ALBERT

Description: The two-dimensional hydrocode CSQ III was used to calculate the fraction of momentum transferred from a flyer plate to a target of two spaced plates. The effect of the vaporization phase transition, as calculated with the ANEOS analytical complete three-phase equation of state, was estimated. Application of these results to the protection of spacecraft from meteoroids and orbital debris is discussed.

Description: A remedy for the lack of a technique for testing the effects of orbital debris impacts has been sought along two paths at Boeing and elsewhere, firstly through the development of new launcher techniques capable of impact velocities between 8 and 16 km/s and secondly through the development of similitude techniques for modeling 8 to 16 km/s impacts using the present capabilities of projectile launchers. These two approaches are briefly discussed.

Description: Hypervelocity impact tests of 2.5 grains per foot flexible confined detonating chord (FCDC) shielded by a 1 mm thick 2024-T3 aluminum alloy bumper standing off 51 mm from the FCDC were performed. Testing showed that a 6 mm diameter 2017-T4 aluminum alloy ball impacting the bumper at 6.97 km/s and 45 degrees impact angle initiated the FCDC. However, impact by the same diameter and speed ball at 0 degrees angle of impact did not initiate the FCDC. Furthermore, impact at 45 degrees and the same speed by a slightly smaller diameter ball (5.8 mm diameter) also did not initiate the FCDC.

Description: The Gemini, Apollo and Space Shuttle spacecraft utilized explosive transfer lines (ETL) in a number of applications. In each case the ETL was located behind substantial structure and the risk of impact initiation by micrometeoroids and orbital debris was negligible. A current NASA program is considering an ETL to synchronize the actuation of pyrobolts to release 12 capture latches in a contingency. The space constraints require placing the ETL 50 mm below the 1 mm thick 2024-T72 Whipple shield. The proximity of the ETL to the thin shield prompted analysts at NASA to perform a scoping analysis with a finite-difference hydrocode to calculate impact parameters that would initiate the ETL. The results suggest testing is required and a 12 shot test program with surplused Shuttle ETL is scheduled for February 2012 at the NASA White Sands Test Facility. Explosive initiation models are essential to the analysis and one exists in the CTH library for HNS I, but not the HNS II used in the Shuttle 2.5 gr/ft rigid shielded mild detonating cord (SMDC). HNS II is less sensitive than HNS I so it is anticipated that these results using the HNS I model are conservative. Until the hypervelocity impact test results are available, the only check on the analysis was comparison with the Shuttle qualification test result that a 22 long bullet would not initiate the SMDC. This result was reproduced by the hydrocode simulation. Simulations of the direct impact of a 7 km/s aluminum ball, impacting at 0 degree angle of incidence, onto the SMDC resulted in a 1.5 mm diameter ball initiating the SMDC and 1.0 mm ball failing to initiate it. Where one 1.0 mm ball could not initiate the SMDC, a cluster of six 1.0 mm diameter aluminum balls striking simultaneously could. Thus the impact parameters that will result in initiating SMDC located behind a Whipple shield will depend on how well the shield fragments the projectile and spreads the fragments. An end-to-end simulation of the impact of an aluminum ball onto a Whipple shield covering SMDC is problematic due to the hydrocode fracture models. Regardless, two simulations were performed resulting in a 5 mm ball initiating the SMDC and a 4 mm ball failing to initiate the SMDC.

Description: No abstract available

Description: Meteoroid and orbital debris shielding has played an important role from the beginning of manned spaceflight. During the early 60 s, meteoroid protection drove requirements for new meteor and micrometeoroid impact science. Meteoroid protection also stimulated advances in the technology of hypervelocity impact launchers and impact damage assessment methodologies. The first phase of meteoroid shielding assessments closed in the early 70 s with the end of the Apollo program. The second phase of meteoroid protection technology began in the early 80 s when it was determined that there is a manmade Earth orbital debris belt that poses a significant risk to LEO manned spacecraft. The severity of the Earth orbital debris environment has dictated changes in Space Shuttle and ISS operations as well as driven advances in shielding technology and assessment methodologies. A timeline of shielding technology and assessment methodology advances is presented along with a summary of risk assessment results.

Description: This report provides results of a Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) risk assessment of the Mars Sample Return Earth Entry Vehicle (MSR EEV). The assessment was performed using standard risk assessment methodology illustrated in Figure 1-1. Central to the process is the Bumper risk assessment code (Figure 1-2), which calculates the critical penetration risk based on geometry, shielding configurations and flight parameters. The assessment process begins by building a finite element model (FEM) of the spacecraft, which defines the size and shape of the spacecraft as well as the locations of the various shielding configurations. This model is built using the NX I-deas software package from Siemens PLM Software. The FEM is constructed using triangular and quadrilateral elements that define the outer shell of the spacecraft. Bumper-II uses the model file to determine the geometry of the spacecraft for the analysis. The next step of the process is to identify the ballistic limit characteristics for the various shield types. These ballistic limits define the critical size particle that will penetrate a shield at a given impact angle and impact velocity. When the finite element model is built, each individual element is assigned a property identifier (PID) to act as an index for its shielding properties. Using the ballistic limit equations (BLEs) built into the Bumper-II code, the shield characteristics are defined for each and every PID in the model. The final stage of the analysis is to determine the probability of no penetration (PNP) on the spacecraft. This is done using the micrometeoroid and orbital debris environment definitions that are built into the Bumper-II code. These engineering models take into account orbit inclination, altitude, attitude and analysis date in order to predict an impacting particle flux on the spacecraft. Using the geometry and shielding characteristics previously defined for the spacecraft and combining that information with the environment model calculations, the Bumper-II code calculates a probability of no penetration for the spacecraft.

Description: The Moon is under constant bombardment by meteoroids. When the meteoroid is large, the impact craters the surface, launching crater ejecta far from the impact potentially threatening astronauts on the lunar surface. In the early 1960s, the ejecta impact flux was thought no more than the sporadic meteoroid flux but with speeds one to two orders of magnitude smaller. However, the Lunar Module designers realized by 1965 that meteoroid bumpers do not perform well at the smaller ejecta impact speeds. Their estimates of the Lunar Module risk of penetration by ejecta were 25 to 50% of the total risk. This was in spite of the exposure time to ejecta being only a third of that to sporadic meteoroids. The standard committee based the 1969 NASA SP-8013 lunar ejecta environment on Zooks 1967 flux analysis and Gault, Shoemaker and Moores 1963 test data for impacts into solid basalt targets. However, Zook noted in his 1967 analysis, that if the lunar surface was composed of soil, that the ejected soil particles would be smaller than ejected basalt fragments and that the ejection speeds would be smaller. Both effects contribute to reducing the risk of a critical failure due to lunar ejecta. The authors revised Zooks analysis to incorporate soil particle size distributions developed from analysis of Apollo lunar soil samples and ejected mass as a function of ejecta speed developed from coupling parameter analyses of soil impact-test data. The authors estimated EVA risk by assuming failure occurs at a critical impact energy. At these impact speeds, this might be true for suit hard and soft goods. However, these speeds are small enough that there may be significant strength effects that require new test data to modify the hypervelocity critical energy failure criterion. With these caveats, Christiansen, Cour-Palais and Freisen list the critical energy of the ISS EMU hard upper torso as 44 J and the helmet and visor as 71 J at hypervelocity. The authors then assumed that the lunar EVA suit fails at 50 J critical energy. This results in a 1,700,000 years mean time to failure using the results of this analysis and a 3,800 years mean time to failure using NASA SP-8013.