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  • 1
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    American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS)
    Publication Date: 2007-10-27
    Description: Altruism-benefiting fellow group members at a cost to oneself-and parochialism-hostility toward individuals not of one's own ethnic, racial, or other group-are common human behaviors. The intersection of the two-which we term "parochial altruism"-is puzzling from an evolutionary perspective because altruistic or parochial behavior reduces one's payoffs by comparison to what one would gain by eschewing these behaviors. But parochial altruism could have evolved if parochialism promoted intergroup hostilities and the combination of altruism and parochialism contributed to success in these conflicts. Our game-theoretic analysis and agent-based simulations show that under conditions likely to have been experienced by late Pleistocene and early Holocene humans, neither parochialism nor altruism would have been viable singly, but by promoting group conflict, they could have evolved jointly.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Notes: 〈/span〉Choi, Jung-Kyoo -- Bowles, Samuel -- New York, N.Y. -- Science. 2007 Oct 26;318(5850):636-40.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Author address: 〈/span〉School of Economics and Trade, Kyungpook National University, 1370 Sankyuk-dong, Buk-gu, Daegu 702-701, Korea.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Record origin:〈/span〉 〈a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17962562" target="_blank"〉PubMed〈/a〉
    Keywords: Algorithms ; *Altruism ; *Biological Evolution ; Computer Simulation ; Cooperative Behavior ; Female ; Game Theory ; *Hostility ; Humans ; Male ; Models, Psychological ; Reproduction ; *Social Behavior ; *Warfare
    Print ISSN: 0036-8075
    Electronic ISSN: 1095-9203
    Topics: Biology , Chemistry and Pharmacology , Computer Science , Medicine , Natural Sciences in General , Physics
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  • 2
    Publication Date: 2009-06-06
    Description: Since Darwin, intergroup hostilities have figured prominently in explanations of the evolution of human social behavior. Yet whether ancestral humans were largely "peaceful" or "warlike" remains controversial. I ask a more precise question: If more cooperative groups were more likely to prevail in conflicts with other groups, was the level of intergroup violence sufficient to influence the evolution of human social behavior? Using a model of the evolutionary impact of between-group competition and a new data set that combines archaeological evidence on causes of death during the Late Pleistocene and early Holocene with ethnographic and historical reports on hunter-gatherer populations, I find that the estimated level of mortality in intergroup conflicts would have had substantial effects, allowing the proliferation of group-beneficial behaviors that were quite costly to the individual altruist.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Notes: 〈/span〉Bowles, Samuel -- New York, N.Y. -- Science. 2009 Jun 5;324(5932):1293-8. doi: 10.1126/science.1168112.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Author address: 〈/span〉Santa Fe Institute, 1399 Hyde Park Road, Santa Fe, NM 87501, USA. samuel.bowles@gmail.com〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Record origin:〈/span〉 〈a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19498163" target="_blank"〉PubMed〈/a〉
    Keywords: *Altruism ; Anthropology, Cultural ; Archaeology ; *Biological Evolution ; Cooperative Behavior ; *Cultural Evolution ; Female ; Genetic Variation ; Humans ; Male ; Microsatellite Repeats ; Models, Theoretical ; *Social Behavior ; *Warfare
    Print ISSN: 0036-8075
    Electronic ISSN: 1095-9203
    Topics: Biology , Chemistry and Pharmacology , Computer Science , Medicine , Natural Sciences in General , Physics
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  • 3
    Publication Date: 2010-05-01
    Description: Because mutually beneficial cooperation may unravel unless most members of a group contribute, people often gang up on free-riders, punishing them when this is cost-effective in sustaining cooperation. In contrast, current models of the evolution of cooperation assume that punishment is uncoordinated and unconditional. These models have difficulty explaining the evolutionary emergence of punishment because rare unconditional punishers bear substantial costs and hence are eliminated. Moreover, in human behavioral experiments in which punishment is uncoordinated, the sum of costs to punishers and their targets often exceeds the benefits of the increased cooperation that results from the punishment of free-riders. As a result, cooperation sustained by punishment may actually reduce the average payoffs of group members in comparison with groups in which punishment of free-riders is not an option. Here, we present a model of coordinated punishment that is calibrated for ancestral human conditions and captures a further aspect of reality missing from both models and experiments: The total cost of punishing a free-rider declines as the number of punishers increases. We show that punishment can proliferate when rare, and when it does, it enhances group-average payoffs.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Notes: 〈/span〉Boyd, Robert -- Gintis, Herbert -- Bowles, Samuel -- New York, N.Y. -- Science. 2010 Apr 30;328(5978):617-20. doi: 10.1126/science.1183665.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Author address: 〈/span〉Department of Anthropology, University of California, Los Angeles, CA 90064, USA. rboyd@anthro.ucla.edu〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Record origin:〈/span〉 〈a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20431013" target="_blank"〉PubMed〈/a〉
    Keywords: *Communication ; *Cooperative Behavior ; Games, Experimental ; *Group Processes ; Humans ; *Models, Psychological ; *Punishment ; *Social Behavior
    Print ISSN: 0036-8075
    Electronic ISSN: 1095-9203
    Topics: Biology , Chemistry and Pharmacology , Computer Science , Medicine , Natural Sciences in General , Physics
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