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1.
E-BOOK
Non-Equilibrium Social Science and Policy : Introduction and Essays on New and Changing Paradigms in Socio-Economic Thinking (2017)
Cham, Heidelberg, Dordrecht, London, New York : SpringerOpen
Notes: The overall aim of this book, an outcome of the European FP7 FET Open NESS project, is to contribute to the ongoing effort to put the quantitative social sciences on a proper footing for the 21st century. A key focus is economics, and its implications on policy making, where the still dominant traditional approach increasingly struggles to capture the economic realities we observe in the world today - with vested interests getting too often in the way of real advances. Insights into behavioral economics and modern computing techniques have made possible both the integration of larger information sets and the exploration of disequilibrium behavior. The domain-based chapters of this work illustrate how economic theory is the only branch of social sciences which still holds to its old paradigm of an equilibrium science - an assumption that has already been relaxed in all related fields of research in the light of recent advances in complex and dynamical systems theory and related data mining. The other chapters give various takes on policy and decision making in this context. Written in nontechnical style throughout, with a mix of tutorial and essay-like contributions, this book will benefit all researchers, scientists, professionals and practitioners interested in learning about the "thinking in complexity" to understand how socio-economic systems really work.
Pages: VIII, 232 S.
ISBN: 978-3-319-42422-4
2.
Paper (German National Licenses)
On an axiomatization of the banzhaf value without the additivity axiom (1997)
Springer
International journal of game theory 26 (1997), S. 137-141 
ISSN: 1432-1270
Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
Topics: Mathematics , Economics
Notes: Abstract We prove that the Banzhaf value is a unique symmetric solution having the dummy player property, the marginal contributions property introduced by Young (1985) and satisfying a very natural reduction axiom of Lehrer (1988).
Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
3.
Paper (German National Licenses)
Sensitive equilibria for ergodic stochastic games with countable state spaces (1999)
Springer
ISSN: 1432-5217
Keywords Key words: Stochastic games ; countable state space ; sensitive optimality ; unbounded payoffs
Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
Topics: Mathematics , Economics
Notes: Abstract. We consider stochastic games with countable state spaces and unbounded immediate payoff functions. Our assumptions on the transition structure of the game are based on a recent work by Meyn and Tweedie [19] on computable bounds for geometric convergence rates of Markov chains. The main results in this paper concern the existence of sensitive optimal strategies in some classes of zero-sum stochastic games. By sensitive optimality we mean overtaking or 1-optimality. We also provide a new Nash equilibrium theorem for a class of ergodic nonzero-sum stochastic games with denumerable state spaces.
Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
4.
Paper (German National Licenses)
A solidarity value forn-person transferable utility games (1994)
Springer
International journal of game theory 23 (1994), S. 43-48 
ISSN: 1432-1270
Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
Topics: Mathematics , Economics
Notes: Abstract In this paper, we introduce axiomatically a new value for cooperative TU games satisfying the efficiency, additivity, and symmetry axioms of Shapley (1953) and some new postulate connected with the average marginal contributions of the members of coalitions which can form. Our solution is referred to as the solidarity value. The reason is that its interpretation can be based on the assumption that if a coalition, sayS, forms, then the players who contribute toS more than the average marginal contribution of a member ofS support in some sense their “weaker” partners inS. Sometimes, it happens that the solidarity value belongs to the core of a game while the Shapley value does not.
Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
5.
Paper (German National Licenses)
On an Axiomatization of the Banzhaf Value without the Additivity Axiom (1997)
Springer
International journal of game theory 26 (1997), S. 137-141 
ISSN: 1432-1270
Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
Topics: Mathematics , Economics
Notes: Abstract:  We prove that the Banzhaf value is a unique symmetric solution having the dummy player property, the marginal contribution property introduced by Young (1985) and satisfying a very natural reduction axiom of Lehrer (1988).
Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
6.
Paper (German National Licenses)
An alternative characterization of the weighted Banzhaf value (2000)
Springer
International journal of game theory 29 (2000), S. 127-132 
ISSN: 1432-1270
Keywords Key words: Cooperative games, Banzhaf value, weighted value.
Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
Topics: Mathematics , Economics
Notes: Abstract. We provide a new characterization of the weighted Banzhaf value derived from some postulates in a recent paper by Radzik, Nowak and Driessen [7]. Our approach owes much to the work by Lehrer [4] on the classical Banzhaf value based on the idea of amalgamation of pairs of players and an induction construction of the value. Compared with the approach in [7] we consider two new postulates: a weighted version of Lehrer’s “2-efficiency axiom” [4] and a generalized “null player out” property studied in terms of symmetric games by Derks and Haller [2].
Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
7.
Paper (German National Licenses)
ISSN: 1432-5217
Keywords Cooperative transferable utility games ; Banzhaf values ; nonsymmetric values
Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
Topics: Mathematics , Economics
Notes: Abstract The family of weighted Banzhaf values for cooperativen-person TU-games is studied. First we introduce the weighted Banzhaf value for an exogenously given vector of positive weights of the players. Then we give an axiomatic characterization of the class of all possible weighted Banzhaf values.
Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
8.
Paper (German National Licenses)
A counterexample on overtaking optimality (1999)
Springer
ISSN: 1432-5217
Keywords Key words: Markov decision chains ; overtaking optimality criteria
Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
Topics: Mathematics , Economics
Notes: Abstract. Brown [3] constructed an aperiodic Markov decision chain in which no overtaking policy (stationary or nonstationary) exists. However, in his example a strong overtaking optimal policy exists in the class of all stationary policies. We provide another example of an aperiodic and geometric ergodic Markov decision chain which shows that the existence of a strong overtaking optimal stationary policy may fail inclusively in the class of stationary policies. We also give a brief survey of the existing literature on overtaking optimality in Markov decision chains.
Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
9.
Paper (German National Licenses)
A note on strong 1-optimal policies in Markov decision chains with unbounded costs (1999)
Springer
ISSN: 1432-5217
Keywords Key words: Markov decision chains ; countable state space ; sensitive optimality ; unbounded costs.
Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
Topics: Mathematics , Economics
Notes: Abstract. We extend a result by Cavazos-Cadena and Lasserre on the existence of strong 1-optimal stationary policies in Markov decision chains with countable state spaces, uniformly ergodic transition probabilities and bounded costs to a larger class of models with unbounded costs and the so-called V-uniform ergodic transition structure.
Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
10.
Paper (German National Licenses)
Optimal strategies in a class of zero-sum ergodic stochastic games (1999)
Springer
ISSN: 1432-5217
Keywords Key words: Discrete-time zero-sum stochastic games ; Borel state space ; average optimal strategies ; overtaking optimal strategies
Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
Topics: Mathematics , Economics
Notes: Abstract. In this paper we study zero-sum stochastic games with Borel state spaces. We make some stochastic stability assumptions on the transition structure of the game which imply the so-called w-uniform geometric ergodicity of Markov chains induced by stationary strategies of the players. Under such assumptions and some regularity conditions on the primitive data, we prove the existence of optimal stationary strategies for the players in the expected average payoff stochastic games. We also provide a first result on overtaking optimality in zero-sum stochastic games.
Type of Medium: Electronic Resource