECW 26/520 [MEW 21/264]).

4. *Engels's interventions.* – In some cases they lead to shifts of meaning that are at first glance hardly noticeable, but which, upon closer inspection, turn out to be radical.

Thesis 1: The comparison in the second sentence – ‘in contradistinction to materialism, the active side developed abstractly by idealism’ [‘die *thätige* Seite abstrakt im Gegensatz zu dem Materialismus von dem Idealismus [...] entwickelt’] – was transformed into a narrative by the addition in bold here: ‘Daher **geschah es, daß** die *thätige* Seite, ~~abstrakt~~ [crossed out by **Engels**] im Gegensatz zu dem Materialismus, von dem Idealismus entwickelt **wurde**’ [‘Hence it happened that the active side, in contradistinction to materialism, was set forth by idealism’].

Thesis 2: The statement regarding ‘thinking which is isolated from practice’ (resulting in the question of truth becoming a scholastic inquiry) is substituted by **Engels** with: ‘thinking, which isolates itself from practice’. – **Labica** (1987) considers this change (likewise in Thesis 1) to be ‘of a purely formal nature’, ‘motivated by a concern to make certain of **Marx's** formulations less abrupt and more explicit’, (11); he overlooks that in so doing, the structural assertion was changed into a moral one because it was given a responsible subject.

Thesis 3: **Engels** adds to **Marx's** criticism of milieu-determinism the milieu-theoretical assertion that ‘changed men are products of other circumstances and changed upbringing’; **Engels** adds ‘in Robert **Owen**, for example’ to the criticism of educationism, substitutes ‘revolutionary practice’ [‘revolutionaire

Praxis'] with 'revolutionising practice' ['*umwälzende Praxis*'] and crosses out the fundamentally important concept of 'self-change'.

Thesis 4: The thesis of 'the duplication of the world into a religious one and a secular one' is changed by the added opposition 'supposed' / 'actual' with the effect that the real-imaginary is understood as a merely erroneous and unreal one. Where in **Marx** the family has to be 'destroyed in theory and in practice', **Engels** has him say: 'criticized in theory and transformed [*umgewälzt*] in practice'.

Thesis 6: **Marx's** observation that a private-individualist approach necessarily carries with it the complementary-opposing concept of *genus* loses its general application in **Engels's** version when he adds 'with him', that is, in **Feuerbach**.

Thesis 9 and 10: Where **Marx** declares civil [*bürgerliche*] society as the basis of **Feuerbachian** individualism, **Engels** puts 'bürgerlich' in quotation marks.

Thesis 11: After 'The philosophers have only *interpreted* the world in various ways', **Engels** substitutes the comma by a semicolon and adds a 'but' to the following phrase 'the point is to *change* it', both of which further sharpen the contrast; **Bloch** too has noted that the 'but' does not belong here, the more so because Thesis 8 presents the 'rational solution' as lying 'in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice' – that is, in the context of interpreting and changing the world. 'There is no contrast' (1959/1986, 278).

5. *The relationship to Feuerbach.* – **Marx** refers specifically to **Feuerbach's** *The Essence of Christianity*; his relationship to Feuerbach becomes imprecise, indeed unfair if one generalises it without closer examination (on this, see **Keiler** 1985 and 1997). **Marx's** critique revolves 1) around the status of theory and practice, 2) around the concept of species, and 3) around reductionism in the critique of religion. – **Feuerbach's** break with 'speculation which draws its material from within' and his orientation towards 'real existence' versus 'existence on paper' (1841/1881, viii, ix) are retained by **Marx**; the question is only *how* to fulfil both tasks. – 1. **Feuerbach** transfigures theory – which in Greek literally means 'viewing' and should therefore have the 'eye' as its organ – panegyrically to become the actual *humanum* and sees philosophers as true humans: 'Man alone has purely intellectual, disinterested joys and passions; the eye of man alone keeps theoretic festivals. [...] The eye is heavenly in its nature. Hence man elevates himself above the earth only with the eye; hence theory begins with the contemplation of the heavens. The first philosophers were astronomers. It is the heavens that admonish man of his destination, and remind him that he is destined not merely to action, but also to contemplation' (5). Feuerbach attributes 'utilism' (113) and the 'practical standpoint'

(113) to the Jews whose God is their ‘personified selfishness’ (114). To ‘the Jew’ Feuerbach counterposes ‘the Greek’; while the latter ‘considered nature with the eyes of the keen *mineralogist*’, the Jew considered it ‘with the eye of a *trafficker in minerals*, calculating his profit’ (GW 1841/1973, 210), and so forth. Marx has been accused of anti-Semitism because he said of Feuerbach in Thesis 1 that he knew practice ‘only in its dirty Jewish manifestation’; it is, on the contrary, the case that from Feuerbach’s anti-Semitic perspective the ThF occupy precisely the ‘Jewish’ standpoint (see Haug 1993, 214). – 2. In contrast to animals, man has an ‘inner life’ in the form of conceptual (generic) thinking, which is separate from his external life; this is conceived of by Feuerbach as life in ‘relation to his species’: While an animal needs another in order to exercise species functions, man can do so through thinking alone ‘apart from another individual’, external to himself (1841/1881, 2). Behind this thought lies an equivocal use of the concept of species (on the one hand, as a grammatical and logical concept, on the other hand as a biological one): ‘In practical life we have to do with individuals; in science, with species’ (2). For Feuerbach, species is ‘the proper humanity of man’ (3). – 3. Feuerbach’s ‘tracing of the origins’ of “divine beings to man” (GW 1841/1973, 33, fn. 5) refers to this abstract ‘man’, who contains his species being within himself. ‘Religion is the disuniting of man from himself [...] But in religion man contemplates his own latent nature’ (33).

If Marx’s critique applies to *Essence of Christianity*, it does not apply equally to other writings of Feuerbach. In his letter to Ruge in the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*, Feuerbach almost accomplishes a turn towards the Marxian concept of praxis: ‘The mind is not always ahead; it is at once the most mobile and most cumbersome thing. The new arises in the head but [...] the old clings to it even longer. Hand and feet happily surrender to the head – thus above all the cleansed and purged head. The head is a theoretician, a philosopher. It only must bear the heavy yoke of praxis down under which we pull it and learn to live on the shoulders of acting people. [...] The theoretical is what only haunts my head; the practical is what haunts the heads of many. That which unites many heads, creates a mass [...]. If a new organ [a journal] is to be created for the new principle, then this is a praxis that must not be neglected’ (cited in MEGA I.2/485). – The idea expressed in Thesis 6 approaches that of Feuerbach’s *Principles of the Philosophy of the Future*: ‘The single man for himself possesses the essence of man neither in himself as a moral being nor as a thinking being. The essence of man is contained only in the community and unity of man with man; it is a unity, however, which rests only on the reality of the distinction between I and thou’ (1843/1966, § 59, 71). To be sure, such statements only attenuate the distance without removing it.

6. *Problems of Interpretation.* – The transmission of ‘two texts’ instead of one (**Labica**) under the title *ThF*, along with translation problems – which partly are connected with shorthand abbreviations of the text or peculiarities of the German original that are hard to translate (for example, the distinction between *gegenständlich* and *objektiv*) – have entailed divergent interpretations. Some of these can be dismissed as misunderstandings, while others stand and fall with the different interpretative frameworks. The most important controversies arise from the understanding of Theses 1, 6, and 11. – As a whole, the status of the *ThF* within **Marx**’s intellectual biography, and in relation to the formation of what later was understood to be Marxist, has become the object of controversies. Above all in France, in connection with **Althusser** (*FM*), there has been debate over the question of an epistemological break between **Marx**’s early and later writings; it is a debate that in part overlaps with the dispute over humanism in Marxism: **Althusser**, who understands the break as that between **Marx**’s ideological and scientific writings, sees in the *ThF* ‘the earlier limit of this break, the point at which the new theoretical consciousness is already beginning to show through in the erstwhile consciousness and the erstwhile language, that is, as *necessarily ambiguous and unbalanced concepts*’ (*FM*, 33); At another point he speaks of *transition-breaks* (244; see **Sève** 1978, ch. 11, fn. 27, 162). There is no doubt that the *ThF* make up a transitional document; however, as the *Notes on Adolf Wagner’s Lehrbuch der politischen Ökonomie*, one of **Marx**’s last writings, testify, we are dealing with a transition in the sense of a never abandoned, though not always thematic, *project*.

