Abstract
The “tragedy of the commons” is the familiar problem that open access to a common property resource leads to overexploitation and to zero profits. A commons model is applied to an example of state sponsored private violence, the practice of privateering or licensed piracy. It is predicted that the presence of uncertainty about the value of the prey will reduce the amount of exploitation effort, and that industry profits may be positive due to both uncertainty and heterogeneous exploiters. Using data from England's wars with France and Spain between 1625 and 1630, the model suggests that the commons, represented by enemy merchant shipping, was not overexploited and that privateering profits were positive. The dynamic paths of privateering effort, ships seized, and individual firm profits were, however, consistent with the normal expectation that commons exploitation will peak and fall, as competition drives down returns through entry.
“England was never richer than when at war with Spain.”
Sir Edward Coke
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Conybeare, J.A.C., Sandler, T. State-sponsored violence as a tragedy of the commons: England's privateering wars with France and Spain, 1625–1630. Public Choice 77, 879–897 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01048000
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01048000