1 Details of the Bulletin of Activities are given on p. 67.Google Scholar

2 There is a vast amount of Soviet literature available on the subject of military doctrine and strategy, but comparatively little Chinese material. Possibly the Chinese have an extensive body of restricted literature on the subject, but more likely, because of their lack of advanced weapons and their admitted technological inferiority to the West, they simply have not explored many of the problems which concern Soviet military policy makers.Google Scholar

3 Resolution of the Enlarged Session of Military Affairs Committee Concerning the Strengthening of Indoctrination Work in Troop Units, 10 20, 1960, in Bulletin, 01 7, 1961Google Scholar; Chien-ying, Yeh, speech at Military Affairs Committee Conference on Training, late 01 1961, in Bulletin, 02 20, 1961.Google Scholar

4 Yeh Chien-ying, op. cit.Google Scholar

5idGoogle Scholar

6 Resolution of the Enlarged Session of Military Affairs Committee Concerning the Strengthening of Indoctrination Work in Troop Units, 10 20, 1960, in Bulletin, 01 7, 1961.Google Scholar

7 See, for example, “Important Discussion Records of the Army Training Forum on Thoroughly Fulfilling the Policy of ‘Fewer in Quantity but More Refined in Quality’”—The Year 1961, in Bulletin, 07 25, 1961.Google Scholar

8 Yeh Chien-ying is also a member of the Party's Central Committee, a member of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, and Vice-Chairman of the National Defence Council. In 1954 he was appointed Director of the Inspectorate of the Armed Forces and, in 1958, President and Political Commissar of the Academy of Military Science of the People's Liberation Army. In 1955, Yeh was one of two Chinese generals who openly admitted the implications of nuclear warfare. At that time he advocated the purchase of modern equipment from abroad.Google Scholar

9 Yeh Chien-ying, op. cit.Google Scholar

10 It should be noted that, despite Soviet distortion of the Chinese position on war, particularly in the July–December 1963 exchanges, the Chinese position on the possibility of avoiding a world war is in fact not very different from that of the Russians. This strongly suggests that the Chinese believe that the Soviet nuclear shield does deter an unprovoked U.S. attack on China. The Sino-Soviet argument on war and peace centres more on the degree of support that the Soviet Union should give to China's external objectives and the extent to which revolutionary activity should be encouraged in underdeveloped areas. For a more detailed discussion of this subject, see Langley Hsieh, Alice, The Sino-Soviet Nuclear Dialogue, 1963 (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, P–2852, 01 1964 to be published in the June issue of The Journal of Conflict Resolution.Google Scholar

11 Most Chinese public statements have, as a matter of policy, disparaged the impact of nuclear weapons on modern military operations and strategic concepts. However, as early as July 1955 concern over the danger of a sudden nuclear attack was voiced by Generals Yeh Chien-ying and Liu Po-ch'eng. Again, in October 1957, the publication Fang-k'ung Chun (Air Defence Troops) assessed the main threat as that of a surprise attack from the air. See Hsieh, A. L., Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1962), pp. 34–36, 70–71.Google Scholar

12Bulletin, 02 20, 1961.Google Scholar

13 It should be noted that dawn and dusk flights are a World War II technique that loses much of its significance as a result of the use of radar.Google Scholar

14Ch'eng-wu, Yang, speech before the All-Army Communications Specialty Conference, in Bulletin, 05 22, 1961.Google Scholar

15 Chinese officers, like most military men, place a high value on the element of surprise and expect an enemy to do the same. It is no accident that in tactical conventional and tactical-nuclear operations Chinese training manuals continue to emphasise the element of surprise in offence. See, for example, Academy of Military Science, “Our Armed Forces' Combat Laws and Ordinances are Products of Mao Tse-tung's Military Thinking,” in Bulletin, 08 1, 1961.Google Scholar

16Ch'eng-wu, Yang, op. cit. For similar Soviet views on this subject, see Marshal, V. D.Sokolovskii, , ed., Soviet Military Strategy, translated and annotated by H. S. Dinerstein, L. Gouré, T. W. Wolfe (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, R-416-PR, 04 1963), p. 390.Google Scholar