Thesis 1: According to **Max Adler**, here, **Marx** is criticising previous materialism for recognising only objects and ‘material contexts’ – and not activity – and consequently ‘viewing everything intellectual as something observed externally, as the product of material, rather than seeing it in its inner, subjective activity’ (1930, 74). – **Henri Lefebvre** posits here the concept ‘of power, not of political power but human power over nature outside people (and over nature within people)’, becomes ‘a fundamental concept of philosophy’ (1958, 42). – **Ernst Bloch** understands Thesis 1 as an epistemological thesis with ‘perception’ [‘Anschauung’] as the ‘beginning where all materialist cognition identifies itself’; it is precisely ‘perception’ that he puts in the place where **Marx** places the object, and he consequently re-articulates the Marxian criticism that perception ‘is only conceived of “under the form of the object”’ (1959/1986, 255). – While **Jean-Paul Sartre**, in opposing the philosophical materialism of Marxism-Leninism, reads Thesis 1 in such a way that ‘action is the unveiling of reality *at the same time* as the modification of this reality’ (1947, 168), **Maurice Merleau-Ponty** shifts the emphasis from **Marxian** ‘praxis; [...] subjectively’ to ‘subjectivity’ in the phenomenological sense and uses this against his Marxist-

Leninist critics: 'Let us remind those who shudder at the very word "subjectivity" of Marx's famous phrase ...' (1964, 80). – For Jürgen **Habermas** 'objectifying activity' takes on the sense of a 'transcendental achievement', namely 'of constituting the objectivity of possible objects of experience. As natural objects the latter share with nature the property of being-in-itself, but bear the character of produced objectivity owing to the activity of man' (1968/1987, 27). Such approaches, in order to retain the neo-Kantian nomenclature, obscure the fact that here, **Marx's** critique is attempting a shift of terrain from epistemology to an epistemology of praxis, and is ultimately directed against a 'fundamental form in which there is a philosophical question and answer, namely the scheme in which a subject of perception faces objects of perception' (**Haug** 1996, 47–63; see 1984, 19). This scheme and the separation of theory and practice 'have generated the metaphysical answers to the fundamental question of philosophy', while Thesis 1 'puts the relation of objectifying activity in the place of the epistemological relations of perception' (**Holz** 1997, 40). Here, 'object' has become a concept of form, something which has hardly been understood (see **Haug** 1999).

Thesis 3 announces a 'farewell to any sort of *preceptorial* mastermind stance of the philosopher' (**Fleischer** 1995, 291). Adam **Schaff** overlooks the critique of educationalism and the implicit critique of vanguardism, which 'anticipates the criticism of bureaucratic socialism' (**Förster** 1999, 151), in favour of a 'humanistic', 'moderate interpretation' of human *self*-creativity: 'Man acts upon reality, and in changing it he creates new conditions of his existence. Man is a product of the conditions of the natural and social milieus and at the same time himself creates these conditions and this milieu. The educator must himself be educated, as **Marx** says: The conditions that form man are themselves formed by him' (**Schaff** 1964, 111).

Thesis 6: A 'great deal of ink has flowed' (**Labica** 1987, 83) on account of this thesis, especially over **Marx's** core statement that 'the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each single individual [...]' but 'in reality, it is the ensemble of the social relations'. Like **Lenin** (see *CW* 21/53) before him, Ernst **Bloch** overlooks the phrase 'in reality' – which, instead of the simple equation (essence = conditions), designates the character of conditions as the condition of reality, or, better, the medium of reality, of the essence of man, its 'seat or its origin' (**Sève** 1978, ch. 11, fn. 9, 159) – and summarily says: '**Marx** [...] defines human existence [das menschliche Wesen] as "ensemble of social relations"' (1959/1986, 264). **Schaff** even paraphrases as follows: 'Man as a "single individual" is "the ensemble of social relations"', in which he interprets the equation 'individual = conditions' in the sense 'that one can only understand one's genesis and development in its social and historical con-

text, that one is a *product* of social life' (1964, 25). Even Louis **Althusser** thinks that Thesis 6 means 'that the non-abstract "man" [...] is the "ensemble of the social relations"' (*FM*, 243). **Garaudy** turns 'the relations' into 'his relations' and defines the individual as 'the sum total of his social relationships' (1966/1970, 68; see **Sève** 1978, ch. II, fn. 9, 159). – When measured against Thesis 6, all such statements are hasty conclusions, 'complete syntactic nonsense' (**Fleischer** 1995, 290). – **Labica** consolidates 'human essence [...] in its reality' to 'essence réelle (effective)' (1987, 77). However, the 'human essence' in the sense used in the ThF, is, as Lucien **Sève** emphasises, 'excentrée par rapport aux individus' [eccentric in relation to individuals] (qtd. **Labica** 1987, 89), that is, 'excentric' (**Sève** 1978, 139). To be more precise: human individuals come upon the ensemble of social relations as their medium of humanisation, so that 'an individual only becomes human in the specific sense through his socialisation' (**Kühne** 1979, 815). As a consequence, **Sève** (analogously to **Freud's** *Civilization and its Discontents*, despite **Sève's** distance from it) speaks of the 'foreignness of the human essence in relation to the isolated individual' (1978, 253). **Wolfgang Förster** appears to follow him to an undialectical extreme (already criticised by **Lothar Kühne**): 'The human essence is not found on the side of the single individual but on the side of social relations' (1999, 154). **Peter Keiler**, referring to **Leontiev** and **Sève**, opposes the idea 'that "the human essence" must have an existence independent of individuals, a quasi-material existence lying *outside* them' (1985, 83). – By contrast, **Hans-Thies Lehmann** and **Helmut Lethen** understand that what conditions the reality of the human essence of an individual is not as something external, but instead credit **Marx** with having discovered 'in the human subject the intersection, the "ensemble" of social relations' (1980, 156). Here **Georg Simmel's** determination of the individual as 'a point at which the lines of society intersect' seems to resonate; in **Simmel's** words, 'such a point is nothing in itself and, therefore, does not effect any inner change in the societal configuration that impinge on it' (1907/1986, 146). – For the rest, **Lothar Kühne**, who uses human 'essences' in the plural, sees the appearance in Thesis 6 of a new object of cognition of social theory, specifically the 'relation of particular social relations to each other' (1979, 816, 809).

Thesis 11 is one of those sentences of **Marx's** that have penetrated furthest into the general consciousness and whose meaning, although in an oversimplified and one-sided way, immediately found an echo in everyday consciousness. Prompted by **Engels's** shift of emphasis, the controversy turns around the relation of interpretation and change, theory and practice. A specific conception of the unity of theory and practice, with primacy given to the latter, which then was understood as practice 'led by the party', has proven to be destructive. In the extreme case, this thesis is understood reductively: 'that the point

is not to interpret the world but to change it' – Wolfgang **Pehnt**, who cites Thesis 11 with these words in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (1991), sees it as compatible with Robert **Owens's** statement: 'Up to now the world has been burdened by useless chatter [...]. But in the future action will make theories unnecessary'. – In addition, 'change' has become a synonym for automatically ongoing destructive processes, since capitalism's dynamic is in any case irreversibly changing the world at an accelerating tempo. Thus, Walter **Benjamin** used the image of the emergency brake to characterise revolutionary change (1940/2003, 402), and Günther **Anders** (1980) stressed the counter-thesis, that of 'changing [...] the change' (5). – Helmut **Fleischer** reads the thesis in the light of Thesis 8: accordingly, what is decisive is 'the conjunction of *practice and the understanding of this practice*', and, finally: 'What is this understanding other than an accompanying interpretation of practice?' (1995, 291). **Irrlitz**, who conceives of Thesis 11 as 'the self-transcendence of the text' (1995, 194), interprets it as a mere repetition of the conclusion of Thesis 3: 'Thesis 11 says of the part that is superior to society that its activity remains a mere theoretical interpretation. The point is to enter into a qualitative process of change and self-change on the part of the one effecting the change' (193). He bypasses the critique articulated in Thesis 3 of an absolutist-Enlightenment educational dictatorship.

