ALBERT

Description: NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) Johnson Space Center (JSC) Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) uses two human reliability analysis (HRA) methodologies. The first is a simplified method which is based on how much time is available to complete the action, with consideration included for environmental and personal factors that could influence the human's reliability. This method is expected to provide a conservative value or placeholder as a preliminary estimate. This preliminary estimate or screening value is used to determine which placeholder needs a more detailed assessment. The second methodology is used to develop a more detailed human reliability assessment on the performance of critical human actions. This assessment needs to consider more than the time available, this would include factors such as: the importance of the action, the context, environmental factors, potential human stresses, previous experience, training, physical design interfaces, available procedures/checklists and internal human stresses. The more detailed assessment is expected to be more realistic than that based primarily on time available. When performing an HRA on a system or process that has an operational history, we have information specific to the task based on this history and experience. In the case of a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) that is based on a new design and has no operational history, providing a "reasonable" assessment of potential crew actions becomes more challenging. To determine what is expected of future operational parameters, the experience from individuals who had relevant experience and were familiar with the system and process previously implemented by NASA was used to provide the "best" available data. Personnel from Flight Operations, Flight Directors, Launch Test Directors, Control Room Console Operators, and Astronauts were all interviewed to provide a comprehensive picture of previous NASA operations. Verification of the assumptions and expectations expressed in the assessments will be needed when the procedures, flight rules, and operational requirements are developed and then finalized.

Description: NASA uses two HRA assessment methodologies. The first is a simplified method which is based on how much time is available to complete the action, with consideration included for environmental and personal factors that could influence the human's reliability. This method is expected to provide a conservative value or placeholder as a preliminary estimate. This preliminary estimate is used to determine which placeholder needs a more detailed assessment. The second methodology is used to develop a more detailed human reliability assessment on the performance of critical human actions. This assessment needs to consider more than the time available, this would include factors such as: the importance of the action, the context, environmental factors, potential human stresses, previous experience, training, physical design interfaces, available procedures/checklists and internal human stresses. The more detailed assessment is still expected to be more realistic than that based primarily on time available. When performing an HRA on a system or process that has an operational history, we have information specific to the task based on this history and experience. In the case of a PRA model that is based on a new design and has no operational history, providing a "reasonable" assessment of potential crew actions becomes more problematic. In order to determine what is expected of future operational parameters, the experience from individuals who had relevant experience and were familiar with the system and process previously implemented by NASA was used to provide the "best" available data. Personnel from Flight Operations, Flight Directors, Launch Test Directors, Control Room Console Operators and Astronauts were all interviewed to provide a comprehensive picture of previous NASA operations. Verification of the assumptions and expectations expressed in the assessments will be needed when the procedures, flight rules and operational requirements are developed and then finalized.

Description: NASA is developing new capabilities to send humans beyond low Earth orbit (LEO) for the first time in several decades with the new Multi-purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) Orion spacecraft and Space Launch System (SLS) launch vehicle. As part of these capabilities, NASA is developing means to terminate missions prior to reaching mission destinations in order to save the crew in the event of critical life-threatening failures. This abort capability exists for both ascent and in-space operations. While the risk associated with ascent aborts has been modeled in detail, less has been done in the area of in-space aborts (e.g. Apollo 13). Recent efforts have started to better assess the risk associated with in-space aborts. This paper will describe these efforts. The in-space abort model described in this paper is part of a larger Cross-Program PRA (XPRA) model of exploration missions planned in the next few years to the vicinity of the Moon. The model consists of linked event trees and fault trees and associated rules built using the Systems Analysis Program for Hands-On Integrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE) tool. This model structure is being built with flexibility in mind in order to perform risk trades and further expansion of the model.

Description: NASA is developing capabilities for crewed missions beyond Low Earth Orbit (LEO) for the first time in nearly 50 years. Given the greater distances from Earth that these missions will entail, it is prudent to develop in-space abort capabilities in order to save the crew in the event of critical life-threatening failures that may occur. NASA has developed a Cross Program PRA (XPRA) of the integrated vehicle, from pre-launch through landing and rescue of the crew. An ascent abort model has already been developed as part of this XPRA model to assess the risk associated with failures during prelaunch and ascent. The scope of the analysis discussed here is focused on aborts associated with the in-space portion of the mission up to and including the Trans-Lunar Injection (TLI) burn, which places the Orion spacecraft on a trajectory to the Moon.

Description: As part of the Constellation (Cx) Program development effort, several test flights were planned to prove concepts and operational capabilities of the new vehicles being developed. The first test, involving the Eastern Test Range, is the Ares I-X launched in 2009. As part of this test, the risk to the general public was addressed to ensure it is within Air Force requirements. This paper describes the methodology used to develop first flight estimates of overall loss of vehicle (LOV) failure probability, specifically for the Ares I-X. The method described in this report starts with the Air Force s generic failure probability estimate for first flight and adjusts the value based on the complexity of the vehicle as compared to the complexity of a generic vehicle. The results estimate a 1 in 9 probability of failure. The paper also describes traditional PRA methods used in this assessment, which were then combined with the updated first flight risk methodology to generate inputs required by the malfunction turn analysis to support estimate of casualty (Ec) calculations as part of the Final Flight Data Package (FFDP) delivered to the Eastern Range for Final Flight Plan Approval.

Description: Over the last few years, NASA has been evaluating various vehicle designs for multiple proposed design reference missions (DRM) beyond low Earth orbit in support of its Exploration Systems Development (ESD) programs. This paper addresses several of the proposed missions and the analysis techniques used to assess the key risk metric, probability of loss of crew (LOC). Probability of LOC is a metric used to assess the safety risk as well as a design requirement. These assessments or studies were categorized as LOC achievability studies to help inform NASA management as to what "ball park" estimates of probability of LOC could be achieved for each DRM and were eventually used to establish the corresponding LOC requirements. Given that details of the vehicles and mission are not well known at this time, the ground rules, assumptions, and consistency across the programs become the important basis of the assessments as well as for the decision makers to understand.

Description: No abstract available