ISSN:
1573-7101
Source:
Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
Topics:
Economics
Notes:
Conclusion In this article, I have shown that institutionally induced stability models can be expanded to incorporate the role of implementing agencies acting in conjunction with the legislature. By so extending stability models, inferences can be made on agency behavior as well as on legislative behavior. In particular, the expanded model can be used to show how the two actors together determine the ultimate location of stable policies. Coalition building considerations, jurisdictional limitations, and the other customs and institutional considerations that restrict the legislature's policy space, make it possible for committees to produce a stable policy mandate. But, these stability inducing arrangements do not directly apply to agencies. The policy mandate constrains but does not completely restrict the area of the policy space open to the agency. Thus, legislative structures do not, in and of themselves, induce stable policy outcomes. Legislative policy mandates are changed and defined by the acts of the implementing agency in its role as a non-voting, decision making actor in the policy process. Endless cycling by the agency among possible implementation points is prevented by the agency's organizational goal of a stable environment. I suggest, then, that legislative arrangements acting in conjunction with an agency executive's need to create a certain, regular, and predictable environment, lead to the creation of an agency determined stability. While the model implies an agency has some latitude over policy decisions, it does not imply agencies dominate legislatures. Decision making is a function of both the legislature and the agency, with the legislature as a whole having authority over the agency. Indeed, policy latitude is possible only because agency executives are able to alter outcomes in a manner that increases individual legislator utility.
Type of Medium:
Electronic Resource
URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00124425
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