7. *The main lines of reception.* – The detailed presentation of the history of the Theses' impact within and outside Marxism would fill volumes, and attempting to cover it has required dozens of articles in the HCDM. Three aspects are of particular interest here: 1. The initial lines of reception among the first generation of Marxists; 2. the continually new effect of a foundational text; 3. the ThF as a point of departure and intersection of diverse theoretical tendencies.

7.1 The two most influential elements in terms of generating interpretations were provided by **Engels** in *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*, to which was attached the first publication of the ThF – one generation later they became identity tags of conflicting lines of reception: the – in comparison to **Marx** technicistically narrow – motif of practice and the theorem – foreign or even opposed to Marx – of 'the great basic question of all [...] philosophy' being 'that concerning the relation of thinking and being', and the connected two-camps theory of materialism/idealism, which asks which of the two sides is accorded primacy (MECW 26/365 et sqq. [MEW 21/274 et sq.]). The fundamental ontological question transverses the "epistemological" one: 'Are we able in our ideas and notions of the real world to produce a correct reflection of reality?' **Engels** immediately reinterprets this question as well by claiming 'in the language of philosophy this question is called the question

of the identity of thinking and being' (367). The **Marxian** epistemology of the non-identity between object of cognition and real object (see *Introduction to Grundrisse* (1857), MECW 28/17–48 [MEW 42/15–45]) is just as suppressed here as is the twofold critique of the two philosophical “camps” with which the ThF begin. – The second central idea is that of ‘practice’, which **Engels** narrows to mean ‘experimentation and industry’ and of which he pragmatically asserts that we ‘are able to prove [?] the correctness of our conception of a natural phenomenon by bringing it about ourselves’ (367). Once again, ‘practice’, which initially enabled **Marx’s** break from epistemology, gets caught in its clutches again. Now, it is simply one which answers its basic question “materialistically”.

The Russian reception, substantially represented by Georgi V. **Plekhanov**, moves along the lines established by the materialism of late **Engels**: According to **Plekhanov**, a ‘part of **Feuerbach’s** philosophy became an integral part of the philosophy of **Marx and Engels**’ (1908/1969, 31). Even in **Marx’s** critique of **Feuerbach**, he, in **Plekhanov’s** words, ‘often develops and augments’ **Feuerbach’s** ‘ideas’, for instance when **Feuerbach** writes: ‘Before thinking of an object, man experiences its action on himself, contemplates and senses it’; **Marx**, so **Plekhanov**, had ‘these words [...] in mind when he wrote’ Thesis 1 (31 et sq.). If for **Feuerbach**, ‘our *I* cognizes the object by coming under its action’ **Marx** is said to respond: ‘our *I* cognizes the object, *while at the same time acting upon that object*’, and **Plekhanov** sums up: ‘It may of course be objected, in defense of **Feuerbach**, that in the process of our acting upon objects we cognize their properties only in the measure in which they, on their part, act upon us’ (32). In this he sees **Feuerbach’s** assertion confirmed: ‘The *suffering* precedes the thinking’ (1842/1983, 161). **Plekhanov** continues: ‘Since this action on the outer world is prescribed to man by the struggle for existence, the theory of knowledge is closely linked up by **Marx** with his materialist view of the history of human civilization’ (1908/1969, 32).

Similarly to the Austro-Marxists – who were shaped by Neo-Kantianism – but also to **Bloch**, **Plekhanov** thus *firstly* mistakes the ThF as an epistemological text whose basis he *secondly* asserts to be, ‘properly speaking, the epistemology of **Feuerbach**, only rendered more profound by the masterly correction made by **Marx**’ (33). That **Marx** was dialectically sublating the opposition of materialism and idealism through a twofold critique of both is thus buried by **Plekhanov** in favour of a seamless continuation of philosophical materialism: ‘The doctrine of the unity of subject and object, thinking and being, which was shared in equal measure by **Feuerbach** and by **Marx and Engels**, was also held by the most outstanding materialists of the 17th and 18th cent.s.’ (ibid.) For confirmation, **Plekhanov** turns to **Huxley**, to **Häckel’s** monism, and to Auguste **Forel’s** conception ‘that consciousness is the “inner reflex of cerebral activity”’

(35). – Thus the ground was laid upon which Marxism-Leninism was built with its epistemological doctrine of reflection.

Antonio **Labriola** takes the factor of praxis as his point of departure, which he liberates from technicist reduction. In his *Letters to Georges Sorel* he understands the ThF, which he translated into Italian (on the 14 different Italian translations, see **Bortolotti** 1976, 100 et sqq.), as the text that contains the ‘kernel’ of historical materialism, ‘so to say, its whole *philosophy*’ (1912, 43). **Labriola** gives the latter the name *philosophy of practice* (60), suggested by the ThF, and calls for its elaboration.

Three representatives of the next generation, **Mondolfo**, **Croce**, and **Gentile**, take up **Labriola**’s challenge. However, in contrast to what **Labriola** had in mind, they carried the impulse of the ThF into the various 20th-cent. political-theoretical camps: Rodolfo **Mondolfo**, ‘from 1904 to 1926 arguably the most significant representative of Italian “academic” Marxism’ (**Riechers** 1970, 21), conceives of the fundamental philosophical impulse of Marxism to be a ‘voluntarism of praxis, which **Marx** and **Engels** had derived from **Feuerbach**’ (**Mondolfo** 1912, 251; cited according to **Riechers** 1970, 23). In this Mario **Tronti** sees a telistic (from *telos*) voluntarism or pragmatism that, however, no longer starts with the bourgeois, private individual but represents a philosophy of action ‘from the standpoint of society, which exists within the individual him or herself’ (1959, 73). Benedetto **Croce**, who became the leader of the liberals, took up the impulse of the ThF under the title *Filosofia della Pratica* and absorbed it into neo-idealism (1908). Giovanni **Gentile**, who established his own translation of the ThF (1899, 68 et sq.), carried the impulse in the form of a philosophy of action (*attualismo*) into the fascist camp, whose chief ideologue he was to become. The second part of his early work, *Filosofia di Marx*, which **Lenin** felt merited attention (CW 21/88) is captioned *La filosofia della prassi*. He sees in the ThF the conception ‘di tutto un nuovo sistema speculativo’ (**Gentile** 1899, 71); he connects the concept of practice found in the ThF with Giambattista **Vico**’s *verum et factum convertuntur* (73), to which **Marx** already alludes in *C I* with the remark that ‘human history’ is easier to grasp than natural history ‘since, as **Vico** says, [...] we have made the former, but not the latter’ (MECW 35/375, note 2 [MEW 23/393, fn. 89]). However, **Gentile** pushes this thought into the camp of fictionalism: ‘one discovers truth by making it’ (‘la verità, quindi si scopre, facendola’; 1899, 73).

7.2 The result of a reception, for which **Plekhanov** is emblematic, has determined the problematic out of which a way is being sought by decisive attempts at renewal within Marxist philosophising. The situation has been doubly inverted: ‘The organising thought behind the *ThF* has been driven out by the “offi-

cial” Marxisms of the Second and Third Internationals, while at the same time it is precisely the politically most reactionary philosophies that have derived new strength from it’ (Haug 1996, 45). It is above all **Gramsci** and **Brecht** who, without being aware of each other, have recovered ‘this idea in order to use it in a transformed historical context and in confrontation with the qualitatively new scientific developments since the beginning of the 20th cent., as the initial spark of new Marxist thinking’ (ibid.).

