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  • 1
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    Nature Publishing Group (NPG)
    Publication Date: 2008-11-21
    Description: 〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Notes: 〈/span〉Bowles, Samuel -- England -- Nature. 2008 Nov 20;456(7220):326-7. doi: 10.1038/456326a.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Author address: 〈/span〉Behavioral Sciences Program at the Santa Fe Institute, 1399 Hyde Park Road, Santa Fe, New Mexico 87501, USA. bowles@santafe.edu〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Record origin:〈/span〉 〈a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19020603" target="_blank"〉PubMed〈/a〉
    Keywords: *Altruism ; Animals ; Biological Evolution ; *Conflict (Psychology) ; *Cooperative Behavior ; *Human Characteristics ; Humans ; Models, Biological ; Violence/psychology/statistics & numerical data ; Warfare
    Print ISSN: 0028-0836
    Electronic ISSN: 1476-4687
    Topics: Biology , Chemistry and Pharmacology , Medicine , Natural Sciences in General , Physics
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  • 2
    Publication Date: 2010-05-01
    Description: Because mutually beneficial cooperation may unravel unless most members of a group contribute, people often gang up on free-riders, punishing them when this is cost-effective in sustaining cooperation. In contrast, current models of the evolution of cooperation assume that punishment is uncoordinated and unconditional. These models have difficulty explaining the evolutionary emergence of punishment because rare unconditional punishers bear substantial costs and hence are eliminated. Moreover, in human behavioral experiments in which punishment is uncoordinated, the sum of costs to punishers and their targets often exceeds the benefits of the increased cooperation that results from the punishment of free-riders. As a result, cooperation sustained by punishment may actually reduce the average payoffs of group members in comparison with groups in which punishment of free-riders is not an option. Here, we present a model of coordinated punishment that is calibrated for ancestral human conditions and captures a further aspect of reality missing from both models and experiments: The total cost of punishing a free-rider declines as the number of punishers increases. We show that punishment can proliferate when rare, and when it does, it enhances group-average payoffs.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Notes: 〈/span〉Boyd, Robert -- Gintis, Herbert -- Bowles, Samuel -- New York, N.Y. -- Science. 2010 Apr 30;328(5978):617-20. doi: 10.1126/science.1183665.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Author address: 〈/span〉Department of Anthropology, University of California, Los Angeles, CA 90064, USA. rboyd@anthro.ucla.edu〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Record origin:〈/span〉 〈a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20431013" target="_blank"〉PubMed〈/a〉
    Keywords: *Communication ; *Cooperative Behavior ; Games, Experimental ; *Group Processes ; Humans ; *Models, Psychological ; *Punishment ; *Social Behavior
    Print ISSN: 0036-8075
    Electronic ISSN: 1095-9203
    Topics: Biology , Chemistry and Pharmacology , Computer Science , Medicine , Natural Sciences in General , Physics
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  • 3
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    American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS)
    Publication Date: 2012-05-19
    Description: The origins of such varied features of contemporary life as the national state and the desire to uphold generous and civic social norms are to be found in a combination of conflict between groups and attenuation of both inequalities and conflicts within groups. In contrast to the adoption of a better tool or a more productive crop, which can be adopted by a single individual, a new institution works only if most people adopt it. This explains why collective action against those benefitting from the status quo at the expense of others, as well as conflict between groups governed by different norms and institutions, figures so prominently in our capacity to adapt to changing circumstances and to harness new knowledge for human benefit.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Notes: 〈/span〉Bowles, Samuel -- New York, N.Y. -- Science. 2012 May 18;336(6083):876-9. doi: 10.1126/science.1217336.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Author address: 〈/span〉Santa Fe Institute, 1399 Hyde Park Road, Santa Fe, NM 87501, USA. samuel.bowles@gmail.com〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Record origin:〈/span〉 〈a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22605768" target="_blank"〉PubMed〈/a〉
    Keywords: *Altruism ; *Conflict (Psychology) ; Cooperative Behavior ; *Cultural Evolution/history ; History, 18th Century ; History, 19th Century ; History, 20th Century ; History, Ancient ; Humans ; Political Systems/history ; *Social Behavior ; Social Values ; *Warfare
    Print ISSN: 0036-8075
    Electronic ISSN: 1095-9203
    Topics: Biology , Chemistry and Pharmacology , Computer Science , Medicine , Natural Sciences in General , Physics
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