Abstract
This paper provides a test of the Appelbaum and Katz (1987) rent-seeking model, in which rents are endogenous. The Appelbaum-Katz model is theoretically modified to correspond to our empirical application, in which rent-seeking and rent-avoiding coalitions are attempting to influence legislators' votes on pesticide regulations. Probit estimations are used to analyze the legislators' votes on two bills to amend pesticide legislation (a proxy for rent). Empirical results generally support the rent-seeking determinants identified in the model. Tobit estimation is used to investigate campaign contributions by the coalitions to the legislators. These contributions are a proxy for rent-seeking activities. Again, the model is supported.
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Wise, S.J., Sandler, T. Rent-seeking and pesticide legislation. Public Choice 78, 329–350 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01047762
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01047762