Francisco **Piñon** has said of Antonio **Gramsci**’s work that it is nothing more than ‘una interpretación de las tesis de **Marx** sobre **Feuerbach**’ (1989, 7). **Gramsci** takes up **Labriola**’s programmatic concept of a philosophy of praxis, which he wrenches from neo-idealist hybrids in order at the same time to theoretically destroy the objectivism of official Marxisms (see *Prison Notebooks*, vol. 6 in German edition). This intensification in his prison notes is immediately preceded at the beginning of Notebook 7 by a new translation of the ThF (in **Engels**’s version) (see Q 3, 2355–57), whose concepts from then on run like leitmotifs through the notes on various topics. **Gramsci** reflects this renewing reconquest by paralleling it with the situation after **Hegel**’s death: That the fundamental ideas of the ThF have been turned to the right is ‘ignored by the so-called orthodox’ (*SPN*, 388), because from their positivist deformed viewpoint it must seem absurd that ‘the most important philosophical combination that has taken place has been between the philosophy of praxis and various idealist tendencies’ (ibid.); as **Hegel** had once dialectically treated materialism and idealism under the heading of Spirit, a dialectic that came apart into two extremes after his death, **Marx** had done the same under a historical materialist banner in the ThF, with an analogous “de-dialectisation” after his death: ‘The laceration which happened to Hegelianism has been repeated with the philosophy of praxis. That is to say, from dialectical unity there has been a regress to philosophical materialism on the one hand, while on the other hand modern idealist high culture has tried to incorporate that part of the philosophy of praxis which was needed in order for it to find a new elixir’ (*SPN*, 396). **Gramsci** especially names ‘**Croce**, **Gentile**, **Sorel**, **Bergson** even, pragmatism’ (*SPN*, N. 16, § 9, 389).

In dealing with the metaphysical and linguistic-criticism views of the Vienna Circle, with ways of thinking drawn from quantum mechanics as well as field theory applied to psychology, etc., **Brecht** developed an enormously productive renewal of Marxist philosophising. He also found the key for the dialectical adaptation of these tendencies in the ThF (see **Haug** 1996).

7.3 The history of the *Theses*’ influence covers all imaginable areas, inner-Marxist schools and non-Marxist tendencies, indeed anti-Marxist tendencies

of 20th-cent. philosophy, sometimes warring ones. Deriving from the ThF there is, on the one side, the subject-object dialectic characteristic of the Yugoslav praxis philosophy, for which 'the essential innovation of Marxian philosophy [...] is contained in compressed form in the *First Thesis on Feuerbach*', with praxis, according to Mihail Marković (1960, 19), as the *fundamental category of epistemology*. On the other side, the critique of the subject-object articulation in Marxism (Haug 1984) is also derived from the ThF, as well as a reformulation of 'philosophy as the critique of the so-called consciousness paradigm and the philosophy of subject' (Irrlitz 1995, 199). In this regard, Lucien Goldmann sees 'no fundamental distinction between Heidegger's theses and the *ThF*' (1977, 37).

Klaus Holzkamp considers '*the decisive precondition for the conception of a critical-emancipatory psychology*' to be given by the insight found in Theses 6 and 7 that in accepting an '*abstract – isolated – human individual*' one is abstracting 'from the historical process', and not seeing 'that the abstract individual [...] belongs to a specific form of society' (1972, 101). – Importantly, the new feminist movement drew on the ThF: For Frigga Haug, they in part read 'like a direct introduction to feminist theory and practice today'; in this respect, particularly for the debate on whether women are only victims or also perpetrators of their oppression, the 'coinciding of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-change' sketched in Thesis 3 takes on special significance (1999, 178 et sq.).

8. *Marxian critique*. – The severest inter-Marxist critique of the ThF comes from Louis Althusser: 'Those brief sparks, the *Theses on Feuerbach*, light up every philosopher who comes near them, but as is well known, a spark dazzles rather than illuminates [...]. One day we will have to show that these eleven deceptively transparent theses are really riddles' (*FM*, 36 et sq.). A critique Althusser most likely wrote in the summer of 1982 was published posthumously in 1995. The ThF, which he still cites in Engels's version, appears to him to be 'enthralled by Feuerbach's and Hegel's concepts', but at the same time mark a break, 'indeed a remarkable break, because it remains open'. Althusser attaches the evaluation above all to Thesis 11. That philosophers had 'only interpreted' the world, an assertion he attributes to Marx without reflecting on Engels's shift in emphasis, he considers 'completely false. They have never, at any time, refrained from changing the world because they were in practice acting on it and its forms of knowledge and practice, certainly not directly but at a distance, in accordance with their disposition and action, something which is inherent in all philosophy' (1995, 9 et sq.). What most disturbed this critic of humanism in the ThF is the fact – cited by Gold-

mann in opposing **Althusser's** elimination of 'the human being' – that this concept is present in almost all of the ThF (1977, 90). Apparently, for Althusser the philosophy of praxis is Neo-Kantian: the 'primacy of practice over theory, the immanence of "human action" in the "object" and of practice in theory' turns practice, according to Althusser, into 'an unknown transcendental subject' (1995, 11). It is evident that Althusser read 'sensuous human activity, practice' in Thesis 1 as a pseudo-Hegelian substance-subject rather than the concrete plane of innumerable individual practices, which alone reveals reality.

9. *Open questions.* – The relation of the ThF to the *GI* needs to be re-examined in light of the critical edition of both texts, as well as the correspondence from the Brussels period. In doing so, the concrete question arises as to why out of the two key concepts of the ThF, *practice* and *activity*, the former in particular appears to receive marginal treatment in the *GI*. Does this imply a new revision in **Marx's** thinking or a difference with **Engels**? What does the absence of the concept of labour mean? How to explain that **Marx** never brought the ThF to the attention of his friend and co-author of *GI*?

But much more important questions are posed by the ThF for future history: Will an associated capacity to act ever take form that will pass from the interpretation of existence – indeed of humanity's capacity to survive – to change-effecting action – and in so doing, constitute 'social humanity'? Will social divisions and the corresponding ideological 'duplications' ever be overcome? Jacques **Derrida**, who appears to have dismissed the ideological critique of such duplications, insists all the more emphatically on that source of unrest named in Thesis 11. He criticises the zeitgeist that by contrast is ready 'to accept the return of **Marx** or the return to **Marx**, on the condition that a silence is maintained about **Marx's** injunction not just to decipher but to act and to make the deciphering [the interpretation] into a transformation that "changes the world" (1994, 38). What is imperative is 'without delay, to do everything we can so as to avoid the neutralizing anesthesia of a new theoreticism, and to prevent a philosophico-philological return to **Marx** from prevailing' (1994, 39). And yet such a return will equally be required if it is true that 'Marxism has defeated itself', not least due to the 'inability to absorb some of the lessons of the *ThF* in time' (**MacIntyre** 1996, 554).

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→ activity, appropriation, Austro-Marxism, Brecht School (II), change/to transform, complete Edition of Marx and Engels, contemplative materialism, critique of religion, debate on humanism, doubling, early writings, educationalism, enlightenment, ensemble of social relations, epistemology, Feuerbachian materialism, form, idealism, interpretation, marxism, materialism, mechanical materialism, objectivism, philosophy of praxis, practice, praxis, reconstruction, religion, revolution, self-transformation, social milieu, species-being, species-essence, theory, theory of knowledge, truth, women's movement

→ Aneignung, anschauender Materialismus, Aufklärung, Austromarxismus, Brecht-Linie (II), Edukationismus, Ensemble der gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse, Epistemologie, Erkenntnistheorie, Feuerbachscher Materialismus, Form, Frauenbewegung, Frühschriften, Gattungswesen, Genese, Humanismus-Streit, Idealismus, Interpretation, Marxismus, Materialismus, mechanischer Materialismus, MEGA, Milieu, Objektivismus, Philosophie der Praxis, Pragmatismus, Praxis, Rekonstruktion, Religion, Religionskritik, Revolution, Selbstveränderung, Tätigkeit, Theorie, Verändern, Verdoppelung, Wahrheit