17 Yeh Chien-ying, op. cit.Google Scholar

18 In their more open statements the Chinese have taken exception to the Soviet public position on local war—the Soviet position being that it is almost inevitable that local wars involving the nuclear powers will escalate into general war. See Gouré, Leon, Soviet Limited War Doctrine (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, P-2744, 05 1963). A Hung Ch'i (Red Flag) article on April 1, 1960, admitted that it is possible that local wars will escalate into general wars, but cited instances where U.S. aggression had been smashed—Korea, Egypt, Hungary, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Cuba—and from this argued that “the great force for safeguarding world peace can put local wars started by imperialism to a prompt end, and thus thwart imperialist plans for enlarging local wars.” More recently, in its letter of 07 14, 1963, to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union the Central Committee of the CCP again took exception to the Soviet view when it charged that “in recent years, certain persons have been spreading the argument that a single spark from a war of national liberation or from a revolutionary people's war will lead to a world conflagration destroying the whole of mankind.” In its September 1 statement, Peking argued that the United States could not use nuclear weapons in civil wars and wars of national independence because of the political costs of such use, the destructiveness of such weapons, and the close combat nature of military operations. At the same time the Chinese contradicted their 1960 analysis by depreciating the role of Soviet nuclear weapons in limiting local conflict.Google Scholar

19Chien-ying, Yeh, op. cit. For similar Russian views on the importance of the initial period of a war and on the need to occupy enemy country in order to achieve final victory, see Sokolovskii, , ed., Soviet Military Strategy, pp. 308 and 302.Google Scholar

20 Yang Ch'eng-wu, op. cit.Google Scholar

21 This concept of a “broken-back” war is to some extent similar to that voiced by Senior General Su Yü, then Chief of the General Staff, in mid-1957, though Su did not mention the possibility of bacteriological warfare. It differs from that presented in Fang-k'ung Chun (Air Defence Troops), a publication issued in October 1957, which emphasised the destruction of military areas, industrial complexes, and communication centres by surprise attack from the air and ignored the threat of invasion and of a counteroffensive carried out mainly by infantry. (See A. L. Hsieh, Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era, pp. 64–67, 70–71.)Google Scholar

22 “Important Discussion Records of the Army Training Forum on Thoroughly Fulfilling the Policy of Fewer in Quantity but More Refined in Quality—The Year 1961,” in Bulletin, July 25, 1961. These programmes also mention the use of atomic weapons, but in similar fashion place emphasis on training in defence against these weapons.Google Scholar

23 Lin Piao was elected Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee of the CCP and a member of the Standing Committee of the Politbureau in May 1958. In September 1958 he succeeded P'eng Teh-huai as Minister of National Defence. It was at that time that Lin probably became First Vice-Chairman of the Military Affairs Committee. In the reference to “Chief Lin” (Lin tsung), “Chief” (tsung) is used here as a traditional, popular, and respectful form of address to a ranking military officer regardless of his official title or rank.Google Scholar

24 Yeh Chien-ying, op. cit. (emphasis added).Google Scholar

25Chien-ying, Yeh, Summation Report, delivered at First Session of the Regulations and Ordinance Study and Acceptance Committee of the Military Affairs Committee, 04 15, 1961, in Bulletin, July 13, 1961 (emphasis added).Google Scholar

26 “Important Discussion Records of the Army Training Forum on Thoroughly Fulfilling the Policy of Fewer in Quantity but More Refined in Quality—The Year 1961,” in Bulletin, 07 25, 1961;Google ScholarAcademy of Military Science, “Our Amed Forces' Combat Laws and Ordinances are Products of Mao Tse-tung's Military Thinking,” in Bulletin, 08 1, 1961.Google Scholar

27 On August 15, 1963, Peking declared that “as far back as June 20, 1959, … the Soviet Government unilaterally tore up the agreement on new technology for national defence concluded between China and the Soviet Union on October 15, 1957, and refused to provide China with a sample of an atomic bomb and technical data concerning its manufacture.” (Statement by the spokesman of the Chinese Government (a comment on the Soviet Government's statement of August 3), August 15, 1963, NCNA, Peking, 08 14, 1963.)Google Scholar

28 The Military Affairs Committee Rectification and Dispatch of August 17, 1961, on General Rear Service Department's “Report on Rear Service Work Conference of Entire Armed Forces,” in Bulletin, 08 26, 1961.Google Scholar

29 Academy of Military Science, “Our Armed Forces' Combat Laws and Ordinances are Products of Mao Tse-tung's Military Thinking,” in Bulletin, 08 1, 1961.Google Scholar

30Chien-ying, Yeh, Summation Report, delivered at First Session of the Regulations and Ordinance Study and Acceptance Committee of the Military Affairs Committee, 04 15, 1961, in Bulletin, July 13, 1961 (emphasis added).Google Scholar

