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  • 1
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Market-Share Import Restraints in Oligopoly (1999)
    Oxford, UK and Boston, USA : Blackwell Publishers Ltd.
    Review of international economics 7 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1467-9396
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: This paper contributes to the theoretical analysis of proportional import restraints; that is, restraints that are defined in terms of percentage market share rather than in terms of volume of imports. It is shown that an increase in the market share of foreign firms from zero has a negative effect locally on domestic welfare. In the case of a domestic oligopoly, domestic firms may prefer a proportional restraint over an equivalent volume restraint.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9396.00196
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  • 2
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Patents, Secrets, and the First-Inventor Defense (2004)
    350 Main Street , Malden , MA 02148 , USA , and PO Box 1354, 9600 Garsington Road , Oxford OX4 2XG , UK . : Blackwell Publishing
    Journal of economics & management strategy 13 (2004), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: We analyze optimal patent design when innovators can rely on secrecy to protect their innovations. Secrecy has no fixed term but does not preclude accidental disclosure nor independent creation by other inventors. We derive the optimal scope of the rights conferred to such second inventors, showing that if the patent life is set optimally, second inventors should be allowed to patent and to exclude first inventors who have relied on secrecy. We then identify conditions under which it is socially desirable to increase patent life as much as is necessary to induce first inventors to patent. The circumstances in which it is preferable that they rely on secrecy seem rather limited.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2004.00021.x
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  • 3
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Independence of irrelevant alternatives and consistency of choice (2000)
    Springer
    Economic theory 15 (2000), S. 221-226 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Schlagwort(e): Keywords and Phrases:Independence of irrelevant alternatives, Arrow's choice axiom. ; JEL Classification Number:D7.
    Quelle: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: Summary. We show that Arrow's condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives is logically related to conditions of consistency of choice (in particular, to Arrow's choice axiom). The relation, however, is indirect. The link is provided by an independence condition due to Hansson (Synthese, 1969) which applies to fixed agenda social choice rules.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001990050009
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  • 4
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    Public debt and the Pasinetti Paradox (1990)
    Oxford : Periodicals Archive Online (PAO)
    Cambridge journal of economics. 14:3 (1990:Sept.) 339 
    Details
    ISSN: 0309-166X
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: NOTES AND COMMENTS
    URL: http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:pao:&rft_dat=xri:pao:article:d414-1990-014-03-000007
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  • 5
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Preferenza sociale non transitiva e teorema di Arrow (1988)
    Springer
    Decisions in economics and finance 11 (1988), S. 133-146 
    Details
    ISSN: 1129-6569
    Quelle: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Thema: Mathematik , Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Beschreibung / Inhaltsverzeichnis: Summary This paper extend's Arrow's impossiblity theorem to the case where strict social preference may be intransitive. The main result of the paper is that if a Social Decision Function satisfies Unrestricted Domain, Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, Transitivity of Social Indifference, the Strong Pareto Principle, and the Pareto Indifference Rule, then there exists a dictator. An application of this result is a new impossibility theorem concerning SDF obeying the condition of Duality. As a by-product of this analysis, the relationships between Neutrality and Duality are somewhat clarified.
    Notizen: Abstract Questo lavoro estende il teorema di impossiblità di Arrow al caso di preferenza sociale stretta non transitiva. In particolare, si dimostra che se una Funzione di Decisione Sociale (FDS) soddisfa le condizioni di dominio universale, indipendenza dalle alternative irrilevanti, transitività della relazione di indifferenza sociale, il principio di Pareto forte e la regola di indifferenza paretiana, allora la FDS deve essere dittatoriale. Vengono inoltre illustrate le implicazioni di tale risultato per il caso in cui la FDS soddisfa la condizione di dualità.
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    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02085220
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  • 6
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Specific and Ad Valorem Taxation in Asymmetric Cournot Oligopolies (2000)
    Springer
    International tax and public finance 7 (2000), S. 335-342 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-6970
    Schlagwort(e): specific tax, ad valorem tax, cournot oligopoly, welfare dominance
    Quelle: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: Abstract This paper compares ad valorem and specific taxes in asymmetric homogenous Cournot oligopolies with constant marginal costs. We show that for any given level of industry output, ad valorem taxes are superior to specific taxes in terms of revenue raised. If the tax rates are sufficiently high, for any given specific tax one can find an ad valorem tax that leads to greater tax revenue, consumer surplus, and industry profits.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1008709914537
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  • 7
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    A characterization of utilitarianism without the transitivity axiom (1999)
    Springer
    Social choice and welfare 16 (1999), S. 273-278 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-217X
    Quelle: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Thema: Sociologie , Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: Abstract. We show that d'Aspremont and Gevers' (1977) characterization of utilitarianism can be strengthened by dropping the condition of transitivity of the social preference relation while slightly strengthening the Anonymity condition. The Anonymity condition we use is weaker, however, than the combination of transitivity and d'Aspremont and Gevers' Anonymity condition.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s003550050144
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  • 8
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    No-envy and Arrow's conditions (1999)
    Springer
    Social choice and welfare 16 (1999), S. 585-597 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-217X
    Quelle: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Thema: Sociologie , Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: Abstract. This paper analyzes the concept of envy-freeness in the framework of Arrovian social choice theory. We define various no-envy conditions and study their relationships with Arrow's condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives. We also propose a new condition, called Minimal Equity, that says that each individual must have the conditional power to veto at least one social state (for instance, a social state which is particularly unfair to him). We show that, under unrestricted domain, Pareto Optimality and a weak independence condition, Minimal Equity leads to an impossibility result.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s003550050162
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  • 9
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Independent Decisiveness and the Arrow theorem (1998)
    Springer
    Social choice and welfare 15 (1998), S. 563-566 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-217X
    Quelle: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Thema: Sociologie , Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: Abstract. I show that the condition of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives in Arrow's impossibility theorem can be weakened into Relational Independent Decisiveness. The condition of Relational Independent Decisiveness is essentially a translation of Sen's Independent Decisiveness into the traditional Arrovian framework. I also show by example that Relational Independent Decisiveness is indeed weaker than Arrow's Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s003550050124
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  • 10
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Nash Bargaining Theory, Nonconvex Problems and Social Welfare Orderings (2000)
    Springer
    Theory and decision 48 (2000), S. 351-358 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-7187
    Schlagwort(e): Bargaining ; Nash solution ; Nonconvex problems ; Social Welfare Orderings
    Quelle: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Thema: Sociologie , Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: Abstract In this paper we deal with the extension of Nash bargaining theory to nonconvex problems. By focussing on the Social Welfare Ordering associated with a bargaining solution, we characterize the symmetric Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS). Moreover, we obtain a unified method of proof of recent characterization results for the asymmetric single-valued NBS and the symmetric multivalued NBS, as well as their extensions to different domains.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1005278100070
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