An Open-Ended Project in Global Marxism

The contributors to the Berlin-based project of the *Historical-Critical Dictionary of Marxism* (HCDM) with the earliest and latest birth years are Henri Lefebvre (b. 1901) and Sauli Havu (b. 1998). The gap between the dates, encompassing nearly the entire twentieth century, means one of them was old enough to remember the Russian Revolution of 1917, while the other was born almost a decade after the fall of the European socialist states. While Lefebvre had passed away by the time the HCDM's first volume appeared in 1994, he left some material that has since been edited into three short entries ('Everydayness' [*Alltäglichkeit*], 'Metaphilosophy' [*Metaphilosophie*] and 'Surplus Product' [*Mehrprodukt*]). Havu has authored – in tandem with Juha Koivisto (b. 1958) – the entry 'Multicultural Question', due out this year in the HCDM's latest volume (9/11 *Mitleid – Nazismus* [Compassion – Nazism]). Neither is German; Havu is part of a strong Finnish component in the lexicon, represented in this volume by J.O. Andersson's 'Imperialism'. Lefebvre's contribution, in turn, evokes the HCDM's significant debt to French Marxist thought; a connection best embodied in the fact that the lexicon started off as a supplement to the German translation of the *Dictionnaire critique du marxisme* (Critical Dictionary of Marxism – DCM), published in 1982 as a collaboration of editor Georges Labica with Gérard Bensussan and the journal *Dialectiques*.¹

The key figure behind that translation initiative, and its eventual metamorphosis into a self-contained project that would eventually outstrip its French counterpart in length and scope, was the Marxist philosopher Wolfgang Fritz Haug (b. 1936), at the time a philosophy professor of the Free University of Berlin, now retired. Haug's international trajectory and wide network in the global Marxist sphere has decidedly shaped the HCDM's physiognomy; his brand of critical Marxism, in turn, provides its theoretical framework to this day. The key role of its initiator notwithstanding, the HCDM is a quintessentially collective enterprise, centred around the Berlin Institute of Critical Theory (*Berliner Institut für kritische Theorie* – InKriT); its active editorial board of around two dozen members coordinates a network of authors and

1 A second, revised edition, with Bensussan as co-editor, was published in 1985. A third edition followed in 1999, conserving the 1985 text. See Bensussan and Labica's October 1998 'Préface à la troisième édition', *Dictionnaire critique du marxisme*, Paris: PUF, xv–xvi.

collaborators spread across the disciplines (and latitudes) now numbering in the hundreds.

The entries gathered in the present volume aim to reflect both dimensions of the HCDM, i.e., its international imprint and concrete situatedness. The Berlin-based project began as a two-pronged effort of renewal – against the ossified Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy propped up by ruling communist parties and as a response to a supposed ‘crisis of [Western] Marxism’ in the 1980s. Against the backdrop of European state socialism’s utter collapse and the onset of neo-liberal globalisation in the 1990s, it quickly metamorphosed into a bulwark of resistance and revitalisation in the global Marxist landscape. Due to its ambitious scope, the challenging conjuncture it has faced, but also the success of its ‘formula’, the HCDM remains an ongoing, open-ended project. In what follows, I briefly delve into some of the key historical and theoretical strands that have converged to give the HCDM its peculiar physiognomy in the hopes of shedding light on a project that readers can profit from and, hopefully, actively contribute to. The goal of this translation volume and the (re)internationalisation project behind it is, hence, twofold: expand the HCDM’s global readership and, on this basis, win over a new cohort of authors and collaborators to propel what, as of 2023, will be its fourth decade of activities.²

1 An International Network as Impulse

Due to its direct links to the *Dictionnaire Critique du Marxisme*, any reconstruction of the HCDM’s international genealogy must make reference to Wolfgang F. Haug’s reception of French Marxist thought, from his critical dialogue with Althusser – approached in its further development in Jan Rehmann’s entry ‘**Theory of Ideology**’ – to his affinities with Georges Labica’s deconstruction of the Marxist-Leninist paradigm. The long list of French contributors to the HCDM – from Lefebvre to figures like Étienne Balibar, Isabelle Garo and Lucien Sève – is a testament to this cross-border exchange, represented in the present volume by André Tosel’s ‘**Communism**’.

2 Since mid-2019, the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation has supported the project ‘Internationalisation of the Historical-Critical Dictionary of Marxism’ with funds from the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development of the Federal Republic of Germany. The project’s main goals are the diffusion of the HCDM internationally (and especially in the Global South) through translations, workshops, and collaborations. Alongside this volume and other English-language selections, the project oversees the publication of Spanish-language selections and supports the full translation of the HCDM into Chinese.

In an indication of the *global* nature of the international network that propelled the HCDM's emergence, Haug's acquaintance with the *Dictionnaire Critique* and its initiators did not stem primarily from his time as a guest lecturer in Paris in 1983. His contact with Labica³ dates back, in fact, to the 'Socialism in the World' international conferences held in the then Yugoslavian coastal city of Cavtat. In a recent interview with Serbian researcher Aleksandar Matković, Haug emphasised the key role of these conferences – which constituted a rare 'non-aligned' space of convergence for global leftist thinkers from 1976 to 1989 – in terms of the genesis of the contributor network that would underpin the HCDM's first decades of work.⁴ This includes, for instance, his acquaintance with figures like Ernest Mandel (1923–1995) and Samir Amin (1931–2018), whose single entry in the lexicon – this volume's 'Anticolonialism' – should not belie his important bridge-building role between the Berlin-based project and Marxists from outside Europe.

Those extra-European connections are also represented by a few more Middle-Eastern authors and a small contingent of Asian contributors – the latter based mainly in Japan, followed by China and India – but, above all, by the HCDM's significant Latin American cohort. If the forthcoming volume 9/11 is included, Cubans, Brazilians, and Argentinians will have written about a dozen entries for the project so far. Multiple generations of Mexican contributors, amongst which are Pablo González Casanova (b. 1922) and Gabriel Vargas Lozano (b. 1947), will have been responsible, in turn, for almost twice that number; the editorial board even constituted a Mexico-based 'consultive committee' in 1996. The formalisation of this 'bilateral' collaboration harkens back to the project initiator's strong ties to the country and its thinkers. The HCDM's period of genesis in the 1980s coincided, in fact, with Haug and his Berlin-based collaborators' heightened reception of Latin American Marxist thought. The publisher *Argument*, founded by Haug, was responsible for the German-language edition

3 See Haug's 2010 account of his friendship with Georges Labica, "Une passion partagée": Georges Labica et le Dictionnaire (historique et) critique du marxisme, available at: <http://www.wolfgangfritzhaug.inkrit.de/documents/Labica-Alger-10.pdf>.

4 The proceedings of these conferences were published yearly in the journal *Socialism in the World* (Belgrade, 1977–1989). As Matković detailed in a recent e-mail, the events were organised by Belgrade's Center for Social Research (*Centar za društvena istraživanja* or CDI), namely, the main hub of a wide network of fairly autonomous Marxist centers in Yugoslavia. The CDI constituted a 'vehicle for the "self-research of the party"', i.e., the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, and was tasked with 'carrying out both surveys and scientific inquiry related to [the LCY's] political decisions'. Miloš Nikolić was the key figure behind both the CDI and Cavtat conferences; Haug also stressed his importance to the genesis of the HCDM during the interview (held online on March 30, 2022).

of José Carlos Mariátegui's *Siete ensayos de interpretación de la realidad peruana* (*Seven Interpretive Essays on Peruvian Reality*) in 1986 and, most recently, the first volume of essays from Ecuadorian thinker Bolívar Echeverría in German translation.⁵

The dynamic detailed by Eleonore von Oertzen in this volume's 'Mariáteguism' with regards to the international genesis and diffusion of the Peruvian Marxist's work is, hence, also at play in the HCDM's ties to Latin America. In both cases, the reception (and re-elaboration) of Marxist thought beyond Europe 'crosses back' over the Atlantic to impact the West European intellectual landscape, just as a new round of appropriation in postcolonial contexts gets underway, in a continuous process of circulation (as characterised by William W. Hansen in the close of 'Fanonism'). Along these lines, Wolfgang F. Haug and his collaborators' drive to preserve and reclaim the living legacy of the Marxist tradition since its nineteenth-century inception has consistently overlapped with an urgent search for new modes and forms of Marxist thought, not least beyond Europe, in a combined process of recovery and reorientation that underlies the HCDM's framework to this day.