31 Resolution of the Enlarged Session of the Military Affairs Committee Concerning the Strengthening of Indoctrination Work in Troop Units,” 10 20, 1960, in Bulletin, 01 7, 1961.Google Scholar

32 Summary of Telephone Conference held by the Regulations and Ordinance Study and Acceptance Committee of the Military Affairs Committee, March 3, 1961, in Bulletin, 03 10, 1961. While the subject of differences in the Chinese military leadership is beyond the scope of this paper, the Bulletin material gives further support to the hypothesis that the reasons for the dismissal of P'eng included his questioning of the régime's challenge of the Soviet Union, his awareness that the modernisation of China's armed forces depended on continued Soviet military assistance, and his possible willingness to pay a price (for example, joint military control arrangements) for such assistance.Google Scholar

33 In the article, “The Origin and Development of the Differences between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves—Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU,” published by People's Daily and Red Flag on 09 6, 1963, the Chinese asserted: “In 1958 the leadership of the CPSU put forward unreasonable demands designed to bring China under Soviet military control. These unreasonable demands were rightly and firmly rejected by the Chinese Government.”Google Scholar

34 See Yeh Chien-ying, Summation Report, delivered at the First Session of the Regulations and Ordinance Study and Acceptance Committee of the Military Affairs Committee, April 15, 1961, in Bulletin, July 13, 1961; “The Military Affairs Committee Instructions Concerning Execution of Armed Forces Combat Regulations and Training Directives,” in Bulletin, August 1, 1961; Academy of Military Science, “Our Armed Forces' Combat Laws and Ordinances are Products of Mao Tse-tung's Military Thinking,” in Bulletin, 08 1, 1961. For similar Soviet statements on the role of morale in the armed forces, see Sokolovskii, , ed., Soviet Military Strategy, pp. 123–128.Google Scholar

35Chien-ying, Yeh, speech at the Military Affairs Committee Conference on Training, late January 1961, in Bulletin, 02 20, 1961 (emphasis added).Google Scholar

36 Instruction on Strictly Enforcing the Construction Policy Established by the Military Affairs Committee, in Bulletin, 07 25, 1961.Google Scholar

37 For Russian doctrine on this subject, see Sokolovskii, , ed., Soviet Military Strategy, pp. 449–458;Google Scholar and Gouré, Leon, The Role of Civil Defence in Soviet Strategy (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, RM-3703-PR, 06 1963), pp. 17–20.Google Scholar

38 See Air Force Party Committee Report to the Military Affairs Committee, General Staff Department, and General Political Department on its Eighth Plenary Session, December 16, 1960, in Bulletin, January 3, 1961; Liu Ya-lou, speech on “Training and Operational Problems of the Air Force” at the Air Force conference on training and operations, in Bulletin, February 20, 1961; “Lesson Learned from Failure in Air Warfare Engagement by Anti-aircraft Artillery Group in a Certain Position,” in Bulletin, March 10, 1961; Yeh Chien-ying, report to the Military Affairs Committee on “Problems of Military Training,” June 22, 1961, in Bulletin, July 25, 1961; “Summation of Anti-Air Raid Manoeuvres in Shenyang Military Region,” issued by the Shenyang Military Region Command Headquarters, May 23, 1961, in Bulletin, 06 28, 1961.Google Scholar

39 Air Force Party Committee Report to the Military Affairs Committee, General Staff Department, and General Political Department on its Eighth Plenary Session, December 16, 1960, in Bulletin, 01 3, 1961; Liu Ya-lou, op. cit.Google Scholar

40 “Lin Piao's Major Points on Signal Communications,” March 17, 1961, in Bulletin, May 22, 1961; Lo Jui-ch'ing, speech opening All-Army Communications Specialty Conference, in Bulletin, 05 22, 1961; Yang Ch'eng-wu, op. cit.Google Scholar

41 “Summation of Anti-Air Raid Manoeuvres in Shenyang Military Region,” issued by the Shenyang Military Region Command Headquarters, May 23, 1961, in Bulletin, June 28, 1961. This same role was assigned to the Air Force in the October 1957 publication, Fang-k'ung Chün (Air Defence Troops).Google Scholar

42 Liu Ya-lou, op. cit. “Mobility,” as used here, would appear to mean ability to use alternative airfields, dispersal sites and damaged fields.Google Scholar

43 Air Force Party Committee Report to the Military Affairs Committee, General Staff Department, and General Political Department on its Eighth Plenary Session, December 16, 1960, in Bulletin, 01 3, 1961.Google Scholar

