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Independence of irrelevant alternatives and consistency of choice

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Summary.

We show that Arrow's condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives is logically related to conditions of consistency of choice (in particular, to Arrow's choice axiom). The relation, however, is indirect. The link is provided by an independence condition due to Hansson (Synthese, 1969) which applies to fixed agenda social choice rules.

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  1. Department of Economics, University of Bologna, Piazza Scaravilli 2, I-40126 Bologna, ITALY (e-mail: denicolo@economia.unibo.it) , , , , , , IT

    Vincenzo Denicolò

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  1. Vincenzo Denicolò
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Received: January 23, 1998; revised version: May 18, 1998

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Denicolò, V. Independence of irrelevant alternatives and consistency of choice. Econ Theory 15, 221–226 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050009

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050009

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