Haug's reception of the ideas of Mexico-based (Spanish-born) thinker Adolfo Sánchez Vázquez, and especially the latter's contribution to reconceptualising Marxism as a 'philosophy of praxis', is exemplary in this regard. In an essay from 1980, Sánchez Vázquez framed this work of praxeological 'reorientation' in the following terms: 'Praxis is the axis upon which Marxism articulates itself in its triple dimensionality: as a project to radically transform the world, as an – equally radical – critique of existing reality, and as the necessary knowledge of the reality to be transformed'.⁶ Latching on to these impulses, Haug and his team turned to another purveyor of Marxism as 'philosophy of praxis', Antonio Gramsci, whose *Prison Notebooks* they translated and published in a critical edition from 1991 to 2002 (an edition of the *Prison Letters* would follow around a decade after). These translation and 'bridge-building' efforts into global Marxism, enormous undertakings unto themselves, necessarily impacted HCDM production. The Gramsci connection facilitated, for one, the arrival of a significant number of Italian contributors as well as of Gramscian thinkers from the

5 See, respectively, José Carlos Mariátegui ([1928] 1986), *Sieben Versuche die peruanische Wirklichkeit zu verstehen*, Berlin (West): Argument / Fribourg: Exodus; and Bolívar Echeverría (2021), *Für eine alternative Moderne: Studien zu Krise, Kultur und Mestizaje*, ed. David Graaff, Javier Sigüenza, Lukas Böckmann, Hamburg: Argument. Latin American resistance to the neoliberal offensive – and experiments towards 'alternatives' to it – in the region since the 1980s no doubt helped dynamise these intellectual exchanges.

6 Adolfo Sánchez Vázquez ([1980] 1997), '¿Por qué y para qué enseñar filosofía?', *Filosofía y circunstancias*, Barcelona: Anthropos / México, D.F.: Facultad de Filosofía y Letras (UNAM), 43.

Anglophone space (including Peter Thomas, an HCDM contributor and instrumental figure in the publication of the first entries translated into English in the *Historical Materialism* journal). Gramsci's thought is approached in several of this volume's entries – notably in 'Absolute Historicism', 'Hegemony', 'Luxemburg-Gramsci Line' and 'Intellectuals' – in a testament to the meaning of this 'rediscovery' for those thinkers (in the German context and beyond) attempting to prevent the crisis conjuncture of the 1990s from unravelling the Marxist landscape altogether.

International cooperation between the pockets of impenitent Marxists that remained active in that conjuncture was crucial for the preservation – continuing into the present – of a space of radical critique of the existing capitalist reality. The HCDM was (and remains) precisely one such node for the coming together of diverse strands of critical theory from around the world. Yet, while the lexicon can only be understood from the standpoint of its international genealogy – a trait it shares with other contemporary Marxist projects – it is the oblique connections that have constituted it that make the HCDM peculiar. In other words, the fact that the road of its German initiators to heterodox French Marxism and reappraisal of Gramsci's legacy went, respectively, through Yugoslavia and Mexico.

2 The 'Berlin School of Critical Theory'

If the HCDM's trajectory cannot be understood without reference to its international roots and key role of its initiator, the project's rootedness in a divided-then-united Germany and collaborative character are equally central to its makeup. In that regard, the lexicon's role as a vehicle of 'plural Marxism' and lively controversy across borders coexists with and is propelled by its editors' *specific* contribution to global Marxism, constituting what could be termed the 'Berlin School of Critical Theory'. While mapping out the different components of this collective intellectual enterprise would exceed the scope of this afterword, the entries published in the present volume provide clues to a few of its central coordinates. Wolfgang F. Haug's praxis-centred reconstruction of Marxian thought (see 'Dialectics' and 'Theses on Feuerbach') as both 'non-metaphysical' and 'anti-naturalistic', for instance, conjugates Antonio Labriola and Bertolt Brecht. In 'Luxemburg-Gramsci Line', Frigga Haug, a chief-editor of the HCDM, invites a 'reciprocal' study of Rosa Luxemburg and Gramsci to 'reinforce political hope and, with it, the capacity for action [*Handlungsfähigkeit*]'. That concept, in turn, is approached by Rinse Reeling Brouwer and Morus Markard, respectively, in its Spinozan roots and appropriation in

the framework of Klaus Holzkamp's Critical Psychology in the entry '**Action Potence, Agency**'.

Holzkamp and the Haugs collaborated closely over several decades, struggling relentlessly as colleagues at the Free University of Berlin to safeguard institutional space for Marxist psychology and philosophy in a hostile Cold War conjuncture; a space that, with the eclipsing of the bipolar world in the 1990s, has paradoxically become even narrower in German academia (critical, left-wing professors constitute rare exceptions, such as '**Land Seizure/Land Grab**' author Klaus Dörre (b. 1957), chair of labour and economic sociology at the University of Jena). The relevant presence of Marxists and other radical thinkers in West German universities from the 1960s through to the 1980s was due, fundamentally, to a spillover of the Federal Republic's social-movement ferment into the academic landscape. The emergence of the movement for peace and against nuclear armament in that country in the 1950s, for instance, is directly tied to the HCDM's history, considering it provided the framework for the formation of the journal *Das Argument* by Wolfgang F. Haug in 1959. The West Berlin-based platform emerged from the convergence of a broad spectrum of humanist intellectuals (e.g., Margherita von Brentano, Helmut Gollwitzer and Klaus Heinrich) and various progressive student and confessional organisations. The publication would closely engage with the labour, student and Third World movements in the run-up to and aftermath of the 1968 events, coalescing many of the critical Marxists (and core controversies) that would later culminate in the lexicon initiative; the journal remains in print today.

It is in the late-1970s, however, that many of the early members of the HCDM's editorial board, both from West Germany and abroad, come together in the framework of the 'Theory of Ideology Project' (*Projekt Ideologie-Theorie – PIT*), directed by W.F. Haug at the FU Berlin from 1977 to 1985. As Haug recounts, the project raised the 'question of socialisation [*Vergesellschaftung*] within the overlapping framework of the division of labour, antagonistic class-based relations of production, and ideological powers, primarily the state'. The PIT not only produced a range of publications on the theoretical dimensions of ideological phenomena and, in a considerable empirical effort, the 'ideological powers in German fascism';⁷ it would form many of the key contributors to the HCDM, such as Jan Rehmann (b. 1953), Peter Jehle (b. 1954) and Thomas Weber (b. 1954) and provide a further platform for exchange with researchers from outside Germany and Europe.

7 See Wolfgang F. Haug (1986), 'Das "Projekt Ideologie-Theorie" (1977–1985): Ein Nachruf', available at <http://www.wolfgangfritzhaug.inkrit.de/documents/PIT-Nachruf1986.pdf>.

The dialogue between Marxist scholars and social movements in post-1968 West Germany equally extends to the feminist upsurge of the 1970s. As Frigga Haug, the main conduit of this debate within the HCDM, stresses: ‘**Marxism-Feminism** is characterised by its effort to fight and work for an integration of the feminist revolution into Marxism. The resistance it encounters means that feminism has been forced to take on an initially oppositional and polemical form’. This ever-current vector of renewal within Marxism has had a central role in the HCDM over the years; F. Haug’s ‘**Cook (female)**’ and ‘**Gender Relations**’ round up, alongside Lise Vogel’s account of the ‘**Domestic-Labour Debate**’, a small sample of a Marxist-Feminist output that now adds to several dozen entries in the lexicon.⁸

Finally, this volume also aims to reflect the lasting engagement of the HCDM’s founders and editors with the critique of political economy,⁹ harking back to W.F. Haug’s classic work *Critique of Commodity Aesthetics*¹⁰ and long-running course on Marx’s *Capital* at the FU Berlin,¹¹ as well as their early concern with the contradictory – exploitation-increasing, but also potentially

8 Entries (and entry segments) with a feminist scope form a corpus sizeable enough to have been spun off into a lexicon of its own, the ‘Historical-Critical Dictionary of Feminism’ (*Historisch-Kritisches Wörterbuch des Feminismus*), published in three volumes (2003, 2011, 2014) by Argument. A collaboration with Latin American Marxist and feminist intellectuals over 2020–21 led, in turn, to the publication of a Marxist-Feminist entry selection in Spanish in early 2022 in the framework of the HCDM’s ‘Internationalisation’ project. The *Diccionario Histórico-Crítico del Marxismo-Feminismo* (edited by Mariela Ferrari, Victor Strazzeri, and Miguel Vedda, Buenos Aires: Herramienta), gathers 34 entries from *Brija* (witch) to *Trabajo femenino* (female labour/women’s labour).