44Life, 07 13, 1959, p. 36.Google Scholar

45Nanes, Allan, “The Armies of Red China,” Current History, 12 1960, p. 342;Google ScholarHarold, C.Hinton, , “Communist China's Military Posture,” Current History, 09 1962, p. 153.Google Scholar

46 Statement made by Hotz, Robert, editor of Aviation Week, on television programme “China and the Bomb,” recorded 05 27, 1963.Google Scholar

47 For what light it may cast on the question of delivery priorities, it should be noted that there is no evidence in the available issues of Bulletin that the Air Force was receiving any preference in the allocation of very scarce resources in early 1961. Like the other branches of the armed services, the Air Force was clearly suffering, particularly in aircraft maintenance and training, from the failure to obtain equipment abroad and from cutbacks in indigenous production for national defence. Because of the lack of equipment, fuel and other materials, Marshal Yeh in June of 1961 reported to the Military Affairs Committee that “XX” (the XXs appear in the original Chinese) per cent. of the aircraft in the Air Force were grounded, that pilot flight-training hours had been cut to less than half, and that each pilot could fly “XX–XX” hours on an average. These unspecified figures were contrasted with the number of hours flown by Soviet and U.S. pilots. It was at this time that Yeh urged the Air Force to engage in simulated training on the ground in order to save wear and tear on available equipment (Bulletin, July 25, 1961).Google Scholar

48 Yeh Chien-ying, speech at the Military Affairs Committee Conference on Training, late January 1961, in Bulletin, February 20, 1961. An article prepared by the Academy of Military Science noted that “night and close combat are not only important means to annihilate the enemy under present conditions but also can greatly reduce the damage which may be caused by the enemy's atomic weapons” (Bulletin, 08 1, 1961). This reference indicates that the Chinese appear to be relying on the standard techniques for ground warfare in the nuclear era. Lacking mobility and firepower, the Chinese, to safeguard their own troops from destruction, would have to depend on the prodigal use of manpower in close combat in order to prevent the use of nuclear weapons by the enemy in a given tactical situation. By close combat and night fighting the Chinese would “hug” the enemy, and thus make it impossible for him to use nuclear weapons without endangering his own forces.Google Scholar

49 Yeh Chien-ying, speeches at training conferences of Land Force, Navy and Air Force, in Bulletin, 06 28, 1961 (emphasis added).Google Scholar

50 Yeh Chien-ying, speech at the Military Affairs Committee conference on training, late January 1961, in Bulletin, February 20, 1961; Report of Hsiao Hua to Deputy Chairman Lin, Ho and Nieh, and the Military Affairs Committee following inspection of troops in Nanking area, in Bulletin, 06 1, 1961.Google Scholar

51 Yeh Chien-ying, in a report to the Military Affairs Committee on June 22, 1961, insisted on the need to conserve equipment, material and fuel, and noted that the Army had difficulties in obtaining vehicles, batteries, fuel and ammunition (Bulletin, July 25, 1961). In a series of speeches at training conferences that same month he revealed that material and equipment could not keep up with training needs. As one reason for this, he mentioned the low standard of national defence industry which, though rapidly expanded since 1949, could not satisfy the needs of national defence construction (Bulletin, June 28, 1961). A rectification by the Military Affairs Committee of a report by the General Rear Services Department in August 1961 noted the inability to meet steel, lumber and cement allocations and the shortages of goods of domestic and foreign origin, of auto parts, weapons and ammunition, and of fuel oil and petroleum. The production of weapons, munitions and related items was said to have reached only 15·9 per cent. of the plan scheduled by state factories in the first half of 1961. The document concluded with the injunction that the armed forces must firmly respect the year's reduced budget for national defence (Bulletin, 08 26, 1961).Google Scholar

52 Some study materials published in Bulletin, April 25, 1961, in referring to these border arrangements, pointed out that “we were successful because the United States had no part in this and had no way to exercise its pressure.”Google Scholar

53 While more a question of foreign policy than of military strategy, the Chinese regard Mao's military thinking and their experience in close combat and night fighting as a model for national liberation movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America. According to Yeh Chien-ying, the Chinese were compiling regulations and ordinances based on their historical experience not only for themselves but also for the benefit of other nations still fighting for their national liberation. (See statement of Yeh Chien-ying during Telephone Conference held by the Regulations and Ordinance Study and Acceptance Committee of the Military Affairs Committee, March 3, 1961, in Bulletin, 03 10, 1961.)Google Scholar