ALBERT

Description: Over the last few years, NASA has been evaluating various vehicle designs for multiple proposed design reference missions (DRM) beyond low Earth orbit in support of its Exploration Systems Development (ESD) programs. This paper addresses several of the proposed missions and the analysis techniques used to assess the key risk metric, probability of loss of crew (LOC). Probability of LOC is a metric used to assess the safety risk as well as a design requirement. These risk assessments typically cover the concept phase of a DRM, i.e. when little more than a general idea of the mission is known and are used to help establish "best estimates" for proposed program and agency level risk requirements. These assessments or studies were categorized as LOC achievability studies to help inform NASA management as to what "ball park" estimates of probability of LOC could be achieved for each DRM and were eventually used to establish the corresponding LOC requirements. Given that details of the vehicles and mission are not well known at this time, the ground rules, assumptions, and consistency across the programs become the important basis of the assessments as well as for the decision makers to understand.

Description: No abstract available

Description: NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) Johnson Space Center (JSC) Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) uses two human reliability analysis (HRA) methodologies. The first is a simplified method which is based on how much time is available to complete the action, with consideration included for environmental and personal factors that could influence the human's reliability. This method is expected to provide a conservative value or placeholder as a preliminary estimate. This preliminary estimate or screening value is used to determine which placeholder needs a more detailed assessment. The second methodology is used to develop a more detailed human reliability assessment on the performance of critical human actions. This assessment needs to consider more than the time available, this would include factors such as: the importance of the action, the context, environmental factors, potential human stresses, previous experience, training, physical design interfaces, available procedures/checklists and internal human stresses. The more detailed assessment is expected to be more realistic than that based primarily on time available. When performing an HRA on a system or process that has an operational history, we have information specific to the task based on this history and experience. In the case of a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) that is based on a new design and has no operational history, providing a "reasonable" assessment of potential crew actions becomes more challenging. To determine what is expected of future operational parameters, the experience from individuals who had relevant experience and were familiar with the system and process previously implemented by NASA was used to provide the "best" available data. Personnel from Flight Operations, Flight Directors, Launch Test Directors, Control Room Console Operators, and Astronauts were all interviewed to provide a comprehensive picture of previous NASA operations. Verification of the assumptions and expectations expressed in the assessments will be needed when the procedures, flight rules, and operational requirements are developed and then finalized.

Description: No abstract available

Description: The Shuttle Program initiated an Extravehicular Activity (EVA) Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) to assess the risks associated with performing a Shuttle Thermal Protection System (TPS) repair during the Space Transportation System (STS)-125 Hubble repair mission as part of risk trades between TPS repair and crew rescue.

Description: NASA uses two HRA assessment methodologies. The first is a simplified method which is based on how much time is available to complete the action, with consideration included for environmental and personal factors that could influence the human's reliability. This method is expected to provide a conservative value or placeholder as a preliminary estimate. This preliminary estimate is used to determine which placeholder needs a more detailed assessment. The second methodology is used to develop a more detailed human reliability assessment on the performance of critical human actions. This assessment needs to consider more than the time available, this would include factors such as: the importance of the action, the context, environmental factors, potential human stresses, previous experience, training, physical design interfaces, available procedures/checklists and internal human stresses. The more detailed assessment is still expected to be more realistic than that based primarily on time available. When performing an HRA on a system or process that has an operational history, we have information specific to the task based on this history and experience. In the case of a PRA model that is based on a new design and has no operational history, providing a "reasonable" assessment of potential crew actions becomes more problematic. In order to determine what is expected of future operational parameters, the experience from individuals who had relevant experience and were familiar with the system and process previously implemented by NASA was used to provide the "best" available data. Personnel from Flight Operations, Flight Directors, Launch Test Directors, Control Room Console Operators and Astronauts were all interviewed to provide a comprehensive picture of previous NASA operations. Verification of the assumptions and expectations expressed in the assessments will be needed when the procedures, flight rules and operational requirements are developed and then finalized.