9 See W.F. Haug’s ‘**Capitalist Mode of Production**’, Michael Vester’s ‘**Class in Itself/for Itself**’, Thomas Sablowski’s ‘**Crisis Theories**’ and Mario Candeias’s ‘**International Division of Labour**’.

10 Published in English by Polity in 1986. The German original dates back to 1971; its latest revised edition was published in 2009: *Kritik der Warenästhetik: überarbeitete Neuausgabe gefolgt von Warenästhetik im High-Tech-Kapitalismus*, Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp.

11 The course was another key entry-point for subsequent lexicon contributors. Conceived as an introduction to Marxist theory work and critical research practice with *Capital* as its reference point – rather than a conventional reading course – it started while Haug was still a postgraduate assistant at the FU in 1970–1 and ran until 2000–1. Thousands of students from a wide disciplinary background would attend both the lectures and the smaller, tutor-led work-sessions during the period. The lessons are gathered in two volumes: *Vorlesungen zur Einführung ins ‘Kapital’* and *Neue Vorlesungen zur Einführung ins ‘Kapital’*, published in their latest editions by Argument in 2005 and 2006; they were followed by the volume *Das Kapital lesen – aber wie?* from 2013. The first tome of the *Vorlesungen* was translated into Spanish (in 1974, revised in 1978), Slovenian (1980) and French (1983). The Spanish translation has recently been re-edited based on the updated German third edition (*Lecciones de introducción a la lectura de ‘El Capital’*, Barcelona: Laertes/Trebol Negro,

emancipatory – dimensions of technical development, dating back to the Frigga Haug-led ‘Project Automation and Qualification’ (*Projekt Automation und Qualifikation* – PAQ) based at the FU Berlin’s Institute of Psychology in the 1970s and 1980s. Christof Ohm (b. 1942), the author of ‘**Hacker**’, was a researcher at the PAQ and is a long-time member of the HCDM’s editorial board; the lexicon’s focus on the ever-evolving aspects of capitalism’s transformation into a *high-tech* mode of production has carried over into earlier cohorts of contributors – see Mario Candeias’s (b. 1969) ‘**Cybertariat**’ – and was recently the focus of a double-issue of *Das Argument* on ‘online capitalism’.¹²

The journal’s analogously forward-looking engagement with the ecological question – ‘ecology’ has figured as a rubric in its review section since 1978 and a constant stream of articles on the topic dots its issues throughout the 1980s and 1990s all the way into the present – is represented by Peter Schyga’s and Victor Wallis’s ‘**Limits to Growth**’. The lexicon’s three-decade journey to the letter ‘n’ and the current conjuncture of climate catastrophe and rise of new ecological movements has, in turn, rekindled debate on human-nature relations from the standpoint of the philosophy of praxis within the HCDM (resulting in the nature-related ‘article complex’ of the upcoming vol. 9/11).

3 A (Rare) Bridge between the Two Germanies

After Lefebvre, the HCDM’s oldest author is the historian Jürgen Kuczynski (1904–1997). Kuczynski, whose lifelong political engagement dated back to his militancy in communist organisations in the 1920s before he joined the German Communist Party in 1930, was a leading intellectual in the German Democratic Republic (GDR). Termed a ‘critical believer’ of the East German socialist system by historian Mario Kessler,¹³ his relationship to the GDR’s ruling party and authorities was marked by a form of alignment that never devolved into utter capitulation to dogmatism or the abandonment of his critical stance. He remained a committed Marxist after 1989 and wrote the entry ‘Misery, Poverty’ (*Elend*) for the HCDM, published on the year of his death.

2016). I thank Dr. Hansjörg Tuguntke, former course tutor and current InkriT chair, for the information on the *Capital* courses.

12 See ‘Online-Kapitalismus: Umwälzungen in Produktions- und Lebensweise’, *Das Argument* 335, 2021.

13 For a portrayal of Kuczynski’s trajectory as a ‘critical believer’ and ambivalent status as a ‘faithful dissident’ in the GDR and beyond, see Kessler’s essay, ‘Jürgen Kuczynski – ein linientreuer Dissident?’, *UTOPIE kreativ* 171, 2005, 42–49.

Kuczynski's participation in the lexicon is indicative of another of its defining traits, namely, the significant contribution of intellectuals active in East Germany (or who grew up in the now extinct country). The HCDM's integration of critical Marxists from the former GDR is arguably one of the project's greatest feats of 'internationalisation'; while scientific research in unified Germany without a doubt boasts a broad international character, projects gathering academics from both 'Germanies' on equal footing have been a rare phenomenon over the last three decades. Indeed, the longest distance from (former-West) Germany to any other country seems to be the one separating it from the other (former-East) Germany. In this regard, the HCDM provided a rare lifeline to a collective of researchers whose work would be otherwise inaccessible beyond German libraries and archives.

This applies to Kuczynski and intellectuals like Heinrich Taut (1907–1995), who were born early enough to be politicised in the Weimar Republic, join the communist resistance in Nazi Germany, and eventually choose to resettle in the GDR after their return from exile. The lexicon's value as an outlet was greater, however, for a cohort of HCDM contributors born 'into' the German socialist state. This is true of several of its authors who grew up in the 1920s and 1930s, such as legal scholar Hermann Klenner (b. 1926) and musicologist Günter Mayer (1930–2010), both of whom had mature careers by the time the GDR collapsed;¹⁴ even more so, however, for those whose trajectory as Marxist intellectuals in East German institutions was interrupted at a relatively early point by the events of 1989, such as Thomas Marxhausen (1947–2010) and Wolfram Adolphi (b. 1951). Much like the viable East German enterprises that were either acquired by West German competitors or purposefully ran out of business to benefit them, unification represented a massive destruction of 'intellectual' productive forces, with a large segment of the GDR's scientific establishment labelled too 'compromised' to continue scientific work by their West German peers.¹⁵

In this volume, the contribution of researchers trained in East Germany is represented by Lutz-Dieter Behrendt (b. 1941) and Wolfgang Küttler (b. 1936),

14 Other members of this generation of East German intellectuals, such as philosophers Helmut Seidel (1929–2007) and Wolfgang Heise (1925–1987), contributed to the HCDM's approach to the 'philosophy of praxis' and the ecological question, respectively, even if they ultimately never authored entries for the lexicon.

15 Werner Röhr has reconstructed the 'winding down' or *Abwicklung* of the GDR's historical research establishment by their West German counterparts through highly questionable procedures in *Abwicklung: das Ende der Geschichtswissenschaft der DDR*, Berlin: Edition Organon, 2011–2012, 2 vols.

one of the HCDM's chief-editors. The entries in question, '**Kronstadt Rebellion**' and '**Lenin's Marxism**', symptomatically demand a serious effort of self-criticism by the authors; not only due to their GDR roots, but in their defiant adherence to Marxism 'after the deluge' and into a present still hostile to emancipatory articulations of alternatives to capitalism. In that respect, if the responsibility of 'settling accounts' with the legacy of the Soviet experience and the contradictions of the thought and trajectory of major Marxist thinkers such as Vladimir Lenin cuts through the ensemble of HCDM authors, East Germans have understandably experienced the complexities and lacerations of that process more intensely. In that regard, as a platform for coming to terms with a catastrophic historical defeat and coalescing no longer bridgeable East-West divides, the HCDM has also witnessed the flaring up of psychic and personal trauma amongst its contributors, at times with cathartic, at times with quite painful consequences.

