Abstract
Public goods production is not necessarily desirable and involves higher costs than is often recognized. Specifically, public goods production may require that a small minority of individuals can collude at the expense of others or impose strategic sanctions on non-contributors. These facilities may have negative as well as positive effects. The same conditions that support public goods production also support business cartels and racial discrimination, for instance. We examine the implications of this perspective for modern debates on economic policy, civic virtue, communitarianism, and libertarianism.
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Cowen, T., Sutter, D. The Costs of Cooperation. The Review of Austrian Economics 12, 161–173 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007864125523
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007864125523