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  • Articles  (2)
  • European Union  (1)
  • international competition  (1)
  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Modelling International Policy Games: Lessons from European Monetary Coordination (1997)
    Springer
    Empirica 24 (1997), S. 163-177 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-6911
    Keywords: European Union ; monetary cooperation ; policy games ; inverse control
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract Most international monetary policy games are modelled as prisoners' dilemma games. Political scientists suggest however that other game-theoretic structures (chicken, stag-hunt and deadlock games) could be more appropriate to describe international monetary coordination. This paper provides some empirical evidence on this issue, by studying the case of European monetary coordination from 1979 to 1989. First, central banks' and governments' preferences are revealed through an analysis of their actual behaviour. Then, the dynamic game describing policymakers' interactions is simulated under alternative institutional arrangements: coordination, defection, sub-group coalitions, etc. The main conclusion is that the stylised facts derived from those experiments seem not to be consistent with the implications of the prisoners' dilemma framework. Consistency is instead found with the features of a stag-hunt game.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1006801900147
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Environmental innovation policy and international competition (1992)
    Springer
    Environmental and resource economics 2 (1992), S. 183-200 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-1502
    Keywords: Pollution control ; environmental innovation ; international competition ; subsidies ; asymmetric information ; self-selection
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Energy, Environment Protection, Nuclear Power Engineering , Economics
    Notes: Abstract We consider one polluting industry in an open economy. The national government implements a policy of industrial pollution control, by inducing appropriate technological innovation to reduce toxic emissions. The emission-reducing innovations are developed through firm-specific costly investments. Under different hypotheses on market structure (perfect competition, Bertrand and Cournot oligopoly), international competition forces the national government to subsidize innovation. The appropriate subsidy scheme varies according to the information available to the government and according to market structure. If information is asymmetric, the subsidy must include the information premium necessary to separate different types of firms.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00338242
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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