Conversely, the lexicon project's stress on 'unresolved' and 'undisposed of' aspects of emancipatory struggle and thought mean it is fundamentally oriented towards a possible better future; it is 'historical-critical', therefore, also in the sense that its entries are produced from the standpoint of a clear-eyed outlook *on the present* and as a hope-bearing intervention *into it*. As J. Rehmann writes in '**Hope**', referencing Ernst Bloch, the HCDM is rooted in the active search for a 'future embedded in the past which is still to be realised'.

4 An Unfinished Project with a History

The publications of the HCDM's first three volumes – in 1994, 1995, and 1997, respectively – predate its soon-to-be youngest author, Sauli Havu. The project, in other words, has by now its 'own', decades-long history. After nine volumes – adding up to thirteen tomes published between 1994 and 2022 – it is, nevertheless, not close to being finished. In terms of the (German) alphabetical list, we are barely into letter 'n', with work on vol. 10/1 (*Nebenwiderspruch – Ökofeminismus* [Secondary Contradiction – Ecofeminism]) set to begin in earnest only in 2023. Yet, the perspective driving the HCDM makes all thought of 'being finished' relative; the lexicon is itself a living project with each tome representing both a link in an accumulated corpus of work and a new beginning. As such, the HCDM's volumes form their own microcosm, due to the specific conjuncture under which they are produced – each tome takes around three years of work – and the peculiar collective of authors and collaborators they gather. While a full list of entries from A to Z was established at the outset of the project in the early-1990s through a dialogue between the editors and a

broad panel of international experts, it is complemented and updated with the start of work on each new volume. The process usually reveals entry topics that have since been transcended or lost their urgency; absences, on the other hand, underline issues which were not on the horizon – or had not received proper attention – until recently. Novel issues or concepts might, of course, also have emerged.

Given this high degree of mutability, the alphabetical ordering emerges as an accidental but useful baseline limiting each volume's scope and ambition. Previous omissions or new additions must be addressed within the range set by the first and last entries (though compound nouns and the creative use of adjectives and word order provide some leeway). Each letter brings, furthermore, interrelated entries that are produced, as much as possible, in dialogue with each other (e.g., the entries on 'materialism' in vol. 9/I or on 'nation' in 9/II) and which give volumes their overarching themes.

Ongoing internationalisation and translation initiatives further complicate the HCDM's alphabetical timeline. The project that started as a translation of a lexicon in 1983, before turning into a self-contained original endeavour, is now being translated into several languages, with particular intensity into Chinese, English, and Spanish.¹⁶ Translation necessarily shuffles the alphabetic ordering of entry production, alongside its chronology, as is the case of this volume. It also provides further insight into omissions, silences, and biases that a concretely situated project, with its specific conjuncture, theoretical-editorial line, and set of bearers, will inevitably produce. In this sense, much like Marx's efforts in *Capital*, the HCDM is always 'finished' and ever incomplete.

Most revealing in this regard is the Peking University-led 'complete translation' of the HCDM, given that entry order becomes entirely contingent once converted to Chinese characters. The choice to translate each volume as such has, however, the key advantage of faithfully preserving and immediately displaying their historicity; with the contingent alphabetical ordering out of view, the interval of production re-emerges as the fundamental link between a given set of entries.

As of late 2022, Chinese readers will have access to three integral HCDM volumes published in the 1990s. These volumes' almost three-decade old publication dates does not necessarily mean, however, that they are per se 'dated'. Such an interval might well vindicate (or dispel) aspects of lexicon projects like the DCM and the HCDM; the Chinese – and otherwise international – reception

16 About twenty articles have also been translated into Turkish (see the Journal *Felsefelogos* at felsefelogos.org) and, more recently, Persian through the militant initiative and efforts of HCDM collaborators Sinan Özbek and Hassan Maarfi Poor, respectively.

will be the judge in that regard. But marks of historicity are never ‘blemishes’ in a Marxist-oriented project. As Labica and Bensussan reflected in the preface to the third edition of the DCM in 1999, which – despite all intervening transformations – they left unaltered from the 1985 version:

At the end of the day, in its three editions and their respective dates – which are as indicative as the successive positions of a slider on a ruler – the *Dictionnaire critique du marxisme* constitutes the testimony of a life, the life of Marxism in the determined conditions of a space and a time.¹⁷

The same is true, of course, of the HCDM’s entries and volumes. Yet, because it is an ongoing endeavour and far from finished, if the exhaustive Chinese translation project continues over the next decade or so, it will eventually catch up with the production of the ‘original’ lexicon. Hopefully, by the time there is nothing left to translate, the cohort of Chinese authors will also have increased, fostering the project’s ‘completion’ (at least according to the ‘provincial’ German alphabetical entry list). The same goes, naturally, for the translation projects into other languages. As a key part of them, this volume is an invitation for participation in an open-ended project, whose ‘identity’ is also in permanent mutation. As Stuart Hall (1932–2014), another HCDM interlocutor whose lone entry in the lexicon (‘Identification’) is both highly symbolic and barely indicative of his significance to the project, underscored, ‘the process of identification’ behind ‘identity’ is neither univocal nor static. It is, rather, ‘the product of taking a position, of staking a place in a certain discourse or practice’. As such, it is ‘always, as they say, in process. It is in the making. It is moving from a determined past toward the horizon of a possible future, which is not yet fully known’.¹⁸

The same applies to the ongoing production of this lexicon project. For more information on how to contribute, see the InkriT’s homepage (inkrit.org) and the internationalisation project’s blog (hkwm.blog).

5 Conclusion – a Space of Confluency

In a 1999 interview to the French publication *Regards* titled ‘Marxism as a globalisation project’, Wolfgang F. Haug described the conjuncture that produced

17 ‘Préface à la troisième édition’, *Dictionnaire critique du marxisme*, Paris: PUF, XVI.

18 Stuart Hall, ([2007] 2019), ‘Through the prism of an intellectual life’, David Morley (ed.), *Essential essays, vol. 2: identity and diaspora*, Durham and London: Duke University Press, 315.

the HCDM and presented its fundamental, two-pronged task in the following terms:

The historical rupture of the years 1989–91, the end of the bipolar East-West world have put in danger an entire universe of critical ideas and practices rooted in the social struggles of that century. It is necessary to, simultaneously, save the treasures buried under the ruins and to subject to self-critique the enormous errors committed along this history, *so we are prepared for the future*.¹⁹

In its attempt to both ‘safeguard’ a century-and-a-half of critical Marxist thought from permanent loss under the rubble of state socialism, at the same time attending to its permanent renewal and multiple (at times conflicting) strands, the HCDM is above all a future-oriented space of ‘confluency’. Mariátegui used the term to describe the virtuous ‘blending together [*aleación*] of “indigenism” and socialism’ in 1927. He writes:

I confess to have arrived at an appreciation, an understanding of the value and the meaning of the indigenous in our time neither through erudition, aesthetic intuition, or even theoretical speculation, but rather through the – at once intellectual, emotional, and practical – pathway of socialism.²⁰

As with other conduits of emancipatory convergence in both the spheres of social struggle and theoretical production, the HCDM provides both the possibility to meet along that path, and calls for the active participation in shaping its trajectory. The ‘confluency’ of streams towards emancipation, despite the rubble in its way, is wide, and has not yet come to a stop.

Victor Strazzeri

Carouge GE, Switzerland – Summer 2022

19 Olivier Gebuhrer, ‘Du marxisme comme projet de mondialisation: entretien avec Wolfgang Fritz Haug’, *Regards: les idées en mouvement*, Vol. 50 (1 October, 1999), No. 6, 15–16. (The emphasis is mine.)

20 José Carlos Mariátegui ([1927] 1976), ‘Intermezzo polemico’, Manuel Aquézo Castro (ed.), *La polémica del indigenismo*, La Paz: Mosca Azul, 76.

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