Description: For the last 30 years, the United States's human space program has been focused on low Earth orbit exploration and operations with the Space Shuttle and International Space Station programs. After nearly 50 years, the U.S. is again working to return humans beyond Earth orbit. To do so, NASA is developing a new launch vehicle and spacecraft to provide this capability. The launch vehicle is referred to as the Space Launch System (SLS) and the spacecraft is called Orion. The new launch system is being developed with an abort system that will enable the crew to escape launch failures that would otherwise be catastrophic as well as probabilistic design requirements set for probability of loss of crew (LOC) and loss of mission (LOM). In order to optimize the risk associated with designing this new launch system, as well as verifying the associated requirements, NASA has developed a comprehensive Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) of the integrated ascent phase of the mission that includes the launch vehicle, spacecraft and ground launch facilities. Given the dynamic nature of rocket launches and the potential for things to go wrong, developing a PRA to assess the risk can be a very challenging effort. Prior to launch and after the crew has boarded the spacecraft, the risk exposure time can be on the order of three hours. During this time, events may initiate from either of the spacecraft, the launch vehicle, or the ground systems, thus requiring an emergency egress from the spacecraft to a safe ground location or a pad abort via the spacecraft's launch abort system. Following launch, again either the spacecraft or the launch vehicle can initiate the need for the crew to abort the mission and return to the home. Obviously, there are thousands of scenarios whose outcome depends on when the abort is initiated during ascent as to how the abort is performed. This includes modeling the risk associated with explosions and benign system failures that require aborting a spacecraft under very dynamic conditions, particularly in the lower atmosphere, and returning the crew home safely. This paper will provide an overview of the PRA model that has been developed of this new launch system, including some of the challenges that are associated with this effort. Key Words: PRA, space launches, human space program, ascent abort, spacecraft, launch vehicles

Description: NASA is developing new capabilities to send humans beyond low Earth orbit (LEO) for the first time in several decades with the new Multi-purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) Orion spacecraft and Space Launch System (SLS) launch vehicle. As part of these capabilities, NASA is developing means to terminate missions prior to reaching mission destinations in order to save the crew in the event of critical life-threatening failures. This abort capability exists for both ascent and in-space operations. While the risk associated with ascent aborts has been modeled in detail, less has been done in the area of in-space aborts (e.g. Apollo 13). Recent efforts have started to better assess the risk associated with in-space aborts. This paper will describe these efforts. The in-space abort model described in this paper is part of a larger Cross-Program PRA (XPRA) model of exploration missions planned in the next few years to the vicinity of the Moon. The model consists of linked event trees and fault trees and associated rules built using the Systems Analysis Program for Hands-On Integrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE) tool. This model structure is being built with flexibility in mind in order to perform risk trades and further expansion of the model.

Description: NASA is developing capabilities for crewed missions beyond Low Earth Orbit (LEO) for the first time in nearly 50 years. Given the greater distances from Earth that these missions will entail, it is prudent to develop in-space abort capabilities in order to save the crew in the event of critical life-threatening failures that may occur. NASA has developed a Cross Program PRA (XPRA) of the integrated vehicle, from pre-launch through landing and rescue of the crew. An ascent abort model has already been developed as part of this XPRA model to assess the risk associated with failures during prelaunch and ascent. The scope of the analysis discussed here is focused on aborts associated with the in-space portion of the mission up to and including the Trans-Lunar Injection (TLI) burn, which places the Orion spacecraft on a trajectory to the Moon.

Description: The Johnson Space Center (JSC) Safety & Mission Assurance (S&MA) Directorate s Risk and Reliability Analysis Group provides both mathematical and engineering analysis expertise in the areas of Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) analysis, and data collection and analysis. The fundamental goal of this group is to provide National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) decisionmakers with the necessary information to make informed decisions when evaluating personnel, flight hardware, and public safety concerns associated with current operating systems as well as with any future systems. The Analysis Group includes a staff of statistical and reliability experts with valuable backgrounds in the statistical, reliability, and engineering fields. This group includes JSC S&MA Analysis Branch personnel as well as S&MA support services contractors, such as Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) and SoHaR. The Analysis Group s experience base includes nuclear power (both commercial and navy), manufacturing, Department of Defense, chemical, and shipping industries, as well as significant aerospace experience specifically in the Shuttle, International Space Station (ISS), and Constellation Programs. The Analysis Group partners with project and program offices, other NASA centers, NASA contractors, and universities to provide additional resources or information to the group when performing various analysis tasks. The JSC S&MA Analysis Group is recognized as a leader in risk and reliability analysis within the NASA community. Therefore, the Analysis Group is in high demand to help the Space Shuttle Program (SSP) continue to fly safely, assist in designing the next generation spacecraft for the Constellation Program (CxP), and promote advanced analytical techniques. The Analysis Section s tasks include teaching classes and instituting personnel qualification processes to enhance the professional abilities of our analysts as well as performing major probabilistic assessments used to support flight rationale and help establish program requirements. During 2008, the Analysis Group performed more than 70 assessments. Although all these assessments were important, some were instrumental in the decisionmaking processes for the Shuttle and Constellation Programs. Two of the more significant tasks were the Space Transportation System (STS)-122 Low Level Cutoff PRA for the SSP and the Orion Pad Abort One (PA-1) PRA for the CxP. These two activities, along with the numerous other tasks the Analysis Group performed in 2008, are summarized in this report. This report also highlights several ongoing and upcoming efforts to provide crucial statistical and probabilistic assessments, such as the Extravehicular Activity (EVA) PRA for the Hubble Space Telescope service mission and the first fully integrated PRAs for the CxP's Lunar Sortie and ISS missions.