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    American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS)
    Publication Date: 2006-12-13
    Description: Humans behave altruistically in natural settings and experiments. A possible explanation-that groups with more altruists survive when groups compete-has long been judged untenable on empirical grounds for most species. But there have been no empirical tests of this explanation for humans. My empirical estimates show that genetic differences between early human groups are likely to have been great enough so that lethal intergroup competition could account for the evolution of altruism. Crucial to this process were distinctive human practices such as sharing food beyond the immediate family, monogamy, and other forms of reproductive leveling. These culturally transmitted practices presuppose advanced cognitive and linguistic capacities, possibly accounting for the distinctive forms of altruism found in our species.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Notes: 〈/span〉Bowles, Samuel -- New York, N.Y. -- Science. 2006 Dec 8;314(5805):1569-72.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Author address: 〈/span〉Santa Fe Institute, 1399 Hyde Park Road, Santa Fe, NM 87501, USA, and Universita di Siena, 17 Piazza San Francesco, Siena, Italy. bowles@santafe.edu〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Record origin:〈/span〉 〈a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17158320" target="_blank"〉PubMed〈/a〉
    Keywords: *Altruism ; Archaeology ; *Biological Evolution ; Climate ; *Competitive Behavior ; Cultural Evolution ; Genetic Variation ; Genetics, Population ; *Group Processes ; Humans ; Mathematics ; Models, Theoretical ; Population Dynamics ; *Reproduction ; Selection, Genetic ; Violence ; Warfare
    Print ISSN: 0036-8075
    Electronic ISSN: 1095-9203
    Topics: Biology , Chemistry and Pharmacology , Computer Science , Medicine , Natural Sciences in General , Physics
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  • 2
    Publication Date: 2010-05-01
    Description: Because mutually beneficial cooperation may unravel unless most members of a group contribute, people often gang up on free-riders, punishing them when this is cost-effective in sustaining cooperation. In contrast, current models of the evolution of cooperation assume that punishment is uncoordinated and unconditional. These models have difficulty explaining the evolutionary emergence of punishment because rare unconditional punishers bear substantial costs and hence are eliminated. Moreover, in human behavioral experiments in which punishment is uncoordinated, the sum of costs to punishers and their targets often exceeds the benefits of the increased cooperation that results from the punishment of free-riders. As a result, cooperation sustained by punishment may actually reduce the average payoffs of group members in comparison with groups in which punishment of free-riders is not an option. Here, we present a model of coordinated punishment that is calibrated for ancestral human conditions and captures a further aspect of reality missing from both models and experiments: The total cost of punishing a free-rider declines as the number of punishers increases. We show that punishment can proliferate when rare, and when it does, it enhances group-average payoffs.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Notes: 〈/span〉Boyd, Robert -- Gintis, Herbert -- Bowles, Samuel -- New York, N.Y. -- Science. 2010 Apr 30;328(5978):617-20. doi: 10.1126/science.1183665.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Author address: 〈/span〉Department of Anthropology, University of California, Los Angeles, CA 90064, USA. rboyd@anthro.ucla.edu〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Record origin:〈/span〉 〈a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20431013" target="_blank"〉PubMed〈/a〉
    Keywords: *Communication ; *Cooperative Behavior ; Games, Experimental ; *Group Processes ; Humans ; *Models, Psychological ; *Punishment ; *Social Behavior
    Print ISSN: 0036-8075
    Electronic ISSN: 1095-9203
    Topics: Biology , Chemistry and Pharmacology , Computer Science , Medicine , Natural Sciences in General , Physics
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