ISSN:
1573-7187
Keywords:
Rationality
;
practical reason
;
Kant
;
preference
Source:
Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
Topics:
Sociology
,
Economics
Notes:
Abstract This article presents the thesis that a critique of decisions is not necessarily (except in the trivial sense) a critique of preferences. This thesis runs contrary to the fundamental assumption in economic theory that a critique of decisions will always simultaneously be a critique of (subjective) preferences, since decision behavior is after all a ‘manifestation’ of preferences. If this thesis is right, then the paradigm of so-called ‘instrumental rationality’ is in serious trouble, not for external reasons but because of imminent inconsistencies. The thesis is developed in five parts: I. A preliminary remark to the economic theory of rationality in general. II. The cooperation problem as a challenge to the economic theory of rationality. III. An account of the most interesting attempt to save the theory. IV. A critique of that attempt. V. And the conclusion: practical reason is concerned with actions and not with preferences.
Type of Medium:
Electronic Resource
URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00134121
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