Electronic Resource
Oxford, UK and Boston, USA
:
Blackwell Publishers Ltd
Bulletin of economic research
53 (2001), S. 0
ISSN:
1467-8586
Source:
Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
Topics:
Economics
Notes:
The author discusses games of both perfect and imperfect information at two levels of structural detail: players’ local actions, and their global powers for determining outcomes of the game. Matching logical languages are proposed for both. In particular, at the ‘action level’, imperfect information games naturally model a combined ‘dynamic-epistemic language’– and correspondences are found between special axioms in this language and particular modes of playing games with their information dynamics. At the ‘outcome level’, the paper presents suitable notions of game equivalence, and some simple representation results.
Type of Medium:
Electronic Resource
URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8586.00133
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